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Case 1:21-cr-00338-RDB Document 62 Filed 11/22/22 Page 1 of 4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *
v. * CRIMINAL NO. RDB-21-0338
GLADSTONE NJOKEM, *
Defendant. *
* * * * * * * * * * * *
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendant Gladstone Njokem (“Njokem” or “Defendant”) has been charged with five
counts in an eleven-count Indictment alleging one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud
under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, three counts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of
aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(4), (c)(5). (Indictment, ECF No.
1.) Now pending is Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements (ECF No. 39)
which argues that a search warrant executed by federal agents lacked probable cause. The
Court has considered the Government’s Opposition (ECF No. 42), the Defendant’s Reply
(ECF No. 56), and held a motions hearing on November 21, 2022. (ECF No. 58.) For the
reasons stated on the record, and briefly reiterated below, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
The Defendant argues that the search warrant issued by Magistrate Judge Thomas M.
DiGirolamo on February 4, 2021, to search Defendant’s residence 1 relied on facts dating back
to June 2020, thereby rendering probable cause stale. (ECF No. 39). When a defendant
1 Defendant is listed as a contact person on the lease, had been viewed by federal agents on the property, and
is listed on the Comcast bills linked to the residence. (ECF Nos. 39, 42.)
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challenges a search warrant, the government bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence at a suppression hearing. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177–78 n.14
(1974).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. The Supreme Court of the United States “has required that the existence of
probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible.” Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,112 (1975) (citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948)). The
magistrate is required “simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all
the circumstances in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’
of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Blackwood, 913 F.2d 139,
142 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
Probable cause may be called into question under a “staleness” argument. As to
staleness, the time between the facts supporting a finding of probable cause and the issuance
of a search warrant is an important factor. United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1335–36 (4th
Cir. 1984). Even so, “[t]he vitality of probable cause cannot be quantified by simply counting
the number of days between the occurrence of the facts supplied and the issuance of the
affidavit.” Id.; United States v. Farmer, 370 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2004) (same). In the presence
of ongoing and continuous criminal activity, staleness is much less of a concern. Farmer, 370
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F.3d at 439 (rejecting staleness argument because it was unlikely that defendant's
counterfeiting operations would suddenly cease).
Significantly, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not bar the admission of
evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a
magistrate later found to be invalid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923–24 (1984). The
evidence will be suppressed only if (1) the issuing judge was misled by information that the
affiant knew or should have known was false, (2) the judge “wholly abandoned” his neutral
role, (3) the affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in
its existence entirely unreasonable,” or (4) the warrant is so facially deficient that no reasonable
officer could presume it to be valid. Id. at 923 (citations omitted).
In reviewing the search warrant, this Court must show “great deference” to the
probable cause determination of a magistrate judge. Blackwood, 913 F.2d at 142; United States v.
Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 309 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Drummond, 925 F.3d 681, 687 (4th Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 976 (2020). “[T]he task of the reviewing court is not to conduct a
de novo determination of probable cause, but only to determine whether there is substantial
evidence in the record supporting the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant.” Massachusetts
v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728 (1984); see also United States v. Bosyk, 933 F.3d 319, 325 (4th Cir.
2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1124 (2020).
The Government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the search
warrant at issue contained sufficient probable cause, and Defendant’s staleness argument fails.
Given the evolving and continuous nature of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting influx
of unemployment benefits applications, there was a sufficient showing that evidence
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pertaining to the Defendant’s alleged involvement in the fraudulent scheme based on those
unemployment benefits would be present in the Defendant’s residence at the time of the
search warrant’s execution. As the Government aptly notes, the Defendant “incorrectly argues
that the scheme to defraud is complete when a fraudulent [unemployment insurance]
application is submitted.” (ECF No. 42 at 8.) The Government has set forth evidence that the
Defendant’s alleged crimes were ongoing and continuous, that the length of the alleged crimes
lasted more than six months, and that evidence of unemployment insurance benefits fraud is
not diminished by the passage of time. (ECF No. 42 at 7.) Further, the nature of the property
sought by the search warrant, including victims’ personally identifiable information, financial
documents, debit and credit cards, is not the type that is ordinarily destroyed or moved. As a
result, the challenged search warrant was founded on probable cause as there was a “fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime” would have been found at the listed
property. Blackwood, 913 F.2d at 142. 2
Accordingly, IT IS, this 22nd day of November, 2022, hereby ORDERED that
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence and Statements (ECF No. 39) is DENIED.
________/s/___________
Richard D. Bennett
United States District Judge
2 Because this Court finds sufficient probable cause, the Defendant’s parallel Leon argument fails. In other
words, the affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
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