Memorandum Opinion and Order — U.S. v. Tiwan Robert Bailey and Carrie Roy (S.D. W. Va.)

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A Memorandum Opinion and Order filed February 3, 2026 as Document 225 in United States of America v. Tiwan Robert Bailey and Carrie Roy, Criminal Action No. 2:24-cr-00118, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Charleston Division. The court takes up Bailey's Post-Trial Motion to Set Aside Verdicts and Order a New Trial (ECF No. 215), which argues that Bailey was denied the right to examine the voting record of the grand jury. It also takes up Roy's Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial (ECF No. 216), which argues that the evidence does not support the verdict. The court states that the verdicts are supported by sufficient evidence and denies both motions.

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“Memorandum Opinion and Order — U.S. v. Tiwan Robert Bailey and Carrie Roy (S.D. W. Va.).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-2-24-cr-00118-dkt-225-s-d-w-va-93dc882fd5/, SHA-256 42f4d95d9b6f3a384c18d4c7f3904a884618c6d03dfb0ab2dd8f2625ffe6e629.

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Case 2:24-cr-00118 Document 225 Filed 02/03/26 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 1645

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

CHARLESTON DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:24-cr-00118

TIWAN ROBERT BAILEY
CARRIE ROY

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending before the court are two motions: (1) Defendant Tiwan Bailey’s Post-Trial Motion

to Set Aside Verdicts and Order a New Trial, [ECF No. 215], and (2) Defendant Carrie Roy’s

Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial, [ECF

No. 216]. The United States (“the Government”) filed responses in opposition, [ECF Nos. 217,

218], and neither Defendant filed a reply. The matters are ripe for review.

During the five-day trial, the Government presented evidence that Defendant Tiwan Bailey

obstructed justice, conspired to sex traffic a minor, and sex trafficked four victims, including one

minor. The Government also presented evidence that Defendant Carrie Roy conspired with and

aided and abetted another in the sex trafficking of a minor victim. The jury returned guilty verdicts

as to both Defendants. Because the verdicts are supported by sufficient evidence and the weight

of the evidence supports the jury’s findings, the verdicts will be upheld. Accordingly, Defendants’

motions, [ECF Nos. 215, 216], are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 16, 2024, a grand jury returned a Third Superseding Indictment against

Defendants Tiwan Bailey, Carrie Roy, and David Lee White. [ECF No. 22]. The six-count

Indictment charged Defendants Bailey and Roy with engaging in sex trafficking offenses and
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charged Defendants Bailey and White with obstructing the enforcement of the federal sex

trafficking statute. Id.

Specifically, Count One alleged that Defendants Bailey and Roy aided and abetted each

other in knowingly recruiting, enticing, harboring, providing, obtaining, maintaining, patronizing,

and soliciting Victim 1, and benefitted financially from that venture. Id. at 1. The Indictment

further alleged that Bailey and Roy committed these acts after having a reasonable opportunity to

observe Victim 1, knowing that she had not attained the age of 18 and that she would be caused to

engage in a commercial sex act. Id. at 1–2. Victim 1 was identified at trial as the minor victim

named “K.T.”

Counts Two, Three, and Four alleged that Bailey knowingly “recruited, enticed, harbored,

provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, and solicited” Victims 2, 3, and 4, knowing that

“means of force, threats of force, coercion,” and any combination of such means would cause the

victims to engage in a commercial sex act, and benefited financially from that venture. Id. at 3–5.

Count Two charged Bailey with sex trafficking Victim 2, identified as “Haley”; Count Three

charged Bailey with sex trafficking Victim 3, identified as “Sydnea”; and Count Four charged

Bailey with sex trafficking Victim 4, identified as “Lizzy.” Id.

Count Five alleged that Bailey, aided and abetted by White, “obstructed, attempted to

obstruct, and in any way interfered with and prevented the enforcement of” the federal sex

trafficking statute. Id. at 6. Count Six alleged that Bailey and Roy knowingly conspired to engage

in the conduct described in Count One. Id. at 7.

All three defendants went to trial on September 23, 2025. [ECF No. 192]. After a five-day

trial, a jury returned its verdict. Bailey was found guilty on all counts: conspiring to sex traffic a

minor (Count Six); sex trafficking a minor (Count One); obstructing the enforcement of the statute

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(Count Five); and sex trafficking three other victims by force (Counts Two, Three, and Four).

[ECF No. 202]. Roy was found guilty on the two counts charged against her: conspiring to sex

traffic a minor (Count Six) and aiding and abetting the sex trafficking a minor (Count One). Id.

White was acquitted. Id.

Bailey now moves to set aside the guilty verdicts and requests a new trial on the ground

that he was “denied the right to examine the voting record of the grand jury.” [ECF No. 215, at 1].

Roy moves for a judgment of acquittal, or alternatively, a new trial, arguing that the jury’s verdict

is unsupported by the evidence. [ECF No. 216]. For the reasons that follow, both motions are

DENIED.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a “defendant may move for a judgment of

acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict or after the court discharges

the jury, whichever is later.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1). Upon such a motion, the court may consider

“whether the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction,” and the court “must enter judgment

of acquittal of any offence for which the evidence is insufficient.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a).

In evaluating a Rule 29 motion, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to

the government. United States v. Ordonez-Zometa, 141 F.4th 531, 557 (4th Cir. 2025). A jury’s

verdict must be upheld if “it is supported by ‘evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept

as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” United States v. Lamborn, 159 F.4th. 230, 242 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v.

Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). In other words, “a judgment of acquittal is

appropriate when the evidence is so deficient that acquittal is ‘the only proper verdict.’” United

States v. Rafiekian, 68 F.4th 177, 186 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42

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(1982) (emphasis added)).

The standard for a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 is different. See Ordonez-Zometa,

141 F.4th at 557 (explaining the difference between Rules 29 and 33); Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. Under

Rule 33, the court may “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). Unlike Rule 29, the court may reweigh the evidence

independently, without construing it in favor of the government. Rafiekian, 68 F.4th at 186. A new

trial should be granted only in “rare” instances, “when the evidence weighs so heavily against the

verdict that it would be unjust to enter judgment.” Id. (first citing United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d

236, 249 (4th Cir. 2008); and then citing United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1485 (4th Cir.

1985)). Put simply, the new trial standard under Rule 33 is “demanding.” United States v.

Millender, 970 F.3d 523, 531 (4th Cir. 2020).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant Roy moves for acquittal, or in the alternative a new trial, arguing that the

Government failed to present evidence sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict. Defendant Bailey

moves to set aside the verdict because he was denied the right to view grand jury documents.

A. Carrie Roy

I first turn to the application of Rules 29 and 33 to Defendant Roy’s post-trial motion.

Defendant Roy’s motion fails under both Rule 29 and Rule 33. Under Rule 29, the United States

presented sufficient evidence “to sustain a conviction.” Fed R. Crim. P. 29(a). Viewed in the light

most favorable to the United States, the jury’s verdict is supported by “adequate and sufficient”

evidence “to support a conclusion of a [Roy’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lamborn, 159

F.4th at 242. Under Rule 33, this is not one of the “rare” instances in which justice requires the

court to reweigh the evidence, vacate the judgment, and grant a new trial. I will address Counts

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One and Six separately under the Rule 29 standard first, then I will address them under the Rule

33 standard.

1. Count One

To obtain a conviction on Count One, the United States had to present sufficient evidence

that Defendant Roy aided and abetted Defendant Bailey in the sex trafficking of the minor victim

K.T. Specifically, Count One alleges

In and around December 2023, at or near Charleston and Rand, Kanawha County,
West Virginia within the Southern District of West Virginia, defendant TIWAN
ROBERT BAILEY, also known as “Quick,” and CARRIE ROY, also known as
“Carrie Ash,” aided and abetted by one another, in and affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, provided, obtained,
maintained, patronized, and solicited, by any means, Victim 1, and benefited
financially and by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which
recruited, enticed, harbored, provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, and
solicited, by any means, Victims 1, having had a reasonable opportunity to observe
Victim 1 and knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that Victim 1 had not
attained the age of 18 years and that Victim 1 would be caused to engage in a
commercial sex act.

[ECF No. 22, at 1–2]. The Government alleged this conduct violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1),

(b)(2), (c), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. at 2.

As the court read on the record and instructed the jury, to sustain its burden on Count One,

the Government had to prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

FIRST: That the defendant:

knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, provided, obtained,
maintained, patronized, or solicited, by any means, Victim 1;

benefitted financially or by receiving anything of value from
participation in a venture which recruited, enticed, harbored,
provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited, by any
means, Victim 1;

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SECOND: That the defendant did so in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce;

THIRD: The defendant knew or recklessly disregarded that Victim 1 had not
attained the age of 18 years, and knew that Victim 1 would be caused
to engage in a commercial sex act;

If the defendant knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, provided,
obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited by any means Victim
1, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to view Victim 1, who
had not obtained the age of 18 years, and knew Victim 1 would be
caused to engage in a commercial sex act.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (a)(2), and (c). The Government could also meet its burden if the

jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Roy aided and abetted another in the commission of the

offense, as alleged in the Indictment. [ECF No. 22, at 1–2]; 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (“Whoever commits

an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induce or procures its

commission, is punishable as a principal.”). In other words, the Government was not required to

prove that each Defendant personally committed every element of the offense so long as it proved

that they aided and abetted one another.

The question, then, is whether the Government presented sufficient evidence to support the

jury’s guilty verdict. Roy argues that neither element one nor element three is supported by the

evidence. 1 Defendant offers three reasons for acquittal: (1) “the Government failed to prove that

Defendant Roy took any direct action” regarding K.T. “knowing that K.T. would be caused to

engage in a commercial sex act,” (2) Defendant Roy did not have a reasonable opportunity to

observe K.T. prior to the time K.T. was caused to engage in a commercial sex act, and (3) “no

rational jury could have found that defendant Roy knew or recklessly disregarded K.T.’s true age.”

[ECF No. 216, at 12]. These arguments are not persuasive.

1
That the crime occurred in or affecting interstate commerce is not contested. [ECF No. 216, at 12].

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First, Roy argues that the Government “failed to prove that Defendant Roy took any direct

action as to K.T., knowing that she would be caused to engage in commercial sex.” [ECF No. 216,

at 12]. The Government responds that a jury could find the Roy guilty based on evidence showing

that she knew sex trafficking was happening, she drove victims—including K.T.—to locations for

commercial sex, she lived with Defendant Bailey, and she collected the proceeds of K.T.’s

commercial sex acts. [ECF No. 218, at 6–8]. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,

this evidence is sufficient to support a conviction on Count One.

It is important to frame the allegation in the Indictment properly. Roy and Bailey are

charged with aiding and abetting one another in the commission of sex trafficking of a minor.

Accordingly, the Government was not required to prove that Roy actually committed any of the

enumerated actions in 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a), such as recruiting, harboring, enticing, providing, and

maintaining. Instead, it was sufficient for the Government to prove that Roy aided, abetted,

counseled, commanded, induced, facilitated, or procured the commission of the offense. See 18

U.S.C. § 2.

Here, the evidence supports the jury’s conviction of Defendant Roy for aiding and abetting

Defendant Bailey in the sex-trafficking of K.T., a minor. The Government presented evidence that

Roy often acted as the go-between for Bailey, the victims, other girls associated with the victims,

and K.T. [ECF No. 210-29] (Government Exhibit 30). Exhibit 30 is a summary of Roy’s Cash App

records from November 2023 to August 2024. Id. These records show that Roy both sent money

to and received money from Bailey, including during December 2023, as alleged in the Indictment.

Id. The records further show that, during the same period, Roy sent money to K.T. 2 and Haley

2
The Government offered testimony that K.T. used her mother’s CashApp Account, named “Lea Ann Thompson.”
The Government’s Exhibit 30 shows that Roy paid about $363.00 to the account “Lea Ann Thompson” in December
2023. [ECF No. 210-29]. Roy also directly sent money to K.T.’s account “Kd Bandz” in June and July of 2024. Id.
The Homeland Security Investigations Special Agent Colin Nash further testified that Roy sent money to an account

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(Victim 2) while the two were together. Id.

From December 19 to December 23, 2023, K.T. and Haley reserved a hotel room at the

Comfort Inn for the purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts. [ECF No. 210-26] (hotel

receipts); [ECF No. 210, 17–37] (Government Exhibit 1) (messages between K.T. and Bailey

regarding commercial sex acts and photos of K.T. and Haley); [ECF No. 210-1] (Government

Exhibit 2) (messages between Haley and Bailey about the Comfort Inn); [ECF No. 210-19, 210-

20] (Government Exhibits 20 and 21) (advertisements on a pay-for-sex website by K.T. and

Haley). While at the hotel, K.T. twice told Bailey that she and Haley “gave Carrie the $300.” [ECF

No. 210, 30, 35]. 3

The Government also presented evidence that Roy drove the victims—including K.T.—to

various locations, including those where the victims engaged in commercial sex acts. Lizzy

(Victim 4) testified that Roy primarily drove her to clients’ houses for sex and that she would text

Roy when she was finished. Sydnea (Victim 3) also testified that Roy drove her to and from sex

work jobs. On cross-examination, Sydnea explained that Roy consistently drove the victims to

“dates” while other male drivers “did not come until the end,” after Roy was pulled over and no

longer able to drive. 4 Haley testified that Roy took her to hotels and other people’s houses for

commercial sex and that she knew Roy took other girls to their jobs as well. Lastly, Haley testified

that Roy did drive K.T. for the purpose of commercial sex. 5

named “Chasity” referring to a person in Texas known to associate with K.T.
3
At trial Lizzy testified that if a client paid via CashApp, the money would typically go to Roy who would send it to
Bailey. Haley testified that she remembered sending money through the CashApp to Roy. Sydnea testified that she
would follow a “chain of commands” and give money from a client to Haley who would give it to Roy to give to
Bailey.
4
Counsel did attempt to impeach the witness by reading grand jury testimony where Sydnea said that Roy would
“sometimes” drive her to and from the hotels, in addition to another man who worked for Bailey, and the transportation
was always reliable.
5
Roy disputes this. During cross-examination, Haley first testified that she thought she remembered Roy driving her
and K.T. somewhere. Later, however, she testified that she didn’t remember Roy driving K.T. to any “out-calls,”
meaning another person’s house for the purpose of commercial sex. “In-calls,” which Haley used to describe the

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The Government also presented evidence that Roy lived in the trailer with Bailey and K.T.

in December 2023. 6 Lizzy, who lived at the trailer at some point, described Roy as an “errand

boy” at the trailer and testified that she talked to Roy about sex work. Haley described Roy as

Bailey’s “worker.” Emma Burdette, a Government witness and friend of K.T.’s, testified that on

one occasion Bailey brought her and K.T. back to the trailer where Bailey and Roy lived. Haley

also lived in the Rand trailer for a time, and she testified that Roy lived there at the same time K.T.

did and that Haley had discussed her sex work in front of Roy.

In summary, the Government offered sufficient evidence that Roy: (1) collected and

distributed money from Bailey’s sex trafficking victims, including K.T., (2) facilitated

transportation of the victims to and from locations where they engaged in commercial sex acts,

and (3) lived in the trailer where Bailey lived, where other victims lived, and where K.T. lived. A

reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence demonstrated that Roy was one “who aids, abets,

counsels, commands, induces, facilitates, or procures the commission of an act,” making her

criminally liable for aiding and abetting Bailey. 7 Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 2 “reflects a centuries-old

commercial sex performed at the Comfort Inn, are different. While the use of certain terminology may cast some doubt
on the witness’s recollection of certain facts, it does not work as a refutation of her entire testimony. Nonetheless, this
is the kind of testimony a jury is expected to weigh against the rest of the evidence in the case, and it is the province
of the jury to determine the credibility of each witness and her testimony. In this instance, a reasonable jury could
have found that this testimony supported a conviction.
6
Ms. Mariah Bennett’s testimony showed that K.T. lived there too, and Lizzy testified that she saw “[Roy] every
day that [she] was” at the trailer.
7
A jury could reasonably find that Roy’s actions clearly benefited Bailey’s commercial sex-work operation. The jury
had the opportunity to consider K.T.’s description of the sex-work, particularly when she described it to Lizzy:

If you’re working for him he will be you’re daddy basically your pimp so u will have to stay loyal
like u can’t be texting all the negative cp people back and always be out chilling I can try it for a
few days with me and Haley and see if u like it if not I can leave you’re gonna be living with us he
will provide u w your dope Haley does heroin too just limit yourself don’t always be strung out u
can get high all day but when it’s time for business u got to get ready and it’s not just a job it’s a
family so if u join please don’t play we all take care of each other depending if the days slow I can
make 1000 a day n u don’t have to work everyday n I will help u get comfortable U DO HAVE TO
GIVE HIM ALL THE MONEY U MAKE SO LMK IF YOURE COOL WITH THAT it might seem
weird at first like you’re not getting all you’re money but in the end u are he gets us whatever we
want food, dope, clothes, nails done, we go to the mall all the time and he will always make sure
you’re okay he won’t let anyone bother u SERIOUSLY THO U NEED TO STOP TALKING TO

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view of culpability: that a person may be responsible for a crime he has not personally carried out

if he helps another to complete its commission.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 70 (2014)

(citing J. Hawley & M. McGregor, Criminal Law 81 (1899)).

Under a Rule 29 analysis, this evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

Government. The evidence shows that Roy aided and abetted Bailey in his sex trafficking of K.T.,

as alleged in Count One. Roy facilitated the exchange of money and transported victims to

locations where they engaged in commercial sex acts, with proceeds ultimately relinquished to

Bailey. The Government’s witnesses testified that Roy was involved in the operation in some

capacity. Even if the jury believed that Roy did not take direct action—unlikely in the face of the

evidence—the Government presented adequate and sufficient evidence that Roy aided and abetted

Bailey.

Second, Roy argues that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence that Roy had

a reasonable opportunity to observe K.T. [ECF No. 216, at 14–16]. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), a

defendant’s opportunity to observe a minor victim relieves the Government of its burden of

proving that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the victim’s age. In full, the statute

states:

In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported,
provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited, the Government need not
prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the person
had not attained the age of 18 years.

18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).

In Count One, the Government alleged that Roy had an opportunity to observe K.T. under

SOME OF THE PEOPLE UP THERE this is a good opportunity Liz sometimes u have to make
sacrifices and cut people off

[ECF No. 210-16, at 4].

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Section 1591(c). And the Government presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding

on this point. K.T. lived in the Rand trailer for at least 10 days in December 2023, the same trailer

where multiple witnesses testified Roy lived with Bailey. Ten days (or as long as two weeks, as

testified by some witnesses) in a single-wide trailer with limited space is sufficient to have a

reasonable opportunity to observe, especially when witnesses testified that Roy slept on the couch

of the living room of the trailer. [ECF No. 211-1–211-8] (images of the small trailer). In addition,

the Government presented evidence that Roy drove K.T. to the Comfort Inn and collected money

from her. Taken together, these circumstances are more than sufficient for a jury to conclude that

Roy had a reasonable opportunity to observe K.T. as a minor.

Lastly, Roy contends that the Government presented no evidence to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Roy knew or recklessly disregarded K.T.’s age. [ECF No. 216, at 16–17].

While proof of knowledge (or reckless disregard) is not necessary to sustain a conviction under §

1591(a)(1), it is required to sustain a conviction under § 1591(a)(2). And after the five-day trial,

the jury found that Roy had violated both sections. [ECF No. 202]. Defendant now challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence presented to support the jury’s finding that Roy knew or recklessly

disregarded K.T.s age. I am not persuaded by Roy’s argument. 8

The Government presented evidence that K.T. lived in the same small trailer as Roy and

that Roy drove K.T. to jobs. The Government also introduced communications between K.T. and

Bailey, including photos of herself, as well as photos of them together. [ECF No. 210, at 2] (picture

of K.T. and Bailey); see also [ECF Nos. 210-19, 210-20] (pictures of Haley and K.T. on the sex-

advertisement website).

8
Even if I were to agree with Roy’s argument, the jury’s conviction on Count One was supported by the evidence
that Roy had a reasonable opportunity to observe K.T. and aided and abetted Bailey in trafficking her under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591(a)(1). Therefore, a judgment of acquittal would be inappropriate.

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Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, a jury could

conclude that Roy and Bailey recklessly disregarded K.T.’s true age, and that all of Roy’s actions

aided and abetted Bailey in sex trafficking K.T. for his financial benefit, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1591(a)(2). This alone is sufficient to support and sustain a conviction on Count One. Still, Roy’s

conviction on Count One is supported by evidence of aiding and abetting criminal conduct in

violation of both §§ 1591(a)(1) and 1591(a)(2).

2. Count Six

Defendant Roy also argues that the Government failed to present sufficient evidence that

she conspired to commit a sex trafficking offense. Related to Count One, Count Six charges

Defendants Roy and Bailey with conspiring to sex traffic the minor K.T.. in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1594(c). [ECF No. 22]. The jury found that both Bailey and Roy were guilty of conspiring to sex

traffic K.T. [ECF No. 202]. Now, Defendant Roy moves for acquittal.

At its heart, “conspiracy is ‘the combination of minds in an unlawful purpose.’” Smith v.

United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 (2013) (quoting United States v. Hirsch, 100 U.S. 33, 34 (1879)).

In other words, it is an “agreement to effectuate a criminal act.” United States v. Laughman, 618

F.2d 1067, 1074 (4th Cir. 1980). Conspiracies are often private, hidden from the public, and

therefore result “in little direct evidence of such an agreement.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d

849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996). That is why the Government may present, juries may consider, and courts

can rely on circumstantial evidence. Indeed, in some cases circumstantial evidence may entirely

prove the existence of a conspiracy. Id. at 858. That evidence may include the defendant’s

“relationship with other members of the conspiracy, the length of this association, [the defendant’s]

attitude, conduct, and the nature of the conspiracy.” United States v. Collazo, 732 F.2d 1200, 1206

(4th Cir. 1984). In this case, the Government had to prove that (1) two or more persons entered

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into an agreement to sex traffic a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), (2) Roy knew of

the conspiracy, and (3) she voluntarily became a part of it. United States v. Rhymes, 827 F. App’x

266, 268 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing McMillan, 813 F. App’x at 849 and Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857).

Here, the Government presented sufficient and adequate evidence for a jury to conclude

that Roy knowingly conspired with another to sex traffic the minor victim K.T. As already

discussed, Roy lived in the same trailer as K.T. and Bailey, and victim witnesses testified that they

openly discussed their sex work in the small trailer. Roy collected money from victims, including

K.T. She also sent money to and received money from Bailey, acting seemingly as a necessary

part of the sex trafficking conspiracy. And again, the Government presented evidence that Roy

directly and purposely advanced the conspiracy by transporting the girls to clients and hotels,

including K.T. and Haley in December 2023 as alleged in the Indictment.

Contrary to Roy’s argument, the Government presented both direct and circumstantial

evidence to tie Roy to a conspiracy to sex traffic K.T. As outlined, the evidence included Roy’s

various roles; the time and space Roy, K.T., and Bailey spent together; and the relationship

between Roy, Bailey, the victims, and other coconspirators. 9 Considering all of this, the jury’s

conclusion is sufficiently and adequately supported by the evidence. Therefore, a judgment of

acquittal under Rule 29 is not appropriate.

3. Rule 33

Alternatively, Defendant Roy asks the court to order a new trial under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 33. Under Rule 33, the court may “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial

9
Compare United States v. Wysinger, 64 F.4th 207, 213 (4th Cir. 2023) (holding that a reasonable jury could conclude
that coconspirators had a shared intent when they lived together and with sex trafficking victims, among other factors)
with United States v. McMillan, 813 F. App’x 846, (4th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (holding that the Government failed
to provide evidence that one alleged coconspirator “purposely assisted” another “with sex trafficking and thereby
either tacitly entered into an agreement”).

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if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). This standard permits the court to

reweigh the evidence, but a new trial should only be granted in the “rare” circumstance where “the

evidence weighs so heavily against the verdict that it would be unjust to enter judgment.”

Rafiekian, 68 F.4th at 186 (citing Arrington, 757 F.2d at 1485).

This is not such a case. The evidence—presented over three and a half days of testimony

and comprised of more than 100 exhibits—implicates Bailey as the leader and organizer of the sex

trafficking operation. The evidence similarly shows that Defendant Roy aided and abetted him

throughout, including the sex trafficking of K.T., during December 2023. Roy collected money

from and sent money to Bailey and the victims, drove the victims, including K.T. to hotels, and

lived in the Rand trailer with Bailey and the victims that would pass through, including K.T.

Roy was part and parcel of the conspiracy and operation to sex traffic K.T. and others.

Even without construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence

sufficiently supports Roy’s conviction on Counts One and Six. This is not the rare instance where

justice demands a new trial, nor does the evidence weigh against the verdict. Indeed, for many of

the reasons already stated, the evidence weighs in favor of the verdict and the court will not disturb

it. Therefore, the Roy’s Motion for a new trial under Rule 33, [ECF No. 216], is DENIED.

B. Tiwan Bailey

In his post-trial motion to set aside the verdict and order a new trial, [ECF No. 215],

Defendant Bailey asserts only one argument. He argues that he was denied the right to examine

the voting record of the grand jury and that this alleged denial entitles him to a new trial. Id.

Bailey advanced the same argument before trial, [ECF No. 136], and this court rejected it because

he “failed to offer any particular reasons for disclosure.” [ECF No. 147, at 3]. The court sees no

basis to reconsider that ruling, as Bailey has yet to offer any reason justifying the disclosure of the

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requested grand jury document. Therefore, the motion, [ECF No 215], is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Tiwan Bailey’s Post-Trial Motion to Set Aside

Verdicts and Order a New Trial, [ECF No. 215], and Defendant Carrie Roy’s Renewed Motion

for Judgment of Acquittal or, in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial, [ECF No. 216], are

DENIED.

The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

the defendants and counsel, the United States Attorney, the United States Probation Office, and

the United States Marshal.

ENTER: February 3, 2026

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