Magistrate Judge's Order and Final Report and Recommendation (N.D. Ga., Dkt. 173, September 16, 2024)

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A Magistrate Judge's Order and Final Report and Recommendation in Angela Brady-Williams v. United States, Criminal No. 1:21-CR-39-MHC-JSA-1 and Civil Action No. 1:24-CV-850-MHC-JSA, Document 173, filed September 16, 2024, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. It addresses a pro se motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (Doc. 155) that challenges a conviction and sentence following a guilty plea. The report states that Movant pleaded guilty on June 12, 2023 to one count of filing a false tax return, was sentenced on December 12, 2023 to thirty-three (33) months of imprisonment and $1,080,606.44 in restitution to the IRS, and raises one ground, ineffective assistance of counsel. It recommends that the §2255 motion be DENIED and that a certificate of appealability be denied.

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Case 1:21-cr-00039-MHC-JSA Document 173 Filed 09/16/24 Page 1 of 21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

ANGELA BRADY-WILLIAMS, : MOTION TO VACATE
Fed. Reg. No. 21996510, : 28 U.S.C. §2255
Movant, :
: CRIMINAL NO.
v. : 1:21-CR-39-MHC-JSA-1
:
UNITED STATES, : CIVIL ACTION NO.
Respondent. : 1:24-CV-850-MHC-JSA

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER AND FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION

Movant Angela Brady-Williams has filed the instant pro se motion to vacate

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255. (Doc. 155). Movant seeks to challenge the

constitutionality of Movant’s conviction and sentence following Movant’s guilty

plea in the Northern District of Georgia.

I. Procedural and Factual History

A. Facts

Movant is the sole owner and proprietor of an I.T. consulting business. (Doc.

157 (“Plea Tr.”) at 20). Movant’s company did not have any W-2 or 1099

employees; instead, Movant hired foreign contractors from India and paid them

exclusively through PayPal. (Id.; Doc. 139 (“PSR”) at ¶11). Movant did not pay

any family members or friends in the United States to perform contract work. (Plea

Tr. at 20).
Case 1:21-cr-00039-MHC-JSA Document 173 Filed 09/16/24 Page 2 of 21

For tax years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, Movant authorized a tax preparer,

Felicia Jackson, to prepare Movant’s Form 1040 individual tax returns. (Id.).

Movant did not provide Ms. Jackson with bank or PayPal statements; instead,

Movant provided Ms. Jackson with the 1040 forms and Ms. Jackson based the tax

returns solely on the information and documents provided by Movant. (PSR ¶14).

After Ms. Jackson completed the tax returns for each of the four years, she reviewed

those returns with Movant in person until Movant understood exactly what was

contained therein. (Id. ¶15). For all of those years, Movant declared under penalty

of perjury that Movant examined the returns filed electronically on her behalf and

that they were true and accurate. (Plea Tr. at 20). In each year, however, Movant

knowingly provided Ms. Jackson with false amounts of contract labor expenses, and

for 2016 and 2017 she also provided false spreadsheets of contract labor amounts.

(Id. at 20-21).

Movant’s bank and PayPal accounts showed that the total contract labor

expenses claimed on Movant’s 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 returns were

substantially inflated by over two million dollars.1 (Id.; PSR ¶12). Consequently,

the falsely inflated contract labor expenses increased Movant’s total income as well

as Movant’s reported tax due and owing, and thus were material and important to

1
Specifically, the labor costs provided on Movant’s tax returns exceeded the
actual amounts in Movant’s PayPal account by $614,515.20 in 2014, $448,751.07
in 2015, $537,949.89 in 2016, and $531,387.33 in 2017. (PSR ¶12).
2
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the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)’s evaluation of the accuracy of Movant’s tax

return. (Plea Tr. at 21).

B. Procedural History

1. Pre-Plea Proceedings

On January 27, 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Movant and charged her

with four counts of filing false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206(1) for the

years 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. (Doc. 1). During Movant’s arraignment, the

Court appointed Brian Mendelsohn of the Federal Defender Program to represent

Movant, and on July 21, 2021, Carmen Brooks of the Federal Defender Program

also entered an appearance on Movant’s behalf. (Docs. 9, 16). The Court first set a

trial date for March 1, 2022; however, that date was subsequently continued to the

following dates: May 10, 2022; August 1, 2022; October 11, 2022; November 1,

2022; January 17, 2023; March 6, 2023; and March 7, 2023.2 (Docs. 26, 28, 34, 36,

37, 38, 39, 40, 45).

Meanwhile, Gregory Timothy Bailey entered an appearance on Movant’s

behalf on July 22, 2022. (See Docket Entry dated 7/22/22). On December 27, 2022,

Movant and Mr. Bailey met with the Government to discuss a plea agreement, during

which the Government informed Movant of the applicable sentencing guidelines.

2
Some of these continuances were requested by one or both parties for various
reasons, and some were granted because Movant fired several of her attorneys.
3
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(Doc. 62-1 ¶¶28, 34). Movant signed the plea agreement and the Court set a date

for Movant to enter the plea on January 10, 2023. (Id. ¶34; Docket Entry dated

1/3/23). Two days before the scheduled plea hearing, however, Movant fired Mr.

Bailey and hired Herald Alexander to represent her. (Docs. 62, 63). The Court

subsequently granted Movant’s request to continue the trial, and the new trial date

was set for March 6, 2023. (Docs. 62-3, 64, 77, 102, 104; Docket Entry dated

2/17/23). When Movant requested another continuance because Movant had newly

retained an expert witness, the Court granted the motion in part. (Docket Entry dated

2/17/23; Doc. 82). To that end, the Court only delayed the case by one day until

March 7, 2023, based on the age of the case, the nearly decade-old matters in the

indictment, and the six previous continuances. (Docket Entry dated 2/17/2023; Doc.

82).

The trial nevertheless was continued one more time after U.S. District Judge

J.P. Boulee recused from the case and it was reassigned to U.S. District Judge Mark

H. Cohen. (Docs. 94, 95, 104). This time, the trial date was rescheduled to June 12,

2023. (Doc. 102). Three days before the date of trial, however, Movant fired Mr.

Alexander and hired Abram Jack Fishman as counsel. (Docs. 128, 129, 130). Mr.

Fishman negotiated a plea with the Government on Movant’s behalf, which Movant

signed on June 10, 2023. (Doc. 130).

4
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2. Plea Proceedings

On June 12, 2023, while represented by Mr. Fishman,3 Movant entered a

guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement to one count of filing a false tax return.4

(Docs. 130, 130-1 (“Plea Agreement”)). Therein, the Government agreed that: the

Government would dismiss the other three counts in exchange for the plea [Plea

Agreement ¶13]; Movant would receive a two-level offense adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility [Id. ¶16]; and the Government would make no

recommendation as to the amount of the fine to be imposed [Id. ¶19]. Movant agreed

that the recommendations, stipulations, and guideline computations were not

binding on the Court. (Id. ¶27). The plea agreement also contained an appellate and

collateral waiver which provided that Movant waived the right to file an appeal and

collaterally attack her conviction and sentence in any post-conviction motion –

including a motion under §2255 – on any ground, except for an upward departure or

variance from the guideline range or for ineffective assistance of counsel claims.

(Id. ¶28). During the plea colloquy and in the plea agreement, Movant affirmed that

she had read the agreement in its entirety, carefully reviewed every part of it with

3
Mr. Alexander also was present at the plea hearing since the Court had not yet
ruled on his motion to withdraw, but the Court granted that motion at the beginning
of the hearing. (Doc. 130; Doc. 157 (“Plea Tr.”) at 3-5).
4
Specifically, Movant entered a plea to Count 3, which was for filing the 2016
false tax return. (Plea Agreement ¶1; Doc. 1 at 2-3).
5
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her attorney, understood the terms and conditions in the agreement and voluntarily

agreed to them, and was fully satisfied with counsel’s representation. (Id. at 15-16;

see generally Doc. 157 (“Plea Tr.”)).

Also during the plea colloquy, Movant stated under oath that: Movant

understood the constitutional rights she was waiving by pleading guilty; Movant

understood that she was entering a plea to filing a false tax return and the

consequences thereof, including a potential maximum sentence of three years; the

decision to plead guilty was not a result of threats, force, or promises other than those

contained the agreement; Movant felt that she had sufficient time to think about and

fully discuss the matter with counsel; Movant had conferred with counsel about how

the sentencing guidelines might apply in her case; Movant understood that the Court

would not be not bound by the Government’s recommendation and had the authority

to impose a sentence more or less severe than the sentencing guideline range; and

that any such sentence would not be a basis to withdraw the guilty plea. (Plea Tr. at

9-12, 16-18, 21-22, 24, 26).

As part of the Government’s summary of the plea agreement, the Government

read the paragraph containing the waiver of Movant’s appellate and collateral rights.

(Id. at 15-16). The Court also went into great detail about the rights Movant was

waiving in that paragraph of the agreement, after which Movant stated that she

understood. (Id. at 24-26). The Government set forth the factual basis for the plea,

6
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and Movant told the Court that she agreed with that summary and affirmed that she

was, in fact, guilty of the offenses in the indictment to which she was entering a plea.

(Id. at 19-22). After receiving confirmation from Mr. Fishman that after conferring

with Movant he believed that Movant was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently

waving her constitutional rights, the Court accepted Movant’s guilty plea. (Id. at

18-19, 27-28).

On December 12, 2023, the Court sentenced Movant to thirty-three (33)

months of imprisonment and $1,080,606.44 in restitution to the IRS. (Doc. 138).

Movant did not file a direct appeal with the Eleventh Circuit.

Movant executed the instant pro se motion to vacate her sentence pursuant to

§2255 on February 3, 2024. (Doc. 155). Therein, Movant raises one ground for

relief, that Mr. Fishman provided ineffective assistance of counsel by coercing

Movant into entering a guilty plea. (Id.). For the following reasons, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that the instant §2255 motion be DENIED.

II. Standard of Review

Congress enacted §2255, authorizing convicted criminal defendants to file a

motion to correct sentences that violate federal law, with the intention that the statute

serve as the primary method of collateral attack on federally imposed sentences.

United States v. Jordan, 915 F.2d 622, 625 (11th Cir. 1990). Pursuant to §2255,

individuals sentenced by a federal court can attack the sentence imposed by claiming

7
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one of four different grounds: “(1) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) that the court was without jurisdiction

to impose such sentence; (3) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum

authorized by law; and (4) that the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”

Id. (citations omitted); see generally United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952).

“[T]o obtain collateral relief a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hurdle

than would exist on direct appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 166

(1982). Movant must establish that the facts surrounding his claim present

“exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of

habeas corpus is apparent.” Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 (1939).

The Court should order an evidentiary hearing if “the motion and the files and

records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28

U.S.C. §2255(b); see also Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662, 670 (11th Cir.

2020) (noting that although a movant is entitled to evidentiary hearing if relief is

warranted by the facts he alleges, a hearing is not required if the record conclusively

demonstrates that no relief is warranted). As discussed further below, Movant’s

§2255 motion and the record in this case conclusively show that Movant is not

entitled to relief in connection with her claim. Thus, no evidentiary hearing is

required.

8
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III. Analysis

A. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standard

The standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims was set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Green v. Nelson, 595 F.3d

1245, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010). “An ineffective assistance claim has two components:

A petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the

deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). To establish deficiency, a petitioner is required

to establish that “counsel’s representation ‘fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.’” Wiggins 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). To

establish prejudice, a petitioner must prove a “reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Allen v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 611 F.3d

740, 750 (11th Cir. 2010).

“An attorney’s performance is not deficient in hindsight just because he or she

made one choice versus another.” Scott v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1259 (11th

Cir. 2018); see also Willis v. Newsome, 771 F.2d 1445, 1447 (11th Cir. 1985)

(“Tactical decisions do not render assistance ineffective merely because in retrospect

it is apparent that counsel chose the wrong course.”). An ineffective assistance claim

should be examined based on the “‘totality of the circumstances[,]’” McCoy v.

9
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Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1262 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted), and the court

may “dispose of [the] ineffectiveness claim[] on either of its two grounds.” Atkins

v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 959 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697 (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to

address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient

showing on one.”).

Strickland’s two-pronged test applies to counsel’s representation of a

defendant in connection with a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59

(1985). To demonstrate counsel’s ineffective assistance after entering a plea, the

Movant must show that his “counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance

affected the outcome of the plea process[,]” id. at 59, by “convinc[ing] the court that

a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the

circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); Chandler v. United

States, No. 20-13521, 2022 WL 445762, at *2 (11th Cir. Feb. 14) (per curiam)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 143 S. Ct.

174 (2022); see also Jackson v. United States, 463 F. App’x 833, 835 (11th Cir.

2012) (“If [the movant] cannot establish both that counsel misadvised him and that

a decision not to plead guilty would have been rational, his claim that his guilty plea

was not knowing and voluntary due to counsel’s ineffectiveness will fail.”). “[A]

petitioner’s bare allegation that he would not have pleaded guilty is insufficient to

10
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establish prejudice under Strickland.” Roach v. Roberts, 373 F. App’x 983, 985

(11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also Chandler, 2022 WL

445762, at *2 (“Post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have

pleaded, but for his attorney’s alleged deficiencies, are insufficient to allege an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.”).

B. Movant’s Ineffective Assistance Claim Is Belied By The Record.

Movant argues that Mr. Fishman provided ineffective assistance of counsel

and coerced Movant into entering a guilty plea to a charge for which Movant was

innocent, because Mr. Fishman: was unprepared to proceed to trial in three days;

would not seek a continuance because in his experience the court would not grant

any such request on the eve of trial; and told Movant that if she did not enter a plea

she would be found guilty and would receive a certain sentence of twelve years,

whereas if Movant were to enter a plea the sentence would be much lower at up to

three years. In support of this argument, Movant presents her own affidavit which

outlines Mr. Fishman’s alleged coercive tactics.5 (See generally Doc. 168 (“Movant

Decl.”) at 17). Movant’s affidavit, however, directly contradicts Movant’s sworn

statements made during the plea colloquy.

5
Movant also provides the affidavit of Movant’s friend Margaret Flowers, who
testified that Movant was with her when Movant received Mr. Fishman’s call about
the plea, and heard the discussion between them. (Doc. 168 at 20).
11
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There is a strong presumption that statements made during the plea colloquy

are true, and those sworn statements “constitute a formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977);

see also Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662, 670 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating that

statements made during plea colloquy “are afforded great weight”); United States v.

Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1514 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986) (“[I]f the Rule 11 plea taking

procedure is careful and detailed, the defendant will not later be heard to contend

that he swore falsely[.]”). And where, as here, a movant’s claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is in direct conflict with the movant’s statements under oath,

the movant has a strong burden to show that those sworn statements are false. Patel

v. United States, 252 F. App’x 970, 974-75 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); see also

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164, 166 (1982) (“Once the defendant’s chance

to appeal has been waived or exhausted, however, we are entitled to presume that he

stands fairly and finally convicted.”). Movant has not met this rigorous burden.

Setting aside that Movant herself chose to hire new counsel just three days

before trial, more importantly, Movant also swore, in relevant part, that she was

satisfied with her newly-hired counsel and that no one threatened or forced her to

plead guilty, and her present after-the-fact self-serving affidavit to the contrary is

insufficient to overcome the presumption of truth of these sworn statements. See

Sanders v. United States, No. 18-11807-A, 2018 WL 11303658, at *2 (11th Cir. Oct.

12
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5, 2018) (finding movant claiming he was forced by counsel to plead guilty to

offenses he did not commit did not overcome the strong presumption of the veracity

of his statements under oath during the plea colloquy); Lynch v. United States, No.

16-16243-C, 2017 WL 4570524, at *11 (11th Cir. June 26, 2017) (“At the plea

hearing, . . . Lynch affirmed under oath that the factual resume was true and correct

and that the government could have proven the facts contained therein at trial, and

that affirmation carries a strong presumption of veracity that cannot be overcome by

Lynch’s present self-serving statements to the contrary.”); United States v. Durham,

172 F. App’x 261, 265-66 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying motion to withdraw guilty plea when movant

claimed that attorney coerced him into entering the plea, because the court was

permitted to attach a strong presumption of truth to movant’s statement during the

plea colloquy that the plea was not a product of coercion).

Even if Movant had overcome the presumption of truth, however, Movant still

has not demonstrated that Mr. Fishman rendered ineffective assistance. Indeed, Mr.

Fishman’s advice was sound, that is, that Movant should take the plea to one charge

for a maximum term of three years or potentially face a maximum of twelve years if

convicted on all four charges after trial, and Movant does not, and cannot, show

otherwise. Consequently, Movant’s characterization of the information Mr.

Fishman provided to Movant as “misrepresentations” is just plain wrong. Instead,

13
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Mr. Fishman’s advice constituted nothing other than reasonable, professional

judgment, Movant relied on that judgment when deciding to enter the plea, and

Movant cannot now argue that she was coerced into doing so because she feels

buyer’s remorse. See, e.g., Connolly v. United States, 568 F. App’x 770, 771 (11th

Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding no ineffective assistance where movant claimed

attorney made “threats” that he would receive a life sentence and never see his wife

and child again if he did not plead guilty, because “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty

relying on his counsel’s best professional judgment, he cannot later argue that his

plea was due to coercion by counsel”); Maldonado v. United States, No. 6:07-cr-

107-orl-28gkj, 2011 WL 13311824, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2011) (finding movant’s

guilty plea was not the product of improper coercion even though counsel advised

movant that he would “most definitely be sentenced to life imprisonment” if he went

to trial and lost, since the movant also affirmed that he knew the maximum penalty

he faced and understood the consequences of the plea).

Likewise, Movant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. First, Movant’s

conclusory statements that had counsel not “coerced” her into entering a plea she

would have proceeded to trial and maintained her innocence are woefully

inadequate. See, e.g., Roach, 373 F. App’x at 985 (“[A] petitioner’s bare allegation

that he would not have pleaded guilty is insufficient to establish prejudice under

Strickland.”) (citation omitted). Movant also cannot demonstrate that a decision to

14
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go to trial would have been rational, as the evidence of Movant’s guilt was

overwhelming, since her own statements, her bank account, and her PayPal records

all demonstrated that the contract labor expenses reported on Movant’s tax returns

greatly exceeded the amounts in her PayPal records. (See PSR ¶12). What’s more,

Movant received a sentence of less than three years of imprisonment, which is

significantly less than Movant would have faced had she proceeded to trial with no

plausible defense.6

Thus, Movant’s sentencing exposure would have significantly increased after

a trial since the Government would not have dismissed the other three counts against

her. Accordingly, Movant has failed to show that a decision to forego the plea and

proceed to trial would have been rational. See Baker v. United States, 847 F. App’x

761, 765 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (finding no prejudice where “[a]side from his

belated, self-serving statements, Baker presented no evidence he would not have

pleaded guilty but for his counsel’s allegedly erroneous advice”); United States v.

Miranda-Alfaro, 462 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (finding

movant could not demonstrate prejudice because a rational person would not have

rejected a plea bargain where movant received the “exceptional benefit” of lowering

his sentence); see also Jackson v. United States, 463 F. App’x 833, 835 (11th Cir.

6
As will be discussed further herein, other than Movant’s conclusory
statements, the only defense she appears to raise is that she is actually innocent,
which she has not demonstrated.
15
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2012) (per curiam) (“If [the movant] cannot establish both that counsel misadvised

him and that a decision not to plead guilty would have been rational, his claim that

his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary due to counsel’s ineffectiveness will

fail.”).

C. Movant Has Not Demonstrated Actual Innocence.

Throughout the §2255 motion and Movant’s reply, Movant repetitively argues

that she is actually innocent; however, Movant’s argument is belied by the entire

record. Indeed, an actual innocence claim is “exceedingly narrow in scope,” and a

movant must present “new reliable evidence” that she is factually innocent. See

Granda v. United States, 990 F.3d 1272, 1292 (11th Cir. 2021); Rozzelle v. Sec’y,

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1012-15 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); see also

Banks v. United States, 770 F. App’x 946, 948 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“To

show actual innocence, a movant must present new, reliable evidence that he is

factually innocent of the crime of conviction.”). Any such evidence normally

consists of “exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or

critical physical evidence.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 322-24 (1995). And

significantly, “new” evidence that provides the basis of an actual innocence claim

means evidence that was both “newly discovered” and not available while the

criminal proceedings were pending. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400

(1993) (describing evidence of actual innocence as “newly discovered” evidence that

16
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“could not reasonably have been presented to the state trier of facts”); Woodruff v.

Crockett, No. 16-16845-H, 2017 WL 11680250, at *2 (11th Cir. Sept. 19, 2017) (“A

claim of actual innocence is also required to contain newly discovered evidence that

was not available at the time of trial.”); accord Cobb v. United States, No. 22-13909,

2024 WL 470346, at *2, n.2 (11th Cir. Feb. 7, 2024) (per curiam). Significantly,

“the Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’

case.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S,. 518, 538 (2006). This case is not so extraordinary.

To that end, in support of the claim that Movant is actually innocent, Movant

relies upon what she refers to as a “newly discovered affidavit” of Marion Harden,

who claims to be responsible for preparing Movant’s Excel spreadsheets in the years

2014-2017. (Doc. 168 at 23 (“Harden Aff.”)).7 According to Mr. Harden, in

preparing for the tax returns for those years, Movant would log into the PayPal

accounts, download full data dumps, and send the data to Harden. (Id.). Harden

would then sift through the data and prepare a spreadsheet containing only a list of

the contractors that were paid each year to send to Movant’s tax preparer, Ms.

Jackson. (Id.). Mr. Harden further claims that although he created and sent the Excel

7
Interestingly, although the indictment was issued in 2021, there appears to be
no mention whatsoever of Mr. Harden in the entire record until Movant submitted
Harden’s affidavit with Movant’s reply. Moreover, it is unclear why Movant needed
Mr. Harden’s testimony to testify about Movant’s own actions in preparing the tax
returns.
17
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files to Movant, Movant did not review and verify those spreadsheets; instead, the

files immediately were sent to Ms. Jackson to prepare the tax returns. (Id.).

It bears repeating that Movant swore under oath that the opposite was true

when Movant told the Court that she did, in fact, file a false and fraudulent tax return

knowing that it had contained false information that was material, and agreed that

she presented false spreadsheets with false and substantially inflated contract labor

amounts to Ms. Jackson. Additionally, in each of those years Ms. Jackson reviewed

the completed tax returns with Movant until Movant understood exactly what was

contained therein, and on all four tax returns Movant declared under penalty of

perjury that she examined the returns Ms. Jackson filed electronically on her behalf

and that they were true and accurate.

Finally, despite Movant’s dubious description of Mr. Harden’s affidavit as

“newly discovered,” the testimony contained therein is not new; nor was the

information unavailable to Movant at the time of her plea – as Mr. Harden describes

Movant’s own actions – which Movant would have known when she entered a guilty

plea and to which she herself could have testified but swore instead that she

knowingly submitted false tax returns. Movant also by definition was aware of Mr.

Harden’s supposed role in this arrangement and—regardless of the availability of an

affidavit (which would be hearsay in any event at trial)—there is no reason why

Movant would not have been able to call Harden as a witness.

18
Case 1:21-cr-00039-MHC-JSA Document 173 Filed 09/16/24 Page 19 of 21

In light of the entire record, Movant has failed to show that she is actually

innocent. See Wright v. United States, No. 16-15391-F, 2017 WL 3724992, at *1

(11th Cir. Feb. 1, 2017) (finding movant did not show actual innocence of possession

of stolen firearm conviction where movant presented affidavit of woman with him

at the time of his arrest who stated that the gun was hers and was not stolen, which

contradicted the movant’s sworn testimony that he was guilty); cf. U.S. ex rel.

McLaurin v. McCann, No. 1:07-C-1705, 2007 WL 3446496, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Nov.

16, 2007) (finding affidavits were not newly discovered evidence where any such

testimony could have been presented at trial.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

Angela Brady-Williams’s motion to vacate her sentence [Doc. 155] be DENIED

WITH PREJUDICE.

V. Certificate Of Appealability

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing §2255 Cases, “[t]he district court

must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse

to the applicant. . . . If the court issues a certificate, the court must state the specific

issue or issues that satisfy the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).” 28

U.S.C. §2253(c)(2) provides that a certificate of appealability (“COA”) may issue

19
Case 1:21-cr-00039-MHC-JSA Document 173 Filed 09/16/24 Page 20 of 21

“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” In order for the certification requirement to fulfill its function of weeding out

frivolous appeals, a court should not automatically issue a COA; rather, the applicant

must prove “something more than the absence of frivolity” or “the existence of mere

‘good faith’ on his or her part.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003)

(citations omitted).

Movant need not prove, however, that some jurists would grant the §2255

motion. See id. “The question is the debatability of the underlying constitutional

claim, not the resolution of that debate.” See Lamarca v. Secretary, Dep’t of Corr.,

568 F.3d 929, 934 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 325). In other

words, Movant need only demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Based on the foregoing discussion, reasonable

jurists would not find “debatable or wrong” the undersigned’s determination that

Movant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel or actual innocence.

See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a COA be denied.

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The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate the reference to the undersigned

Magistrate Judge.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED AND ORDERED this 16th day of September,

2024.

__________________________________
JUSTIN S. ANAND
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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