Order — United States v. Tyrone Young (E.D. Pa., Dkt. 69, November 1, 2024)

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An Order filed November 1, 2024, in United States v. Tyrone Young, Criminal Action No. 21-188, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The order states that Mr. Young moves to dismiss Count Three, possession of a firearm by a felon under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), arguing that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied and on its face. The Court states that it adopts analysis from courts in the district finding § 922(g)(1) constitutional as applied to convicted drug dealers, and that the vagueness and Commerce Clause arguments fail. It denies the Motion to Dismiss the Indictment with prejudice and is signed /s/ Cynthia M. Rufe.

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             Case 2:21-cr-00188-CMR Document 69 Filed 11/01/24 Page 1 of 4




                             IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


                     v.
                                                                   CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 21-188

    TYRONE YOUNG




                                                      ORDER

           On May 6, 2021, Defendant Tyrone Young was charged in a three-count indictment with

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and oxycodone in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C) (Count One); possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Two); and

possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (Count

Three).1 Mr. Young was previously convicted in 2006, 2008, and 2011 of felony drug trafficking

offenses, for which he served more than 12 months of imprisonment.2 He was on state parole at

the time of the instant offense.3

           Mr. Young moves to dismiss Count Three of the indictment.4 He argues that § 922(g)(1)

is unconstitutional as applied to him and on its face, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), and the Third



1
    Indictment [Doc. No. 1].
2
    Indictment at 1-2 [Doc. No. 1]; Gov’t’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 4 [Doc. No. 68].
3
    Gov’t’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 4 [Doc. No. 68].
4
    Def.’s Mot. Dismiss [Doc. No. 64].
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              Case 2:21-cr-00188-CMR Document 69 Filed 11/01/24 Page 2 of 4




Circuit’s decision in Range v. Attorney General, 69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023) (en banc). The

Government responds that “the historical record amply supports the disarming of persons

previously convicted of felony offenses suggesting a danger to the public.”5

           Mr. Young’s motion is one of many nearly identical motions brought by defendants

following the Bruen and Range decisions. Courts in this district have “exhaustively discussed”

the issue here and have consistently rejected these § 922(g)(1) challenges, finding that Range is

limited to its unique facts.6 In Range, the Third Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) was

unconstitutional as applied to “an individual with a single, almost thirty-year-old [non-violent]

criminal conviction for food stamp fraud.”7 However, thorough analysis from this Court and

other judges in this district and circuit has found sufficient historical precedent to disarm

convicted drug dealers “given the strong and established connection between drug trafficking

and violence.”8 The Court adopts and relies upon that analysis and will not repeat it here.

           The Court has carefully reviewed Mr. Young’s circumstances and is reassured that his

indictment does not violate the Second Amendment. Mr. Young was on state parole at the time


5
    Gov’t’s Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Dismiss at 2 [Doc. No. 68].
6
 United States v. Harris, No. 22-441, 2023 WL 7927758, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2023) (collecting cases). See also
United States v. Spady, No. 23-36, 2023 WL 7706263, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2023) (collecting cases).
7
    United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 530 (3d Cir. 2024).
8
  United States v. Thrones, No. 24-42, 2024 WL 3204457, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2024) (holding § 922(g)(1)
constitutional as applied to a parolee with prior drug convictions). See also United States v. Brown, No. 20-260,
2023 WL 7021181, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2023) (same, as to defendant with prior convictions for burglary, drug
trafficking, firearms violations, and eluding the police); United States v. Blackshear, No. 23-159, 2023 WL
5985284, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2023) (same, as to defendant with prior convictions for drug trafficking and gun
possession); United States v. Pearson, No. 22-271, 2023 WL 6216527, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2023) (same);
United States v. Carothers, No. 20-31, 2024 WL 1722521, at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2024) (observing that courts
around the country routinely hold that possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime does not
constitute conduct protected by the Second Amendment); United States v. Boone, No. 22-233, 2024 WL 965146,
at *8 (D.N.J. March 6, 2024) (finding historical support for the need for dispossession statutes affecting a repeat
offender with felony possession with intent to deliver or distribute illegal drugs); United States v. Woznichak, 21-
242, 2023 WL 7324442, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2023) (finding that the Government showed sufficient historical
support for disarming defendant, who had prior drug trafficking convictions).


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              Case 2:21-cr-00188-CMR Document 69 Filed 11/01/24 Page 3 of 4




of the instant offense and his criminal history includes multiple prior felony convictions, each of

which involved inherently dangerous drug trafficking. He is decidedly unlike Range. His

criminal history, parolee status, and circumstances fit squarely within the significant authority

holding § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to his case.

           Because § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to him, Mr. Young’s argument that

§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face must fail.9 Mr. Young’s related arguments that

§ 922(g)(1) is impermissibly vague and violates the Commerce Clause fail as well.

Section 922(g)(1) provides unambiguous notice that it bars those convicted of “a crime

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm or

ammunition.10 Mr. Young’s Commerce Clause argument is foreclosed by binding precedent.11

           The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. 1889 (2024),

only bolsters the Court’s conclusion that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional, both as applied to Mr.

Young and on its face. In Rahimi, the Supreme Court rejected an as-applied Second Amendment

challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which bars possession of a firearm by a person subject to a

domestic violence restraining order, concluding that “the Government offers ample evidence that

the Second Amendment permits the disarmament of individuals who pose a credible threat to the

physical safety of others.”12 And it reiterated its guidance that many prohibitions, “like those on




9
  Blackshear, 2023 WL 5985284, at *3 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)) (rejecting a
facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) because defendant could not demonstrate the statute was unconstitutional on an as-
applied basis).
10
     18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
11
  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steep Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196,
204 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Shambry, 392 F.3d 631, 634-35 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Gateward, 84
F.3d 670, 671-72 (3d Cir. 1996).
12
     Rahimi, 144 S. Ct. at 1898.


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              Case 2:21-cr-00188-CMR Document 69 Filed 11/01/24 Page 4 of 4




the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’”13

Moreover, the Supreme Court explicitly vacated and remanded the Third Circuit’s decision in

Range, on which Mr. Young’s arguments principally rely, following its decision in Rahimi.14

           Count Three of Mr. Young’s indictment will stand.

           AND NOW, this 1st day of November 2024, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss the Indictment [Doc. No. 64] and the Government’s response thereto, and for the

foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is

DENIED with prejudice.

           It is so ORDERED.

                                                                     BY THE COURT:

                                                                      /s/ Cynthia M. Rufe
                                                                     _____________________
                                                                     CYNTHIA M. RUFE, J.




13
     Id. at 1902 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 & n.26 (2008)).
14
  Garland v. Range, 144 S. Ct. 2706 (2024). The Third Circuit reheard argument in Range en banc on October 9,
2024. Docket, Range v. Att’y Gen., No. 21-2835 (3d Cir.).


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