Government Letter in Support of Motion for Conditions of Release — United States v. Keith Williams et al.

Summary

This is a January 22, 2025 letter from the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of New York in United States v. Keith Williams, et al., Docket No. 25-CR-20 (GRB), supporting conditions of release for Williams. The government says Williams, along with six co-defendants, has been charged in a 56-count indictment with attempting to obtain more than $650 million in COVID-19-related funds, including through over 8,000 Forms 941 claiming the Employee Retention Credit, and that more than $44 million was secured. It calls Williams the mastermind and argues flight risk, citing potential penalties, strong evidence and a week in Dubai. It asks for a fully secured $5 million bond co-signed by multiple financially responsible sureties and travel limited to the Eastern District of New York.

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“Government Letter in Support of Motion for Conditions of Release — United States v. Keith Williams et al.” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-2-25-cr-00020-dkt-13-e-d-n-y-373e4b15b8/, SHA-256 889e697c5026b2cc7f84ea70159e3efd83c3ad41e0ee48553e125b29afb9895c.

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Case 2:25-cr-00020-GRB Document 13 Filed 01/22/25 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 100

U.S. Department of Justice

United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
CMM:AT/JRS 610 Federal Plaza
F. #2022R01048 Central Islip, New York 11722

January 22, 2025

By ECF and E-mail

The Honorable Gary R. Brown
United States District Judge
United States District Court
Eastern District of New York
100 Federal Plaza
Central Islip, New York 11722

Re: United States v. Keith Williams, et al.
Docket No. 25-CR-20 (GRB)

Dear Judge Brown:

The government respectfully submits this letter in support of its motion that the
Court impose appropriate conditions of release to reasonably assure that defendant Keith Williams
appears in court as required as well as to ensure the safety of other persons and the community.

Williams, along with six co-defendants, has been charged in the above-captioned
56-count indictment. He is scheduled to make his initial appearance before Your Honor later this
afternoon. As described in the indictment, Williams and his co-defendants attempted to steal over
$650 million in COVID-19-related funds from the United States government to which they were
not lawfully entitled. Williams was the mastermind of this fraudulent scheme, and he guided his
co-defendants in taking advantage of a global health crisis to line their pockets. The defendants
successfully obtained over $44 million through their greed, which they used to fund lifestyles of
luxury that they openly flaunted through social media posts and by purchasing designer goods.
All the while, the families and small businesses for whom these government funds were actually
intended struggled to stay afloat amid an unprecedented worldwide pandemic.

As set forth below, given Williams’s sophisticated and years-long acts of
deception, the severe potential penalties he faces upon conviction, and the overwhelming evidence
of his guilt, the government respectfully submits that Williams should be released only upon the
imposition and satisfaction of appropriate conditions to ensure that he does not flee or commit any
additional crimes. Specifically, Williams should be subject to strict conditions of release,
including the imposition of a fully secured $5 million bond co-signed by multiple financially
responsible sureties.
Case 2:25-cr-00020-GRB Document 13 Filed 01/22/25 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 101

I. Background 1

From in or about and between November 2021 through June 2023, the defendants,
Keith Williams, Janine “Holiday” Davis, Morais Dicks, James “Poppa J” Hames, Jr., Jamari “Mr.
Chaketah” Lewis, Ewendra “Rayda” Mathurin, and Tiffany “Joy” Williams (the “Defendants”)
conspired to obtain, by fraud, more than $650 million from the United States by preparing and
filing over 8,000 quarterly payroll tax returns, known as Forms 941. On these Forms 941, the
Defendants falsely claimed that they were entitled to the Employee Retention Credit (“ERC”) 2 and
Sick and Family Leave Credit (“SFLC,” and together with the ERC referred to hereinafter as the
“COVID-Related Tax Credits”). 3 Many of the Defendants, including Williams, have also been
charged with wire fraud for filing fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan
applications prior to the COVID-Related Tax Credits scheme. Their fraudulent PPP applications
falsely represented income, expenses, and wages. During the COVID-19 global pandemic,
Congress enacted these programs to ensure that small businesses could remain in operation and
continue to pay their employees, and families would not be financially penalized should they
become unable to work due to sickness.

The Defendants’ fraudulent scheme, which was headquartered at Williams’s
Franklin Square, New York-based business, Credit Reset, ultimately secured more than $44
million in government payments for the Defendants and their clients. According to multiple
individuals interviewed as part of the investigation, Williams led the conspiracy and taught his co-
defendants how to commit the fraud. The Defendants profited from the scheme in several ways.
In certain cases, they received refunds by filing false Forms 941 on behalf of businesses in the
Defendants’ own names. In other circumstances, they charged clients up-front fees for preparing
false Forms 941 claiming COVID-Related Tax Credits, and then charged clients a percentage of
the refunds the clients ultimately received. Many of the Forms 941 prepared by the Defendants
and their co-conspirators during the scheme were for businesses that did not actually exist or had
no actual operations. In total, the Defendants sought to steal over $650 million in COVID-Related
Tax Credits, and their criminal conduct appears to be the largest charged ERC scheme in the United
States.

1
The proffer of facts set forth herein does not purport to provide a complete
statement of all facts and evidence of which the government is aware or that it will seek to
introduce at trial. The government is entitled to proceed by proffer in a detention hearing. United
States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 320 n.7 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d
125, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986).
2
Congress created the ERC to incentivize businesses economically hurt by the
COVID-19 pandemic to continue paying employees. From Q2 2020 through the end of the year,
it provided for a 50% credit on up to $10,000 in wages paid to each employee for the calendar year
for businesses ordered closed by government order or who had a 50% drop in gross receipts due
to the pandemic. For 2021, the percentage credit increased to 70% per employee per quarter.
3
The SFLC was passed by Congress and provided a dollar-for-dollar tax credit to
businesses who paid wages to employees on sick leave and a two-thirds credit on wages paid to
employees on family leave due to COVID-19.

2
Case 2:25-cr-00020-GRB Document 13 Filed 01/22/25 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 102

The Defendants flaunted their criminal activity openly. Williams, who personally
received millions of dollars in payments deposited into his bank accounts during the conspiracy,
gloated about how he had successfully pillaged government funds that were intended for
vulnerable pandemic victims. In a recorded call with a co-conspirator reviewed as part of the
investigation, Williams compared the fraud scheme to “taking candy from a baby.”

When investigators executed a search warrant at Williams’s home, they seized
millions of dollars’ worth of luxury goods that appear to have been purchased using proceeds of
the fraud scheme, including designer items from Rolex, Gucci, Louis Vuitton, Fendi, Balenciaga,
and Versace, as well as several high-end vehicles, such as a Land Rover, a Polaris Slingshot, and
a Tesla Model Y.

For his part, defendant Jamari Lewis, an aspiring rapper who uses the stage name
“Mr. Chaketah,” posted on social media a recording of a song he wrote entitled, “I’m Really
Sophisticated (IRS).” In addition to referencing the IRS in his song title, Lewis also featured the
logo for the IRS in the song’s album cover:

In a music video for the song, Lewis can be seen wearing designer clothing and openly flaunting
how he stole money from the IRS. Among his lyrics are: “That government bread I ran that shit
up like how am I gon’ lose?”

3
Case 2:25-cr-00020-GRB Document 13 Filed 01/22/25 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 103

II. Legal Standard

In deciding whether to release or detain a defendant, a court “must undertake a two-
step inquiry.” United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1988). “It must first determine
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant either has been charged with one of the
crimes enumerated in Section 3142(f)(1) or that the defendant presents a risk of flight or
obstruction of justice.” Id. “Once this determination has been made, the court turns to whether
any condition or combinations of conditions of release will protect the safety of the community
and reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance at trial.” Id.

If the court finds that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the
community,” the court “shall order” a defendant detained. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The
government bears the burden of persuading the court by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant is a flight risk or by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is a danger to the
community. United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001).

The government may proceed by proffer to establish facts relevant to a detention
determination. United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d 540, 541 (2d Cir. 1995). Furthermore, “[t]he
rules of evidence do not apply in a detention hearing.” Id. at 542. As the Second Circuit has
explained:

[I]n the pre-trial context, few detention hearings involve live
testimony or cross examination. Most proceed on proffers. See
United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 2000). This
is because bail hearings are “typically informal affairs, not
substitutes for trial or discovery.” United States v. Acevedo-Ramos,
755 F.2d 203, 206 (1st Cir. 1985) (Breyer, J.) (quoted approvingly
in LaFontaine, 210 F.3d at 131). Indeed, § 3142(f)(2)(B) expressly
states that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at bail
hearings; thus, courts often base detention decisions on hearsay
evidence. Id.

Abuhamra, 389 F.3d at 320 n.7.

Whether detention is sought on the basis of flight or dangerousness, the Bail
Reform Act lists four factors to be considered in the detention analysis: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the crimes charged, “including whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . or
involves a . . . firearm”; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and
characteristics of the defendant, including “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the
person was on probation [or] on parole”; and (4) the seriousness of the danger posed by the
defendant’s release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Specifically, in evaluating dangerousness, courts
consider not only the effect of a defendant’s release on the safety of identifiable individuals, such
as victims and witnesses, but also “‘the danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity
to the detriment of the community.’” United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1048 (2d Cir. 1993)
(quoting legislative history).

4
Case 2:25-cr-00020-GRB Document 13 Filed 01/22/25 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 104

III. Argument

Williams presents a flight risk due to, among other reasons, the seriousness of the
offense, the severity of the penalties that he faces, and the strength of the evidence.

First, “[t]he prospect of a severe sentence can create a strong incentive for a
defendant to flee and thereby avoid that sentence.” United States v. Zhang, 55 F.4th 141, 151 (2d
Cir. 2022). Here, if Williams is convicted at trial, he faces the possibility of serving several
decades of potential imprisonment under the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines given
the intended loss amount of his fraudulent scheme. Courts have recognized that even a
significantly shorter potential sentence can warrant a risk-of-flight finding. See United States v.
Scali, 738 F. App’x 32, 33 (2d Cir. 2018) (“The court reasonably determined that Scali’s
Guidelines range of 87-108 months’ imprisonment was significant enough to provide an incentive
to flee.”); United States v. Khusanov, 731 F. App’x 19, 21 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[E]ven if, as a practical
matter, Khusanov’s maximum sentence exposure were only 15, rather than 30, years’
imprisonment, that would still be sufficient to provide him with a strong incentive to flee.”); United
States v. Williams, No. 20-CR-293 (WFK), 2020 WL 4719982, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2020)
(Guidelines range of “92 to 115 months’ imprisonment” gave defendant “a strong incentive to
flee”).

Second, where, as here, the evidence of a defendant’s guilt is strong, “it follows
that the defendant faces an elevated risk of conviction (and of the attendant punishment), and
therefore may present an elevated risk of flight.” Zhang, 55 F.4th at 151; United States v.
Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding detention appropriate because, in part, “the
evidence of [the defendants’] guilt, both direct and circumstantial, appears strong”); United States
v. Bruno, 89 F. Supp. 3d 425, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“When evidence of a defendant’s guilt is
strong, and when the sentence of imprisonment upon conviction is likely to be long a defendant
has stronger motives to flee.”). Here, the evidence of Williams’s guilt is overwhelming. At trial,
the government will introduce evidence that the accounts that filed the fraudulent returns were
owned and controlled by the Defendants, including Williams. Williams also paid for some of these
accounts using his own credit cards. The government will introduce testimony from many
individuals, including clients and co-conspirators, who will explain that Williams was the leader
of the conspiracy, taught others how to file false returns, and was the central beneficiary of the
conspiracy. Furthermore, numerous documents, communications, and recordings uncovered over
the course of the investigation corroborate the expected testimony of these witnesses and will
further elaborate the extent of the scheme and Williams’s central role in it.

Third, Williams has the means to flee if he chooses to do so. See Sabhnani, 493
F.3d at 76 (“a second factor strengthens the case for detention: defendants’ ample means to finance
flight”). Based on the investigation, the government understands that Williams has substantial
assets, and he personally stole several millions of dollars from the government as part of the
scheme. See United States v. Zarrab, No. 15-CR-867 (RMB), 2016 WL 3681423, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
June 16, 2016) (citing defendant’s “significant wealth and his substantial resources” as another
factor that supported detention). Records obtained by the government also reflect international
travel by Williams to locations where he may flee from justice, including, among other places, the
United Arab Emirates. In fact, one and a half months after the search warrant was executed at his

5
Case 2:25-cr-00020-GRB Document 13 Filed 01/22/25 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 105

residence, Williams spent one week in Dubai. Furthermore, in order for the scheme to succeed,
Williams and his co-conspirators impersonated others and manufactured fake government filings.
As the Second Circuit has explained, “‘apparent access to false documents’ supports a finding that
a defendant poses a risk of flight.” United States v. Baig, 536 F. App’x 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2013)
(quoting United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2000)). Because the defendant has
demonstrated his ready ability to impersonate other people and entities, his risk of flight is high,
further warranting the imposition of a significant bail package. See United States v. Sternquist,
No. 22-MJ-1005(RLM), 2022 WL 6162532, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2022) (“For obvious reasons,
this access to false identification devices increases the defendant’s capacity for flight.”).

Finally, the dishonesty shown by Williams in this case—through his perpetuation
of the fraud scheme and his attempts to hide evidence—demonstrates that he cannot be trusted to
return to court as required without appropriate conditions. Williams and his co-defendants took
concerted steps to conceal their criminal activity, including by using Virtual Private Networks to
hide the IP addresses they used to further the scheme and to avoid detection of their true identities.
They also shredded documentary evidence, created fictitious records, and impersonated
individuals, including clients of the scheme. Given this criminal conduct, there is no reason to
believe that any promise to return to court should be accepted unless it is based on substantially
more than Williams’s word.

In light of the above, the government submits that the Court should release
Williams only if he satisfies appropriate conditions, including a substantial, fully secured bond of
$5 million co-signed by multiple financially responsible sureties with net worths of sufficient
unencumbered value to pay the amount of the bond, with appropriate moral suasion over Williams.
See Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 77 (“[T]he deterrent effect of a bond is necessarily a function of the
totality of a defendant’s assets.”); United States v. Batista, 163 F. Supp. 2d 222, 224 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (“In addition to the requirement of financial responsibility, a defendant must show that the
proposed suretors exercise moral suasion to ensure the defendant’s presence at trial.”); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xii) (requiring that any surety “have a net worth which shall have sufficient
unencumbered value to pay the amount of the bail bond”). Further, travel restrictions limiting
Williams’s travel to the Eastern District of New York should be imposed. See 18 U.S.C. §
3142(c)(1)(B)(iv). Finally, Williams should be forbidden from contacting his co-defendants and
co-conspirators except in the presence of his counsel, or any witnesses (with case-by-case
exclusions for family members and close friends who were not involved in the fraudulent scheme,
if consented to by the government and pre-trial), see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(v).

6
Case 2:25-cr-00020-GRB Document 13 Filed 01/22/25 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 106

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the government respectfully submits that the Court
should impose appropriate conditions to mitigate the risk that Williams will flee or engage in
further criminal activity harmful to the community.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN J. DURHAM
United States Attorney

By: /s/
Adam R. Toporovsky
James R. Simmons
Assistant U.S. Attorneys
(631) 715-7846
(718) 254-7511

cc: Clerk of the Court (GRB) (by ECF)
Counsel of Record (by ECF)

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