Memorandum Opinion and Order — U.S. v. Bonas (E.D. Va.)

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A Memorandum Opinion and Order filed November 2, 2023 as Document 93 in United States v. Ian Ishmel Bonas, Criminal Action No. 2:23-cr-25, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk Division. The Court addresses Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, filed after a two-day bench trial on a thirteen-count Superseding Indictment. The opinion summarizes the testimony of Mr. Blow and Mr. Waller on the controlled buys and the Government's evidence of four Paycheck Protection Program loans. The Court finds sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction on all Counts except Count Nine and states that Defendant's Motion is DENIED.

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Case 2:23-cr-00025-RAJ-LRL Document 93 Filed 11/02/23 Page 1 of 12 PageID# 236

LED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA NUV - 2 2023
Norfolk Division
CLERK, U.S, DISTRICT COURT
NORFOLK. VA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

V. CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 2:23-cr-25

IAN ISHMEL BONAS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Ian Ishmel Bonus’s ('"Del^ndant”) Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 29 (“Rule 29”). Def. Mot. J. Acquittal, ECF

Nos. 90, 91 (“Def.’s Mot.”). The Government opposed the Motion. Gov. Resp., ECF No. 92

(“Resp. 0pp.”). Defendant did not file a reply. This matter is now ripe for judicial determination.

For the reasons stated below. Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 12, 2023, Defendant was named in a thirteen-count Superseding Indictment,

returned by an Eastern District of Virginia Grand Jury, Norfolk Division, charging him as

follows: Counts One, Four, Five, and Six with Possession with the Intent to Distribute Cocaine,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; Counts Two and Seven

with Use and Carry a Firearm and in Relation to Drug Trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(l(A) and § 2; Count Three with Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2) and § 2; Count Eight with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with

the Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; Count Nine with Conspiracy to

Commit Wire Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1349; Counts Ten through Thirteen with Wire
Case 2:23-cr-00025-RAJ-LRL Document 93 Filed 11/02/23 Page 2 of 12 PageID# 237

Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and § 2. ECF No. 72. On September 12, 2023, a two-day

bench trial commenced before The Honorable Raymond A. Jackson, United States Senior

District Judge. ECF Nos. 86-87. During the trial, the Government presented evidence regarding

four controlled drug and firearm buys. Resp. 0pp. The Government called multiple witness to

describe each controlled buy to support the charges the Government sought. Id. Additionally, the

Government presented evidence of four Paycheck Protection Program (*TPP“) loans for which

Defendant applied. !d. At the close of the Government’s case. Defendant did not move for

judgment of acquittal. On September 13, 2023, the Court returned a verdict finding Defendant

guilty on all Counts except Count Nine. See Verdict, Docket Sheet. The Court scheduled

sentencing for January 16, 2024. ECF No. 89.

On September 27, 2023, Defendant filed a post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal

under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. ECF Nos. 90-91. The United States filed a

response in opposition on October 10, 2023. ECF No. 92.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides that '‘[i]f the jury has returned a guilty

verdict, the court may set aside the verdict and enter an acquittal,” where the defendant has

successfully challenged the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him. Fed R. Crim. Pr. 29

(c)(2). “A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction carries

a heavy burden.” United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation

omitted). In reviewing a Rule 29 challenge to a conviction, a court inquires whether ‘"'"any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

United States v. Johnson, 55 F.3d 976, 979 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Deference to the trier of fact requires that the court "construe the evidence

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in the light most favorable to the Government, assuming its credibility, drawing all favorable

inferences from it, and taking into account all the evidence, however adduced.” Johnson, 55

F.3d at 979 (quoting United States v. Giunta, 925 F.2d 758, 764 (4th Cir.1991)).

In its sufficiency review, a court considers both the circumstantial and direct evidence.

See United States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 281, 289 (4th Cir. 2008); United Slates v. Jackson, 863

F.2d 1168, 1173 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting "'circumstantial evidence is treated no differently than

direct evidence, and may be sufficient to support a guilty verdict even though it does not exclude

every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.”). However, assessing the credibility of

witnesses is within the province of the fact finder, see U.S. v. Okwesa, No. 1:14CR90 JCC, 2014

WL 2766120, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 18, 2014), and the uncorroborated testimony of a single

witness may be sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict, even if that witness is an accomplice, co¬

defendant, or informant. See United Stales v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1189-90 (4th Cir. 1997);

see also United States v. Arrington, 719 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1983); see also United States v.

Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

At trial and in his Motion, Defendant argues that the Government’s evidence was

insufficient to sustain a conviction on all Counts. Defendant specifically states that there was no

evidence established to prove that Defendant applied for the PPP loans, no evidence to suggest

that Defendant was the consistent “link” to setting up the four controlled purchases of drugs and

firearms, and the confidential informant, Willis Blow, and another government witness, Antonio

Waller, gave contradictory testimony. Def’s Mot. In opposition, the Government argues it

presented sufficient evidence at trial to support the Judge’s verdict. Resp. 0pp. Having reviewed

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the parties' arguments and the record, the Court finds that there was sufficient evidence to

sustain the conviction on all Counts except Count Nine.

Defendant is charged in Counts One, Four, Five, and Six with Possession with the Intent

to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). The statute provides

that it is unlawful to knowingly or intentionally distribute or possess with the intent to distribute

a controlled substance, in this case cocaine. At trial the Government was required to prove four

elements: 1) Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the controlled substance

described in Counts One, Four, Five, and Six of the Superseding Indictment; 2) at the time

Defendant knew that the substance was a controlled substance; 3) Defendant intended to

distribute the controlled substance; and 4) that Defendant possessed with intent to distribute a

quantity of cocaine base. See Eric Wm. Ruschky, PaUern Jury Instructions for Federal Criminal

Cases, District ofSouth Carolina § 841 (2020 Online Edition). In addition, the Government

charged Defendant with having aided and abetted others under §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. The Government was required to prove that Defendant participated at

some stage of the criminal venture with knowledge of the result and the intent to bring about that

result. See United States v. Arrington, 719 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir.1983) (discussing elements of

aiding and abetting).

Defendant argues that the Government did not present testimony that Defendant was the

consistent link to the controlled buys. Def’s Mot. at 3. Further, Defendant stated that Mr. Blow

contradicted himself by stating Defendant handed him the drugs directly instead of another co¬

conspirator, Travis Saunders. Id. Additionally, Mr. Blow testified that Mr. Waller was present at

controlled buy number two, which contradicts testimony by other witnesses that Mr. Waller was

present at controlled buy number four only. Id. Lastly, Mr. Waller testified that Defendant was

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not his preferred drug dealer but made payments for drugs once every few days, which

contradicts the CashApp transactions presented in court. Id. at 3-4.

In this case, there was sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant aided and abetted in

distributing cocaine and that these actions resulted in four controlled purchases of cocaine. At

trial, the Government presented evidence to show Defendant’s involvement with possessing and

distributing cocaine. The Government connected Defendant to the crime through testimony by

Mr. Blow, Mr. Waller, and FBI Agent Ivone. Mr. Blow testified that he connected with

Defendant through Mr. Saunders and met Defendant for the first time on May 20, 2021, at a

Citgo gas station to buy drugs and a firearm. See Excerpt Transcript of Proceedings at 9-10,

United States v. Ian Bonas, E.D. VA. (2023) (Mr. Blow’s testimony on direct examination

regarding the first controlled buy.). Additionally, during the first buy, Mr. Blow stated he got

into Defendant’s black Cadillac and sat in the backseat, where Defendant handed Mr. Blow the

firearm and drugs in exchange for cash, which Mr. Saunders received.' Id. at 11-12; see also

Gov. Ex. ID-lFandlH.

The second buy occurred on May 25, 2021, at a music studio in Virginia Beach with Mr.

Blow, Mr. Saunders, and Defendant. Gov. Ex. 2B. Mr. Blow tcstiHed that he got one gun from

Mr. Saunders, and Defendant appeared with the cocaine. See Excerpt Transcript of Proceedings

at 29-30, United States v. Ian Bonas, E.D. VA. (2023). Mr. Blow then followed Defendant to

Norfolk to get the second gun from Defendant. Id at. 31. Mr. Blow testified about the third buy.

which occurred on June 15, 2021. at Norfolk Premium Outlets ("‘Outlets”) to purchase cocaine

from Defendant and Mr. Saunders. Gov. Ex. 3B. Mr. Blow then drove to the back of the Outlets

and parked next to Defendant. See Excerpt Transcript of Proceedings at 36-37, United States v.

' The testimony is not clear regarding whether the drugs and the firearm were in a bookbag or outside of the
bookbag. However, Mr. Blow indicated that Defendanthanded him the drugs and the firearm.
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Ian Bonas, E.D. VA. (2023). Defendant then got into Mr. Blow's car with Mr. Saunders and

handed Mr. Blow the cocaine in exchange for cash. Id.

Mr. Blow testified about the fourth buy, which occurred on July 1.2021, to purchase

cocaine. See Excerpt Transcript of Proceedings at 50-56, United States v. Ian Bonas, E.D. VA.

(2023). Mr. Blow stated that Defendant arrived at the Wawa gas station and gave the cocaine to

Mr. Saunders, who then handed the cocaine to Mr. Blow. Id. Additionally, Mr. Waller testified

that he purchased cocaine from Defendant numerous times. Id. at 96 (Mr. Waller’s testimony on

direct examination.); see also Gov. Ex. 1IG and 1IH (CashApp payments to Defendant from Mr.

Waller.). Mr. Waller stated he witnessed Defendant make crack cocaine at his apartment. Id. at

101-102 (stating he cooked cocaine at Defendant’s apartment to smoke, whereas Defendant

cooked cocaine to sell.). The Government also introduced evidence to prove that Mr. Waller was

present at the fourth buy by having him identify himself in the pictures. See Gov. Ex. 4M and

4N.

The Government established these connections through Delendant's phone records, geo¬

location data from his phone, and the substances purchased through the drug deal that FBI Agent

Ivone received, which was later confirmed as cocaine. While much of the Government’s

evidence consisted of both circumstantial and direct evidence, both may support a conviction and

a conviction may rely entirely on circumstantial evidence. See Uniled Stales v. Bonner, 648 F.3d

209, 213 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). The finder of fact in this case, the Judge,

found the Government’s evidence and the witnesses testimony sufficient to sustain a conviction

under these Counts. Therefore, Defendant fails to establish that there was insufficient evidence to

support his conviction on Counts One, Four, Five, and Six.

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Defendant is charged in Counts Two and Seven with Use and Carry a Firearm and in

Relation to Drug Trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l(A). The statute provides that

any person who uses or carries a firearm during a drug trafficking crime shall be punished for no

less than seven (7) years. The Government was required to prove at trial: 1) Defendant

committed the crime of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine base; 2) in furtherance of

that crime, Defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and 3) Defendant’s brandishing or

possession of that firearm was in furtherance of the crime identified in Count One of the

Indictment. See Ruschky, supra, § 924(c). The Government also charged Defendant with having

aided and abetted others under § 924(c)(1)(A), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. The Government

was required to prove the elements of the charge. See Arrington, 719 F.2d at 705. Lastly,

Defendant is charged in Count Three with Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g). The Government was required to prove: 1) at the time Defendant possessed the

firearm, Defendant had been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year; 2) such possession was in or affecting interstate commerce; and 3)

Defendant knowingly possessed the firearm described in the Indictment. See Ruschky, supra, §

922(g). The parties stipulated that Defendant is a convicted felon. ECF No. 88.

Defendant argues that the Government did not “link'’ him to the gun and drugs during the

first buy with Mr. Blow because Mr. Blow spoke directly with Mr. Saunders via text message,

not Defendant. Def.’s Mot. at 3. Furthermore, Mr. Blow did not convey whether Defendant

handed Mr. Blow the firearm and drugs in a bookbag or outside the bookbag. Id. Flowever, the

Government presented evidence to support that Defendant used or carried a firearm during two

out of the four controlled buys. At trial, Mr. Blow stated he was physically present during the

first controlled buy, and Defendant handed him the firearm. See Excerpt Transcript of

/
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Proceedings at 9-12, United States v. Ian Bonas, E.D. VA. (2023). Whether during the first buy

the firearm and drugs were in a bag or out in the open is irrelevant to the charge because an

eyewitness testified to being in the car with Defendant when Defendant possessed and handed

over the firearm.

Although Mr. Blow's testimony could be viewed as circumstantial, the Government

corroborated the testimony with audio and video recordings and photographs taken by the FBI.

Additionally, FBI Agent Ivone testifed about each controlled buy. including receiving firearms

from Mr. Blow that Delbndant gave him. See Gov. Ex. 1C and 2D. Based on the evidence the

Government presented, a conviction on Counts Two, Three, and Seven was sufficient because

Defendant is a felon and carried firearms to the controlled buys. Therefore, Defendant fails to

establish that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Counts Two, Three,

and Seven.

Defendant is charged in Count Eight with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with the

Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The statute provides that any person

who attempts or conspires to commit any offense described in this subchapter, here distribute

and possess cocaine, shall be punished, 'fhe Government was required to prove the following: 1)

that two or more persons in some way or manner, positively or tacitly, came to a mutual

understanding to try to accomplish a common unlawful plan, as charged in the Indictment; 2)

that Defendant knew of the unlawful purpose of the plan and willfully joined in it; 3) that the

object of the unlawful plan was to distribute or possess with intent to distribute cocaine; and 4)

that the conspiracy involved a quantity of cocaine base. See Ruschky, supra, § 846.

Defendant makes the same arguments mentioned previously about the cocaine. Def.’s

Mot. at 3. However, the Government sufficiently established enough evidence to sustain a
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conviction under Count Eight. At trial, Mr. Blow testified about Defendant and Mr. Saunders

being present at each controlled buy. See e.g., Excerpt Transcript of Proceedings at 9-12, 29-37,

United States v. Ian Bonas, E.D. VA. (2023). Mr. Blow stated Mr. Saunders referred to

Defendant as his “peoples” who would bring the firearms and drugs to the controlled buys. Id,

The Government corroborated the testimony at trial with audio and video recordings,

photographs, and evidence of Defendant’s bank records and CashApp transactions sending

money to Mr. Saunders. See Gov. Ex. 11D. Based on the evidence the Government presented, a

conviction on Count Eight was sufficient because Defendant conspired with Mr. Saunders to

distribute and possess cocaine when meeting with Mr. Blow. Therefore, Defendant fails to

establish that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count Eight.

Defendant is charged in Counts Ten, Eleven, Twelve, and fhirteen with Wire Fraud, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The statue states whoever devises any scheme transmitted by wire

communication in interstate or foreign commerce shall be guilty of the offense. The Government

must prove the following: 1) Defendant knowingly devised or knowingly participated in a

scheme or artifice to defraud and to obtain money by means of materially false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations, or promises as detailed in the Indictment; 2) Defendant did so with the

intent to defraud; and 3) in advancing, or furthering, or carrying out this scheme to defraud and

to obtain money by means of materially false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or

promises, Defendant transmitted any writing, signal, or sounds by means of a wire

communication in interstate or foreign commerce or caused the transmission of any writing, or

sound of some kind by means of a wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or

foreign commerce. See Ruschky, supra. § 1343. The Government also charged Defendant with

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having aided and abetted others under § 1343, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. The Government

was required to prove the elements of the charge. See Arrington, 119 F.2d at 705.

Defendant argues that the Government did not present testimony showing that Defendant

electronically signed the PPP loans or that the IP address matched an IP address Defendant used.

Def.’s Mot. at 2. Furthermore, Defendant claims that no evidence explicitly shows that he

applied for the funds or loan forgiveness, although the funds were deposited into his account. Id.

However, the Government sufficiently established that Defendant committed wire fraud. At trial,

the Government presented four of Defendant’s loan applications. Two applications displayed

Defendant’s name, social security number, address, and email address. See Gov. Ex. 5, 6. The

other two applications were in Defendant’s business name, '‘A Class Cars & Towing,” which

also referenced Defendant’s name, address, and the same email address used in his individual

loan applications. See Gov. Ex. 7, 8. Additionally, the Government introduced Defendant’s tax

returns in Defendant’s name and his business showing inflated income figures. See Gov. Ex.

12A-12D. Lastly, the Government corroborated Defendant’s receipt of the loan funds by

introducing evidence of his bank records showing the funds were deposited into his accounts.

See Gov. Ex. 5-8. The Government introduced enough circumstantial evidence to sustain a wire

fraud conviction. Therefore, Defendant fails to establish that there was insufficient evidence to

support his convictions on Counts Ten through Thirteen.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is DENIED.

ECF Nos. 90.91.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and

Order to counsel and parties of record.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Norfolk, Virginia
October , 2023
Raymond A. Jackson
United States District Judge

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal is DENIED.

ECF Nos. 90,91.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to provide a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and

Order to counsel and parlies of record.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Norfolk, Virginia
Raymond A. J
November^ ,2023 United States District Judge

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