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Case 2:21-mj-01008-DUTY Document 1 Filed 03/02/21 Page 1 of 49 Page ID #:1
Case 2:21-mj-01008-DUTY Document 1 Filed 03/02/21 Page 2 of 49 Page ID #:2
AFFIDAVIT
I, Anthony Clark, being duly sworn, declare and state as
follows:
I. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT
This affidavit is made in support of a complaint and
arrest warrant for Edward Kim (“KIM”) for a violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii): Possession with Intent to
Distribute Methamphetamine.
This affidavit is also made in support of an
application for a warrant to search the following premises
(collectively, the “SUBJECT PREMISES”):
a. The premises of 1039 South Hobart Boulevard Unit
214, Los Angeles, CA 90006 (“SUBJECT PREMISES 1”), one of KIM’s
apartments, as more fully described on Attachment A-1;
b. The backroom or any other areas under PALOMA
FOSTER’s control, whether attached or unattached, at the
property located at 113 South Grandview Avenue, Covina, CA 91723
(“SUBJECT PREMISES 2”), which is a residence rented by KIM’s
girlfriend/partner and co-conspirator, PALOMA FOSTER (“FOSTER”),
and where KIM is also known to frequent, as more fully described
on Attachment A-2;
c. The premises of 1301 South Beach Boulevard,
Suite E, La Habra, CA 90631 (“SUBJECT PREMISES 3”), a commercial
space that KIM is currently renting, as more fully described on
Attachment A-3; and
d. The premises of 1200 South Figueroa Street, Unit
W3124, Los Angeles, CA 90015 (“SUBJECT PREMISES 4”), a luxury
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apartment that KIM has been renting since July 2020, as more
fully described on Attachment A-4.
The requested search warrant seeks authorization to
seize evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of
Title 18, United States Code §§ 1028A (Aggravated Identity
Theft), 1029 (Fraud in Connection with Access Devices), 371
(Conspiracy), 1956 (Money Laundering), 286 (Conspiracy to
Defraud the Government with Respect to Claims), 287 (False,
Fictitious or Fraudulent Claims), 1341 (Mail Fraud), 1343 (Wire
Fraud), 922(g) (Felon in Possession of a Firearm and
Ammunition), and 924(c) (Carrying a Firearm During and in
Relation to, and Possessing a Firearm in Furtherance of, a Drug
Trafficking Crime); and Title 21, United States Code, §§ 846
(Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances), 841
(Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances),
and 843(b) (Use of a Communication Facility to Distribute
Controlled Substances) (the “Subject Offenses”), as described
more fully in Attachment B. Attachments A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4,
and B are incorporated herein by reference.
The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon
my personal observations, my training and experience, and
information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and
witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there
is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and
warrants, and does not purport to set forth all of my knowledge
of or investigation into this matter. Unless specifically
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indicated otherwise, all conversations and statements described
in this affidavit are related in substance and in part only.
II. BACKGROUND OF AFFIANT
I am Special Agent with U.S. Department of Labor
Office of Inspector General (“DOL-OIG”), currently assigned to
the Las Vegas Field Office. I have been employed with DOL-OIG
since January 2019. I am a graduate of the Criminal
Investigator Training Program and Inspector General Investigator
Training Program held at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center in Glynco, Georgia. As a DOL-OIG special agent, my
duties include investigating fraud, waste, and abuse of various
DOL programs. I have conducted investigations of criminal
activity involving unemployment insurance (“UI”) fraud, workers’
compensation fraud, and grant fraud. Prior to my employment
with DOL-OIG, I was employed as an investigator with the Wage
and Hour Division of the U.S. Department of Labor.
III. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Since late 2019, multiple federal law enforcement
agencies have been investigating Edward Kim (“KIM”) for several
crimes and fraudulent schemes, including drug trafficking, the
filing of false tax returns with stolen identities, and
Employment Development Department (“EDD”) fraud through the
filing of false unemployment insurance claims.
Over the course of the nearly year-and-a-half
investigation, agents have determined that, among other things,
(1) KIM conspired with others, and carried out, a conspiracy to
ship approximately 449 grams of methamphetamine to co-
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conspirators in Hawaii in a package addressed from “Edward Kim”
to “Clear Point Logistics”; (2) KIM, in conspiracy with another
individual, filed approximately 297 fraudulent tax returns using
stolen identities in order to fraudulently claim Economic Impact
Payments (“EIP”), resulting in a loss of $21,600 dollars; (3)
KIM, potentially along with other co-conspirators, fraudulently
applied for and received approximately $3.0 million in EDD
funds; and mostly recently (4) KIM possessed approximately 22
grams of methamphetamine and other drugs and paraphernalia,
including another package of drugs from “Clear Point Logistics,”
during a traffic stop by the La Habra Police Department
(“LHPD”).
Throughout this period, law enforcement determined
that KIM used multiple locations under his control to facilitate
and perpetuate these crimes, including his apartment in Los
Angeles (SUBJECT PREMISES 1), the residence of his
girlfriend/partner and co-conspirator, PALOMA FOSTER (“FOSTER”),
in Covina 1 (SUBJECT PREMISES 2), and a commercial space that KIM
rents in La Habra (SUBJECT PREMISES 3), to apply for and receive
fraudulent EDD claims and tax filings, and traffic drugs. Most
recently, law enforcement has observed KIM and FOSTER at a
luxury apartment in downtown Los Angeles (SUBJECT PREMISES 4),
which KIM began renting in July 2020, and for which he has paid
portion of with EDD funds.
1 The investigation revealed that KIM and FOSTER are or were
in a romantic relationship and share a child.
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Finally, on November 15, 2020, the LHPD stopped KIM
for multiple violations of the California Vehicle Code. This
stop was unrelated to the separate pending federal
investigations into KIM. During the traffic stop, and after
learning that KIM was on probation with full search terms and
securing his consent, officers searched KIM’s car and
belongings. Among the items found in KIM’s car were multiple
pieces of EDD mail in names other than KIM’s name, multiple VISA
debit cards in names other than KIM’s, approximately 22.049
grams of methamphetamine, other drugs, a digital scale, an
electroshock weapon (commonly referred to as a taser), and
$26,778 in cash. Law enforcement also found a mail parcel
containing Alprazolam, which was addressed from “Clear Point
Logistics” at P.O. Box 2305, La Habra, California 90632 and
addressed to an individual in Colorado.
IV. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE
Based on my review of law enforcement reports,
conversations with other law enforcement agents, and my own
knowledge of the investigation, I am aware of the following:
A. HSI Investigates KIM for Distribution of
Methamphetamine in November 2019 from SUBJECT
PREMISES 2
Since October 2019, HSI has been investigating KIM for
distribution of methamphetamine. That investigation began when
HSI received information from a LHPD source of information
(“SOI”), who identified an individual named “Eddie Kim,” as a
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trafficker of drugs. 2 Using law enforcement databases, LHPD
determined the person identified as “Eddie Kim” was, in fact,
KIM. LHPD then provided a photo of KIM to the SOI, who
positively identified KIM as the narcotics trafficker he knows
as “Eddie Kim.”
Law enforcement then began surveillance on KIM in mid-
November 2019. On November 15, 2019, while conducting
surveillance on KIM at SUBJECT PREMISES 2 (which law enforcement
later learned was the backroom of a property his partner,
FOSTER, rents and resides), LHPD observed KIM exiting SUBJECT
PREMISES 2 carrying a shipping box. LHPD saw KIM get into a car
and drive to a FedEx store in West Covina, California. LHPD
observed KIM exit the car carrying the shipping box and enter
the FedEx store.
Law enforcement later saw KIM leaving that store with
a stack of empty shipping boxes similar in size to the parcel he
originally entered the FedEx store with. After KIM departed, a
LHPD detective went inside the FedEx store, identified himself
to the FedEx employee, and inquired about the parcel KIM dropped
off. The FedEx employee assisted the LHPD detective in locating
the parcel. The parcel was sealed and labeled from Edward Kim
at an address of 3010 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
The SOI was previously arrested on drug offenses and is
2
working with local law enforcement in the hopes of leniency in
prosecution and any potential sentence. The SOI has the
following felony criminal convictions: possession of a
controlled substance in 2007, 2011, and 2013; possession of a
controlled substance for sale in 2007, 2008, 2010, 2016, and
2018; transportation of a controlled substance in 2007, 2016,
and 2019; making and passing fictitious check in 2016; and
possession of a stolen vehicle in 2019.
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California 90010 and addressed to “Clear Point Logistics,”
located at 75-5660 Kopiko Street, Suite C7 #304, Kailua-Kona,
Hawaii.
Law enforcement in Hawaii were advised of the package
destined to Kailua-Kona, and they obtained an anticipatory
search warrant for the parcel from U.S. Magistrate Judge Kenneth
Mansfield. See Case No. 19-MJ-1199 (D. Hawaii). The search
warrant was executed in Hawaii on November 18, 2019. Inside the
package that KIM was seen mailing, law enforcement found
approximately 449.6 grams of methamphetamine. Several co-
conspirators in Hawaii were ultimately arrested and charged
federally with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
Based on my discussion with other agents, federal
agents were planning to charge KIM along with his co-
conspirators located in Hawaii. However, due to the COVID-19
pandemic, federal agents in Hawaii ultimately did not move to
arrest or charge KIM in Hawaii due to the travel restrictions
and quarantine. Instead, the case was later referred to the
U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Central District of California for
investigation.
B. In June 2020, IRS-CI Begins Investigating KIM for
Fraudulent Tax Filings Associated with SUBJECT
PREMISES 1 and 2
Separately, in June 2020, IRS-CI began investigating
KIM for filing fraudulent tax returns under stolen identities to
receive Economic Impact Payments (“EIP”), also known as stimulus
payments.
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KIM was first identified as being involved in
suspicious tax filings through the EIP Lead Portal. The EIP
Lead Portal is an IRS database developed to combat fraud through
identifying suspicious activity associated with non-filer EIP
account creation.
After a review of EIP Lead Portal data, IRS-CI
identified 297 fraudulent returns filed by KIM and his partner,
FOSTER. The 297 returns were in various names other than the
names of KIM and FOSTER. These returns were linked to five
separate banks accounts. Of the 297 EIP returns, 129 returns
listed SUBJECT PREMISES 1 as the taxpayer’s address.
IRS-CI then obtained bank records relating to these
five bank accounts and determined all the accounts were owned by
KIM or FOSTER. For example, records obtained from Bancorp bank
account ending in 6759 showed KIM as the sole account holder.
This bank account was associated with 82 returns. Records
obtained from Lili bank account ending in 8213 showed KIM as the
sole account holder and a total of 89 returns were associated
with this bank account. Records obtained from BBVA USA bank
account ending in 2343, Evolve bank account ending in 4718, and
Bancorp bank account ending in 4606, showed FOSTER as the sole
account holder with the listed address as SUBJECT PREMISES 2.
These bank accounts in FOSTER’s name were associated with 126
returns.
Further investigation revealed that most of these
returns were filed from the IP address of 76.170.55.188. Law
enforcement subsequently obtained subscriber information for the
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IP address from Charter Communications. According to Charter
Communication, KIM was the subscriber of the IP address at the
service address of SUBJECT PREMISES 1 at the dates and times
that the returns were filed.
The IRS-CI interviewed approximately seven individuals
who had tax returns filed under their names which were
associated with KIM or FOSTER. All of the individuals indicated
the filings were unauthorized and they confirmed they never gave
either KIM or FOSTER permission to use their identities to file
tax returns for EIP payments.
IRS-CI linked KIM and FOSTER to the filing of at least
297 fraudulent tax returns by linking the returns to the bank
accounts associated with KIM and FOSTER or at SUBJECT PREMISES
1. These tax returns claimed EIP payments totaling
approximately $356,400, of which $21,600 were released and paid
to the bank accounts associated with KIM and FOSTER.
C. In Summer 2020, DOL-OIG Discovers KIM’s Scheme to
Fraudulently Obtain EDD Benefits Using SUBJECT
PREMISES 1-3
In September 2020, while HSI and IRS-CI were
investigating KIM for drug trafficking and filing false tax
returns, DOL-OIG began investigating KIM for suspected EDD fraud
after receiving the following tip from the Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMP”).
1. KIM is Arrested with EDD Cards in Las Vegas
On September 15, 2020, LVMP arrested KIM after
security at the hotel KIM was staying at observed
methamphetamine and approximately 21 EDD cards inside KIM’s
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hotel room. The hotel security observed the items in KIM’s room
while responding to a disturbance in the room and notified LVMP
thereafter. At time of the incident, KIM was present at the
hotel with FOSTER. FOSTER was not arrested, however.
The 21 EDD cards found in KIM’s room were not in KIM’s
name. In a search incident to his arrest, LVMP searched KIM’s
person and found 11 additional EDD cards, for a total of 32 EDD
cards, and approximately 17 grams of suspected
methamphetamine. LVMP Mirandized and interviewed KIM. KIM told
LVMP that the reason he had multiple EDD cards in his possession
was because he helps people file unemployment claims in exchange
for a 10-percent kickback from each of the EDD card owners.
LVMP referred the EDD cards to DOL-OIG.
2. DOL-OIG Investigates the EDD Cards and Finds that
KIM is Connected to Hundreds of Fraudulent Claims
DOL-OIG then began investigating KIM and the EDD cards
that were found in his possession during the Las Vegas arrest.
DOL-OIG first conducted a search of law enforcement databases
and discovered that 22 of the EDD cards in KIM’s possession were
obtained by filing online applications for unemployment
assistance from the IP address of 76.170.62.36 (the “Target IP
Address”). Further investigation determined that approximately
400 claims were connected to KIM through the use of the common
mailing addresses, IP addresses, or email address, all of which
were found to be under KIM’s or his co-conspirators’ control.
For example, DOL-OIG determined that all 32 EDD cards
found in KIM’s possession during the Las Vegas arrest listed
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locations under KIM’s control as the mailing address on the
online EDD applications. Specifically, 18 EDD cards listed
SUBJECT PREMISES 1, as the claimant’s mailing address on EDD
claims, and 1 card listed the home of KIM’s parents, as the
claimant’s mailing address. In addition, 11 EDD cards listed an
apartment at 951 South Beach Boulevard in La Habra, California
(“KIM’s Former Beach Boulevard Apartment”), which law
enforcement determined was KIM’s apartment from approximately
June 11, 2020 until recently based on lease records. Two
additional cards used the mailing address of 964 East Badillo
Street # 436, Covina, CA 91724, which is a private mailbox
rented by KIM. 3
3. DOL-OIG Tracks Hundreds of Additional EDD Claims
to KIM at SUBJECT PREMISES 1 through 3
Broadening their investigation, DOL-OIG reviewed
additional EDD claims records which showed that at least 78
claims used SUBJECT PREMISES 1 and an additional 170 claims used
KIM’s Former Beach Boulevard Apartment as their respective
mailing addresses on the EDD applications.
DOL-OIG continued its investigation by looking at all
other EDD applications filed from the Target IP Address, which
was used to file applications for 22 of the 32 EDD cards that
were found in KIM’s possession in Las Vegas on September 15,
2020. This analysis showed that at least an additional 114 EDD
This address is associated with at least 43 unemployment
3
insurance claims.
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claims were filed from the Target IP Address between May 2020
and July 2020.
DOL-OIG subpoenaed subscriber information for the
Target IP Address from Charter Communications. Charter reported
that KIM was the subscriber of the Target IP Address, with a
service address of SUBJECT PREMISES 1, at the time the
fraudulent EDD claims were filed.
DOL-OIG reviewed additional EDD claims records, which
showed at least four other claims, including FOSTER’s own EDD
claim, used SUBJECT PREMISES 2 as their respective mailing
address on the EDD applications. Additionally, law enforcement
determined that FOSTER was the subscriber of IP address
76.91.184.115, which was used to file at least 80 claims,
including four of the EDD cards in KIM’s possession during the
Las Vegas arrest.
Further analysis of EDD claims records showed at least
17 claims used SUBJECT PREMISES 3 as their respective mailing
address on the EDD applications.
4. DOL-OIG Determines That Many of the Fraudulent
EDD Claims are in Inmates’ Names
DOL-OIG also determined that 23 of the 32 EDD cards in
KIM’s possession during the Las Vegas arrest were in names of
incarcerated California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) inmates. Inmates are not eligible to
apply for unemployment insurance (“UI”) benefits because they
are not unemployed through no fault of their own; able and
available for work; and/or actively seeking work. The EDD
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applications for these 23 inmate-claims each reported being
unemployed as a direct result of COVID-19 and an annual income
of $72,000. This reported income on the fraudulent applications
caused EDD to pay the maximum amount, thereby maximizing the
fraud and benefits received. None of these applications
provided driver’s license information either, which is requested
on the applications for verification purposes.
The table below provides a sample of the EDD inmate-
claims that were tracked to KIM. Notably, each of the claims
share commonalities, including unemployment reason, reported
income, affected work date, and lack of driver’s license for
verification. Each of the claims also used an address
controlled by KIM, including SUBJECT PREMISES 1, KIM’s Former
Beach Boulevard Apartment, and KIM’s private mailbox.
State Provided Date Date Amount of Incareation
Reason Stated
Claim Claimant Driver's Work Claim Claim and Dates in
Unemployed Income
Filed License Affected Filed Status CA
Approved 1/23/2017
CA COVID-19 M.B. N $72,000.00 2/2/2020 5/16/2020
$23,100 to Present
Approved 12/28/2017
CA COVID-19 W.B. N $72,000.00 2/2/2020 5/30/2020
$22,800 to Present
Approved 5/3/2016
CA COVID-19 Y.B. N $72,000.00 2/2/2020 6/4/2020
$18,300 to Present
Approved 2/8/2019
CA COVID-19 E.C. N $72,000.00 2/5/2020 7/4/2020
$21,450 to Present
Approved 1/28/2010
CA COVID-19 B.D. N $72,000.00 2/12/2020 7/4/2020
$21,450 to Present
Approved 12/16/2019
CA COVID-19 J.G. N $72,000.00 2/2/2020 7/4/2020
$22,800 to Present
Approved 11/19/2015
CA COVID-19 I.H. N $72,000.00 2/4/2020 7/4/2020
$22,800 to Present
Approved 3/16/2010
CA COVID-19 E.I. N $72,000.00 2/3/2020 7/9/2020
$22,800 to Present
Approved 9/10/2010
CA COVID-19 A.K. N $72,000.00 2/2/2020 7/25/2020
$22,800 to Present
Approved 10/13/2011
CA COVID-19 B.K. N $72,000.00 2/2/2020 7/25/2020
$21,900 to Present
DOL-OIG further investigated each of these inmate-
claims through a review of EDD records, CDCR records, and
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discussions with CDCR representatives. Below are examples of
some of the findings:
a. Inmate-Claimant I.H.: An EDD claim in I.H.’s
name and using I.H.’s social security number was filed on July
4, 2020. EDD claim records indicate that I.H.’s claim for EDD
benefits reported that he lost work due to COVID-19 and earned
an annual salary of $72,000 before his loss of employment. His
reported last day of work was June 27, 2020; however, CDCR
records indicate that I.H. has been incarcerated since November
19, 2015. Further investigation revealed that the Target IP
address, registered to SUBJECT PREMISES 1, was used to file the
claim. Kim’s Former Beach Boulevard Apartment was listed as
I.H.’s mailing address on the application. Bank of America
(“BofA”) records indicate that an EDD debit card issued in the
name of I.H., ending 9474, was mailed to Kim’s Former Beach
Boulevard Apartment on July 10, 2020. BofA records indicate
that I.H.’s card was used multiple times from July 19, 2020 to
September 13, 2020, including 9 purchases totaling $2,300.86 and
20 ATM withdrawals totaling $20,003. Surveillance footage
associated with the ATM withdrawals show a person matching KIM’s
description, as well as currently unknown associates, making
multiple withdrawals using the card in I.H.’s name.
b. Inmate-Claimant W.B.: An EDD claim in W.B.’s
name and using W.B.’s social security number was filed on May
30, 2020. EDD claim records indicate that W.B.’s claim for EDD
benefits reported that he lost work due to COVID-19 and earned
an annual salary of $72,000 before his loss of employment. His
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reported last day of work was May 23, 2020; however, CDCR
records indicate that W.B. has been incarcerated since December
28, 2017. Further investigation revealed that the Target IP
address, registered to SUBJECT PREMISES 1, was used to file the
claim. SUBJECT PREMISES 1 was also listed as W.B.’s mailing
address on the application. BofA records indicate that an EDD
debit card issued in the name of W.B. was mailed to SUBJECT
PREMISES 1 on June 5, 2020. 4
c. Inmate-Claimant E.I.: An EDD claim in E.I.’s
name and using E.I.’s social security number was filed on July
9, 2020. Similar to the other claims, EDD claim records
indicate that E.I.’s claim for EDD benefits reported that he
lost work due to COVID-19 and earned an annual salary of $72,000
prior his loss of employment. His reported last day of work was
July 4, 2020; however, CDCR records indicate that E.I. has been
incarcerated since March 16, 2010. EDD records indicate that IP
address 172.118.206.165 was used to file the claim. 5 Further
investigation revealed that E.I.’s application listed KIM’s
Former Beach Boulevard Apartment as the mailing address. BofA
records indicate that a debit card, ending in 4746, was issued
in E.I.’s name and mailed to KIM’s Former Beach Boulevard
4 KIM had this card in his possession when LVMPD arrested
him on September 15, 2020, and it was subsequently seized.
Following its seizure, BofA records indicate another card was
issued to W.B. and mailed to SUBJECT PREMISES 1 on September 21,
2020. This second card was found in KIM’s possession during the
November 15, 2020 arrest in La Habra, California.
5This IP address was also used in at least 56 EDD claims,
54 of which used KIM’s Former Beach Boulevard Apartment as the
mailing address.
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Apartment on July 13, 2020. Later, BofA surveillance shows a
man matching KIM’s description making a $1,000 withdrawal from a
BofA ATM located near Beach Boulevard and La Habra Boulevard in
La Habra, California on August 27, 2020.
Further review of additional Bank of America
surveillance shows a suspect matching KIM making numerous $1,000
withdrawals using EDD cards in names other than his own. Many
of these withdraws occurred at ATMs near SUBJECT PREMISES 1.
5. DOL-OIG Determines that KIM is Responsible for
over $3.0 Million Fraudulent EDD Payments and
That He and Others Withdrew At Least $1.9 Million
in Cash
All told, DOL-OIG agents determined that KIM has filed
or caused the filing of at least 400 fraudulent EDD claims, with
at least 120 of these fraudulent claims filed in the name of
inmates at California correctional institutions. Ultimately,
DOL-OIG determined that EDD paid out at least $3.0 million on
the approximately 400 EDD claims associated with KIM from
approximately March 30, 2020 to September 8, 2020.
A significant portion of EDD benefits that were paid,
at least $1.9 million, were withdrawn in cash ATM withdrawals by
KIM and unknown co-conspirators. As a result, law enforcement
believes that KIM still possesses a significant amount of cash
at any one or multiple SUBJECT PREMISES. Indeed, in this
regard, law enforcement learned that, in late September 2020,
KIM made multiple large cash purchases, including a brand new,
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2020 model year Dodge Ram Rebel truck, which KIM purchased with
approximately $81,500 in cash. 6
D. LHPD Stops KIM in November 2020 and Finds
Methamphetamine and Drugs in a “Clear Point Logistics”
Parcel
Most recently, KIM was arrested by local police and
found to be in possession of methamphetamine, additional EDD
materials, and a package of drugs from “Clear Point Logistics.”
Specifically, at approximately 12:55 a.m. on November
15, 2020, LHPD pulled over KIM, who was driving alone in his new
Dodge Ram Rebel truck, for multiple violations of the California
Vehicle Code. Before the stop, LHPD first saw KIM’s truck
depart the business complex where SUBJECT PREMISES 3 is located.
Upon exiting the complex, an officer saw the truck enter an
intersection, then it suddenly braked and stopped. The truck
then reversed back into the business complex where SUBJECT
PREMISE 3 was located, in violation of California Vehicle Code
Section 22106. The officer then saw the truck wait for
approximately 45 seconds behind the limit line with its turning
signal activated. The officer then saw that the truck had
heavily tinted windows and lacked a front license plate, both
violations of the California Vehicle Code. As the officer
passed the truck, the truck then made an immediate right turn,
opposite its original direction of travel, and sped off. The
officer made a U-turn and visually observed the truck going
approximately 80 miles per hour, in violation of the 50 mile per
6Notably, during the relevant time period, KIM had no
reported wage income, according to EDD.
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hour speed limit. The officer then conducted a traffic stop of
the truck.
After pulling over the truck, LHPD ran a records check
on KIM, which showed that KIM was on formal probation through
Los Angeles County with full search and seizure terms, including
his person and any vehicles under his control. The truck came
back registered to KIM at SUBJECT PREMISES 4.
KIM told officers that he was driving home from work,
which he identified as a business that he owned. Officers later
found a utility bill for SUBJECT PREMISES 3 in the truck. LHPD
then asked KIM what he was on probation for. KIM responded
“sales.” 7 When they asked what he was selling, KIM responded
“drugs.” The officers then asked, “what kind of drugs?” KIM
responded, “meth.” 8
Pursuant to the terms of KIM’s probation, LHPD asked
KIM to exit the truck. LHPD then conducted a search of his
person. During the search, LHPD discovered a large quantity of
cash in KIM’s back pocket, which KIM identified as $10,000 cash
7 The quotes are not verbatim as no transcript from the stop
exists at this time. Rather, the quotations reflect what KIM
said in substance based on the officer’s body-worn camera
footage.
8A subsequent review of KIM’s criminal history reveals that
he has several convictions, including, among others, a
conviction for manufacturing a controlled substance in 2014;
possession of a controlled substance in 2014; misdemeanor
burglary in 2014; bringing a controlled substance into prison in
2015; possession of a controlled substances in 2016; possession
of a controlled substances in 2017; possession of 10 or more IDs
with intent to defraud in 2019; and possession of a controlled
substance for sale in 2019.
18
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in $100 bills. KIM said the money was for his rent, which he
said was approximately $6,000 per month.
Officers then asked if there was any methamphetamine
in the car. KIM responded no. Officers then asked KIM if they
could search the truck. KIM consented and asked them to make it
quick.
Officers then searched the truck pursuant to both
KIM’s search terms and his consent. Upon immediately opening
the passenger door, and within seconds of starting the search,
officers saw suspected methamphetamine residue and a suspected
rock of methamphetamine in the truck’s passenger side door
panel. Officers explained to KIM what they had found in this
car. Upon hearing they found methamphetamine, KIM said, “I
don’t have any.” In response, an officer stated that she “could
see it in the side of his car.” KIM responded, “what do you
mean?” At that point, the officer took the suspected
methamphetamine rock from the car and walked it over to show KIM
directly. The officer even shined her flashlight on it. KIM
continued to appear to play coy, and said, “what is that?” KIM
claimed he “had no idea” what it was and asked the officer “are
you sure?” when she told him it was methamphetamine.
Officers then continued the search of KIM’s truck.
During the search, officers located a black bag on the front
seat containing a digital scale covered in suspected
methamphetamine residue, a glass jar of marijuana, a computer
hard drive, and a black container labeled as “moonrocks.” The
officer asked KIM what “moonrocks” were. KIM responded that
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they were a type of marijuana, indicating that he knew about the
contents of the bag and had control over the items inside,
including the digital scale. Inside the car, officers also
found a fluorescent grow light still inside its original
packaging and other items related to the cultivation of
marijuana. KIM told officers he was growing marijuana for
personal consumption.
In the front seat of the vehicle, LHPD located a
sealed mail parcel, which was labeled from “Clear Point
Logistics,” P.O. Box 2305, La Habra, California 90632 and
addressed to an individual in Colorado. 9 LHPD asked KIM if that
parcel belonged to him. KIM only answered that it was outgoing
mail. Based on the fact that KIM had possession of this parcel
in the truck, knew of the outgoing status of the parcel, and was
on probation with search terms, LHPD opened the parcel. Within
the parcel, officers found white rectangular pills believed to
be Alprazolam (also known as Xanax).
In the truck’s backseat, LHPD found an orange backpack
which contained an electroshock weapon (commonly referred to as
a taser) and a white pill bottle with KIM’s name in the front
zippered compartment along with bills in KIM’s name. The larger
compartment of the backpack was locked closed with a combination
lock. LHPD asked KIM for the combination to the lock on the
backpack. KIM stated the backpack did not belong to him and
that it belonged to his girlfriend. Based on the fact that KIM
Clear Point Logistics was the company on the package
9
containing methamphetamine that KIM was seen mailing to Hawaii
in November 2019, as discussed above.
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was on probation and subject to search terms, the truck was
registered to KIM (who was the sole occupant), and KIM’s
property (including his prescription medication and bills) was
found inside the backpack, officers forced entry into the
backpack with a knife.
Within the locked compartment, LHPD located several
pieces of EDD mail, bills, booking information from a prior
arrest of KIM, two cell phones, several Visa cards in various
individuals’ names other than KIM’s, two clear plastic baggies,
and a black container containing what later tested positive for
approximately 22.049 grams of methamphetamine. Notably, many of
EDD cards and EDD mailings found in the truck were addressed to
various individuals at SUBJECT PREMISES 1. Officers also
located a yellow pill bottle labeled with a female’s name.
Inside that bottle, LHPD located three different types of pills,
one of which was suspected to be Alprazolam.
During the search of the truck, officers also found an
additional stack of cash, similar to the stack of cash found on
KIM, as well as a third stack of cash in some bags. All told,
officers seized approximately $26,778 in cash from KIM’s person
and the truck.
Officers arrested KIM for the possession of the drugs
and seized his digital devices, contraband, cash, bags, debit
cards, EDD materials, and other items as evidence. The truck
was impounded as evidence.
On December 14, 2020, Magistrate Judge
Gail J. Standish issued a federal search warrant for KIM’s truck
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and the four digital devices found inside. Law enforcement then
executed a search of the truck. During the search, officers
found a Spectrum Business mailing addressed to “Clear Point
Logistics” at SUBJECT PREMISES 3, causing them to believe that
Clear Point Logistics is operating from that location. Officers
also found the truck’s DMV registration, which listed KIM as the
registered owner at SUBJECT PREMISES 4, a Colorado state ID with
KIM’s name and image, and mailing address to KIM at KIM’s Former
Beach Boulevard apartment, and 3010 Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, among others.
In addition, officers found a notebook inside KIM’s
truck. Inside the notebook, officers found, among other items,
a bill of sale for an Aprilia motorcycle for $9,500 cash on
September 4, 2020 as well as documents referencing KIM’s
purchase of a Harley Davidson motorcycle in cash on or around
September 8, 2020. The notebook also contained a handwritten
ledger of expenses, including expenses for “Ram Truck $60K,”
“Ducati 1199 $15K,” and “Aprilia RSV4 $15k,” which appear to be
references to KIM’s truck and motorcycles. The handwritten
ledger also includes cash notations, including “$80K cash,”
“$90k cash, “$290K cash,” and “$120K cash Mom.”
A search of the digital devices found in KIM’s truck
revealed, among other items, numerous images of large quantities
of suspected methamphetamine, significant quantities of cash,
miscellaneous pills, a pill press, and a gun. There were also
images of notes that referenced a pill press and bitcoin. The
digital devices also included indicia of KIM’s ownership,
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including pictures of his driver license, photos of himself
(including KIM holding cash), references to Clear Point
Logistics, and receipts for Clear Point Logistics shipments to
Hawaii in November 2019.
In addition, the digital devices contained a
screenshot of a conversation between a person believed to be KIM
and an individual named Peter. KIM appears to say “I need to
know ASAP it’s very important. I got 50K on the line here bro.”
Peter responds, “Yo eddie I just told you how I feel after
taking a qtr of it . . . I just snorted half of one so I told
you I’ll let you know here soon if I feel anything.” Based on
my training and experience and conversations with other law
enforcement officers, I believe this conversation is in
reference to the production and distribution of illicit drugs.
E. Law Enforcement’s Investigation and Continued
Surveillance of KIM Shows He Operates Out of All
SUBJECT PREMISES and Has Connections to Each
During the investigation, law enforcement has
identified KIM’s multiple contacts at each of the SUBJECT
PREMISES. As a result of these pending investigations, law
enforcement believes the SUBJECT PREMISES contain evidence
related to these investigations, including, but not limited to,
drug trafficking and EIP and EDD fraud. Law enforcement also
believes these SUBJECT PREMISES likely contain large amounts of
cash from the approximately $3.0 million in fraudulent EDD funds
that KIM received.
23
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1. SUBJECT PREMISES 1 – KIM’s Apartment
Based on records provided from the landlord, law
enforcement determined that KIM is the current lessee of SUBJECT
PREMISES 1, an apartment in Los Angeles, since April 2020
through the present. Moreover, law enforcement determined that
rent payments for SUBJECT PREMISES 1 were paid from KIM’s
Bancorp 6759 account and EDD cards in the names of two CDCR
inmates, including one found in KIM’s possession during his Las
Vegas arrest. Each EDD card used SUBJECT PREMISES 1 as a
mailing address.
Around the fall 2020, the owner of SUBJECT PREMISES 1
reported to law enforcement that an unknown white male was
staying at SUBJECT PREMISES 1. The owner reported that the
unidentified white male was creating disturbances at SUBJECT
PREMISES 1, including climbing down apartment balconies and,
more recently, stealing artwork and packages from the common
areas. The owner observed the white male on numerous occasions
waiting for the mail man, who handed mail directly to him
instead of putting them in the mailboxes located in the lobby.
The owner reported seeing on one occasion about 50 EDD letters
all addressed to different individuals and the postal carrier
could not fit them all into the mailbox for SUBJECT PREMISES 1.
When the owner asked the white male who he was, the white male
told the owner that he is an associate of KIM’s and that he is
taking care of things for KIM at SUBJECT PREMISES 1. When the
owner asked the white male to sign a lease for the unit, the
white male stated that he does not live there and is just taking
24
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care of business for KIM while KIM is in Denver. The owner
stated he called KIM approximately a month ago to ask for
overdue rent payment, and KIM stated during the call that he is
having issues with his account and will be sending payment soon.
Law enforcement reviewed surveillance from SUBJECT
PREMISES 1 containing the unidentified white male. Law
enforcement subsequently determined that the unidentified white
male seen at SUBJECT PREMISES 1 matched the description of a co-
conspirator who was seen on BofA surveillance withdrawing money
from fraudulently-issued EDD cards. For example, BofA
surveillance shows the unidentified white male seen at SUBJECT
PREMISES 1, and an unidentified Asian female recently seen
entering SUBJECT PREMISES 1 on February 5, 2021, have also made
multiple ATM withdrawals from EDD cards that were found in KIM’s
possession during his Las Vegas arrest. BofA surveillance shows
the unidentified white male making withdrawals on at least a
dozen occasions from various cards found in KIM’s possession
during his Law Vegas arrest. For instance, on August 16, 2020,
the unidentified white male withdrew $1,000 from an EDD card in
the name of CDCR inmate I.H. Based on Google Maps, this BofA
ATM is approximately 0.3 miles from SUBJECT PREMISES 1. 10
Additionally, on July 22, 2020, the unidentified Asian
female recently seen entering SUBJECT PREMISES 1 withdrew $1,000
As discussed below, I know it is common for EDD
10
fraudsters to send EDD correspondence to addresses under their
control, rather than where they actually live. This allows the
fraudster to access the mail while putting one layer of
separation between themselves and the mailings in order to evade
detection by law enforcement.
25
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from three EDD cards at a BofA ATM located near Western Avenue
and Olympic Boulevard in Los Angeles. Again, each of the cards
used for those withdrawals were found in KIM’s possession during
his Las Vegas arrest, including one in the name of CDCR inmate
E.I.
Most recently, law enforcement has observed one of
KIM’s cars in the vicinity of SUBJECT PREMISES 1. Specifically,
in January 2021, LHPD received a GPS warrant for one of KIM’s
cars from Orange County Superior Court Judge Nancy Zeltzer. 11
This GPS tracker shows pings from KIM’s car within the vicinity
of SUBJECT PREMISES 1 on several occasions, with one ping as
recently as February 4, 2021, which was within 10 to 15 meters
of SUBJECT PREMISES 1.
Recent postal records show that, on February 9, 2021,
KIM placed a mail hold for all mail delivered to SUBJECT
PREMISES 1. The mail hold began on February 9, 2021 with an end
date of March 11, 2021. The instructions on the hold state
“Please do not deliver to mailbox and only release to the
authorized tenant on the leasing agreement, Mr. Edward Kim.”
Further review of EDD records shows that additional
5$2 $&
EDD mailings were mailed to SUBJECT PREMISES 2021 as recently as
January 2021.
All told, law enforcement connected SUBJECT PREMISES 1
to approximately 78 fraudulent EDD applications and 129
fraudulent tax returns.
KIM has additional cars and motorcycles which were not
11
tracked. Thus, law enforcement is only aware of the movements
of one of KIM’s vehicles.
26
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2. SUBJECT PREMISES 2 – FOSTER’s Residence
SUBJECT PREMISES 2 is the backroom or any other areas
under PALOMA FOSTER’s control, whether attached or unattached,
at the single-family residence located at 113 South Grandview
Avenue, Covina, CA 91723. During the investigation, law
enforcement spoke with the owner of the property who told law
enforcement that he rents a “backroom” to FOSTER. During the
investigation, law enforcement and other witnesses have
identified KIM and FOSTER as being present at SUBJECT PREMISES 2
throughout the relevant periods. A review of the CLEAR database
also shows that FOSTER and KIM are associated with SUBJECT
PREMISES 2.
Most recently, law enforcement observed FOSTER at
SUBJECT PREMISES 2 on February 13, 2021. Further review shows
that FOSTER is still using SUBJECT PREMISES 2. For example, she
recently renewed her driver’s license and listed SUBJECT
PREMISES 2 in the renewal application, dated February 3, 2021.
In addition, FOSTER recently confirmed SUBJECT PREMISES 2 as her
mailing address on her own individual EDD application, which she
updated on February 15, 2021.
As a result, law enforcement believes that FOSTER and
KIM still occasionally reside at and have access to SUBJECT
PREMISES 2.
All told, law enforcement connected SUBJECT PREMISES 2
to approximately four fraudulent EDD applications and three bank
accounts registered in FOSTER’s name at this address were linked
to dozens of fraudulent tax return filings.
27
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3. SUBJECT PREMISES 3 – KIM’s Corporate Suite
SUBJECT PREMISES 3 is a corporate suite that KIM is
currently renting in the name of “Clear Point Logistics.” Law
enforcement believes it may be associated with KIM’s drug
trafficking activities.
Law enforcement has surveilled SUBJECT PREMISES 3 on
multiple occasions. During this surveillance, the corporate
suite appears vacant. It has no visible signage and no name on
the door or elsewhere, as depicted in the picture below. It
does not appear open to the public. Law enforcement, however,
observed KIM’s cars at SUBJECT PREMISES 3 on multiple occasions.
Law enforcement subsequently conducted additional
investigation into Clear Point Logistics. That investigation
revealed that Clear Point Logistics is a California-registered
Limited Liability Company. According to the Secretary of State,
the business was registered on June 17, 2020. The entity’s
mailing address is listed as KIM’s Former Beach Boulevard
Apartment. Legalzoom.com is the listed agent for service of
28
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process for Clear Point Logistics. 12 Further investigation
determined that Clear Point Logistics is not registered to do
business in the City of La Habra. The City of La Habra has no
records of any business or person at SUBJECT PREMISES 3, and it
considered the unit to be vacant.
Law enforcement obtained the landlord of the building
housing SUBJECT PREMISES 3. The records revealed that that, on
July 14, 2020, KIM, acting as a guarantor, entered into a one-
year lease for SUBJECT PREMISES 3 on behalf of Clear Point
Logistics. The lease term runs from August 1, 2020 to July 31,
2021. Leasing records for SUBJECT PREMISES 3 also list KIM as a
representative of Clear Point Logistics with a contact address
as SUBJECT PREMISES 1.
Most recently, law enforcement has repeatedly seen
KIM’s cars at SUBJECT PREMISES 3, including as recently as
February 25, 2021. Law enforcement has also observed KIM’s
father at SUBJECT PREMISES 3.
Based on the investigation as a whole, and the
evidence set forth above, law enforcement believes that KIM and
any co-conspirators are not engaged in legitimate business
activity and that SUBJECT PREMISES 3 and Clear Point Logistics
are permeated by fraud. Among other things, this is because the
business entity was only recently created; the business entity
was created using the services of Legalzoom.com, which was paid
One of the EDD card associated with KIM had multiple
12
Legalzoom.com charges, including a registered agent fee, from
between June and July 2020, the time when Clear Point Logistics
was organized.
29
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for with fraudulently obtained EDD funds; the business entity is
not registered to do business in the City of La Habra; the City
of La Habra has no record of any business or person currently at
SUBJECT PREMISES 3; SUBJECT PREMISES 3 appears vacant from the
outside; SUBJECT PREMISES 3 has no visible signage or name on
the exterior; SUBJECT PREMISES 3 shows no signs of any
legitimate business activity; SUBJECT PREMISES 3 was used as a
mailing address for 17 EDD claims, including at least 7
identified as from inmates; and, finally, KIM appears to be
using the name Clear Point Logistics to ship drugs around the
country, including methamphetamine to Hawaii and Alprazolam to
Colorado.
4. SUBJECT PREMISES 4 – KIM’s New Luxury Apartment
Lastly, law enforcement involved in the investigation
believes that SUBJECT PREMISES 4 is KIM’s new downtown luxury
apartment. Leasing documents indicate KIM began leasing SUBJECT
PREMISES 4 on July 25, 2020. Moreover, law enforcement believes
that KIM is using money received from EDD to pay for this
apartment. Specifically, BofA records indicate that a
fraudulently-obtained EDD card associated with KIM was used to
pay for fees related to the rental application of SUBJECT
PREMISES 2. 13 In addition, KIM listed SUBJECT PREMISES 4 as the
address on the sale documents for the Dodge truck he purchased
on September 28, 2020.
The application for this EDD card was filed from the
13
Target IP Address with a mailing address of KIM’s Former Beach
Boulevard Apartment.
30
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Law enforcement believes that KIM is residing at
SUBJECT PREMISES 4 and FOSTER is known to frequent the residence
as well. Specifically, in mid-January 2021, law enforcement
observed KIM’s motorcycle and FOSTER’s car present at SUBJECT
PREMISES 4. In addition, the landlord of SUBJECT PREMISES 4
provided law enforcement with recent surveillance showing KIM at
SUBJECT PREMISES 4.
V. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS AND
COIVD-19 RELATED FRAUD
Since 1935, the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Unemployment Insurance (“UI”) program has provided unemployment
benefits to eligible workers who become unemployed through no
fault of their own. This program ensures that at least a
significant portion of the necessities of life--most notably
food, shelter, and clothing--are met on a weekly basis while the
worker seeks employment. UI beneficiaries who meet the
requirements of the applicable state law are eligible for this
temporary financial assistance. Each state administers a
separate UI program within the guidelines established by Federal
law. In California, the EDD administers the UI program for
residents and others physically performing work activities in
California.
Generally speaking, regular UI claimants must be:
(1) unemployed through no fault of their own; (2) able and
available for work; (3) willing to accept suitable work; and (4)
actively seeking work.
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On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States
declared the COVID-19 pandemic an emergency under the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. On March
27, 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(“CARES Act”) was enacted to provide emergency assistance and
health care response for individuals, families, and businesses
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The CARES Act included,
among others, the establishment of (1) the Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance (“PUA”) benefit to provide financial assistance to
individuals who are out of work due to the pandemic, including
those who do not usually qualify for regular state UI such as
self-employed, contract, and “gig workers,” (2) the Pandemic
Emergency Unemployment Compensation (“PEUC”) benefit, a 13-week
benefit extension for people who have used all benefits
available in their regular UI claim, and (3) the Pandemic
Additional Compensation (“PAC”) benefit, an additional $600
federal stimulus payment automatically added to each week of
benefits received between March 29, 2020 and July 25, 2020.
Prior to the enactment of the CARES Act, to be
eligible for UI administered by California’s EDD, a person must
have been employed and worked in California and received at
least a certain amount of wages from an employer in the 18
months preceding his/her UI benefits claim. Because of this
requirement, self-employed workers, independent contractors, and
employees with insufficient earnings were not eligible to
receive regular UI benefits.
32
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Under the PUA program, workers who are not eligible
for regular UI benefits but are unemployed or partially
unemployed for a COVID-19-related reason permissible under
federal law may receive unemployment benefits for up to 46
weeks. Under the PEUC program, workers who are eligible for the
regular UI benefits for up to 26 weeks may receive an additional
13 weeks of benefits for a total of 39 weeks. Under the PAC
program, an individual receiving a regular UI benefit, a PUA
benefit, or a PEUC benefit between March 29, 2020 and July 25,
2020, the EDD pays an additional $600 in CARES Act funds to each
week of benefits.
California EDD began accepting applications for PUA
benefits on or about April 28, 2020. To make benefits available
as quickly as possible, payments are issued in phases. If a
claimant qualifies for PUA benefits, the minimum payments are as
follows based on the claim’s start date:
a. Phase 1: For claims with start dates from
February 2, 2020 to March 28, 2020, $167 per week for each week
the claimant is unemployed due to COVID-19.
b. Phase 2: For claims with start dates from March
29, 2020 to July 25, 2020, $167 plus $600 per week for each week
the claimant is unemployed due to COVID-19.
c. Phase 3: For claims with start dates from July
26, 2020 to December 26, 2020, $167 per week for each week the
claimant is unemployed due to COVID-19.
33
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PUA applicants may be eligible for more than the
minimum weekly benefit amount of $167 if their annual income for
2019 reported on the PUA application meets a minimum threshold.
A UI claimant can usually collect 26 weeks of regular
state UI benefits. As noted above, the CARES Act allows for
additional PEUC benefit to provide up to 13 weeks of additional
payments, for a total of 39 weeks of benefits. PEUC is
available to persons who were or are fully or partially
unemployed at any time between from March 29, 2020 through
December 26, 2020. Persons with a regular UI claim, a PUA
claim, or a PEUC extension filed between March 29, 2020 and July
25, 2020, also receive Federal Pandemic Unemployment
Compensation (“FPUC”), which is the extra $600 per week.
Between July 25, 2020 and September 5, 2020, the FPUC benefit
amount was an extra $300 per week, instead of an extra $600 per
week.
Persons applying for PUA benefits do not need to
submit any supporting documents to the EDD with their
applications. Claimants enter their total income for the 2019
calendar year on the application. The stated income will be
used to pay the minimum benefits of $167 per week. EDD may
request documentation to provide proof of the stated income. 14
If the income information provided by the PUA claimant meets an
annual earnings threshold of $17,368 or more, the EDD will work
as quickly as possible to verify the claimant’s income using
In general, EDD accepts items such as an annual tax
14
return, 1099 forms, W-2s, and pay stubs as proof of income.
34
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other resources available to EDD in order to increase the PUA
weekly benefit amount.
Like regular UI claims, PUA claims can be filed
online. When an individual files a PUA claim online, EDD
automatically maintains certain information regarding the filing
of the claim. This information includes the date and time the
claim was submitted, the name of the person for whom the claim
was filed, and the Internet Protocol (“IP”) address of the
computer, or Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) account, that was
used to file the claim.
A PUA claimant must answer various questions to
establish his or her eligibility for PUA benefits. The claimant
must provide his or her name, social security number, and
mailing address. The claimant must also identify a qualifying
occupational status and COVID-19-related reason for being out of
work.
After it accepts a UI claim, including a claim
submitted pursuant to the PUA program, EDD typically deposits UI
funds every two weeks to a BofA-administered Electronic Benefit
Payment (“EBP”) debit card, which the claimant can use to pay
for his/her expenses. This EBP card is sent via the U.S. Postal
Service to the claimant at the address the claimant provides in
their UI claim. Claimants can activate their debit card over
the phone or online.
When receiving regular UI benefits, a claimant must
complete a Continued Claim Form (DE 4581) and certify every two
weeks, under penalty of perjury, that he/she remains unemployed
35
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and eligible to receive UI benefits. EDD authorizes and
deposits payment to the EBP debit card after it receives the
Continued Claim Form. At present, weekly PUA benefits typically
range from $40 to $450. In order to receive the maximum weekly
benefit of $450, a claimant must have earned $11,674.01 or more
in the highest quarter of the claimant's base employment
period. 15
The submission of the PUA claims cause mailings to the
addresses provided on the claims, including mailings of EBP
debit cards administered by BofA that are used to access the
fraudulently obtained UI benefits. The co-schemers and their
associates use the EBP debit cards to withdraw the fraudulently
obtained UI benefits by making cash withdrawals at Automated
Teller Machines and point of sale (POS) purchases at merchants
across the United States.
Based on my conversations with other law enforcement
officers, I know that individuals scheming to fraudulently
obtain UI benefits generally follow recognizable patterns,
including, among other indicia:
a. Co-schemers commonly buy or outright steal the
personally identifiable information (“PII”) of other people to
file for fraudulent UI benefits in the ID-theft victims’ names
and then collect the UI funds. Co-schemers often buy PII from
15 The combination of regular UI, PUA, and/or FPUC claims
are henceforth collectively referred to as “UI claims.”
Similarly, the combination of regular UI, PUA, and/or FPUC
benefits are henceforth collectively referred to as “UI
benefits.”
36
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other fraudsters or from the Dark Web 16 (using cryptocurrency
such as Bitcoin) and verify that the PII belongs to real persons
by checking the PII at background check websites such as
Beenverified, Spokeo, Intelius, and Whitepages.
b. Using addresses the schemers control as the addresses
submitted to EDD for the claims so that EBP debit cards and
other EDD correspondence will be mailed to these addresses and
thus be accessible to the schemers. In this regard, fraudsters
sometimes typically do not use their actual residences, but
rather other addresses they control, in order to evade
detection. Once the EBP debit cards arrive, co-schemers
commonly withdraw UI benefits via ATMs or make POS purchases at
merchants for goods and services.
c. Submitting multiple UI claims from the same IP address
for multiple claimants. These claims are sometimes submitted on
the same day close in time.
d. Providing the same phone number or no phone number for
multiple UI claims for different claimants. The phone number is
usually one the schemers control.
e. Submitting multiple UI claims without providing a
driver’s license number or state identification number.
Dark Web is the set of web pages on the Internet that
16
cannot be indexed by search engines, are not viewable in a
standard web browser, require specific means (such as
specialized software or network configuration) in order to
access, and use encryption to provide anonymity and privacy for
users. Dark Web has become the Internet’s black market in
recent years where visitors can make illegal purchases of PII,
guns, and drugs, and trade child pornography.
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VI. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON THE SUBJECT OFFENSES
Based on my training, education, and experience, and
discussions with other law enforcement personnel, along with
information provided by sources of information and confidential
sources, I know the following:
a. UI fraudsters often keep large amounts of United
States currency on hand. Fraudsters commonly maintain such
currency where they have ready access to it, such as in their
homes and vehicles. It is also common for fraudsters to possess
proceeds and items purchased with proceeds in their homes and
vehicles. Thus, it is common for currency, expensive jewelry,
precious metals, or financial instruments to be found in the
possession of UI defrauders.
b. UI fraudsters often maintain UI debit cards and
mailing distributed by state workforce agencies (“SWA”) in order
to continue to receive the funds and utilize them through ATM
transactions or point of sale purchases. Fraudsters commonly
maintain such items in homes, businesses, or in their vehicles.
c. UI fraudsters often maintain paper records of
their fraudulent UI activity. Such records are commonly
maintained for long periods of time and therefore are likely to
be found at the SUBJECT PREMISES.
d. UI fraudsters commonly use computers, cellular
telephones, and other electronic devices to communicate with
other fraudsters about their defrauding activities through the
use of telephone calls, text messages, email, chat rooms, social
media, and other internet and applications based communication
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forums to obtain and distribute personal identifying
information. The fraudsters also utilize these devices to apply
for the UI benefits and to transfer and/receive the benefits.
Therefore, evidence related to UI defrauding is likely to be
found on electronic storage media found at the SUBJECT PREMISES,
as further described below.
e. In addition to items which may constitute
evidence, fruits and/or instrumentalities of the crimes set
forth in this Affidavit, I also request permission to seize any
articles tending to establish the identity of persons who have
dominion and control over the SUBJECT PREMISES, including rent
receipts, utility bills, telephone bills, addressed mail,
personal identification, keys, purchase receipts, sale receipts,
photographs, vehicle pink slips, and vehicle registration.
Based on my training and experience, conversations
with other law enforcement officers, and familiarity with
investigations into fraud and money laundering involving false
tax returns (including government stimulus payments), I know
that individuals scheming to fraudulently obtain economic
assistance payments generally follow recognizable patterns,
including the following, among others:
a. Filing fraudulent tax returns in other persons’
names to collect government funds. In some instances, the tax
returns are from victims of identity theft; in other instances,
the tax returns or claims are from people who have provided
their personal identifying information to the schemers and have
agreed to pay the schemers a portion of the fraudulent benefits
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that are obtained from the tax returns; in yet other instances,
the tax returns or claims are from people who believe they may
be entitled to benefits but do not know that the schemers are
reporting false information to the IRS to fraudulently increase
the amount of the benefits claimed and or received.
b. Using computer, cellphones, and other digital
devices, the schemers submit false tax returns to the IRS and
using a static IP address associated to a residential or
commercially available internet service provider.
c. Using banks accounts controlled by the schemers,
the schemers then list bank account numbers they control on the
false tax returns.
d. Using mailing and physical addresses that the
schemers control, the schemers list these addresses on fake tax
returns so that any checks, payments, and other correspondence
will be mailed to the address and thus intercepted by the
schemers.
e. Finally, the schemers usually withdraw the
fraudulently-obtained economic stimulus payments through ATM
withdrawals from the bank accounts they control, which they
listed on the false tax returns.
Based on my training and experience, conversations
with other law enforcement officers, and familiarity with
investigations into drug trafficking, I know that individuals
involved in drug trafficking generally follow recognizable
patterns, including the following, among others:
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a. Drug traffickers commit crimes that involve
numerous co-conspirators, from lower-level dealers to higher-
level suppliers, as well as associates to process, package, and
deliver the drugs and launder the drug proceeds. Drug
traffickers and fraudsters often travel by car, bus, train, or
airplane, both domestically and to foreign countries, in
connection with their illegal activities in order to meet with
co-conspirators, conduct criminal transactions, and transport
drugs or proceeds obtained from fraudulent activity.
b. Drug traffickers often maintain books, receipts,
notes, ledgers, bank records, and other records related to the
manufacturing, transportation, ordering, sale and distribution
of illegal drugs or proceeds obtained from illegal activity.
The aforementioned records are often maintained where the drug
trafficker has ready access to them, such as in their
residences, businesses, and vehicles, and on their cell phones
and other digital devices.
c. Communications between people buying and selling
drugs take place by telephone calls and messages, such as e-
mail, text messages, and social media messaging applications,
sent to and from cell phones and other digital devices. This
includes sending photos or videos of the drugs between the
seller and the buyer, the negotiation of price, and discussion
of whether or not participants will bring weapons to a deal. In
addition, it is common for people engaged in drug trafficking
and fraud to have photos and videos on their cell phones of
drugs or others working with them, as they frequently send these
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photos to each other and others to boast about their illicit
activities.
d. Drug traffickers, like fraudsters, often keep the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of their associates on
their digital devices. Drug traffickers often keep records of
meetings with associates, customers, and suppliers on their
digital devices, including in the form of calendar entries and
location data.
e. Individuals engaged in the illegal purchase or
sale of drugs and other contraband often use multiple digital
devices, including rotating the usage of telephone numbers to
avoid law enforcement detection. Narcotics traffickers often
require the use of one or more digital devices to negotiate
times, places, schemes, and manners for importing, possessing,
concealing, manufacturing, and distributing controlled
substances and for arranging the disposition of proceeds from
the sale of controlled substances.
From my training, personal experience, and the
collective experiences related to me by other law enforcement
officers who conduct firearms investigations, I am aware of the
following:
a. Persons who possess, purchase, or sell firearms
generally maintain records of their firearm transactions as
items of value and usually keep them in their residences,
vehicles, and stash houses, or in places that are readily
accessible, and under their physical control, such as in their
digital devices. It has been my experience that prohibited
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individuals who own firearms illegally will keep the contact
information of the individual who is supplying firearms to
prohibited individuals or other individuals involved in criminal
activities for future purchases or referrals. Such information
is also kept on digital devices.
b. Many people also keep mementos of their firearms,
including digital photographs or recordings of themselves
possessing or using firearms on their digital devices. These
photographs and recordings are often shared via social media,
text messages, and over text messaging applications.
c. Those who illegally possess firearms often sell
their firearms and purchase firearms. Correspondence between
persons buying and selling firearms often occurs over phone
calls, e-mail, text message, and social media message to and
from smartphones, laptops, or other digital devices. This
includes sending photos of the firearm between the seller and
the buyer, as well as negotiation of price. In my experience,
individuals who engage in street sales of firearms frequently
use phone calls, e-mail, and text messages to communicate with
each other regarding firearms that the sell or offer for sale.
In addition, it is common for individuals engaging in the
unlawful sale of firearms to have photographs of firearms they
or other individuals working with them possess on their cellular
phones and other digital devices as they frequently send these
photos to each other to boast of their firearms possession
and/or to facilitate sales or transfers of firearms.
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VII. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DIGITAL DEVICES 17
Based on my training, experience, and information from
those involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I
know that the following electronic evidence, inter alia, is
often retrievable from digital devices:
a. Forensic methods may uncover electronic files or
remnants of such files months or even years after the files have
been downloaded, deleted, or viewed via the Internet. Normally,
when a person deletes a file on a computer, the data contained
in the file does not disappear; rather, the data remain on the
hard drive until overwritten by new data, which may only occur
after a long period of time. Similarly, files viewed on the
Internet are often automatically downloaded into a temporary
directory or cache that are only overwritten as they are
replaced with more recently downloaded or viewed content and may
also be recoverable months or years later.
b. Digital devices often contain electronic evidence
related to a crime, the device’s user, or the existence of
evidence in other locations, such as, how the device has been
used, what it has been used for, who has used it, and who has
been responsible for creating or maintaining records, documents,
As used herein, the term “digital device” includes any
17
electronic system or device capable of storing or processing
data in digital form, including central processing units;
desktop, laptop, notebook, and tablet computers; personal
digital assistants; wireless communication devices, such as
paging devices, mobile telephones, and smart phones; digital
cameras; gaming consoles; peripheral input/output devices, such
as keyboards, printers, scanners, monitors, and drives; related
communications devices, such as modems, routers, cables, and
connections; storage media; and security devices.
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programs, applications, and materials on the device. That
evidence is often stored in logs and other artifacts that are
not kept in places where the user stores files, and in places
where the user may be unaware of them. For example, recoverable
data can include evidence of deleted or edited files; recently
used tasks and processes; online nicknames and passwords in the
form of configuration data stored by browser, e-mail, and chat
programs; attachment of other devices; times the device was in
use; and file creation dates and sequence.
c. The absence of data on a digital device may be
evidence of how the device was used, what it was used for, and
who used it. For example, showing the absence of certain
software on a device may be necessary to rebut a claim that the
device was being controlled remotely by such software.
d. Digital device users can also attempt to conceal
data by using encryption, steganography, or by using misleading
filenames and extensions. Digital devices may also contain
“booby traps” that destroy or alter data if certain procedures
are not scrupulously followed. Law enforcement continuously
develops and acquires new methods of decryption, even for
devices or data that cannot currently be decrypted.
Based on my training, experience, and information from
those involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I
know that it is not always possible to search devices for data
during a search of the premises for a number of reasons,
including the following:
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a. Digital data are particularly vulnerable to
inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction. Thus,
often a controlled environment with specially trained personnel
may be necessary to maintain the integrity of and to conduct a
complete and accurate analysis of data on digital devices, which
may take substantial time, particularly as to the categories of
electronic evidence referenced above. Also, there are now so
many types of digital devices and programs that it is difficult
to bring to a search site all of the specialized manuals,
equipment, and personnel that may be required.
b. Digital devices capable of storing multiple
gigabytes are now commonplace. As an example of the amount of
data this equates to, one gigabyte can store close to 19,000
average file size (300kb) Word documents, or 614 photos with an
average size of 1.5MB.
The search warrant requests authorization to use the
biometric unlock features of a device, based on the following,
which I know from my training, experience, and review of
publicly available materials:
a. Users may enable a biometric unlock function on
some digital devices. To use this function, a user generally
displays a physical feature, such as a fingerprint, face, or
eye, and the device will automatically unlock if that physical
feature matches one the user has stored on the device. To
unlock a device enabled with a fingerprint unlock function, a
user places one or more of the user’s fingers on a device’s
fingerprint scanner for approximately one second. To unlock a
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device enabled with a facial, retina, or iris recognition
function, the user holds the device in front of the user’s face
with the user’s eyes open for approximately one second.
b. In some circumstances, a biometric unlock
function will not unlock a device even if enabled, such as when
a device has been restarted or inactive, has not been unlocked
for a certain period of time (often 48 hours or less), or after
a certain number of unsuccessful unlock attempts. Thus, the
opportunity to use a biometric unlock function even on an
enabled device may exist for only a short time. I do not know
the passcodes of the devices likely to be found in the search.
c. Thus, the warrant I am applying for would permit
law enforcement personnel to, with respect to any device that
appears to have a biometric sensor and falls within the scope of
the warrant: (1) depress KIM’s and FOSTER’s thumb and/or fingers
on the device(s); and (2) hold the device(s) in front of KIM’s
and FOSTER’s face with his or her eyes open to activate the
facial-, iris-, and/or retina-recognition feature.
Other than what has been described herein, to my
knowledge, the United States has not attempted to obtain this
data by other means.
///
///
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