Amended Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing — United States v. Magee (E.D. Va., Dkt. 16)
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Amended Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing, filed September 1, 2023 as Document 16 in United States v. Bennie Earl Magee, Case No. 1:23-CR-00091-CMH, in the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, with a hearing on September 8, 2023. Magee pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. The government states that Magee devised a scheme to defraud the United States and lending institutions of over $7 million in pandemic relief funds under the PPP and EIDL programs. It says the range is 121-151 months and supports enhancements for sophisticated means, an organizer or leader role and obstruction of justice. It asks for a guideline sentence, restitution, forfeiture and a three-year term of supervised release.
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“Amended Position of the United States with Respect to Sentencing — United States v. Magee (E.D. Va., Dkt. 16).”
Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-e-d-va-no-1-23-cr-00091-dkt-16-e-d-va-bc9f44b997/
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Case 1:23-cr-00091-CMH Document 16 Filed 09/01/23 Page 1 of 15 PageID# 143
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Case No. 1:23-CR-00091-CMH
v.
The Honorable Claude M. Hilton
BENNIE EARL MAGEE,
Hearing: September 8, 2023
Defendant.
AMENDED POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES
WITH RESPECT TO SENTENCING
The United States of America, through its undersigned counsel, in accordance with 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”
or “U.S.S.G.”), hereby submits its position with respect to sentencing of Bennie Earl Magee (“the
defendant” or “Magee”). The defendant comes before the Court for sentencing after pleading
guilty to one count of wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343. With
the exception of acceptance of responsibility, the United States concurs with the Probation
Officer’s calculations of the defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines range as set forth in the
Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). See PSR ¶¶ 89-103, 132-33. For the reasons set forth
below, the United States respectfully submits that a term of imprisonment within the applicable
guideline range, adjusted for acceptance, would be reasonable and appropriate in consideration of
all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). That range is 121-151 months (offense level 32,
criminal history category I).
I. BACKGROUND
The purpose of the paycheck protection program was to allow active companies adversely
impacted by COVID-19 to continue to make payroll to documented employees. The purpose of
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the EIDL program was to assist businesses to maintain current operations. Not long after these
programs were announced, Magee concocted a scheme to defraud the United States and lending
institutions of over $7 million in pandemic relief funds under both the PPP and EIDL programs.
Magee lost large amounts of the fraud proceeds in crypto currency speculation. He also spent it on
vehicles and other vanity projects.
Magee’s criminal conduct was extremely willful and flagrant. It would have been bad
enough had he exposed only himself to criminal prosecution, but he misused his position of trust
within his family circle and through longtime friendships to corrupt others, like Michael Gilcher
and Magee’s own brother-in-law, Individual J.S. These people would never have engaged in the
fraud but for Magee’s insistence, his leadership, and his promises of no consequences and free
money.
Magee executed his scheme by offering co-conspirators (e.g., Gilcher), unsophisticated
family members (e.g., Individual J.S.), and people he perceived as friends (e.g., Confidential
Witness), his services in executing the fraud. These services included filling out loan application
forms with false information; fabricating IRS tax returns with detailed false information in terms
of employee withholding taxes and payroll; falsifying payroll records; and creating completely
falsified profit/loss statements. Magee also promised that nobody would need to repay the loans
since he would submit additional falsified records to qualify himself and others for loan
forgiveness. In exchange for these criminal services, Magee requested around half of the proceeds
gained from the fraudulent PPP loans.
Magee was most prolific in executing loan fraud for his own many entities, all of which
were basically his alter egos. Of the 11 companies Magee controlled, only two appear to have had
any recent real business operations. The other nine were essentially dormant or minimally active
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entities. Every single EIDL and PPP loan application that Magee submitted on behalf of these
entities was riddled with fraudulent information, whether or not the company did any actual
business.
Magee, laboring in his home office in Manassas to make the documents sophisticated
enough to fool lenders, obtained over $5 million for himself, and over $7 million in total (including
the loans Magee completed for Gilcher and for Individual J.S.). He then blew portions of these
millions on reckless crypto currency speculation makes the fraud all the more outrageous.
II. GUIDELINES CALCULATION
Although the Supreme Court rendered the federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory in
United States v. Booker, it held that a sentencing court must “consult [the] Guidelines and take
them into account when sentencing.” 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005); see also United States v. Clark,
434 F.3d 684, 685 (4th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has directed district courts to “begin all
sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). The “Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial
benchmark,” but the sentencing court must also “consider all of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors”
in determining the appropriate sentence. Id. at 49–50; see also Clark, 434 F.3d at 685.
A. The Base Offense Level and Loss Amount
The base offense and loss enhancement are not in contention. As agreed in the plea
agreement, the base offense level is 7, and the actual loss amount is over $7 million. As such, an
18-level enhancement for the loss amount is proper under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J).
B. More than $1 Million in Gross Receipts from a Financial Institution
There is no factual dispute that Magee through his entities personally derived substantially
over $1 Million dollars from TD Bank, a federally insured financial institution. Accordingly, the
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two-level enhancement under 2B1.1(b)(17)(A) applies. See PSR ¶ 93.
C. Sophisticated Means
Magee certainly used sophisticated means to execute the scheme to defraud. He did far
more than simply fill out application forms. His scheme took considerable planning. It required
the use of multiple interlocking, fabricated documents to create a convincing illusion of
functioning companies with employees, payroll, payroll taxes, expenditures of goods, income,
profit and losses. It must have taken Magee many days hunched over his computer in his spacious
house to create his web of lies for over a dozen entities, covering first and second draw PPP loans,
EIDL loans, and fraudulent loan forgiveness applications and supporting documents.
Magee’s scheme operated with the type of multilayered sophistication that the Fourth
Circuit has found to satisfy the sophistication enhancement. See United States v. Davis, No. 18-
4080, 2018 WL 5096070, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 18, 2018) (unpublished) (affirming application of
the sophisticated means enhancement applies where the defendant created a “multilayered
scheme” and “used numerous means to conceal the fraud, including forgery, altering
documentation, transferring money between accounts, and omitting property from certain
accountings”). As described collectively in the PSR and the Statement of Facts, the defendant used
a sophisticated set of interlocking transactional documents to simulate real businesses, with real
employees, taxes, profits, and losses. He did it for many, many entities.
Magee’s conduct certainly warrants the two-level enhancement for sophisticated means.
“The enhancement requires some means of execution that separates the offense from the ordinary
or generic.” United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d. 471, 486 (4th Cir. 2012) (tax case). “On the
other hand, a defendant need not utilize the most complex means possible to conceal his fraudulent
activities in order for the court to find that he used sophisticated means.” Id. (internal citations
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omitted).
D. The Defendant’s Role in the Offense
The Probation Officer is correct that defendant was an organizer and leader of criminal
activity involving five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Accordingly, a four-level
adjustment is applicable under §3B1.1(a). PSR ¶¶ 82.83, 95. In applying this enhancement, among
the factors a sentencing court should consider are: the degree to which the defendant understood
the scope and structure of the criminal activity; the degree to which the defendant exercised
decision-making authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making authority; the nature and
extent of the defendant’s participation in the commission of the criminal activity, including the
acts the defendant performed and the responsibility and discretion the defendant had in performing
those acts; and the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the criminal activity.
§ 3B1.1 note 4.
The crimes at issue in this case involved a number of participants. “A ‘participant’ is a
person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense but need not have been
convicted.” § 3B1.1 note 1. There are two criminally charged participants in this case: Magee
and Gilcher. Additionally, there is at least one uncharged person who engaged in the scheme with
Magee: Individual J.S. These people obtained loans using the same modus operandi, all conducted
by Magee, and shared funds back with Magee, at his direction and control.
Magee’s conduct fits perfectly with the “otherwise extensive” clause of the enhancement.
The application note explains:
In assessing whether an organization is ‘otherwise extensive,’ all persons
involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered. Thus, a
fraud that involved only three participants but used the unknowing services of
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many outsiders could be considered extensive.
§ 3B1.1 note 3. Here, there are three persons with serious criminal and civil exposure. Further,
Magee used the identities of numerous real people to falsely portray them to lenders as his
employees to obtain the loans that he claimed he needed for their payroll. Finally, bank employees’
dedicated their time and attention to these fraudulent loans and forgiveness packages. They were
unknowingly used to execute the scheme.
The defendant managed and supervised Gilcher and Individual J.S. There is no doubt that
Magee’s “friends and family” fraud scheme would not have taken shape but for Magee’s impetus,
direction, and control. Magee is truly the leader and organizer of this extensive scheme and its
participants. The government’s financial analysis has shown that the defendant reaped the greatest
portion of the overall funds obtained in this case: over $5 million of the $7 million in proceeds. He
profited handsomely from the criminal activity. His outsized take of the proceeds is another factor
that Courts consider in applying the guideline.
In contrast to the facts on the record in United States v. Slade, 631 F.3d 185, 190-92 (4th
Cir. 2011), here the evidence of significant control, management and direction is very clear. At
minimum, the defendant exercised at least the degree of managerial and supervisory role in this
scheme that the Fourth Circuit found merited the three-level enhancement in United States v.
Bartley, 230 F.3d 667, 673-74 (4th Cir. 2000). There is simply no denying that Magee coordinated
the nature, manner, and timing of how this extensive scheme was executed, and that Magee
effectively controlled Gilcher and Individual J.S.
E. Obstruction of Justice
The government agrees with the Probation Officer that a two-level enhancement applies
under §3C1.1. See PSR ¶¶ 84, 96. As Application Note 3 to this guideline notes, “[o]bstructive
conduct can vary widely in nature, degree, planning, or seriousness.” USSG § 3C1.1, cmt. 3.
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Here, Magee, after the FBI executed a search warrant, fabricated a false lease agreement between
his entity, Bull Run Capital Investments, LLC, and Gilcher’s entity, Infinity Communications
Solutions, LLC. This economically absurd rental agreement (over $15,000 a month for a business
with no tiny amounts of revenue) papered over Gilcher’s kickback to Magee of nearly 50% of the
fraud proceeds. By disguising the huge payments to Bull Run as a legitimate debt payment, rather
than the kickback it was, Magee hoped to fool the lender into forgiving Gilcher’s two PPP loans.
He also appears to have believed he would look less culpable to the government and to this Court
if he were receiving legitimate back rent payments from Gilcher versus simply taking half of the
fraud proceeds as his cut for leading the scheme. Perhaps Magee also was aware of a whistle-
blower allegation about his pitching the scheme to others in exchange for a 50% cut of the proceeds
and perpetrated this lie to minimize his exposure.
But Magee did not stop with simply creating the fake document. Magee stuck with the lie
when he himself came into the U.S. Attorney’s Office to discuss the case with prosecutors and
agents. He also, most egregiously of all, pressured and suborned Gilcher into coming into the U.S.
Attorney’s Office and lying to agents and the undersigned AUSA. That Gilcher would do so
illustrates the degree of control Magee exercised over Gilcher from the very start of the entire
scheme.
This is not a “he said” versus “he said” situation. Gilcher risked his acceptance of
responsibility by coming clean with the government and Probation with respect to this material lie.
The undersigned AUSA knows that Gilcher and his attorney were very trepidatious about sharing
the truth of the situation with the government, but they wanted to be totally straight and honest
with the Court and the government in this process. The same certainly cannot be said for Magee.
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In sum, Magee’s obstructive conduct fits closely with several of the examples of covered
conduct cited under Application Note 4. See USSG § 3C1.1, cmt. 4 (A), (B), (C), (G) & (H). For
these reasons, the obstruction enhancement applies.
F. Acceptance of Responsibility
The United States does not dispute the reasonableness of the Probation Officer’s denial of
acceptance of responsibility in light of the defendant’s obstruction of justice. That said, the
defendant still did own up to most of the criminal conduct. He did plead pre-indictment and has
saved the government considerable resources by pleading rather going to trial. For those reasons,
and to honor the plea agreement, the government asks that the Court apply the two-level reduction
for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and, in accordance with the plea
agreement, hereby moves for the additional one-point reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b).
III. IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Court should consider: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for
the sentence imposed to, among other things, reflect the seriousness of the offense and adequately
deter criminal conduct; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5)
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to victims of the offense. Ultimately, the sentence imposed must
meet a standard of reasonableness. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–61. The advisory guidelines
range is an important starting point because it captures the seriousness of the offense. United States
v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 257 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Guidelines reflect a carefully considered
assessment of the seriousness of federal crimes”).
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Likewise, “[t]he fact that § 3553(a)[(4)] explicitly directs sentencing courts to consider the
Guidelines supports the premise that district courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines
and remain cognizant of them throughout the sentencing process.” United States v. Langford, 516
F.3d 205, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Moreover, “the authors of the Guidelines, no
less than district courts, have been tasked with ensuring that criminal sentences meet the goals of
sentencing set forth in § 3553(a),” United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2010),
and have prepared “Guidelines that seek to embody the § 3553(a) considerations,” Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-50 (2007). 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(A), 994(f). In general, then, “a
within-guidelines range sentence is more likely to be reasonable than one that lies outside the
advisory guidelines range[.]” Goff, 501 F.3d at 257 (quotation omitted).
Based on all these factors a guideline sentence is appropriate in this case. There is little that
is truly mitigating here that would warrant a substantial downward variance.
A. The Nature, Circumstances, and Seriousness of the Offense
The COVID-19 pandemic has claimed over one million American lives, and many more
world-wide. It disrupted life profoundly. We were fortunate to live in a country with resources to
mitigate the worst of it. Among other actions to combat the pandemic, on March 27, 2020,
Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, more commonly known
as the “CARES Act.” Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). The law sought to alleviate the
massive suffering caused by the pandemic and the damage to the economy caused by resulting
sudden, widespread lockdowns. The terms of the Act were generous by design: it made billions of
government-guaranteed loans available to qualified small businesses through the Paycheck
Protection Program (“PPP”). The loans would carry the exceptionally low interest rate of 1% if
they came due at all. And the loans would be forgiven entirely so long as the proceeds were used
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on a narrow list of expenses designed to help struggling businesses survive: payroll, utilities, rent,
premiums to keep health care benefits in force, and just enough to pay the interest (but not the
principal) on a company’s pre-existing mortgage or other business loan.
To qualify for a PPP loan, an applicant had to meet certain criteria that were designed to
ensure that the program’s assets would be used to forestall widespread layoffs and economic
collapse. A business applying for a PPP loan was required to certify, among other things, that it
was “in operation on February 15, 2020 and either had employees for whom [it] paid salaries and
payroll taxes or paid independent contractors, as reported on a Form 1099-MISC.” 1 The amount
of the loan that could be approved under the program was a function of the applicant’s historical
payroll costs, subject to certain exclusions. Again, the intent of the Act and its implementing
regulations were to alleviate widespread economic suffering caused by the pandemic, by giving
companies enough money to pay the absolute essentials.
While millions of Americans were struggling, Magee plotted from his palatial home to
obtain dozens of PPP loans and EIDL loans and grants by fraud. Magee fabricated payroll reports.
He made entirely from whole cloth backdated and preposterous IRS Forms 940 and 941, falsely
claiming his businesses had paid millions in payroll to fictious employees, even claiming they had
withheld and paid over to the IRS substantial employee withholding taxes. None of that was true.
This was fraud and deceit willingly and enthusiastically told to obtain essentially free government
money.
But this money has not been free to taxpayers, nor has such large, extensive fraud like this
been cost-free to the country. As a result of all the easy money, much obtained by fraud, for a
period of time the economy suffered from inflation the likes of which had not been seen since the
1
PPP Borrower Application Form, Certifications, page 2, SBA Form 2483 (04/20).
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1970s. The willful actions of people like Magee, who rushed in to take as much low-interest money
as possible, by fraud, and then injected it into the economy without contributing much of anything
productive in the process, certainly did not help matters.
Magee freely chose to commit these crimes. He had other options available. After all, banks
offer other types of loans – like a business loan, or a personal line of credit, but you have to tell
the truth; you have to pass due diligence; maybe you have to pay a real interest rate and be expected
to put up collateral and to pay it back. Magee has had significant financial resources, living in an
expensive home. He did not need to commit this crime. This was hardly a crime of necessity. It
was entirely a crime of choice – of opportunistic greed. For that reason, this defendant, the leader
of this scheme, deserves real, meaningful punishment.
B. The Defendant’s History and Characteristics and the Need for Specific
Deterrence
The history and characteristics of the defendant support a meaningful carceral sentence.
Although the defendant has no scored criminal history, the scope of the scheme, the sheer number
of fraudulent loans at issue, the leading role the defendant played in the scheme, all suggest he
needs to receive a substantial jail sentence to drive home the message that these sorts of crimes do
not pay. Indeed, the Sentencing Commission noted in its “background” commentary to § 3B1.1
that the upward adjustment for leadership, in part, is based on the view that persons who organize
and lead extensive criminal conduct involving multiple individuals inherently pose a higher risk
of recidivism. For the same reasons, this defendant’s history and characteristics under § 3553(a)(1)
counsel in favor of a significant jail sentence. The brazenness of the conduct, as revealed in the
sheer number of fraudulent loan applications at issue, support this conclusion.
Magee constructed a small personality cult around himself that he used to take in naïve and
gullible people like his brother-in-law, Individual J.S., as well as his protegee, Michael Gilcher.
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Individual J.S. was essentially a blue-collar worker. Magee managed Individual J.S.’s financial
affairs and had unfettered access to his banking and business information. Gilcher was similarly
taken in with Magee. Both men described to law enforcement the awe in which they held “Dr.
Magee.” Magee displayed the trapping of business acumen, evidenced by his vehicles and his
house in Manassas, complete with a large portrait of himself hanging in the house. To
unsophisticated folks, it was quite a sight. So, when Magee concocted his COVID fraud scheme,
he was able to manipulate Gilcher and Individual J.S. into the scheme with ease.
The extensiveness of Magee’s crimes in the case, including the psychological sway Magee
held over others, all counsel in favor of a substantial period of incarceration. This is needed to
incapacitate Magee from committing further crimes. Magee’s conduct should cause concern about
future recidivism.
C. Need to Deter Future Criminal Conduct and Promote Respect for the Law
A significant, but not excessive sentence, is also called for in this case to promote general
deterrence. Absent a meaningful term of imprisonment, general deterrence — “the effort to
discourage similar wrongdoing by others through a reminder that the law’s warnings are real and
that the grim consequence of imprisonment is likely to follow”—will not be achieved. United
States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Court must also consider how to
deter others as a general matter from engaging in similar conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
Morgan, 635 F. App’x 423, 450 (10th Cir. 2015) (“General deterrence comes from a probability
of conviction and significant consequences. If either is eliminated or minimized, the deterrent
effect is proportionally minimized.”).
EIDL and PPP loan frauds in general, and this crime in particular, are deliberate and
calculated crimes of choice. They are therefore more susceptible to general deterrence and more
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in need of a significant sentence to achieve that deterrence. United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227,
1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding that crimes that are “rational, cool, and calculated” rather than
“crimes of passion or opportunity” are “prime candidates for general deterrence”) (citation
omitted). Moreover, crimes like this are lucrative and can be difficult to detect. As shown here,
Magee made over $5 million for himself from this scheme, making this crime a very attractive
option for would-be fraudsters, unless there is a meaningful threat of a lengthy term of
incarceration. See, e.g., United States v. Hefferman, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994)
(“Considerations of (general) deterrence argue for punishing more heavily those offenses that
either are lucrative or are difficult to detect and punish, since both attributes go to increase the
expected benefits of a crime and hence the punishment required to deter it.”)
A significant sentence is, therefore, necessary to send the appropriate message to Magee—
and more importantly, to others, and to the public, that those who engage in conduct this stunning
and brazen in scope will be caught and punished significantly. And this type of fraud appears to
have been rampant: as much as $400 Billion in PPP funds and $80 Billion in EIDL funds were
stolen by people like Magee. 2
Absent a significant jail sentence, the public would be right to wonder whether the rule of
law truly has any teeth. Defendants who so brazenly scam relief funds the way this defendant did
deserve significant sentences.
D. Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities
Magee is the leader and prime mover of this extensive scheme. Thus, a sentence pegged to
2
“’Biggest Fraud in a Generation:’ The looting of the Covid relief plan known as PPP,” by Ken Dilanian
and Laura Strickler, NBC News, March 28, 2022, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-
department/biggest-fraud-generation-looting-covid-relief-program-known-ppp-n1279664 (last visited
June 29, 2022) (quoting Department of Justice, Secret Service, and Small Business Administration
estimates).
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the guidelines is less likely to create future sentencing disparities. That is because, as the Seventh
Circuit has noted, “[s]entencing disparities are at their ebb when the Guidelines are followed, for
the ranges are themselves designed to treat similar offenders similarly.” United States v.
Boscarino, 437 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting light sentence for cooperating defendant was
appropriate and lengthy sentence for defendant who did not was appropriate, and was not a
disparity, but a justifiable difference); see also United States v. Matthews, 701 F.3d 1199, 1205
(7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Smith, 510 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir.2010)) (“To find an
unwarranted disparity in this case would allow defendants to bind district courts according to the
most lenient sentence that another court had imposed for a similar crime.”).”
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, a guideline sentence, as well as orders of
restitution and forfeiture, and a three-year term of supervised release, are necessary and entirely
appropriate in this case.
Respectfully submitted,
Jessica D. Aber
United States Attorney
By:
Russell L. Carlberg
Kathleen Robeson
Assistant United States Attorneys
United States Attorney’s Office
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: (703) 299-3868
Facsimile: (703) 299-3980
Email: Russell.L.Carlberg@usdoj.gov
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 1, 2023, I caused a copy of the foregoing memorandum
to be filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically generate
a Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF) to all counsel of record.
A copy has also been sent via email to:
Rachael Meyer
United States Probation Officer
Rachael_Meyer@vaep.uscourts.gov
Russell L. Carlberg
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney’s Office
Eastern District of Virginia
2100 Jamieson Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22314
Telephone: (703) 299-3868
Facsimile: (703) 299-3980
Email: Russell.L.Carlberg@usdoj.gov
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