Consent Decree — State of Missouri v. Biden, No. 3:22-cv-01213 (Doc. 478, W.D. La.)

Summary

A Consent Decree, Document 478 filed March 25, 2026, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana in The State of Missouri, et al. v. President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., et al., Civil Action No. 22-cv-1213. The introduction quotes Executive Order 14149 and states that Plaintiffs and Defendants agree to terms, to be enforced upon approval by the Court, for a period of 10 years. The background states that individual plaintiffs and the States of Missouri and Louisiana alleged that federal government defendants unlawfully pressured third parties. The closing release states that plaintiffs waive all rights to claims relating to the allegations in the Complaint. The decree is ordered March 25, 2026, and signature pages list counsel consenting for the plaintiffs and defendants.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Archived web capture. Preserved source — captured from archive.org; archived 2026-09-26.

Cite this document

“Consent Decree — State of Missouri v. Biden, No. 3:22-cv-01213 (Doc. 478, W.D. La.).” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/consent-decree-state-of-missouri-v-biden-no-3-22-cv-01213-doc-478-w-d-e890555627/, SHA-256 710e5f2f2c222ef27bf1df80164dad9582a13b310abca247d4fa22cdeb707cb8.

Full text

Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 1 of 11 PageID #:
29975

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, etaL,

Plaintiffs,

v.
Civil Action No. 22-cv-1213
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., in his official
capacity as President of the United States of
America, et. al,

Defendants.

CONSENT DECREE

1
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 2 of 11 PageID #:
29976

I. INTRODUCTION

As President Trump stated upon taking office on January 20, 2025, "[o]ver the last 4 years, the

previous administration trampled free speech rights by censoring Americans' speech on online

platforms, often by exerting substantial coercive pressure on third parties, such as social media

companies, to moderate, deplatform, or otherwise suppress speech that the Federal Government did

not approve." Executive Order 14149, "Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal

Censorship," on January 20, 2025. See 90 Fed. Reg. 8,243 Gan. 20, 2025). "Under the guise of

combatting 'misinformation,' 'disinformation,' and 'malinformation,' the Federal Government

infringed on the constitutionally protected speech rights of American citizens across the United States

in a manner that advanced the Government's preferred narrative about significant matters of public

debate." Id. To prevent such censorship from recurring, Plaintiffs and Defendants agree to the terms

set forth below, to be enforced upon approval by the Court, for a period of 10 years.

II. BACKGROUND

1. Individual Plaintiffs, Dr. Aaron Kheriaty, Ms. Jill Hines, and Mr. Jim Hoft, joined by

the States of Missouri and Louisiana, alleged in their Complaint, Amended Complaints, and Motion

for Preliminary Injunction, that federal government Defendants unlawfully pressured, coerced,

induced, and encouraged major social media platforms to censor their posts about Covid-19, the

Hunter Biden laptop report, and the 2020 Presidential election. See First and Second Am. Compls. and

Pls.' Proposed Suppl. Br. in Support of Mot. for Prelim. lnj., ECF 45, 84, 212-2, Missouri v. Biden (W.D.

La.) (No. 3:22-cv-1213). 1

1
Dr. J ayanta Bhattacharya was a plaintiff in this lawsuit until he withdrew due to his confirmation as
Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), a Defendant in this case. See 4/17/2025 Order,
ECF 441. Dr. Martin Kulldorff was a plaintiff in this lawsuit until he withdrew due to his new role
within the Department of Health and Human Services, a Defendant in this case. See 3/12/2026 Order,
ECF 474.
2
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 3 of 11 PageID #:
29977

2. Plaintiffs initially filed this lawsuit based upon public statements of government

officials boasting about working with social media platforms to censor disfavored speech,

accompanied by open threats to punish noncompliant companies. See Compl., ECF 1, ,r,r 116-240.

As a result of this Court's award of discovery, Plaintiffs uncovered evidence of what they characterize

as a coordinated censorship operation emanating from the highest levels of government. See Pls.

Proposed Finding of Fact, ECF 212- 3.

3. After this Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, Missouri v.

Biden, 680 F. Supp.3d at 729, which the Fifth Circuit upheld in large part, 2 Missouri v. Biden, 8 3 F.4th

at 392, the Supreme Court reversed. But the six-member majority-in contrast to the lower courts-

did not reach the merits of the case, as it explicitly acknowledged. See Murthy, 144 S.Ct. at 1985 n.3.

4. Rather, the Supreme Court held that no plaintiff demonstrated the standing necessary

to keep a preliminary i,!Junction in place because Plaintiffs had not adequately proven that their harm is

traceable to (caused by) the Federal Government. At no point did the Supreme Court explicitly

address the question whether Plaintiffs failed to allege standing adequate to maintain the lawsuit. See

Murthy, 144 S.Ct. at 1985-97.

5. Following briefing on the matter, this Court agreed with Plaintiffs that the Supreme

Court's decision was not dispositive of standing with respect to the lawsuit. Accordingly, the Court

permitted Plaintiffs to submit discovery requests on Defendants designed to verify their standing. See

11/08/24 Order, ECF 404. That discovery was then stayed. See 02/0 3/25 Order, ECF 4 32.

2
Although the Fifth Circuit reduced the number of officials subject to the preliminary injunction, it
echoed this Court's concern about government censorship. "[I]he Supreme Court has rarely been
faced with a coordinated campaign of this magnitude ... . Therefore, the district court was correct in
its assessment-'unrelenting pressure' from certain government officials likely 'had the intended result
of suppressing millions of protected free speech postings by American citizens.' We see no error or
abuse of discretion in that finding." Id. at 392.
3
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 4 of 11 PageID #:
29978

6. In the midst of the Parties' judicially-mediated dispute about the appropriate breadth

and amount of discovery requests, President Trump signed Executive Order 14149, "Restoring

Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship," on January 20, 2025. See 90 Fed. Reg. 8,243

Gan. 20, 2025).

7. In that Executive Order, the President stated that "[o]ver the last 4 years, the previous

administration trampled free speech rights by censoring Americans' speech on online platforms, often

by exerting substantial coercive pressure on third parties, such as social media companies, to moderate,

deplatform, or otherwise suppress speech that the Federal Government did not approve."

8. President Trump concluded in his Executive Order that the Federal Government

"infringed on the constitutionally protected speech rights of American citizens across the United

States in a manner that advanced the Government's preferred narrative about significant matters of

public debate." Id. Accordingly, President Trump called for the Federal Government to identify and

take actions to correct past misconduct related to censoring protected speech online. He further

directed the Attorney General to investigate the activities from the last four years that targeted First

Amendment protected speech of Americans and to submit a report "with recommendations for

appropriate remedial actions to be taken based on the findings of the report." Id.

9. The Parties then agreed to brief their respective positions as to the effect the Executive

Order has on the case. Currently, Defendants' deadline to submit their position is March 25, 2026;

Plaintiffs' response is due April 27, 2026; and the deadline for the Parties to file a joint status report

is either May 27, 2026 or 14 days after any order this Court issues on the matter. See 3/16/2026 Order,

ECF 476.

10. In the meantime, the Parties have reached the conclusion that this case may be

resolved by consent decree-as opposed to continuing costly and protracted litigation.

4
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 5 of 11 PageID #:
29979

III. GENERAL PROVISIONS

11. This Court has jurisdiction over this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345. Venue

is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(6)(2) because Plaintiff Jill Hines resides in the district,

so a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred therein, and also because this

District lies within the State of Louisiana, which is a Plaintiff in this matter.

12. This Agreement resolves all claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint filed in this case. This

Agreement shall constitute the entire integrated Agreement of the Parties (all Plaintiffs and

Defendants in this case). No prior drafts or prior or contemporaneous communications, oral or

written, shall be relevant or admissible for purposes of determining the meaning of any provisions

herein in any litigation or other proceeding.

13. This Agreement is binding upon all Parties hereto, by and through their officials,

agents, employees, assigns, and successors.

14. This Agreement is enforceable only by the Parties or their successors as provided by

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No person or entity is intended to be a third-party beneficiary

of the provisions of this Agreement for purposes of any civil, criminal, or administrative action.

Accordingly, no person or entity other than the Parties may assert any claim or right as a beneficiary

or protected class under this Agreement. With respect to a State plaintiff, this Agreement may be

enforced only by the Attorneys General of the States of Missouri and Louisiana.

15. This Agreement is not intended to limit or expand the right of any person or

organization (other than the Plaintiffs pursuant to the provisions herein) to seek relief against the

United States or any officer, agent or employee thereof, for their conduct.

16. This Agreement shall remain operative until 10 years from the date such Agreement is

signed by the Parties and approved by the Court.

5
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 6 of 11 PageID #:
29980

17. The parties acknowledge that this Agreement is entered into solely for the purpose of

settling and compromising any remaining claims in this action without further litigation, and, except

as stated explicitly in the text of the Agreement, it shall not be construed as evidence or as an admission

regarding any issues of law or fact, or regarding the truth or validity of any allegation or claim raised

in this action or in any other action.

18. Nothing in this Agreement 1s intended to limit the authority of the Federal

Government to investigate and prosecute criminal activity and threats to the United States' national

security.

III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

19. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the Government

from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press[.]" U.S. Const., amend. I. See W. Va. State Bd.

ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constellation, it is that no

official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other

matters of opinion.").

20. The Parties agree that modern technology does not alter the Government's obligation

to abide by the strictures of the First Amendment.

21. The Parties also agree that government, politicians, media, academics, or anyone else

applying labels such as "misinformation," "disinformation," or "malinformation" to speech does not

render it constitutionally unprotected. See United States v. AlvareZ; 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012) (plurality

op.) ("Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is

any general exception to the First Amendment for false statements. This comports with the common

understanding that some false statements are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous

expression of views in public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to

guarantee.").

6
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 7 of 11 PageID #:
29981

22. For these reasons, the Government cannot take actions, formal or informal, directly

or indirectly-except as authorized by law-to threaten Social-Media Companies with some form of

punishment (i.e., an adverse legal, regulatory, or economic government sanction) unless they remove,

delete, suppress, or reduce, including through altering their algorithms, posted social-media content

containing protected free speech.

IV. PERMANENT INJUNCTION

23. The Surgeon General, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) ("Enjoined Defendants"), and their

employees and agents, shall take no actions, formal or informal, directly or indirectly-except as

authorized by the Constitution, statute, judicial order, or regulation-to threaten Social-Media

Companies with some form of punishment (i.e., an adverse legal, regulatory, or economic government

sanction) unless they remove, delete, suppress, or reduce, including through altering their algorithms,

posted social-media content containing protected free speech. Nor shall Enjoined Defendants

unilaterally direct or veto social media content moderation decisions of Social Media Companies.

24. This prohibition does not extend to providing Social-Media Companies with

information that the companies are free to use as they wish. Nor does it extend to statements by

government officials that posts on Social Media Companies' platforms are inaccurate, wrong, or

contrary to the Administration's views, unless those statements are otherwise coupled with a threat of

punishment within the meaning of the above provision.

25. For the purposes of this provision, "Social Media Companies" shall include only

Facebook, Instagram, Twitter or X, Linkedln, and YouTube.

26. This prohibition as set out in Paragraphs 23 to 25 shall be limited to the Plaintiffs'

social-media content and does not extend to social-media content posted by non-parties. For

purposes of this provision, Plaintiffs State of Missouri and State of Louisiana shall be construed only

7
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 8 of 11 PageID #:
29982

to include government officials or agencies of these states acting solely in their official capacities.

Plaintiffs shall provide Enjoined Defendants with a list of their social media accounts to assist

Enjoined Defendants in complying with this prohibition.

27. Within 30 days of the Court's approval of this Consent Decree, Enjoined Defendants

will provide notice of this Consent Decree to all of their employees.

V. CONSENT DECREE ADMINISTRATION

28. The district court's jurisdiction to enforce this consent decree shall be limited to

issuing orders necessary to redress any violations of provisions (23 to 27). Those orders shall be

limited to ordering the removal or retraction of any statements issued in violation of those provisions

and declaring those statements to be null and void and of no effect.

29. Before bringing any motion to enforce the consent decree, Plaintiffs must first

specifically identify the purported violation and bring that to the attention of the Enjoined Defendants

alleged to have committed such violation. Enjoined Defendants must be given at least fifteen business

days to investigate and, if necessary, remedy that violation. Only if Enjoined Defendants fail to remedy

that violation may Plaintiffs seek relief from this Court, subject to limitations in paragraph 28.

VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES

30. This consent decree shall not preclude Plaintiffs from submitting a request for

attorneys' fees and costs as authorized under law. In any such request, provided that this consent

decree has been entered by the Court, Defendants agree not to contest that Plaintiffs are prevailing

parties for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).

VI. RELEASE

31. The Consent Decree, once finally approved and effective, resolves in full all claims,

agreements, actions, cases, causes of action, compromises, controversies, costs, damages, debts,

demands, disputes, expenses, judgments, liabilities, payments, promises, and suits of any nature

8
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 9 of 11 PageID #:
29983

whatsoever which are based upon or could be based upon or arise from the facts alleged in Plaintiffs'

operative Complaint, whether or not known, against Defendants or their current and former agents,

servants, officers, officials, and/ or employees, in their individual and official capacities, by Plaintiffs,

their agents, heirs, and assigns, involving violations of law or constitutional rights, including, without

limitation, their Fifth Amendment rights or any other federal law, regulation, duty, or obligation, or

any other legal theory, action or cause of action. When the Consent decree is final, as of the date the

Court enters this Order, Plaintiffs, their agents, heirs, and assigns, waive all rights to any and all claims

relating to the allegations in the Complaint under any theory or cause of action whatsoever under

federal law. This waiver and release shall include a full release and waiver of unknown rights based on

claims (including any individual claims) relating to the allegations in the Complaint.

It is SO ORDERED, this 25th day of March, 2026.

The Hon. Terry A. Doughty
United States District Judge

9
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 10 of 11 PageID
#: 29984

Date: 3/23/2026

CONSENTED TO BY:

FOR PLAINTIFFS:

Catherine L. Hanaway Liz Murrill
Attorney General Attorney General
Louis J. Capozzi, III J. Benjamin Aguinaga
Solicitor General Solicitor General
Office of the Missouri Attorney General Zachary Faircloth
207 W. High St. Principal Deputy Solicitor General
P.O. Box 899 Louisiana Department of Justice
Jefferson City,MO 65102 1885 N. Third St.
For Plaintiff the State of Missouri Baton Rouge, LA 70802
For Plaintiff the State of Louisiana

John J. Vecchione John C. Burns
Senior Litigation Counsel Burns Law Firm
New Civil Liberties Alliance P.O. Box 191250
4250 N. Fairfax Drive, Suite 300 St. Louis,MO 63119
Arlington, VA 22203 For Plaintiff Jim Hoft
For Plaintiffs Jill Hines
And Aaron Kheriaty

10
Case 3:22-cv-01213-TAD-KDM Document 478 Filed 03/25/26 Page 11 of 11 PageID
#: 29985

FOR DEFENDANTS:

Brett A. Shumate
Assistant Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Civil Division
950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20530

File and source

File: gov-uscourts-lawd-189520-478-0-pdf_ae56fd3f5b3182de.pdf
Size: 437,978 bytes
SHA-256: 710e5f2f2c222ef27bf1df80164dad9582a13b310abca247d4fa22cdeb707cb8
Our copy: gov-uscourts-lawd-189520-478-0-pdf_ae56fd3f5b3182de.pdf
Original: archive.org