Complaint — United States v. Constantin Sandu (No. 3:23-cr-00386, S.D. Cal.)

Summary

A criminal complaint filed March 2, 2023 as Document 1 in United States v. Constantin Sandu, aka Bobi Sandu, aka Ionut Mihai, Magistrate Case No. 23MJ0697-AHG (3:23-cr-00386-LAB), in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Count 1 charges conspiracy to commit wire fraud under Title 18, U.S.C. § 1349 and 1343 from in or about September 2020 to in or about August 2022, with criminal forfeiture. The probable cause statement of FBI Special Agent Scott Brady, attested before Magistrate Judge Allison H. Goddard, alleges Sandu facilitated a conspiracy to obtain California EDD unemployment benefits by fraud, and that ID.me device fingerprints linked applications to devices used by Sandu. It concludes that Sandu conspired with 214 known persons and others, with a total loss of no less than $5,207,687.00.

Summary drafted by a model from the text of the original file linked on this page and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Cite this document

“Complaint — United States v. Constantin Sandu (No. 3:23-cr-00386, S.D. Cal.).” Original at ecf.casd.uscourts.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/complaint-usa-v-sandu-dkt-1-s-d-cal-ab4efb5ad0/, SHA-256 80d62a03a464a858458e3b3dcf55e982bbb62991fa2ff2992b54ddadd2d6e92e.

Full text

Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.1 Page 1 of 17

6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9

10
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Magistrate Case No. 23MJ0697-AHG
11
Plaintiff, COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF
12
v. Title 18, U.S.C. § 1349 and
13
1343 - Conspiracy to Commit Wire
CONSTANTIN SANDU, Fraud(Felony)
14
aka Bobi Sandu,
aka Ionut Mihai, Title 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)
15
Criminal Forfeitures;
16
Title 28, U.S.C. § 2461(c) Civil
17 Forfeitures
Defendant.
18

19 The undersigned complainant being duly sworn states:
20 Count 1
21 1. Beginning in or about September 2020, and continuing to in or

22 about August 2022, in the Southern District of California, and

23 elsewhere, Defendant CONSTANTIN SANDU, Aka Bobi Sandu, Aka Ionut Mihai,

24 conspired and agreed with other persons known and unknown, to commit an

25
offense against the United States, that is, wire fraud in violation of
26
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, all in violation of United
27
States Code Section 1349.
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Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.2 Page 2 of 17

2
Criminal Forfeiture Allegations
3
2. The allegations contained in Count 1 are re-alleged and
4
incorporated by reference for the purpose of alleging forfeiture
5
pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title
6
28, United States Code, Section 2461(c).
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3. Upon conviction of the offense in violation of Title 18,
8
United States Code, Section 1349 set forth in Count 1 of this Complaint,
9
the defendant, CONSTANTIN SANDU, aka Bobi Sandu, aka Ionut Mihai, shall
10
forfeit to the United States of America, pursuant to Title 18, United
11
States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), and Title 28, United States Code,
12
Section 2461(c), any property, real and or personal, which constitutes
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and is derived from proceeds traceable to the offenses. The property to
14
be forfeited shall include but is not limited to, a money judgment in
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favor of the United States in an amount equal to the total amount of
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proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the offenses.
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4. If any of the property described above, as a result of any
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act or omission of the defendants:
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a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
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b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third
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party;
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c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
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d. has been substantially diminished in value; or
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e. has been commingled with other property which cannot be
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divided without difficulty,
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the United States of America shall be entitled to forfeiture of
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substitute property pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section
28

2
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.3 Page 3 of 17

1 853(p), as incorporated by Title 28, United States Code, Section

2 2461(c). It is the intent of the United States of America, pursuant to

3 Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b), to seek forfeiture of

4 substitute property up to the value of forfeitable property

5 described above.

6 5. This complaint is based on the facts in the attached probable

7 cause statement, which is incorporated herein by reference.

10
6FRWW%UDG\
______________________________
Scott Brady
FBI Special Agent
11

12 Sworn and attested to under oath by telephone, in accordance with
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.1, this 2nd day of March, 2023.
13

14 ______________________________
Honorable Allison H. Goddard
15 United States Magistrate Judge
16

25
26

3
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.4 Page 4 of 17

1 Probable Cause Statement

2 1. I, Scott Brady, being duly sworn, declare under penalty of

3 perjury that the following statement is true and correct: I am a Special

4 Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and have been so

5 employed since 2019. Prior to my appointment to the FBI, I served as a

6 Surface Warfare Officer in the United States Navy. My formal education

7 consists of an undergraduate degree from the University of Central

8 Florida and a graduate degree from Northeastern University.

9 2. Prior to my current assignment with FBI San Diego, I completed

10 the 20-week FBI Academy and was trained in investigative techniques,

11 procedures, and strategies. I am currently assigned to the San Diego

12 Field Office, Transnational Organized Crime - Global (TOC Global) squad,

13 where I investigate various crimes that include, but are not limited

14 to, narcotics trafficking, bulk cash smuggling, money laundering, and

15 fraud, and I have been involved in numerous investigations involving

16 individuals and criminal organizations involved in wire fraud, money

17 laundering, and other financial crimes.

18 3. I have served as the case agent and co-case agent for multiple

19 investigations targeting sophisticated money laundering organizations

20 operating in the United States and other countries such as Colombia and

21 Mexico. I have also received specialized training in transnational

22 organized crime and money laundering techniques utilized by various

23 criminal enterprises. I have also participated in investigations in

24 which criminals relied heavily upon telephone communication to include

25 the use of messaging applications such as WhatsApp, e-mail services,
26 social media applications such as Facebook and Instagram, and cellular

27 phones to communicate with associates and co-conspirators.

4
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.5 Page 5 of 17

1 4. Through my investigations, my training and experience, and

2 discussions with other law enforcement personnel, I have become familiar

3 with the tactics and methods used by criminal enterprises to

4 communicate, organize various schemes and frauds, and launder the

5 proceeds. My knowledge of the matters contained in this affidavit is

6 based upon my personal knowledge, the extensive review of financial

7 records, search warrants, grand jury subpoenas, and information

8 provided to me by other law enforcement officers/agents. The information

9 contained below was learned during the course of my duties, as well as

10 review of reports prepared by other law enforcement officers. The

11 following does not contain all of the information known to myself or

12 other federal agents and state and local officers regarding this

13 investigation, but does contain those facts believed to be necessary to

14 establish the requisite probable cause.

15 A. Background on Sandu and Romanian Organized Crime Group

16 5. In September 2021, Romanian law enforcement provided

17 information to the FBI regarding various organized crime groups, going

18 to the United States from Romania, to commit various frauds, swindles,

19 and schemes, to obtain as much money as possible and then launder the

20 funds back to Romania. In November of 2021, the San Diego Police

21 Department (SDPD) became aware of a series of felony theft related

22 crimes targeting the elderly population in San Diego. Throughout SDPD’s

23 investigation, detectives determined many Romanian organized crime

24 groups conducted numerous jewelry thefts, frauds, and swindles

25 throughout the Southern District of California and the United States.
26 6. Through a series of custodial interviews and search warrants

27 to Facebook accounts utilized by members of Romanian organized crime

28 groups, investigators discovered a separate but overlapping wide-spread

5
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.6 Page 6 of 17

1 conspiracy to conduct wire fraud and fraudulently obtain unemployment

2 benefits in California. This conspiracy was perpetrated by hundreds of

3 members of Romanian organized crime groups, and was facilitated by

4 Sandu.

5 B. Background on California EDD

6 7. The Social Security Act established the dual program of

7 federal and state unemployment benefits. Under the Act, each state

8 administered its own unemployment program through their State Workforce

9 Agency, within the guidelines of federal law.

10 8. State unemployment benefits were financed in part by state

11 payroll taxes, which were held in trust by the United States Department

12 of Treasury’s Unemployment Trust Fund.

13 9. The Insurance Program “UI Program” was a joint federal-state

14 partnership administered on behalf of the U.S. Department of Labor by

15 agencies in each state. In the State of California, the UI Program is

16 administered by California’s Employment Development Department

17 (“California EDD”).

18 10. On March 13, 2020, President Donald J. Trump declared a

19 nationwide emergency due to COVID-19, as defined in section 102 of the

20 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, PL

21 100-707, which amended the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, PL 93-288,

22 codified at 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.b. The Unemployment.

23 11. In March 2020, the Families First Coronavirus Response Act

24 (FFCRA) and the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES)

25 Act provided additional funding for state UI agencies to respond to the
26 COVID-19 pandemic. The CARES Act allowed states to expand the scope of

27 workers who were eligible to receive state UI benefits, to extend the

28 period of time for which workers could be eligible for UI benefits, and

6
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.7 Page 7 of 17

1 to allow workers who may have exhausted UI benefits under traditional

2 programs to receive benefits.

3 12. The CARES Act further expanded the ability of states to

4 provide benefits to unemployed workers by creating three new

5 unemployment programs, namely, the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance

6 (PUA) program, which permitted states to provide benefits to individuals

7 who were self-employed, seeking part-time employment, or otherwise

8 would not qualify for regular unemployment benefits, the Federal

9 Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) Program, which provided an

10 additional benefit, initially in the amount of $600 and later, in the

11 amount of $300, in federal benefits to individuals collecting

12 traditional UI program benefits, and the Pandemic Emergency

13 Unemployment Compensation (PEUC) program, which provided additional

14 weeks of benefits for individuals who had otherwise exhausted their

15 entitlement to regular UI benefits (collectively referred to herein as

16 “expanded pandemic UI benefits”) PUA and FPUC benefits were 100%

17 federally funded benefits paid through state UI agencies.

18 13. To receive UI, PUA, PEUC, and FPUC benefits from a state UI

19 agency, an applicant could file a claim, via the internet, with the

20 state UI agency from which he was eligible to seek benefits.

21 14. California EDD provided unemployment insurance benefits for

22 regular UI and expanded UI pandemic benefits to individuals whom

23 California EDD determined were entitled to receive such benefits through

24 debit cards, which were funded by California EDD and issued by Bank of

25 America N.A.
15. California EDD’s determination of whether the individuals
26
were entitled to receive unemployment insurance benefits relied, in
27
part, on confirmations from the employer (from which the individual has
28

7
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.8 Page 8 of 17

been recently unemployed) that the employee had worked with the
1
employer.
2
16. Once a debit card for unemployment insurance benefits was
3 issued, California EDD funded those debit cards by having funds drawn

4 from the United States federal treasury in Washington, D.C., and wired

5 those funds to Bank of America N.A.
17. Bank of America N.A. utilized debit processing services
6
located in Colorado and Virginia to create accounts, load funds, and
7
post payments for unemployment insurance debit cards. When a withdrawal
8 was made from an account using a debit card, information was sent

9 electronically to servers in Colorado and Virginia to post a debit to

10 the account.

11 C. Implementation of ID.me Verification Process:
18. After the initial rollout of PUA benefits, the system became
12
overburdened with applications, many of which needed to be manually
13
processed for applicant verification, creating a large backlog and a
14 stall in getting benefits to California’s workforce.

15 19. Between March and October 2020, over 8 million Californians
16 filed for unemployment benefits. In July, 2020, California Governor
Gavin Newsom appointed a team to modernize EDD’S process and improve
17
the customer experience with the intention of getting benefits to
18
Californians faster.
19
20. In September 2020, the EDD system temporarily stopped
20 accepting new applications so that EDD could roll out a new verification

21 process, partnering with an internet-based verification company

22 headquartered out of Virginia, ID.me. ID.me was a company that was
already established and had many partnerships with numerous federal,
23
state, and local government agencies as well as private sector companies
24
for identity verification processes.
25 21. On October 5, 2020, the new ID.me verification process was
26 activated for EDD. ID.me provided an automated process with a virtual

27 in-person session with an ID.me representative, known as a “trusted

28 referee”, to quickly handle the verification process for EDD claims.

8
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.9 Page 9 of 17

ID.me’s roll in the benefits process was exclusively to verify the
1
identity of the applicant through a multi-step process using Artificial
2
Intelligence and Human Intelligence together.
3 22. With the addition of ID.me, each applicant needed to complete
4 a verification process before applying for benefits. One the

5 verification process was completed, they could re-enter the EDD portal
and apply for benefits. The applicant would be given a “Confirmation
6
Number” connected to their application for future reference.
7
23. Once approved for pandemic benefits, the recipient of the
8 benefits would be required to periodically recertify under the penalties

9 of perjury that, among other things, the recipient was unemployed due

10 to the COVID-19 pandemic and therefore remained eligible to receive

11 pandemic benefits.
24. Many applicants who had applied before October 2020, were
12
required to complete the ID.me process in order to re-apply or continue
13
to receive benefits.
14 D. ID.me Device Fingerprint
15 25. A device fingerprint is a unique identifier (aggregated hash
16 value) associated with a user’s device, from the hardware to the
operating system to the audio stack and its configuration. Browser
17
fingerprinting refers to the process of collecting information through
18
java script to create a fingerprint of a device. The fingerprinting
19
conducted by ID.me delivers a robust item of investigative importance.
20 Comparing device fingerprints with applications known to be submitted

21 by Sandu, investigators were able to connect four devices to Sandu and

22 his brother, unnamed co-conspirator #11. On several occasions, Sandu
and the unnamed co-conspirator #11 are seen in the background of
23
recorded ID.me video sessions for various co-conspirator EDD
24
applications.
25 26. According to the California Franchise Tax Board, the
26 following entities are not established businesses in the State of

27 California: Kraftsman Construction Co., Bless Tires & Auto Repair, TLC

28 Cleaning, Hood Cleaning Service, LB Construction Co., Jaggar’s Service,

9
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.10 Page 10 of 17

Lincoln Maids, Mic Carpet & Tile Cleaning, Alvarez Construction Co.,
1
Reliable Honest Mechanic, etc.
2
E. The Means and Manner of the Conspiracy
3 27. The object of the conspiracy, to fraudulently obtain as much
4 money as possible from California EDD, was carried out as follows:

5 28. Beginning in July 2021, Sandu and unnamed co-conspirator #11
sent public announcements via social media to a large network of co-
6
conspirators, offering services or meetings to conduct the fraud. Sandu
7
learned and developed a process to receive the most benefits possible
8 by using fraudulent identifications, falsified utility bills, falsified

9 earnings statements, falsified W2s, and fraudulent Health Insurance

10 cards. Additionally, Sandu learned to “backdate” or modify their EDD

11 application with an earlier unemployment start date to generate
additional fraudulent income.
12
29. Beginning on or about September 2020, and continuing through
13
at least August 2022 co-conspirators across California would share
14 information, knowledge and resources with Sandu, for Sandu to file

15 claims for regular UI and expanded pandemic UI benefits from California

16 EDD.
30. Co-conspirators communicated with Sandu via Facebook or other
17
electronic means, or met with him in person to provide their PII. Sandu
18
used Personal Identifying Information (“PII”) from co-conspirators to
19
create or have others create fraudulent documents which Sandu then
20 submitted in support of EDD applications.

21 31. A significant number of consistencies were identified across

22 numerous documents in applications reflected Sandu’s reuse of resources
in support of the scheme, to included, but not limited to, the name of
23
the business and EIN on the fraudulent W2, the same ID numbers on
24
fraudulent Blue Cross Blue Shield ID cards, and the same password
25 “Romania221$” for almost all email addresses required for the EDD
26 application. According to the California Franchise Tax Board, none of
27 the companies in the various W2’s submitted for conspirators’ EDD

28 applications were real companies. According to Blue Cross Blue Shield,

10
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.11 Page 11 of 17

none of the member ID’s submitted for conspirators EDD applications
1
were real.
2
32. In total, Sandu conspired with unnamed 214 co-conspirators to
3 fraudulently obtain no less than $5,207,687.00 in California
4 Unemployment Insurance benefits. Below is a representative sample of

5 the overt acts that Sandu and his co-conspirators committed. Given that
there are 215 total co-conspirators it is not practical to list the
6
overt acts involving each of them.
7
F. Overt Acts
8 33. Beginning in and around September 2020, Sandu created email
9 addresses for EDD applications, registered ID.me accounts, created

10 fraudulent and falsified documents, submitted documents and photographs

11 to ID.me and EDD, submitted applications for EDD, participated in or
assisted with ID.me video verification sessions, and “backdated” EDD
12
claims for other co-conspirators. Sandu himself applied for EDD four
13
separate times, on 9/18/2020, 7/10/2021, 7/13/2021, and 6/5/2022. In
14 the application submitted on 9/18/2020, Sandu received $3,600.00. This

15 application was prior to the ID.me verification process. On this
16 application, Sandu listed his SSN as 655-88-9415, which the Social
Security Administration Office of the Inspector General confirmed is
17
associated with Sandu. Sandu used different, and fraudulent, SSN’s in
18
each subsequent application.
19
34. In the application submitted on 7/10/2021, Sandu submitted a
20
photograph of himself, a Maryland ID, and a W2 showing he worked for
21
Kraftsman Construction Co. As stated previously, Kraftsman
22
Construction Co. does not exist. Sandu participated in an ID.me
23
verification session where he confirmed he was applying for California
24
EDD benefits. Sandu received $24,600.00 for this application. In the
25
application submitted on 7/13/2021, under the alias Ionut Mihai, Sandu
26
submitted a photograph of himself, a Washington state ID, a California
27
state ID, and another W2 from Kraftsman Construction Co. Sandu
28

11
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.12 Page 12 of 17

1 participated in an ID.me verification session where he confirmed he was

2 applying for California EDD benefits. Sandu received $26,250.00 for

3 this application. In the application submitted on 6/5/2022, Sandu filed

4 with a different SSN than previously, submitted another W2 from

5 Kraftsman Construction Co., and a Maryland ID. Sandu participated in

6 an ID.me verification session where he confirmed he was applying for

7 California EDD benefits. Sandu received $0 for this application.

8 35. Unnamed Conspirator #1 communicated directly with Constantin

9 Sandu regarding EDD on behalf of his wife, Unnamed Conspirator #2. On

10 7/14/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #2 participated in a recorded video

11 interview with ID.me, in which Unnamed Conspirator #2 identified herself

12 by name and date of birth, and confirmed that she was applying for

13 California EDD. A fraudulent Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield member ID

14 were added to Unnamed Conspirator #2’s ID.me account. On 7/15/2021,

15 Unnamed Conspirator #1 sent Sandu a Facebook message with the phone

16 number 669-2239-5640. Following this, Sandu sent Unnamed Conspirator #1

17 a screenshot of an EDD application confirmation screen for Unnamed

18 Conspirator #2, confirmation number 38022946. On 7/15/2021, Sandu sent

19 Unnamed Conspirator #1 the email marta22121m@gmail.com and the password

20 Romania221$.

21 36. According to EDD, an application was submitted for Unnamed

22 Conspirator #2 on 7/15/2021, under the email address of

23 marta22121m@gmail.com. The phone number connected to the application

24 was 669-239-5640, the same as the number provided by Unnamed Conspirator

25 #1 above. Also on 7/15/2021, Sandu received a falsified W2 for Unnamed
26 Conspirator #2 from another unnamed conspirator. Investigators know

27 that the W2 is fraudulent as the business listed does not exist,

28 according to the California Franchise Tax Board.

12
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.13 Page 13 of 17

1 37. On 7/25/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #2 began receiving EDD

2 benefits, totaling $27,000.00. On 9/17/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #1

3 asked Sandu what was put for the address and employer, presumably on

4 the EDD application that Sandu had done. On 9/18/2021, Sandu sent

5 Unnamed Conspirator #1 a screenshot of a portion of a W2, containing a

6 partial EIN, employer name, address and zip code of TLC CLeaning, 600

7 S Gilbert Street, Fullerton CA 92833, and employee name of Unnamed

8 Conspirator #2. As stated previously, TLC Cleaning does not exist.

9 38. On 10/4/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #1 sent Sandu a photo of a

10 W2 for Unnamed Conspirator #2 with the SSN 216-01-6289. 216-01-6289 is

11 the SSN used on Unnamed Conspirator #2’s EDD application. In October

12 2021, Unnamed Conspirator #1 told Sandu he would be in San Diego, and

13 they discussed money. Bank of America records show the money

14 fraudulently obtained by Unnamed Conspirator #1 and Unnamed Conspirator

15 #2 was withdrawn at ATMs in the SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, as

16 well as in Oregon and other parts of California, including a $400.00

17 ATM withdrawal in Escondido, CA on 8/4/2021. Unnamed Conspirator #1 was

18 captured on Bank of America ATM footage withdrawing money from Unnamed

19 Conspirator #2’s EDD account in California by himself and with Unnamed

20 Conspirator #2. Unnamed Conspirator #2 was captured on Bank of America

21 ATM footage withdrawing money from her EDD account in California.

22 39. Unnamed Conspirator #3 communicated directly with Constantin

23 Sandu. On 5/19/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #3 was encountered at the US

24 border in Texas with his wife and son, Unnamed Conspirator #4. On

25 7/14/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #4 participated in a recorded video
26 interview with ID.me, during which he confirmed that he was applying

27 for California EDD benefits, and presented a fraudulent California

28 driver’s license. According to the California DMV, this drivers license

13
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.14 Page 14 of 17

1 number belongs to someone else. On 7/15/2021, Sandu sent Unnamed

2 Conspirator #3 a Facebook message indicating that Sandu needed a W2.

3 That same day, Unnamed Conspirator #3 responded with a W2 for Unnamed

4 Conspirator #4, SSN 216-35-4671, as well as a photograph with the email

5 address gioninebunuo@gmail.com, the password Romania221$, and the phone

6 number 714-837-3249.

7 40. On 7/15/2021, an application for unemployment benefits was

8 submitted to EDD for Unnamed Conspirator #4, SSN 216-35-4671, claiming

9 to be a US Citizen, and being employed by Kraftsman Construction. As

10 stated previously, this company does not exist. On 7/15/2021, Unnamed

11 Conspirator #3 sent Sandu the ID.me verification codes for both Unnamed

12 Conspirator #3 and Unnamed Conspirator #4. On 7/15/2021, Sandu sent

13 Unnamed Conspirator #3 a Facebook message with a confirmation screen

14 from EDD for Unnamed Conspirator #4, confirmation number 38029477. On

15 8/9/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #4 began receiving $6,000.00 in EDD

16 benefits. On 8/29/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #3 began receiving

17 $27,000.00 in EDD benefits. Bank of America records confirm Unnamed

18 Conspirator #3 withdrew $26,950 from the ATMs in the Southern District

19 of California, including $900 in Escondido, CA on 9/23/2021, and other

20 parts of California. ATM footage confirms Unnamed Conspirator #3 was

21 withdrawing the funds on at least one occasion. As of 12/29/2022, the

22 account has a balance of $8.27.

23 41. Unnamed Conspirator #5 communicated directly with Constantin

24 Sandu regarding EDD fraud on behalf of himself and Unnamed Conspirator

25 #6. On 6/24/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #6 participated in a recorded
26 video interview with ID.me, during which she confirmed that she was

27 applying for California EDD benefits, and presented a fraudulent

28 Colorado driver’s license. The Colorado DMV has no record of this

14
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.15 Page 15 of 17

1 license number. Also uploaded to Unnamed Conspirator #5’s ID.me account

2 was a W2 from Clean Net USA Inc. According to the California Franchise

3 Tax Board, this company does not exist. Unnamed Conspirator #5 also

4 participated in an ID.me interview under an alias, but the interview

5 did not record properly. A fraudulent Colorado driver’s license in

6 Unnamed Conspirator #5’s alias was submitted to Unnamed Conspirator

7 #5’s ID.me account. Unnamed Conspirator #5 also submitted a fraudulent

8 Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield member ID and a W2 from Premier

9 Construction. According to the California Franchise Tax Board, this

10 company does not exist. This Colorado driver’s license had the same

11 license number as the one uploaded to Unnamed Conspirator #6’s ID.me

12 account.

13 42. On 10/21/2021, Unnamed Conspirator #5 sent Sandu a photo of

14 handwritten PII, including Unnamed Conspirator #5’s alias, the email

15 address gstoica989@yahoo.com, the phone number 352-678-8636, and the

16 confirmation number 37819826. The same day, Unnamed Conspirator #5

17 sent Sandu another photo of handwritten PII, including the name of

18 Unnamed Conspirator #6, the email address dmustata46@yahoo.com, the

19 phone number 626-691-8664, and the confirmation number 37819912. Bank

20 of America records show $27,740 was withdrawn from Unnamed Conspirator

21 #5’s alias’s EDD account from ATMs in the CDCA. A balance inquiry was

22 conducted in the Southern District of California. ATM footage confirms

23 Unnamed Conspirator #5 was the subject withdrawing the funds on several

24 occasions. As of 12/29/2022 his account has a $10 balance.

25
26

15
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1 43. Some conspirators, named and unnamed, were identified as

2 having conspired with Sandu through the digital fingerprint1 associated

3 to the device used to create, log in or manipulate their ID.me accounts2.

4 Four devices were associated to applications conducted by members of

5 the conspiracy. Devices 1-4 were attributed to Sandu through

6 conversations and applications. Device 2 was used to create/manipulate

7 the ID.me accounts for Unnamed Conspirator #7, Unnamed Conspirator #8,

8 Unnamed Conspirator #9 and Unnamed Conspirator #10. Bank of America

9 records confirm $28,340 was withdrawn from Unnamed Conspirator #7’s

10 account, from ATMs and tellers in the Southern District of California

11 and elsewhere in California. As of 12/29/2022, the account has a balance

12 of $1,577.65.

13 44. Bank of America records confirm $48,300 was withdrawn from

14 Unnamed Conspirator #8’s account, from ATMs and tellers in the Southern

15 District of California, elsewhere in California, and Texas. As of

16 12/29/2022, the account has a balance of $0. Bank of America records

17 confirm $26,220 was withdrawn from Unnamed Conspirator #9’s account

18 from ATMs and tellers in the Southern District of California, elsewhere

19 in California, Texas, Nevada, and Arizona. As of 12/29/2022, the account

20 has a balance of $50. Bank of America records confirm over $19,000 was

21 withdrawn from Unnamed Conspirator #10’s account, from ATMs and tellers

22 in the Southern District of California and elsewhere in California. As

23 of 12/29/2022, the account remains open and has a balance of $7,119.

24
1 A device fingerprint is a unique identifier (aggregated hash value) associated
25 with a user’s device, from the hardware, operating system, audio stack, and its
configuration. Browser fingerprinting refers to the process of collecting
26 information through java script to create a fingerprint of a device.

2 On October 5, 2020, EDD partnered with an internet-based verification company,
27
ID.me, to verify the identity of EDD applicants. The EDD application would prompt
applicants to create an ID.me profile, upload identification documents, and undergo
28 a live video verification session with an ID.me representative.

16
Case 3:23-cr-00386-LAB Document 1 Filed 03/02/23 PageID.17 Page 17 of 17

1 G. Conclusions

2 45. Between September 2020 and August 2022, Sandu conspired with

3 214 known persons and others unknown to commit wire fraud. Sandu was

4 the center of the conspiracy enabling the State of California to be

5 defrauded by hundreds of millions, with a total loss of no less than

6 $5,207,687.00. Therefore, I do believe there is substantial probable

7 cause for a criminal complaint to be filed against defendant Sandu for

8 Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 1349, Title 18, United

9 States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28, United States Code

10 Section 2461(c).

25
26

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