Memorandum and Order — United States of America v. Irvin Vilneus (C.A. No. 20-cr-99-MRD-PAS)

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A memorandum and order of Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge, in United States v. Irvin Vilneus, No. 20-cr-99-MRD-PAS, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island, filed October 7, 2025 as Document 92. It denies Vilneus' motion to suppress evidence (ECF Nos. 78, 78-1), which the court heard on September 19, 2025 with testimony from law enforcement agents. Vilneus was indicted on November 6, 2020 on three counts of wire fraud and three counts of aggravated identity theft arising from an investigation into Covid-era unemployment fraud. He sought to suppress the fruits of a warrant search of his apartment because the warrant affidavit relied on agents' observations of cash, debit cards, a laptop and a gun during a warrantless search earlier that day.

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Case 1:20-cr-O0099-MRD-PAS Document92- Filed 10/07/25 Page 1 of 15 PagelD #:
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

C.A. No. 20-cr-99-MRD-PAS

IRVIN VILNEUS,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Melissa R. DuBose, United States District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Irvin Vilneus’ Motion to Suppress Evidence
Obtained in Violation of the Fourth Amendment and memorandum in support (“Mot.
Suppress”), ECF Nos. 78, 78-1. The Court held a hearing on this motion on September
19, 2025, at which it heard testimony from law enforcement agents and additional
argument from each party. Vilneus is seeking to suppress the fruits of the search of
his apartment because the affidavit submitted in support of the warrant contained
information—first-hand observations of cash, debit cards, a laptop computer, anda
gun—agents obtained during a warrantless search of the apartment earlier that day.
For the reasons below, the Motion to Suppress is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 6, 2020, Irvin Vilneus was indicted on three counts of wire fraud

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and three counts of aggravated identity theft in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. The Indictment (ECF No. 14) stems from a federal
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investigation into a Covid-era unemployment fraud scheme. As part of the
investigation into this fraudulent activity, the following arrest and search warrants
were issued:
1) Complaint and Arrest warrant for Irvin Vilneus issued by Magistrate Judge
Sullivan on October 8, 2020. ECF No. 82-2;
2) Search warrant for Vilneus’ cell-site information issued by Magistrate
Judge Sullivan on October 8, 2020. ECF No. 82-21, (“Ping Warrant”);
3) Three search warrants for physical addresses located in Rhode Island;
4) Search warrants for 6808 Rio Pinar, North Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a
white 2017 Inifinti Q60, and for Vilneus issued on October 12, 2020. ECF
No. 82-3 at 7;
5) Search warrant for 5401 Wiles Road, Apartment 4-105, Coconut Creek,
Florida issued on October 13, 2020. ECF Nos. 78-2 (“Wiles Warrant”).
ECF No. 78-1 at 2-3; ECF No. 82-1 at 1-2. Vilneus’ Motion to Suppress focuses on
the Wiles Warrant, specifically contending that the affidavit in support included
information obtained during a warrantless search of the Wiles Road apartment on
the morning of October 13, 2020. ECF No. 78 at 1.
In the morning hours of October 13, 2020, law enforcement officials were
seeking to execute an Arrest Warrant for Irvin Vilneus. ECF No. 78-1 at 3. Some

agents went to 6808 Rio Pinar Drive to locate Vilneus while others went to the

1 The Affidavit in support of the Complaint and Arrest Warrant and Ping
Warrant are the same, as the Agent applied for all three simultaneously.
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Coconut Creek apartment complex. Jd. The agents who went to the Rio Pinar Drive
address were greeted by Vilneus’ mother who informed them that Vilneus had moved
out of that location.2, Jd. Meanwhile, the agents at the Coconut Creek apartment
complex were knocking on doors trying to locate Vilneus when a neighbor directed
the arrest team to a group of apartments in the back of the complex. Jd. Importantly,
because of the authorized Ping Warrant, agents had been monitoring the location of
a cellphone associated with Vilneus and noticed it “pinging” in the area of the Coconut
Creek apartments on October 11-18, though the exact location was unknown. Id.
Eventually, agents knocked on the door to apartment 4-105 and observed an
unidentifiable individual peak through the blinds in the apartment window. Jd. One
to two minutes later someone opened the door and identified himself as Irvin Vilneus.
Id. at 3-4. At the suppression hearing, Special Agent Quoc Tran Nguyen explained
that Vilneus was guided just outside the apartment so the arrest could take place.
As he was being guided outside, Vilneus was asked if anyone else was present in the
apartment and if there were any firearms present in the apartment. Jd. at 4. He
answered both questions truthfully—nobody else was inside the apartment and he
did have a lawfully owned handgun inside. Jd. Contemporaneously, another group

of arrest team agents entered the apartment to conduct a “protective sweep.” Jd.

2 At the hearing held on this motion, Special Agent Quoc Tuan Nguyen
identified factors that led him to believe that Vilneus may be located at the Rio Pinar
address, including that it was Vilneus’ mother’s residence and that the internet
account was in Vilneus’ name. The agent’s Affidavit, submitted in support of his
request for the Arrest Warrant and Ping Warrant, identifies additional factors
connecting Vilneus to that address. See ECF No. 78-2 at 27 (explaining that the
address was used to register Vilneus’ business).
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“During the protective sweep, officers observed in plain-view on the kitchen counter,
a handgun, a laptop computer, cash, and debit cards inside an open pouch.” Jd A
cash counting machine was also found in the closet. Jd. The agents who testified at
the hearing explained that nothing was disturbed during this protective sweep.

At this point, agents had executed the arrest warrant for Vilneus and were
preparing to take him to the U.S. Marshals office to be processed. Before being led
away from the apartment, Vilneus “asked for some clothing, and specifically, a pair

”

of sweatpants anda shirt from his bedroom.” Jd. The agents complied with Vilneus’
request and noted that he was only wearing boxers when he answered the door
moments earlier. Agents, again entered the apartment and led Vilneus to the
bedroom so he could get a changeof clothes. Jd. During this subsequent entry, agents
again noticed in plain-view the handgun, laptop computer, cash, debit cards, and a
cash counting machine.? Id.

While Vilneus was transported to the U.S. Marshals for processing, agents
secured the scene and obtained the Wiles Warrant. ECF Nos. 78-2. This warrant
was executed later the same day and the search yielded guns, cash, debit cards, cell
phones, and a money counting machine, among other items. ECF No. 78-1 at 4.
Vilneus now moves to suppress “evidence obtained from the initial [October] 13, 2020,

warrantless search of apartment 4-105 at 5401 Wiles Road, Coconut Creek, Florida.”

ECF No. 78 at 1.

3 The agents also saw a shotgun, but it is unclear on this record whether this
was observed during the initial protective sweep, the officers’ re-entry to retrieve
clothing for Vilneus, or when officers executed the Wiles Warrant.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution “protects ‘[tlhe right of the
people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” United States v. Delgado-Pérez, 867 F.3d 244, 251 (1st Cir.
2017) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV.). “Because the prophylaxis of the Fourth
Amendment is at its zenith with respect to an individual’s home, a warrantless search
of a private residence is presumptively unreasonable unless one of a few well-
delineated exceptions applies.” Jd. (quoting United States v. Infante, 701 F.3d 386,
392 (1st Cir. 2012)) (cleaned up). One such exception, and the one at issue here, “is
the exception for protective sweeps.” Jd. The Defendant “bears the burden to show a
Fourth Amendment violation.” United States v. Young, 835 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir.
2016) (citing United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 330 (1st Cir. 2011)). Whena
Defendant has shown he was subjected to a warrantless search, “the government
must bear its burden of proving the search was constitutionally legitimate.” United
States v. Manubolu, 13 F.4th 57, 69 (1st Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Rodriguez-
Pacheco, 948 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2020)).

If a warrant affidavit contains tainted information, the Court would set aside
the tainted information and examine the warrant affidavit for probable cause without
the tainted information. See United States v. Ford, 22 F.3d 374, 379 (1st Cir. 1994)
(quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 172 (1978)) (‘When reviewing affidavits
containing ‘tainted’ evidence, courts regularly set aside the tainted information and

then determine if ‘there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support
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a finding of probable cause.”); see also id. (quoting United States v. Veillette, 778
F.2d 899, 904 (1st Cir. 1985)) (“[The illegally obtained information] should be set to
one side... and the remaining content of the affidavit examined to determine
whether there was probable cause to search, apart from the tainted averments.”).
III. DISCUSSION

Vilneus is seeking to suppress the fruits of the search of his apartment, arguing
that “the protective sweep was improperly based on a lack of information available to
police, rather than specific facts ...to constitutionally justify their warrantless

”

actions.” ECF No. 78-1 at 8. The government justifies the warrantless search as a
protective sweep by arguing that, “with arrest warrant in hand, officers are permitted
to look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from
which an attack could be immediately launched.” ECF No. 82-1 at 11. They proffer
two additional justifications to deny the instant motion: 1) the items were in plain-
view when agents returned into the apartment to retrieve clothes for Vilneus, and 2)
inevitable discovery because agents would have sought a warrant to search
apartment 4-105 to locate items such as laptops and cell phones once it had executed
the arrest warrant. Since Vilneus has alleged he was “subjected to a warrantless
search,” the Court will now examine the government’s arguments to determine

whether “the search was constitutionally legitimate.” Manubolu, 13 F.4th at 69

(citing United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 948 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2020)).
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A. Protective Sweep

To justify a protective sweep, officers must have a “reasonable suspicion of
danger,” which means “there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in
believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on
the arrest scene.” United States v. Hernandez-Mieses, 931 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir.
2019) (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990)). “[Al mere inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch that someone is hiding who could pose a danger
to the arresting officers is not enough to support a protective sweep.” Jd. (quoting
Buie, 494 U.S. at 332). In Bure, the Court was clear that “[a] protective sweep also
must be limited in scope to ‘a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a
person might be hiding.” Jd. (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 327).4

In Bure, police had an arrest warrant for the defendant, and they entered the
home to execute the warrant. 494 U.S. at 328. Once inside the house, the officers
scattered throughout the first and second floors, and another announced that he
would secure the basement. Jd. The officer announced his presence at the top of the
stairs and the defendant came out with his hands up. Jd. He was arrested. Jd. Then
another officer entered the basement “in case there was someone else” down there,

and that officer noticed, and seized, incriminating evidence from the basement. Jd.

4 While Vilneus contends the entry into the apartment was illegal, he does not
specifically argue this prong of the Buze analysis which focuses on where officers can
search during a protective sweep. The Court does not find it necessary to address
this part of Buie in its analysis.
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In upholding the denial of the motion to suppress, the Supreme Court first articulated
the contours of the modern “protective sweep” and stated, “[t]he Fourth Amendment
permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest
when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and
articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to
those on the arrest scene.” Jd. at 337.

The First Circuit more recently discussed the issue in Delgado-Pérez where the
Court found that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a protective sweep
of the defendant’s apartment following his immediate surrender outside his home.
867 F.3d at 256. There, police went to the defendant’s home to execute an arrest
warrant, and when they arrived, he told them that he would open the gate and be
right out. Jd. at 247-48. He also told the officers he was by himself, and eventually
exited the house and was arrested on the porch. Jd. Despite this, “officers undertook
a protective sweep of the residence, which, according to one officer, [was] their
standard practice to ensure officer safety and prevent destruction of evidence.” Jd. at
248. The Circuit rejected the government’s arguments that 1) drug trafficking is
violent and usually involves guns, 2) the house had a gate and security cameras, and
3) that the voluntary surrender on the porch allows officers to infer the presence of
others lying in wait from inside the residence. Jd. at 253-55. In rejecting the
protective sweep argument, the Court relied on an officer’s testimony that they did
“a lot of intel work” before the arrest, which involved “doing surveillance” and

gathering “all information available” to “make sure that officers knew exactly where
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they were going” and to ensure that the execution of the arrest was “as safe as
possible.” Jd. at 253. As the Court remarked, “there [was] no indication in the
testimony that the pre-arrest ‘intel work’ resulted in any evidence that another
person might be present in the home at the time of the arrest, let alone that another
dangerous person would be.” Jd. Moreover, the court was clear that a “lack of
information cannot provide an articulable basis upon which to justify a protective

>

sweep.” Jd. at 256. More recently, this court rejected the government’s contention
that the search of a residence after a defendant was arrested just outside the house
was a valid protective sweep. DaCruz, 694 F. Supp. 3d at 198 (concluding that “the
officers [] did not have reasonable suspicion to believe a person in the apartment
posed a danger to them” because “[t]here was no evidence of violence at or near [the
residence], no particularized reason to believe Defendant’s girlfriend or anyone else
was armed and dangerous, and no particularized evidence that anyone was in the
residence.”)

Whether the search in this case is a valid protective sweep or an illegal search
is a fact intensive inquiry aimed at the information police had leading up to and
during the arrest. The government points to the following statement in the Wiles
Warrant as justification for the protective sweep.

To ensure their safety, particularly in light of VILNEUS statement that

a gun was inside the house and the observation of a possible additional

occupant looking out the window, agents conducted a brief protective

sweep of the apartment.

ECF 82-1 at 12. This is insufficient to justify a protective sweep because the

information elicited during the investigation and arrest lacks the specific and
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articulable facts that “would warrant a reasonably prudent [agent] in believing that
lapartment 4-105] harborled] an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene.” Hernandez-Mieses, 931 F.3d at 141 (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 334).

Here, agents were attempting to arrest Vilneus on a fraud-related warrant; the
culmination of a months-long investigation. In that process, agents tracked Vilneus’
cell phone, spoke to his mother and brother, and spoke to a neighbor. There were no
specific and articulable facts elicited during this investigation that provided agents
with a reasonable suspicion of danger at the Coconut Creek apartment. Police
knocked on the door, observed someone peek out the window then open the door, and
the person at the door immediately identified himself as Vilneus. At that exact
moment, the circumstances did not suggest that Vilneus was armed/dangerous, or
that he was living with anyone else at the apartment (never mind that person also
being armed/dangerous). As the arrest was happening, Vilneus informed officers that
he was alone in the apartment and that there was a legally owned firearm in the
apartment. There was no information presented to suggest the agents did not believe
him. Furthermore, at the suppression hearing, Agent Greene described the arrest
and entry into the apartment as happening contemporaneously, meaning it is
unlikely that the agents who entered the apartment had the benefit of knowing there
was a lawfully owned firearm inside. Moreover, testimony from both agents Nguyen
and Greene reflects that the agents searched because of the unknowns associated
with executing the arrest warrant. When that timeline is compared to Agent

Neguyen’s recollection that it took approximately 20—40 seconds to guide Vilneus away

10
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from the door and put him under arrest, it becomes clear that the agents who entered
the apartment lacked the information about the lawfully owned firearm.

This Court concludes that the information unknown at the time the agents
executed the arrest warrant does not amount to particularized reasonable suspicion
that someone armed/dangerous was in the house, especially when compared to the
facts in Buie, Delgado-Pérez, and DaCruz. The search of the apartment executed at
the time of Vilneus’ arrest was not, therefore, a valid protective sweep. See DaCruz,
694 F. Supp. 3d at 197-98 (rejecting the government’s protective-sweep justification
under similar circumstances).

B. Re-entry

The Court’s analysis is not over because agents re-entered the apartment at
Vilneus’ explicit request.° The Court must therefore decide whether the information
agents gained from entering apartment 4-105 must still be excised from the Wiles
Warrant because the items—cash, debit cards, handgun, etc.—were still in plain-view
when agents re-entered apartment 4-105 to retrieve clothes for Vilneus.

The Court finds that the information from the initial warrantless entry need
not be excised from the warrant since agents lawfully entered after Vilneus gave
consent. See United States v. Melendez, 301 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (quoting

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)) (stating “[olne of the

5 At the suppression hearing there was discussion about whether Vilneus
asked to get clothes or whether Agent Nguyen asked Vilneus if he wanted clothes.
The point is that Vilneus agreed to the agents’ re-entry into the residence. Whether
he was prompted by the agents or made the request himself does not change the
analysis.

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specifically established exceptions to the [Fourth Amendment] requirements of both
a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”).
Moreover, the plain view doctrine “permits the warrantless seizure of an item if the
officer is lawfully present in a position from which the item is clearly visible, there is
probable cause to seize the item, and the officer has a lawful right of access to the
item itself.” United States v. Gamache, 792 F.3d 194, 199 (1st Cir. 2015). The Court
notes that the agents could have simply seized those items at the time of re-entry
given the nature of the charges and the relation to the observed contraband. See
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (describing as the plain-view doctrine,
that, “lilf an article is already in plain-view, neither its observation nor its seizure
would involve any invasion of privacy”). The first-hand observation of the items
during the re-entry is separate and independent from the first observation which
occurred during the warrantless “protective sweep” entry. The use of the information
gained during re-entry and used for the Wiles Warrant application is therefore not
an infringement of Vilneus’ Fourth Amendment rights. The agents were lawfully in
the apartment when they observed the contraband the second time. Therefore, it was
proper for the information to be included in the Wiles Warrant affidavit. To the
extent the Motion to Suppress argues otherwise, it is denied.

C. Inevitable Discovery

The government’s last argument that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation on October 13, 2020 asserts that “the facts before the court fall squarely

within the Inevitable Discovery exception to the search warrant requirement.” ECF

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No. 82-1 at 15. The “inevitable discovery doctrine” allows the admission of unlawfully
obtained evidence at trial where the “evidence. ..‘would inevitably have been
discovered without reference to the police error or misconductl.]!” United States v.
Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 440 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448
(1984)). “Such evidence is admissible ‘so long as (i) the lawful means of its discovery
are independent and would necessarily have been employed, (ii) discovery by that
means is in fact inevitable, and Gii) application of the doctrine in a particular case
will not sully the prophylaxis of the Fourth Amendment.” Jd. (quoting United States
v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 978 (1st Cir. 1994)). A colleague in this court applied the
following test to determine whether the exception applied: First, it determined
whether the decision to seek a warrant was made independently of what was
discovered during the illegal entry, and second, whether the affidavit contained a
sufficient basis for probable cause when stripped of illegally obtained material.
DaCruz, 694 F. Supp. 3d at 198-99. The Court finds this test provides a helpful
framework to consider the government’s argument.

The government was investigating a multi-state fraud operation that involved
computers and cell phones. The government argues:

Law enforcement officers were looking for the Defendant. They had
ample evidence that the Defendant had used a cellular telephone to
commit the offenses for which he had been charged. Barely dressed
when he answered the door without his telephone, law enforcement
officers had ample probable cause to search for telephones and the other
items related to the fraud as described in Attachment B of the warrant
for the TARGET PREMISES (Attached at Exhibit 11), EVEN WERE
THE mention of the CARDS, LAPTOP, MONEY COUNTING
MACHINE and CASH, were excised from the affidavit.

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ECF No. 82-1 at 18. The defendant suggests that the officers did not even know where
Vilneus lived, so how could they show that the items sought might be found in the
place they want to search as required for a search warrant. Vilneus argues “lilt
appears that the agents hoped to find evidence of crime in any location frequented by
Mr. Vilneus, without any articulable facts to suggest the evidence would be in that
location.” ECF No. 84 at 6.

Vilneus’ argument is unpersuasive because, based on the investigation
underway the government would have sought a warrant for these items, and it is
reasonable to expect that a computer and cell phone would be located in a place where
a Vilneus was living. This is highlighted by the information obtained from the Ping
Warrant and from Vilneus’ mother. Agents knew Vilneus’ cell phone was pinging in
the area of apartment 4-105 and his mother explained he moved out of the Rio Pinar
address months prior. These facts fit squarely within the bounds of the inevitable
discovery doctrine. See United States v. Soto-Peguero, 978 F.3d 13, 20 (1st Cir. 2020)
(applying the inevitable discovery doctrine because an agent “would have pursued a
warrant regardless of what was found in securing the apartment.”); United States v.
Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 42 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining “the inevitable discovery exception,
applies to any case in which the prosecution can show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the government would have discovered the challenged evidence even

had the constitutional violation to which the defendant objects never occurred.).

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to

Suppress.

Melissa R. DuBose
United States District Judge

10/07/2025

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