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Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Sky Lawson — United States v. Sky Lawson (D. Md., Dkt. 351)

Summary

Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Sky Lawson, filed April 18, 2025 as Document 351, Case 1:22-cr-00219-BAH, United States v. Sky Lawson, District of Maryland. Defense counsel submits it in support of a request for a sentence of 24 months' imprisonment. It states that the probation officer calculated an advisory guideline range of 33 months to 41 months, from a total offense level of 20 and Criminal History Category I, and argues the guideline range offers no useful advice. It states that the government has agreed to recommend a sentence of 24 months, which it calls the mandatory minimum in the case. It refers to letters from family members and friends in Exhibit A. It is signed /s/ Dennis E. Boyle, Counsel for Defendant.

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“Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Sky Lawson — United States v. Sky Lawson (D. Md., Dkt. 351).” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/court-filing-d-md-no-1-22-cr-00219-dkt-351-d-md-73eb3aec7f/, SHA-256 809e3af7f8db0f9dda7d55a7652bbfedc35ebda6f89e38da61b21e11279451a7.

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            Case 1:22-cr-00219-BAH         Document 351       Filed 04/18/25      Page 1 of 17



                           IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

                                                  :
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                    :
                                                  :
                                                  :
       v.                                         : Case No. 1:22-CR-219-004
                                                  :
     SKY LAWSON,                                  :
                                                  :
                              Defendant.          :


                SENTENCING MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF SKY LAWSON

            Defendant Sky Lawson (“Ms. Lawson”) submits this sentencing memorandum in support

 of her request for a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment. Although her conduct is indeed

 serious, it represents the only legal transgression Ms. Lawson has ever committed.

            Ms. Lawson has learned valuable life lessons from this incident, and she will never repeat

 the actions that bring her before the Court in this case. For the reasons set forth in greater detail

 below, we request a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment because we believe it to be

 “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18

 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

            Ms. Lawson has pled guilty and admitted her violation. Her sentencing guideline range is

 33 months to 41 months as calculated by the probation officer. However, this is a case where the

 guidelines themselves should be discarded since they fail to take into account Ms. Lawson’s

 unique personal attributes. In fact, the defense argues that under all of the 18 U.S.C. 1335(a)

 factors, a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment would be appropriate in this case.

I.          FACTUAL BACKGROUND

            Ms. Lawson was a law-abiding citizen before the instant offense. Her life was

  characterized by hard work, dedication, and love for her family and friends. Indeed, it was the
      Case 1:22-cr-00219-BAH          Document 351       Filed 04/18/25      Page 2 of 17



love for her friends which ultimately caused her to become involved in the instant offense.

        Ms. Lawson resides with her parents in Upper Marlboro, Maryland. Her life is centered

around her family, whom she loves and cares for very deeply, and her work with animals at the

APAW Veterinary Hospital and Wellness Center in New Carrollton, Maryland. The letters

appended hereto from her family members and friends show that she has touched their lives very

deeply. See Exhibit “A”.

       A.      Sky Lawson’s Family Background

       Ms. Lawson was born on June 7, 1994, in Bowie, Maryland. PSR ¶ 42. She is one of two

children born to Michelle Haywood and Christopher Lawson. Ibid. Ms. Lawon grew up in a very

peaceful and protective environment. Id. at 21. She has always been very close with both her

parents and her brother, Jet Lawson, who resides in Bowie, Maryland, and works at an

automotive shop, see PSR ¶ 46.

       Ms. Lawson has never married and has no children. Id. ¶ 47. She was, however, in a

committed relationship with Christopher Canales who tragically passed away in 2015 after

suffering a severe asthma attack. Id., ¶ 56. His death was sudden and devastated Ms. Lawson,

who believed that Mr. Canales would be the man she would spend the rest of her life with. Co-

Defendant, Michael Makoge, was a close friend of Mr. Canales. The death of Mr. Canales and

the grief Mr. Makoge and Ms. Lawson shared deepened their friendship, and Ms. Lawson came

to view Mr. Makoge like a big brother whom she trusted inherently.

       B.      Sky Lawson’s Educational and Professional Background

       Ms. Lawson was homeschooled by her mother through seventh grade. Id., ¶ 43.

Afterwards, she attended Bowie High School and graduated in 2012. Id., ¶ 67. Since December

2024, Ms. Lawson has attended Prince George’s County Community College with a focus on
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business. Id., ¶ 65. She is currently in her last semester. Ibid.

       Since November 2021, Ms. Lawson has worked for APWA Veterinary Hospital and

Wellness Center in New Carrollton, Maryland. Id., ¶ 69. She was employed as a veterinary

technician. Ibid. However, in 2024, Ms. Lawson sustained serious injuries to her hand as the

result of a dog attack at work. Ibid. Since then, Ms. Lawson has primarily worked at the front

desk. Ibid. Notably, after the attack, Ms. Lawson insisted that no report should be made because

Ms. Lawson feared that the dog would be euthanized, and she knew how much the owner loved

their dog. Ms. Lawson’s love for animals is further exemplified by the way she has cared for her

two dogs, Boo and Esko. Boo is a black labrador whom Ms. Lawson had for 12 years, and Esko

is a 2-year old French bulldog.

        C.      Ms. Lawson’s Arrest

        In July 2022, Ms. Lawson was arrested for the present offense. Ms. Lawson was charged

with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft. Ms. Lawson pled guilty,

agreed with the description of the offenses outlined in the plea memorandum and acknowledged

her role in the instant offense.

       Ms. Lawson accepts responsibility for her wrongdoing and is sincerely remorseful for her

conduct. She is committed to facing the consequences of her actions and rebuilding her life after

making a big mistake. She is deeply sorry for her actions and looks forward to expressing

remorse at the upcoming hearing.

        D.      Sky Lawson is a Pillar in her Community

       Ms. Lawson has received multiple letters from family and friends describing her as a

devoted and helpful daughter, sister, and friend. See Exhibit “A”.

       Ms. Lawson’s mother, Michelle Haywood, describes Ms. Lawson’s generosity and
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kindness. Id. at 1. Ms. Lawson “volunteer[ed] hundreds of hours of community service” and

“[e]ven on her job, she volunteers to work on holidays to spare her colleagues.” Ibid. Ms.

Lawson “was the one to deliver toys to families on Christmas Eve when volunteers couldn’t”.

Ibid. Ms. Haywood further reflects on the recent tragic accident Ms. Lawson was involved in at

work. Ibid. Ms. Lawson “was attacked on her neck and hand, dragged by an unmuzzled 116

pound Dogo Argentino while doing her job as a Veterinary Technician. Traumatized, bleeding,

in excruciating pain in the hospital bed, [Ms. Lawson] cried to me”, Ms. Haywood recalls. Ibid.

“She expressed, in that moment as we worried about saving her right hand, that she did not want

the dog put down because of her. ‘He (the owner) loves that dog!’ she cried. She didn’t want the

dog owner to feel bad or be sued. Nor did she want her employer to be put at a disadvantage

from the incident.” Ibid. Finally, Ms. Haywood describes how the instant offense changed Ms.

Lawson’s life. Ms. Lawson “changed her circles” and she changed her “focus in life”. Ibid.

“[H]er regrettable move” was the “turning point that catapulted [Ms. Lawson’s] growth to

responsible adulthood”. Ibid. Further attached to Ms. Haywood’s letter is a document which she

created, and which reflects the history of Ms. Lawson’s family and upbringing. See id., at 3-11.

       Ismael Vincent Canales, a friend and the former President of the Maryland State Fraternal

Order of Police, has known Ms. Lawson for 15 years. His son was Ms. Lawson’s boyfriend who

tragically passed away in 2015. Mr. Canales recalls how his son “ranted about finding the love of

his life” when he met Ms. Lawson. Id. at 12. He understood why when he met Ms. Lawson

himself. “She was kind, delightful, funny, charming, intelligent, and cultured. The type of young

lady you hope your son brings home to meet the family”. Ibid. Despite Mr. Canales’ son’s

passing, Ms. Lawson “remains to this day a part of [Mr. Canales’] family”. Ibid. Mr. Canales

further observed Ms. Lawson to be “an upstanding, lovely young lady who volunteers a lot of her
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time and wants to see only the best in people and the world”. Ibid. After talking with Ms.

Lawson and realizing “that [Ms. Lawson] recognizes and regrets the pain [her actions ha[ve]

caused, Mr. Canales is “wholeheartedly convinced that there’s no chance of her ever being

mixed up with or on the wrong side of the law after this episode”. Ibid.

       Former County Executive for Prince George’s County and family friend, Rushern Baker

III also provided a letter for Ms. Lawson. He states that he has known Ms. Lawson for 20 years

and that Ms. Lawson was one of his “youngest and most dedicated volunteers” when he “first ran

for County Executive in 2002”. Id. at 13. He describes how she “encouraged other young people

to engage in public service” and how she “worked tirelessly on projects that benefited the most

vulnerable members of our community—organizing toy drives, distributing food to families in

need, rehabilitating shelters, and leading environmental clean-ups. These efforts were not merely

acts of obligation; they were a reflection of her compassionate heart and strong moral character”.

Ibid. Mr. Baker further states that Ms. Lawson “has expressed deep remorse to [him] personally,

and understands the seriousness of her choices”. Ibid. Mr. Baker has “no doubt that she will use

this experience as a catalyst for growth, striving to make amends and continue serving her

community in meaningful ways”. Ibid. Ms. Lawson “is not someone who takes this moment

lightly, and [Mr. Baker] believe[s] she has the potential to emerge from this experience as an

even stronger and more responsible member of society”. Ibid.

       Karen Farmer, a family friend and retired Probation and Parole Officer with the Court

Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia states that she has

known Ms. Lawson since her birth as a life-long friend of Ms. Lawson’s mother. Id. at 15. Ms.

Farmer has “volunteered alongside [Ms. Lawson] many times over the years”. Ibid. Ms. Lawson

“is a delightful, generous and honorable young lady with a spirit for helping others”. Ibid. From
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      Ms. Farmer’s “personal and professional experience, [she] strongly believe[s] [Ms. Lawson’s]

      poor decision stemmed from her inability to exercise good judgment during a young and

      developing stage of her life”. Ibid. She believes “that was coupled with some gullibility when

      facing a high-risk situation, as well as the inherent pressures of being lured by a close and trusted

      male friend”. Ibid. Ms. Farmer concludes her letter with the following:

                     As a Community Supervision Officer, I’ve felt the pleasures of
                     observing individuals thrive and turn the page from lenient
                     sentences. I’ve also felt that dismay when others squandered that
                     golden opportunity. With the benefit of knowing Sky personally, it
                     is my professional belief that Sky is the individual who will take full
                     advantage of every opportunity given to her in the event of lenient
                     sentencing. Sky would present as a model candidate and success
                     story. A young woman immediately returning to the life expected of
                     her. Her recent strives for academic success alone, hint at the woman
                     she truly is. Sky promises to be one of those cases that would forever
                     remind us criminal justice practitioners of why we continue to
                     believe in redemption.

      Ibid. Furthermore, additional letters are included within Exhibit A from Ms. Lawson’s father,

      Chris Lawson, her brother, Jet Lawson, her aunt Yvonne Haywood, her friends, Chyna Murry,

      Kelsey Garibaldi, Noddra Gray, and Reginald Staton, and her employer, Dr. Patricia Peynado-

      Boyce who all agree that Ms. Lawson is a wonderful person who deserves a second chance. Id.,

   at 17-30.

II.          ADVISORY GUIDELINE RANGE

             The Probation Officer has calculated an advisory guideline range of 33 months to 41

      months, resulting from a total offense level of 20 and Criminal History Category I. The

      guideline range offers no useful advice because it (1) is the product of a guideline that is not

      based on empirical evidence or national experience; (2) fails to take any account of Ms.

  Lawson’s culpability or low risk of recidivism; (3) would result in unwarranted disparity as


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    compared with sentences for similarly situated Defendants; and (4) is far greater than necessary

    to promote the goals of sentencing in this case. The government apparently recognizes this fact

    and has agreed to recommend a sentence of 24 months, the mandatory minimum in the case.

              Furthermore, the guideline range, is only one of the factors the Court must consider under

       18 U.S.C. 3553(a).

III.          A SENTENCE OF 24 MONTHS’ IMPRISONMENT WOULD BEST SATISFY
              THE GOALS OF §3553(a).

              The Court must “ impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to

       comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2),” which are “ the need for the sentence

       imposed

              (A)     to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and

                      to provide just punishment for the offense;

              (B)     to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

              (C)     to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

              (D)     to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,

                      medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.”

       18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In “determining the particular sentence to be imposed,” the Court must

       consider these purposes, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

       characteristics of the defendant, the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, and the need to

       provide restitution to any victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7).

              No workable guideline could ever “account for many of the myriad factors that are

       properly considered in fashioning just sentences.” See United States v. Ovid, slip op., 2010 WL

       3940724, *1 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). A departure is needed in this case because of the following


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mitigating factors, all of which are highly relevant to the purposes of sentencing and none of

which are taken into account by the guideline range.

          A.     The Guidelines are not Based on Empirical Evidence or National Experience
                 and Fail to Promote any Purpose of Sentencing.

          When Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it directed the Commission

to promulgate guidelines that assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing, 28 U.S.C. §

991(b)(1)(A), and to use average sentences imposed and prison time actually served in the pre-

guidelines period as a “starting point”. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m). The Commission was then to

continually review and revise the guidelines in light of sentencing data, criminological research,

and consultation with frontline actors in the criminal justice system. See 28 U.S.C. §

991(b)(1)(C), § 991(b)(2), § 994(o), § 995(13), (15), (16).

          The original Commissioners abandoned the effort to design the guidelines based on the

purposes of sentencing because they could not agree on which purposes should predominate, and

instead purportedly based the guidelines on an empirical study of time served for various

offenses before the guidelines. See USSG, Ch. 1 Pt. A(3); Justice Stephen Breyer, The Federal

Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest,17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 7

(1988).

          In Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007), the Supreme Court gave two reasons that it

may be fair to assume that the guidelines reflect a rough approximation of sentences that “might

achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” First, the original Commission used an “empirical approach”

which began “with an empirical examination of 10,000 presentence reports setting forth what

judges had done in the past.” Second, the Commission can review and revise the guidelines

based on judicial feedback through sentencing decisions, and consultation with other frontline


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interactors, civil liberties groups, and experts. Id. at 348-50.

        The Court recognized, however, that not all guidelines were developed in this manner.

See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 & n.2 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S.

96 (2007). When a guideline “do[es] not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its

characteristic institutional role, because the Commission “did not take account of ‘empirical data

and national experience,’” the sentencing court is free to conclude that the guideline “yields a

sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purpose, even in a mine-run case.” Id. at

109-10.

        The guideline regarding offenses involving aggravated identity theft is not based on

empirical data of past practice or on national experience since then. Because the Commission

failed to rely on empirical data or national experience in promulgating or amending USSG

§ 2Xl.1 and § 2B 1.1, and thus failed to fulfill its institutional role, this Court is free to disagree,

on reasoned policy grounds, with its recommendation. See Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct.

840, 843 (2009); Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 101-02, 109-10; Rita, 551 U.S. at 351, 357.

        The United States Sentencing Guidelines have faced criticism for their shortcomings in

accurately determining the length of sentences. One primary concern is that the guidelines often

rely heavily on factors such as the severity of the offense and the defendant’s criminal history,

without adequately considering individual circumstances and potential for rehabilitation. This

one-size-fits-all approach may result in disproportionately harsh sentences that fail to account for

mitigating factors or the potential for an offender’s successful reintegration into society. See

Amy Baron-Evans & Jennifer Coffin, Judges are free to disagree with any guideline, not just

crack, 2-9 (Nov. 7, 2011). Furthermore, the rigidity of the guidelines limits judicial discretion

and prevents judges from tailoring sentences to fit the unique circumstances of each case. Ibid.
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This inflexibility may lead to sentencing outcomes that do not align with the goals of deterrence,

rehabilitation, or proportionality. Additionally, the guidelines have been criticized for

perpetuating racial and socioeconomic disparities in the criminal justice system, as they may

disproportionately affect marginalized communities. See George Coppolo, Criticism of Federal

Sentencing Guidelines, THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY, (July 6, 1994). Overall, these

concerns highlight the limitations of the United States Sentencing Guidelines in accurately

determining the appropriate length of sentences and the need for a more nuanced and

individualized approach to sentencing.

        B.        Need for Just Punishment in Light of Seriousness of the Offense.

        The need for retribution is measured by the degree of “blameworthiness,” which “is

generally assessed according to two kinds of elements: the nature and seriousness of the harm

caused or threatened by the crime; and the offender’s degree of culpability in committing the

crime, in particular, his degree of intent (mens rea), motives, role in the offense, and mental

illness or other diminished capacity.” Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment

Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 571,

590 (February 2005). The guidelines include none of the factors bearing on Ms. Lawson’s degree

of culpability.

                  1.    Sky Lawson’s Conduct was Aberrant.

        Ms. Lawson generally lived a law-abiding life until the instant offense began. Her is

offense is completely uncharacteristic when viewed in the context of her entire productive adult

life. This Court must consider the aberrant nature of her conduct. See, e.g., United States v.

Howe, 543 D.3d 128, 132 (3rd Cir. 2008) (variance based on “isolated mistake” in otherwise

long and entirely upstanding life; see also United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th

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      Case 1:22-cr-00219-BAH          Document 351         Filed 04/18/25      Page 11 of 17



Cir. 2005) (Defendant was a “law abiding citizen, who [did] an incredibly dumb thing”); United

States v. Davis, 2008 WL 232920 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Defendant was a first offender who had

worked throughout his 15-year marriage to educate his six children and whose offense was

prompted by economic pressures).

        C.      Need for Deterrence.

        Research has consistently shown that while the certainty of being caught and punished

has a deterrent effect, “increases in severity of punishments do not yield significant (if any)

marginal deterrent effects.” Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 Crime &

Just. 1, 28 (2006). “Three National Academy of Science panels ... reached that conclusion, as

has every major survey of evidence.” Ibid.; see also Zvi D. Gabbay, Exploring the Limits of the

Restorative Justice Paradigm: Restorative Justice and White Collar Crime, 8 Cardozo J. Conflict

Resol. 421, 447048 (2007) (“certainty of punishment is empirically known to be a far better

deterrent than its severity”).

        Typical of the findings on general deterrence are those of the Institute of Criminology at

Cambridge University. See Andrew von Hirsch, et al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence

Severity: An Analysis of Recent Research (1999). The report, commissioned by the British Home

Office, examined penalties in the United States as well as several European countries. Id., at 1. It

examined the effects of changes to both the certainty and severity of punishment. Ibid. While

significant correlations between sentence severity and crime rates ... were not sufficient to

achieve statistical significance.” Id. at 2. The report concluded that “the studies reviewed do not

provide a basis for inferring that increasing the severity of sentences is capable of enhancing

deterrent effects.” Id. at 1.

        According to “the best available evidence, ... prisons do not reduce recidivism more than
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noncustodial sanctions.” Francis T. Cullen, et al., Prisons Do Not Reduce Recidivism: The High

Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 Prison J. 48S, 50S-51S (2011).

       D.      Need for Incapacitation.

       Ms. Lawson has an exceptionally low risk of recidivism.

       Furthermore, Ms. Lawson has shown that while released on bail she has demonstrated no

intention of engaging in any further criminal conduct. She has met all terms of bail and has

continued to be a productive member of society.

         Ms. Lawson is a first offender and was employed throughout her adult life. For all

female offenders in Criminal History Category I, the recidivism rate is 10%. See U.S. Sent’g

Comm’n, Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computation of the Federal Sentencing

Guidelines. For those who have been employed, the rate is 12.7%. Ibid. Finally, offenders like

Ms. Lawson with zero criminal history points have a rate of recidivism half that of offenders

with one criminal history point. See Sent’g Comm’n, Recidivism and the “First Offender,” at 13-

14 (May 2004) [hereinafter First Offender].

       The Commission has recognized the advisability of revising the guidelines to take first

offender status into account. See First Offender, at 1-2 (identifying goal of “refin[ing] a workable

‘first-offender’ concept within the guideline criminal history structure”).

       In imposing the least sentence sufficient to account for the need to protect the public from

further crimes of Ms. Lawson, this Court should consider the statistically low risk of recidivism

presented by Ms. Lawson’s history and characteristics. See, e.g., United States v. Darway, 255

Fed. Appx. 68, 73 (6th Cir. 2007) (upholding downward variance on a basis of Defendant’s

first-offender status); United States v. Urbina, slip op., 2-0 WL 565485, *3 (E.D. Wis. 2009)

(considering low risk of recidivism indicated by Defendant’s lack of criminal record, positive
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work history, and strong family ties); United States v. Cabrera, 567 F. Supp. 2d 271, 279 (D.

Mass. 2008) (granting variance because Defendants “with zero criminal history points are less

likely to recidivate than all other offenders”).

       E.      Need to Avoid Unwarranted Disparities and Unwarranted Similarities.

       The Court must consider the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants

with similar criminal histories convicted of similar criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

The court should avoid unwarranted similarities in sentencing among defendants who are

different in ways not accounted for in the guideline range, see Gall, 552 U.S. at 55 (“need to

avoid unwarranted similarities among other co-conspirators who were not similarly situated”);

United States v. Ovid, 2010 WL 3940724 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (sentencing two Defendants with

similar guideline ranges to 60 months and 126 months respectively based on distinctions in

circumstances of the offenses and characteristics of the Defendants), and unwarranted

differences among defendants whose conduct and characteristics are similar. See United States v.

Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 753, 756-62 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).

       The chart below includes sentences of Ms. Lawson’s co-defendants who have also been

convicted of similar offenses and where Ms. Lawson’s co-defendants received sentences

substantially below the guideline ranges applicable in those cases and commensurate with their

respective conduct. Notably, there is a significant disparity between Ms. Lawson’s conduct and

the conduct of her co-defendants. The conduct of each of Ms. Lawson’s co-defendants was much

worse than Ms. Lawson’s conduct. Ms. Lawson’s primary involvement in this case was the use

of her mailing address for unemployment insurance benefits applications and mailings. However,

relative to Ms. Lawson’s co-defendants, her conduct is most similar to that of Aiyanna Mone

Washington. The defense and the government both request this same sentence for Ms. Lawson.

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        Co-Defendant                     Conviction             Sentence Imposed
 Aiyanna Mone Washington         18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343,      24 months’ imprisonment
                                 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5)           2 years’ supervised release
                                                               Restitution of $2,094,319.00


 Christian Malik Adrea           18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343,      36 months’ imprisonment
                                 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5)           3 years’ supervised release
                                                               Restitution of $2,094,319.00


 Michael Akame Ngwese Ay 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343,              53 months’ imprisonment
 Makoge                  1028A(a)(1), (c)(5)                   3 years’ supervised release
                                                               Restitution of $2,094,319.00


 Stephawn Malik Watson           18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343,      53 months’ imprisonment
                                 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5)           3 years’ supervised release
                                                               Restitution of $2,094,319.00


 Dementrious Von Smith           18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343,      53 months’ imprisonment
                                 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5)           3 years’ supervised release
                                                               Restitution of $2,094,319.00


 Christopher Thomas Yancey 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1343,            63 months’ imprisonment
                           1028A(a)(1), (c)(5)                 3 years’ supervised release
                                                               Restitution of $2,094,319.00



       F.      Kinds of Sentences Available.

       This Court must consider all of “the kinds of sentences available” by statute,

§ 3553(a)(3), even if the “kinds of sentence ... established [by] the guidelines” zones recommend

only a lengthy prison term. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 59 & n.11. According to the Supreme Court’s

decisions in Gall and Kimbrough, federal judges are free to consider relevant circumstances

related to an offense and the history and characteristics of a defendant, and are not tied to the

rigid, arithmetic framework of the Guidelines. Indeed, Kimbrough and Gall have returned
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   sentencing courts to the “federal judicial tradition” of considering “every convicted person as an

   individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate,

   sometimes magnify the crime and the punishment to ensue.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 52; see also

   United States v. Tornko, 562 F.3d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The sentencing judge is in a superior

   position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.”).

          Ultimately, the Court must “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary”

   to comport with the goals of sentencing. See United States v. Ollzovsky, 562 F.3d 530, 552 (3d

   Cir. 2009). Congress directed the Commission to “insure that the guidelines reflect the general

   appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant

   is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious

   offense,” and the “general appropriateness of imposing a term of imprisonment on a person

   convicted of a crime of violence that results in serious bodily injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 9940).

          Congress issued this directive in the belief that “sentencing decisions should be designed

   to ensure that prison resources are, first and foremost, reserved for those violent and serious

   criminal offenders who pose the most dangerous threat to society,” and that “in cases of

   nonviolent and non-serious offenders, the interests of society as a whole as well as individual

   victims of crime can continue to be served through the imposition of alternative sentences, such

   as restitution and community service.” See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 239, 98 Stat. 1987, 2039 (1984)

   (set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note). Ms. Lawson is plainly not a “violent and serious offender”

   who “pose[s] the most dangerous threat to society”.

IV.       CONCLUSION

          At the time of Ms. Lawson’s sentencing, this Court will be charged with imposing a

   sentence that is fair, but not “greater than necessary.” 18 U.S.C. § 18553(a); Kimbrough, 552

                                                    15
      Case 1:22-cr-00219-BAH         Document 351        Filed 04/18/25      Page 16 of 17



U.S. at 101. This bedrock principle of sentencing law cannot be fulfilled in Ms. Lawson’s case if

she is sentenced at or near the range proposed by the Guidelines. Rather, as reflected by the data

and analogous case law above, a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment is more appropriate in

this case.

        Ms. Lawson is a good person who is profoundly sorry for her transgressions. She has

learned from her mistake and accepted full responsibility for her actions. She has no criminal

history and is extremely unlikely to recidivate in this manner again. Furthermore, Ms. Lawson

has shown while on probation she has no intention of engaging in similar criminal conduct. Ms.

Lawson plans to address the Court at her upcoming sentencing hearing to express her sincere

remorse once again, and to assure the Court that she will never again break the law.



Date: April 18, 2025                         Respectfully Submitted,



                                             /s/ Dennis E. Boyle
                                             Dennis E. Boyle, Esquire
                                             Boyle & Jasari
                                             1050 Connecticut Ave, NW
                                             Suite 500
                                             Washington, D.C., 20036
                                             Email: dboyle@boylejasari.com

                                             Phone: (202) 430-1900

                                             Counsel for Defendant




                                                16
      Case 1:22-cr-00219-BAH           Document 351       Filed 04/18/25      Page 17 of 17



                                 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

       I hereby certify that on this 18th day of April 2025, I electronically filed the foregoing

document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send an electronic

notification of such filing to all counsel of record.



                                               /s/ Dennis E. Boyle
                                               Dennis E. Boyle, Esquire




                                                  17


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