Memorandum & Order — United States v. Michael Jones (E.D.N.Y., Dkt. 93, September 4, 2026)

Summary

In this Memorandum & Order in United States v. Michael Jones, Natasha C. Merle, United States District Judge, denies Jones's motion to suppress statements made to New York Police Department officers on April 23, 2024. Jones is charged with being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). It is undisputed that Jones received and waived Miranda rights; Jones argued the waiver was invalid because of high intoxication. The Court concludes that, although defendant was likely intoxicated, the waiver was voluntary. It also rejects the requests to suppress the booking photographs and still frames from the interview footage.

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“Memorandum & Order — United States v. Michael Jones (E.D.N.Y., Dkt. 93, September 4, 2026).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-1-24-cr-00235-dkt-93-e-d-n-y-431c6803f0/, SHA-256 8bdc732e6dc3c39ef8a16b46c8fb6b0edf909a01e9e41d2e50b72519901c7b9a.

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Case 1:24-cr-00235-NCM Document 93 Filed 09/04/26 Page 1 of 15 PageID #: 571

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

– against – MEMORANDUM & ORDER
24-cr-00235 (NCM)

MICHAEL JONES,
Defendant.

NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:

Defendant Michael Jones is charged with being a felon in possession of

ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See Indictment, ECF. No. 15. Before the

Court is Mr. Jones’s motion to suppress statements he made to New York Police

Department (“NYPD”) officers on April 23, 2024, at the 81st Precinct. Mot. 2–3, ECF

No. 58. 1 It is undisputed that Mr. Jones received, and waived, his Miranda rights before

proceeding to make incriminating statements. Mot. 3–4. Mr. Jones maintains, however,

that his waiver was invalid because he was highly intoxicated at the time. Mot. 3–4. But

intoxication is only one factor to be considered when deciding whether a Miranda waiver

is voluntary. And because the totality of the circumstances indicate that—intoxication

notwithstanding—Mr. Jones’s waiver was in fact knowing and voluntary, there is no basis

upon which to suppress his statements.

For the reasons discussed in more detail below, Mr. Jones’s motion is DENIED.

1 The Court hereinafter refers to defendant’s Motion to Suppress, ECF No. 58, as the
“Motion”; the government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to defendant’s Motion
to Suppress, ECF No. 61, as the “Opposition”; and defendant’s Reply Memorandum in
Further Support of Motion to Suppress, ECF No. 65, as the “Reply.” Throughout this
Order, page numbers for docket filings refer to the page numbers assigned in ECF filing
headers.
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BACKGROUND

On April 25, 2024, the government filed a Complaint alleging that Jones, having

previously been convicted of a felony, knowingly possessed firearm ammunition. See

Compl. 1, ECF No. 1. The Complaint alleges that on April 13, 2024, NYPD officers were

alerted to a shot fired near 554 Madison Street, Brooklyn, New York. Compl. ¶ 2. Officers

recovered a 9mm bullet shell casing from the location and identified a “Black man wearing

light pants and a dark jacket firing a gun into the air” from surveillance footage taken

around the time of the incident. Compl. ¶ 2. According to additional footage, this

individual’s jacket contained a “Chicago Bulls insignia on the chest and light-colored

patches on the sleeves.” Compl. ¶ 3. Officers included images from this footage in a

Wanted Flyer, No. 91790579, which was later used to identify Jones. See Compl. ¶¶ 3–4.

On April 23, 2024, Jones encountered Officer Sanjeev Kissoondyal while walking

out of the NYPD 81st Precinct. Suppression Hr’g Tr. (“Tr.”) 22:1–23:3, ECF No. 86.2

Officer Kissoondyal recognized Jones from the Wanted Flyer, Tr. 23:18–21, and from

having observed Jones on several prior occasions. 3 When Officer Kissoondyal saw Jones,

he was “pacing back and forth in front of the precinct.” Tr. 22:6–13. Officer Kissoondyal

“confronted” Jones, telling him “I know you’re here to do the right thing.” Tr. 22:6–13. At

that point, Jones walked back into the precinct with Officer Kissoondyal, where Officer

2 Although defendant says that he turned himself in at night, testimony at the
suppression hearing confirmed that he turned himself in the morning of April 23, 2024.
Tr. 79:1–3 (Question: “[Y]ou just testified that you actually turned yourself in to police
the morning of April 23rd, right?” Answer: “Yes.”).

3 There is some question regarding the number of times Officer Kissoondyal had
previously observed Jones. Tr. 43:19–44:13. For present purposes, the Court concludes
that regardless of how many times Officer Kissoondyal previously observed Jones, it is
likely that Jones would have been recognizable based on the Wanted Flyer, in which he
was wearing the same “distinctive Chicago Bulls jacket” as he was wearing the day of the
arrest. Tr. 27:8–11; see Tr. 23:20–21; see generally Opp’n Ex. A (“Interview Footage”).
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Kissoondyal proceeded to collect Jones’s pedigree information and conduct a search of

Jones’s person. Tr. 24:6–25:22. 4 This process took approximately five minutes. Tr.

25:23–25. Officer Kissoondyal was at most two feet away from Jones during this time, Tr.

26:1–4, 28:16, and during the search, Officer Kissoodyal described himself as “basically

on top of” Jones, Tr. 26:5–6, 28:17–21.

After being processed, Jones was first placed in the precinct’s holding area and

then brought to an interview room. Tr. 26:10, 84:7–13. The entirety of Jones’s time in the

interview is captured on video. See Opp’n Ex. A (“Interview Footage”). After confirming

Jones’s name, address, and phone number, Detective David Paray reads Jones his

Miranda rights. Interview Footage 21:00–22:04. Mr. Jones responds “yes” each time he

is asked if he understands each of his rights, and answers “yes” when asked if he would

like to speak to the detective. Interview Footage 21:31–22:04. Jones proceeds to identify

himself as the person firing the weapon in the video, which he claims is an “airsoft

paintball gun.” Interview Footage 31:00–50.

On June 5, 2024, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Jones with one

count of being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

See Indictment ¶ 1.

On February 27, 2026, Jones filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to

law enforcement, arguing that he waived his Miranda rights involuntarily because he was

highly intoxicated at the time. Mot. 3–4. The government opposed, arguing that Jones

was “in no way intoxicated” and that the totality of circumstances demonstrated that

Jones’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. Opp’n 5–7. The government also pointed to

4 Pedigree information includes a person’s “name, date of birth, [address], and the
[physical] condition that the [person is] in at that time. Tr. 24:24–25:2.
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other pieces of evidence from the interview that, in its view, fall outside the scope of

Miranda, arguing that these should be admitted even if the Court were to grant Jones’s

motion to suppress. Opp’n 8–9. Jones replied, disputing for the first time the

“admissibility of other items of evidence relating to the interview,” such as the fact that

he presented himself to the precinct and identified himself, and the evidence about the

clothing he was wearing at the time. Reply 4. Jones also attached a declaration describing

his history with alcoholism and his drinking behavior immediately prior to turning

himself in. Reply Ex. A, ECF No. 65-1.

After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the Court concluded that an evidentiary

hearing was required to assess the totality of the circumstances surrounding Jones’s

Miranda waiver. See ECF Order dated June 11, 2026. 5

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to suppress statements he made to officers at the 81st Precinct

for one reason—he was so intoxicated at the time that he was unable to appreciate the

rights he was waiving or the consequences of his waiver. Mot. 3. 6 Because he has suffered

5 The evidence presented at the suppression hearing is incorporated as relevant to
the discussion below.

6 At the suppression hearing, defendant clarified that he seeks to suppress two
additional categories of information. First, he seeks to suppress certain information that
was collected when he entered the precinct, such as his biographical information (name,
address, and telephone number), and the fact that he walked into the precinct, identified
himself, and said he was there to turn himself in, Reply 4; Tr. 8:1–11:3. Defendant claims
Miranda should apply to these statements because the police already suspected he was
the person who had discharged the firearm. Tr. 10:3–11:4. Because the location of the
alleged discharge, as well as defendant’s address and identity were the subject of law
enforcement interest at the time, defendant argues that the officers should have known
that his answers to questions about his identity and address—less than a tenth of a mile
from the location of the alleged discharge—would have been likely to elicit an
incriminating response. Tr. 8:17–9:16, 10:3–11:4. This argument is unavailing because
“Miranda’s warning requirements apply only to custodial interrogation,” United States

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from alcoholism for years and drank heavily the day before he turned himself in, and

because he cannot remember the details of his interaction with police that morning,

defendant argues that he “lacked the capacity for conscious choice” and his Miranda

waiver was therefore invalid. Reply 3 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,

224 (1973)).

The government, relying on video footage of defendant’s interview, argues first that

defendant was not intoxicated, his Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary, and his

motion should be denied on that basis alone. Opp’n 5–6. But even accepting that

defendant was intoxicated, that fact does not change the analysis in the government’s

view. Opp’n 6–7. That is because “[a] person of [defendant’s] age, education, and criminal

v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 669 (2d Cir. 2004), and defendant was not in custody at the
time he made those initial statements, see id. (“[I]t makes sense for a court to begin any
custody analysis by asking whether a reasonable person would have thought he was free
to leave the police encounter at issue. If the answer is yes, the Miranda inquiry is at an
end.”). Although Officer Kissoondyal’s comment that he knew defendant was at the
precinct “to do the right thing,” Tr. 22:12–13, somewhat undermines the government’s
assertion in its briefing that defendant simply “appeared at the local police precinct to
turn himself in,” Opp’n 2, it does not suggest that a reasonable person in defendant’s
position would have felt he lacked the ability to leave. See White v. Keane, No. 95-cv-
10754, 1996 WL 527340, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1996) (“Here the petitioner voluntarily
accompanied the police officer to the station, never indicated that he wanted to leave and
was allowed to go unescorted to the bathroom. Petitioner has failed to establish conduct
by the detectives amounting to the kind of pressure that would cause a reasonable person
to feel that he had no choice but to submit.”). Moreover, “pedigree questions that pertain
to administration or a defendant’s basic identification information do not trigger
Miranda.” United States v. Familetti, 878 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2017).
Second, defendant seeks to suppress the booking photographs that were taken
after his interview. Reply 4–5; Tr. 11:10–12:3. Defendant’s argument on this point
appears to be that the photographs, taken after the allegedly invalid Miranda waiver,
should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Because the Court concludes that
defendant’s Miranda waiver was in fact valid this argument fails. For that same reason,
there is no basis for defendant’s suggestion that the still frames taken from the Interview
Footage should be suppressed. See Tr. 11:10–12:3.

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history is likely to understand a basic Miranda warning and to be able voluntarily to waive

his rights—intoxicated or not.” Opp’n 7.

After careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes

that, although defendant was likely intoxicated at the time, his Miranda waiver was

voluntary. Therefore, none of the statements he made to officers on April 24, 2026,

warrant suppression.

Legal Standard

“In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the in-custody

interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling

pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to

speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Georgison v. Donelli, 588 F.3d 145, 154

(2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). “It is well settled

that Miranda requires all individuals who are under arrest, or otherwise in police custody,

to be informed prior to interrogation, inter alia, of their right to remain silent and to have

an attorney present during questioning.” Id. at 155.

Miranda’s warning requirements, however, apply only to “custodial

interrogation.” United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 669 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444). A person is in custody for purposes of Miranda if “a

reasonable person in [that person’s] position would have understood [the]mself to be

subjected to the restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest.” Id. at 671;

see id. at 675 (“Miranda’s focus is on the facts known to the seized suspect and whether a

reasonable person would have understood that his situation was comparable to a formal

arrest.”). An interrogation includes “any words or actions that are likely to have the force

of a question on the accused and [would] therefore be reasonably likely to elicit an

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incriminating response.” United States v. Carr, 63 F. Supp. 3d 226, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2014);

see also United States v. Broughton, 600 F. App’x 780, 783 (“[I]nterrogation can take the

form of express questioning or its functional equivalent, which includes words or actions

on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an

incriminating response from the suspect.”) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,

300–01 (1980)). In assessing whether the police “should have known” that their actions

were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, courts consider “the totality of

the circumstances.” Broughton, 600 F. App’x at 783 (quoting Acosta v. Artuz, 575 F.3d

177, 191 (2d Cir. 2009)).

That said, “[v]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth

Amendment and, thus, do not require preliminary advice of rights.” United States v.

Rommy, 506 F.3d 108, 132 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478). Where a

defendant has alleged police custodial interrogation in the absence of Miranda warnings,

“the burden shifts to the government to prove Miranda voluntariness[.]” United States v.

Northover, No. 25-cr-0087, 2026 WL 1179599, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2026).

A person may waive their Miranda rights. However, the prosecution must

establish that such a waiver was “knowingly and voluntarily” made. United States v.

Taylor, 745 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 2014). A Miranda waiver is knowing if made “with a full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the

decision to abandon it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). It is voluntary if it

was “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or

deception.” United States v. Plugh, 648 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Moran, 475

U.S. at 421). The prosecution has the burden to establish the validity of a Miranda waiver

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by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Burger, 739 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir.

1984).

The Court must examine the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the

interrogation” to determine whether a Miranda waiver was both knowing and voluntary.

Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. These circumstances include “(1) the characteristics of the

accused, (2) the conditions of interrogation, and (3) the conduct of law enforcement

officials.” United States v. Mendonca, 88 F.4th 144, 164 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting United

States v. Haak, 884 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir. 2018)). A confession is not voluntary if

“obtained under circumstances that overbear the defendant’s will at the time it is given.”

Mendonca, 88 F.4th at 163–64. Thus, a defendant’s intoxication level is one of the

circumstances the Court should consider in determining the voluntariness of a Miranda

waiver. Siciliano Nuñez v. McCarthy, 718 F. Supp. 3d 209, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2024).

Application

Defendant argues that, given his history of alcoholism and voluminous

consumption of alcohol in the days and hours leading up to his conversation with Det.

Paray, his Miranda waiver was neither knowing nor voluntary. Mot. 3; Reply 2–3; see

Tr. 140:3–141: 10. The government maintains—somewhat incredibly—that defendant was

not intoxicated at the time of the interview. Opp’n 5–6; see Tr. 133:13–134:8 (arguing that

defendant was “sobering up, at least a little bit” between 8:30 a.m., when he entered the

precinct, and approximately 10:30 a.m. when the interview began, after drinking all day

and all night before, and noting that defendant “only . . . [drank] one additional drink that

morning”). Perhaps sensing the implausible nature of its topline argument, the

government contends that, even if defendant was intoxicated, he nonetheless knowingly

and voluntarily waived his rights. Opp’n 6–7; Tr. 134:12–14 (“I don’t want to be repetitive.

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The video speaks for itself. He’s able to understand [the Miranda] questions even if he

had been drinking.”).

As a threshold matter, the Court finds it more likely than not that defendant was

intoxicated at the time he waived his Miranda rights. Defendant testified that there are

several people in his family that have issues with drinking too much alcohol. Tr. 59:6–13.

He said that these family members “drink[] all day.” Tr. 59:7–25. It is therefore as

unsurprising as it is unfortunate that defendant began drinking at age eleven. Tr. 60:1–

15. From ages eleven to sixteen, defendant drank “two to three days a week,” until he

became incarcerated. Tr. 60:11–22. Although defendant stopped drinking while

incarcerated and for a period of time after he was released, he began drinking socially

again in 2021. Tr. 61:4–10. By 2024, however, defendant’s drinking had escalated to the

point that he would “wake up drinking and go to sleep drinking” every day of the week.

Tr. 62:22–63:9.

Based on defendant’s testimony it is difficult to imagine that he is ever both awake

and entirely sober. 7 Defendant testified that each day, he wakes up around 8:00 a.m.

and—if his roommate is still asleep—“sneak[s] in the [roommate’s] bar and pour[s] [] a

cup of liquor,” before heading outside to “wait for the liquor store to open up at 10:00

a.m.” Tr. 63: 10–15; see Tr. 63:24. At that point, he “buy[s] a bottle” and waits for his

friends to come outside, Tr. 63:15–16, at which point they put their money together to

“get another bottle.” Tr. 63:16–17. “[A]s soon as th[at] bottle runs out,” defendant and his

friends “get another bottle.” Tr. 63:18. This routine “continues into the night” until “11:00

7 Although certain aspects of defendant’s testimony regarding the timeline of events
leading up to his interview with Det. Paray were not fully consistent with his declaration,
Tr. 78:14–22, the Court largely credits defendant’s testimony regarding his own alcohol
use.
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p.m. [or] 12:00 a.m.” when defendant and his friends are “getting ready to go to the club.”

Tr. 64:5–15. Once at the club, defendant and his friends “just dr[i]nk all night.” Tr. 65:15–

18. Defendant never drinks wine, beer, or mixed drinks; he only drinks straight liquor.

Tr. 65:24–66:4.

And defendant testified that on April 22, 2024, the day before he turned himself

in, he did not deviate from this “routine.” Tr. 66:20–67:9. Accordingly, defendant drank

from morning until night, went to the club and continued to drink “until it closed,” and

thereafter “linger[ed] outside the club” and continued to drink. Tr. 67:4–15. Notably, he

“didn’t eat” anything at the club. Tr. 68:8–12. Eventually, he headed home, where his

roommate told him that the police had been looking for him for an alleged incident of

domestic violence. Tr. 68:13–22. Defendant’s roommate was not happy that the police

had visited his house, and the two began to argue. Tr. 68:25–69:3. Frustrated, defendant

“poured some liquor in a cup and left and went to [his] girlfriend’s house.” Tr. 69:6–7. 8

Once defendant arrived at his girlfriend’s apartment he was not allowed to enter.

Tr. 70:22–71:10. From there he proceeded to the precinct. Tr. 71:11–12.

Because defendant drank practically nonstop from 8 a.m. on April 22, 2024, until

approximately 7 a.m. the morning he turned himself in, the Court concludes that it is

more likely than not that he was intoxicated to some degree at the time he waived his

Miranda rights.

But the fact that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the waiver is not the end

of the matter. That is because “a defendant’s intoxication is only one circumstance the

8 Defendant testified that in his previous experiences being booked for domestic
violence offenses, he would turn himself in but have to wait for 12 to 15 hours before
receiving a lawyer, and that he would drink heavily before turning himself in so that he
could sleep during those 12 to 15 hours. Tr. 69:11–70:21.
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court must consider.” Siciliano Nuñez, 718 F. Supp. 3d at 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). Indeed,

“an intoxicated defendant may waive his or her Miranda rights so long as he or she

appreciated the nature of the waiver.” Id.; see United States v. DiLorenzo,

No. 94-cr-00303, 1995 WL 366377, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1995) (collecting cases and

observing that “a claim that a defendant was . . . suffering from the effects of alcohol is

not, in the absence of coercive law enforcement activity, sufficient to characterize his

confession as involuntary”).

The totality of circumstances indicates that defendant appreciated the nature of

his waiver. As previously stated, these circumstances include (1) the characteristics of the

accused, (2) the conditions of interrogation, and (3) the conduct of law enforcement

officials.” Mendonca, 88 F.4th at 164.

First, defendant’s age and background suggest he would have had a general adult-

level understanding of the NYPD and the warnings Det. Paray provided. Defendant was

28 years old at that time of the interview. Opp’n Ex. C (“Pretrial Services Report”) 2, ECF

No. 63-2. For 26 of those years, defendant has lived in New York City. Id. He is a native

English speaker, earned his GED, and, at least prior to his arrest, held long-term

employment as a fire safety guard. Id. Even accepting defendant’s testimony that he had

never before received a Miranda warning, Tr. 85:21–86:15, these factors suggest that

defendant had the requisite level of competence to understand the Miranda warnings that

Det. Paray read to him.

Second, intoxication does not work like a light switch. Defendant’s long-term abuse

of alcohol—and testimony at the suppression hearing—suggests that he has built up a

tolerance to its effects. Accordingly, the mere fact that defendant had been drinking

heavily the day before the interview with Det. Paray cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. And

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several pieces of evidence suggest that, at the time of the interview, defendant was not

intoxicated to the degree that he “lack[ed] capacity for conscious choice.” Reply 3 (citing

Taylor, 745 F.3d at 24). 9

Defendant’s behavior during other interactions with police suggests that his

intoxication operates on a spectrum. Since his arrest, defendant has violated his pretrial

conditions of release several times. See Opp’n Ex. B, ECF No. 63-1. These incidents, in

which defendant was reportedly intoxicated, reveal that in at least some instances his level

of intoxication results in violence and disorderly conduct. See id. at 2 (“It should be noted

9 The Court notes that it finds Det. Kissoondyal’s testimony that despite being
“basically on top of” defendant while searching him, Tr. 26:6, 28:21–22, he detected “no
odor of alcohol at all,” Tr. 31:7, difficult to believe in light of defendant’s account of his
daily drinking routine, Tr. 63:7–66:8, and Det. Kissoondyal’s own admission that
defendant was known as “the town drunk,” Tr. 49:8–10. Nonetheless, this case is
distinguishable from United States v. Cellemme, in which the court granted a motion to
suppress because it had “serious doubts regarding the credibility of the government’s
version” of events. 431 F. Supp. 731, 734 (D. Mass. 1977). There, the defendant, who
witnesses described as “a poor drinker” and “not hav[ing] much drinking capacity” was
arrested less than an hour after a wedding reception at which those same witnesses
observed him drinking heavily. Id. at 733–34. The court found it “curious” that the
“[arresting] officers detected no odor of alcohol on the defendant’s breath,” “troubl[ing]”
that despite the defendant’s allegedly immediate agreement to cooperate, “it still took
approximately two hours to obtain a signed confession consisting of only one and a half
typed pages,” and “puzzl[ing] [] the contention that the defendant waited approximately
one and a half hours after making a confession to call anyone.” Id. at 734. The court
concluded that “while perhaps none of these factors would independently establish that
the defendant was so intoxicated as to be incapable of voluntarily confessing, they are
sufficient to raise serious doubts regarding the credibility of the government’s version” of
events. Id. Here, there is no testimony that defendant is a poor drinker; quite the opposite.
Tr. 101:12–17 (Question: “Was he the type of person who would slur his word[s] or
stumble around? Answer: “No. Michael could still walk around and get around pretty
good.” Question: “Was he the type of person who’d be falling over? Answer: “No, not at
all.”). Nor, as discussed below, is there evidence of coercion. And although the Court
reiterates its skepticism of Det. Kissoondyal’s “curious” testimony regarding the lack of
smell of alcohol on defendant, see Cellemme, 431 F. Supp. at 734, this fact, in light of the
other evidence suggesting that defendant was able to “appreciate the nature of [his]
waiver,” Bruno v. Cunningham, No. 03-cv-00937, 2004 WL 2290503, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 8, 2004) (quoting Alvarez v. Keane, 92 F. Supp. 137, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), does not
meaningfully change the Court’s analysis.

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that the police report indicated the defendant was intoxicated at the scene and acted in a

violent manner toward police.”); id. at 3 (“The report indicates that [defendant] was

highly uncooperative with [the NYPD]; was intoxicated and refused to walk. It was noted

that four members of service were needed to carry [] defendant into the station house.”).

In contrast, his behavior during the interview—calmly and appropriately answering Det.

Paray’s questions and being overall cooperative—at the very least suggests that he was not

at the height of intoxication at the time. See, e.g., Interview Footage 22:04–44, 24:15–35.

And the interview video footage supports the inference that defendant’s level of

intoxication was at the lower end of his spectrum. In the video, defendant appears to be

coherent and responsive. See generally Interview Footage. He reviews video footage with

Det. Paray, seemingly able to follow what the video is showing. Interview Footage 23:00–

29:41, 30:50–31:40; see id. 31:30–35 (“I was on the phone, obviously I was on the

phone . . . with my cousin”). He notes that the video is “dark,” id. 23:11–15, and asks what

time of day it is showing, id. 23:20–23:25. At one point, defendant identifies the bodega

in the video as one from which he frequently buys “cigarettes [and] beers.” Id. 24:15–

24:28.10 Perhaps most tellingly, once presented with evidence that he was caught on video

discharging the firearm in question, defendant formulates a story about how it was not a

real gun but rather an “airsoft paintball” gun that “take[s] the CO2 cartridges.” Id. 31:00–

49. And although he answers several questions throughout the interview, at no point does

defendant slur his words or appear otherwise intoxicated. Put differently, he “seemed to

understand what was going on.” Parsad v. Greiner, 337 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2003); see

People v. Parsad, 243 A.D.2d 510, 512 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Although the defendant had been

10 Det. Paray’s question “you a big drinker,” Interview Footage 24:28–35, to which
defendant responds in the negative, appears to have been precipitated by this statement,
as opposed to any outward signs of intoxication.
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drinking alcohol when the officers initially approached him . . . [he] was able to walk and

articulate appropriate responses to the detectives’ questions.”). Finally, the video shows

defendant sit and stand with no apparent difficulty. Interview Footage 17:30–39, 36:55–

37:17, 37:30–40. The stability with which he accomplishes these maneuvers suggests that

defendant’s motor skills were not overly affected by his level of intoxication at the time. 11

In sum, even considering the fact that defendant has “an issue with alcohol,”

Tr. 148:15–16, and that he was likely somewhat intoxicated when he walked into the 81st

Precinct, the evidence does not suggest that he was so intoxicated that he failed to

appreciate the nature of his actions.

The remaining analysis requires little discussion. As depicted on the video footage,

neither the “the conditions of interrogation” nor “the conduct of law enforcement

officials,” Mendonca, 88 F.4th at 164, suggest that Det. Paray “took undue advantage of

[defendant]’s diminished mental state, and ultimately overbore his will.” Taylor, 745 F.3d

at 25.

The interview was conducted in a conversational tone, and Det. Paray, who was the

only officer present, never raised his voice or otherwise appeared threatening. See, e.g.,

Interview Footage 33:00–34:33. Further, “[t]he interview itself was not unduly lengthy,”

Haak, 884 F.3d at 415, as it lasted under twenty minutes, Interview Footage 20:57–37:50;

cf. United States ex rel. Burns v. LaVallee, 436 F.2d 1352, 1355–56 (2d Cir.1970) (finding

11 Defendant’s citation to United States v. Cope for the proposition that experienced
drinkers “cannot have tolerance to the cognitive effects” of alcohol is unavailing, primarily
because that case involved an expert witness who was opining on a pilot’s ability to safely
operate a commercial airplane. 676 F.3d 1219, 1223, 1228–29 (10th Cir. 2012). While the
Court agrees that, as a general matter, experienced drinkers may be able to mask the
physical effects of their overconsumption such that they appear to be functioning at a
higher cognitive level than they actually are, it does not follow that cognitive function for
purposes of flying a plane is in any way analogous to cognitive function for purposes of a
Miranda waiver.
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a written confession to be involuntary when given “after over eighteen hours of

uninterrupted custodial interrogation, after [the defendant] had been without sleep, and

almost without food, for thirty hours.”). Defendant was not handcuffed during the

interview, and was provided cigarettes upon request. Defendant does not allege that Det.

Paray or any other officer engaged in manipulation, coercion, or intimidation. Simply, it

would be difficult to imagine a more “routine, benign, and noncoercive investigatory

scenario.” Haak, 884 F.3d at 415.

Given the characteristics of the defendant, including his history of alcoholism, the

conditions of the interrogation, and the conduct of Det. Paray, the totality of the

circumstances establishes that defendant’s Miranda waiver was voluntary and thus valid.

Accordingly, it would be inappropriate for this Court to suppress the statements he made

after that waiver.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to suppress is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Natasha C. Merle
NATASHA C. MERLE
United States District Judge
Dated: September 4, 2026
Brooklyn, New York

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