Memorandum-Decision and Order — United States v. Andre Decker (Dkt. 143, February 5, 2026)

Summary

In this Memorandum-Decision and Order in United States v. Andre Decker, Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge, denies Decker's renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (Dkt. Nos. 107, 137). On June 13, 2025, following a four-day trial, a unanimous jury convicted Decker of one count of possession of firearms by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The motion challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of knowing possession. The Court states that neither direct evidence nor actual possession is required, and cites trial evidence that included Decker's DNA on multiple locations on both firearms found in the bedroom closet of the apartment where Decker regularly stayed overnight.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Cite this document

“Memorandum-Decision and Order — United States v. Andre Decker (Dkt. 143, February 5, 2026).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-1-24-cr-00361-dkt-143-536eee7f46/, SHA-256 b0a402f235aa23bc80f1eb6a1ab9f749a0b12b757a3cfaff0af463453e140d63.

Full text

Case 1:24-cr-00361-AMN Document 143 Filed 02/05/26 Page 1 of 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. 1:24-cr-00361 (AMN)

ANDRE DECKER,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

United States Attorney for the ASHLYN JESSICA MIRANDA, ESQ.
Northern District of New York MIKAYLA ESPINOSA, ESQ.
445 Broadway – Room 218 Assistant United States Attorneys
Albany, New York 12207
Counsel for the Government

Frost, Kavanaugh Law Firm ARTHUR R. FROST, ESQ.
287 North Greenbush Road
Troy, New York 12180
Counsel for Defendant

Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 13, 2025, following a four-day trial, a unanimous jury convicted defendant Andre

Decker (“Defendant”) of one count of possession of firearms by a prohibited person in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dkt. Nos. 1, 97, 103. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s renewed

motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Case 1:24-cr-00361-AMN Document 143 Filed 02/05/26 Page 2 of 8

(“Rule 29”).1 Dkt. Nos. 107, 137 (the “Motion”); see also Dkt. No. 138.2 For the reasons set forth

below, Defendant’s Motion is denied.

II. SUMMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL

The following summary reflects only some of the evidence adduced at trial, as necessary

to address the Motion, and presents that evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.

United States v. Atilla, 966 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2020).

In the summer of 2023, Defendant completed a federal prison sentence and began a term

of supervised release in the Southern District of New York.3 Dkt. No. 124 at 206:6-208:17.

Defendant’s probation officer tried to meet with him for several months, without success. Id. at

214:8-215:8. In November 2023, the probation officer requested and received an arrest warrant

from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 215:9-216:10.

The United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) was tasked with apprehending Defendant.

Dkt. No. 125 at 8:6-11:6. After using various investigative methods—including in-person

surveillance, analysis of location data from Defendant’s cell phone, and analysis of numerous

transactions from Defendant’s public benefits card—a USMS task force came to believe that

Defendant was staying in the Northern District of New York, at his girlfriend’s apartment in

Albany. Id. at 11:7-27:22. The task force obtained a warrant to search the premises for Defendant.

1
Defendant previously moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the Government’s case and
at the close of all proof; the Court denied both motions. Dkt. No. 126 at 63:19-65:19; id. at 70:6-
71:2. Citations to docket entries utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s
electronic filing system, and not the documents’ internal pagination.
2
Defendant declined to submit a reply in further support. See generally Docket Sheet.
3
This sentence was the result of Defendant’s prior conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Dkt. No. 28-1. The Court sustained Defendant’s objection to admitting certain evidence regarding
this conviction, Dkt. No. 90 at 2-5, and the parties stipulated that, prior to November 2023,
Defendant had been convicted of a felony, knew he had been convicted of a felony, and had served
more than one year in prison as a result, Dkt. No. 99.

2
Case 1:24-cr-00361-AMN Document 143 Filed 02/05/26 Page 3 of 8

Id. at 27:23-28:10.

The task force executed the warrant at approximately 6:00 a.m. on November 27, 2023.

Id. at 28:11-34:25. After Ms. McKenzie answered the door, members of the task force entered the

apartment and noticed an open second story window at the back of the apartment. Id. at 35:1-

48:11. Defendant was eventually spotted hiding in a neighboring property, in only his boxers,

despite the cold weather. Id. at 48:12-51:23; id. at 65:24-66:22; id. at 148:8-150:21. After

continued pursuit, the task force was able to arrest Defendant and observed injuries to his bare

feet. Id. at 150:22-155:24; Government Exhibit 10.

Cell phone data indicated that Defendant’s phone had been regularly present during

nighttime hours at the apartment for weeks prior to his arrest. See, e.g., id. at 132:24-133:17. Cell

phone data further indicated that Defendant’s phone was present in the apartment on November

26, 2023, including shortly before midnight, and that the phone was still there at approximately

7:00 a.m. the next morning. Id. at 142:14-144:5. At that time, the task force observed Defendant’s

phone charging on a stand in a bedroom, called the phone, and seized the phone after it rang. Id.

at 60:2-17; Government Exhibit 11-J. The task force also recovered from the bedroom

Defendant’s public benefits card, Bureau of Prisons identification card,4 and mail addressed to

him. Dkt. No. 125 at 55:4-57:5. Directly in front of the bedroom, the task force found a “go bag”

packed with, inter alia, sets of men’s clothes. Id. at 58:3-59:8. The task force concluded that the

bedroom was shared by Defendant and Ms. McKenzie. See, e.g., id. at 45:13-17.

In the closet of the bedroom, the task force found two bags, each with a firearm. Id. at

4
Based on testimony from Defendant’s probation officer that Defendant had acquired neither
employment nor state-issued identification while on supervised release, Dkt. No. 124 at 211:8-
212:4, the Government argued in closing that these items constituted Defendant’s only known
source of income and identification, Dkt. No. 126 at 112:6-18.

3
Case 1:24-cr-00361-AMN Document 143 Filed 02/05/26 Page 4 of 8

158:9-23. Subsequent forensic analysis determined that multiple locations on each firearm

contained Defendant’s DNA. See, e.g., id. at 222:7-19; id. at 223:3-17; see also Dkt. No. 138 at 4

(detailing DNA evidence).

Ms. McKenzie testified, inter alia, that Defendant began staying with her in or about

September 2023; that he stayed with her several times a week; that he only slept in their shared

bedroom; that he kept his belongings in that bedroom, including his cell phone and “[s]urvival bag

type stuff[;]” and that Defendant spent time in Ms. McKenzie’s apartment when she was not there.

Dkt. No. 126 at 11:17-13:19. Ms. McKenzie further testified that she was aware that the firearms

were in the apartment; that Defendant had brought the firearms into her apartment; that the firearms

were his; and that she had seen Defendant leave and return to the apartment with the firearms.5 Id.

at 23:12-24:18.

Defendant exercised his constitutional right not to testify at trial. Id. at 65:20-67:18.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a defendant to move for “a

judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”

Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). However, a defendant who challenges the sufficiency of evidence “bears

a heavy burden” “[b]ecause of the strong deference to which jury verdicts are entitled in our justice

system.” United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4th 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2023) (first quoting United States v.

Jackson, 335 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir. 2003); and then citing United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170,

181 (2d Cir. 2021)).

Given this “exceedingly deferential” standard of review, United States v. Gahagen, 44

5
Shortly before her testimony at trial, Ms. McKenzie entered into an immunity agreement with
the federal government and provided the testimony noted above; she was questioned about the
immunity agreement on both direct and cross examination. Id. at 9:21-10:1; id. at 25:2-26:24.

4
Case 1:24-cr-00361-AMN Document 143 Filed 02/05/26 Page 5 of 8

F.4th 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), a court evaluating the sufficiency of evidence is

“required to draw all permissible inferences in favor of the [G]overnment and resolve all issues of

credibility in favor of the jury’s verdict,” Willis, 14 F.4th at 181 (citation omitted). A court must

also consider the evidence “in its totality, ‘as each fact may gain color from others.’” United States

v. Landesman, 17 F.4th 298, 319 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Importantly, “[t]hese principles

apply whether the evidence being reviewed is direct or circumstantial.” United States v. Chow,

993 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Ultimately, “[a] jury verdict must be upheld

if, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Gahagen,

44 F.4th at 108 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Motion challenges the sufficiency of the evidence offered at trial by the Government

to prove one of the four elements of Defendant’s crime of conviction: knowing possession. Dkt.

No. 107 at 2; Dkt. No. 137-1 at 3.

Defendant’s challenge fails. Defendant first argues that the Government offered no direct

evidence that he knowingly possessed the firearms and could not prove his actual possession of

any firearm. Dkt. No. 107 at 2; Dkt. No. 137-1 at 3, 6. However, neither direct evidence nor actual

possession is required. See, e.g., Willis, 14 F.4th at 181 (“At trial, the government pursued theories

of constructive possession. ‘Constructive possession exists when a person has the power and

intention to exercise dominion and control’ over the contraband in question and may be shown by

direct or circumstantial evidence.”) (citation omitted) (affirming, inter alia, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

convictions following district court’s denial of Rule 29 motions); United States v. Payton, 159

F.3d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The government need not prove that [defendant] physically possessed

5
Case 1:24-cr-00361-AMN Document 143 Filed 02/05/26 Page 6 of 8

the firearm to establish a 922(g) violation; proof of constructive possession is sufficient. . . . and

may be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence.”) (citations omitted) (affirming 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) conviction following district court’s denial of Rule 29 motion); see also Henderson v.

United States, 575 U.S. 622, 626 (2015) (“Section 922(g) proscribes possession alone, but covers

possession in every form. . . . encompassing what the criminal law recognizes as ‘actual’ and

‘constructive’ possession alike. . . . Section 922(g) thus prevents a felon not only from holding his

firearms himself but also from maintaining control over those guns in the hands of others.”)

(citations omitted). And knowledge can be proven through circumstantial evidence. See, e.g.,

United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mens rea elements of

knowledge and intent can often be proved through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom. . . . Indeed, the law draws no distinction between direct and

circumstantial evidence in requiring the [G]overnment to carry its burden of proof.”) (citations

omitted).

The core of Defendant’s remaining arguments is that if the jury had drawn his preferred

inferences from certain evidence, the jury could also have concluded that he did not constructively

possess the firearms for which he was convicted. See generally Dkt. No. 107; Dkt. No. 137-1.

While this may be true, it is immaterial to the Court’s analysis under Rule 29. See, e.g.,

MacPherson, 424 F.3d at 190 (“The possibility that inferences consistent with innocence as well

as with guilt might be drawn from circumstantial evidence is of no matter to sufficiency analysis

because ‘it is the task of the jury, not the court, to choose among competing inferences.’”) (citation

omitted). In contrast, the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient for the jury to find that Defendant

knowingly possessed the firearms. See, e.g., Willis, 14 F.4th at 182 (“[T]he government was not

required to prove that the contraband was not subject to the control of others, because possession

6
Case 1:24-cr-00361-AMN Document 143 Filed 02/05/26 Page 7 of 8

need not be exclusive, and the jury was not required to accept [defendant]’s alternative explanation

of innocence. . . . In other words, the fact that others may have also possessed the keys, drugs, and

weapons does not preclude a finding that [defendant] did so as well.”) (citations omitted); Payton,

159 F.3d at 56 (“The government need not disprove that the weapon was subject to the dominion

and control of others.”) (citation omitted); see also Landesman, 17 F.4th at 319 (“[T]he

Government need not negate every theory of innocence.”) (citation omitted).

As detailed above, see supra Section II, that evidence showed that at approximately 7:00

a.m. in late November 2023, task force officers located Defendant wearing only his boxers and

with injuries to his bare feet, just outside a second-story apartment—with an open window—where

Defendant regularly stayed overnight. Numerous of Defendant’s possessions were still in a

bedroom of that apartment, including his mail and only known cell phone, identification, and

source of funds. United States v. Facen, 812 F.3d 280, 288 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The jury was not

required to accept [defendant]’s version of his connection with the location, and there was

sufficient evidence to permit the jury to adopt the competing interpretation—that he had a

substantial, long-term connection to the house as evidenced by the presence there of his mail and

important personal documents.”) (affirming 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) conviction following district

court’s denial of Rule 29 challenge to that conviction). Additionally, Defendant’s DNA was

retrieved from multiple locations on both of the firearms kept in the bedroom closet and there was

testimony that, inter alia, the firearms were Defendant’s and that Defendant transported the

firearms into and out of the apartment. Facen, 812 F.3d at 287 (“‘[M]ere presence at the location

of contraband does not establish possession.’ . . . However, ‘presence under a particular set of

circumstances’ from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant constructively

possessed contraband located there can support a conviction.”) (first quoting United States v. Rios,

7
Case 1:24-cr-00361-AMN Document 143 Filed 02/05/26 Page 8 of 8

856 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir.1988); and then quoting United States v. Soto, 959 F.2d 1181, 1185 (2d

Cir. 1992)).

In short, “[t]his evidence could easily convince a rational jury, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that [Defendant] had ‘the power and intention to exercise dominion and control over’ the gun[s]”

seized from the bedroom where he stayed. United States v. Greer, 631 F.3d 608, 614 (2d Cir.

2011) (quoting United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2002)) (affirming 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1) conviction following district court’s denial of Rule 29 motion). As a result, the Court

denies Defendant’s Motion. Gahagen, 44 F.4th at 108; Willis, 14 F.4th at 181.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Defendant’s Motion, Dkt. Nos. 107, 137, is DENIED; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order on the parties in accordance with the

Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2026
Albany, New York

File and source

File: 143.pdf
Size: 309,668 bytes
SHA-256: b0a402f235aa23bc80f1eb6a1ab9f749a0b12b757a3cfaff0af463453e140d63
Our copy: 143.pdf
Original: No public link identified.