Memorandum Order — United States v. Keith Berman (No. 1:20-cr-00278, December 15, 2025)

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Memorandum Order filed December 15, 2025 as Document 221 in No. 20-cr-00278 (TNM) on Keith Berman's Motion for Reconsideration of Restitution Order, which asked to reduce monthly payments to $25. The court denies the request. It recounts the sentence of 84 months' imprisonment and restitution of $613,286.08, payable at $100 each month from prison funds and earnings. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), it finds that Berman has not shown a material change in financial situation: Berman was incarcerated with no monthly cash flow when the schedule was set, receives $100 each month from a nonprofit, and has earned up to $76 per month. It states that a possible cutoff of the nonprofit payments is not an immediate change in his economic circumstances.

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       Case 1:20-cr-00278-TNM          Document 221        Filed 12/15/25      Page 1 of 3




                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    UNITED STATES,

                        v.
                                                           No. 20-cr-00278 (TNM)
    KEITH BERMAN,

                        Defendant.


                                  MEMORANDUM ORDER

        Two years ago, Keith Berman pled guilty to wire fraud, securities fraud, and obstructing

an SEC proceeding. See ECF No. 170. For these offenses, the Court sentenced Berman to 84

months’ imprisonment, followed by supervised release. ECF No. 197 at 3–4. The Court also

ordered Berman to pay $613,286.08 in restitution to his victims. Mem. Order at 17, ECF No.

217; see 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii), (c)(1)(B) (requiring restitution for Berman’s crimes).

The payment schedule took account of Berman’s “dire” financial situation. Mem. Order at 15.

Berman must pay $100 each month, using his “prison funds and earnings” to satisfy his

obligation while incarcerated. Id.at 16. Berman moved to modify those payment terms two

weeks after the Court imposed them. Mot. for Reconsideration, ECF No. 218. He asks the Court

to reduce his monthly payments to $25. Id. at 2. The Court denies that request.

        The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act permits courts to adjust a restitution payment

schedule based on a “material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances that might

affect the defendant’s ability to pay restitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). 1 Lacking D.C. Circuit



1
 The United States has not weighed in on Berman’s motion. Without input from the
Government, the Court could not grant the reconsideration request. The Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act allows the Court to “adjust the payment schedule” only after the Attorney
General “certif[ies] to the court that the victim or victims owed restitution by the defendant have
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       Case 1:20-cr-00278-TNM           Document 221         Filed 12/15/25       Page 2 of 3




guidance on the meaning of a “material change,” the Court finds persuasive the Second Circuit’s

direction that Section 3664(k) requires “an objective comparison of a defendant’s financial

condition before and after a sentence is imposed.” United States v. Grant, 235 F.3d 95, 100 (2d

Cir. 2000) (holding that the unfreezing of a bank account was a material change); see United

States v. Fields, No. 99-CR-0286 (KBJ), 2020 WL 32990, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 2, 2020) (endorsing

this test). The focus on whether a change has occurred means that difficulty making payments

alone is not enough. See, e.g., Fields, 2020 WL 32990, at *3.

       Berman has not shown that his financial situation materially changed. He points to his

transfer to Federal Medical Center in Fort Worth, Texas, as a material change in his

circumstances. Mot. for Reconsideration at 3–4. Because Berman arrived at the facility only

after the parties briefed the restitution issue, he says, they could not estimate his earning potential

in prison. Id. But Berman’s financial condition is objectively unchanged. See Grant, 235 F.3d

at 100. When the Court imposed Berman’s payment schedule, Berman was “incarcerated with

no monthly cash flow.” Mem. Order at 15 (citation omitted). So the Court assumed that Berman

would use his “prison funds and earnings” to pay restitution each month. Mem. Order at 16.

That is the exact situation Berman finds himself in now. See Mot. for Reconsideration at 2.

       And though the parties may have been unaware of Berman’s exact income potential when

they briefed the restitution issue, Berman’s latest filing suggests that his “prison funds and

earnings” can satisfy his payment obligation. Mem. Order at 16; see Ex. A at 7, ECF No. 218-1

(showing Berman’s prison account balance of $269.17 as of May 21, 2025). Most importantly,

Berman receives $100 each month from a nonprofit. Mot. for Reconsideration at 2. He has also




been notified of the change in circumstances.” 18 U.S.C. § 3364(k). But that language does not
require certification before the Court denies a motion to alter the payment schedule.
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earned up to $76 per month by teaching classes and working on the suicide watch team. Id. at 2–

3; see Ex. A at 7. (showing a $76.05 payroll deposit on May 8, 2025). Berman’s desire to spend

more of this cash on toiletries and phone calls, Mot for Reconsideration at 2, does not work a

material change in his financial situation, see, e.g., United States v. Locke, No. 09-cr-259, 2012

WL 1154084, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2012) (refusing to suspend restitution payments based on the

defendant’s arguments that “her institutional earnings are insufficient and that funds provided by

her family should be solely for her own use”). The Court assumed Berman would have limited

financial resources when it imposed his payment plan. Mem. Order at 15.

       Nor does it matter that Berman’s monthly $100 stipend “is not guaranteed.” Mot. for

Reconsideration at 2. Berman received that gift five months in a row. See Ex. A at 2–6. The

possibility that it could be cut off in future is not an “immediate change in his economic

circumstances.” United States v. Vanhorn, 399 F.3d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 2005). On that point,

Vanhorn is instructive. There, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court had not abused

its discretion by holding that the defendant’s HIV diagnosis did not work a material change in his

financial circumstances because the government paid for his medication. Id. That was true even

though the defendant said he needed to save money while in prison so he could afford his “drug

regimen after his release.” Id. As in Vanhorn, Berman’s hypothetical future financial condition

is a question for another day.

       For these reasons, the [218] Motion for Reconsideration of Restitution Order is

DENIED.

       SO ORDERED.                                                              2025.12.15
                                                                                11:52:45 -05'00'
Dated: December 15, 2025                              TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.




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