Commercial Aviation: Key Lessons from COVID-19 (GAO, 2024)
Summary
GAO-24-106754, a U.S. Government Accountability Office report to congressional addressees dated March 18, 2024, on lessons from COVID-19 preparedness and emergency financial assistance to commercial aviation. It reports that airline traffic fell to 3 million passengers in April 2020, a 96 percent decrease from April 2019, and that the federal government provided $132 billion in assistance to airlines, other businesses and airports. GAO states that the Department of Transportation has not developed the aviation preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks that GAO recommended in 2015. Its four financial-assistance lessons, drawn from the Payroll Support Program, the CARES Act loan program, Airport Grants and the Aviation Manufacturing Jobs Protection program, cover safeguards, program paths, communication and workforce retention.
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United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Addressees
COMMERCIAL
March 2024
AVIATION
Key Lessons from
COVID-19
Preparedness and
Emergency Financial
Assistance to the
Industry
GAO-24-106754
March 2024
COMMERCIAL AVIATION
Key Lessons from COVID-19 Preparedness and
Emergency Financial Assistance to the Industry
Highlights of GAO-24-106754, a report to
congressional addressees
Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found
The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in A key lesson from GAO’s prior work is that greater federal leadership could
catastrophic loss of life and profoundly benefit both aviation pandemic preparedness and disease mitigation research.
affected the aviation industry. In April
2020, U.S. commercial airline traffic fell • The Department of Transportation (DOT) has not developed a national
to 3 million passengers, a 96 percent aviation preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks as GAO
decrease from April 2019. The federal recommended in 2015. Such a plan is needed to avoid the piecemeal
government responded in many ways, response seen early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Stakeholders GAO spoke to
including by providing $132 billion in in 2020 and 2021 said confidence in air travel could have been restored
financial assistance to airlines, aviation more quickly with greater federal coordination. At GAO’s urging, Congress
and other businesses, and airports. passed legislation in December 2022 requiring DOT to develop the plan.
GAO was asked to identify lessons • In July 2022, GAO reported that federal leadership was needed to advance
from COVID-19. This report examines research on disease transmission in air travel, including real-world situations
key lessons GAO identified from the and the effectiveness of mitigation efforts. GAO recommended Congress
federal government’s (1) preparedness direct the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop a research
and response to disease transmission strategy, which Congress had not done as of March 2024.
in air travel and (2) financial assistance
to the aviation industry. DOT and FAA officials stated in 2023 and 2024 that they have actions underway
to develop the preparedness plan and identify needed research. By implementing
GAO reviewed its body of work on
aviation and the pandemic, which
GAO’s recommendations, DOT and other aviation stakeholders would be better
includes over 20 reports, to identify positioned to address a communicable disease threat while minimizing
relevant lessons. GAO also reviewed unnecessary aviation disruptions which were significant in the case of COVID-19.
documents from offices of inspector Key lessons from GAO’s work on four COVID-19 aviation financial assistance
general and aviation stakeholders as programs— the Department of the Treasury’s Payroll Support Program (PSP)
well as interviewed officials from DOT and CARES Act loan program and DOT’s Airport Grants and Aviation
and Treasury. Manufacturing Jobs Protection Program—include the following.
What GAO Recommends • Financial and other safeguards, when developed before distributing
GAO previously made one assistance, can help agencies minimize risks associated with emergency
recommendation to DOT and two funding. DOT and Treasury quickly awarded funds but did not always have
matters for Congress on federal safeguards in place in a timely manner. For instance, Treasury did not
leadership. Congress addressed one quickly implement a monitoring plan for PSP.
matter by requiring DOT to develop a
preparedness plan for disease • Multiple programs or paths within a program may better accommodate
outbreaks. DOT needs to develop the businesses of varying types and sizes. Businesses eligible for the PSP and
plan to address GAO’s 2015 loan programs ranged from large airlines to ticket agents with a handful of
recommendation, which DOT aims to employees. Large airlines viewed the programs favorably, but small
do by the end of 2024. For the other businesses reported challenges accessing funds.
matter, Congress has not yet directed
• Clear communication with eligible entities is important for new or expanded
FAA to develop a communicable
funding programs. Some program applicants reported confusion—e.g., small
disease research strategy. GAO will
continue to monitor the federal COVID- businesses new to applying for federal funding—regarding issues such as
19 response, including DOT's and eligibility requirements and expected funding time frames.
Treasury’s plans to gather aviation • Workforce retention requirements were a part of all four programs, but
lessons learned. airlines still struggled with sufficient staffing to handle air traffic when it
View GAO-24-106754. For more information,
recovered. The aviation industry credited the funding programs, especially
contact Heather Krause at (202) 512-2834 or the PSP, in providing critical support. But factors such as early retirements
krauseh@gao.gov. and pauses on employee training also affected airline workforce levels.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Background 4
Aviation Pandemic Preparedness and Disease Mitigation
Research Could Benefit from Greater Federal Leadership 8
Four Key Lessons Could Help Agencies Manage Future
Emergency Financial Assistance to the Aviation Industry 13
Agency Comments 29
Appendix I GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 32
Related GAO Products 33
Table
Table 1: Selected Federal Programs Providing Financial
Assistance to the Aviation Industry and Certain Other
Eligible Businesses in Response to the COVID-19
Pandemic 7
Page i GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Abbreviations
AMJP Aviation Manufacturing Jobs Protection program
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DOT Department of Transportation
ERC employee retention credit
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
Loan program CARES Act Section 4003 Loan Program
OIG Office of Inspector General
PPP Paycheck Protection Program
PSP Payroll Support Program
SARS sudden acute respiratory syndrome
TSA Transportation Security Administration
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Page ii GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Letter
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
March 18, 2024
Congressional Addressees
The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in catastrophic loss of life and damage
to the global economy, with the U.S. aviation industry among many
industries profoundly affected. U.S. commercial airline passenger traffic
reached its lowest levels in April 2020, when traffic fell to 3 million
passengers system-wide, a 96 percent decrease from April 2019. 1 The
federal government responded in many ways, including by providing $132
billion in financial assistance to airlines, aviation and other businesses,
and airports.
We began reporting on COVID-19 within months of the pandemic, first
testifying on aviation and COVID-19 in June 2020. 2 While the pandemic
was unfolding, we continued to regularly report on the response by the
federal government and aviation industry. Our work in this area spans
over 20 products, including comprehensive reports and testimonies. 3 We
made a number of recommendations and matters for congressional
consideration as well as identified lessons learned regarding the COVID-
19 response. As the federal public health emergency for COVID-19
expired on May 11, 2023, there is an opportunity to gather lessons
1GAO, COVID-19 Pandemic: Observations on the Ongoing Recovery of the Aviation
Industry, GAO-22-104429 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2021).
2See GAO, Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Status of Research Efforts and
Action Still Needed to Develop Federal Preparedness Plan, GAO-20-655T (Washington,
D.C.: June 23, 2020). The World Health Organization characterized COVID-19 as a
pandemic on March 11, 2020.
3The CARES Act of 2020 included a provision for GAO to report regularly on the effects of
the pandemic and the federal response. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010(c),
134 Stat. 281, 580 (2020). We will continue our oversight of the federal response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. As part of this work, we plan to examine the Department of
Transportation’s and the Department of Treasury’s plans to gather aviation lessons
learned from the pandemic. For all of GAO’s COVID-19 oversight reports, see
https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus.
Page 1 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
learned from our prior work to better prepare the aviation sector for future
communicable disease outbreaks. 4
The CARES Act includes a provision for us to report on our ongoing
monitoring and oversight efforts related to the COVID-19 pandemic. 5 This
report is a part of that body of work. We also were asked to assess the
response to COVID-19 and provide lessons learned that could assist with
pandemic preparedness planning as it pertains to aviation. This report
examines key lessons we have identified from the federal government’s
(1) preparedness for and response to COVID-19 disease transmission in
air travel and (2) financial assistance to support the aviation industry
during the COVID-19 pandemic.
For both objectives, we reviewed our body of work on COVID-19 and
aviation, encompassing over 20 products from June 2020 to July 2023. In
this prior work, we interviewed stakeholders about their perspectives,
including representatives from selected industry associations, airlines,
and airports. We reviewed these products to identify lessons regarding
preparedness, response, and financial assistance. We also examined our
findings specific to aviation and the pandemic. For this study, we also
interviewed officials from the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the
Department of the Treasury to learn about the current status of DOT’s
and Treasury’s programs and prior GAO recommendations, as well as to
gain the agencies’ perspectives on lessons learned.
For this study we also reviewed the following:
• Reports from Offices of Inspector General (OIG)—specifically the
DOT OIG, Treasury OIG, and the Special Inspector General for
Pandemic Recovery.
• Documents and reports from industry associations and other aviation
stakeholders, such as relevant testimonies from airline
representatives.
4The Secretary of Health and Human Services first declared a public health emergency
under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act on January 31, 2020. On March 13,
2020, the President declared COVID-19 a national emergency under the National
Emergencies Act and subsequently a nationwide emergency under section 501(b) of the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). The
national emergency declaration terminated on April 10, 2023, and the Stafford Act
declarations terminated on May 11, 2023.
5Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010(b)-(c), 134 Stat. 281, 580 (2020).
Page 2 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
• Academic and policy papers published from 2020 through 2023 that
we identified through a literature search. The literature search focused
on lessons learned from the federal response to COVID-19 disease
transmission on aircraft and from federal financial assistance to
support the aviation industry during the pandemic.
• Documents from DOT and Treasury, such as presentations on
communicable disease research efforts by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and financial assistance program status
documentation.
To identify lessons learned from the federal financial assistance provided
to the aviation industry, we focused on four key programs that were
authorized under COVID-19 relief legislation and were largely designed to
provide direct assistance the aviation industry: the Payroll Support
Program (PSP), the CARES Act loan program (loan program), Airport
Grants, and the Aviation Manufacturing Jobs Protection program (AMJP).
Other COVID-19 federal assistance the aviation industry was eligible for
was outside the scope of our review, such as the suspension of aviation
excise taxes, 6 programs such as the Paycheck Protection Program and
6Congress suspended through calendar year 2020 certain aviation excise taxes on air
transport of people, cargo, and aviation fuel. CARES Act, Pub. L 116-136, § 4007, 134
Stat. 281, 477 (2020). In October 2020, Congress appropriated $14 billion to the Airport
and Airway Trust Fund, the income of which had been affected by reduced revenues from
air travel during the pandemic and the CARES Act’s suspension of aviation excise taxes.
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2021 and Other Extensions Act, Pub. L. No. 116-159, §
1205, 134 Stat. 709, 728 (2020).
Page 3 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
the Main Street Lending Program, 7 and various employer and business
tax provisions. 8
We conducted this performance audit from April 2023 to March 2024 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
The Effect of COVID-19 on The COVID-19 pandemic, along with public health-related restrictions and
the U.S. Aviation Industry precautions taken by consumers, resulted in an extraordinary shock to
the economy and the aviation industry. The airline industry has been
affected by several past shocks, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the
2003 sudden acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak. However,
COVID-19 caused an unprecedented and sudden reduction in demand
for U.S. passenger airlines. As the industry group Airlines for America
testified to Congress, passenger traffic levels dropped to levels that had
7For our most recent report examining the Main Street Lending Program, see GAO,
Federal Reserve Lending Programs: Status of Monitoring and Main Street Lending
Program, GAO-24-106482 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2023).
8Starting in March 2020, Congress passed several laws providing employers with tax
relief. One tax provision in these laws was the Employee Retention Credit (ERC),
encouraging employers to keep employees on their payroll. An eligible employer was able
to claim the ERC in 2020 when it experienced either (1) full or partial suspension of
operations due to government orders during any quarter or (2) a significant decline in
gross receipts, more than 50 percent for the same quarter in 2019. We reported that
industries involved in air transportation and warehousing claimed about $621 million in
ERCs, while those involved in the manufacturing of transportation equipment claimed
about $393 million in ERCs in 2020. We found the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) took
some steps to plan for compliance risks associated with the ERC. However, we made five
recommendations, including that IRS develop a compliance plan consistent with project
management principles, document compliance processes for adjusted returns and tax
credits using restricted wages, and identify ineligible entities. IRS agreed with two of the
recommendations and disagreed with three, stating that its current processes are
sufficient. GAO maintained that the recommendations were warranted. See GAO, COVID-
19: IRS Implemented Tax Relief for Employers Quickly, but Could Strengthen Its
Compliance Efforts, GAO-22-104280 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2022).
Page 4 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
not been seen since the 1950s as a result of COVID-19. 9 Air travel, more
than any other transportation mode, creates the potential for
communicable disease to move quickly from one part of the world to
another. 10
Although the industry entered the COVID-19 crisis in a relatively strong
financial position, U.S. passenger airlines lost billions from 2020-2022,
according to Airlines for America. The recovery of air traffic and industry
profitability also took time. After plummeting in 2020, passenger demand
for air travel started rebounding in spring 2021 and began to reach and
exceed pre-pandemic levels in 2023. The International Air Transport
Association reported that U.S. domestic traffic grew above pre-pandemic
levels in January 2023. 11
Pandemic Preparation and In the U.S., preparing for, assessing, and responding to communicable
Response disease threats in the civil aviation system require immense coordination
among several federal agencies and aviation stakeholders, such as
airports and airlines. Each federal agency has a different mission, which
affects its role in protecting against communicable disease threats.
According to DOT officials, leadership roles can vary depending on the
situation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) can lead the federal government’s
response to a communicable disease threat. Examples of agency roles
include the following:
• DHS’s component agency, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), focuses on securing the nation’s transportation sector,
including aviation. This involves screening passengers and issuing
security requirements with which airlines and airports must comply.
Meanwhile, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), also within
DHS, processes international travelers at airports and other ports of
entry.
9Prepare for Takeoff: America’s Safe Return to Air Travel, Hearing on SR-253, Before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation Subcommittee on
Aviation Safety, Operations, and Innovation, 117th Cong. (2021) (statement of Nick Calio,
President and CEO, Airlines for America).
10GAO-20-655T.
11International Air Transport Association, Air Passenger Market Analysis: January 2023
(Geneva, Switzerland, March 8, 2023).
Page 5 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
• The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), within HHS,
protects the nation from public health threats, both foreign and
domestic.
• FAA, within DOT, is the principal federal agency responsible for
overseeing civil aviation and the safe and efficient movement of air
traffic in the national airspace system. In addition, FAA supports and
coordinates a range of research and development activities for the
civil aviation system. DOT also has authorities related to international
air transport agreements, among other responsibilities.
In our December 2015 report addressing communicable disease threats
to aviation, such as Ebola and SARS, we recommended that DOT work
with relevant stakeholders, such as DHS and HHS, to develop a
comprehensive aviation preparedness plan for communicable disease
outbreaks. 12 However, at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, DOT had
not implemented this recommendation. In our 2015 report, we explained
that such a plan would provide airports and airlines with an adaptable and
scalable framework with which to integrate their individual plans and
promote harmonization across airports and airlines. 13 We also noted that
an international aviation treaty, to which the U.S. is a signatory,
establishes a standard that obligates member states to develop such a
plan. 14
At the time of our 2015 report, DOT agreed that a plan was needed but
suggested that agencies that have both the legal authority and expertise
for emergency response and public health—namely HHS and DHS—
were best positioned to take the lead role in developing such a plan. We
have maintained that DOT is in the best position to lead a multiagency
effort to develop the plan given its responsibility in overseeing the aviation
12GAO, Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Comprehensive Federal Plan Needed for
U.S. Aviation System’s Preparedness, GAO-16-127 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2015).
13The extent to which individual U.S. airports and airlines have individual preparedness
plans for communicable disease threats is unknown, as no federal agency tracks this
information. See GAO-20-655T.
14ICAO adopts standards and recommended practices in accordance with Article 37 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) in order for all contracting
states (including the U.S.) to have the highest practicable degree of uniformity in
regulations, standards, and procedures in relation to air navigation and transportation.
ICAO’s Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention provides a standard for contracting states to
“establish a national aviation plan in preparation for an outbreak of a communicable
disease posing a public health risk or public health emergency of international concern.”
Page 6 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
industry. We describe DOT’s efforts to address our recommendation,
which remains open, later in this report.
Federal COVID-19 Congress passed three COVID-19 relief laws in 2020 and 2021 that made
Emergency Financial $132 billion in assistance available for airlines, aviation and other
businesses, and airports across four selected programs (see table 1 for
Assistance to the Aviation an overview of these programs). 15 Two of these programs—the Payroll
Industry Support Program (PSP) 16 and the Airport Grants Program 17 were funded
in each of the three laws. The other two programs were each funded
once. Specifically, the March 2020 CARES Act provided funding to
Treasury’s loan program. 18 In addition, the American Rescue Plan Act of
March 2021 provided funding to the Aviation Manufacturing Jobs
Protection Program (AMJP). DOT, along with Treasury, undertook new
responsibilities and, where appropriate, set up new programs to distribute
these funds.
Table 1: Selected Federal Programs Providing Financial Assistance to the Aviation Industry and Certain Other Eligible
Businesses in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
Program and purpose Available funds Funding actual amounts as Department
of December 31, 2023 overseeing
program
Payroll Support Program (PSP): Exclusively for employee $63 billiona $58.9 billion in payments Department of
wages, salaries, and benefits of passenger airlines, cargo the Treasury
airlines, and aviation contractors
CARES Act Loan Program: Provided liquidity to $46 billionb Of $21.9 billion in loans Treasury
passenger airlines, cargo airlines, repair stations, ticket executed, about $2.7 billion
agents, and national security businesses disbursedc
Airport Grants: Supported U.S. airports (and starting with $20 billion $18.1 billion in payments Department of
the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021, certain airport Transportation
tenants) experiencing disruption caused by the pandemic (DOT)
15CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020); Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116–260, 134 Stat. 1182 (2020); American Rescue Plan Act of
2021, Pub. L. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (2021).
16Specifically, the CARES Act of March 2020 made $32 billion available; the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 of December 2020 made $16 billion available; and the American
Rescue Plan Act of March 2021 made $15 billion available.
17Specifically, the CARES Act of March 2020 made $10 billion available; the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2021 of December 2020 made $2 billion available; and the American
Rescue Plan Act of March 2021 made $8 billion available.
18This program is sometimes referred to as the Section 4003 Loan Program in reference
to the section of the CARES Act that authorized it. Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 4003, 134 Stat.
281, 470 (2020). We refer to it as the “CARES Act loan program” or simply “loan program”
throughout this report.
Page 7 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Program and purpose Available funds Funding actual amounts as Department
of December 31, 2023 overseeing
program
Aviation Manufacturing Jobs Protection Program $3 billion $681 million disbursedd DOT
(AMJP): Provided payroll support to eligible businesses for
employee wages, salaries, and benefits, and to facilitate the
retention, rehire, or recall of employees
Source: GAO analysis of information from Treasury and DOT. | GAO-24-106754
Note: This table does not specify unobligated balances from these programs which may have been
permanently rescinded through subsequent legislation, such as the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023,
Pub. L. No 118-5, 137 Stat. 10.
a
Up to $54 billion for passenger airlines, $4 billion for cargo airlines, and $5 billion for aviation
contractors.
b
Up to $25 billion for passenger airlines; businesses certified to perform inspection, repair, replace, or
overhaul services; and ticket agents. Up to $4 billion for cargo airlines and $17 billion for businesses
critical to maintaining national security.
c
Seven borrowers—all passenger airlines—did not draw down the full authorized amount of their
loans.
d
According to DOT officials, the lower amount disbursed from this program was due to several
reasons, such as a lower total amount of funding requested by applicants, some eligible applicants
not accepting awards, and DOT reducing the amount of some awards during post-award oversight.
As of November 2023, DOT officials noted that the program was largely concluded.
The key lesson for both pandemic preparedness and disease
Aviation Pandemic transmission research is the need for greater federal leadership. First, we
Preparedness and have found that a comprehensive national plan could help the U.S.
aviation system avoid a piecemeal approach to preparedness. Second,
Disease Mitigation increased federal leadership in research could help inform future actions
Research Could to mitigate disease spread.
Benefit from Greater
Federal Leadership
Comprehensive National We reported in June 2020 that both the federal government and the
Plan Could Help Avoid aviation industry took several actions early in the pandemic intended to
help limit the spread of COVID-19 through air travel. We stated at the
Piecemeal Response to
time that while these actions were helpful, some aviation stakeholders
Future Communicable publicly highlighted the piecemeal nature of the response efforts, which
Disease Outbreaks may have contributed to confusion in the early pandemic. 19 Below are
some of the actions taken in response to the pandemic and the
perspectives shared by selected aviation stakeholders during our prior
audit work:
19GAO-20-655T.
Page 8 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
• Travel restrictions and enhanced health screenings.
Implementation issues with travel restrictions resulted in confusion
and crowding at some airports in March 2020. Starting in January
2020, the White House issued executive actions to restrict air travel to
the U.S. for some individuals with recent travel in countries with high
COVID-19 transmission rates. For example, on March 11, 2020, the
Trump administration announced presidential proclamations
restricting air travel from Europe that went into effect on March 13,
2020. DHS also required that flights carrying persons with recent
travel in certain countries arrive at specified airports and undergo
enhanced health screenings by CDC. 20 We reported in June 2021 that
there were significant delays in processing travelers at Chicago
O’Hare International Airport on the first full day of travel restrictions
from Europe in March 2020. According to airport and CBP officials we
interviewed at the time, implementation issues with the travel
restrictions caused thousands of travelers to wait for hours without
access to food, water, or bathrooms. 21
• Policies to protect passenger and employee health. Individual
airlines and airports took steps to mitigate the spread of COVID-19
and to protect passenger and employee health in 2020. Specific
actions included the following: enhancing cleaning protocols, requiring
and providing masks, implementing social distancing (i.e., blocking
the sale of middle seats to allow for greater distancing between
passengers), implementing contactless technology to reduce
interaction between employees and passengers, and allowing
employees to work from home when possible. In July 2020, DOT,
HHS, and DHS issued Runway to Recovery to provide guidance to
airports and airlines on measures to mitigate disease, such as social
distancing. This document was most recently updated in December
2020. 22 However, we reported in October 2021 that representatives
from one airport told us that inconsistent passenger procedures
20For these enhanced screenings, travelers were to be observed for signs of illness, have
their temperature taken, complete a questionnaire about symptoms and COVID-19
exposure, and provide U.S. contact information. In September 2020, CDC ceased these
screenings, stating that it would instead dedicate resources to other mitigation strategies.
See GAO, Transportation Security: TSA Efforts to Coordinate with Stakeholders on
COVID-19 Security Directives, GAO-22-104583 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2022).
21GAO, Border Security: CBP’s Response to COVID-19, GAO-21-431 (Washington, D.C.:
June 14, 2021).
22See U.S. Departments of Transportation, Homeland Security, and Health and Human
Services, Runway to Recovery: The United States Framework for Airlines and Airports to
Mitigate the Public Health Risks of Coronavirus, Version 1.1 (Washington, D.C.:
December 2020).
Page 9 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
between origin and destination airports were a major challenge, and
that the federal government plays a pivotal role in restoring passenger
confidence in flying. Furthermore, aviation stakeholders we spoke with
in 2020 and early 2021 told us that confidence in air travel could have
been restored more quickly if the federal government had provided
greater coordination and guidance earlier in the pandemic. 23
• Federal face mask requirement. On January 31, 2021, DHS and
TSA issued security directives that required face masks to be worn by
passengers and employees on transportation systems, including
aviation. 24 We reported in March 2022 that industry stakeholders we
spoke with stated that TSA coordinated positively and effectively
overall when issuing the COVID-19 related security directives. 25
Specifically, we reported that TSA officials reached out to airlines and
airports through a series of conference calls and emails. In addition,
officials from DOT and its component agencies previously told us that
they were also included and participated in TSA outreach efforts to
industry stakeholders about the face mask requirement and also
provided additional resources for operators. However, industry
stakeholders we interviewed for our March 2022 report raised some
implementation issues with the security directives. For example, some
of these stakeholders noted that better guidance and signage from
TSA prior to the release of the directives could have better informed
the public that the face mask directive was a federal requirement.
As we reported in October 2021, FAA also took actions early in the
pandemic to gather and respond to airport operators’ and other
stakeholders’ questions and concerns, and to grant specific and
temporary regulatory relief in response to requests from airlines and other
industry associations. 26 FAA created a rapid response team that was a
focal point for gathering and responding to such questions and concerns
in March 2020. According to FAA officials we interviewed for our October
2021 report, the team’s main purpose was to create a channel of
communication with industry, quickly tackle any issue brought to its
attention, and elevate issues that needed broader attention. The team
23GAO-22-104429.
24See GAO-22-104583. Transp. Sec. Admin., SD 1582/84-21-01, Security Measures –
Mask Requirements (2021). The U.S. mask mandates ended, and most airlines stopped
requiring them, in April 2022.
25GAO-22-104583.
26GAO-22-104429.
Page 10 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
had cataloged over 750 requests for information and policy decisions at
the time of our October 2021 report.
In addition, airlines and aviation associations sought FAA’s assistance to
ease regulatory and operational requirements that they said negatively
affected the safety and continuity of operations. The airline
representatives we interviewed for our October 2021 report credited FAA
for its quick actions in support of continuing operations. For example, one
airline stated that by allowing flight attendants to sit in seats throughout
the plane at a distance from crewmembers and passengers (not in their
designated jump seat), FAA likely helped airlines reduce the spread of the
virus.
After the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, in June 2020, we urged
Congress to require DOT to develop a national aviation preparedness
plan for communicable disease outbreaks. 27 As described above, we had
previously recommended in 2015 that DOT develop such a plan, but the
recommendation remains unaddressed. In June 2020 we emphasized
that the absence of a national plan undermined the ability of the public
health and aviation sectors to coordinate on a response or provide
consistent guidance to airports and airlines. We also noted the plan could
serve as the basis for testing communication mechanisms among
responders and to ensure staff have received appropriate training to
reduce exposure. Furthermore, we noted that the existence of a national
plan might have reduced some of the confusion among aviation
stakeholders and passengers early in the pandemic. In December 2022,
Congress passed legislation which requires DOT to develop an aviation
preparedness plan for communicable disease outbreaks. 28
In March 2024, DOT officials told us that the plan has been drafted and is
being coordinated internally within FAA, with a target delivery date at the
end of the 2024 calendar year. DOT officials said that they have used
lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as from the Ebola,
SARS, and other communicable disease outbreaks, to inform the draft
plan. According to DOT officials, the need for communication and
collaboration is a key lesson the department learned from the pandemic.
Specifically, DOT officials identified the need to share information early
27GAO, COVID-19: Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery Efforts,
GAO-20-625 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2020).
28Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-328, § 105, 136 Stat. 4459,
5253-55 (2022). This legislation also directs GAO to assess the plan.
Page 11 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
and often, maintain relationships across the U.S. government and
industry, and leverage knowledge through a multi-disciplinary approach.
Finalizing the forthcoming plan, including incorporating lessons learned
from the pandemic, will better position DOT and other aviation
stakeholders to address a communicable disease threat while minimizing
unnecessary aviation disruptions, which as mentioned above, were
significant in the case of COVID-19.
Increased Federal Another key lesson we identified is that federal leadership is needed to
Leadership in Research advance research on communicable diseases in air travel to better
understand the effectiveness of various disease mitigation efforts. In July
Could Help Inform
2022, we found that such research we identified at the time had
Agencies’ and Industry’s limitations that could be addressed by improved federal leadership. For
Future Actions to Mitigate example, we identified research conducted in several areas—such as
Disease Spread how air moves in an aircraft and the effect of different airline operations
on potential disease transmission. 29 However, stakeholders we
interviewed told us that more research is needed that incorporates the
real-world environment and human behavior in air travel. These
stakeholders also identified challenges to conducting research that could
help address knowledge gaps, such as researchers’ inability to access
aircraft, airports, or data. As we reported in July 2022, federal leadership
could help overcome these challenges by linking researchers with
aviation stakeholders. Furthermore, additional research, facilitated by
greater federal leadership, could inform the development of evidence-
based mitigation measures to protect employees, passengers, and the
public.
In its December 2020 Runway to Recovery guidance on mitigating the
risks of COVID-19, DOT, HHS, and DHS acknowledged the need for the
U.S. government to continue to evaluate evolving risk reduction
opportunities and to provide additional revisions to the guidance as
lessons are learned and risk conditions change. New information about
how communicable diseases are transmitted in air travel, and how to
mitigate this transmission, can improve not only existing guidance, but
also future policies and regulations.
In our July 2022 report, we recommended Congress consider directing
FAA to develop and implement a strategy to identify and advance needed
research on communicable diseases in air travel, in coordination with
29GAO, Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Federal Leadership Needed to Advance
Research, GAO-22-104579 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2022).
Page 12 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
appropriate federal agencies—such as DHS and HHS—and external
partners. As of March 2024, Congress had not passed legislation to
address this matter. 30
Although FAA has not developed and implemented a strategy specific to
research on communicable disease in air travel, FAA officials we
interviewed in September 2023 said the agency has taken steps to
identify needed research. Specifically, FAA officials reported that they are
integrating communicable disease threats into their aviation safety
framework through the agency’s safety risk management process. 31 FAA
officials reported that doing so will provide the agency with tools they can
eventually incorporate into DOT’s comprehensive national plan to better
prepare for communicable disease outbreaks. FAA officials said they
initiated a safety risk management team that includes DHS and HHS in
January 2022. As of September 2023, FAA officials reported that they
had recently confirmed the knowledge gaps that GAO identified in its
2022 report regarding the need for additional information that reflect the
real-world aviation operations and behaviors. To address these gaps,
FAA officials said they are working with other agencies and entities to
better understand the transmission of disease in air travel as well as to
measure the effectiveness of potential countermeasures.
Four Key Lessons
Could Help Agencies
Manage Future
Emergency Financial
Assistance to the
Aviation Industry
30In May 2023, the Healthy Air Travel Act was introduced in the House of
Representatives. The bill directs FAA to develop an interagency task force to develop and
implement a strategy to identify and advance research on communicable diseases in air
travel, and other related purposes. Healthy Air Travel Act, H.R. 3679, 118th Cong. (2023).
31Safety risk management is designed to identify potential safety hazards, assess the
risks arising from those hazards, and develop mitigation plans to reduce or eliminate those
risks.
Page 13 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Agencies Can Minimize We previously found that DOT and Treasury awarded funds quickly to the
Risk by Developing aviation industry and eligible entities during the pandemic, given the
programs were designed to provide emergency assistance. However, as
Appropriate Financial and
we also found in our work on COVID-19 assistance programs more
Other Safeguards Before broadly, the agencies did not always develop or implement internal
Distributing Emergency controls or apply certain financial management practices in a timely
Funding manner. 32
DOT and Treasury took actions and leveraged resources to help award
funding quickly under challenging circumstances. Three of the four
assistance programs—Treasury’s Payroll Support Program (PSP),
Treasury’s CARES Act loan program, and DOT’s Aviation Manufacturing
Jobs Protection Program (AMJP)—were new and involved developing
new policies and procedures. The fourth program, Airport Grants, used
aspects of the existing Airport Improvement Program but expanded the
eligible use of funds. As we previously reported:
• For PSP, Treasury signed agreements with over half of 580 PSP
recipients within 2 months after the CARES Act was signed into law. 33
• For the CARES Act loan program, Treasury drew on its experience
aiding the private sector in times of crisis, enlisted external advisors,
and detailed staff from across the department. Treasury published
initial procedures for the loan program 3 days after enactment of the
CARES Act.
• For the Airport Grants program, FAA announced CARES Act funds for
more than 3,000 airports just 2 weeks after Congress passed the
legislation. FAA also established a dedicated team with prior airport
grant management experience to review and process payment
requests. 34
32Internal controls comprise the plans, methods, policies, and procedures used to fulfill the
mission, strategic plan, goals, and objectives of the entity, and go hand-in-hand with
effective financial and fraud risk management practices. See GAO, Emergency Relief
Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and Accountability
for COVID-19 and Beyond, GAO-22-105715 (Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2022).
33Similarly, for the second round of PSP funding, Treasury signed agreements with the 12
largest passenger airlines within 7 business days of their application. See GAO, COVID-
19: Sustained Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second Year,
GAO-21-387 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2021).
34GAO, COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Accountability and Program
Effectiveness of Federal Response, GAO-22-105051 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2021).
Page 14 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
• For AMJP, DOT officials said they established a process to accept
and review applications 90 days after the program was established. 35
Since the program was authorized later than other COVID-19 relief
programs, DOT had discussions with the Small Business
Administration and Treasury on how to administer the program based
on the experiences of other relief programs. 36
Although the agencies moved quickly to distribute funds, we and others
found instances in the PSP, the loan program, and Airport Grants
program where appropriate financial controls and safeguards were not in
place in a timely manner. 37 Examples from these three programs
showcase the importance of having safeguards in place when awarding
and monitoring funds, as well as of protecting the government interest.
• Awarding Funds. We and others have reported issues with a $700
million loan that Treasury made through the CARES Act loan program
to Yellow Corporation, a trucking company formerly known as YRC
Worldwide. While Yellow Corporation was not a part of the aviation
industry, the loan program was available to businesses critical to
maintaining national security. 38 We reported in December 2020 that
Treasury executed the loan in July 2020 before it had finalized
procedures for evaluating applications. 39 A May 2023 report by the
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery found internal
control weaknesses in Treasury’s approach to reviewing, approving,
35DOT officials said they initiated the process to seek emergency approval under the
Paperwork Reduction Act within 30 days of enactment, and 60 days later established a
process to accept and review applications.
36DOT also had discussions with these agencies regarding the types of data available
from other relief programs to enforce eligibility restrictions established by the AMJP
statute, according to DOT officials. AMJP eligibility restrictions are described later in this
report.
37For AMJP, a September 2023 DOT OIG report found that DOT appropriately managed
the program, with sufficient processes to validate applicant data, allocate funding, and
ensure funding was used lawfully. DOT OIG recommended that DOT conduct an after-
action review of AMJP to identify lessons learned and incorporate improvements into
future grant programs. DOT agreed with the recommendation and, as of March 2024,
DOT officials said the department had conducted an after-action review. See U.S.
Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, DOT Has Effectively Managed
the Aviation Manufacturing Jobs Protection Program and Should Capture Lessons
Learned From Its Oversight Efforts, AV2023045 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2023).
38Up to $17 billion of the total $46 billion Congress made available for the loan program
was designated for businesses critical to maintaining national security.
39GAO, Financial Assistance: Lessons Learned from CARES Act Loan Program for
Aviation and Other Eligible Businesses, GAO-21-198 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2020).
Page 15 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
and disbursing the loan. 40 Furthermore, a congressional investigation
found that White House officials overrode career officials’ assessment
that the company was not eligible for the loan and that Treasury made
the loan on terms that violated CARES Act requirements. 41
Although Yellow Corporation filed for bankruptcy, it repaid its $700
million loan, according to Yellow Corporation and Treasury officials.
On August 6, 2023, Yellow Corporation filed for bankruptcy. In
November 2023 Treasury officials said they were working through
Yellow Corporation’s bankruptcy process to recover the loan and
protect taxpayer interests. On February 5, 2024, Yellow Corporation
announced it had fully repaid its loan, including $700 million in
principal and more than $151 million in interest. In February 2024,
Treasury confirmed that the loan had been fully repaid.
• Conducting Post-Award Monitoring. We reported in November
2020 that Treasury did not implement post-payment controls in a
timely manner for PSP. Specifically, 3 months after the first quarterly
compliance reports were due, Treasury had not completed developing
and implementing a plan to monitor recipients’ compliance with PSP
agreement terms. 42 We recommended that Treasury finish developing
and implementing a compliance monitoring plan that identified and
responded to risks in the PSP program to ensure program integrity
and address potential fraud, including the use of funds for purposes
other than for the continuation of employee wages, salaries, and
benefits. In April 2021, we confirmed that Treasury had developed,
documented, and implemented a risk-based approach to monitor PSP
compliance.
For the loan program, the Special Inspector General for Pandemic
Recovery found that Treasury did not conduct timely monitoring of
loans. Specifically, although Treasury’s authority to make new loans
ended December 31, 2020, Treasury did not create a monitoring
40This report recommended Treasury develop a lessons learned report of the process
used to approve the loan to Yellow Corporation. Office of the Special Inspector General
for Pandemic Recovery Office of Audits, Audit of the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Process for Its Direct Loan to YRC Worldwide, Inc., SIGPR-A-22-005 (May 11, 2023).
41See Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, Preparing for and Preventing the
Next Public Health Emergency: Lessons Learned from the Coronavirus Crisis, December
2022. On June 27, 2023, the Congressional Oversight Commission published a special
report regarding the loan, available at https://coc.senate.gov/press-
releases/congressional-oversight-commission-publishes-special-final-report/.
42GAO, COVID-19: Urgent Actions Needed to Better Ensure an Effective Federal
Response, GAO-21-191 (Nov. 30, 2020).
Page 16 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
policy guide for the program until May 2022. 43 Finally, for Airport
Grants, the DOT OIG reported in July 2022 that FAA did not adopt all
the internal controls from the Airport Improvement Program, which
hampered the agency’s ability to detect and prevent improper
payments and monitor program performance. The DOT OIG made
recommendations to improve FAA’s internal controls and policies and
procedures for overseeing the Airport Grants program. In response,
DOT partially agreed with these recommendations and took actions to
better monitor the grant program and strengthen the program’s
internal controls through manual invoice reviews and updated
guidance. 44
• Exercising Warrants. Warrants give Treasury an option to buy stock
shares at a predetermined price or an equity interest in the company
and are a tool to help protect taxpayer investments. For the PSP and
the loan program, the CARES Act and subsequent legislation
authorized, or in the case of the loan program, required Treasury to
receive notes, warrants, or other financial instruments for providing
financial assistance. 45 As we reported in 2010, acquiring an
ownership interest in private companies can help protect taxpayers by
enabling the government to earn returns when it sells its shares. 46
However, we reported in October 2021 that Treasury had not
developed policies and procedures to ensure that warrants are acted
upon in a manner that would provide appropriate compensation to the
federal government. 47 As a result we recommended that Treasury
43Office of the Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery Office of Audits,
Weaknesses in Treasury’s CARES Act Loan Monitoring, SIGPR-A-22-002-2 (May 31,
2023).
44U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of Inspector General, FAA Quickly Awarded
CARES Act Funds but Can Enhance Its Oversight Approach To Promote Effective
Stewardship, AV2022032 (Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2022).
45In total across all rounds of PSP, the note principal amount that must be repaid by 36
recipients is $15.1 billion, and 14 recipients provided a total of 58 million warrants. Notes
are financial instruments, the value of which is a percentage of the assistance provided
and which must be repaid. For the loan program, Treasury received warrants from nine
passenger airlines equal to 10 percent of the total loan amount drawn. Treasury also
received shares equal to 29.6 percent of Yellow Corporation common stock as taxpayer
compensation.
46GAO, Financial Assistance: Ongoing Challenges and Guiding Principles Related to
Government Assistance for Private Sector Companies, GAO-10-719 (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 3, 2010).
47GAO-22-105051.
Page 17 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
develop policies and procedures to determine when to act on the PSP
and loan program warrants. Treasury implemented these
recommendations in March 2023 when it provided us with its guide for
determining when to act on the warrants, which better positions
Treasury to maximize the benefit to the federal government. As of
February 2024, Treasury officials said they have exercised its
warrants from one PSP recipient—Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc.
Our prior work identified significant shortcomings in the application of
fundamental internal controls and financial and fraud risk management
practices across several federal COVID-19 financial assistance programs,
beyond those offering assistance to the aviation industry. In March 2022,
we recommended 10 actions for congressional consideration to help
address these shortcomings. For example, we recommended that
Congress consider requiring the Office of Management and Budget to
provide guidance for agencies to develop internal controls plans in
advance of issuing funds, that can be put into immediate use for future
emergency funding. 48 Although federal laws have required agencies to
submit specific internal control plans for relief funds in previous
emergencies, there was no such requirement for the COVID-19
pandemic. By applying effective internal controls consistent with
nonemergency federal spending, agencies can distribute emergency
relief funding quickly while ensuring financial and other safeguards are in
place to minimize the risk of fraud and improper payments. As of
February 2024, Congress has taken no action on this matter.
DOT and Treasury officials we interviewed for this review identified
lessons learned and offered areas for Congress to help agencies
distribute funds quickly while ensuring oversight in the future. For
instance, Treasury officials said that in future emergency financial
assistance programs, Congress should try to resolve the conflict between
disbursing funds quickly and the complex process needed to validate
applicant identity, eligibility, and amount of awards. Treasury officials
suggested, for example, that Congress could simplify the processes for
validating the identity, eligibility and award amounts. According to these
officials, such actions would help reduce the agency workload and
program complexity, which they noted was significant for the COVID-19
programs. Similarly, DOT officials also stated that in the future, when
designing program eligibility restrictions, Congress should consider what
data are available to ensure compliance with such restrictions. DOT
48GAO-22-105715.
Page 18 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
officials said they faced challenges in verifying eligibility of some AMJP
applicants, because some of the eligibility criteria in the law would have
depended upon data that were not required by other relief programs. 49
Multiple Programs or Our prior work has shown that providing future emergency financial
Paths within a Program assistance through multiple programs or multiple paths within a program
may better accommodate businesses of varied types and sizes. As we
May Better Accommodate
previously reported, a broad range of private businesses were eligible for
Businesses of Varied the PSP and loan program, including ticket agents, repair station
Types and Sizes operators, and major passenger airlines. 50 These businesses ranged from
ticket agents with a handful of employees to passenger airlines with tens
of thousands of employees. Although many businesses were facing dire
financial circumstances brought about by the pandemic, smaller
businesses reported more challenges accessing the pandemic assistance
than large airlines.
Our work has shown that in terms of the amount of funding received,
timeliness of assistance, and overall perceived benefit of the programs,
large passenger airlines had a different experience with the PSP and loan
program than smaller eligible entities.
• Amount of Funding Received. Large passenger airlines received
over half of the $132 billion in total assistance Congress made
available across the four financial assistance programs in our review.
The amounts that large passenger airlines received were driven both
by how the programs were designed in statute as well as decisions
49By statute, businesses were ineligible to receive AMJP funds if they had either: (1)
received financial assistance from the first round of PSP; (2) were still expending
Paycheck Protection Program funds as of the date of application to the AMJP; or (3) under
DOT’s statutory interpretation were allowed the Employee Retention Credit for the quarter
immediately prior to the one an AMJP agreement was to be entered into if a company was
allowed the credit for a calendar quarter occurring prior to July 1, 2021. American Rescue
Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 7202, 135 Stat. 4, 176-182. See GAO-22-105051
and GAO, COVID-19: Current and Future Federal Preparedness Requires Fixes to
Improve Health Data and Address Improper Payments, GAO-22-105397 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 27, 2022).
50Many of these businesses were also eligible for assistance through the Small Business
Administration’s Paycheck Protection Program (PPP). The Paycheck Protection Program
and Health Care Enhancement Act appropriated a total of $670 billion for the PPP under
the Small Business Administration’s 7(a) small business lending program. PPP loans were
made at 1 percent interest and were fully forgiven if certain conditions were met. In
general, small businesses with 500 or fewer employees were eligible. We reported in
November 2020 that many PSP recipients also received PPP funds, which was permitted
if a business was eligible for both programs. See GAO-21-191. As mentioned earlier in
this report, we did not include PPP in the scope of this review.
Page 19 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
made by Treasury. 51 Specifically, the 10 largest passenger airlines
received $50 billion in PSP payments as of December 31, 2023.
Meanwhile, for the loan program, we reported that seven of these 10
major passenger airlines executed loans with Treasury for nearly $21
billion. 52 Although these large airlines represented seven of the 35
total loans Treasury made, their loans made up the overwhelming
majority of the approximately $22 billion in total loans Treasury made
through the program. 53 Meanwhile, we reported that out of 173
smaller passenger airlines, repair station operators, and ticket agents
that applied for the program, Treasury executed 16 loans for a total of
$440 million.
• Timeliness of Assistance. The largest passenger airlines were
among the earliest recipients of financial assistance. We reported in
September 2020 that Treasury officials said they prioritized the large
airlines’ applications over those of smaller businesses because they
were the largest employers and represented a significant amount of
jobs at stake. 54 Officials also said that the large airlines’ applications
were straightforward under the statutory formula because those
airlines are required to regularly report employee and salary data to
DOT. Other entities eligible for the PSP and loan program—
particularly regional and small aviation companies—reported
challenges accessing the assistance. For example, Treasury had
obligated approximately 85 percent of the total $32 billion
appropriated through the first round of the PSP by July 31, 2020.
However, we reported that some PSP applicants we interviewed in
late June and early July 2020 said that they had not heard from
Treasury as to whether they would receive funds, though they had
applied for PSP in April 2020. 55
51For the PSP, the three statutes made up to $54 billion available for passenger airlines
and specified the formula for calculating the awardable amounts for each recipient. For the
loan program, the CARES Act grouped passenger airlines together with repair station
operators and ticket agents and made up to $25 billion available for this group. In addition,
the statute designated up to $4 billion for cargo airlines and up to $17 billion for
businesses critical to maintaining national security.
52GAO-21-198.
53Of the nearly $21 billion awarded to the seven large passenger airlines, Treasury
disbursed about $1.6 billion as of January 1, 2024. These seven borrowers did not draw
down the full authorized amount of their loans, and they have all repaid their loans in full.
54GAO, COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and Concerted
Actions, GAO-20-701 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2020).
55GAO-20-701.
Page 20 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
• Perceived Benefit of the Programs. In our prior work, we found the
largest passenger airlines viewed the Treasury programs favorably.
For example, we reported in July 2021 that representatives from four
large passenger airlines we interviewed—two that applied for and
received loans and two that applied for but did not receive loans—
reported the existence of the loan program created liquidity in financial
markets. The two large airlines that received loans reported that the
program created liquidity that was critical to the airlines maintaining
operations. In addition, the two large passenger airlines that did not
receive Treasury loans were able to access loans through private
markets. These airline representatives credited the Treasury loan
program with increasing the confidence of lenders in private financial
markets to make loans to airlines. 56
We reported in July 2021 that Treasury officials noted the purpose of
this loan program was to provide liquidity, and they viewed the
continued operations of major airlines as an indicator of the program’s
success. Meanwhile, smaller businesses we interviewed reported
fewer benefits of the loan program than the large airlines. In July 2021
we reported that the cost of applying, in terms of time, dollars, and
missed opportunities, was more onerous for smaller businesses. 57 For
example, several small businesses we spoke to for that report said
they needed to hire outside counsel to assist with their applications. In
addition, smaller businesses that did not receive loans said the
program did not positively affect their ability to receive alternative
financing, with most unable to find financing to take the place of the
Treasury loan.
Treasury officials we interviewed for this review said that smaller entities
faced difficulties due to issues with applications and statutory
requirements, and that in future assistance, consideration should be given
to recipient capacity in designing program requirements. We previously
reported that Treasury officials noted that many small businesses that
applied for the loan program were unfamiliar with government programs
or the underwriting process. 58 In addition, according to Treasury officials,
many PSP applications from smaller airlines and contractors had
application issues, such as incomplete information. Officials said these
56GAO, COVID-19: Continued Attention Needed to Enhance Federal Preparedness,
Response, Service Delivery, and Program Integrity, GAO-21-551 (Washington, D.C.: July
19, 2021).
57GAO-21-551.
58GAO-21-198.
Page 21 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
issues took time to address before they could determine whether
applications met statutory requirements. According to the officials, the
concerns highlighted by smaller businesses reflected the loan program
structure and the conditions imposed by statute. For example, they said
that to meet the CARES Act requirements, Treasury undertook extensive
due diligence on each loan application to assess each applicant’s
financial position and ensure that loans were sufficiently secured or made
at a rate that reflected the risk of the loan. Treasury officials also said that
in the future, Congress should take into account the relative experience of
agencies in dealing with particular pools of applicants, such as small
businesses.
The pandemic affected industries differently, and in some situations,
Congress made changes to program eligibility for subsequent funding.
For example, Congress excluded cargo airlines from PSP after the
CARES Act, which had made up to $4 billion in PSP funds available to
cargo airlines. As we reported in October 2021, cargo airlines used only a
fraction of this funding, with 39 cargo airlines receiving over $828 million
in assistance. 59 As we reported, domestic cargo airlines experienced an
increased demand for service because of the larger number of people
staying home during the pandemic and the growth in e-commerce. A
similar approach of recognizing the needs and capabilities of businesses
affected by the crisis could help inform future emergency financial
assistance. In the case of the loan program, several associations we
interviewed for our December 2020 report said the program could have
been improved by creating two different paths for loans: one for large and
one for small businesses. Such an approach could potentially allow
applicants of different sizes and types to better take advantage of
programs for which they are eligible. 60
New or Expanded Funding Our prior work has shown that federal assistance to businesses facing
Programs Require Clear emergency circumstances requires clear and consistent information to
applicants and eligible entities. This is especially true when the federal
Communication with
assistance is provided through new or expanded programs. Three of the
Eligible Entities four programs providing federal assistance to the aviation industry,
including both Treasury programs and AMJP, were new programs. 61
These programs involved communicating new procedures to applicants
59GAO-22-104429.
60GAO-21-198.
61As mentioned above, the fourth program, Airport Grants, used aspects of an existing
program to provide funds to airports.
Page 22 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
that may be unfamiliar with accessing federal funds. While our prior work
showed agencies communicated with applicants and eligible entities, we
also found areas where communication could be improved.
In July 2021, we reported that for the PSP and loan program, Treasury
did not communicate clearly with applicants, particularly small
businesses. 62 Treasury officials we interviewed for this review said that
the emergency nature of the programs and emphasis on quickly
distributing funds limited the amount of time the department had to
conduct the outreach it typically does when implementing new programs.
• For our September 2020 report, industry associations representing
regional and small aviation companies reported the following:
confusion about eligibility and other requirements, lack of a direct
contact at Treasury, and lack of a mechanism to check on PSP
application status, among other issues. 63
• For the loan program, we reported in December 2020 that Treasury’s
initial application procedures did not communicate a timeline for the
program. As a result, businesses were unsure on time frames, which
they said complicated their financial decision-making. 64
• We also reported in December 2020 that Treasury viewed itself as a
lender of last resort when designing and implementing the loan
program, according to Treasury officials. However, as we reported at
that time, published information on Treasury’s website about the loan
program did not include this view, and many businesses expected
Treasury to make loans more quickly. 65 This omission led to some
applicants being surprised by parts of the process, such as when
Treasury encouraged over a third of all applicants to apply to another
loan program before continuing to pursue a loan from Treasury.
Treasury officials in November 2023 stated this is not accurate, noting
that the guidance Treasury issued on March 30, 2020, said that a
condition of borrower eligibility was “No Credit Elsewhere. The
borrower is an eligible business for which credit is not reasonably
available at the time of the transaction.”
62GAO, COVID-19 Pandemic: Actions Needed to Improve Federal Oversight of
Assistance to Individuals, Communities, and the Transportation Industry, GAO-21-105202
(Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2021).
63GAO-20-701.
64GAO-21-198.
65GAO-21-198.
Page 23 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Applicants generally reported better communication regarding funding
distributed through established DOT programs, although DOT faced
challenges communicating new eligible uses of funds and communicating
with businesses new to federal funding. In November 2020, we reported
that selected airport sponsors and airport association representatives said
that FAA generally provided timely communication for the Airport Grants
program. Specifically, they said that FAA provided timely guidance and
assistance on how to apply for federal funds and determine the eligibility
for and claim reimbursement for airport costs. 66 However, we also found
the following:
• We reported in July 2021 that airport representatives said that
determining eligibility for tenant relief, a new eligible use of these
funds, could be complex. 67 For example, airports had varying
agreements with tenants, and tenants were not often single entities.
To address some of these challenges, we reported that FAA provided
guidance on how to administer relief to tenants through FAQs posted
to FAA’s website and videoconferences. Airport associations
appreciated FAA’s response to airport inquiries.
• For AMJP, we reported in October 2021 that industry associations
were generally complimentary of DOT’s communication, although
some expressed challenges with the clarity of some DOT guidance. 68
According to DOT officials we interviewed for this review, AMJP was
challenging to manage in part because the applicants lacked
experience with federal financial assistance programs.
We previously reported that developing a comprehensive strategy for
communicating with participants would better prepare agencies in the
future to respond to longer-term, large-scale emergencies. 69 Such a
66GAO-21-191.
67Eligible airport tenants include airport car rental and in-terminal concessions. Starting
with the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, airport sponsors that accepted tenant
relief funds waived rent for eligible airport tenants. Sponsors provided FAA tenant relief
plans so that FAA could ensure that airport sponsors are providing relief according to the
law. See GAO-21-551.
68GAO-22-105051.
69We recommended the Small Business Administration develop a comprehensive strategy
for communicating with potential and actual program applicants in the event of a disaster.
The Small Business Administration agreed with the recommendation and reported that as
of February 2023, the development of a new disaster loan application portal is underway.
The recommendation remains open. See GAO, Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program:
Additional Actions Needed to Improve Communication with Applicants and Address Fraud
Risks, GAO-21-589 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2021).
Page 24 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
strategy would benefit both the agency and program participants. For
example, such communication could reduce applicant confusion and
uncertainty, while also lessening the burden on agency resources created
by applicants inquiring about status, posing questions, or submitting
duplicate applications.
Despite Workforce Although the aviation emergency financial assistance programs contained
Retention Requirements, workforce retention provisions, airlines still struggled with sufficient
staffing to handle air traffic when it recovered. This raised long-standing
Airlines Were Not Fully
industry concerns, which we have reported on, that new workers are not
Positioned to Respond entering the aviation industry at a pace sufficient to replace attrition and
when Demand for Air retirements and to support the industry’s projected growth. 70 We have
Travel Returned previously reported that when providing financial assistance to private
market participants, the federal government should separate out issues
that require an immediate response from structural challenges that will
take longer to resolve. 71 For example, we previously reported that in the
assistance to the auto industry in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008-
2009, Treasury identified a lack of liquidity as requiring immediate
attention and provided short-term assistance. To address that industry’s
structural challenges, Treasury required automakers to submit
restructuring plans in February 2009 that described how the companies
intended to achieve long-term financial viability. 72
Congress conditioned federal assistance to the aviation industry on
workforce retention. All four federal financial assistance programs
contained workforce retention requirements, meaning recipients were
required to refrain from reducing employment levels, such as through
70GAO most recently reviewed these issues in May 2023. See GAO, Aviation Workforce:
Current and Future Availability of Airline Pilots and Aircraft Mechanics, GAO-23-105571
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2023). See also GAO, Aviation Workforce: Current and
Future Availability of Airline Pilots, GAO-14-232 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2014), and
Current and Future Availability of Aviation Engineering and Maintenance Professionals,
GAO-14-237 (Washington D.C.: Feb. 28, 2014).
71GAO-10-719.
72GAO, Auto Industry: Summary of Government Efforts and Automakers’ Restructuring to
Date, GAO-09-553 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23, 2009).
Page 25 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
involuntary furloughs or terminations, for a specified amount of time. 73 In
addition, PSP and AMJP funds were to be used exclusively for the
salaries, wages, and benefits of employees.
The aviation industry credited these federal programs, especially PSP, for
providing critical and timely support that reduced the need for drastic
cost-cutting measures that could have caused long-term damage to the
industry. We reported in October 2021 that representatives from
passenger airlines and credit rating agencies told us that the federal
assistance was essential to preserving airlines operations. Specifically,
this assistance helped to cover airline passenger expenses, keep
employees on their payrolls, and help stem cash outflows while
passenger traffic levels were at historic lows. 74 A representative from a
major airline testified before Congress in December 2021 that the PSP
program saved the airline industry, and that without it, airlines would have
stopped flying in April 2020, furloughed almost all employees, and waited
for demand to return to levels strong enough to justify restoring flying. 75
As we have reported, the federal COVID-19 assistance did not preclude
actions by airlines to manage labor costs, such as offering early
retirements and other incentives. We reported in October 2021 that
representatives we interviewed from passenger airlines took several
actions to manage labor costs throughout 2020, such as freezing non-
essential hiring and offering voluntary unpaid leave and early
73For PSP, recipients agreed to refrain from conducting involuntary furloughs or
terminations for specified amounts of time. For the most recent round of PSP, this
requirement expired on September 30, 2023, or when the recipient had expended all of its
payroll support, whichever was later. For the loan program, borrowers agreed, to the
extent practicable, not to reduce employment levels by more than 10 percent from levels
as of March 24, 2020, through September 30, 2020. CARES Act, Pub. L No. 116-136, §
4003(G), 134 Stat. 281, 471 (2020). For Airport Grants, certain airport sponsors accepting
Airport Grant funds were required to directly employ at least 90 percent of the number of
employees onboard as of March 27, 2020, for a specified amount of time. Lastly, to
receive AMJP funds, companies had to commit that they would not involuntarily furlough
or lay off (or reduce the pay or benefits for) employees for whom they are receiving AMJP
funding for the duration of the agreement. American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No.
117-2, § 7202, 135 Stat. 103 (2021).
74GAO-22-104429.
75Doug Parker, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, American Airlines Group, Inc.,
Oversight of the U.S. Airline Industry, testimony before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 117th Cong., December 15, 2021.
Page 26 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
retirements. 76 According to Airlines for America, many workers at least
temporarily left the aviation industry during the pandemic.
As we reported in May 2023, Airlines for America estimated the following,
based on a mix of public reports and information provided directly by
airlines: approximately 50,000 airline employees opted for early
retirement or voluntary separation in 2020, while 100,000 employees took
unpaid leaves of absence. 77 These actions resulted in significant
reductions in the airlines’ workforce in 2020. For example, we reported
that the number of full-time employees for major U.S. passenger airlines
decreased by about 9.5 percent between February 2020 and May 2020,
according to DOT’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics. According to data
from the bureau, Delta Air Lines, which maintained a workforce of around
90,000 employees during 2019, went from more than 91,000 employees
in February of 2020 to less than 51,000 employees in May of 2020. As
passenger demand for air travel returned in the spring of 2021, airlines
began hiring new employees, including pilots.
While all four funding programs included workforce retention provisions,
major airlines struggled when air traffic resumed in 2021. In our prior
work, we noted that these struggles were due in part to the lack of
available staff. In April 2023, we found that flight cancellations increased
in the second half of 2021 and the first 4 months of 2022, outpacing
cancellation rates in both 2018 and 2019 despite fewer flights overall. 78 In
addition, Bureau of Transportation Statistics data show that factors within
the airlines’ control (e.g., aircraft maintenance or lack of crew) were the
leading causes of flight cancellations and delays in the last 3 months of
2021, as well as in April 2022.
We reported that airline and union representatives told us that when air
travel began to rebound in 2021, operational challenges such as a need
for additional pilots and crew made it more difficult to manage flight
disruptions. For example, representatives from all four airlines and three
unions we spoke with said it was more difficult than before the pandemic
for airlines to ensure they had enough crew to staff aircraft and to set
reliable airline schedules. Three of the four airlines we spoke to also
reported challenges operating training facilities and onboarding
76GAO-22-104429.
77GAO-23-105571.
78GAO, Airline Passenger Protections: Observations on Flight Delays and Cancellations,
and DOT’s Efforts to Address Them, GAO-23-105524 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2023).
Page 27 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
employees as flight operations increased in 2021. For example, we
reported in April 2023 that representatives from one airline told us that
they had stopped conducting training during the first year of the
pandemic. Consequently, the airline had to handle a large number of staff
certifications when operations increased. 79
Flight delays and cancellations prompted congressional inquiries into the
airlines’ compliance with the workforce retention requirements. 80 For
example, in July 2021, the Chair of the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee asked certain major airlines to provide
information on how they used the federal funds. 81 The Chair noted the
reported workforce shortages ran counter to the “objective and spirit of
the PSP, which was to enable airlines to endure the pandemic and keep
employees on payroll so that the industry was positioned to capture a
rebound in demand.”
In March 2021, we reported that other mechanisms beyond emergency
assistance could play a role in supporting the highly skilled U.S. aviation
workforce during the recovery of air traffic demand from the pandemic.
For example, we reported worker retention incentives, aviation workforce
retraining, and efforts to strengthen the pipeline of new applicants for
careers in aviation, among other efforts, could help support the workforce
79Due to the pandemic, FAA issued regulatory exemptions providing airlines grace periods
for certain personnel to complete some training requirements.
80See House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, “Press Release: Bipartisan
Committee Leaders Request Clarity from Airlines on Management of Payroll Support
Program Funds” (Dec. 3, 2021),
https://transportation.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=405727; and
House Committee on Oversight and Reform and Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus
Crisis, “Press Release: In Light of Pilot Shortage, Chairs Maloney and Clyburn Request
Treasury Inspector General Review Airlines’ Use of Pandemic Relief Funds” (Sept. 9,
2022), https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/in-light-of-pilot-
shortage-chairs-maloney-and-clyburn-request-treasury-inspector.
81See Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, “Press Release: As
Workforce Shortages Force Flight Cancellations, Delays, and Passenger Frustrations,
Chair Cantwell Calls on Airlines for Answers” (July 16, 2021),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2021/7/as-workforce-shortages-force-flight-
cancellations-delays-and-passenger-frustrations-chair-cantwell-calls-on-airlines-for-
answers. This committee also held a hearing on these issues. See Oversight of the U.S.
Airline Industry, hearing before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 117th Cong., December 15, 2021.
Page 28 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
as air travel demand returned. 82 As we reported in May 2023, aviation
industry stakeholders and FAA are taking steps to address workforce
supply concerns. For example, several regional airlines raised pay
substantially in 2022, airlines are creating flight schools, and FAA is
undertaking efforts to support industry workforce development, including
awarding grants to attract young people to aviation careers. 83
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Transportation
Agency Comments and the Treasury for review and comment. Both agencies provided
technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretaries of Transportation and Treasury, and other
interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no charge on our
website at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-2834 or KrauseH@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this
report are listed in appendix I.
Heather Krause
Managing Director, Physical Infrastructure
82GAO, COVID-19 Pandemic: Preliminary Observations on Efforts toward and Factors
Affecting the Aviation Industry’s Recovery, GAO-21-412T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2,
2021).
83GAO-23-105571.
Page 29 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
List of Addressees
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
The Honorable Susan Collins
Vice Chair
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ron Wyden
Chairman
The Honorable Mike Crapo
Ranking Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable Bernard Sanders
Chair
The Honorable Bill Cassidy, M.D.
Ranking Member
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
United States Senate
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chairman
The Honorable Rand Paul, M.D.
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Kay Granger
Chairwoman
The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Chair
The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
Ranking Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
Page 30 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
The Honorable Mark E. Green, M.D.
Chairman
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable James Comer
Chairman
The Honorable Jamie Raskin
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Accountability
House of Representatives
The Honorable Rick Larsen
Ranking Member
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
The Honorable Jason Smith
Chairman
The Honorable Richard Neal
Ranking Member
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives
The Honorable Steve Cohen
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
Page 31 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Heather Krause, (202) 512-2834 or KrauseH@gao.gov
GAO Contact
In addition to the contact named above, Jonathan Carver (Assistant
Staff Director), Emily Larson (Analyst in Charge), Paul Aussendorf, Laura
Acknowledgments Bonomini, James Geibel, Delwen Jones, Bonnie Pignatiello Leer, Dan
Luo, and Kelly Rubin made key contributions to this report.
Page 32 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products
COVID-19: GAO Recommendations Can Help Federal Agencies Better
Prepare for Future Public Health Emergencies. GAO-23-106554.
Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2023.
Aviation Workforce: Current and Future Availability of Airline Pilots and
Aircraft Mechanics. GAO-23-105571. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2023.
Aviation Workforce: Supply of Airline Pilots and Aircraft Mechanics.
GAO-23-106769. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2023.
Airline Passenger Protections: Observations on Flight Delays and
Cancellations, and DOT’s Efforts to Address Them. GAO-23-105524.
Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2023.
Emergency Relief Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to
Address Fraud and Improper Payments. GAO-23-106556. Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 1, 2023.
Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Federal Leadership Needed to
Advance Research. GAO-22-104579. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2022.
Contact Tracing for Air Travel: CDC’s Data System Needs Substantial
Improvement. GAO-22-105018, Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2022.
COVID-19: Current and Future Federal Preparedness Requires Fixes to
Improve Health Data and Address Improper Payments. GAO-22-105397.
Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2022.
Emergency Relief Funds: Significant Improvements Are Needed to
Ensure Transparency and Accountability for COVID-19 and Beyond.
GAO-22-105715. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2022.
Transportation Security: TSA Efforts to Coordinate with Stakeholders on
COVID-19 Security Directives. GAO-22-104583. Washington, D.C.:
March 14, 2022.
COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Accountability and
Program Effectiveness of Federal Response. GAO-22-105051.
Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2021.
COVID-19 Pandemic: Observations on the Ongoing Recovery of the
Aviation Industry. GAO-22-104429. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2021.
Page 33 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Related GAO Products
COVID-19 Pandemic: Actions Needed to Improve Federal Oversight of
Assistance to Individuals, Communities, and the Transportation Industry.
GAO-21-105202. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2021.
COVID-19: Continued Attention Needed to Enhance Federal
Preparedness. Response, Service Delivery, and Program Integrity.
GAO-21-551. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2021.
COVID-19: Federal Air Marshal Service Should Document Its Response
to Cases and Facilitate Access to Testing. GAO-21-595. Washington,
D.C.: June 23, 2021.
Border Security: CBP’s Response to COVID-19. GAO-21-431.
Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2021.
COVID-19: TSA Could Better Monitor Its Efforts to Reduce Infectious
Disease Spread at Checkpoints. GAO-21-364. Washington, D.C.: June
14, 2021.
Science & Tech Spotlight: Digital Vaccine Credentials. GAO-21-534SP.
Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2021.
COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its
Second Year. GAO-21-387. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2021.
COVID-19 Pandemic: Preliminary Observations on Efforts toward and
Factors Affecting the Aviation Industry’s Recovery. GAO-21-412T.
Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2021.
Financial Assistance: Lessons Learned from CARES Act Loan Program
for Aviation and Other Eligible Businesses. GAO-21-198. Washington,
D.C.: December 10, 2020.
COVID-19: Urgent Actions Needed to Better Ensure and Effective
Federal Response. GAO-21-191. Washington. D.C.: November 30, 2020.
COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and
Concerted Actions. GAO-20-701. Washington. D.C.: September 21, 2020.
COVID-19: Opportunities to Improve Federal Response and Recovery
Efforts. GAO-20-625. Washington. D.C.: June 25, 2020.
Page 34 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
Related GAO Products
Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Status of Research Efforts and
Action Still Needed to Develop Federal Preparedness Plan.
GAO-20-655T. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2020.
Air Travel and Communicable Diseases: Comprehensive Federal Plan
Needed for U.S. Aviation System’s Preparedness. GAO-16-127.
Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2015.
Page 35 GAO-24-106754 Aviation Pandemic Lessons
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