Congressional Research Service IN11265 (COVID-19 and Passenger Airline Travel)

Summary

CRS Insight IN11265, COVID-19 and Passenger Airline Travel, by Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy, dated March 20, 2020. It describes the risks the COVID-19 pandemic poses to commercial passenger airline travel and the difficulty of curbing disease spread in a system concentrated around 30 large hub airports. It reports that about 2.25 million passengers a day passed through screening checkpoints in early March 2019, that early March 2020 averaged just under 2 million, and that volumes at Transportation Security Administration (TSA) checkpoints fell to less than 1 million daily passengers by mid-March 2020. It then reviews the federal response, which has focused on risk-based health screening of inbound international travelers.

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INSIGHTi

COVID-19 and Passenger Airline Travel

Bart Elias
Specialist in Aviation Policy

March 20, 2020
The COVID-19 global pandemic presents particular risks and challenges to commercial passenger airline
travel. Taking a passenger flight involves numerous interpersonal interactions, transiting through often
crowded airport terminals, and sitting in close proximity to others for extended periods, both onboard
aircraft and at airport gates. These activities may increase the probability of exposure to infectious
disease.
Curtailing infectious disease spread through airline travel is challenging, in part because the passenger
airline system in the United States is highly concentrated around 30 large hub airports, with tens of
thousands of passengers passing through each of these airports every day. In early March 2019, a year
before the COVID-19 outbreak, about 2.25 million passengers passed through screening checkpoints
across the United States on a daily basis. Passenger activity for early March 2020 appeared to be only
slightly lower, averaging just under 2 million daily passengers. However, as travel restrictions and
warnings in response to COVID-19 have been issued, passenger volumes at Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) checkpoints decreased to less than 1 million daily passengers by mid-March 2020.
This travel reduction has had considerable economic impact, and questions remain as to whether adequate
steps are being taken to reduce the potential spread of COVID-19 through passenger airline travel.

International Travel
The federal response to address COVID-19 spread through passenger airline travel has focused on risk-
based health screening of inbound international passengers and restrictions placed on certain international
arrivals. On January 31, 2020, President Trump suspended travel from China. International travel
restrictions have since expanded to include travelers from Iran, the European Schengen area, the United
Kingdom, and Ireland. Travelers returning home to the United States from these areas must enter the
country through one of 13 designated entry airports for enhanced screening and are instructed to stay at
home for 14 days thereafter and monitor their health for COVID-19 symptoms. On March 19, 2020, the
U.S. Department of State issued a global health advisory urging U.S. citizens to avoid all international
travel, noting that many airlines have canceled international flights in response to COVID-19 creating
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disruptions that could prevent travelers from returning to the United States for an undetermined time
frame.

Domestic Flights
Efforts to restrict domestic air travel have largely been voluntary. The President’s Coronavirus Guidelines
for America advise individuals to avoid discretionary travel. The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) has noted that “[c]rowded travel settings, like airports, may increase chances of getting
COVID-19, if there are other travelers with coronavirus infection.” Individual travelers weigh their
options for canceling or delaying a trip depending on their unique circumstances.
Restrictions have been put in place at some airports to limit access. For example, access to the terminal at
Baltimore-Washington Thurgood Marshall International Airport (BWI) has been restricted to ticketed
passengers and airport workers.

Screening Checkpoints
TSA has eased some travel rules, allowing passengers to bring up to 12 ounces of liquid hand sanitizer
though screening checkpoints and wear masks during the screening process. It is instructing passengers to
keep personal items such as wallets, keys, and cell phones inside carry-on bags rather than placing them
in plastic bins. TSA is also allowing passengers to use expired driver’s licenses as identification since
some state motor vehicle agencies are now closed due to COVID-19. TSA has instructed its workers to
increase cleaning of screening checkpoints, but in 2020 it reportedly eliminated federal funding for
checkpoint cleaning services, leaving airports to shoulder the cost. Security screeners must wear gloves
when swabbing or patting down passengers, and passengers may request that screeners put on new
gloves. TSA reportedly is providing surgical masks to screeners, but wearing them is optional. The TSA
screeners’ union has asked TSA to provide N95 masks that are currently in short supply.

Aviation Workforce Infections and Absenteeism
In addition to passengers, airports and airlines employ large numbers of individuals who work at and
transit through airports and interact with passengers. In theory, these individuals could be infected and
spread or become infected by COVID-19 while at airports or aboard aircraft. Moreover, the aviation
system itself could be significantly impacted by COVID-19 if high levels of absenteeism in the sector’s
safety-critical workforce result or if key facilities and infrastructure become temporarily unavailable
subsequent to possible COVID-19 contamination. In March 2020, for example, the Federal Aviation
Administration closed air traffic control towers for disinfecting after a controller at Las Vegas McCarran
International Airport, three technicians at Chicago Midway airport, and a worker at New York Kennedy
International Airport reportedly tested positive for COVID-19. While these airports remained open to air
traffic, albeit with reduced capacity, several flights were canceled. More widespread disruptions could
occur if larger facilities, like en route centers or terminal radar approach control facilities, are affected.
Impacts to the security screening workforce could also affect passenger airline operations. A few TSA
screeners have tested positive for the virus. It has also been reported that hundreds of TSA screeners are
opting to stay home under a more relaxed policy regarding paid “safety leave.” TSA has closed several
checkpoints in response to decreased passenger demand, but may need to alter checkpoint availability
depending on staffing levels. TSA already faced concerns regarding screener attrition prior to COVID-19.
Further attrition coupled with a recently implemented freeze on hiring and overtime pay could leave the
agency short-staffed in some locations should the COVID-19 outbreak abate and airline passenger
demand pick back up.
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Sudden reductions in passenger demand are causing numerous flight cancellations and could lead
to furloughs and layoffs at airlines that collectively employed almost 750,000 people as of
January 2020. Virus-related absenteeism among airline employees, particularly pilots, flight
attendants, and ground handlers, could complicate airlines’ efforts to maintain reduced flight
schedules.

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