Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing — United States v. Sherrie Lynne Bryant (D. Md., Dkt. 40)

Summary

Government's Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, filed January 12, 2023 as Document 40, Case 8:22-cr-00308-DLB, United States v. Sherrie Lynne Bryant, District of Maryland. It states that sentencing is scheduled for January 26, 2023, at 2:00 p.m., and that Bryant obtained at least $419,100 in fraudulent loan proceeds from March 2020 through April 2021. It states a final offense level of 16, criminal history category III, and a Guidelines range of 27 months to 33 months as to Count One. The Government recommends 27 months as to Count One followed by 12 months for the violation of probation, for a total of 39 months, plus 3 years of supervised release and forfeiture and restitution orders each in the amount of $419,100. It is signed /s/ Kelly O. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney.

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          Case 8:22-cr-00308-DLB Document 40 Filed 01/12/23 Page 1 of 8



                        IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA                         *
                                                  *
        v.                                        *    CRIMINAL NO. DJB-22-308
                                                  *    CRIMINAL NO. DJB-17-518
 SHERRIE LYNNE BRYANT,                            *
                                                  *
        Defendant                                 *
                                                  *
                                               *******

             GOVERNMENT’S MEMORANDUM IN AID OF SENTENCING

       The United States of America, by and through its attorney, hereby submits the

Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing. Defendant Sherrie Lynn Bryant (“Bryant” or

“the defendant”) is scheduled to be sentenced on January 26, 2023, at 2:00 p.m. As a result of

fraudulent loan applications related to the COVID-19 pandemic, Bryant obtained at least $419,100

in fraudulent loan proceeds from March 2020 through April 2021. Bryant has two prior federal

convictions—one for wire fraud and one for obstruction of an audit—and was on (and remains on)

probation for the latter when she submitted these fraudulent applications. Bryant now stands

convicted of three federal crimes over the last 17 years, with no signs that any prior conviction has

deterred the defendant from continuing to commit fraud. For the reasons set forth below, the

Government submits that a term of imprisonment of 27 months as to the current offense (“Count

One”), followed by a term of imprisonment of 12 months for Bryant’s violation of supervised

release, for a total term of imprisonment of 39 months, is a sentence sufficient but not greater

than necessary to satisfy the goals of sentencing. The Government further requests that the Court

impose an additional term of supervised release of 3 years and enter a forfeiture order and a

restitution order, both in the amount of $419,100.
          Case 8:22-cr-00308-DLB Document 40 Filed 01/12/23 Page 2 of 8



I.     Background

       On August 24, 2021, the defendant was charged by criminal complaint with one count of

wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of false statements, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1001.

       On August 30, 2022, the defendant pled guilty to an Information charging her with wire

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (“Count One”). The defendant also admitted to violating

the terms of her federal probation by committing another federal, state, or local crime. ECF 34, ¶

1 (Plea Agreement).

       Pursuant to a written plea agreement, the parties agreed that the base offense level for Count

One is 7 and that there is a 12-level increase because the amount of actual or intended loss involved

in the offense was more than $250,000 but less than $550,000. The Government did not oppose a

2-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the Government agreed to move for an

additional 1-level reduction in recognition of the defendant’s timely notification of her intention

to enter a plea of guilty. The final offense level is therefore 16. The United States Probation Office

(“Probation”) agrees with this calculated offense level. (PSR ¶¶ 22-31.)

       The Government agrees with Probation’s calculation that the defendant’s criminal history

score is 6 and her criminal history category is therefore III. (PSR ¶ 38.) For a final offense level

of 16 and criminal history category III, the Guidelines prescribe a sentence of 27 months to 33

months imprisonment as to Count One.

       The parties further agreed that the guidelines range for Bryant’s violation of probation is 6

months to 12 months imprisonment because Count One is a Grade B violation and at the time of

the defendant’s original conviction, she was a criminal history category II. The parties further

agreed that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f), any term of imprisonment upon the revocation of




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supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment

imposed as to Count One.

       Further, pursuant to the parties’ plea agreement, the Government has agreed to recommend

a sentence at the low end of the advisory guidelines range as to Count One, and a reasonable

sentence as to the violation of probation. The Court is not bound by this recommendation.

II.    Legal Standard

       In United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit held that after

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), which made the Sentencing Guidelines effectively

advisory, the district court is commanded to fulfill congressionally established objectives for

sentencing set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): promoting respect for the law; providing just

punishment for the offense; affording adequate deterrence; protecting the public from further

criminal activity of the defendant; providing the defendant training, medical care, and

correctional treatment; and providing restitution to victims. See Green, 436 F.3d at 455; see also

United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2006).

       Thus, in conducting a sentencing, district courts must (1) calculate the sentence range

recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines; (2) determine whether a sentence within that range

and within statutory limits serves the statutory sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

and, if not, select a sentence that does serve those factors; (3) implement mandatory statutory

limitations; and (4) articulate the reasons for selecting the particular sentence, especially

explaining why a sentence outside of the Sentencing Guidelines range better serves the relevant

statutory sentencing purposes. See Green, 436 F.3d at 455-56; Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432. The

explanation of a variant sentence must be tied to the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and must be

accompanied by findings of fact as necessary. See Green, 436 F.3d at 455-56; United States v.



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Perez-Pena, 453 F.3d 236, 241 (4th Cir. 2006). The district court is given “some latitude,” and “a

degree of deference,” to tailor a particular sentence to the circumstances. Green, 436 F.3d at 456-

57; Moreland, 437 F.3d 433.

III.   Relevant Sentencing Considerations Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

       The statement of facts attached to the defendant’s plea agreement demonstrates the serious

nature of the offense. The defendant fraudulently took advantage of the Economic Injury Disaster

Loan (“EIDL”) program and Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”)—both programs that offered

emergency financial assistance to eligible small businesses experiencing substantial disruptions

due to the COVID-19 pandemic—to steal money from the federal government to which she was

not entitled. In total, between March 2020 and April 2021, as a result of three separate fraudulent

applications, Bryant stole at least $419,100 in loan proceeds—money that should have been

reserved for those actually in need during the height of the pandemic. Not only did Bryant falsely

inflate profits for her company NOW LLC, in each of the fraudulent loan applications, Bryant also

falsely claimed that she had not been previously convicted of any crimes.

       Specifically, in March 2020, Bryant submitted an EIDL application that claimed NOW

LLC had earned approximately $475,610 in gross revenues during the twelve months prior to

January 31, 2022 and had incurred a cost of goods sold of $276,614 during the same period. In

reality, Bryant’s business earned less than $70,000 of income that year.        Moreover, in the

application, Bryant denied having previously been convicted of a criminal offense when, in fact,

Bryant has two prior federal convictions (and was on probation for one such conviction while she

was submitting such application). Pursuant to the false application, Bryant received an EIDL loan

of $89,500, plus a $10,000 advance.




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       Then, in April 2020, Bryant submitted a fraudulent application for PPP loan proceeds,

again claiming that she had never been convicted of a crime. As a result, Bryant obtained another

$21,200 from the U.S. Government.

       In April 2021, Bryant submitted a request for a modification to her May 2020 EIDL Loan.

Specifically, she requested that the loan be increased from $89,500 to $388,000 and, based on the

fraudulent application and request for modification, the increased loan was approved.

       Adding insult to injury, not only did Bryant fraudulently obtain these funds to which she

was not entitled, Bryant also did not use the funds for their intended purpose: to assist her business

and its employees. Instead, Bryant used a portion of the proceeds for personal use, including

paying for her car and a boat, to pay for a vacation, and to pay for tickets to sporting events. A

significant sentence must be imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, the need for just

punishment, and to promote respect for the law.

       A sentence of 27 months as to Count One, followed by 12 months for the defendant’s

violation of probation, is also warranted to deter the defendant and to protect the public from the

defendant’s continued criminal conduct. The current offense—which the defendant committed

while on probation—is the defendant’s third federal fraud conviction. The defendant represents

that she is a businesswoman, yet each of her businesses and places of employment have been rife

with fraudulent conduct. Bryant has shown that she cannot—or will not—work and earn legitimate

money, despite having the necessary skills and education to do so. She must be deterred from

continuing to commit fraud.

       The details of Bryant’s past infractions make this clear. In 2005, the defendant pled guilty

to two counts of wire fraud and was sentenced to 27 months’ imprisonment. From January 2003

through September 2004, the defendant worked in the accounting department of a company in




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Clinton, Maryland. While employed at the company, the defendant requested wire transfers

purportedly to the company when, in fact, many of the requested transfer were to her personal

account. Through this scheme, the defendant obtained approximately $537,500 in victim funds.

       But that was not it. The defendant conducted this same scheme at the next company with

which she was employed, from November 2004 through January 2005. During this time, while

employed at the second company, the defendant caused wire transfers to her personal account and

to her personal vendors (such as her personal gas and cable companies) and charged personal

expenditures to the company’s corporate credit cards. From this second company, Bryant stole

approximately $47,200. Bryant was released from the Bureau of Prisons in 2007.

       Bryant’s next job after being released from BOP was at Creative Options, where she was

a contract manager. 1 At Creative Options, Bryant again committed fraud—the subject of her

second federal criminal conviction.     Specifically, in 2017, the defendant was convicted of

obstruction of a federal audit and was sentenced to 3 years’ probation.

       From 2009 through 2014, the defendant’s employer Creative Options—which provided job

coaching services to mentally challenged adults in Washington, DC and Maryland—perpetrated a

false billing scheme against the District and federal Medicaid programs. A Medicaid provider can

bill for “professional” job coaching services only if the job coach graduated from a four-year

college and has at least two years of experience in “supported employment.” A provider can also

bill for “paraprofessional” job coaching services, which requires the job coach to have at least a

high school diploma and three years of supported employment. Work experience aside, a provider



1
  See Bryant has also worked at Tate’s Tax Services. According to the PSR, this business is
owned by a relative of Bryant’s and has employed Bryant from 2007 through the present. See
https://www.tatestaxservice.com/who-we-are (indicating that the defendant (“Sherrie”) is the
stepchild of one of the founders of Tate’s Tax Services and works at the company alongside her
two siblings, Karen and Phil)


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          Case 8:22-cr-00308-DLB Document 40 Filed 01/12/23 Page 7 of 8



cannot bill at a professional rate unless the job coach has a degree from a four-year college, or at

a paraprofessional rate unless the job coach has high school diploma. Though Creative Options

normally rendered job coaching services to its clients, the company ignored the rules described

above and billed DC Medicaid (which the federal government reimburses) at an artificially inflated

rate.

        Specifically, from 2010 until early 2013, Creative Options billed job coaches who did not

graduate from high school (and were therefore entirely unqualified to perform any type of job

coaching service) at the paraprofessional rate, and billed job coaches who did not graduate from

college (and therefore could only provide paraprofessional services) at the professional rate. When

Medicaid reviewers audited Creative Options in October 2012, Bryant personally forged the job

coaches’ credentials and convinced the job coaches to lie to the reviewers about their education

and work experience. As such, once again, Bryant used her position of employment to commit

crimes to benefit herself.

        NOW LLC is Bryant’s only other business venture, and it too involved fraud—the current

offense. As set forth in the statement of facts, Bryant was a managing member of NOW LLC,

which was organized in Maryland in September 2013, with Bryant as the sole managing member.

NOW LLC stated that its business purpose was to “provide mentoring, education and training to

underserved populations.” Contrary to its stated purpose, however, NOW LLC has been awarded

contracts for “janitorial services” for Amtrak and has applied for multiple SBA loans through

various programs and cited its line of business as “construction and contractors.” Most relevant

to this sentencing, Bryant used NOW LLC to perpetrate her current scheme to obtain COVID-19

related loans designed to help businesses and their employees which, as explained above, Bryant

obtained using grossly inflated profits and denials of her prior criminal convictions.




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       In sum, the defendant has used nearly every business and place of employment to engage

in criminal conduct to her personal benefit. The defendant must be incarcerated for a significant

period of time to ensure that the public is protected from the defendant and to attempt to deter the

defendant from continuing to live a life of crime.

IV.    Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, and additional information that may be presented at the

sentencing hearing, the Government respectfully submits that a sentence of 27-month sentence as

to Count One, followed by a 12-month sentence for the violation of probation, for a total sentence

of 39 months, is sufficient but not greater than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing as

enumerated in the § 3553(a) factors.



                                                             Respectfully submitted,

                                                             Erek L. Barron
                                                             United States Attorney

                                                       By:      /s/
                                                             Kelly O. Hayes
                                                             Assistant United States Attorney




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