Government's Sentencing Memorandum — United States v. Craven Casper (D.D.C., Dkt. 34, October 16, 2020)

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Government's sentencing memorandum filed in two criminal matters against Craven Casper in the District of Columbia. The memorandum asks the Court to sentence Casper to 41 months of incarceration, at the high end of the revised Guidelines range of 33-41 months as calculated by the government, with supervised release of three years and restitution of $235,807.11. It states that Casper filed fraudulent tax returns and false class action settlement claims in other people's names, and operated a website offering coronavirus-related personal protection equipment that customers never received. It states that the government identified at least $3,800.45 taken from customers of that website.

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“Government's Sentencing Memorandum — United States v. Craven Casper (D.D.C., Dkt. 34, October 16, 2020).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-no-1-20-cr-00102-dkt-34-d-d-c-67bd0a6b8f/, SHA-256 c547b8873b754fba02363577c72589a651d114981de8e5a4e81c2df207dc76ec.

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Case 1:20-cr-00102-APM Document 34 Filed 10/16/20 Page 1 of 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Case No. 20-cr-00061(APM)
v.
Case No. 20-cr-00102 (APM)
CRAVEN CASPER,

Defendant.

GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

The United States of America, by and through its attorney, the United States Attorney for

the District of Columbia, respectfully submits this sentencing memorandum in the two above-

captioned criminal matters. The defendant, Craven Casper, is charged in two pending criminal

matters that the Court consolidated for sentencing, which is scheduled for October 22, 2020, at

11:00 a.m. As set forth below, Casper is a serial fraudster who thrives on committing a wide

variety of thefts. Indeed, lying and stealing have been a major part of his life, if not a compulsion,

as evidenced by Casper’s extensive criminal history, his commission of the instant offenses while

on probation, and his troubling post-plea conduct while awaiting his upcoming sentencing. In

short, Casper provides a textbook example of the dangers of under-deterrence. The state courts’

slap-on-the-wrist approach to addressing Casper’s previous crimes did not work. Rather, it

emboldened him to continue and indeed escalate his criminal conduct and in turn failed to protect

the public from Casper’s continuing harm.

Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court should sentence Casper to a

period of incarceration of 41 months. This is at the high end of his revised Guidelines range of

33-41 months, as calculated by the government below, and it approaches the Guidelines range of

46-57 months, as calculated by U.S. Probation. Alternatively, if the Court calculates a different
1
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Guidelines range, it should sentence Casper at the high end of that range. The Court should

further order a period of supervised release of three years and order Casper to pay restitution in

the amount of $235,807.11 ($232,006.66 from the first prosecution plus $3,800.45 from the

second). The recommended 41-month sentence is needed to protect the public from an inveterate

and out-of-control fraudster and send a long-overdue message to Casper and to other would-be

fraudsters that such conduct will not be tolerated.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. United States v. Craven Casper, 20-cr-00061 (APM)

In 2019 the District of Columbia Office of Tax and Revenue (“DC-OTR”) and the United

States Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”) discovered that Casper filed hundreds of online

fraudulent tax returns to various state taxing authorities around the country, using other peoples’

names and personal identifying information to obtain fraudulent tax refunds. Many of those states

issued tax refund checks to Casper, and Casper deposited those checks in various bank accounts

he opened, often in victims’ names. To facilitate his fraud, Casper also opened various Post

Office boxes in the District of Columbia to receive the refund checks. From February 2019 to July

2019, Casper successfully received and negotiated approximately 50 refund checks from various

states, totaling over $197,000. 1 See Statement of Offense at ¶ 2(f), ECF No. 5.

DC-OTR and USPIS also discovered that Casper submitted numerous online fraudulent

claims for payments from various class action settlement funds pending from litigation in both

1
This figure may be less than what Casper actually received, since the Government may not have
identified all of the bank accounts controlled by Casper into which he deposited fraudulent tax
refund checks. Because Casper often opened bank accounts in victims’ names, identifying the
universe of his bank accounts has posed significant challenges.

2
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state and federal courts around the country. Specifically, the evidence revealed that Casper

identified various class action settlement funds administered throughout the country and submitted

false claims for money from those funds, using other peoples’ names and personal identifying

information. Casper then received class action settlement checks at various Post Office boxes he

maintained, and he deposited them into various bank accounts that he had opened, often in victims’

names. DC-OTR and USPIS determined that Casper received over $34,487.84 from this

scheme. 2 See Statement of Offense at ¶ 2(j), ECF No. 5.

Based on this criminal conduct, the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of

Columbia served a target letter on Casper in October 2019. The letter informed Casper of the

pending criminal investigation and provided him the opportunity to meet with the office for an

interview. That month, Casper met with the office and confessed to his crimes. At the

conclusion of the interview, the government warned Casper not to commit any further criminal

conduct while the parties negotiated the terms of a plea agreement. On March 12, 2020, Casper

appeared before this Court and pled guilty to a one-count Information charging him with Mail

Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. See Plea Agreement and Statement of Offense, ECF

No’s. 4, 5. This Court scheduled Casper’s sentencing hearing for June 23, 2020.

Of note, Casper committed all of the tax refund and class action settlement fraud while

being supervised in at least one other criminal fraud case in Carteret County, North Carolina.

See Pretrial Services Report, ECF No. 3; Final Presentence Report (“PSR”) at ¶ 60. Specifically,

Casper was convicted in North Carolina in 2016 of multiple fraud-related felonies – for “Identity

2
Again, this figure may be lower than what Casper actually received, since the Government may
not have identified all of Casper’s bank accounts.
3
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Fraud/Theft,” and “Obtaining Signature False Pretense,” as well as a series of theft-related felonies

involving two separate instances of stealing and re-selling or attempting to re-sell over $40,000

collectively of restaurant equipment. PSR ¶¶ 60-71. The Carteret County Court ultimately

consolidated several of those matters into consecutive judgments. See PSR ¶ 60, 71. According

to the court records obtained by the PSR writer, Casper appeared before the Court in Carteret

County for a three-year review hearing in connection with 16CR1344, and the Court terminated

his supervision early, on or about November 22, 2019. PSR ¶ 71.3

II. United States v. Craven Casper, 20-cr-00102 (APM)

Despite having been convicted in North Carolina and this Court for committing fraud,

Casper remained undeterred in his criminal ways. In early March 2020, shortly before Casper’s

March 12, 2020, plea hearing in 20-cr-00061, USPIS discovered the website,

“www.coronavirusprotectionmasks.org,” being operated by Casper. On that website, Casper

offered various coronavirus-related personal protection equipment (“PPE”) products for sale,

such as N95 respirator masks, an “Emergency Pandemic Prep Kit” (consisting of one Tyvek

coverall suit, respirator masks, latex gloves, and hand sanitizer), and Purell hand sanitizer. The

website also solicited donations to the Global Coronavirus Relief Fund, claiming that donations

would be used to support hospitals affected by the COVID-19 outbreak. Records later obtained

from the company hosting the website show that Casper created the website on February 24, 2020.

3
According to media reports, Casper’s convictions stem from: (1) a scheme where he worked as
a real estate broker and stole kitchen equipment from a client’s restaurant, which he subsequently
sold; and (2) a credit card fraudulently set up by Casper using a family member’s name. See
“Casper faces new charges, higher bond,” Carteret County News-Times, available at
https://www.carolinacoastonline.com/news_times/article_52bd2aae-2e65-11e6-8c12-
13d75661ef88.html (last checked April 1, 2020). This was confirmed by the PSR writer. See
PSR ¶¶ 60-71.
4
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Following Casper’s plea hearing in his pending matter before Judge Mehta, a USPIS postal

inspector attempted to purchase PPE from the website. The website’s payment processing

service, however, was no longer accepting any payments from the site. Records obtained from

Stripe Inc., the online payment processing service utilized by Casper for the website, revealed that

over 140 transactions for customer purchases occurred through the website between February 27,

2020, and March 12, 2020 (the date of Casper’s guilty plea before Judge Mehta). At least 24 of

those customers filed disputes with their credit card providers. The records obtained from Stripe

also showed that Casper had at least $8,938.74 in transactions on his website over the near two-

week period, and he transferred $7,958.19 to an outside bank account at Coastal Community Bank.

See Stripe Records, Exhibit B.

Law enforcement contacted some of the customers, and each of them confirmed that they

attempted to purchase coronavirus-related supplies on Casper’s website, which they never

received. The customers explained that they received an email from Casper’s website stating that

their order was submitted, and a second email stating that their items shipped. When some of the

customers attempted to contact Casper through the email account associated with the website, the

customers received a message stating the account was no longer operational. Furthermore, none

of the customers ever received a refund from Casper’s website. 4 In all, the government identified

that Casper stole at least $3,800.45 of the money submitted by customers to purchase PPE through

his website. See Statement of Offense at ¶ 2(h), ECF No. 23.

4
Law enforcement also found at least five Twitter accounts controlled by Casper which advertised
his website, coronavirusprotectionmasks.org. Various Twitter users, who apparently attempted
to purchase items from Casper’s website, complained on Casper’s Twitter accounts that the
website was fraudulent.

5
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Moreover, records obtained from Coastal Community Bank, which received the funds from

the PPE website’s customers, showed that Casper used a false name to create his bank account

(Craven John Casper rather than his true name, is Craven Randall Casper). See Bank Records,

Exhibits A and C. Casper also provided a new email address to Coastal Community Bank –

johncasper1953@yahoo.com.

III. Casper’s Post-Plea Conduct While on Release in 20-CR-00061

After pleading guilty on March, 12, 2020, while Casper was on release in the above-

captioned tax refund/class action settlement fraud matter, he spent stolen victim funds, traveled to

North Carolina without permission, and continued to engage in additional fraudulent activities.

The Coastal Community Bank records showed that, between March 12, 2020, and April 1, 2020,

Casper withdrew sums of money without providing any refunds to the customers who failed to

receive products through his website. For example, the records show that Casper withdrew

$443.00 on March 16, 2020, and $503.00 on March 14, 2020 (these were likely withdrawals for

$440.00 and $500.00, with an additional $3.00 ATM service fee included). See Exhibit A.

Casper also spent money at Target, CVS, and restaurants in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, from

March 12, 2020, to March 16, 2020. Id. Indeed, on the day that Casper pled guilty (March 12,

2020), his bank account held $1,779.62. Id. As of today, that bank account is nearly zero,

meaning that Casper continued to spend down, rather than refund, his victims’ money while on

release in this case. See Exhibit C (showing a balance of near zero in his bank account).

The records from Coastal Community Bank also revealed that Casper was spending money

at various establishments in North Carolina while he was on pretrial release in his pending case,

even though his pretrial conditions prohibited him from traveling outside of the District of

6
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Columbia without prior permission of the Court. For instance, the records revealed that Casper

charged his account at a Chick-Fil-A restaurant in Durham, North Carolina, on March 16, 2020,

and made other charges in North Carolina around that time. See Exhibit A. At no time did

Casper ever seek permission from Pretrial Services or this Court to travel outside of the District of

Columbia in his pending case. Moreover, the bank records also showed that, on March 2, 2020,

Casper cashed a check in the amount of $2,120.00 from the Treasurer of the State of Missouri.

This check is most likely one that Casper received as part of his tax refund scam to which, ten days

after cashing this check, he pled guilty.

On the day of Casper’s arrest (April 3, 2020), law enforcement agents executed a search of

his apartment and found boxes containing N95 masks. The government, however, found no

evidence that Casper ever fulfilled any of the orders submitted through his website. The agents

also found a boarding pass in Casper’s name for a flight from Raleigh, North Carolina, dated March

16, 2020, which confirms that Casper traveled from the District of Columbia in violation of his

conditions of release in his other pending matter. See Boarding Pass, Exhibit G.

Moreover, during the execution of the search warrant on the day of Casper’s arrest, law

enforcement agents found evidence indicating that Casper continued to engage in additional

fraudulent activity.

i. Fraudulent Claim for West Virginia Unemployment Benefits

During the execution of the search warrant on April 3, 2020, agents recovered documents

showing that Casper filed for unemployment benefits with the State of West Virginia. See West

Virginia Unemployment Benefits Records, Exhibit D. The documents showed that Casper filed

for the benefits on March 31, 2020, at 12:07 pm. Id. p.3. He received Confirmation Code

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N852714. 5 Casper provided a false address of 30 Iberian Ct, Martinsville, West Virginia, 25405.

Id. Casper also provided his email address and his phone number as part of the application.

According to Casper’s application for benefits, he claimed to have worked at Payless ShoeSource

from January 21, 2018, to March 21, 2020. Id. p. 4. This, of course, contradicts Casper’s

statements to Pretrial Services, where he informed his Pretrial Services representative that he was

unemployed. Casper, at all relevant times, lived in the District of Columbia and never resided in

Martinsville, West Virginia. Furthermore, law enforcement found that Casper often used the

purported employer, “Payless ShoeSource,” on many of the false state tax returns he filed as part

of the fraudulent tax refund scheme. 6 USPIS agents also confirmed that the application for

unemployment benefits was actually submitted online with Workforce West Virginia on March

31, 2020. Therefore it appears that Casper attempted to commit the crimes of theft and fraud

while pending sentencing in his first case before this Court (20-cr-00061).

ii. Attempted Theft from United States Postal Service

During the execution of the search warrant on April 3, 2020, agents also seized documents

showing that Casper submitted a claim, also on or about March 31, 2020, the same day he

submitted the bogus unemployment insurance claim to West Virginia, this time to the United States

Postal Service (“USPS”) for a missing package associated with his coronavirus fraud scheme. See

Postal Claim Documents, Exhibit E. Specifically, agents found a completed USPS domestic

claim for a lost/missing package, which Casper signed and dated on March 31, 2020. See id. p.

5
Casper also gave the State of West Virginia a false name, referring to himself as “Craven R.
Caspee.”
6
Casper likely used Payless ShoeSource because the company is currently in Chapter 11
bankruptcy, and therefore it would be more difficult to confirm his employment there.
8
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1-4. The form stated that Craven purchased N95 supplies for a dealer in Coppell, Texas, for

$361.91 and which Casper claimed had a value of $1,104.00. See p. 2. Casper provided the

tracking number for the package in his claim form, and he claimed that he did not receive the

package at all. See id. Agents also found a print-out from eBay for a seller of N95 masks in

Coppell, Texas, in Casper’s apartment. Id. p. 6. In addition, agents found documents indicating

that Casper submitted the claim to USPS by mail. Id. p. 1, 10.

Notably, agents found the package in Casper’s apartment that he claimed was missing.

See Photograph of “Missing” Box, Exhibit F. That package had the same tracking number as

submitted by Casper on the missing package form to USPS (note the last nine digits of the tracking

number on the label match the last nine digits on the USPS claim form). Therefore, it appears

that Casper sought to steal from USPS by submitting a false claim that his package was never

delivered, when in fact it was delivered and sitting in plain view in his apartment. Therefore it

appears that Casper attempted to commit theft of government funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

641, while on release.

THE PSR WRITER’S GUIDELINES CALCULATIONS AND PLEA AGREEMENTS

According to the Final Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), U.S. Probation

calculated Casper’s Guidelines as follows:

Base offense level (USSG §2B1.1(a)(1)) 7
Loss amount of $235k ($150k-$250k) (§2B1.1(b)(1)(G)) 10
10 or more victims (USSG §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i)) 2
5 or more means of identification (USSG §2B1.1(b)(11)) 2
No acceptance of responsibility (USSG §3E1.1) 0
Total adjusted offense level: 21

See PSR at ¶¶ 48-58.

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In its calculations, Probation determined that Casper is not eligible for a three-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility under USSG §3E1.1, reasoning that he committed the

COVID-related fraud while out on bond for the tax refund and class action settlement fraud

schemes. PSR at ¶¶ 43, 57. It calculated Casper’s criminal history as a category III. PSR at ¶

76. Accordingly, Probation calculated Casper’s total adjusted offense level at 21 and his

recommended guidelines range at 46-57 months. PSR at ¶ 122. In its recommendation, Probation

recommended an upward variance to 60 months’ in custody. See U.S. Probation’s Sentencing

Recommendation, pp. 1-3, Dkt. 33.

In the March 12, 2020, plea agreement, which drives Casper’s sentence, the parties set forth

Casper’s estimated total offense level of 21, with a three-level adjustment for acceptance pursuant

to USSG §3E1.1, which ultimately calculated Casper’s estimated total adjusted offense level of

“at least 18.” See March 12, 2020 Plea Agreement (Case No. 20-cr-00061) at Para. 4A, p. 2-3.

See also July 7, 2020, Plea Agreement (Case No. 20-cr-00120) at Para. 4A, pp. 2-3. The parties

also set forth Casper’s estimated criminal history category at a Criminal History Category (“CHC”)

II. Accordingly, Casper’s estimated Guidelines range set forth in the plea agreement was 30-37

months. See March 12, 2020 Plea Agreement (Case No. 20-cr-00061) at Para. 4C, p. 3.

Acceptance of Responsibility

As set forth in the discussion of the § 3553 factors below, Casper’s brazen conduct after

the entry of his plea on March 12 is quite troubling and provides further evidence that a substantial

sentence is needed to incapacitate him, protect the public, and deter him from future crime.

Nevertheless, the government, per its written plea agreements, recommends that he receive three

levels off for acceptance of responsibility under USSG §3E1.1.

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Criminal History

As set forth in the PSR, the pre-sentence investigation revealed that Casper has an extensive

criminal history in North Carolina. The PSR contains a detailed analysis of Casper’s criminal

history points, the defendant’s objections, and Probation’s responses. In each instance, the

government agrees with Probation’s calculation of Casper’s CHC. As the PSR sets forth, Casper

has at least 14 separate docket entries in Carteret County Court, each of which resulted in

convictions, mostly for fraud and fraud-related conduct. Although the North Carolina Court

sentenced Casper on the same day (September 8, 2016), it is clear from the court records that in

multiple instances Casper had been arrested on separate occasions for criminal conduct that

occurred on separate dates, involved distinct victims, and had been charged in separate

instruments.

Probation’s calculation of Casper’s four criminal history points (one for case number

15CRS051307, one for 16CR01352, one for 16CR1344, one for 16CR055368) is supported by the

Carteret County court records. As discussed in the PSR, Casper’s conviction in connection with

case 15CRS051307 relates to Casper’s arrest on April 16, 2015, and later conviction for, among

other things, felony larceny involving $22,000 worth of restaurant equipment on January 23, 2015.

Casper’s conviction in connection with case 16CR01352 relates to Casper’s arrest on May 7, 2015,

and later conviction for, among other things, obtaining property by false pretenses when he

subsequently sold the stolen equipment for $2,000 on January 26, 2015. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

4A1.2(a)(2), because of the different arrest dates, each conviction gives rise to a separate criminal

history point. The fact that Casper was sentenced on the same date is of no moment. By contrast,

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) provides that had there been “no intervening arrest date, prior sentences

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are counted separately unless . . . (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day.” Likewise,

the fact that Casper’s convictions were consolidated into consecutive judgments does not alter the

fact that each is treated as a prior sentence.

Casper’s conviction in connection with case 16CR1344 relates to Casper’s arrest on May

30, 2016, and later conviction for identity theft that occurred on May 30, 2016. Again, pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(A)(2), because of the different arrest dates, this conviction gives rise to a third

criminal history point. The court records confirm that Casper’s conviction in this case was not

consolidated with 15CRS051307.

As set forth in the PSR, Casper’s fourth criminal history point stems from his conviction

in connection with case 16CR055368, which relates to Casper’s arrest on November 8, 2016, and

later conviction, for cyberstalking. Court records make clear that Casper pled guilty to the charge

on August 30, 2017. At the time of his plea, the Court indicated that it would postpone sentencing

and dismiss the charge if Casper complied with certain terms of supervision. The court eventually

dismissed the charge on December 19, 2017. Contrary to Casper’s objection, this eventual

dismissal does not impact his criminal history calculation. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f), “a

diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt . . . in a judicial proceeding

is counted as a sentence under § 4A1.1(c), even if a conviction is not formally entered.”

Court records also confirm that Casper was properly awarded an additional two points

under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) because he committed the instant offense while he was “under any

criminal justice sentence, including probation . . . . .” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). See PSR ¶ 71. Here,

Casper successfully obtained an early termination of his probation in connection with 16CR1344

on November 22, 2019. As set forth above and in Casper’s statement of offense, he committed

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the mail fraud tax refund theft scheme from February 2019 to July 2019, while still on probation.

PSR ¶ 24. See Statement of Offense at ¶ 2(f), ECF No. 5.

Accordingly, the government agrees with Probation’s calculation of his criminal history

score is 6 and, per the Sentencing Table Part A, his CHC is III. PSR ¶ 76. Notably, the plea

agreements specifically contemplated possible future revisions of Casper’s CHC. The

agreements noted that the CHC was merely an “estimate,” “based upon the information now

available,” and provided that “after the pre-sentence investigation . . . a different conclusion . . .

may be reached and your client’s criminal history points may increase or decrease.” See March

12, 2020 Plea Agreement (Case No. 20-cr-00061) at Para. 4B and July 7, 2020 Plea Agreement

(Case No. 20-cr-00120) at Para. 4B. The plea agreements also specifically provided in Paragraph

4C that “the parties are free to argue for a Criminal History Category different from that estimated

above . . . .” In addition, the plea agreements both specifically stated, “[i]n the event that the

Court or the presentence report writer considers any Sentencing Guidelines adjustments,

departures, or calculations different from those agreed to and/or estimated in this Agreement, or

contemplates a sentence outside the Guidelines range based upon the general sentencing factors

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the parties reserve the right to answer any related inquiries from the

Court or the presentence report writer and to allocute for a sentence within the Guidelines range,

as ultimately determined by the Court, even if the Guidelines range ultimately determined by the

Court is different from the Estimated Guidelines Range calculated herein.”

THE FACTORS UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 3553 SUPPORT A 41-MONTH SENTENCE

After calculating the applicable Guidelines range, the Court should next consider all of

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the applicable factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 7

1. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense and its Seriousness

Casper engaged in a calculated scheme to steal money from various states by submitting

false and fraudulent tax returns in order to obtain tax refund checks. This scheme was complex,

as Casper obtained individuals’ personal identifying information from various online resources,

submitted fraudulent tax returns to a variety of states, and then had to open Post Office boxes to

receive those checks. Once Casper obtained the checks, he had to then cash them, often using a

variety of bank accounts that he opened in victims’ names. Moreover Casper stole a considerable

amount of money. In only six months, he successfully stole over $197,000 through this scheme,

and possibly more.

While Casper was engaging in that tax refund scheme, he was operating a similar scheme

where he submitted false claims for class action settlement checks. To accomplish these thefts,

Casper submitted the claims in other peoples’ names, engaging in the same type of identity theft

that he engaged in regarding the tax refund scheme. Casper stole approximately $34,000 through

that scheme.

These significant financial losses, totaling just under $250,000, still understate the harm

7
Section 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense,
afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant, and provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care,
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for the offense as set forth in
Guidelines; (5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

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Casper inflicted on his victims when he stole and successfully misused the means of identification

of at least 167 individuals. For those innocent individuals, many will have to try to clear their

names with federal and state taxing authorities and/or claims administrators and otherwise expend

resources to “claw back” their stolen and misappropriated identities. 8

Casper’s criminal conduct was multi-faceted, widespread, and ruthless. While Casper

was directly engaged in negotiating his plea agreement, he began yet another fraud scheme, this

one tied directly to the COVID-19 pandemic. While Casper may have provided the PPE to his

customers at the beginning of the scheme, he eventually decided to steal his customers’ money

instead. Casper’s COVID-related fraud scheme, although smaller in size, was particularly

pernicious. For his own financial gain, Casper exploited the pandemic and preyed upon people

who were desperate to protect themselves and their families from danger. He did so during the

early stages of the pandemic, when PPE supplies were especially scarce and people were even

more vulnerable to exploitation. Furthermore, Casper continued to spend down the money he

stole in his PPE scheme while on release in his original tax refund/class action settlement fraud

matter. From February 27 through his March 12 change of plea hearing, Casper engaged in 140

PPE transactions and took in over $8,000. After formally pleading guilty on March 12, Casper

chose to dissipate the money he stole from victims rather than to pay victims’ pending refund

8
As a consequence of Casper’s scheme, a taxpayer victim will be at a much higher risk of being
audited and/or fined by the IRS. In a hypothetical example, if Casper submitted a bogus tax
refund request for $3,000 in the name of Virginia resident Victim A to the state of Maryland for
2018, Maryland would then issue a $3,000 check in Victim A’s name, which would be sent to
Casper. Then in the 2019 tax year, Maryland tax authorities would mail a 1099G showing the
$3,000 in income to taxpayer Victim A. That 1099G would also be transmitted to the IRS, which
in turn would erroneously show additional income associated with Victim A’s social security
number. So when Victim A then filed her tax return in 2019, there would be a discrepancy that
could expose her to an audit and/or fine by the IRS.
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requests. Perhaps most troubling, on March 31, 2020, Casper was expanding into additional

criminal ventures, this time posing as Craven “Caspee” and filing a fraudulent application for West

Virginia unemployment benefits.

Casper’s criminal conduct, which involved identity theft, online fraud, opening bank

accounts, cashing checks, and spending down ill-gotten profits – some of which was committed

while Casper knew he was on release –is serious and warrants the recommended 41-month

sentence, or a sentence at the high end of any alternative Guidelines range as calculated by the

Court.

A high-end Guidelines sentence is particularly appropriate here because Casper received

significant benefits from his plea agreements. Notably, Casper avoided being charged with

committing aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1028A, which has a two-year

mandatory minimum sentence, to be imposed consecutively.

2. The History and Characteristics of the Defendant

Casper, although eminently employable, instead became a brazen, seasoned fraudster. He

is a 38-year-old male who, by all accounts, is well educated and capable of earning money through

honest means. According to Casper, he holds an undergraduate of the University of North

Carolina at Chapel Hill and a Masters in Business Administration from Johns Hopkins University.

Yet despite garnering these credentials, Casper chose to eschew legitimate employment and

instead to steal money and identities through fraudulent means – as shown in his numerous felony

convictions from Carteret County, North Carolina, his two federal felony convictions in this Court,

and the other uncharged criminal conduct discovered by the government while executing the

search warrant in the most recent matter. Again and again, rather than make an honest living,

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Casper has opted to lie to and steal from others. His extensive criminal history, his commission

of the instant offenses while on probation, his disturbing post-plea criminal conduct, and his

callous exploitation of a global pandemic all support a 41-month sentence.

3. The Need to Protect the Public and to Deter Casper and Others

Casper provides a textbook example of the dangers of under-deterrence. Despite

numerous earlier convictions, and indeed even while on release, Casper relentlessly continued to

devise and pursue new fraudulent schemes – effectively scoffing at the absence of serious

consequences from earlier prosecutions. A below-guidelines sentence, like the state courts’

previous approach, will continue to send the message to Casper that his criminal conduct is not

serious. This will once again embolden him and encourage him, and others like him, to continue

and even escalate his criminal conduct and in turn to hurt more people. As the PSR writer noted

in its recommendation for an upward variance to 60 months, Casper has shown that he has no

intention of refraining from criminal conduct, and, as a result, incapacitation is needed to protect

the public and deter Casper.

Therefore, this factor favors a sentence at the high end of the Guidelines range.

4. The Kinds of Sentences Available Support a Within-Guidelines Range

The maximum term of imprisonment for Wire Fraud is 20 years with a term of supervised

release of not more than three years. Because the applicable Guidelines range is in Zone D of the

Sentencing Table, the defendant is not eligible for probation under the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. §

5B1.1, commentary.

5. The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentence Disparities

A Guidelines-compliant sentence of 41 months would be in-line with not just the

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appropriate sentence contemplated under the Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines framework but

also other sentences issued in similar cases, thereby avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities.

For example, in United States v. Mikolai Mardakhayeu, 10-cr-010196 (GAO) (D. Mass. 2011),

the defendant was sentenced on June 22, 2011, in the District of Massachusetts to 41 months in

custody, having pleaded guilty to wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy in connection with his

operating a tax refund fraud scheme. The defendant, who had no criminal history, received

approximately $230,000 in stolen refunds. His guidelines range was 41-51 months, and the

government had recommended a 41-month sentence.

6. The Need to Provide Restitution

Casper stole over $230,000 from taxing authorities, settlement claims administrators, and

consumers. As part of the Court’s sentence, the Court should require Casper to pay restitution

in the amount of $235,807.11, per the terms of the parties’ plea agreements.

CONCLUSION

Casper, who has an extensive criminal history, engaged in complex schemes through which

he stole over $230,000 from taxing authorities, claims administrators, and consumers.

Accordingly, the government is requesting a sentence of imprisonment of 41 months, at the high

end of the Guidelines range of 33-41 months. The Court should also order the defendant to pay

the agreed-upon amount of $235,807.11 in restitution.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL R. SHERWIN
ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

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BY: /s/ Mona Sedky
Mona Sedky
Special Assistant United States Attorney
D.C. Bar. Bar 447968
555 4th Street, N.W., Rm. 4842
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 262-7122; Mona.Sedky2@usdoj.gov

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Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that the GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM and
attachments were duly served upon the defense counsel Michelle Peterson, FPD, by electronic
means via the Court’s ECF system.

This 16th day of October, 2020.
/s/ Mona Sedky
Mona Sedky
Special Assistant United States Attorney
D.C. Bar. Bar 447968
555 4th Street, N.W., Rm. 4842
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 262-7122; Mona.Sedky2@usdoj.gov

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