Memorandum — United States v. Antoine Davis (E.D. Pa., Dkt. 30, January 29, 2021)

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A Memorandum by R. Barclay Surrick, signed as judge, dated January 29, 2021 in United States of America v. Antoine Davis, Criminal Action No. 20-230-1, Document 30, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. It addresses the defendant's Motion for Revocation of the Pretrial Detention Order (ECF No. 16), which sought home confinement because of the COVID-19 pandemic and followed a virtual hearing on January 21, 2021. The Court discusses the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, and the presumption of detention, and states that the § 3142(g) factors weigh in favor of pretrial detention. It concludes that the motion for bail and to revoke pretrial detention is denied.

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            Case 2:20-cr-00230-RBS Document 30 Filed 01/29/21 Page 1 of 5




                       IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                    FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                     :
                                             :               CRIMINAL ACTION
       v.                                    :
                                             :               NO. 20-230-1
ANTOINE DAVIS                                :


                                       MEMORANDUM

SURRICK, J.                                                                 JANUARY 29, 2021

       Defendant Antoine Davis filed a Motion For Revocation Of The Pretrial Detention Order.

(ECF No. 16.) The Government filed a response in opposition thereto. (ECF Nos. 18-19.) A

virtual hearing on this Motion was held on January 21, 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing,

the Motion was denied.

I.     BACKGROUND

       Antoine Davis has been detained in federal custody since October 2020. (ECF Nos. 7, 9.)

A grand jury indicted Davis for possession with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), b(1)(a); knowingly possessing a loaded .45 caliber

Ruger P345 handgun in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.

924(c)(1); and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

(ECF No. 1.) On October 30, 2020, after a hearing before Magistrate Judge Timothy R. Rice,

the Government’s motion for detention was granted and Davis was detained pending trial. (ECF

No. 9.) Davis filed this Motion seeking revocation of the pretrial detention order based on the

ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 16.) He requested home confinement

with audio and video surveillance. (Id.) Davis waived his right to be present at the hearing on

the Motion. (ECF No. 29.)
          Case 2:20-cr-00230-RBS Document 30 Filed 01/29/21 Page 2 of 5




II.    DISCUSSION

       The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, et seq., “requires the pretrial release of

defendants unless ‘no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the

appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.’”

United States v. Soriano Nunez, 928 F.3d 240, 244 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3142(e)(1)). Judge Rice determined that Davis should be detained pending trial. Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), a district court may review a magistrate judge’s pretrial detention de novo.

See United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (3d Cir. 1985). Section 3142(i) allows a

court to reexamine the detention decision “to the extent that the judicial officer determines such

release to be necessary for the preparation of the person’s defense or for another compelling

reason.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). In the context of COVID-19, courts consider factors such as the

specificity of the defendant’s stated COVID-19 concerns. Courts grant motions for release when

there is a highly particularized risk of severe illness to the movant, not when the risk is

generalized. See United States v. Bolger, No. 20-308-1, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 231841, at *13

(E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2020) (collecting cases).

       The charges against Davis trigger a rebuttable presumption “that no condition or

combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and

the safety of the community” if the court finds that there is probable cause to believe the

defendant committed a firearms offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See 18 U.S.C. §§

3142(e)(3)(B), (f)(1)(E). An indictment “is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause

triggering the rebuttable presumption of dangerousness under § 3142(e).” United States v.

Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1986). The Indictment charges Davis with knowingly

possessing a loaded .45 caliber Ruger P345 handgun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in



                                                  2
           Case 2:20-cr-00230-RBS Document 30 Filed 01/29/21 Page 3 of 5




violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). (ECF No. 1.) The Indictment also charges Davis with an

offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the

Controlled Substances Act,18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(e)(3)(A), (f)(1)(C), and with offenses for which

the maximum authorized penalty is life imprisonment,18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(B), both of which

also raise the presumption for detention. Davis does not contest that any one of these charges

would be sufficient to trigger the presumption that he is a flight risk and a danger to the

community. Therefore, the burden shifts to Davis to rebut the presumption. Davis argues that he

is not a fight risk or a danger because of his family and professional ties to the community.

       To rebut this presumption, a defendant must produce “some credible evidence forming a

basis for his contention that he will appear and will not pose a threat to the community.” United

States v. Carbone, 793 F.2d 559, 560 (3d Cir. 1986). In determining whether a defendant

has rebutted the presumption of pretrial detention, the court “take[s] into account the available

information concerning” (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight

of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the defendant’s history and characteristics, including

whether he was on probation or pretrial release at the time of the offense; and (4) the nature of

any danger he might pose. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). The court’s determination is “based on all the

evidence and arguments adduced” and not on any one factor. United States v. Grimes, No. 16-

59, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53301, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2016) (citation omitted).

       Davis states that he has strong community ties as a married father of five and a gainfully

employed member of a Laborers Union.1 (Jan. 21, 2021 Hr’g Tr. 8.) This is not sufficient to




       1
         Davis’ Motion states that the 74 other members of his laborers’ union would “vouch”
for him. (Def’s Mot. at 4, ECF No. 16.)


                                                 3
           Case 2:20-cr-00230-RBS Document 30 Filed 01/29/21 Page 4 of 5




rebut the presumption that he is a danger to the community and presents a flight risk. The

relevant § 3142(g) factors clearly weigh in favor of pretrial detention here.

       With regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged and the strength of

the evidence, the charges against Davis are serious drug- and gun-related offenses. Davis faces

up to life imprisonment if convicted. This provides a strong incentive for Davis to flee. Davis

was found in possession of $5 million in cash over the course of eight days and fled from police

twice. The first time he was stopped by law enforcement, his identification, 22 kilograms of

cocaine, $2.4 million, and a loaded automatic handgun were found in the vehicle. Davis

managed to flee on foot, avoiding apprehension for eight days. The second time Davis was

stopped by law enforcement, state troopers found another $2.4 million, which was located in the

area of the backseat where Davis had been sitting. At that time, Davis presented a fake name and

birthdate and attempted to flee again before being apprehended by police.2

       In addition, the Court must consider Davis’ history and characteristics. Davis has a prior

conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). United States v. Davis, Case No. 97-cr-104-1 (E.D. Pa.), at

ECF No. 38. In that case, the late Honorable Lowell Reed sentenced Davis to 211 months’

imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Id. at ECF No. 59. Davis completed the

supervised release in 2012. Id. at ECF No. 114. Davis is prohibited from possessing or carrying

firearms. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This factor also weights in favor of pretrial detention.




       2
         These facts are taken from the Government’s response brief and representations during
the hearing. Davis does not dispute the Government’s recitation of the facts. (Jan. 21, 2021
Hr’g Tr. 10-12 (on file with Court).)

                                                 4
          Case 2:20-cr-00230-RBS Document 30 Filed 01/29/21 Page 5 of 5




       Finally, considering the fourth factor, the nature of any danger Davis may pose. Davis’

possession of a loaded firearm, his involvement in the drug trade, his recidivism, and his

propensity to flee law enforcement establish that he is a clear danger to the community and a

proven flight risk. No combination of factors, even Davis’ proposed audio and video

surveillance, would reasonably assure Davis’ appearance in court and the safety of the

community.

       Davis also argued that he does not have meaningful access to counsel due to the COVID-

19 pandemic. The Third Circuit has stated that “[t]he mere existence of COVID-19 in a society .

. . cannot independently justify . . . release.” United States v. Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir.

2020). Davis did not allege that he had any specific health issues or particularized risk of severe

illness from COVID-19. The Government represents that the FDC has made efforts to facilitate

phone calls with legal counsel, and Defense counsel has been able to visit and consult with Davis

on at least one occasion to date, as he represented in the bail hearing. (See Gov’t Resp. at 12 n.3,

ECF No. 18; Jan. 21, 2021 Hr’g Tr. 6.) Davis’ release is not necessary for the preparation of his

defense and there is no other compelling reason to overturn the detention decision.

III.   CONCLUSION

       For these reasons and those expressed at the time of the hearing, Defendant’s Motion for

bail and to revoke his pretrial detention is denied. An appropriate Order follows.



                                                      BY THE COURT:


                                                      /s/ R. Barclay Surrick
                                                      R. BARCLAY SURRICK, J.




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