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Case 3:21-cr-00089-BJB Document 28 Filed 02/08/22 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 63
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
V. NO. 3:21-cr-89-BJB
SALVADOR ABDUL JONES,
* * * * *
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
A grand jury indicted Salvador Abdul Jones on several counts of bank robbery.
DN 1. Jones initially requested a bill of particulars based on a motion that he drafted
himself. DN 22. But because Jones was represented by counsel, the Court declined
to address the motion. DN 25 (citing ABN ABRO Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Smith, No.
1:06-cv-36, 2006 WL 2035542, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2006)). So Jones, this time
through his lawyer, again requested a bill of particulars. DN 26. His motion (DN 26
at 1–2) requests 12 things, listed here verbatim:
1. The way warrant was obtained;
2. How was crime of violence determined;
3. A clear reading of nature and cause of alleged statute violated;
4. Where did this crime occur;
5. Who is the victim of this alleged crime;
6. Proof of jurisdiction over territory of alleged offenses;
7. Showing of proper venue in this judicial district;
8. Testimony of Government witnesses at Grand Jury proceedings under
Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500 and pursuant to Rule 26.2 of Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure;
9. How many grand jurors voted in favor of the indictment;
10. What type of legal advice was given to juror prior to voting;
11. Was hearsay and/or recorded testimony presented before the grand jury;
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12. Was indictment seen and approved by the full grand jury in its final form.
The Government has already provided some of this information through the
indictment: “venue, the statutes violated, the victim of the crimes, and the location of
the crimes.” DN 27 at 1. The rest is not properly subject to a bill of particulars. So
the Court denies Jones’s motion.
A bill of particulars is designed “(1) to ensure that a defendant understands the
nature of the charges against him so that he can adequately prepare for trial; (2) to
avoid or minimize the danger of unfair surprise at trial; and (3) to enable the
defendant to plead double jeopardy if he is later charged with the same defense when
the indictment itself is too vague and indefinite for such purposes.” United States v.
Martin, 822 F.2d 1089, at *2 (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision) (quotation
omitted). Such a motion turns on “whether the indictment sets forth the elements of
the offense charged and sufficiently apprises the defendant of the charges to enable
him to prepare for trial.” Id. (quotation omitted). A district court has broad discretion
in addressing such requests and should not permit defendants to use them as “a
general discovery device.” Id.
But that is exactly what Jones attempts to do here.
The indictment states quite clearly what statute Jones allegedly violated and
what the elements of bank robbery are. DN 1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)). And despite
Jones’s scattershot objections, the indictment is quite clear about when, where, and
to whom the alleged robberies happened. Id. A court in this district recently denied
a nearly identical motion because the indictment made clear the statute, the
elements, and the date of the alleged violation. See United States v. Williamson, No.
3:21-cr-123, 2022 WL 212406, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 24, 2022). In doing so, the court
characterized as improper “discovery” requests the defendant’s queries into how the
warrant was obtained and details regarding the nature of the crime. Id. The court
also denied requests regarding jurisdiction and venue as “legal questions more
appropriately addressed” to counsel. Id. Jones’s indictment here likewise adequately
apprises him of the charges he faces, and his motion seeks nothing but “discovery”
and answers to “legal questions.”
At the risk of belaboring the point, the grand jury proceedings Jones seeks to
unveil are generally secret. Their contents are undiscoverable unless a defendant
demonstrates a “particularized need” for the material “to avoid a possible injustice in
another judicial proceeding.” Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 147–48 (5th Cir. 2004);
see United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 250 (6th Cir. 1976) (“[G]rand jury
proceedings cannot be policed in any detail. It is a price we pay for grand jury
independence that sometimes people are indicted on the basis of evidence tainted in
part by hearsay….”(quotation omitted)). Jones has not even attempted to show a hint
of irregularity regarding his indictment.
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The Jencks Act request is quite premature. As a matter of statute, Jencks
material is only due after a witness has testified against the defendant and covers
only statements by that witness related to subject matter of the witness’s testimony.
United States v. Blankenship, 862 F.2d 316, at *2 (6th Cir. 1988) (unpublished table
decision) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b)). No such testimony has occurred, so Jencks does
not yet compel disclosure of any sort.
As to jurisdiction, the answer is equally clear. This Court has “original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of
the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Moreover, “[f]ederal courts have personal
jurisdiction over criminal defendants before them, whether or not they are forcibly
brought into court.” United States v. Pryor, 842 F.3d 441, 448 (6th Cir. 2016).
And as to venue, “any offense against the United States begun in one district
and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired
of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or
completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). Again, the grand jury indicted Jones under a federal
statute (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) for conduct that allegedly occurred within Louisville,
Kentucky, which lies within the Western District of Kentucky. DN 1. As with
jurisdiction, the government has properly set forth the basis for venue in this Court.
The remaining requests either ask pure legal questions or attempt to secure
discovery by improper means. So the Court denies Jones’s motion for a bill of
particulars (DN 26).
February 8, 2022
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