Congressional Research Service IF12435.3 (Secondary Cockpit Barriers for Airline Aircraft)

Summary

A Congressional Research Service product, IF12435 (version 3), updated August 1, 2024, on secondary cockpit barriers for airline aircraft. It describes an installed physical secondary barrier (IPSB) as typically a lockable gate of metal rods, bars and cables or similar intrusion-resistant materials, placed between the aircraft cabin and the cockpit to prevent or deter access when the cockpit door is open. It notes that RTCA, Inc. developed guidance on such barriers and that in 2015 the FAA issued an advisory recognizing that guidance as an acceptable alternative to methods relying on cabin crew and galley carts. It states that since the 108th Congress in 2004 (H.R. 4801), various legislative proposals have sought to require secondary cockpit barriers on certain commercial aircraft.

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Updated August 1, 2024
Secondary Cockpit Barriers for Airline Aircraft
For the past two decades, there has been continuing policy RTCA, Inc., an independent standards development
interest in enhancing airline in-flight security with organization for aviation, developed guidance on the design
secondary cockpit barriers. A secondary cockpit barrier, and operational procedures for aircraft secondary barrier
also known as an installed physical secondary barrier systems. In 2015, FAA issued an advisory recognizing the
(IPSB), typically consists of a lockable gate constructed of RTCA guidance on secondary barriers as an acceptable
metal rods, bars, and cables or similar intrusion-resistant alternative to commonly employed methods that rely on
materials that retracts when not in use. A suitable barrier is cabin crew monitoring and impeding access to the flight
designed to be positioned between the aircraft cabin and the deck with galley carts or other aircraft cabin equipment.
cockpit; occupy sufficient space so that it cannot be
circumvented by going over, under, or around it; and be Congressional Action
resistant to intrusion, including forceful attempts to pull it Since the 108th Congress in 2004 (see H.R. 4801), various
open or down or push through it. An IPSB primarily serves legislative proposals have been introduced seeking action to
as a means to prevent or deter access to the aircraft cockpit require secondary cockpit barriers on certain commercial
when a cockpit door is briefly opened, for example, when a aircraft. In the 113th Congress, the Saracini Aviation Safety
pilot exits the cockpit to use the lavatory, when flight crew Act of 2013 (H.R. 1775, S. 1495) was introduced. The bill,
are served food or during shift changes on long flights. named after Captain Victor J. Saracini, whose hijacked
airplane was flown into the South Tower of the World
Historical Context Trade Center in New York City on 9/11, would have
Following the September 11, 2001 (9/11), terrorist attacks, mandated the installation and use of secondary cockpit
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated barriers on all aircraft that are required by regulation to
hardened cockpit doors that are resistant to forcible have hardened cockpit doors. This generally includes
intrusion and small firearms on most passenger airline airliners with 20 or more passenger seats and any all-cargo
aircraft and large, all-cargo airplanes operated in the United aircraft with a payload capacity greater than 7,500 pounds.
States. Regulations generally require those doors to remain Similar legislation offered in the 114th Congress (H.R. 911,
closed and locked for the entire duration of a flight with S. 911) and 115th Congress (H.R. 911) would have
few exceptions, and special procedural measures must be mandated secondary cockpit barriers on commercial aircraft
taken in those rare instances when a door is opened to deter with more than 75 passenger seats or a maximum gross
potential attempts to breach a cockpit. However, security takeoff weight of 75,000 pounds. Section 336 of the FAA
concerns over potential flight deck breaches by terrorists or Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254), titled the
unruly passengers have prompted continued interest in Saracini Aviation Safety Act of 2018, mandated the
secondary cockpit barriers. installation of secondary flight deck barriers on all newly
manufactured aircraft delivered to U.S. passenger airlines.
The investigation of the National Commission on Terrorist
Section 350 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L.
Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) did
118-63) requires FAA to convene a rulemaking committee
not find conclusive evidence as to how the 9/11 hijackers to provide recommendations regarding the installation of
gained access to the aircraft flight decks in those attacks,
secondary cockpit barriers on passenger airliners operated
but did find evidence of the terrorists making specific
by U.S. air carriers that are not otherwise subject to existing
inquiries and plotting to exploit opportunities when cockpit or proposed regulations, including existing aircraft. The act
doors were opened. The pre-9/11 industry-wide common
directs FAA to subsequently issue a final rule mandating
strategy of cooperating with hijackers and avoiding direct
the installation of secondary barriers on such aircraft that
confrontation would have rendered physical barriers, such takes into consideration the findings and recommendations
as hardened cockpit doors and secondary barriers, largely
of the committee. The time frame for completing all steps
irrelevant. After the 9/11 attacks, the installation of
in issuing a final rule would be roughly 4½ years, although
hardened cockpit doors and implementation of procedures the final rule may have a separate timeline for compliance.
to defend the cockpit against intrusions have prompted
reviews of potential vulnerabilities, including during times
Regulatory Action
when cockpit doors are opened in flight. In response to the statutory mandate in the FAA
In 2004, United Airlines and Northwest Airlines (Northwest Reauthorization Act of 2018, FAA convened an Aviation
later merged with Delta) equipped some widebody jets with Rulemaking Advisory Committee Working Group on flight
secondary cockpit barriers; other airlines did not follow deck secondary barriers in March 2019. The working
suit. In 2007, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) group’s February 2020 report to the FAA contained cost
published a position paper urging government action to estimates and recommendations regarding the engineering
mandate secondary cockpit barriers by 2010; the issue has and design of IPSBs, installation, crew training, and
remained a top priority for the organization since. In 2011, operational procedures. It advised against expanding the

https://crsreports.congress.gov
Secondary Cockpit Barriers for Airline Aircraft

requirement to include all-cargo aircraft and suggested that secondary cockpit barriers are completely effective at
ISPBs may be unnecessary on smaller aircraft that operate thwarting attacks, installing them would be cost effective,
strictly on short-haul flights, and may be procedurally assuming the probability of an attempted terrorist attack is
impractical on flights staffed by one cabin crewmember. In at least 0.66% per year, or approximately one attempt of
June 2023, FAA issued a final rule that requires installation that scale every 150 years.
of secondary cockpit barriers on newly delivered passenger
airliners and requires those barriers to be closed and locked Further Considerations for Congress
whenever the flight deck door is opened on passenger- The Saracini Enhanced Aviation Safety Act of 2023 (H.R.
carrying flights that are required by FAA to have a 911, S. 911) would require installation of secondary cockpit
hardened cockpit door. It would not apply to any all-cargo barriers on all U.S. passenger airliners. As previously noted,
airplanes or to foreign passenger airliners operated to and a provision in P.L. 118-63 instead directed FAA to convene
from the United States. The rule applies to all new aircraft a rulemaking committee to make recommendations
manufactured after August 25, 2025, placed in service with regarding additional mandates for passenger airline aircraft
U.S. passenger air carriers. not included in the current regulation.

Airline Fleet Composition If the entire passenger airline fleet of roughly 5,900 aircraft
According to FAA data for 2022, U.S. mainline passenger were to fall under such requirements, the total fleetwide
air carrier fleets included a total of 3,915 jets, and regional cost to comply would be approximately $71 million under
carriers operated another 2,002 aircraft, including 1,623 the CBO assumption of a maximum cost per aircraft of
jets. Airlines operated another 935 all-cargo jet aircraft. In $12,000, or $207 million if the per-aircraft cost is $35,000
total, about 6,800 aircraft were operated by U.S. air carriers, as FAA expects. These amounts might be somewhat higher,
of which about 5,900 were engaged in passenger-carrying however, since retrofit installations might cost more than
operations. FAA expects the mainline passenger air carrier installations on brand-new aircraft. FAA estimated that
fleet to grow at an average annual rate of 1.7%, the regional about 922 million passengers flew in 2023, and it forecasts
passenger air carrier fleet to grow at an average rate of that annual passenger enplanements will surpass 1 billion
1.1% per year, and the all-cargo fleet to grow 3.2% per year within a decade. Assuming future average annual
on average over the next 20 years. Additionally, FAA enplanements of 950 million, the barriers would need to
estimates a fleet retirement rate of 3.57% among U.S. air remain in service for about eight years to bring the cost per
carriers, which would result in replacements of about 240 to passenger enplanement to one cent if the cost per airplane is
250 aircraft per year in the United States. In total, over the $12,000. If the cost per airplane is $35,000, then the
next several years, about 350 new aircraft are expected to barriers would need to remain in service for about 22 years
enter air carrier service annually, of which about 300 would to bring the per passenger cost to one cent, which would be
be placed in passenger airline service. At that rate, it would slightly shorter than FAA estimates of a typical 25-year
take roughly 28 years before most aircraft in passenger airplane lifespan. For newer aircraft, per-passenger costs
airline service would have secondary cockpit barriers could be less than one cent across the airplane’s service life.
installed under the current mandate that applies only to Per-passenger costs would be somewhat higher if airlines
airplanes delivered after August 25, 2025, although FAA were required to equip older aircraft close to the end of
assumes most of the passenger airline fleet would be service with secondary barriers, because those barriers
equipped within 25 years. would be in service for a shorter time. Airlines would also
incur additional costs to equip replacement aircraft with
Cost Estimates and Anticipated Security Benefits secondary barriers. So, total costs and per-passenger costs
In 2017, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated would vary across the industry, with somewhat lower costs
the industry-wide cost of IPSBs on new aircraft delivered to incurred by airlines with relatively newer aircraft fleets and
passenger airlines would be under $15 million annually, higher costs incurred by airlines with older fleets. In
based on a per airplane cost between $5,000 and $12,000. general, the longer the aircraft and the secondary cockpit
In contrast, FAA estimated present value annualized costs barriers remain in service without the need for major repair
of $16 million to $17 million through 2047 based on higher or replacement, the lower the per-aircraft and per-passenger
per airplane costs of $35,000 for purchase, installation, and costs of installing and maintaining the barriers would be.
training. FAA also assumes additional costs in the total
airplane lifecycle, bringing total annualized costs to the Congress may take particular interest in monitoring future
airline industry to roughly $20 million to $29 million per actions to address the installation of secondary barriers on
year from 2023 through 2072. currently in-service passenger airliners as mandated by the
FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. Legislative options to
In considering the potential costs of a major terrorist event,
more broadly address potential security risks from
as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks, and the potential
hijackings could include expanding secondary cockpit
benefits of disrupting or deterring such an occurrence, it is barrier requirements to foreign passenger airline flights to
difficult to gauge the probability of a large-scale attack or to and from the United States as well as to all-cargo aircraft.
independently assess the degree to which a single measure,
such as a secondary cockpit barrier, might disrupt such an
attack amid a complex and multilayered approach to Bart Elias, Specialist in Aviation Policy
aviation security. Nonetheless, FAA concluded that, if IF12435

https://crsreports.congress.gov
Secondary Cockpit Barriers for Airline Aircraft

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