Memorandum Opinion — United States v. Sean Mouzon (D. Md., April 29, 2022)
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This is a Memorandum Opinion filed April 29, 2022, in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in United States v. Sean Mouzon, Criminal Action No. ELH-16-0299. The self-represented defendant moved for compassionate release based on the risk posed to him by COVID-19, and the government opposed. It states that he pleaded guilty to Count One, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and received a below Guidelines sentence of 102 months of imprisonment. Saying it is sympathetic to his situation but pointing to his disciplinary record and criminal history, the court denies the Motion without prejudice to renewal upon his full vaccination for COVID-19 and/or for some other reason.
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“Memorandum Opinion — United States v. Sean Mouzon (D. Md., April 29, 2022).”
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Case 1:16-cr-00299-ELH Document 86 Filed 04/29/22 Page 1 of 27
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
Criminal Action No. ELH-16-0299
SEAN MOUZON,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendant Sean Mouzon, who is self-represented, moved for compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), based on the risk posed to him by COVID-19. ECF 69.1 He also
filed a supplement to his motion. ECF 73. I shall refer to ECF 69 and ECF 73 collectively as the
“Motion.” The Office of the Federal Public Defender (the “FPD”) has advised that it does not
intend to supplement the Motion. ECF 77. However, the FPD provided the Court with
documentation concerning defendant’s exhaustion of his administrative remedies. See ECF 77-1.
The government opposes the Motion (ECF 81, the “Opposition”), supported by two
exhibits. See ECF 81-2; ECF 81-3. It urges the Court to deny the Motion for failure to exhaust.
ECF 81 at 6. Moreover, it claims that a review of defendant’s medical records reveals that
defendant does not suffer from any underlying conditions that might render him particularly
vulnerable to COVID-19. Id. at 7-8; see ECF 81-2 (medical records). Additionally, the
government notes that Mouzon has refused the COVID-19 vaccine. ECF 81 at 8-15. Thus, in the
1
In ECF 69, defendant indicates that he also filed a post-conviction petition, seeking relief
under Rehaif v. United States, ___U.S.___, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019). See ECF 68 (the “Petition”).
The Petition was submitted with the assistance of counsel. See id. But, defendant has since moved
to dismiss the Petition (ECF 78), which I granted by Order of September 17, 2021. ECF 79.
Case 1:16-cr-00299-ELH Document 86 Filed 04/29/22 Page 2 of 27
government’s view, defendant’s case does not exhibit an extraordinary and compelling reason for
his release. Id. In the alternative, the government maintains that the sentencing factors outlined
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) caution against defendant’s release. Id. at 15-16.
Additionally, the government has submitted an “update to supplement the Government’s
Response . . . .” ECF 83 (the “Supplement”). In the Supplement, the government acknowledges
that Mouzon previously filed two requests for compassionate release in July 2020, which were
both rejected. Id. But, in its view, these requests do not change its position set forth in the
Opposition with respect to exhaustion, because the requests were not directed to the Warden of
the facility wherein defendant is currently incarcerated. Id.
Defendant has not replied either to the Opposition or to the Supplement. And, the time to
do so has expired.
No hearing is necessary. For the reasons that follow, I shall deny the Motion, without
prejudice.
I. Procedural and Factual Background
On June 15, 2016, a federal grand jury returned a three-count Indictment against Mouzon.
ECF 1. He was charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count One); possession with intent to distribute a quantity of a mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine as well as a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count Two); and
unlawful possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1)(A) (Count Three).
On December 20, 2016, pursuant to a Plea Agreement (ECF 27), the defendant entered a
plea of guilty to Count One of the Indictment. See ECF 26.
2
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The Plea Agreement contained a Stipulation of Facts. ECF 27, ⁋ 6. It stated that on April
24, 2016, defendant “possessed a firearm, specifically a loaded CN Romarm SA/Cugir rifle, model
GP WASR-1063 . . ., which is an AK-47 style rifle, and ammunition . . . .” Id. On that date, “a
Baltimore Police Department detective observed the Defendant walking with a stiff gait, a
characteristic the detective knew was common to a person attempting to conceal a firearm in his
pants, towards a home in the Cherry Hill community of Baltimore, Maryland.” Id. Further, the
detective “observed what was immediately apparent to him as a firearm magazine protruding from
the Defendant’s right pants pocket.” Id.
When the detective attempted to stop the defendant, he fled. Id. Notably, “[t]he detective
observed the Defendant reach into his front waistband area and remove the rifle from his pants as
he ran.” Id. “Eventually, the Defendant was apprehended[,]” and the “Detective recovered the
rifle, which was loaded with one live round in the chamber, and the magazine from the Defendant’s
pants pocket, which contained sixteen live rounds of ammo and was designed for use with the
recovered firearm.” Id.
According to the Stipulation of Facts, Mouzon admitted that he “knowingly possessed the
firearm and ammunition described above . . . and admits that prior to April 24, 2016, he had been
convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year and his civil rights had not
been restored.” Id.
Sentencing was held on March 1, 2019. ECF 60. According to the Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSR”, ECF 51), Mouzon was 33 years old at that time. Id. at 2. He had
neither a high school diploma nor a GED. Id. The PSR also specified that defendant had been
detained in State custody from April 24, 2016 to December 20, 2016, the date on which he tendered
his guilty plea. Id. at 1; see ECF 26.
3
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The PSR indicated that, after three deductions under § 3E1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”), Mouzon had an offense level of 30. ECF 51,
⁋⁋ 22, 25. Moreover, the PSR provided that defendant had a criminal history score of 14 points.
This established a Criminal History Category of VI. Id. ⁋ 35; see id. ⁋⁋ 28-32; see also ECF 27, ⁋
9. Accordingly, the Guidelines contemplated a term of imprisonment between 168 months and
210 months. ECF 51, ⁋ 58.
Notably, in 2002, at age 16, defendant was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
with a handgun offense. Id. ⁋ 28. He was convicted of that offense in 2003, and received a
sentence of three years, with almost all of it suspended. Id. But, he subsequently violated his
probation, and the sentence was imposed. Id.
On March 2, 2006, defendant was sentenced in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to a
term of nine years’ imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id. ⁋ 29. The
offense occurred in December 2004. Id. And, in 2008, he was convicted in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City of another handgun offense, dating to 2004, for which he received a sentence of
eight years of imprisonment. Id. ⁋ 30.
Thereafter, on March 5, 2014, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, defendant was
sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute heroin and
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Id. ⁋ 31. The offenses occurred in 2012. Id.
Additionally, in December 2015, Mouzon was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City
with possession with intent to distribute. Id. ⁋ 32. He was convicted on April 8, 2016, and
sentenced to seven years’ custody, nearly all of which was suspended, and a four-year term of
probation. Id. Defendant was serving his term of probation when the underlying offense occurred.
Id. ⁋⁋ 32, 34.
4
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The Court sentenced defendant to a below Guidelines sentence of 102 months of
imprisonment. ECF 63 (Judgment) at 2; ECF 64 (Statement of Reasons) at 1. Further, Mouzon
was given credit for time served as of April 24, 2016. Moreover, the Judgment specified that
defendant’s federal sentence was to run concurrent with any State sentence. ECF 63 at 2. The
Court also imposed a four-year term of supervised release. Id. at 3.
According to documents submitted by the FPD, on June 8, 2020, Mouzon submitted a
request for compassionate release to the Warden of FCI Schuykill, the facility where he was then
incarcerated. ECF 77-1 at 1. It was denied approximately three weeks later, on July 1, 2020. Id.
at 2. Moreover, according to the government, on July 13, 2020, and July 23, 2020, defendant filed
two additional requests for compassionate release, also directed to the Warden of FCI Schuykill,
both of which were rejected. ECF 83.2 This Motion followed on December 22, 2020. ECF 69.
The government’s opposition was filed on September 23, 2021. ECF 81.3
Mouzon is no longer incarcerated at FCI Schuykill. He is now serving his sentence in
Beaumont USP in Texas. Id. at 5-6; see Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last
accessed Apr. 28, 2022). The record does not reflect the date on which Mouzon was transferred
from FCI Schuykill to USP Beaumont. But, it appears that this transfer was effectuated before
defendant filed the Motion. See ECF 69-1 (envelope that enclosed ECF 69, reflecting return
address at Beaumont USP). And, there is no indication that defendant submitted a new request for
compassionate release to the Warden at USP Beaumont.
2
The government has not provided the Court with a copy of either request, or the Warden’s
responses thereto.
3
The Court has been flooded with motions for compassionate release due to COVID-19.
5
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According to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), the defendant has a projected release date of
October 12, 2023. See Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed Apr. 28,
2022). To date, he has served approximately 70.5% of his sentence.
II. Standard of Review
Ordinarily, a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see United States v. Hargrove, 30 F.4th 189, 194 (4th Cir. 2022); United
States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Jackson, 952 F.3d 492,
495 (4th Cir. 2020); United States v. Martin, 916 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir. 2019). But, “the rule of
finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions.” Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526
(2011). One such exception is when the modification is “expressly permitted by statute.” 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B); see Jackson, 952 F.3d at 495.
Commonly termed the “compassionate release” provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)
provides a statutory vehicle to modify a defendant’s sentence, if “extraordinary and compelling
reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194.
This provision is an exception to the ordinary rule of finality. United States v. Jenkins, 22 F.4th
162, 169 (4th Cir. 2021).
Section 3582 was enacted as part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Originally, it
permitted a court to alter a sentence only upon a motion by the Director of the BOP. See Pub. L.
No. 98-473, § 224(a), 98 Stat. 2030 (1984). Thus, a defendant seeking compassionate release had
to rely on the BOP Director for relief. See, e.g., Orlansky v. FCI Miami Warden, 754 F. App’x
862, 866-67 (11th Cir. 2018); Jarvis v. Stansberry, No. 2:08CV230, 2008 WL 5337908, at *1
(E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2008) (denying compassionate release motion because § 3582 “vests absolute
discretion” in the BOP).
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For many years, the safety valve of § 3582 languished. The BOP rarely filed motions on
an inmate’s behalf. As a result, compassionate release was exceedingly rare. See Hearing on
Compassionate Release and the Conditions of Supervision Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 66
(2016) (statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Inspector General, Dep’t of Justice) (observing that, on
average, only 24 inmates were granted compassionate release per year between 1984 and 2013).
In December 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018 (“2018 FSA” or “First Step
Act”), Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5239 (2018); see United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 275-76
(4th Cir. 2020). As amended by the 2018 FSA, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) now permits a court to
reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment “upon motion of the Director of [BOP], or upon motion
of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure
of the [BOP] to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt
of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility,” whichever occurs first. (Emphasis
added). So, once a defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies, or after 30 days have
passed from the date on which the warden has received the defendant’s request, he or she may
petition a court directly for compassionate release. Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 169; United States v.
Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 129 (4th Cir. 2021); McCoy, 981 F.3d at 276. That option constitutes
a sea change in the law.
Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the court may modify the defendant’s sentence if, “after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) [of 18 U.S.C.] to the extent that they are
applicable,” it finds that
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; or
(ii) the defendant is at least 70 years of age, has served at least 30 years in prison,
pursuant to a sentence imposed under section 3559(c), for the offense or offenses
for which the defendant is currently imprisoned, and a determination has been made
by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant is not a danger to the
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safety of any other person or the community, as provided under section 3142(g);
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission . . . .
See United States v. Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); see also Hargrove,
30 F.4th at 194; United States v. High, 997 F.3d 181, 186 (4th Cir. 2021).
Accordingly, in order to be entitled to relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the
defendant must demonstrate that (1) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction
of his sentence; (2) the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) countenance a reduction; and (3)
the sentence modification is “consistent” with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission. Notably, “Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) does not attempt to define the
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that might merit compassionate release.” McCoy, 981 F.3d
at 276. Moreover, “the district court enjoys broad discretion in conducting a § 3582(c)(1)(A)
analysis.” Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 169.
The Fourth Circuit has said that, “[w]hen deciding whether to reduce a defendant’s
sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may grant a reduction only if it is ‘consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” United States v. Taylor, 820
F. App’x 229, 230 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). In U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13, titled “Reduction in Term of Imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) Policy
Statement,” the Sentencing Commission addressed the “extraordinary and compelling reasons”
that might merit compassionate release. See McCoy, 981 F.3d at 276-77.4
In particular, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 provides that, on motion by the Director of the BOP, the
4
The Sentencing Commission acted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (directing Sentencing
Commission to “describe what should be extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence
reduction”), as well as 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C). See McCoy, 981 F.3d at 276.
8
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court may reduce a sentence where warranted by extraordinary or compelling reasons (§
1B1.13(1)(A)); the defendant is at least 70 years old and has served at least 30 years in prison (§
1B1.13(1)(B)); the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community
(§ 1B1.13(2)); and the reduction is consistent with the policy statement. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(3).
The Application Notes to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 are expansive, and indicate that
compassionate release may be based on circumstances involving illness, declining health, age,
exceptional family circumstances, as well as “other reasons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 App. Notes
1(A)-(D). Application Note 1(D), titled “Other Reasons,” permits the court to reduce a
sentence where, “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the
defendant’s case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the
reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 App. Note 1(D). This is
the “so-called, ‘catch-all’ category.” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 276.
However, as the McCoy Court recognized, the policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 was
issued in 2006 and was last updated in November 2018, prior to the enactment of the First Step
Act. McCoy, 981 F.3d at 276. Of significance here, it is only “directed at BOP requests for
sentence reductions.” Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13). “By its plain terms, in short, § 1B1.13 does
not apply to defendant-filed motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 282; see also
Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 169; United States v. Zullo, 976 F.3d 228, 230 (2nd Cir. 2020); United States
v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1100-02 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178, 1180 (7th
Cir. 2020). In other words, the policy statement does not apply to the court.
Indeed, “[a]s of now, there is no Sentencing Commission policy statement ‘applicable’ to
[] defendants’ compassionate-release motions, which means that district courts need not conform,
under § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s consistency requirement, to § 1B1.13 in determining whether there exist
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‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ for a sentence reduction.” McCoy, 981 F.3d at 283; see
also Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194-95. Consequently, district courts are “‘empowered…to consider
any extraordinary and compelling reason for release that a defendant might raise.’” McCoy, 981
F.3d at 284 (quoting Zullo, 976 F.3d at 230); see also Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 170.
“The factors applicable to the determination of what circumstances can constitute an
extraordinary and compelling reason for release from prison are complex and not easily
summarized.” Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 197. But, “rehabilitation alone cannot serve as a basis for
compassionate release.” United States v. Davis, No. 21-6960, 2022 WL 127900, at * 1 (4th Cir.
Jan. 13, 2022) (per curiam); see McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286 n.9; United States v. Harris, No. 21-6781,
2022 WL 636627, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 2022) (per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). However,
“successful rehabilitation efforts can be considered” in regard to the analysis of extraordinary and
compelling reasons. Harris, 2022 WL 636627, at *1.
The Guidelines “are not directly applicable to defendant-filed motions” under § 3582(c).
Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 169. However, “the court may consider these guidelines in defining what
should be considered an ‘extraordinary and compelling circumstance’ warranting a sentence
reduction.” Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13); see High, 997 F.3d at 187. Although there are currently
no applicable policy statements for the Sentencing Commission that are applicable to
compassionate release, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 “remains helpful guidance . . . .” McCoy, 981 F.3d at
282 n.7; see Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 194.
As the movant, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 715 F.3d 328,
337 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Edwards, NKM-17-00003, 2020 WL 1650406, at *3 (W.D.
Va. Apr. 2, 2020). And, even if the defendant establishes an extraordinary and compelling reason
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that renders him eligible for a sentence reduction, the court must consider the factors under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether, in its discretion, a reduction of sentence is appropriate.
See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826-27 (2010); Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 195; High, 997
F.3d at 186; see also United States v. Butts, No. 21-6380, 2021 WL 3929349, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept.
2, 2021) (per curiam) (noting that, even if the district court finds extraordinary and compelling
circumstances, it must consider the § 3553(a) factors to the extent applicable in exercising its
discretion); Kibble, 992 F.3d at 329-30 (noting that district court must consider § 3553(a) factors
when considering a motion to reduce sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and district court enjoys
broad discretion in conducting this analysis); United States v. Trotman, 829 F. App’x 607, 608
(4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (recognizing that, when considering a motion to reduce sentence under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), the court must consider the sentencing factors under § 3553(a), to the extent
applicable); United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693-94 (5th Cir. 2020) (district court must
give due consideration to the § 3553(a) factors); United States v. Spriggs, CCB-10-0364, 2021 WL
1856667, at *3 (D. Md. May 10, 2021) (court must consider the § 3553(a) factors).
As mentioned, the district court is “‘empowered . . . to consider any extraordinary and
compelling reason for release’” raised by a defendant. McCoy, 981 F.3d at 284 (citation omitted);
see Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 169. Nevertheless, compassionate release is a “rare” remedy. White v.
United States, 378 F. Supp. 3d 784, 787 (W.D. Mo. 2019); see Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693-94;
United States v. Mangarella, FDW-06-151, 2020 WL 1291835, at *2-3 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 16,
2020).
To be sure, “[a] district court need not provide an exhaustive explanation analyzing every
§ 3553(a) factor,” nor is it “required to address each of a defendant’s arguments when it considers
a motion for compassionate release.” Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 170; see Chavez-Mena v. United States,
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___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018) (passim); High, 997 F.3d at 187. But, a district court abuses
its discretion when it “act[s] arbitrarily or irrationally,” “fail[s] to consider judicially recognized
factors constraining its exercise of discretion,” “relie[s] on erroneous factual or legal premises,”
or “commit[s] an error of law.” High, 997 F.3d at 187 (internal quotation marks omitted)
III. COVID-19
The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic on March 11,
2020. See Seth v. McDonough, 461 F. Supp. 3d 242, 247 (D. Md. 2020).5 COVID-19 spawned
“a public health crisis more severe than any seen for a hundred years.” Antietam Battlefield KOA
v. Hogan, CCB-20-1130, 461 F. Supp. 3d 214, 223 (D. Md. 2020).
The judges of this Court “have written extensively about the pandemic.” United States v.
Williams, PWG-19-134, 2020 WL 3073320, at *1 (D. Md. June 10, 2020) (collecting cases).
Therefore, it is not necessary to recount in detail the “unprecedented nature and impact” of it. Id.
That said, the Court must reiterate that the COVID-19 pandemic has been described as the
worst public health crisis that the world has experienced since 1918. See United States v.
Hernandez, 451 F. Supp. 3d 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“The COVID-19 pandemic . . . . presents
a clear and present danger to free society for reasons that need no elaboration.”). Indeed, the
pandemic “produced unparalleled and exceptional circumstances affecting every aspect of life as
we have known it.” Cameron v. Bouchard, LVP-20-10949, 2020 WL 2569868, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
May 21, 2020), vacated on other grounds, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020). For a significant
period of time, life as we have known it came to a halt. For quite some time, businesses and
5
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the cause of
coronavirus disease 2019, commonly called COVID-19. See Naming the Coronavirus Disease
and the Virus that Causes It, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://bit.ly/2UMC6uW (last accessed June
15, 2020).
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schools were shuttered or operated on a limited basis, in an effort to thwart the spread of the virus,
which is highly contagious. See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), How COVID-19
Spreads, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 2, 2020), https://bit.ly/2XoiDDh. The
judiciary, too, faced many operational challenges.
People who are stricken with the virus sometimes experience only mild or moderate
symptoms. But, the virus can cause severe medical problems as well as death, especially for those
in “high-risk categories . . . .” Antietam Battlefield KOA, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 223 (citation omitted).
Of relevance here, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has identified
certain risk factors that may increase the chance of severe illness due to the coronavirus. The risk
factors initially identified by the CDC included age (over 65); lung disease; asthma; chronic kidney
disease; serious heart disease; obesity; diabetes; liver disease; and a compromised immune system.
See Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), People Who Are at Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 14, 2020), https://bit.ly/2WBcB16. But, the CDC has
repeatedly revised its guidance as to medical conditions that pose a greater risk of severe illness
due to COVID-19. In February 2022, it updated its guidance to reflect the most available data.
See People with Certain Medical Conditions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb.
25, 2022), https://bit.ly/38S4NfY.
According to the CDC, the factors that increase the risk include cancer; chronic kidney
disease; chronic liver disease; chronic lung diseases, including COPD, asthma (moderate to
severe), interstitial lung disease, cystic fibrosis, and pulmonary hypertension; dementia or other
neurological conditions; diabetes (Type 1 and Type 2); disabilities, such as Down syndrome; heart
conditions, such as heart failure, coronary artery disease, cardiomyopathies, and hypertension;
HIV; being immunocompromised; liver disease; obesity, where the body mass index (“BMI”) is
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25 or higher; pregnancy; sickle cell disease; smoking; solid organ or blood stem cell transplant;
stroke or cerebrovascular disease; mental health conditions; substance use disorders; and
tuberculosis. Id.
The CDC has also indicated that the risk for severe illness from COVID-19 increases with
age, with older adults at highest risk. See Older Adults At Greater Risk of Requiring
Hospitalization or Dying if Diagnosed with COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Nov. 27, 2020), https://bit.ly/3g1USZ1. Furthermore, “[t]he risk of severe COVID-
19 increases as the number of underlying medical conditions increases in a person.” People with
Certain Medical Conditions, supra.
As to the CDC’s risk factors, in the context of a motion for compassionate release, the
Fourth Circuit has said that “use of a bright-line rule that accepts only the CDC’s highest risk
conditions is too restrictive.” Hargrove, 30 F.4th at 195. In other words, there is no bright-line
rule predicated only on the CDC’s identification of certain health conditions in the “highest risk
category.” Id. at 196.
Particularly at the outset of the pandemic, in an effort to stem the spread of the virus, people
were urged to practice “social distancing” and to wear masks. See Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19), How to Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://bit.ly/3dPA8Ba (last accessed December 9, 2020). However, social distancing is
particularly difficult in the penal setting. Seth, 2020 WL 2571168, at *2; Senate Judiciary Hrg.
Transcript on Incarceration during COVID-19, REV.COM (June 2, 2020) (Testimony of BOP Dir.
Michael Carvajal at 47:00) (“Prisons by design are not made for social distancing. They are on
[sic] the opposite made to contain people in one area.”). Indeed, prisoners have little ability to
isolate themselves from the threat posed by the coronavirus. Id.; see Cameron, 2020 WL 2569868,
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at *1; see also United States v. Mel, TDC-18-0571, 2020 WL 2041674, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 28,
2020) (“In light of the shared facilities, the difficulty of social distancing, and challenges relating
to maintaining sanitation, the risk of infection and the spread of infection within prisons and
detention facilities is particularly high.”). Prisoners usually “share bathrooms, laundry and eating
areas,” and are often “bunked in the same cell” with several others. Amanda Klonsky, An
Epicenter of the Pandemic Will Be Jails and Prisons, if Inaction Continues, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16,
2020). And, they are not free to follow their own rules.
To illustrate, prisoners are not readily able to secure safety products on their own to protect
themselves, such as masks and hand sanitizers, nor are they necessarily able to separate or distance
themselves from others. See Kim Bellware, Prisoners and Guards Agree About Federal
Coronavirus Response: ‘We do Not Feel Safe,’ WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2020) (reporting use of non-
reusable masks for months and a lack of transparency around policies for personal protective
equipment and testing). They do not get to decide where, when, or how to eat or sleep.
Consequently, correctional facilities are especially vulnerable to viral outbreaks and ill-suited to
stem their spread. See Coreas v. Bounds, TDC-20-0780, 2020 WL 1663133, at *2 (D. Md. Apr.
3, 2020) (“Prisons, jails, and detention centers are especially vulnerable to outbreaks of COVID-
19.”); see also Eddie Burkhalter et al., Incarcerated and Infected: How the Virus Tore Through
the U.S. Prison System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2021) (stating that the “cramped, often unsanitary
settings of correctional institutions have been ideal for incubating and transmitting the disease.
Social distancing is often not an option.”); Letter of 3/25/20 to Governor Hogan from
approximately 15 members of Johns Hopkins faculty at the Bloomberg School of Public Health,
School of Nursing, and School of Medicine (explaining that the “close quarters of jails and prisons,
the inability to employ effective social distancing measures, and the many high-contact surfaces
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within facilities, make transmission of COVID-19 more likely”); accord Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S.
493, 519-20 (2011) (referencing a medical expert’s description of the overcrowded California
prison system as “‘breeding grounds for disease’”) (citation omitted).
On March 23, 2020, the CDC issued guidance for the operation of penal institutions to help
prevent the spread of the virus. Seth, 2020 WL 2571168, at *2. Notably, the BOP implemented
substantial measures to mitigate the risks to prisoners, to protect inmates from COVID-19, and to
treat those who are infected. Indeed, as the Third Circuit recognized in United States v. Raia, 954
F.3d 594, 597 (3rd Cir. 2020), the BOP has made “extensive and professional efforts to curtail the
virus’s spread.”6
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) recognized the unique risks from COVID-19
experienced by inmates and employees of the BOP. The DOJ adopted the position that an inmate
who presents with one of the risk factors identified by the CDC should be considered as having an
“extraordinary and compelling reason” warranting a sentence reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
cmt. n.1(A)(ii)(I).
6
The New York Times reported in June 2020 that cases of COVID-19 “have soared in
recent weeks” at jails and prisons across the country. Timothy Williams et al., Coronavirus cases
Rise Sharply in Prisons Even as They Plateau Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020),
https://nyti.ms/37JZgH2; See Cases in Jails and Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2020) (On October
29, 2020, the New York Times reported that, “[i]n American jails and prisons, more than 252,000
people have been infected and at least 1,450 inmates and correctional officers have died” from
COVID-19.). On November 21, 2020, the New York Times reported that “U.S. correctional
facilities are experiencing record spikes in coronavirus infections this fall. During the week of
Nov. 17, there were 13,657 new coronavirus infections reported across the state and federal prison
systems.” America Is Letting the Coronavirus Rage Through Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/21/opinion/sunday/coronavirus-prisons-jails.html.
On April 16, 2021, the New York Times reported that at least 39% of prisoners are known
to have been infected in federal facilities. Eddie Burkhalter et al., Incarcerated and Infected: How
the Virus Tore Through the U.S. Prison System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2021). And, according to
the article, the actual count is most likely much higher “because of the dearth of testing.” Id.
Nevertheless, with the passage of time, the outbreaks of COVID-19 have declined.
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Former Attorney General William Barr issued a memorandum to Michael Carvajal,
Director of the BOP, on March 26, 2020, instructing him to prioritize the use of home confinement
for inmates at risk of complications from COVID-19. See Hallinan v. Scarantino, 20-HC-2088-
FL, 2020 WL 3105094, at *8 (E.D. N.C. June 11, 2020). Then, on March 27, 2020, Congress
passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”), Pub. L. No.
116-136, 134 Stat. 281. In relevant part, the CARES Act authorized the Director of BOP to extend
the permissible length of home confinement, subject to a finding of an emergency by the Attorney
General. See Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2). On April 3, 2020, Attorney General Barr issued
another memorandum to Carvajal, finding “the requisite emergency . . . .” Hallinan, 2020 WL
3105094, at *9. Notably, the April 3 memorandum “had the effect of expanding the [BOP’s]
authority to grant home confinement to any inmate . . . .” Id.
On May 8, 2020, two BOP officials, Andre Matevousian, then Acting Assistant Director
of the Correctional Programs Division, and Hugh Hurwitz, then Assistant Director of the Reentry
Services Division, issued a memorandum to implement the Attorney General’s directives on the
increased use of home confinement. The memorandum provided that the BOP was prioritizing
the review of inmates for home confinement, as to inmates who have either served a certain portion
of their sentence or who only have a short amount of time remaining on their sentence.
Although there is currently no cure for the virus, medical treatments have continued to
improve. And, significantly, we have seen the rollout of three vaccines for COVID-19 (Pfizer,
Moderna, and Johnson & Johnson).7 Initially, the vaccines were made available to health care
7
Questions as to the efficacy of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine were raised as to the Delta
and Omicron variants. See J&J, Sinopharm, Sputnik V COVID-19 shots less effective against
Omicron -study, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-
pharmaceuticals/jj-sinopharm-sputnik-v-shots-weaker-against-omicron-study-shows-2021-12-
17/; Apoorva Mandavilli, J.&J. Vaccine May Be Less Effective Against Delta, Study Suggests,
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workers, the elderly in nursing homes, and first responders. But, the criteria for eligibility has
since been approved for all persons five years of age and older. See Cheyenne Haslett, FDA
Authorizes COVID-19 Vaccine for Kids 5-11, ABC NEWS, Oct. 29, 2021,
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/fda-authorizes-covid-19-vaccine-kids-11/story?id=80846188.
Approximately 66% of the total U.S. population is fully vaccinated, including 28% of people from
ages 5 to 11, 59% of people from ages 12 to 17, 73% of people from ages 18 to 64, and 90% of
people age 65 and up. See How Vaccinations Are Going in Your County and State, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/covid-19-vaccine-doses.html (last visited Apr. 28,
2022).
Moreover, approximately 100.3 million Americans have received a third or “booster”
vaccine dose, which the CDC recommends for all persons age 18 and older. See id.; COVID-19
Vaccine Booster Shots, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/vaccines/booster-shot.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2022). And, federal regulators have
recently approved a second booster dose for individuals age 50 and older. See Cheyenne Haslett
and Eric M. Strauss, Officials say everyone over 50 can get a 4th COVID shot, but ‘especially
important’ for higher risk people, ABC NEWS (Mar. 29, 2022),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/4th-covid-shot-authorized-fda-50/story?id=83730999.
Given the vaccine rollout, the BOP published “COVID-19 Vaccine Guidance” on January
4, 2021 (version 7.0). COVID-19 Vaccine Guidance, Federal Bureau of Prisons Clinical Guidance
(Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/2021_covid19_vaccine.pdf. Administration of
the COVID-19 vaccine (Pfizer and Moderna) will “align with [recommendations of] the Centers
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/20/health/coronavirus-johnson-
vaccine-delta.html.
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for Disease Control and Prevention.” Id. at 4. Its plan was for prisoners at heightened risk to
receive priority for the vaccine. Id. at 6.
The BOP reportedly received its first shipment of vaccines on December 16, 2020. Walter
Pavlo, Federal Bureau of Prisons Starts Vaccination of Staff, Inmates Soon Thereafter, FORBES
(Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2020/12/21/ federal-bureau-of-
prisons-starts-vaccination-of-staff-inmates-soon-thereafter/?sh=5683b99aa96f. As of April 28,
2022, the BOP had 137,381 federal inmates and approximately 36,000 staff. And, by that date,
the BOP had administered 348,440 vaccine doses to staff and inmates. See
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ (last accessed Apr. 28, 2022).
For a brief time in the Fall of 2021, the country enjoyed a reduction of COVID-19 cases.
See David Leonhardt, Covid Cases Keep Falling, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/briefing/covid-cases-falling-delta.html (“The number of
new daily COVID-19 cases has plunged since peaking on Sept.1. Almost as encouraging as the
magnitude of the decline is its breadth: Cases have been declining in every region.”). But, the
trend was short-lived, due to the spread of the Delta variant and then the Omicron variant.
The Delta variant was thought to be more virulent than were earlier strains of COVID-19.
See Delta Variant: What We Know About the Science, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/delta-variant.html (updated
Aug. 6, 2021) (noting that the Delta variant is “more than [two times] as contagious as previous
variants”); see also Jon Kamp & Brianna Abbott, Delta Variant Recedes Across the United States,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/delta-surge-of-covid-19-recedes-
leaving-winter-challenge-ahead-11635672600 (“The Delta-fueled wave continues to take a serious
toll, but the seven day average in reported deaths has dropped to about 1,400 a day from daily
19
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averages above 2,000 in late September, Johns Hopkins data show.”); Apoorva Mandavilli, What
to Know About Breakthrough Infections and the Delta Variant, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/covid-breakthrough-delta-variant.html (noting that, as of August
14, 2021, “[i]nfections have spiked to the highest levels in six months”).
After the Delta variant, the Omicron variant emerged, both around the world and in the
United States. It sparked further cause for concern, because it was highly contagious. See Omicron
Variant: What You Need to Know, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/variants/omicron-variant.html (last updated Dec. 13,
2021). Indeed, Omicron contributed to a substantial and serious spike in COVID-19 cases. See,
e.g., Aya Elamroussi, “Omicron surge is ‘unlike anything we’ve ever seen,’ expert says,” CNN
(Dec. 31, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/12/30/health/us-coronavirus-thursday/index.html.
Then, the number of COVID-19 cases again declined. See, e.g., Anabelle Timsit, U.S.
coronavirus cases are dropping. Other countries are breaking records., WASH. POST (Feb. 7,
2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/02/07/covid-omicron-variant-live-
updates/#link-ZMG6VYX45VH5RAD3JX3IN3JF3Y. And, the country began to return to
normalcy. Nevertheless, we have once again begun to experience an uptick in COVID-19 cases.
See, e.g., Anne Barnard, Covid Cases Are Rising Again. How Cautious Should We Be?, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/07/nyregion/covid-cases-are-rising-again-
how-cautious-should-we-be.html.
As of April 28, 2022, COVID-19 has infected more than 81 million Americans and caused
approximately 992,000 deaths in this country. See COVID-19 Dashboard, THE JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIV., https://bit.ly/2WD4XU9 (last accessed Apr. 28, 2022). And, as of the same date, the BOP
reported that 54 federal inmates, out of a total population of 137,381, and 148 BOP staff, out of
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some 36,000 staff members, currently tested positive for COVID-19. Moreover, 52,517 inmates
and 12,573 staff have recovered from the virus. In addition, 294 inmates and seven staff members
have died from the virus. The BOP has completed 128,757 COVID-19 tests. See
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/, supra.
With respect to USP Beaumont, where the defendant is imprisoned, the BOP reported that
as of April 28, 2022, out of a total of 1,368 inmates, zero inmates or staff have tested positive, zero
inmates have died of COVID-19, and 264 inmates and 99 staff have recovered at the facility. In
addition, 495 staff members and 3,493 inmates across the USP Beaumont, FCI Beaumont Medium,
and FCI Beaumont Low complexes have been inoculated with the vaccine. See
https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/, Federal Bureau of Prisons,
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/bmp/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).
IV. Discussion
In the Motion, defendant asks the Court to grant him compassionate release, in light of the
danger posed to him by COVID-19. See ECF 69; ECF 73. The government contends that the
Court should deny the Motion because defendant has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies;
Mouzon has failed to present the Court with an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release;
and a balancing of the sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) militate against
defendant’s release. See ECF 81 at 6-16; see also ECF 83.
A.
As a threshold issue, the government argues that Mouzon has failed to satisfy the
exhaustion requirements of the compassionate release statute. ECF 81 at 6; see also ECF 83. As
amended by the FSA, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) permits a court to reduce a defendant's term of
imprisonment “upon motion of the Director of [BOP], or upon motion of the defendant after the
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defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the [BOP] to bring a
motion on the defendant's behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the
warden of the defendant's facility,” whichever occurs first. So, once a defendant has exhausted his
administrative remedies, he may petition a court directly for compassionate release. See,
e.g., Jenkins, 22 F.4th at 169 (“Congress enacted the First Step Act to allow incarcerated
individuals to directly petition district courts for compassionate release so long as they first exhaust
their administrative remedies.”).
In this case, documentation supplied by the FPD reflects that Mouzon submitted a request
for compassionate release to the Warden of FCI Schuykill, the facility where he was then
incarcerated, on June 8, 2020. ECF 77-1 at 1. It was denied soon thereafter, on July 1, 2020. Id.
at 2. Further, the government maintains that Mouzon submitted two additional requests to the
Warden of FCI Schuykill in July 2020, which were both rejected. ECF 83.
However, the government maintains that these requests for compassionate release do not
satisfy the relevant exhaustion requirements because defendant was transferred to a new facility
and did not submit a new request for compassionate release to the Warden of his new facility. ECF
83. Thus, in the government’s view, Mouzon has failed to satisfy the exhaustion requirements set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Notably, the government does not cite to any authority in support of its argument. And, at
first glance, it is not clear to me that its assertion is consistent with the text of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). Indeed, several other courts have adopted a position at odds with the one outlined
by the government. See, e.g., United States v. Hamidu, 2:18-CR-00058-6, 2021 WL 2808721, at
*2 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 6, 2021) (collecting cases).
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I shall assume, for present purposes, that despite defendant’s transfer to USP Beaumont,
defendant’s requests for compassionate release, submitted to the warden of FCI Schuykill, while
defendant was incarcerated there, are sufficient to satisfy the threshold exhaustion requirements
outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
B.
Turning to the extraordinary and compelling analysis, the Motion is solely predicated on
defendant’s purported vulnerability to COVID-19. ECF 69; ECF 73. Defendant is now 36 years
of age (ECF 51 at 2), and his medical records reflect that he is in relatively good health. See
generally ECF 81-2.
As to defendant’s vulnerability to COVID-19, the government notes (ECF 81 at 8) that
Mouzon has failed to identify any underlying medical conditions that would heighten his risk of
severe illness were he to contract the virus that causes COVID-19. See ECF 69; ECF 73. But,
defendant’s medical records reflect that he suffers from severe opioid use disorder. See ECF 81-
2 at 9, 16. These records also indicate that, as of November 2, 2020, defendant had a body mass
index (“BMI”) in the range of 26.0 and 26.9. Id. According to the CDC, the defendant’s BMI
renders him slightly overweight. See Certain Medical Conditions, supra.8
Also according to the CDC, substance use disorders and being overweight are among the
conditions that “can make you more likely to get very sick from COVID-19.” See Certain Medical
Conditions, supra. In addition, the CDC cautions that “[a] person’s risk of severe illness from
COVID-19 increases as the number of underlying medical conditions they have increases.” Id.
8
Defendant’s weight was not specifically noted on November 2, 2020, the most recent date
on which his BMI was recorded. See ECF 81-2 at 9, 16. But, at sentencing, defendant was six
feet tall and weighed 225 pounds. ECF 51, ⁋ 50. And, defendant’s medical records reflect that on
June 17, 2021, defendant weighed approximately 221 pounds. See ECF 81-2 at 5.
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Even so, I am persuaded that defendant is not eligible for compassionate release on the
basis of his alleged vulnerability to COVID-19 because, at least as of September 23, 2021, he has
refused to be inoculated against the virus that causes the disease. See ECF 81-2 at 14, 32.
Moreover, defendant has not offered any explanation for his refusal.
Judge Gallagher has previously observed: “Courts now widely recognize that a refusal to
take preventative measures to protect oneself from COVID-19 undermines any assertion that the
risk of viral infection constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason justifying
release. . . . Any decision to the contrary would create a perverse incentive in favor of declining
the vaccine, undermining the BOP’s efforts to protect its incarcerated population and to allow
prison operations to return to some degree of normalcy in the coming months.” United States v.
Ayres, SAG-04-004, 2021 WL 2352322, at *2 (D. Md. June 9, 2021) (collecting cases); accord
United States v. Manon, Crim. No. 16-00460 (SDW), 2022 WL 408958, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 10,
2022); United States v. Carter, 3:19-cr-356, 2022 WL 272196, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2022);
United States v. Culp, 92-cr-81058, 2021 WL 5834312, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2021); United
States v. Hignight, 4:14-CR-129(4), 2021 WL 5299249, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2021) United
States v. Brice, SAG-07-0261, 2021 WL 1926713, at *3 (D. Md. May 13, 2021); United States v.
Siegel, TDC-03-0393, 2021 WL 962491, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 15, 2021).
Defendant’s underlying medical conditions are not severe. Moreover, defendant’s refusal
to be vaccinated against COVID-19 is a factor in assessing any concern regarding defendant’s
health conditions.
I am of the view that defendant’s underlying medical conditions do not constitute an
extraordinary and compelling reason for defendant’s release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. However, if
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defendant has become fully vaccinated against COVID-19 during the pendency of his Motion, he
should promptly inform the Court of the same.
C.
Even assuming that Mouzon presented an extraordinary and compelling reason for his
release, I would deny the Motion because the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
militate against his release at this time. These factors include: (1) the nature of the offense and the
defendant's characteristics; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment; (3) the kinds of sentences available and
the applicable Guidelines range; (4) any pertinent Commission policy statements; (5) the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and (6) the need to provide restitution to
victims. See High, 997 F.3d at 186.
The instant offense is a serious one. Mouzon, a convicted felon, knowingly possessed an
AK-47 style rifle while walking around the Cherry Hill neighborhood of Baltimore City. ECF 27,
⁋ 6. Moreover, the firearm was loaded with a live round of ammunition. Id. And, when Mouzon
was approached by a detective employed by the Baltimore Police Department, he attempted to flee
and discarded a loaded, dangerous weapon. Id. Defendant’s conduct put those around him at risk
of grave harm.
Mouzon’s criminal history is also of great concern to the Court. Defendant has previously
served sentences of incarceration. Yet, they were insufficient to deter him from engaging in the
criminal behavior that led to his current imprisonment. Indeed, Mouzon committed the instant
offense while on probation for a previous felony drug crime. ECF 51, ⁋ 34.
To be sure, Mouzon has already served approximately 70.5% of his 102-month sentence.
ECF 63 at 2; see Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last accessed Apr. 28, 2022).
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But, that sentence was quite lenient, and was well below the range contemplated by the Guidelines.
ECF 51, ⁋ 58. As I see it, defendant’s time served to date does not adequately reflect the
seriousness of his criminal activity.
Mouzon asserts that he has arranged for post-release employment at “Pace Cars Auto
Shop”. ECF 73 at 1; see also ECF 69 at 1-2. Defendant also states that, upon his release, his
family and friends will help him return to society. ECF 69 at 2. In particular, Mouzon notes that
his mother and sister will provide him with a place to live in Baltimore and help pay for medical
bills that he may incur. Id. Further, defendant indicates that he has an eight-year old son who
“need[s] [him] in his life and to be their [sic] every step of the way during these very hard times.”
Id. Additionally, Mouzon states that he is “housed at R-DAP programming” and is “bettering
[himself].” Id. at 1.
The Court is sympathetic to Mouzon’s situation and is encouraged that Mouzon has
endeavored to rehabilitate himself, and has planned for his life following his release from prison.
But, the Fourth Circuit has clarified that “rehabilitation alone cannot serve as a basis for
compassionate release.” Davis, 2022 WL 127900, at * 1. In any event, defendant’s assertions
regarding his rehabilitation are undermined by his problematic disciplinary record. See ECF
81-3.
Notably, in Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 492 (2011), the Supreme Court
acknowledged that a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct “provides the most-up-to-date picture
of [a defendant's] ‘history and characteristics.’” (Quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)). The
government has provided documentation that indicates that, during his incarceration, Mouzon has
incurred numerous disciplinary infractions, including for fighting with another person as well as
the use of drugs or alcohol. See ECF 81-3. Such behavior is worrisome. It suggests that Mouzon
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has not learned to follow the rules and thus he could pose a danger to the community if he were to
be released at this juncture.
V. Conclusion
In sum, given the leniency of the original sentence, the seriousness of the offense,
defendant’s criminal history, and his post-conviction conduct, Mouzon’s release is not appropriate
at this time.
For all of the aforementioned reasons, I shall deny the Motion, without prejudice to
defendant’s right to renew the Motion upon his full vaccination for COVID-19 and/or for some
other reason.
An Order follows, consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: April 29, 2022 /s/
Ellen L. Hollander
United States District Judge
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