Memorandum Opinion and Order — United States v. Olamide Olatayo Bello (E.D. Tex., Dkt. 464, January 3, 2025)
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Memorandum opinion and order, filed January 3, 2025 as Document 464 in United States v. Olamide Olatayo Bello (1), No. 4:23-CR-00136-ALM-BD, in the Eastern District of Texas, Sherman Division. Bello, proceeding pro se, moved to reopen his pretrial-detention hearing (Dkt. 413), and the order denies the motion. It states that Bello did not identify or describe the new evidence he claimed and had not shown a material bearing on detention under Section 3142(f)(2)(B). It also states that his request for release to prepare a defense, based on the government's failure to use body cameras at his house, did not meet the burden under Section 3142(i). The order names United States Magistrate Judge Bill Davis.
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“Memorandum Opinion and Order — United States v. Olamide Olatayo Bello (E.D. Tex., Dkt. 464, January 3, 2025).”
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Case 4:23-cr-00136-ALM-BD Document 464 Filed 01/03/25 Page 1 of 4 PageID #:
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SHERMAN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §
§
v. § NO. 4:23-CR-00136-ALM-BD
§
OLAMIDE OLATAYO BELLO (1) §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Proceeding pro se, defendant Olamide Olatayo Bello filed a motion to reopen his pretrial-
detention hearing. Dkt. 413. The government did not file a response. The motion was referred to
me in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636. Dkt. 455. The court will deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
Bello was indicted for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit money
laundering. Dkts. 1 (sealed original indictment), 24 (redacted original indictment), 376 (first
superseding indictment). The court issued an arrest warrant for Bello and a search warrant for his
house. Dkt. 13 (sealed arrest warrant); No. 4:23-MJ-00344-KPJ-1 (E.D. Tex.), Dkt. 2 (search
warrant). Armed with those warrants, agents with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”)
arrested Bello, searched his house, and seized electronic devices that they found there.
Bello made his initial appearance the next day and was released on conditions. Minute Entry
for June 22, 2023; Dkt. 46 (sealed). A pretrial-services officer later petitioned the court for a
warrant to arrest Bello based on his attempt to contact and coerce one of his codefendants in
violation of three conditions of his pretrial-release order. Dkt. 122 (sealed). The court granted the
petition, issued the warrant, and held a revocation hearing. Dkts. 124 (sealed), 125 (sealed); Minute
Entries for Aug. 17 and 22, 2023. Based on testimony from FBI Special Agent Jason Rennie, the
court ordered Bello detained pending trial. Dkt. 139.
More than a year later, Bello filed three motions to suppress, Dkts. 353, 354, 357, and the court
held a hearing on the motions. Minute Entry for Dec. 13, 2024. Based on Bello’s arguments in his
filings and at the hearing, the court construed one of the motions, Dkt. 353, as a motion to reopen
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the question of his pretrial detention, see Dkt. 419 at 9–10. Although Bello argued that the
WhatsApp messages that the government used to support detention had been tampered with, that
the person who provided those messages to the government lied about them, and that it is doubtful
that Bello was truly the author of a Microsoft Word document used to try to coerce that person,
the court recommended that detention not be reopened. It determined that despite Bello’s
arguments, the court would still have found probable cause to believe that he committed a crime
while on release, and it would still have found clear and convincing evidence that he violated a
condition of his release by arranging for his codefendant to be contacted and coerced.
After the hearing, but before the court issued a report and recommendation on his motions,
Bello filed the motion at issue here. In that motion, Bello claims that he recently discovered
exculpatory evidence that was not known at the time of his hearing and that the evidence has a
material bearing on whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure his
appearance and the safety of any other person and the community. He also states that he should be
immediately released so that he can prepare his defense, given that the government did not use
body cameras when it executed the search warrant of his house.
DISCUSSION
I. Bello has not met his burden under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) for reopening the question
of detention.
Detention may be reopened if a court “finds that information exists that was not known to the
movant at the time of the hearing and that has a material bearing” on “whether there are conditions
of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of
any other person and the community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). New evidence has “material
bearing” if it “relate[s] in some significant or essential way to the decision whether to detain.”
United States v. Worrell, No. 1:21-cr-00292-RCL, 2021 WL 2366934, at *9 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021)
(emphasis omitted) (citing United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 610, 614 (10th Cir. 2003)). The
purpose of § 3142(f)(2)(B) is “to allow parties to present unknown information that increases the
chances the defendant appears for [his or her] criminal hearing[] or decrease[s] the danger the
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defendant poses to an individual or the community as a whole.” United States v. Martin, No. 13-
00466 JSW (KAW), 2015 WL 1738362, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2015).
Bello has not presented new evidence that has a material bearing on the court’s decision to
detain him. As stated in its report and recommendation on Bello’s other motions, Dkt. 419 at 10,
the court ordered Bello detained based, in part, on Agent Rennie’s testimony at the detention
hearing. Rennie credibly testified that Bello, who also went by “David Bello,” tried to coerce his
codefendants not to give information to the government after they were first arrested. Then, two
days after Bello’s release, someone contacted codefendant Sabur Yusuff using two Nigerian phone
numbers. Yusuff had never communicated with anyone using those numbers before. But Bello had.
One of the numbers sent Yusuff a Microsoft Word document that instructed him not to cooperate
with, and to provide a false narrative to, the government. The metadata associated with that
document revealed that “David Bello” authored it. Bello had also previously told a codefendant
(whether Yusuff or someone else is unclear) that an unnamed group of people in the United States
would commit acts of violence if they were not paid 30 percent of the proceeds from the
government-issued loans on which the alleged conspiracy is based.
Although Bello argues that he has recently discovered new evidence material to the question
of detention, he does identify or describe the evidence. Regardless of whether he is referring to the
evidence he put on at the hearing on his previous motion to reopen detention or to some new,
unidentified evidence, Bello has failed to meet his burden and detention should therefore not be
reopened.
If Bello is referring to the evidence he put on at the hearing on his prior motion, the court has
already found that evidence to be immaterial because there would still have been probable cause to
believe that he committed a crime while on release and there would still have been clear and
convincing evidence that he violated a condition of his release by arranging for Yusuff to be
contacted and coerced. Dkt. 419 at 8–10. In other words, the evidence that Bello may be referring
to would have had no material bearing on the court’s detention decision.
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If Bello is instead referring to some other, as-yet-unidentified evidence, he likewise fails to meet
his burden. The court cannot find that a piece of evidence would have a material bearing on its
decision to detain a defendant without knowing what that evidence is.
II. Bello has not met his burden for securing temporary release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i).
Bello mentions that he requires immediate release to prepare for his defense because the
government failed to use body cameras during the execution of the search warrant for his house.
Dkt. 413 at 2. The court liberally construes Bello’s motion to be seeking temporary release under
18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). That statute permits a court to temporarily release a person if it “determines
such release to be necessary for preparation of the person’s defense or for another compelling
reason.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). “As the plain language of this provision reveals, however, it applies
in rare circumstances only: when release is ‘necessary’ for defense preparations or when there is
another ‘compelling reason.’” United States v. Herndon, No. 6:21-CR-00054-JCB, 2023 WL
1766269, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2023) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)). Bello makes no argument to
support his assertion that he should be released based on the government agents’ failure to wear
body cameras. He has therefore failed to meet his burden.
. CONCLUSION
SIGNED at Beaumont, Texas, this 7th day of September, 2004.
It is ORDERED that the motion to reopen detention, Dkt. 413, is DENIED.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 3rd day of January, 2025.
________________________________________
Bill Davis
United States Magistrate Judge
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