Contact Tracing Apps (GAO-20-666SP)
Summary
A GAO Science & Tech Spotlight on contact tracing apps, GAO-20-666SP, dated July 2020, from GAO's Science, Technology Assessment, and Analytics team. It explains that contact tracing identifies infected individuals, notifies their contacts and asks them to quarantine, and that proximity tracing apps could expedite such efforts. It describes apps that detect contacts using Bluetooth, GPS or both, with Bluetooth-based apps relying on anonymous codes shared between smartphones during close encounters. It identifies challenges including accuracy, adoption rates and privacy concerns.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Full text
Science, Technology Assessment,
JULY 2020
and Analytics
WHY THIS MATTERS
Contact tracing can help reduce transmission rates
for infectious diseases like COVID-19 by identifying
SCIENCE & TECH SPOTLIGHT: and notifying people who may have been exposed.
CONTACT TRACING APPS
Contact tracing apps, notably those using proximity
tracing, could expedite such efforts. However, there
are challenges, including accuracy, adoption rates, and
privacy concerns.
/// THE TECHNOLOGY Proximity tracing apps detect contacts using Bluetooth, GPS, or a
combination of both. Bluetooth-based apps rely on anonymous codes
What is it? Contact tracing is a process in which public health officials shared between smartphones during close encounters. These codes
attempt to limit disease transmission by identifying infected individuals, contain no information about location or user identity, helping safeguard
notifying their “contacts”—all the people they may have transmitted privacy. The apps allow public health authorities to set a minimum time
the disease to—and asking infected individuals and their contacts to and distance threshold for someone to count as a contact.
quarantine, if appropriate (see fig. 1). For a highly contagious respiratory
disease such as COVID-19, a contact could be anyone who has been Contact tracing can be centralized or decentralized. With a centralized
nearby. Proximity tracing applications (apps) can expedite contact tracing, approach, contacts identified by the app are often saved to a government
using smartphones to rapidly identify and notify contacts. server, and an official notifies contacts of possible exposure. For a
decentralized approach, contact data are typically stored on the user’s
device at first. When a user voluntarily reports infection, the user’s codes
are uploaded to a database that other app users’ phones search. Users
who have encountered the infected person then receive notifications
through the app (see fig. 2).
Figure 1. A simplified depiction of disease transmission. Through contact tracing, an infected
individual’s contacts are notified and may be asked to quarantine. (In reality, some contacts
may not become infected, and some of those infected may not show symptoms.)
How does it work? In traditional contact tracing, public health officials
begin by identifying an infected individual. They then interview the
individual to identify recent contacts, ask the individual and their contacts
to take containment measures, if appropriate (e.g., a 14-day quarantine
for COVID-19), and coordinate any needed care and testing. Proximity
tracing apps may accelerate the process by replacing the time-consuming
interviews needed to identify contacts. Apps may also identify more
contacts than interviews, which rely on interviewees’ recall and on their
being acquainted with their contacts.
Public health authorities provide the apps, often using systems developed
by companies or research groups. Users voluntarily download the app for Figure 2. Bluetooth-based proximity tracing apps exchange information, notify contacts
their country or region and opt in to contact tracing. In the U.S., state or exposed to an infected person, and provide follow-up information.
local public health authorities would likely implement proximity tracing apps.
GAO-20-666SP Contact Tracing Apps
Science, Technology Assessment,
and Analytics
How mature is it? Traditional contact tracing is well established and /// POLICY CONTEXT AND QUESTIONS
has been an effective infectious disease response strategy for decades.
Proximity tracing apps are relatively new and not as well established. Although proximity tracing apps are relatively new, they have the
Their contact identifications could become more accurate as developers potential to help slow disease transmission. But policymakers will need
improve app technology, for example by improving Bluetooth signal to consider how great the benefits are likely to be, given the challenges.
interpretation or using information from other phone sensors. If policymakers decide to use proximity tracing apps, they will need to
integrate them into the larger public health response and consider the
/// OPPORTUNITIES following questions, among others:
■ Reach more people. For accurate COVID-19 contact tracing using ■ What steps can policymakers take to build public trust and
traditional methods, public health experts have estimated that the encourage communities to support and use proximity tracing apps,
U.S. would require hundreds of thousands of trained contact tracers and mitigate lack of adoption by some populations?
because of the large number of infections. Proximity tracing apps ■ What legal, procedural, privacy, security, and technical safeguards
can expedite and automate identification and notification of the could protect data collected through proximity tracing apps?
contacts, reducing this need.
■ What can policymakers do to improve coordination of contact tracing
■ Faster response. Proximity tracing apps could slow the spread efforts across local, state, and international jurisdictions?
of disease more effectively because they can identify and notify
contacts as soon as a user reports they are infected. ■ What can policymakers do to expedite testing and communication of
test results to maximize the benefits of proximity tracing apps?
■ More complete identification of contacts. Proximity tracing apps,
unlike traditional contact tracing, do not require users to recall or be ■ What can policymakers do to ensure that contact identification is
acquainted with people they have recently encountered. accurate and that its criteria are based on scientific evidence?
/// CHALLENGES /// SELECTED GAO WORK
■ Technology. Technological limitations may lead to missed contacts In addition to ongoing work, GAO has previously issued the following
or false identification of contacts. For example, GPS-based apps products related to disease control:
may not identify precise locations, and Bluetooth apps may ignore
■ Science & Tech Spotlight: Herd Immunity for COVID-19,
barriers preventing exposure, such as walls or protective equipment.
GAO-20-646SP.
In addition, apps may overlook exposure if two people were not in
close enough proximity long enough for it to count as a contact. ■ Science & Tech Spotlight: COVID-19 Testing, GAO-20-584SP.
■ Adoption. Lower adoption rates make the apps less effective. In the ■ Science & Tech Spotlight: Social Distancing During Pandemics,
U.S., some states may choose not to use proximity tracing apps. In GAO-20-545SP.
addition, the public may hesitate to opt in because of concerns about
privacy and uncertainty as to how the data may be used. Recent /// SELECTED REFERENCES
scams using fake contact tracing to steal information may also erode
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Guidelines for the Implementation and Use of
trust in the apps.
Digital Tools to Augment Traditional Contact Tracing. June 16, 2020.
■ Interoperability. Divergent app designs may lead to the inability to
Congressional Research Service. Digital Contact Tracing Technology: Overview and
exchange data between apps, states, and countries, which could be
Considerations for Implementation. IF11559. Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2020.
a problem as travel restrictions are relaxed.
Ferretti, L., et al. “Quantifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission suggests epidemic control with
■ Access. Proximity tracing apps require regular access to
digital contact tracing.” Science, vol. 368, no. 6491 (2020).
smartphones and knowledge about how to install and use apps.
Some vulnerable populations, including seniors, are less likely to World Health Organization, Digital tools for COVID-19 contact tracing. WHO/2019-nCoV/
own smartphones and use apps, possibly affecting adoption. Contact_Tracing/Tools_Annex/2020.1. June 2, 2020.
GAO SUPPORT:
This document is not an audit product and is subject to revision based on continued
GAO meets congressional information needs in several ways, including by
advances in science and technology. It contains information prepared by GAO
providing oversight, insight, and foresight on science and technology issues.
to provide technical insight to legislative bodies or other external organizations.
GAO staff are available to brief on completed bodies of work or specific reports
This document has been reviewed by the Chief Scientist of the U.S. Government
and answer follow-up questions. GAO also provides targeted assistance on
Accountability Office.
specific science and technology topics to support congressional oversight activities
and provide advice on legislative proposals. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in
Timothy M. Persons, PhD, Chief Scientist, personst@gao.gov the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its
entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may
Staff Acknowledgments: Karen Howard (Director), Sushil Sharma (Assistant
contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder
Director), Eleni Orphanides (Analyst-in-Charge), Nora Adkins, Adam Brooks, Diona
may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Martyn, Ethiene Salgado-Rodriguez, Ben Shouse, and Amber Sinclair.
GAO-20-666SP Contact Tracing Apps
File and source
- File
- gao-20-666sp.pdf
- Size
- 434,603 bytes
- SHA-256
- 64834fbe1cbaf8c645b29ddb24e8dc60331c60652080c7dff6bd3ffef1407413
- Our copy
- gao-20-666sp.pdf
- Original
- www.gao.gov