Criminal Complaint — U.S. v. Edgar Saul Hernandez, et al., No. 2:21-cr-00544-MCS-DMG (C.D. Cal. 11/10/21)

Summary

A Criminal Complaint, with attachments and an affidavit, in United States of America v. Edgar Saul Hernandez and Jonathan Jesus Perez-Martinez, Case 2:21-cr-00544-MCS-DMG, Document 1, filed 11/10/21, in the U.S. District Court, Central District of California. The complaint lists 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vi), Distribution and Possession With Intent to Distribute Fentanyl, for on or about November 9, 2021, over the signature /s/ Andre. D. LaMon Jr., HSI Special Agent. Attachment A describes digital devices (the SUBJECT DEVICES) seized on November 9, 2021 and in the custody of Homeland Security Investigations. Attachment B lists items to be seized for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846, with a search period not to exceed 120 days.

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“Criminal Complaint — U.S. v. Edgar Saul Hernandez, et al., No. 2:21-cr-00544-MCS-DMG (C.D. Cal. 11/10/21).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-2-21-cr-00544-dkt-1-c-d-cal-1abc99a3ad/, SHA-256 9b876a8e463af696460506869eea765fd5962efde406d5b840e18c6b4ee742fe.

Full text

Case 2:21-cr-00544-MCS-DMG Document 1 Filed 11/10/21 Page 1 of 24 Page ID #:1

AO 91 (Rev. 11/11) Criminal Complaint (Rev. by USAO on 3/12/20) ‫ ܆‬Original ‫ ܆‬Duplicate Original

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
LODGED
for the CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Central District of California 11/10/2021
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
United States of America jb
BY: ____________BB______ DEPUTY

EDGAR SAUL HERNANDEZ, Case No. 2:21-mj-05153-DUTY
JONATHAN JESUS PEREZ-MARTINEZ,

Defendant(s)
11/10/2021

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT BY TELEPHONE KL
OR OTHER RELIABLE ELECTRONIC MEANS

I, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. On or about

the date(s) of November 9, 2021, in the county of Los Angeles in the Central District of California, the defendant(s)

violated:

Code Section Offense Description

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(vi) Distribution and Possession With Intent to Distribute
Fentanyl

This criminal complaint is based on these facts:

Please see attached affidavit.

_ Continued on the attached sheet.

/s/ Andre. D. LaMon Jr.
Complainant’s signature

Andre. D. LaMon Jr., HSI Special Agent
Printed name and title
Attested to by the applicant in accordance with the requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1 by telephone.

Date: November 10, 2021
Judge’s signature

City and state: Los Angeles, California Hon. Alicia G. Rosenberg, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Printed name and title

AUSA: Rachel N. Agress (x0487)
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ATTACHMENT A

PROPERTY TO BE SEARCHED

The following digital devices (the “SUBJECT DEVICES”),

seized on November 9, 2021 and currently maintained in the

custody of Homeland Security Investigations, in Los Angeles,

California:

a blue iPhone 12 Pro Max in clear case with a

“Billionaire Boys” Club sticker (“SUBJECT DEVICE 1”);

a black Samsung with serial number 357014532269263

(“SUBJECT DEVICE 2”);

a blue Motorola with no case (“SUBJECT DEVICE 3”);

a black iPhone (“SUBJECT DEVICE 4”); and

a black Samsung with serial number 357014531754505

(“SUBJECT DEVICE 5”).

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ATTACHMENT B

I. ITEMS TO BE SEIZED

The items to be seized are evidence, contraband,

fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) (possession with intent to distribute controlled

substances) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy and attempt to

distribute controlled substances) (the “Subject Offenses”),

namely:

a. Records, documents, programs, applications and

materials, or evidence of the absence of same, sufficient to

show call log information, including all telephone numbers

dialed from any of the digital devices and all telephone numbers

accessed through any push-to-talk functions, as well as all

received or missed incoming calls;

b. Records, documents, programs, applications or

materials, or evidence of the absence of same, sufficient to

show SMS text, email communications or other text or written

communications sent to or received from any of the digital

devices and which relate to the above-named violations;

c. Records, documents, programs, applications or

materials, or evidence of the absence of same, sufficient to

show instant and social media messages (such as Facebook,

Facebook Messenger, Snapchat, FaceTime, Skype, and WhatsApp),

SMS text, email communications, or other text or written

communications sent to or received from any digital device and

which relate to the above-named violations;

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d. Records, documents, programs, applications,

materials, or conversations relating to the trafficking of

drugs, including ledgers, pay/owe records, distribution or

customer lists, correspondence, receipts, records, and documents

noting price, quantities, and/or times when drugs were bought,

sold, or otherwise distributed;

e. Audio recordings, pictures, video recordings, or

still captured images related to the purchase, sale,

transportation, or distribution of drugs;

f. Contents of any calendar or date book;

g. Global Positioning System (“GPS”) coordinates and

other information or records identifying travel routes,

destinations, origination points, and other locations; and

h. Any SUBJECT DEVICE which is itself or which

contains evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of

the Subject Offenses, and forensic copies thereof.

i. With respect to any SUBJECT DEVICE containing

evidence falling within the scope of the foregoing categories of

items to be seized:

i. evidence of who used, owned, or controlled

the device at the time the things described in this warrant were

created, edited, or deleted, such as logs, registry entries,

configuration files, saved usernames and passwords, documents,

browsing history, user profiles, e-mail, e-mail contacts, chat

and instant messaging logs, photographs, and correspondence;

ii. evidence of the presence or absence of

software that would allow others to control the device, such as

ii
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viruses, Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious software,

as well as evidence of the presence or absence of security

software designed to detect malicious software;

iii. evidence of the attachment of other devices;

iv. evidence of counter-forensic programs (and

associated data) that are designed to eliminate data from the

device;

v. evidence of the times the device was used;

vi. passwords, encryption keys, and other access

devices that may be necessary to access the device;

vii. applications, utility programs, compilers,

interpreters, or other software, as well as documentation and

manuals, that may be necessary to access the device or to

conduct a forensic examination of it;

viii. records of or information about

Internet Protocol addresses used by the device;

ix. records of or information about the device’s

Internet activity, including firewall logs, caches, browser

history and cookies, “bookmarked” or “favorite” web pages,

search terms that the user entered into any Internet search

engine, and records of user-typed web addresses.

2. As used herein, the terms “records,” “documents,”

“programs,” “applications,” and “materials” include records,

documents, programs, applications, and materials created,

modified, or stored in any form, including in digital form on

any digital device and any forensic copies thereof.

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II. SEARCH PROCEDURE FOR THE SUBJECT DEVICES

3. In searching the SUBJECT DEVICES (or forensic copies

thereof), law enforcement personnel executing this search

warrant will employ the following procedure:

a. Law enforcement personnel or other individuals

assisting law enforcement personnel (the “search team”) may

search any SUBJECT DEVICE capable of being used to facilitate

the above-listed violations or containing data falling within

the scope of the items to be seized.

b. The search team will, in its discretion, either

search each SUBJECT DEVICE where it is currently located or

transport it to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory or

similar facility to be searched at that location.

c. The search team shall complete the search of the

SUBJECT DEVICES as soon as is practicable but not to exceed 120

days from the date of issuance of the warrant. The government

will not search the digital device(s) beyond this 120-day period

without obtaining an extension of time order from the Court.

d. The search team will conduct the search only by

using search protocols specifically chosen to identify only the

specific items to be seized under this warrant.

i. The search team may subject all of the data

contained in each SUBJECT DEVICE capable of containing any of

the items to be seized to the search protocols to determine

whether the SUBJECT DEVICE and any data thereon falls within the

scope of the items to be seized. The search team may also

search for and attempt to recover deleted, “hidden,” or

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encrypted data to determine, pursuant to the search protocols,

whether the data falls within the scope of the items to be

seized.

ii. The search team may use tools to exclude

normal operating system files and standard third-party software

that do not need to be searched.

iii. The search team may use forensic examination

and searching tools, such as “EnCase” and “FTK” (Forensic Tool

Kit), which tools may use hashing and other sophisticated

techniques [, including to search for known images of child

pornography.]

e. The search team will not seize contraband or

evidence relating to other crimes outside the scope of the items

to be seized without first obtaining a further warrant to search

for and seize such contraband or evidence.

f. If the search determines that a SUBJECT DEVICE

does not contain any data falling within the list of items to be

seized, the government will, as soon as is practicable, return

the SUBJECT DEVICE and delete or destroy all forensic copies

thereof.

g. If the search determines that a SUBJECT DEVICE

does contain data falling within the list of items to be seized,

the government may make and retain copies of such data, and may

access such data at any time.

h. If the search determines that the SUBJECT DEVICE

is (1) itself an item to be seized and/or (2) contains data

falling within the list of other items to be seized, the

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government may retain the digital device and any forensic copies

of the digital device, but may not access data falling outside

the scope of the other items to be seized (after the time for

searching the device has expired) absent further court order.

i. The government may also retain a SUBJECT DEVICE

if the government, prior to the end of the search period,

obtains an order from the Court authorizing retention of the

device (or while an application for such an order is pending),

including in circumstances where the government has not been

able to fully search a device because the device or files

contained therein is/are encrypted.

j. After the completion of the search of the SUBJECT

DEVICES, the government shall not access digital data falling

outside the scope of the items to be seized absent further order

of the Court.

4. The review of the electronic data obtained pursuant to

this warrant may be conducted by any government personnel

assisting in the investigation, who may include, in addition to

law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the

government, attorney support staff, and technical experts.

Pursuant to this warrant, the investigating agency may deliver

a complete copy of the seized or copied electronic data to the

custody and control of attorneys for the government and their

support staff for their independent review.

5. During the execution of this search warrant, law

enforcement is permitted to (1) depress Edgar Saul HERNANDEZ’s

(“HERNANDEZ”) and Jonathan Jesus PEREZ-MARTINEZ’s (“PEREZ-

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MARTINEZ”) thumb- and/or fingers onto the fingerprint sensor of

the SUBJECT DEVICES (only if the device has such a sensor), and

direct which specific finger(s) and/or thumb(s) shall be

depressed; and (2) hold the device in front of HERNANDEZ’s and

PEREZ-MARTINEZ’s face with his or her eyes open to activate the

facial-, iris-, or retina-recognition feature, in order to gain

access to the contents of any such device. In depressing a

person’s thumb or finger onto a device and in holding a device

in front of a person’s face, law enforcement may not use

excessive force, as defined in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386

(1989); specifically, law enforcement may use no more than

objectively reasonable force in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them.

6. The special procedures relating to digital devices

found in this warrant govern only the search of digital devices

pursuant to the authority conferred by this warrant and do not

apply to any search of digital devices pursuant to any other

court order.

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AFFIDAVIT

I, Andre D. LaMon Jr, being duly sworn, declare and state as

follows:

I. PURPOSE OF AFFIDAVIT

This affidavit is made in support of a criminal

complaint against Edgar Saul HERNANDEZ (“HERNANDEZ”) and

Jonathan Jesus PEREZ-MARTINEZ (“PEREZ-MARTINEZ”), for a

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1): Possession with Intent to

Distribute Fentanyl.

This affidavit is also made in support of an

application for a warrant to search the following digital

devices (collectively, the “SUBJECT DEVICES”), in the custody of

Homeland Security Investigations, in Los Angeles, California, as

described more fully in Attachment A:

a. a blue iPhone 12 Pro Max in clear case with a

“Billionaire Boys” Club sticker (“SUBJECT DEVICE 1”);

b. a black Samsung with IMEI 357014532269263

(“SUBJECT DEVICE 2”);

c. a blue Motorola with no case (“SUBJECT DEVICE

3”);

d. a black iPhone (“SUBJECT DEVICE 4”); and

e. a black Samsung with IMEI number 357014531754505

(“SUBJECT DEVICE 5”).

The requested search warrant seeks authorization to

seize evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (possession with intent to distribute

controlled substances) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy and
Case 2:21-cr-00544-MCS-DMG Document 1 Filed 11/10/21 Page 11 of 24 Page ID #:11

attempt to distribute controlled substances) (the “Subject

Offenses”), as described more fully in Attachment B.

Attachments A and B are incorporated herein by reference.

The facts set forth in this affidavit are based upon

my personal observations, my training and experience, and

information obtained from various law enforcement personnel and

witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there

is sufficient probable cause for the requested complaint and

search warrant and does not purport to set forth all my

knowledge of or investigation into this matter. Unless

specifically indicated otherwise, all conversations and

statements described in this affidavit are related in substance

and in part only.

II. BACKGROUND OF AFFIANT

I am a Special Agent (“SA”) with Homeland Security

Investigations (“HSI”) and have been so employed since September

2018. In May 2019, I completed the Criminal Investigator

Training Program and Homeland Security Investigations Special

Agent Training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

(“FLETC”) and was assigned to Special Agent in Charge Los

Angeles, California. I am currently assigned as a Special Agent

with Los Angeles Interagency Metropolitan Police Apprehension

Crime Taskforce (“LA IMPACT”).

During my training at FLETC in Glynco, Georgia, I was

trained in conducting criminal investigations and I received

hundreds of hours of comprehensive, formalized instruction for

investigations into such matters as the smuggling of narcotics

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and other contraband; firearms trafficking and human

trafficking; narcotics distribution and street gangs; money

laundering; trade fraud; and asset identification, seizure and

forfeiture. I have also participated in investigations

concerning violations of immigration laws, narcotic

possession/sales, and transnational street gangs. I am a

graduate of California State University Long Beach, with a

bachelor’s degree in criminal justice.

In my experience in law enforcement, I have

participated in numerous investigations involving smuggling and

criminal street gangs, to include extortion, vehicle theft and

vehicle smuggling, false document manufacturing and

distribution, trafficking of firearms, and trade fraud. I have

personally led numerous investigations involving the possession,

manufacture, distribution, and importation of controlled

substances from Mexico into the United States. I have also

gained experience in interviewing, debriefing, surveilling, and

arresting persons involved in narcotics violations and criminal

gang activity.

III. SUMMARY OF PROBABLE CAUSE

In June 2021, via a telephone call, a confidential

source (CS)1 introduced an undercover agent (“UC-1”) to a

1 The CS has been providing information and assistance to
local law enforcement and HSI investigators since June 2021.
The CS has pre-2007 convictions for THC/cannabis distribution,
resisting peace officers and disorderly conduct/false reports,
property damage and theft, storage of weapons, battery, and
driving offenses (including a DUI, reckless driving and driving
with a suspended license). The CS has 2019 convictions for THC
(footnote cont’d on next page)

3
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narcotics broker who is believed to reside in Mexico (the

“broker”). UC-1 communicated with the broker via voice notes

and messages on WhatsApp regarding potential narcotics sales.2

The broker arranged for a source of supply, later

identified as PEREZ-MARTINEZ, to sell UC-1 five kilograms of

fentanyl powder for $21,000 per kilogram. UC-1 and the broker

also discussed the potential sale of 50 pounds of

methamphetamine for $1,350 per pound. On November 9, 2021, UC-1

and a second undercover agent also posing as a drug dealer (“UC-

2”) drove to the meeting place to carry out the deal. PEREZ-

MARTINEZ and a passenger, Individual A, arrived in a silver-grey

Toyota, followed by HERNANDEZ in a silver Ford Focus. While

HERNANDEZ and Individual A remained in the cars, PEREZ-MARTINEZ

got out and showed the UCs a hard-sided plastic luggage case in

the trunk of the silver Ford Focus. PEREZ-MARTINEZ indicated

that the narcotics were in the luggage and UC-1 unzipped the

luggage to reveal 4 bricks of suspected fentanyl.

HSI agents arrested PEREZ-MARTINEZ and HERNANDEZ.
Agents recovered SUBJECT DEVICES 1 and 2 from PEREZ-MARTINEZ’s

person, SUBJECT DEVICE 3 from the center console of the silver

distribution. The CS provided information and assistance in
connection with the investigation of the broker in this case, in
exchange for consideration in an investigation into immigration
violations by the CS. The CS has not been charged, has not
currently entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with law
enforcement, and has not received monetary compensation. The CS
has provided information in this investigation that has proved
to be true and correct and has not provided any information that
was later determined to be false or otherwise unreliable.
2 Unless otherwise stated, all calls referenced in this
affidavit and all voice notes were recorded and were in Spanish.
This affidavit relies on translations by a law enforcement
native Spanish speaker.

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Toyota that PEREZ-MARTINEZ was driving, and SUBJECT DEVICES 4

and 5 from the center console of the silver Ford Focus driven by

HERNANDEZ. Agents also recovered a bag of approximately 8

ounces of a substance resembling crystal methamphetamine

underneath HERNANDEZ’s driver seat.

IV. STATEMENT OF PROBABLE CAUSE

Based on my review of law enforcement reports,

conversations with other law enforcement agents, photographs of

evidence, review of text messages, and my own knowledge of the

investigation, I am aware of the following:

A. Beginning in June 2021, UC-1 communicated with a
Mexican narcotics broker about sales of narcotics

In June 2021, the CS introduced an undercover agent

(“UC-1”) to a narcotics broker who is believed to reside in

Mexico (the “broker”). The introduction was made via telephone,

and the CS introduced UC-1 to the broker as a drug dealer.

Following the introduction, UC-1 and the broker began

communicating via voice notes and messages on WhatsApp regarding

potential narcotics sales.

On or about October 18, 2021, UC-1 and the broker

began discussing a narcotics transaction for fentanyl and

methamphetamine in Los Angeles, California. Via WhatsApp, the

broker told UC-1 that the price for fentanyl per kilogram would

be $24,000 and the price for methamphetamine per pound would be

$1,150. The broker told UC-1 he would have a source of supply

in California mail UC-1 a sample of the fentanyl to a shipping

address provided by UC-1 to the broker.

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On October 19, 2021, the broker sent UC-1 a photograph

on WhatsApp of a UPS receipt. The receipt had tracking

information for a package sent to UC-1’s address by a source of

supply in California. That day, HSI Los Angeles seized the

package from the UPS Hub at the Ontario airport in Ontario,

California. The package contained a small amount of white

powdery substance, wrapped in green plastic, fabric softener

dryer sheets and disinfectant wipes. On October 21, 2021, HSI

Los Angeles and Customs and Border Protection Anti-Terrorism

Contraband Enforcement Team personnel field tested the white

powdery substance and it returned positive for fentanyl.

B. The broker arranges for PEREZ-MARTINEZ and HERNANDEZ
to deliver 5 kilograms of fentanyl and 50 pounds of
methamphetamine to UC-1

On or about November 5, 2021, UC-1 spoke with the

broker via WhatsApp regarding the amount of fentanyl and

methamphetamine being purchased in the upcoming narcotics

transaction. UC-1 agreed to buy 5 kilograms of fentanyl and 50

pounds of methamphetamine from a then unknown source of supply

in California for $172,500, on November 9, 2021.

On November 9, 2021, UC-1 spoke with the broker via

WhatsApp and was informed that the narcotics would be arriving

in two separate cars—-a silver-gray car and a silver Ford Focus.

UC-1 was also informed that the source of supply would first

deliver four kilograms of fentanyl, and then would go back and

retrieve the final kilogram of fentanyl. No final deal was

reached at that time about the sale of 50 pounds of

methamphetamine.

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On November 9, 2021, law enforcement set up

surveillance at the prearranged location where the drug sale was

to take place, a shopping center parking lot in Los Angeles.

Law enforcement identified a silver Toyota followed by a silver

Ford Focus entering the parking lot. The two cars parked near

UC-1’s vehicle, and then the silver Ford Focus re-parked

directly next to driver side of UC-1’s vehicle. PEREZ-MARTINEZ

got out of his car and directed HERNANDEZ to open the trunk of

the silver Ford Focus. PEREZ-MARTINEZ showed the UCs a hard-

sided plastic luggage case in the trunk of the silver Ford

Focus. PEREZ-MARTINEZ indicated that the narcotics were in the

luggage and UC-1 unzipped the luggage to reveal four bricks of a

white powdery substance. PEREZ-MARTINEZ assisted UC-1 in moving

the luggage case to the trunk of UC-1’s vehicle.

C. Arrest of PEREZ-MARTINEZ and HERNANDEZ, and search of
vehicles

HSI agents then detained and arrested PEREZ-MARTINEZ

and HERNANDEZ.

Agents seized four bricks of what appeared to be
pressed fentanyl, in red packaging and vacuum-packed bags, from

inside the luggage case in the trunk of UC-1’s vehicle. Based

on my training and experience, the appearance of the packaging,

and the communications leading up to the deal, I believe these

bricks to contain fentanyl powder. Due to the dangerous nature

of fentanyl and possible transdermal exposure, agents did not

open the packages, but rather they are being sent to the Customs

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and Border Protection (“CBP”) laboratory in Long Beach,

California, for testing and analysis.

Agents also seized a bag of approximately 8 ounces of

a substance resembling crystal methamphetamine from underneath

the driver’s side of the silver Ford Focus, which is where

HERNANDEZ was sitting. The suspected methamphetamine is also

being sent to the the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”)

laboratory for testing and analysis.

Agents recovered SUBJECT DEVICES 1 and 2 from PEREZ-

MARTINEZ’s pockets, SUBJECT DEVICE 3 from the center console of

the silver Toyota which PEREZ MARTINEZ was driving, and SUBJECT

DEVICES 4 and 5 from the center console of the silver Ford

Focus, which HERNANDEZ was driving.

PEREZ-MARTINEZ’s and HERNANDEZ’s Statements

Both PEREZ-MARTINEZ and HERNANDEZ, after being advised

of their Miranda rights and waiving their Miranda rights spoke

with law enforcement. PEREZ-MARTINEZ admitted that he had

arranged the logistics of transporting the narcotics to this
location for sale. HERNANDEZ admitted assisting in transporting

narcotics on occasions, including the methamphetamine found

underneath his seat that day.

HERNANDEZ consented both orally and in writing to the

search of SUBJECT DEVICES 4 and 5, and unlocked both phones for

law enforcement, allowing law enforcement to access the contents

of SUBJECT DEVICES 4 and 5. Law enforcement found messages

relating to distribution-level amounts of narcotics, including

fentanyl.

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V. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DRUG OFFENSES

Based on my training and experience and familiarity

with investigations into drug trafficking conducted by other law

enforcement agents, I know the following:

a. Drug trafficking is a business that involves

numerous co-conspirators, from lower-level dealers to higher-

level suppliers, as well as associates to process, package, and

deliver the drugs and launder the drug proceeds. Drug

traffickers often travel by car, bus, train, or airplane, both

domestically and to foreign countries, in connection with their

illegal activities in order to meet with co-conspirators,

conduct drug transactions, and transport drugs or drug proceeds.

b. Drug traffickers often maintain books, receipts,

notes, ledgers, bank records, and other records relating to the

manufacture, transportation, ordering, sale and distribution of

illegal drugs. The aforementioned records are often maintained

where the drug trafficker has ready access to them, such as on

their cell phones and other digital devices.

c. Communications between people buying and selling

drugs takes place by telephone calls and messages, such as e-

mail, text messages, and social media messaging applications,

sent to and from cell phones and other digital devices. This

includes sending photos or videos of the drugs between the

seller and the buyer, the negotiation of price, and discussion

of whether or not participants will bring weapons to a deal. In

addition, it is common for people engaged in drug trafficking to

have photos and videos on their cell phones of drugs they or

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others working with them possess, as they frequently send these

photos to each other and others to boast about the drugs or

facilitate drug sales.

d. Drug traffickers often keep the names, addresses,

and telephone numbers of their drug trafficking associates on

their digital devices. Drug traffickers often keep records of

meetings with associates, customers, and suppliers on their

digital devices, including in the form of calendar entries and

location data.

e. Individuals engaged in the illegal purchase or

sale of drugs and other contraband often use multiple digital

devices.

VI. TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE ON DIGITAL DEVICES

As used herein, the term “digital device” includes the

SUBJECT DEVICES.

Based on my training, experience, and information from

those involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I

know that the following electronic evidence, inter alia, is

often retrievable from digital devices:

a. Forensic methods may uncover electronic files or

remnants of such files months or even years after the files have

been downloaded, deleted, or viewed via the Internet. Normally,

when a person deletes a file on a computer, the data contained

in the file does not disappear; rather, the data remain on the

hard drive until overwritten by new data, which may only occur

after a long period of time. Similarly, files viewed on the

Internet are often automatically downloaded into a temporary

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directory or cache that are only overwritten as they are

replaced with more recently downloaded or viewed content and may

also be recoverable months or years later.

b. Digital devices often contain electronic evidence

related to a crime, the device’s user, or the existence of

evidence in other locations, such as, how the device has been

used, what it has been used for, who has used it, and who has

been responsible for creating or maintaining records, documents,

programs, applications, and materials on the device. That

evidence is often stored in logs and other artifacts that are

not kept in places where the user stores files, and in places

where the user may be unaware of them. For example, recoverable

data can include evidence of deleted or edited files; recently

used tasks and processes; online nicknames and passwords in the

form of configuration data stored by browser, e-mail, and chat

programs; attachment of other devices; times the device was in

use; and file creation dates and sequence.

c. The absence of data on a digital device may be

evidence of how the device was used, what it was used for, and

who used it. For example, showing the absence of certain

software on a device may be necessary to rebut a claim that the

device was being controlled remotely by such software.

d. Digital device users can also attempt to conceal

data by using encryption, steganography, or by using misleading

filenames and extensions. Digital devices may also contain

“booby traps” that destroy or alter data if certain procedures

are not scrupulously followed. Law enforcement continuously

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develops and acquires new methods of decryption, even for

devices or data that cannot currently be decrypted.

Based on my training, experience, and information from

those involved in the forensic examination of digital devices, I

know that it can take a substantial period of time to search a

digital device for many reasons, including the following:

a. Digital data are particularly vulnerable to

inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction. Thus,

often a controlled environment with specially trained personnel

may be necessary to maintain the integrity of and to conduct a

complete and accurate analysis of data on digital devices, which

may take substantial time, particularly as to the categories of

electronic evidence referenced above.

b. Digital devices capable of storing multiple

gigabytes are now commonplace. As an example of the amount of

data this equates to, one gigabyte can store close to 19,000

average file size (300kb) Word documents, or 614 photos with an

average size of 1.5MB.

c. Given the total number of digital devices (six)

and the fact that the Mexican broker was known to communicate in

Spanish via lengthly voice-notes sent on Whatsapp, which can

only be analyzed for responsive content after being listened to

in their entirety and translated, it may take substantial time

to conduct a complete and accurate analysis of data on digital

devices.

The search warrant requests authorization to use the

biometric unlock features of a device, based on the following,

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which I know from my training, experience, and review of

publicly available materials:

a. Users may enable a biometric unlock function on

some digital devices. To use this function, a user generally

displays a physical feature, such as a fingerprint, face, or

eye, and the device will automatically unlock if that physical

feature matches one the user has stored on the device. To

unlock a device enabled with a fingerprint unlock function, a

user places one or more of the user’s fingers on a device’s

fingerprint scanner for approximately one second. To unlock a

device enabled with a facial, retina, or iris recognition

function, the user holds the device in front of the user’s face

with the user’s eyes open for approximately one second.

b. In some circumstances, a biometric unlock

function will not unlock a device even if enabled, such as when

a device has been restarted or inactive, has not been unlocked

for a certain period of time (often 48 hours or less), or after

a certain number of unsuccessful unlock attempts. Thus, the

opportunity to use a biometric unlock function even on an

enabled device may exist for only a short time. I do not know

the passcodes of the devices likely to be found in the search.

c. The person who is in possession of a device or

has the device among his or her belongings is likely a user of

the device. Thus, the warrant I am applying for would permit

law enforcement personnel to, with respect to any device that

appears to have a biometric sensor and falls within the scope of

the warrant: (1) depress HERNANDEZ’s and PEREZ-MARTINEZ’s thumb-

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and/or fingers on the device(s); and (2) hold the device(s) in

front of HERNANDEZ’s and PEREZ-MARTINEZ’s face with his or her

eyes open to activate the facial-, iris-, and/or retina-

recognition feature.

In addition to what has been described herein, the

United States has attempted to obtain this data by requesting

consent from HERNANDEZ and PEREZ-MARTINEZ to access the

information on the SUBJECT DEVICES. HERNANDEZ consented both

orally and in writing to the search of SUBJECT DEVICES 4 and 5,

and unlocked both phones for law enforcement, allowing law

enforcement to access the contents of SUBJECT DEVICES 4 and 5.

Other than what has been described herein, to my

knowledge, the United States has not attempted to obtain this

data by other means.

VII. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons described above, there is

probable cause to believe that HERNANDEZ and PEREZ-MARTINEZ have

committed a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1): Possession with

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Intent to Distribute Fentanyl. There is also probable cause

that the items to be seized described in Attachment B will be

found in a search of the SUBJECT DEVICES described in Attachment

Attested to by the applicant in
accordance with the requirements of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1 by telephone
on this 9TH day of November 2021.

THE HONORABLE ALICIA G. ROSENBERG
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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