Ruling and Order — United States v. Paul Anthony Lewis (Western District of Louisiana, Document 123)
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Ruling and Order in the Western District of Louisiana, Monroe Division, on the Motion under Section 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence filed by Defendant Paul Anthony Lewis. It states that a jury found Lewis guilty on all counts on February 28, 2023, that he was sentenced to 240 months on all counts to run concurrently, and that the Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction on February 5, 2024. It states that Lewis filed the Motion on May 1, 2025, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, including that his attorney failed to file motions to suppress evidence from search warrants and failed to object to his shackling during trial. The Court analyzes the claims under the Strickland test and orders the Motion DENIED, a Certificate of Appealability DENIED, and a separate judgment entered.
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“Ruling and Order — United States v. Paul Anthony Lewis (Western District of Louisiana, Document 123).”
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CR-00184
VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH
PAUL ANTHONY LEWIS MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
RULING AND ORDER
Before the Court is a MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET ASIDE,
OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 by Defendant Paul Anthony Lewis (“Lewis”) (the “Motion”). [Doc. 108]. The
Government filed a response to the Motion [Doc. 118], to which Lewis filed a reply
and a supplemental reply to the Government’s response. [Docs. 121, 122]. After
considering the arguments of the parties, 1 the record, and the relevant case law, the
Motion is DENIED.
I. Factual Background and Procedural History
On May 24, 2022, law enforcement received information of possible narcotic
activity at 702 Smith Street, in Monroe, Louisiana (“the residence”). [Doc. 101, pp.
113-14]. On May 25, 2022, Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Task Force
1 The Court determined that no evidentiary hearing on the Motion was required.
“When the files and records of a case make manifest the lack of merit of a Section 2255
[motion], the trial court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” United States v.
Hughes, 635 F.2d 449, 451 (5th Cir. 1981); see also United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 373-
74 (5th Cir. 2013). An evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion is required “[u]nless the motion
and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
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Agent Megan Russell 2 conducted surveillance and observed a mailman deliver four
large packages to the residence. Id. at 114. Shortly after the packages were
delivered, Agent Russell saw Lewis exit the house and drive away in his car. Id. at
114-15.
Agent Russell contacted the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office about Lewis’s
departure and asked deputies to conduct a traffic stop if they witnessed a lawful basis
for doing so. Id. at 115. Deputies observed a traffic violation, stopped Lewis’s car,
and found a cell phone and seven tablets of suspected
methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA (commonly known as “ecstasy,” and
later tested and determined to contain a 10% purity of methamphetamine) in a bottle
on the driver’s side console. Id. at 122-23, 143-144, 161. Lewis was arrested, and his
cell phone was seized. Id. at 161, 168.
While the deputies performed the traffic stop, Agent Russell conducted a
“knock and talk” at the residence. Id. at 115. Upon arrival, Lewis’s girlfriend,
Francessica Rodgers (“Rodgers”), answered the door and allowed Agent Russell to
enter the residence where she noticed a bag of marijuana and a bottle of promethazine
cough syrup (commonly known as “codeine”) in plain view. Id. at 115-16.
Based on this observation, Agent Russell obtained a search warrant and found:
• roughly 12 pounds of Ecstasy tablets and twelve pint-sized bottles
of codeine-based cough syrup in the four boxes delivered earlier
that day;
• a lunch box containing five more bottles of codeine-based cough
syrup and two baggies containing crack cocaine and
methamphetamine in a bedroom; and
2 Agent Russell worked at the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office. [Doc. 101, p. 113].
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• in the kitchen, white residue in the microwave and on a mixer,
which tested positive for crack.
Id. at 117-18, 121-22, 127, 139-141, 145, 155; [Doc. 84, ¶¶ 30, 36-39].
In the closet of a bedroom, law enforcement officers also found a black Adidas
backpack containing: (i) multiple bags of tablets (totaling over 1,000 tablets)
suspected to be oxycodone, but later determined to be fentanyl-based counterfeits; (ii)
multiple bags containing over 200 grams of a fentanyl-based powder; (iii) a vacuum-
sealed bag containing roughly 165 grams of cocaine; (iv) two large Ziploc bags
containing roughly 400 grams of methamphetamine; and (v) multiple baggies
containing an additional 184 methamphetamine-based knockoff “ecstasy” tablets. Id.
at 130-138; [Doc. 84, ¶¶ 30-35].
On August 10, 2022, a federal grand jury returned a two-count Indictment
against Lewis, charging him with one count of possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(viii) and one
count of possession with intent to distribute codeine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). [Doc. 1]. On August 19, 2022, the Court appointed Robert S.
Noel, II as the defendant’s counsel. [Doc. 13]. Because Lewis bonded out of state
custody after his traffic-stop arrest on May 25, 2022, the Government obtained an
accompanying federal arrest warrant. [Doc. 101, pp. 168, 173]. When executing the
arrest warrant on August 15, 2022, law enforcement found Lewis at the residence.
Id. at 168. Officers then obtained a search warrant for the residence and found more
cocaine and methamphetamine. Id. at 169. Following his detention hearing, the
Court ordered the defendant detained pending trial. [Doc. 16].
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Officers also obtained a search warrant for Lewis’s cell phone and found
communication between Lewis and others regarding drug-trafficking activity. [Doc.
101 at 161, 184-192, 198, 201, 221-222]. These messages, totaling hundreds of pages,
broadly fell into two categories: (1) communications between the defendant and bulk-
quantity drug suppliers; and (2) communications between the defendant and street-
level dealers. 3
On November 29, 2022, the grand jury returned an eight-count Superseding
Indictment charging the defendant with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, cocaine, crack cocaine, fentanyl, and codeine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and § 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 1); and possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine (Counts 2 and 7), cocaine (Counts 3 and
8), crack cocaine (Count 4), fentanyl (Count 5), and codeine (Count 6). [Doc. 42].
Lewis filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained and discovered from the
May 22, 2022, traffic stop, on grounds the stop was pretextual. [Doc. 26]. On
December 19, 2022, after a hearing, the Court denied Lewis’s motion. [Doc. 50].
3 Regarding the bulk-quantity drug suppliers, officers found hundreds of
communications with at least five different suppliers on Lewis’s phone: “Cheko,” “Carton
Tex,” “Mexhico,” “Oscar,” and “Kelo.” Those communications as well as explanations by law
enforcement of terms used in these communications were introduced during trial. [Doc. 76-
10, pp. 1-21, messages between Lewis and Checo]; [Doc. 76-9, pp. 101-133, messages between
Lewis and Carton Tex]; [Doc. 76-8, pp. 22-51, messages between Lewis and Mexhico]; [Doc.
76-17, p. 14, messages between Lewis and Oscar]; [Doc. 76-13, pp. 1-21, messages between
Lewis and Kelo]. The government similarly introduced various messages between Lewis and
street-level dealers which indicated Lewis coordinating distribution and payment with people
selling drugs to user-customers. [Doc. 76-12, pp. 3-9, messages between Lewis and “Black”];
[Doc. 76-9, pp. 145-158, messages between Lewis and Willie Ray]; [Doc. 76-9, pp. 134-144,
messages between Lewis and Wil G].
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Trial was conducted on February 27-28, 2023. Lewis testified in his own
defense and attempted to explain the messages found on his cell phone, claiming that
his cell phone was “available to the public” at large and, thus, “anybody” could have
sent those messages. [Doc. 102, pp. 111-12]. He also stated that some of the messages
were about “brokering trips” for a “medical transport” business. Id. at 115-116, 122.
Lewis further contended that his ex-wife must have worked together with police and
members of a local middle school’s faculty to set him up, and that his ex-wife might
have “hacked” his phone to plant the incriminating drug texts. Id. at 117-18. 4 On
February 28, 2023, after two days of trial, a jury found Lewis guilty on all counts,
[Doc. 77], and on May 30, 2023, he was sentenced to 240 months on all counts to run
concurrently. [Docs. 89, 91]. Lewis appealed his conviction to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed his conviction on February 5,
2024. [Doc. 105]. 5
4 For example, Lewis testified,
And I feel like the only person that would make someone feel
that way towards me is my ex-wife. And they are connected
through the OPSO [i.e., the Ouachita Parish Sheriff’s Office] and
Riser Junior High…. But she also hacked my phone. It’s
documented she hacked my phone and sent messages to it and
tried to get me to look like I was making texts about drugs.
[Doc. 102, Trial Tr. Vol. II, at 117, 118].
5 On appeal, Lewis contended that the Government improperly called a witness it
expected would not provide favorable testimony in order to impeach her with a recorded
statement to law enforcement that would otherwise have been inadmissible hearsay. Lewis
maintained that the recorded statement constituted the only evidence connecting him to the
backpack containing narcotics. [Doc. 105, p. 4]. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument,
and judgment was entered into the district court record on February 27, 2024. [Doc. 105].
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On May 1, 2025, Lewis filed the instant Motion, requesting that the Court
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. [Doc. 108]. In his Motion, Lewis alleges
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney: (i) failed to file
a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the May 25, 2022, search
warrant; (ii) failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the
August 15, 2022, search warrant; (iii) failed to investigate and challenge the validity
of the conspiracy charge; (iv) failed to investigate the relationship between Agent
Russell and his ex-wife; (v) failed to object to his shackling during trial; and (vi) failed
to present evidence from his divorce attorney to support his argument that he did not
commit perjury. All issues having been fully briefed by the parties, the Motion is ripe
for review.
II. Law and Analysis
Lewis seeks relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. That section provides, as
relevant here:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground
that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move
the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Section 2255 post-conviction relief is reserved for errors of
constitutional dimension and other injuries that could not have been raised on direct
appeal and, if left unaddressed, would result in a complete miscarriage of justice.
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United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Payne, 99 F.3d 1273, 1281 (5th Cir. 1996).
Although § 2255 proceedings are subject to certain procedural limitations,
claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment are
properly raised in a collateral proceeding under § 2255. Massaro v. United States,
538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003). Such claims are analyzed
under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). To prevail, a movant has the burden of showing:
(1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–94, 104 S. Ct. 2052.
To establish deficient performance, a movant must prove that his counsel’s
assistance fell “‘below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” United States v.
Conley, 349 F.3d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2003), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104
S. Ct. 2052). In other words, he must show his “counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment.” United States v. Lincks, 82 F.4th 325, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2023). When
assessing whether an attorney’s performance was deficient, the court “must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 598 (5th Cir. 2001),
citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at Id. at 689. “[T]o establish prejudice, [the movant] ‘must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’”
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Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2003), quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Finally, the movant must satisfy both prongs of the
Strickland test. United States v. Lincks, 82 F.4th 325, 330 (5th Cir. 2023) (“A failure
to establish either prong defeats the claim.”). 6
A. Pre-Trial Ineffective Assistance Claims
Lewis contends that his attorney was ineffective during the pre-trial phase
when he failed to file motions to suppress evidence and failed to investigate and
challenge the validity of the conspiracy charge.
1. Failure to File Motion to Suppress in Connection with the
May 25, 2022, Search
Lewis argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to the May 25, 2022, search warrant. He
contends that the search was invalid because a warrant was never issued, relying on
his assertion that the Ouachita Parish Clerk’s Office was unable to locate a copy of
the warrant when he requested one. In response, the Government contends that
Lewis’s challenge is based on a faulty premise because the May 22, 2022, search was
conducted pursuant to a valid warrant. According to the Government, while Lewis
was being detained for a traffic violation on May 25, 2022, Agent Russell conducted
a “knock and talk” at the residence located at 702 Smith Street. Lewis’s girlfriend,
6 Courts liberally construe the pleadings of pro se litigants and apply less stringent
standards to the briefings of pro se parties than to those represented by counsel. Grant v.
Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, pro se parties must still brief the
issues. Grant, 59 F.3d at 524. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise a
constitutional issue and pro se litigants are not absolved of the need to advance their own
legal and factual analysis. See United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam); see also Oliver v. Bankfirst, 552 F. App’x 357, 357 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
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Francessica Rodgers, answered the door and consented to Agent Russell entering the
residence. [Doc. 101, p. 115]. While inside Rodgers’s living room, Agent Russell
observed in plain view a bag containing marijuana and a bottle of promethazine cough
syrup (i.e., codeine). Based on those observations, Agent Russell obtained a search
warrant, a copy of which is attached to the Government’s response. Id. at 117; [Doc.
118-1].
Considering the foregoing, Lewis presents no viable ground for a motion to
suppress as to the evidence obtained from the May 25, 2022, search warrant, and his
attorney cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Sones v. Hargett,
61 F.3d 410, 415 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Counsel cannot be deficient for failing to press
a frivolous point.”); United States v. Gibson, 55 F.3d 173, 179 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Counsel
is not required by the Sixth Amendment to file meritless motions.”); Koch v. Puckett,
907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[C]ounsel is not required to make futile motions
or objections.”).
2. Failure to File Motion to Suppress in Connection with the
August 15, 2022, Search
Lewis contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
admissibility of evidence obtained pursuant to the August 15, 2022, search warrant.
[Doc. 118-2]. He argues that the affidavit supporting the warrant improperly relied
on officers’ detection of the odor of marijuana because, in his view, Louisiana law
prohibits the odor of marijuana alone from serving as the basis for a warrantless
search of a residence.
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The Court presumes that Lewis is referring to Article 162.4 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that, “Notwithstanding any provision of
the law to the contrary, the odor of marijuana alone shall not provide a law
enforcement officer with probable cause to conduct a search without a warrant of a
person’s place of residence.” La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 162.4 (2025). By its express
terms, Article 162.4 prohibits law enforcement from relying on the odor of marijuana
alone to conduct a warrantless search of a person’s residence. This case, however,
does not involve a warrantless residential search. Rather, officers presented the facts
set forth in the affidavit to a neutral judge, who determined that probable cause
existed and issued a search warrant. [Doc. 118-2]. Accordingly, Article 162.4 is
inapplicable by its own terms to the evidence obtained from the August 15, 2022,
search.
Moreover, even assuming Article 162.4 were implicated, the admissibility of
evidence in this federal prosecution is governed by the Fourth Amendment as
interpreted under federal law, not by Louisiana statutory restrictions on searches.
The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly held that, when evidence obtained by state officers
is offered in a federal prosecution, the relevant inquiry is whether the search violated
the Fourth Amendment, not whether it complied with state law. United States v.
Walker, 960 F.2d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Eastland, 989 F.2d 760,
766 (5th Cir. 1993). Here, under both Louisiana and federal law, the smell of
marijuana alone is sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the search
warrant. State v. Jarquin, 418 So. 3d 898 (La. 2025), reh’g denied, 425 So. 3d 1209
(La. 2025) (per curiam) (“the smell of marijuana alone is sufficient probable cause to
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support the issuance of the search warrant.”), citing United States v. Thurman, 2022
WL 2805147, at *5 (5th Cir. 2022) (“excluding the [information gained from] the
protective sweeps, the search warrant’s reference to the smell of marijuana emitting
from the [apartment] unit supported probable cause”); State v. Robertson, 2014 WL
4668685, at *5 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2014) (officer had probable cause “when he detected
the odor of marijuana as [the defendant’s girlfriend] opened the door.”).
Thus, because the smell of marijuana could properly provide the basis for a
search warrant, which was obtained in this case, Lewis’s attorney was not ineffective
for failing to file a motion to suppress any evidence obtained from the August 15,
2022, search.
3. Failure to Investigate and Challenge the Validity of the
Conspiracy Charge
Lewis argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge the
Superseding Indictment because it charged him with conspiracy without identifying
or charging any co-conspirator. [Doc. 117, p. 5].
Specifically, Count One alleged that Lewis conspired and agreed “with persons
both known and unknown to the Grand Jury.” [Doc. 42]. Counsel was not deficient
for failing to raise such an objection because it is well established that an indictment
need not identify a defendant’s co-conspirators. See United States v. Landry, 903 F.2d
334, 338 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[A] person can be convicted of conspiring with persons
whose names are unknown so long as the ... evidence supports their existence.”)
(cleaned up). Moreover, the evidence available to Lewis’s attorney provided ample
basis to conclude that the Government could establish the existence of unidentified
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co-conspirators. In United States v. Price, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant’s
possession of a portable telephone supported an inference that he communicated with
co-conspirators, while the quantity of cocaine involved supported the conclusion that
he could not have acted alone. 869 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1989). Here, counsel knew that
Lewis’s cellular telephone had been seized and that the Government possessed
evidence of his communications. 7 Accordingly, any challenge to the conspiracy count
on the ground that no co-conspirator was named in the indictment would have lacked
merit, and counsel was neither deficient for failing to raise it, nor was Lewis
prejudiced by its omission.
B. Trial Ineffective Assistance Claims
1. Failure to Investigate
Lewis contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate and
determine that the “investigating officer” shared an office with his ex-wife and had a
motivation to testify against him.
Counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation of a defendant’s case or
make a reasonable decision that a particular investigation is unnecessary.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To support this type of claim, a petitioner must allege
with specificity what the investigation would have revealed and how it would have
changed the outcome of the trial. Miller v. Dretke, 420 F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 2005).
7 At trial, Agent Russell testified about the numerous text messages, voice messages,
and other communications that were found on Lewis’s cell phone, in which Lewis
communicated at length with several individuals – including Mexhico, Oscar, Kelo, Cheko,
Carton Tex, Willie Ray, Wil G, and Black – about drug transactions. Therefore, trial counsel’s
presumed assumptions were not unreasonable. [Doc. 101, pp. 185-225].
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Brief and conclusory allegations that counsel’s representation was deficient because
of his failure to investigate and develop useful evidence will not suffice. Anderson v.
Collins, 18 F.3d 1208, 1221 (5th Cir. 1994).
The Court presumes that Lewis is referring to Agent Russell, who investigated
this case. At the beginning of his cross-examination of Agent Russell, defense counsel
specifically asked if Agent Russell knew Lewis’s ex-wife, and she indicated that she
did not. [Doc. 101, p. 173]. Defense counsel went on to specifically state Lewis’s ex-
wife’s name and the fact that she was a teacher at a Ouachita Parish school, and
Agent Russell replied that her name did not “ring a bell.” Id. Lewis has not presented
the Court with any evidence to support his allegation that Agent Russell knew his
ex-wife and conspired against him, nor has he shown what any further investigation
would have revealed. Because defense counsel cannot be found to have been
ineffective for failing to further investigate in light of Agent Russell’s testimony, this
claim is without merit.
2. Failure to Object to Lewis’s Shackling During Trial
The record reflects that Lewis wore leg irons during trial, and Lewis argues
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the shackling. [Doc. 102, p.
107]. 8
8 There is only one reference to the shackles in the record. After the Government’s
presentation of its case, as Lewis was about to take the stand, a U.S. Marshal stated, “You
want to go ahead and seat him since he has leg irons on?” The Court responded in the
affirmative, and Lewis was seated in the witness box before the jury was brought into the
courtroom. [Doc. 102, p. 107].
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Physical restraints visible to a jury are generally forbidden by the Fifth
Amendment “absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of discretion, that
they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck v. Missouri,
544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005). The restraints may undermine “the presumption of
innocence,” interfere with the defendant’s ability to assist in his own defense, and
undermine the dignity of the judicial process. Id. at 631.
The threshold issue is one of framing. Lewis’s challenge to the use of leg
restraints cannot be analyzed in the abstract; the governing standard depends upon
both the procedural posture and the nature of the claim asserted. On direct appeal,
a claim that a defendant was subjected to unjustified visible shackling is evaluated
under Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005), 9 and the harmless-error framework that
follows from a preserved constitutional objection. This case, however, arises on a
motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, where Lewis asserts ineffective assistance
of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object to the restraints. In that context, the
Court does not apply Deck’s direct-appeal burden-shifting analysis; rather, Lewis
bears the burden of establishing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice
under Strickland. See, e.g., Ricks v. Lumpkin, 120 F.4th 1287, 1291 (5th Cir. 2024),
cert. denied sub nom. Ricks v. Guerrero, 146 S. Ct. 124, 223 L. Ed. 2d 27 (2025) (where
9 In Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments generally prohibit the routine use of visible physical restraints during the guilt
or penalty phase of a criminal trial absent a case-specific determination that such restraints
are justified by an essential state interest, such as courtroom security or escape prevention.
544 U.S. 622, 629–35 (2005). Because Deck involved a preserved constitutional challenge on
direct review, once a Deck violation is established, the burden shifts to the government to
prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 635. Again, because this
Motion arises on collateral review under § 2255 as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
it is governed by Strickland, not Deck’s harmless-error framework.
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state petitioner’s petition for federal writ of habeas corpus was denied and he asked
the Fifth Circuit for a certificate of appealability, Fifth Circuit denied petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on grounds trial counsel’s decision to refrain
from objecting to shackling was not unreasonable, reflecting that the standard for
review of counsel’s actions was Strickland). The distinction is dispositive because the
question here is not whether visible shackling constituted reversible error on direct
review, but whether Lewis has demonstrated a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel objected.
Thus, even if counsel arguably should have objected, the movant still must
establish a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (1984) (“The defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”). See also United States v. Conley, 349
F.3d 837, 841 (5th Cir. 2003) (§ 2255 movant bears the burden of establishing both
deficient performance and prejudice); United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 598 (5th
Cir. 2001) (accord); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982) (a § 2255 movant
bears a significantly higher burden than a defendant on direct appeal).
Here, the record reflects that, before Lewis testified, the Court directed that he
be seated in the witness box before the jury entered the courtroom to ensure that the
jury did not observe his leg restraints. [Doc. 102, p. 107]. Nothing in the record
suggests that the jury ever saw Lewis in leg irons, and Lewis offers no evidence that
any juror became aware that he was restrained. Without some evidence that those
precautions failed, a § 2255 movant is left to speculation that the jury saw the leg
irons, and speculation is not enough to establish Strickland prejudice. Because the
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constitutional concerns identified in Deck arise from the use of visible restraints
before the jury, Lewis has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel objected to the use of the
leg restraints.
C. Sentencing Ineffective Assistance Claims
Lewis contends that his attorney was ineffective at sentencing for failing to
present evidence to refute the Court’s finding that he committed perjury during his
trial testimony. Specifically, at trial, Lewis testified that his ex-wife was friendly
with Agent Russell, and that she orchestrated the investigation by falsely portraying
him as a drug dealer. [Doc. 102, pp. 116-19]. He further testified at trial that he was
not involved in drug trafficking. Id. at 119. At sentencing, the Court imposed an
obstruction-of-justice enhancement based on its finding that Lewis had committed
perjury, a determination Lewis unsuccessfully challenged at sentencing. [Doc. 97,
pp. 3-6]. In the instant Motion, Lewis argues that documentary evidence in the
possession of his divorce attorney would have corroborated his testimony regarding
his ex-wife’s relationship with Agent Russell and the alleged conspiracy to frame him.
According to Lewis, counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain and present this
evidence at trial, or to call the divorce attorney as a witness at sentencing, to
demonstrate that his trial testimony was truthful and that the obstruction
enhancement was unwarranted.
To show that an attorney’s performance at sentencing in a noncapital case was
prejudicial under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s error led
to some increase in the length of his imprisonment. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S.
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198, 203 (2001) (“[A]ny amount of actual jail time has Sixth Amendment
significance.”); United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 581 (2005) (underestimating
possible sentence by 27 months constituted deficient performance); United States v.
Conley, 349 F.3d 837, 842 (5th Cir. 2003) (failing to object to 120-month sentence
when maximum penalty was 60 months constituted prejudice).
Here, as an initial matter, Lewis has not produced the evidence that he now
contends counsel should have presented at sentencing, nor has he submitted any
affidavit or testimony from his divorce attorney establishing the substance of the
purported evidence. More importantly, the sentencing transcript demonstrates that
such evidence would not have altered the Court’s decision to impose the obstruction-
of-justice enhancement. At sentencing, Lewis personally argued, “I have evidence
that my ex-wife tried to set me up.” [Doc. 97, p. 5]. The Court responded, “And I don't
think that is the part of your testimony that was unbelievable, Mr. Lewis.” Id. at 6.
Rather, the Court’s finding of perjury was based on Lewis’s untruthful testimony
denying that his text message communications were drug transactions,
notwithstanding the evidence establishing that they were.
Because the purported evidence concerning Lewis’s ex-wife would not have
undermined the basis for the Court’s perjury finding, Lewis has failed to demonstrate
either that counsel performed deficiently by not presenting it or that there is a
reasonable probability the result of the sentencing proceeding would have been
different had counsel done so. Accordingly, this claim fails under both prongs of
Strickland.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the reasons stated herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that movant’s MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 TO
VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE BY A PERSON IN FEDERAL CUSTODY [Doc.
108] is DENIED. A separate judgment is entered herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) and Rule 11(a)
of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, a Certificate of Appealability is
DENIED.
THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 3rd day of August 2026.
DAVID C. JOSEPH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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