Government's Response to Petitioner's Motion, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (D. Me., Dkt. 285, September 24, 2025)

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Government's Response to Petitioner's Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed September 24, 2025 as Document 285, Case 1:21-cr-00061-LEW and Case 1:25-cv-00232-LEW, Nathan Reardon v. United States of America, District of Maine. The Government opposes the motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence and requests summary dismissal because Reardon filed it while his direct appeal is still pending before the First Circuit. It states that on July 5, 2022 Reardon pleaded guilty to five counts of bank fraud and that the Court imposed concurrent twenty-month sentences followed by three years of supervised release. It asks the Court to dismiss without prejudice and decline to issue a certificate of appealability. It is signed /s/ Brian S. Kleinbord, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

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“Government's Response to Petitioner's Motion, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (D. Me., Dkt. 285, September 24, 2025).” Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-d-me-no-1-21-cr-00061-dkt-285-5606a050cb/, SHA-256 33ad2e181c639110f67dd4b4f01003dccb4fd568b1fc306fe715e82226ed6622.

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Case 1:21-cr-00061-LEW Document 285 Filed 09/24/25 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:
1793

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

NATHAN REARDON,
Petitioner

v. Nos. 1:21-cr-00061-LEW
1:25-cv-00232-LEW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent

GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO PETITIONER’S
MOTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

The Government now responds in opposition to the motion to vacate, set aside,

or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Petitioner Nathan Reardon. D 246.

Because Reardon filed his § 2255 motion while his direct appeal is still pending before

the First Circuit, the Government respectfully requests summary dismissal.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL OVERVIEW

On July 5, 2022, Reardon pleaded guilty to five counts of bank fraud relating to

falsified loan applications that he submitted seeking pandemic-relief funds. D 136. The

Court imposed concurrent twenty-month sentences followed by three years of

supervised release on November 2, 2022. D 155. The Court’s original judgment included

several special conditions of supervised release, one of which prohibited Reardon from

self-employment (special condition six). D 159 at 5.

On direct appeal, the First Circuit vacated special condition six, concluding that

the self-employment ban was imposed without the district court adequately explaining

why it was minimally restrictive. United States v. Reardon, 102 F.4th 558, 570 (1st Cir.

2024). The First Circuit stated that it could not “be certain that the district court

considered whether the total self-employment ban was the minimum restriction

necessary and thus cannot evaluate its analysis for imposing the ban.” Id. The First
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Circuit remanded only that portion of Reardon’s sentence “for resentencing limited to a

reexamination of the scope of” the self-employment restriction. Id. Finally, the First

Circuit stated that “nothing in [its] decision prohibits the re-imposition of an

occupational restriction on remand that satisfies [Sentencing Guideline] requirements.”

Id.

On remand, the Court held a resentencing hearing and entered an amended

judgment that retained both special condition six and special condition seven. D 200; D

258. Reardon filed a notice of appeal of the amended judgment on August 5, 2024. D

203.

Following his resentencing, Reardon has continued to file a multitude of motions

challenging his sentence and supervised release conditions, including a motion to

modify conditions of release; motion for return of property; motion for declaratory

judgment and injunctive relief to restore second amendment rights; and a motion for

early termination of supervised release. D 230, 231, 232, 239.1

The Court denied all of these motions, with the exception of the motion to modify

special condition 6, which it granted in part. D 241. The court was “persuaded that this

condition can and should be modified to lessen the burden on Reardon by allowing for

him to increase his income, better support his family, and pay restitution.” Id. at 5. The

Court “perceive[d] that the total prohibition of self-employment ha[d] posed special

difficulties for Reardon to the extent that he has historically earned income through

1 As a result of Reardon’s countless frivolous filings in civil cases, the Court has
imposed upon him a filing restriction pursuant to Cok v. Family Court of Rhode Island,
985 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1993). See Reardon v. Domonski, No. 1:25-cv-00268-JAW, 2025
WL 1797156 (D. Me. June 30, 2025). Pursuant to this restriction, Reardon must seek the
Court’s permission prior to any future filings. Id. at *1.

2
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rental properties.” Id. Moreover, “Reardon ha[d] worked to comply with the

requirement for roughly one year” and had “demonstrated personal progress in this

regard.” Id. Reardon’s “interest in rehabilitation [was] also evident, particularly in

regard to his desire to pay restitution.” Id. Accordingly, consistent with “the interest of

substantial justice and mindful of the need to ensure deterrent effect, protect the public,

and account for the characteristics of the defendant,” D 241 at 5-6, the Court modified

special condition 6 as follows to allow self-employment under the following limited

circumstances:

6) Defendant shall not be self-employed other than in the business of rental
property ownership and management. Concurrently, he shall maintain
continuous employment by a disinterested third party. Defendant shall not
open any new businesses, sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited
partnerships, or corporations, except as necessary to reestablish himself in
the aforementioned business of rental property ownership and
management.

Id. at 6.

The Court denied, however, Reardon’s request for early termination of supervised

release. Id. at 4-5. The Court stated that it “[did] not believe that early termination [was]

warranted, especially as Reardon’s second term of incarceration already reduced his

term of supervision.” Id. at 5. Additionally, the Court found that “releasing Reardon

from supervision at this time would undermine the deterrent effect of sentencing and

the need for supervision to protect the public.” Id. “Furthermore, the characteristics of

the defendant, in particular his umbrage at the idea that he deserves deterrence or poses

a threat to the public, and his upset at the terms of his sentence, similarly militate

against the early termination of supervision.” Id. Accordingly, “[u]pon consideration of

[the factors enumerated in the statute],” the Court “reject[ed] [Reardon’s] request for

early termination of supervised release.” Id.

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Reardon filed an appeal from the Court’s order. D 245. In addition, Reardon

subsequently filed a motion for recusal and a motion to “expunge probation violation,”

D 243, 244, both of which were denied in a marginal order in which the Court deemed

Reardon’s motions as “untethered from factual reality and the law.” D 262. Reardon

filed an appeal of that order as well. D 265.

On July 29, 2025, the First Circuit granted the government’s motion to

consolidate Reardon’s three pending appeals. The case was subsequently submitted on

the briefs on September 8, 2025. To date, Reardon’s most recent consolidated direct

appeal remains pending before the First Circuit. See generally Docket Sheet.

On May 8, 2025, the Clerk’s Office docketed Reardon’s motion to vacate, set

aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. D 246. Consistent with the Court’s

most recent order to respond, D 270, the Government now submits its response in

opposition to Reardon’s § 2255 motion.

II. ARGUMENT

A. Legal Standards

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 sets forth four potential bases upon which a federal

prisoner may seek relief: (1) “that the sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States”; (2) “that the court was without jurisdiction to

impose such sentence”; (3) “that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized

by law”; or (4) that the sentence “is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(a). Petitioners also have one year from any of four triggering events to file a

claim for relief under § 2255(a): (1) “the date on which the judgment of conviction

becomes final”; (2) “the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by

governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

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removed”; (3) “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the

Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review”; or (4) “the date on which the facts

supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

Importantly, however, a federal prisoner may not pursue his § 2255 collateral

attack during the pendency of his direct appeal absent extraordinary circumstances. See

United States v. Gordon, 634 F.2d 638, 638-39 (1st Cir. 1980) (collecting cases from six

other circuit courts and holding same). As the First Circuit has explained, there are

strong policy considerations underpinning the adoption of this rule. Id. One such policy

consideration is conserving judicial resources and avoiding a scenario where duplicative

arguments are being advanced simultaneously before both this Court and the First

Circuit, which depending on the outcome of the direct appeal may be mooted or

meaningfully altered for purposes of the collateral attack. Id. at 639. Another policy

consideration is that “from the appellant’s standpoint the direct appeal affords him not

only an opportunity to fully present all his claims in one sitting, but the opportunity to

present claims he could not otherwise raise on collateral attack.” Id. Yet another policy

consideration is that the standard of review on direct appeal is “more advantageous to

the appellant” than the standard of review for the petitioner on collateral attack. Id.

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B. Reardon’s § 2255 Motion is Premature2

Where, as here, Reardon’s most recent consolidated direct appeal remains

pending before the First Circuit, Reardon cannot pursue his § 2255 motion before this

Court absent extraordinary circumstances. See Gordon, 634 F.2d at 638-39. See also

United States v. Weekes, 611 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 2010) (cleaned up) (“We have long

recognized that in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the orderly

administration of criminal justice precludes a district court from considering a § 2255

motion while review of the direct appeal is still pending.”).

Because Reardon’s § 2255 motion does not identify any exceptional

circumstances that would warrant a departure from the First Circuit’s longstanding

policy of avoiding adjudicating contemporaneous direct appeals and collateral attacks,

ruling on the merits of Reardon’s § 2255 motion while his direct appeal is still pending

before the First Circuit is “premature,” and the appropriate procedure is to dismiss

Reardon’s current § 2255 motion without prejudice. Weekes, 611 F.3d at 72. See also

Caison v. United States, No. 1:19-CR-00152-LEW-1, 2022 WL 4482705, at *1 (D. Me.

Sept. 27, 2022) (dismissing premature § 2255 motion without prejudice and explaining

“[w]hen faced with an unresolved appeal and a premature § 2255 motion, the proper

procedure in the First Circuit is to dismiss the motion without prejudice.”).

These considerations apply equally here to Reardon’s direct appeal from the

Court’s revocation of supervised release. There is substantial overlap between the issues

raised in Reardon’s pending appeal and his § 2255 motion. Compare Appeal # 24-1724:

2 The Government does not waive any other defenses it may have available as to
this collateral attack, and the Government respectfully requests leave to supplement its
response in the event the Court finds extraordinary circumstances to entertain
Reardon’s § 2255 motion while his direct appeal is still pending before the First Circuit.

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(“Whether the district court violated this Court’s mandate by reinstating previously

vacated probation conditions, specifically restrictions on self-employment”) with

pending § 2255 motion: (Raising ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on

allegation that counsel “failed to secure or formally submit a request to amend

supervised release conditions to allow self-employment, despite multiple requests from

Defendant via text and email.”). The resolution of Reardon’s direct appeal will

significantly impact the procedural and substantive viability of the claims raised in

Reardon’s collateral attack. Accordingly, the interests in “conserving judicial resources”

and “avoiding a scenario where duplicative arguments are being advanced

simultaneously before both this Court and the First Circuit,” see Gordon, 634 F.2d at

639, would be well-served by dismissing Reardon’s § 2255 motion pending resolution of

his direct appeal. If Reardon wishes to refile this collateral attack or file a new § 2255

motion, he may do so after the conclusion of his direct appeal.

III. CONCLUSION

For all the reasons set forth above, the Government asks that the Court dismiss

without prejudice Reardon’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and decline to issue a certificate of

appealability.

Dated: September 24, 2025 Respectfully submitted,

CRAIG M. WOLFF
United States Attorney

By: /s/ Brian S. Kleinbord
Brian S. Kleinbord
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney’s Office
100 Middle Street
Portland, ME 04101
(207) 780-3257
Brian.Kleinbord@usdoj.gov

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 24, 2025, I caused the foregoing response to

be electronically filed with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system and mailed a

copy of the same to:

Nathan Reardon
P.O. Box 52
Detroit, ME 04929.

CRAIG M. WOLFF
United States Attorney

By: /s/ Brian S. Kleinbord
Brian S. Kleinbord
Assistant U.S. Attorney
U.S. Attorney’s Office
100 Middle Street
Portland, ME 04101
(207) 780-3257
Brian.Kleinbord@usdoj.gov

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