Court filing — D. Me. No. 1:21-cr-00061 (Dkt. 211)
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Case 1:21-cr-00061-LEW Document 211 Filed 09/18/24 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 1405
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v. No. 1:21-cr-00061-LEW
NATHAN REARDON
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO RECUSE
The Court should deny Defendant’s Motion to Recuse as frivolous. See Dkt. #210,
Aug. 29, 2024 (the “Motion” or “Mot.”). Defendant, claiming that the Court has not been
“impartial and that there is some sort of personal animus” at play (Mot. at 7), requests
recusal under both the general and enumerated standards of 28 U.S.C. § 455. See id. §
455(a) (“[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned”);
455(b)(1) (listing “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party” as grounds for
recusal). While the statute “forbids not only the reality of partiality but its objective
appearance as well,” see United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2000), such
concerns are wholly absent from this case.
Defendant’s claims of real or perceived impartiality bear no relationship to
reality. What he mistakenly cites as personal attacks and deliberate reputational harm
are instead the Court’s dispassionate rulings and recitation of the evidence underlying
each phase of this case. Defendant committed bank fraud, violated the terms of his bail,
and, following his conviction, violated the conditions of his supervised release. The
Court’s decisions and statements merely addressed what Defendant did, why he did it,
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Case 1:21-cr-00061-LEW Document 211 Filed 09/18/24 Page 2 of 3 PageID #: 1406
and his characteristics throughout. The Court’s accurate, unvarnished discussions and
treatment of Defendant thus present no basis for recusal. The facts, unflattering to
Defendant as they might be, are the facts.
The lack of introspection displayed by Defendant through the Motion, bordering
on the solipsistic, presents precisely the kind of “unsupported, irrational, or highly
tenuous speculation” the First Circuit has identified as being insufficient grounds for
recusal. In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981); see also United States v.
Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116,
127 (2d Cir. 2000)) (recusal not required on the basis of “remote, contingent, indirect[,]
or speculative interests”). Defendant’s continued failure to acknowledge and accept his
criminally fraudulent conduct minimizes to the point of invisibility the seriousness of
his offenses. His unwillingness to take stock of the truth, however, does not elevate his
perceived grievances to an actionable level under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
Accordingly, because there is no reasonable question about the Court’s
impartiality, the Motion should be denied.
Dated: September 18, 2024 DARCIE N. MCELWEE
Bangor, Maine United States Attorney
/s/ Andrew K. Lizotte
ANDREW K. LIZOTTE
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney’s Office
202 Harlow Street
Bangor, Maine 04401
(207) 945-0373
Andrew.Lizotte@usdoj.gov
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 18, 2024, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, and sent a copy via first-class mail to
the following:
Nathan Reardon
P.O. Box 52
Detroit, ME 04929
/s/ Andrew K. Lizotte
ANDREW K. LIZOTTE
Assistant United States Attorney
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