Order on Motions to Dismiss Counts One and Three on Fischer Grounds (D. Mass., Dkt. 57, December 13, 2024)

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In this Order on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Counts One and Three of the Indictment on Fischer Grounds in United States v. Dean A. Tran and Tuyet T. Martin, Chief Judge Saylor denies both motions. The defendants contended that, after the Supreme Court's ruling in Fischer v. United States, their obstruction of justice counts were improperly charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). Count 1 charges that Tran made false statements about, and concealed the truth about, employment-offer letters from federal law enforcement agents, and Count 3 alleges that Martin did so to the grand jury. The Court concludes that concealing the true and complete nature of a document is similar to, but not specifically covered by, subsection (c)(1), and falls within the "otherwise" clause of (c)(2).

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       Case 1:24-cr-10178-FDS           Document 57         Filed 12/13/24      Page 1 of 4




                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

__________________________________________
                                          )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                  )
                                          )
      v.                                  )                   Criminal No.
                                          )                   24-10178-FDS
DEAN A. TRAN and                          )
TUYET T. MARTIN,                          )
                                          )
            Defendants.                   )
__________________________________________)


  ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS COUNTS ONE AND THREE
              OF THE INDICTMENT ON FISCHER GROUNDS

SAYLOR, C.J.

       Defendants Dean Tran and Tuyet Martin have been charged with obstruction of justice in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). Tran has moved to dismiss Count One and Martin has

moved to dismiss Count Three. Both defendants contend that after the Supreme Court’s recent

ruling in Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480, 489 (2024), those counts have been improperly

charged under § 1512(c)(2). For the following reasons, the motions will be denied.

       Section 1512(c) provides:

       Whoever corruptly—

       (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or
           attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability
           for use in an official proceeding; or

       (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or
           attempts to do so,

       shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

       The Fischer Court “focused on what conduct was prohibited by the ‘otherwise’ clause in
        Case 1:24-cr-10178-FDS            Document 57         Filed 12/13/24       Page 2 of 4




§ 1512(c)(2) and emphasized that its broad language is cabined by the narrower terms that

precede it in § 1512(c)(1).” United States v. De Bruhl, 118 F.4th 735, 746-47 (5th Cir. 2024)

(citing Fischer, 603 U.S. at 489). The court concluded that § 1512(c)(2) is not a “one-size-fits-

all solution to obstruction of justice,” Fischer, 603 U.S. at 497, but instead more narrowly

proscribes “impair[ing] the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records,

documents, objects, or . . . other things used in the proceeding, or attempt[ing] to do so,” id. at

498. In substance, therefore, § 1512(c)(2) covers obstruction that implicates actual or potential

evidence. See id. at 492 (“[S]ubsection (c)(2) was designed by Congress to capture other forms

of evidence and other means of impairing its integrity or availability beyond those Congress

specified in (c)(1).”).

        Here, both Counts 1 and 3 allege that defendants created false employment-offer letters in

the course of a fraudulent scheme to obtain unemployment benefits for Tran, and that they made

false statements about, and concealed, the “true and complete” nature of the letters. Specifically,

Count 1 charges that Tran made false statements and concealed the truth about the letters from

federal law enforcement agents; Count 3 alleges that Martin did so to the grand jury. Both

counts charge that the purpose was to obstruct, influence, and impede the grand jury

investigation.

        Defendants first contend that under Fischer the charged conduct falls entirely outside the

scope of § 1512(c). They then argue that even if the charged conduct is within the scope of the

statute, that conduct is covered by subsection (c)(1) and thus cannot be properly charged under

subsection (c)(2). Because the indictment properly charges a crime under subsection (c)(2), both

arguments fail.

        First, “[s]ubsection (c)(2) . . . ensures that liability is still imposed for impairing the



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        Case 1:24-cr-10178-FDS           Document 57         Filed 12/13/24      Page 3 of 4




availability or integrity of . . . witness testimony or intangible information.” Fischer, 603 U.S. at

491 (2024) (approving United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1290 (11th Cir. 2007), a

“prosecution under subsection (c)(2) based in part on the defendant's attempt to orchestrate a

witness's grand jury testimony”). The indictment charges Tran with “providing false information

about” the offer letter to law enforcement, and charges Martin with “testifying falsely about” the

letter to the grand jury. Such false statements about a document “impair[ ] [its] integrity or

availability” in a way closely related to—but not specifically captured in—subsection (c)(1).

Those charges are therefore covered by subsection (c)(2). See id.

       Second, under Fischer, subsection (c)(2) prohibits “impairing the availability or integrity

of . . . things used in an official proceeding” that are not listed in subsection (c)(1). In subsection

(c)(1), the word “conceal” applies to “record[s], document[s], or object[s].” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(c)(1). In the indictment, the word “conceal” applies to “the true and complete nature” of

the documents. Concealing the true and complete nature of a document is not the same thing as

physically concealing a document. Again, however, it conceals evidence in a way closely related

to the activities prohibited by § 1512(c)(1). It therefore falls within the “otherwise” clause of

(c)(2). See Fischer, 603 U.S. at 492.

       In short, Counts 1 and 3 charge conduct that involves the concealment of the true and

complete nature of certain documents in order to obstruct an official proceeding. That conduct is

similar to, but not specifically covered by, § 1512(c)(1). Under the circumstances, such conduct

is covered by the “otherwise” clause of § 1512(c)(2).

       Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, defendant Tran’s motion to dismiss Count 1

(ECF No. 44) and defendant Martin’s motion to dismiss Count 3 (ECF No. 43) are DENIED.




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      Case 1:24-cr-10178-FDS   Document 57    Filed 12/13/24      Page 4 of 4




So Ordered.


                                      /s/ F. Dennis Saylor IV
                                      F. Dennis Saylor IV
Dated: December 13, 2024              Chief Judge, United States District Court




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