Order Granting in Part Government's Motion to Revoke Magistrate Judge's Order of Bond (S.D. Fla., Dkt. 18)
Summary
Order in United States v. Kenny Terlent, Case No. 21-cr-20380-Scola, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, entered July 21, 2021 as Document 18. It grants in part the Government's motion (ECF No. 12) to revoke Magistrate Judge Edwin G. Torres's order of bond, reverses that order and revokes the defendant's bond. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant poses a risk of flight and that no conditions will assure appearance, and it does not reach the Government's request for a finding of danger to the community. The order recites that the Indictment charged possession of fifteen or more unauthorized access devices, six counts of aggravated identity theft and illegal possession of a machinegun. It applies 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) and § 3142(g) and orders the defendant detained pending trial.
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“Order Granting in Part Government's Motion to Revoke Magistrate Judge's Order of Bond (S.D. Fla., Dkt. 18).”
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Case 1:21-cr-20380-RNS Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2021 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court
for the
Southern District of Florida
United States of America )
)
v. ) Case No. 21-cr-20380-Scola
)
Kenny Terlent, Defendant )
Order Granting in Part Government’s Motion
to Revoke Magistrate Judge’s Order of Bond
The Government appeals United State Magistrate Judge Edwin G.
Torres’s order denying motion for pretrial detention and releasing Defendant
Kenny Terlent on bond. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the
Government has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Defendant poses a risk of flight if released and that no conditions or
combination of conditions will assure his appearance. The Court does not
reach that part of the Government’s motion which seeks a finding that the
Defendant poses a danger to the community. The Government’s motion (ECF
No. 12) is granted in part, Magistrate Judge Torres’s order is reversed, the
Defendant’s bond is revoked, and the Defendant is ordered detained pending
trial in this matter.
1. Background
On July 15, 2021, Terlent was charged by Indictment with: (1)
possession of fifteen or more unauthorized access devices, (2) six counts of
aggravated identity theft, and (3) illegal possession of a machinegun. (ECF No.
11.)
After his arrest Terlent was brought before Judge Torres for a detention
hearing. The Government sought pretrial detention based on danger to the
community and risk of flight. The Government further argued that no set of
conditions, short of detention, could reasonably assure Terlent’s appearance
before the Court or the safety of individuals and the community. In support of
its request, the Government presented Secret Service Agent Natalya
Kaczmarczyk. The Government also relied on the Pretrial Services Report that
recommended that Terlent be detained pending his trial.
After considering the evidence, Judge Torres denied the Government’s
request for pretrial detention and ordered Terlent to be released on bond.
Judge Torres granted the Government’s request to stay execution of the bond
for a period of seven days. The Government appealed Judge Torres’s order of
bond, arguing that Terlent poses a severe risk to the community and risk of
flight.
This Court held a hearing on the Government’s motion on July 21, 2021.
Both sides were offered the opportunity to present additional evidence or
Case 1:21-cr-20380-RNS Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2021 Page 2 of 4
testimony and declined to do so. The Court conducted a de novo review and
considered the written submissions of the parties, the transcript of the
detention hearing held before Magistrate Judge Torres, and the arguments of
counsel. The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Terlent poses
a risk of flight.
2. Legal Standards
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3145(a)(1) provides that, “[i]f a person is ordered
released by a magistrate judge,” “the attorney for the Government may file, with
the court having original jurisdiction of the offense, a motion for revocation of
the order or amendment of the conditions of release.” The Court reviews the
Government’s challenge to Judge Torres’s bond order de novo. United States v.
Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1471-1472 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rivera,
90 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1339-1340 (S.D. Fla. 2000). The Court must exercise
independent judgment as to the facts before it and include findings of fact and
reasons for detention. United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667, 670 (11th
Cir.1987). Here, the Court considers the transcript of the hearing before Judge
Torres, the Pretrial Services Report, the parties’ pleadings, and the arguments
presented at the hearing on July 21, 2021.
The Court notes that the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq.
(hereinafter the “Act”) governs the release and detention of a defendant prior to
trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1) entitles the Government to move for detention if the
defendant has been charged with one of the offenses enumerated in the Act
which Congress has determined warrant detention. Where a charged offense is
described in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1), there is a rebuttable presumption that no
combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person
or the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). The Government concedes that
Defendant has not been charged with an offense that triggers a presumption in
favor of detention. (Tr. July 7, 2021, ECF No. 7 at 48.)
Alternatively, as in the matter currently before the Court, the
Government may move for detention where the matter involves a serious risk
that the defendant will flee or obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice. See id. at
§ 3142(f)(2). When considering pre-trial detention, the Court must decide
whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the
appearance of the defendant and protect the safety of any other person or the
community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Factors relevant to this inquiry are: (1)
the nature and circumstances of the offense(s), including whether the offense(s)
are a crime of violence or involve a narcotic drug, (2) the weight of the evidence,
(2) the history and characteristics of the defendant and (4) the nature and
seriousness of the danger posed by the defendant’s release. See 18 U.S.C. §
3142(g).
With regards to dangerousness, the Government must present clear and
convincing evidence that no conditions of release will reasonably assure the
safety of any other person or the community. United States v. Rodriguez, 897
Case 1:21-cr-20380-RNS Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2021 Page 3 of 4
F.Supp. 1461, 1464 (S.D. Fla.1995). Alternatively, regarding the risk of flight,
the Government bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that no conditions will reasonably assure the defendant’s presence at
trial. United States v. Medina, 775 F.2d 1398, 1402 (11th Cir.1985). A finding
of either danger to the safety of any other person or the community or risk of
flight is sufficient to detain the defendant pending trial. King, 849 F.2d at 488.
If, based on the evidence presented, no conditions will reasonably assure the
defendant’s presence or the safety of any other person or the community, then
the Court must order detention. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Conversely, if there
are conditions that will ensure the appropriate safeguards, then the Court
must release the defendant subject to these conditions. See id. at § 3142(c).
3. Analysis
The Court finds that Terlent poses a risk of flight. Additionally, there are
no conditions of release that will reasonably assure Terlent’s appearance and
protect the safety of the community.
Terlent poses a risk of flight. When law enforcement searched his
residence in connection to this case, Terlent fled the scene and threw his cell
phone into a nearby lake, presumably, in an attempt to destroy evidence.
Additionally, Terlent had access to thousands of pieces of personal identifying
information, which would allow him to commit access decide fraud and obtain
proceeds to flee. The search of Terlent’s iCloud account revealed a voluminous
PDF titled, “I’m Rich Bitch,” that contained thousands of social security
numbers, credit card numbers, debit card numbers, names, dates of birth, and
addresses.
Terlent is also aware that the firearm found during the search of his
residence, which forms the basis of one of the charges against him, has been
connected to five other violent offenses. The Court notes that Terlent has not
been charged with any offenses related to those crimes. Even so, the potential
of being charged with additional and more serious offenses further incentivizes
Terlent to flee if released on bond.
Terlent has been charged with illegal possession of firearm that has been
connected to several other crimes. Additionally, Terlent has also been linked to
a violent street gang, 77th Street. Law enforcement’s investigation revealed that
Terlent communicated via text message with 77th Street gang members within
the hour of the murder of P.P. Terlent texted the address of the murder.
Additionally, one 77th Street member (“Witness 1”) stated to law enforcement
that Terlent had been involved with P.P.’s murder to avenge the death of a 77th
Street gang member.
The Court must also decide whether there are conditions of release that
will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant and protect the safety
of any other person or the community. After careful consideration of the factors
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the Court finds that there are no such
conditions.
Terlent is not charged with violations that would give rise to the
Case 1:21-cr-20380-RNS Document 18 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/21/2021 Page 4 of 4
rebuttable presumption of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). In other words, Defendant has
not been charged with a crime involving narcotics, nor has Defendant been
charged with a crime involving violence. However, the nature of the charged
offenses is nonetheless very serious. United States v. Manukyan, No. 15-80183-
CR, 2016 WL 8674496, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2016) (Brannon, MJ.) report
adopted (ECF No. 38) (S.D. Fla. April 27, 2016) (Middlebrooks, J.)
The weight of the evidence is significant. A search of Terlent’s residence,
revealed bank documents in other people’s names, burner phones, and a
Chime card, a device commonly used to conduct fraudulent transfers. A search
of Terlent’s iCloud account also included a PDF containing thousands of pieces
of personal identifying information. During the search law enforcement also
discovered a firearm that had been hidden in a hamper. Terlent had sent
several text messages and pictures referencing a similar firearm.
Terlent also has an extensive criminal record. However, even more
concerning than his previous criminal charges, is a systemic pattern of
disregard for court orders. Indeed, as recently as 2018 and 2019, there are
records indicating that Terlent has not complied with the terms of supervised
release in various state cases. Terlent has failed to appear on at least three
occasions in those state cases. Accordingly, the Court is not confident that if
released Terlent would comply with the terms of supervised release or appear
in later hearings and trial.
4. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court finds that Terlent poses a risk of flight. There
are no conditions that could ensure his appearance at trial. Accordingly, the
Government’s motion (ECF No. 12) to revoke Judge Torres’s order on bond is
granted in part, Judge Torres’s order releasing Terlent is reversed, and Terlent’s
bond is revoked.
Defendant is committed to the custody of the Attorney General for
confinement in a corrections facility separate, to the extent practicable, from
persons awaiting or serving sentences or being held in custody pending appeal.
Defendant shall be awarded reasonable opportunity for private
consultation with counsel.
Upon order of the Court, the Defendant shall be delivered to the custody
of the U.S. Marshal for the purpose of an appearance in connection with a court
proceeding.
Done and ordered in chambers, at Miami, Florida, on July 21, 2021.
_______________________________
Robert N. Scola, Jr.
United States District Judge
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