Hearing — Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (April 21, 2021)

Summary

Hearing record, Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General, before the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Wednesday, April 21, 2021, Serial No. 117–7. Oral and prepared statements are listed for Chairman Bennie G. Thompson and Ranking Member John Katko, and a prepared statement for Sheila Jackson Lee. The witnesses are Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, Government Accountability Office, and Joseph V. Cuffari, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, each with oral and prepared statements. The appendix lists questions from Ranking Member Katko for Cuffari.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Issuer: Congressional materials
Document type: Congressional Hearing
Case: Chrg Chrg 117Hhrg44634 Chrg 117Hhrg44634

Cite this document

“Hearing — Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (April 21, 2021).” Original at www.govinfo.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/chrg-chrg-117hhrg44634-chrg-117hhrg44634/, SHA-256 2fbb099ee2d4b91c75963668f655a9e9004f92e7989b412d29698918b58ac4e8.

Full text

OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY’S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

HEARING
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

APRIL 21, 2021

Serial No. 117–7
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
44–634 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021

Congress.#13
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi, Chairman
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas JOHN KATKO, New York
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana
J. LUIS CORREA, California MICHAEL GUEST, Mississippi
ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan DAN BISHOP, North Carolina
EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri JEFFERSON VAN DREW, New Jersey
AL GREEN, Texas RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, Iowa
ERIC SWALWELL, California DIANA HARSHBARGER, Tennessee
DINA TITUS, Nevada ANDREW S. CLYDE, Georgia
BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York JAKE LATURNER, Kansas
VAL BUTLER DEMINGS, Florida PETER MEIJER, Michigan
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGÁN, California KAT CAMMACK, Florida
JOSH GOTTHEIMER, New Jersey AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
ELAINE G. LURIA, Virginia ANDREW R. GARBARINO, New York
TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
RITCHIE TORRES, New York
HOPE GOINS, Staff Director
DANIEL KROESE, Minority Staff Director
NATALIE NIXON, Clerk

(II)

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security:
Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1
Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the State
of New York, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security:
Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4
Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas:
Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 7

WITNESSES
Mr. Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Team, Govern-
ment Accountability Office:
Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 10
Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 12
Mr. Joseph V. Cuffari, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 21
Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 22

FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas:
Article by Government Executive ........................................................................ 36
Biographical Sketch of Ms. Pauline Nadege Binam .......................................... 37

APPENDIX
Questions From Ranking Member John Katko for Joseph V. Cuffari ................ 61

(III)

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
OVERSIGHT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME-
LAND SECURITY’S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL

Wednesday, April 21, 2021

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., via Webex,
Hon. Bennie G. Thompson [Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Thompson, Jackson Lee, Payne, Correa,
Clarke, Swalwell, Titus, Demings, Barragán, Gottheimer,
Malinowski, Torres, Katko, Higgins, Guest, Bishop, Van Drew, Mil-
ler-Meeks, Harshbarger, Gimenez, LaTurner, Meijer, Cammack,
Pfluger, and Garbarino.
Chairman THOMPSON. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order.
The committee is meeting today to receive testimony on oversight
of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector Gen-
eral. Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare the com-
mittee in recess at any point.
The Committee on Homeland Security is meeting today to con-
duct oversight of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of
Inspector General. Established as part of DHS in 2002, the inspec-
tor general’s mission is to provide independent oversight and pro-
mote excellence, integrity, and accountability within the Depart-
ment. Unfortunately, the OIG has faced challenges for some time.
The Government Accountability Office audited the OIG in 2014
and found it needed to field key senior positions, address concerns
about integrity and independence, develop a process to protect the
identity of those making complaints, and improve coordination and
information sharing for law enforcement authority.
In 2017 and 2018 the OIG removed from its website 13 reports
that inaccurately painted the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s disaster response efforts in a favorable light. I said at that
time that OIG must fully restore confidence in its work and the
committee will be monitoring its progress. Unfortunately, the hope
for progress has not been realized.
In 2019 Inspector General Cuffari was confirmed. Since then the
committee has received several complaints from OIG employees
about management of the office. Specifically, employees have al-
leged that failure to develop, implement, and adhere to manage-
ment policies has resulted in decisions that are arbitrary, show fa-
voritism or bias, hurt morale, and negatively affect operations.
(1)

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
2

In response to these allegations and continued concerns about
the performance of the office, in December 2019 bipartisan leader-
ship of this committee and the Senate Homeland Security and Gov-
ernment Affairs Committee asked GAO to review DOS’s OIG man-
agement and operation. After a comprehensive audit, GAO issued
a draft report last week to the OIG and the committee on its pre-
liminary findings and made 21 recommendations. GAO concluded
that the OIG has not adhered to a number of professional stand-
ards and key practices for effective management. For example,
GAO found that the OIG has been operating without a strategic
plan. Absent such a plan, DHS OIG staff may not understand over-
sight priorities and goals which can negatively affect operations
and performance. GAO also found that the OIG did not adhere to
professional standards for conducting audits, inspections, and eval-
uations.
The committee previously raised concerns about the quality of
the OIG reports, notably those issues regarding the death of chil-
dren in Customs and Border Protection custody. The report did not
reflect thorough and accurate reviews of the relevant facts and
failed to address critical questions about CBP’s ability to care for
children in custody.
Moreover, GAO confirmed what the committee had observed re-
garding the OIG’s average time to issue reports, stating that the
OIG’s review time lines for work were protracted and some work
products remain unapproved for months. For instance, in the Office
of Audits, for fiscal year 2017 only 8 of 102 projects took more than
18 months to complete. Later, in fiscal year 2020, over half of the
projects took more than 18 months to complete. More troubling,
GAO noted the OIG had not taken steps to understand the delays
or determine how to address them. Congress and the public depend
on the OIG to help detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement of DHS programs, operations, and spending. A re-
port that takes years to release allows problems to persist un-
checked.
Overall GAO noted that while the OIG has taken steps to ad-
dress some of the problems identified in the report, its efforts are
incomplete or have only recently been initiated. GAO’s draft report
makes clear that OIG must transform its management and oper-
ation. Just yesterday, the Washington Post and Project on Govern-
ment Oversight published reports that call into question Inspector
General Cuffari’s handling of politically sensitive topics. In par-
ticular, the report alleged inspector general blocked investigation
proposed by a career OIG staff into the previous administration’s
tear-gassing of protestors in Lafayette Square and the spread of
Coronavirus among Secret Service personnel. Inspectors general
must not shy away from the politically sensitive topics or allow po-
litical considerations to affect their work.
The committee will be following up on these very troubling alle-
gations. The committee expects the OIG to fulfill its mission with
independence, integrity, transparency, and accountability.
I look forward to hearing from Director Currie on GAO’s finding
and Inspector General Cuffari about his plans to implement GAO’s
recommendations and reestablish confidence in the Office of Inspec-
tor General.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
3

Be assured that the committee will be watching the OIG’s re-
sponse to GAO’s report closely in the days ahead.
[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]
STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

APRIL 21, 2021
The Committee on Homeland Security is meeting today to conduct oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). Established
as part of DHS in 2002, the inspector general’s mission is to provide independent
oversight and promote excellence, integrity, and accountability within the Depart-
ment. Unfortunately, the OIG has faced challenges for some time.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) audited the OIG in 2014 and found
it needed to: Fill key senior positions, address concerns about integrity and inde-
pendence, develop a process to protect the identities of those making complaints and
improve coordination and information sharing with law enforcement authorities.
In 2017 and 2018, the OIG removed from its website 13 reports that inaccurately
painted the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s disaster response efforts in
a favorable light. I said at the time that the OIG must fully restore confidence in
its work and the committee would be monitoring its progress. Unfortunately, the
hoped-for progress has not been realized. In 2019, Inspector General Cuffari was
confirmed. Since then, the committee has received several complaints from OIG em-
ployees about management of the office.
Specifically, employees have alleged that failure to develop, implement, and ad-
here to management policies has resulted in decisions that are arbitrary, show fa-
voritism or bias, hurt morale, and negatively affect operations. In response to these
allegations and continued concerns about the performance of the office, in December
2019 bipartisan leadership of this committee and the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee asked GAO to review DHS OIG’s management
and operations.
After a comprehensive audit, GAO issued a draft report last week to the OIG and
the committees on its preliminary findings and made 21 recommendations. GAO
concluded that the OIG has not adhered to a number of professional standards and
key practices for effective management. For example, GAO found that the OIG has
been operating without a strategic plan. Absent such a plan, DHS OIG staff may
not understand oversight priorities and goals, which can negatively affect operations
and performance.
GAO also found that the OIG did not adhere to professional standards for con-
ducting audits, inspections, and evaluations. The committee previously raised con-
cerns about the quality of the OIG’s reports, notably those issued regarding the
deaths of children in Customs and Border Protection custody. The reports did not
reflect thorough and accurate reviews of the relevant facts and failed to address crit-
ical questions about CBP’s ability to care for children in custody.
Moreover, GAO confirmed what the committee has observed regarding the OIG’s
average time to issue reports, stating that the OIG’s ‘‘review time lines for work
were protracted and some work products remained unapproved for months.’’ For in-
stance, in the Office of Audits, for fiscal year 2017, only 8 of 102 projects took more
than 18 months to complete. Later, in fiscal year 2020, over half of projects took
more than 18 months to complete.
More troubling, GAO noted the OIG had not taken steps to understand the delays
or determine how to address them. Congress and the public depend on the OIG to
help detect and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement of DHS programs,
operations, and spending. A report that takes years to release allows problems to
persist unchecked. Overall, GAO noted that while the OIG has taken steps to ad-
dress some of the problems identified in the report, its efforts are incomplete or
have only recently been initiated. GAO’s draft report makes clear the OIG must
transform its management and operations.
Just yesterday, the Washington Post and Project on Government Oversight pub-
lished reports that call into question Inspector General Cuffari’s handling of politi-
cally sensitive topics. In particular, the reports allege the inspector general blocked
investigations proposed by career OIG staff into the previous administration’s tear-
gassing of protestors in Lafayette Square and the spread of coronavirus among Se-
cret Service personnel. Inspectors general must not shy away from politically sen-
sitive topics or allow political considerations to affect their work. The committee will
be following up on these very troubling allegations.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
4
The committee expects the OIG to fulfill its mission with independence, integrity,
transparency, and accountability. I look forward to hearing today from Director
Currie on GAO’s findings and Inspector General Cuffari about his plans to imple-
ment GAO’s recommendations and reestablish confidence in the Office of Inspector
General. Be assured that the committee will be watching the OIG’s response to
GAO’s report closely in the days ahead.
Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking
Member of the full committee, the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Katko, for an opening statement.
Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you and
thank you for holding this very important hearing today.
I also want to thank the witnesses, Dr. Cuffari, the DHS inspec-
tor general, and Chris Currie, a director in the Homeland Security
and Justice Team for the Government Accountability Office. Thank
you for both for being here, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, as you and I know, the most important mission
of this committee is to help protect the homeland. It is that simple.
That job has never been more critical or complex as it is today.
With highly sophisticated adversaries only getting smarter, older,
and stronger, we must not only account for the threats of today,
but also the emerging risks of tomorrow. You and I spend much of
our lives working to protect our Nation and hold responsible those
who seek to threaten it or cause it harm.
One important aspect of that is ensuring a strong Department of
Homeland Security by giving the men and women of the Depart-
ment all the tools and resources they need to do their job with in-
tegrity and respect. An important element of Homeland Security,
and of other Federal agencies, is the Office of Inspector General,
or OIG for short. Originally created through the Inspector General
Act of 1978, the Act created inspector general positions and offices
in more than a dozen specific departments and agencies.
The DHS OIG was stood up by the Department after the tragic
events of 9/11. The act gave these inspectors general the authority
to review the internal documents of their departments or offices,
investigate fraud, give policy advice, handle certain complaints by
employees, and to report to the heads of their agencies and to the
Congress on their activities.
Although we wish there was not waste, fraud, or abuse within
Homeland Security or any Federal agency, the reality is we all
know it exists. It is the mission of the IG’s office to help the rest
of the Department identify and address waste, fraud, and abuse as
much as possible.
As a former Federal prosecutor, I am fully supportive of the role
that the inspector general plays throughout the Federal Govern-
ment. They are vital to ensuring accountability and transparency
into each department and agency’s activities. This is especially im-
portant in a department like the Department of Homeland Security
with a mission so paramount and so important. DHS is tasked with
safeguarding the American People, our homeland, and our values
against enemies, foreign and domestic.
To do this on a daily basis, we must ensure that the men and
women of the Department are able to carry out their mission, and
the IG’s office helps ensure that it is done with integrity and honor.
As both our witnesses and the Chairman know well, in 2019 this
committee, along with others, requested that the GAO conduct key

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
5

oversight of the Department of Homeland Security’s OIG’s manage-
ment and operations. GAO has now completed this exhaustive re-
view, which spanned from 2015 to 2020, and has led to this hearing
today. GAO evaluated the OIG’s management operations against
audit quality standards, the Federal standards for internal control,
and leading practices for human capital management and organiza-
tional challenge. I have to say, after reading many GAO reports
over the years, this one is very disturbing. I don’t think that I have
ever seen a GAO report that pinpoints so many weaknesses within
an agency or department.
GAO made 21 specific recommendations in total. They found
weaknesses in multiple areas within OIG that included organiza-
tional performance, quality assurance, reporting timeliness and co-
ordination with the DHS components of the OIG audits. These are
all things that Chairman Thompson highlighted in his opening
statement.
The line that stuck out to me most was, ‘‘Without addressing
these and other long-standing management weaknesses, the DHS
OIG is not well-positioned to fulfill its oversight mission.’’ This is
very concerning and certainly warrants further scrutiny.
Dr. Cuffari, I know that you inherited some of these problems
and have made some changes, but this is a very serious problem
and one that we must address immediately for the reasons I have
stated.
Without a fully functioning OIG the Department will never live
up to its full potential, nor would have the full trust of the Amer-
ican people, something it needs to succeed and something it abso-
lutely cannot afford to lose.
Reports like this also impact employee morale. The men and
women of DHS need to have confidence in their leadership, includ-
ing the IG. I am willing, and want to hear you out on, these find-
ings and look forward to your testimony. I want to hear what you
have done, what you are doing, and your vision for the future. This
matter is very important to the committee, there is no question
about it. I want you to take this report and its recommendations
very seriously and know that while I commit to working with you,
I plan to make this one of our oversight priorities in Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for holding this hear-
ing. Thank you also, Mr. Currie, and his team at GAO, for con-
ducting this important investigation.
Without self-examination once in a while in Government, we are
never going to be able to make the Government work better. We
have to understand how important this hearing is and how impor-
tant that we have faith in the IG going forward.
So, Dr. Cuffari, it is up to you to convince us that you have that
vision going forward that is going to allow us to keep the faith in
the homeland security in particular, but also in the OIG office.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Katko follows:]
STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER JOHN KATKO
Thank you for holding this important hearing, today, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you to our witnesses: Dr. Cuffari, the DHS inspector general, and Chris Currie, a
director in the Homeland Security and Justice Team from GAO.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
6
Mr. Chairman, as you and I know, the most important mission of this committee
is to help protect the homeland. That job has never been more critical or complex
as it is today. With highly sophisticated adversaries only getting smarter, bolder,
and stronger, we must not only account for the threats of today but also the emerg-
ing risks of tomorrow.
You and I have spent much of our lives working to protect our Nation and hold
responsible those who seek to threaten it or cause harm. One important aspect of
that is ensuring a strong Department of Homeland Security by giving the men and
women of the Department all the tools and resources they need to do their jobs with
integrity and respect.
An important element of DHS, and of other Federal agencies, is the Office of In-
spector General, or OIG. Originally created through the Inspector General Act of
1978, the act created inspector general positions and offices in more than a dozen
specific departments and agencies. The DHS OIG was stood up with the Depart-
ment after 9/11. The act gave these inspectors general the authority to review the
internal documents of their departments or offices, investigate fraud, give policy ad-
vice, handle certain complaints by employees, and to report to the heads of their
agencies and to Congress on their activities.
Although we all wish there was not waste, fraud, or abuse within DHS, the re-
ality is we all know it exists. It is the mission of the IG’s office to help the rest
of the Department identify and address waste, fraud, and abuse as much as pos-
sible.
As a former Federal prosecutor, I am fully supportive of the role that the IGs play
throughout the Federal Government. They are vital to ensuring accountability and
transparency into each department or agency’s activities.
This is especially important in a department like DHS with a mission so para-
mount. DHS is tasked with safeguarding the American people, our homeland, and
our values, against enemies foreign and domestic. To do this on a daily basis, we
must ensure that the men and women of the Department are able to carry out their
mission, and the IG’s office helps ensure that this is done with integrity and honor.
As both our witnesses and the Chairman know well, in 2019 this committee, along
with others, requested that the GAO conduct key oversight of the DHS OIG’s man-
agement and operations.
GAO has now completed this review, which spanned from 2015–2020, and has led
to this hearing today.
GAO evaluated the OIG’s management and operations against audit quality
standards, relevant Federal standards for internal control, and leading practices for
human capital management and organizational change.
I have to say, after reading many GAO reports over the years, this one is very
disturbing. I don’t think that I have ever seen a GAO report that pinpoints so many
weaknesses within an agency or department. GAO made 21 recommendations in
total.
GAO found weaknesses in multiple areas within the OIG that included: Organiza-
tional Performance, Quality Assurance, Reporting Timeliness, and Coordination
with the DHS components of the OIG audits.
The line that stuck out to me the most was, ‘‘Without addressing these and other
long-standing management weaknesses, the DHS OIG is not well-positioned to ful-
fill its oversight mission.’’ This is very concerning and certainly warrants further
scrutiny.
Dr. Cuffari, I know that you inherited some of these problems, and have made
some changes, but this is a very serious problem, and one that we must address
immediately for the reasons I’ve stated.
Without a fully functioning OIG, the Department will never live up to its full po-
tential, nor will it have the full trust of the American people—something it needs
to succeed and something it absolutely cannot afford to lose.
Reports like this also impact employee morale. The men and women of DHS need
to have confidence in their leadership, including the IG.
I am willing and want to hear you out on these findings and look forward to your
testimony. I want to hear what you have done, what you are doing, and your vision
for the future.
This matter is very important to the committee. I want you to take this report
and its recommendations very seriously and know that, while I commit to working
with you, I plan to make this one of our oversight priorities this Congress.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing. Thank you, also, to Mr.
Currie and his team at GAO for conducting this important investigation. I look for-
ward to hearing from our witnesses.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
7

Other Members of the committee are reminded that under the
committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

APRIL 21, 2021
Chairman Thompson, and Ranking Member Katko, thank you for convening this
opportunity for the Homeland Security Committee to investigate ‘‘Oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General.’’
I join my colleagues in welcoming today’s witnesses:
• Mr. Christopher P. Currie, director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO), and
• The Hon. Joseph V. Cuffari, inspector general (IG), U.S. Department of Home-
land Security (DHS).
I look forward to today’s hearing because of the important role that inspector gen-
erals fill throughout the Federal Government to guard our Nation and its people
from waste, fraud, and abuse by Government agencies and contractors.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a vital mission: To secure the
Nation from the many threats we face.
To secure the Nation requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees in
jobs that range from aviation and border security to emergency response, which en-
gages a range of professionals from cybersecurity analyst to chemical facility inspec-
tors.
DHS has a presence in the lives of the traveling public, those who fly commer-
cially, or travel across the border, but the agency does much more.
DHS provides immigration services to all those seeking to enter the country
whether as students, visitors, or new citizens.
DHS also protects our ports from threats and keeps commerce moving to markets
within the United States and around the world.
DHS responds to disasters, whether it is a hurricane, an earthquake, a flood, or
a terrorist attack—when an emergency happens DHS is there, working side-by-side
with local leaders and residents to help communities respond and recover.
DHS is in charge of protecting the United States from cyber attacks on our impor-
tant, computer-connected technologies and critical infrastructure.
The most important thing that DHS does is stopping terrorists from attacking our
people or this great Nation before an incident occurs.
All of these jobs make DHS indispensable to our National security and for this
reason it is important that the agency chief internal investigator be free of bias or
favor when carrying out the duties of the IG’s office.
As a senior Member of this committee, and Chair of the Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, I have learned a great
deal about the capacity and strength of the men and women who work at the De-
partment of Homeland Security.
I hold them in the highest regard for their dedication and service to our country.
This Nation depends on the men and women of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity (DHS) to protect citizens from those who wish to do them harm.
Because of the dedication of DHS professionals, we are better prepared to face
these challenges as one Nation united against a common foe.
The Department of Homeland Security was not created to protect the Nation from
desperate people escaping violence and poverty, seeking asylum in our country, or
the ravages of a virus attacking and killing over half a million Americans.
It was created to prevent attacks against our Nation such as the one carried out
by foreign terrorists who used commercial planes as missiles to destroy the World
Trade Center Towers, and a section of the west side of the Pentagon, and would
have killed more if not for the heroic acts of the passengers on Flight 93 to stop
the attackers from reaching their ultimate destination right here at our Nation’s
Capitol.
In 2002, Congress established the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) to pro-
vide independent oversight and promote excellence, integrity, and accountability
within DHS.
The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) is an
independent entity established within the Executive branch to address integrity,
economy, and effectiveness issues that transcend individual Government agencies

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
8
and aid in the establishment of a professional, well-trained, and highly-skilled work-
force in the Offices of Inspectors General.
CIGIE sets quality standards for inspectors general throughout the Federal Gov-
ernment.
Those standards set forth qualities like objectivity, independence, and the obliga-
tion to be ‘‘impartial, intellectually honest, and free of conflicts of interest.’’
CIGIE notes that ‘‘without independence, both in fact and in appearance, objec-
tivity is impaired.
Unfortunately, the DHS OIG has suffered from several long-standing issues with
appearance of objectivity and being free of conflict when carrying out the work of
the office.
Like many DHS agencies, employee morale at the OIG remains low.
The DHS OIG has also seen management crises caused by the actions of IGs serv-
ing in that office.
For example, a former acting DHS IG was removed for jeopardizing the independ-
ence of the office.
Charles Edwards was removed from his interim post on the DHS Science and
Technology staff following the release of a Senate report detailing his inappropriate
socializing and sharing of draft documents with managers of the employees he was
investigating.
Edwards had been the subject of a year-long probe by a Senate Homeland Secu-
rity and Governmental Affairs subcommittee.
The subcommittee found that Mr. Edwards jeopardized the independence of the
OIG and had an ‘‘inadequate understanding of the importance of OIG independence’’
which was reflected in his personal relationships with senior DHS officials.
Mr. Edwards also did not recuse himself from audits and inspections that had a
conflict of interest related to his wife’s employment.
Edwards was ultimately cleared of several allegations, such as abuse of Govern-
ment resources in travel and charges of nepotism, the subcommittee found.
Allegations that he destroyed records and favored certain employees and retali-
ated against others were not substantiated, said the Senate report, which was sent
to the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.
The larger issue in the Edward’s case was the appearance that he was not inde-
pendent of bias or favor toward others within DHS, which caused harm to the office
of the OIG and impacted the morale of the office.
Last year, the GAO was asked to look into the issue of the DHS OIG and its han-
dling of matters regarding agency components in matters of public trust and ac-
countability.
On April 12, 2021, GAO issued a draft report to Congressional requesters dis-
cussing challenges and making 21 recommendations.
The report will be released publicly in the coming weeks.
The draft report identified the following challenges:
• DHS OIG has operated for 4 of the past 6 years without a strategic plan, which
limits its ability to implement other organizational performance management
activities, such as annual planning and performance assessment;
• With an effective system of internal quality insurance, DHS OIG has no way
of knowing if its internal processes ensure that its: (1) Work adheres to its poli-
cies and (2) meets established standards of performance; and
• The time it takes to complete projects has significantly increased, and DHS OIG
has not taken steps to understand the causes of such increases or determine
how to address them.
GAO concludes that if the OIG fails to address these operational and management
weaknesses, it will be ill-positioned to fulfill its oversight mission.
Among the 21 recommendations, the GAO report recommends that the OIG must:
• develop and implement an annual work planning process, as part of a risk-
based planning system;
• develop and implement a process to allocate human capital resources based on
the organization’s current and emerging strategic objectives and priorities;
• evaluate the structure of the organization and clearly define the responsibilities
of each division and program office to ensure they are aligned with the OIG’s
strategic objectives and priorities; and
• develop and implement an organization-wide quality assurance program.
There are underlying concerns about the current OIG that are reminiscent of the
issues raised regarding Edwards the previous IG who was removed from office.
Committee staff investigation of JG Cuffari’s past actions have raised serious con-
cerns about whether his management of the OIG meets CIGIE’s standards, includ-
ing whether politics have influenced decisions on the OIG’s work product, delayed

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
9
access to high-level DHS officials for on-going investigations, and adopted policies
that restrict reports produced to Congress or released publicly.
For example, his handling of the on-going investigation of the ‘‘I’m 10–15’’
Facebook group, which included current and former Border Patrol agents and per-
sonnel, appears to have been mishandled, prompting concerns about whether actions
were motivated by political considerations.
An email provided to committee by a whistleblower indicates that IG Cuffari was
concerned about the demands an interview would impose on senior DHS leadership.
In conflict with standard investigatory practices, IG Cuffari also suggested that
inspectors avoid any questions already publicly commented on by those leaders.
In one troubling example of what occurred in the OIG under Cuffari, according
to the former director of the Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU), Brian Volsky
(who left in January 2021), an OIG employee disclosed the identity of a whistle-
blower to the commandant and vice commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard despite
the fact that WPU staff conducted research concluding that the law did not permit
disclosure of the whistleblower’s identity to DHS.
The IG’s chief of staff concurred with this recommendation, but on the same day
called the commandant and vice commandant to provide a ‘‘heads-up’’ about the in-
vestigation.
While the chief of staff did not specifically name the whistleblower, the vice com-
mandant thanked her for providing enough information to identify who they were
speaking about.
Additionally, according to Mr. Volsky, the IG’s chief of staff attempted to hide the
existence of this phone call from him.
One of the areas that is of interest to Members of this committee are the timely
delivery of reports often mandated by Federal law.
It has come to the attention of the committee through reports from current and
former managers at the OIG who report that delays were caused by IG Cuffari and
his chief of staff sitting on reports.
IG Cuffari and his chief of staff told the Chairman that the delays were due to
the poor quality of drafts requiring substantive edits.
However, the committee has reviewed drafts of a select group of reports, including
those on family separation and conditions at Immigration and Customs Enforcement
facilities, and found minimal edits with no reasonable explanation for extensive
delays.
The GAO was not able to assess the reason for these delays at the front office
because the OIG does not track this information.
However, GAO auditors expressed incredulity with respect to the fact that senior
managers received no explanation for why drafts reports sat with the front office
for months at a time.
These reports are troubling, and it is good that IG Cuffari is present to provide
information to the committee.
As Members of this committee many of us have seen first-hand the consequences
of previous administration’s asylum policy along the border and the Muslim ban.
The Trump administration’s policy of intentionally separating thousands of chil-
dren from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border—resulted in conditions that, de-
spite concentrated efforts by advocates and the Biden administration to reunite fam-
ilies, has resulted in hundreds remaining separated even today—provides an impor-
tant case study of why accountability is necessary and how it may be achieved.
The DHS IG report into this matter did not adequately address key questions that
remain to be answered regarding individual and collective accountability for the
deaths of 7 children while in U.S. custody.
Further, the IG office should have adequately protected the whistleblower Dawn
Wooten, a registered nurse who worked full-time at the Irwin County Detention
Center until July 2020, after she outlined her allegations of unwanted and unneces-
sary medical procedures being performed on women at that facility that effected re-
productive health with several women claiming that hysterectomies were performed.
Ms. Wooten detailed her allegations in a complaint filed with DHS IG by a coali-
tion of advocacy groups, but there are questions about retaliation against Ms.
Wooten because of her role as a whistleblower.
In another matter involving the Irwin County Detention Center a Ms. Pauline
Nadege Binam who was born in Cameroon who has lived in the United States for
30 years since the age of 2 years was being held.
Ms. Binam has a 12-year-old daughter.
She has a mother, father, and 4 sisters, 2 are U.S. citizens and 2 are DACA. She
has no immediate relatives living in Cameroon.
On July 12, 2019 she was ordered removed from the United States and her appeal
was denied on January 21, 2020.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
10
Her attorney filed an emergency stay of removal with ICE on September 15, 2020.
She has been in ICE custody for the past 3 years, since October 2017 until now.
While in the Irwin County Detention Center in Georgia, the individual was told
she needed a D&C procedure, which removed tissue from inside the uterus.
The need for the D&C procedure alone raises questions regarding the conditions
of her detainment in the Irwin County Detention Center.
However, during what should have been a D&C procedure, she was put under an-
esthesia, and the doctor performed a salpingectomy instead, which removed one of
her fallopian tubes without the individual’s knowledge or consent.
Ms. Binam was never told why her fallopian tube was removed and was eventu-
ally transferred to the Montgomery Processing Center in Texas.
The IG office was charged with investigating the details surrounding her treat-
ment and the medical treatment provided to other women at that facility.
On September 14, 2020, the nonprofit Project South, along with 3 other non-
profits, Georgia Detention Watch, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, and
South Georgia Immigrant Support Network, filed a complaint on behalf of detained
immigrants at the Irwin County Detention Center and Nurse Wooten who worked
at the facility.
Despite this, ICE continued to carry through with Ms. Binam’s deportation.
Knowing this, I intervened on September 16, 2020, and disrupted her removal
while in process from the United States.
She has remained in the country while these and other matters regarding that
facility are investigated.
I look forward to the testimony of today’s witnesses.
Thank you.
Chairman THOMPSON. Members are also reminded that the com-
mittee will operate according to the guidelines laid out by myself
and the Ranking Member.
I welcome our panel of witnesses. Our first witness is Mr. Chris-
topher Currie, director of the U.S. Government Accountability Of-
fice, Homeland Security and Justice Team. Mr. Currie has worked
at GAO for nearly 20 years. His portfolio consists of emergency
management, DHS management, and emergency and disaster pre-
paredness, response, and recovery issues.
Our second witness is the Honorable Joseph B. Cuffari. He was
confirmed as the Department of Homeland Security inspector gen-
eral on July 25, 2019. Dr. Cuffari has previously served as a policy
advisory for military and veteran affairs for the Governor or Ari-
zona. He also served more than 40 years in the United States Air
Force.
Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted
in the record.
I now ask each witness to summarize his statement for 5 min-
utes, beginning with Mr. Currie.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECU-
RITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. CURRIE. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking
Member Katko, for the opportunity to discuss our upcoming report
on the DHS Office of Inspector General.
Inspector generals have a very difficult job. They provide inde-
pendent oversight of sensitive and controversial issues, they have
to be firm, they have to be fair, and they also have to be balanced.
The DHS OIG oversees the third-largest Federal department and
some of the most fragmented, sensitive, and publicly-scrutinized
issues in all of Government.
As the country’s National auditor, we at GAO work to ensure
that IGs and audit agencies are as effective as possible. We are all

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
11

in the business of keeping Government accountable and ensuring
that taxpayer dollars are spent effectively.
Our review has identified, as you mentioned, a wide range of
challenges at the Office of Inspector General. To be clear, these
challenges are long-standing and span multiple leaders and mul-
tiple administrations. As a result, blame rests with no one person,
but on years of inconsistent and poor management, discipline, and
practices, in our view.
Today, I am going to provide some examples of these challenges,
not to focus on the past, but just to be clear about what the root
causes are and, more important, to identify what we think is need-
ed to address them and transform this organization into what you
and we all think it should be.
Audit work is governed by very strict standards to ensure inde-
pendence, quality, and timeliness. These standards are developed
and accepted by the audit community because they work and be-
cause they help to avoid problems. Unfortunately, we found that
the IG Office lacks many of these policies and procedures, which
has led to concerns with the quality of their work and other chal-
lenges, such as demoralized staff and turnover.
Specifically, we found that the office lacked a clear quality assur-
ance program and process, which led to flaws in some of its work.
For example, in 2018 a peer review led by the Council of Inspector
Generals on Integrity and Efficiency gave the DHS IG a rating of
pass with deficiencies. Just to be clear, in the auditing world, this
is not the passing grade that you want. This means that the peer
reviewers had concerns about the quality of the work and that
some work did not meet auditing standards.
We have also found problems related to timeliness, as you have
mentioned in your opening statement. For example, projects taking
2 years or more to complete have increased since 2017. This leads
to several specific problems. First, reports sometimes lack the most
current information from the agency and policies once they are fi-
nally issued. This in turn makes the findings and recommendations
less useful to DHS and you, the Congress.
The challenges also affect the OIG’s relationship and credibility
with the Department in audits. To be straight, if an OIG is doing
an effective job, there will always be some disagreement and fric-
tion. However, there is a level of credibility and trust between the
auditor and the auditee by conducting work with integrity in ac-
cordance with standards. This relationship is critical to ensuring
that the Department actually implements recommendations made
to improve effectiveness and efficiency.
The lack of policies and consistency also led to DHS and its com-
ponents raising questions about report quality. For example, we
found that DHS expressed concern about inaccurate information or
facts in about 23 percent of reports the OIG issued in fiscal year
2020.
These are just a few of the areas we identified where there were
challenges. There are many more that we will talk about in the full
report. We are planning numerous recommendations to address
them.
We are currently waiting for the IG’s formal response to our rec-
ommendations and will issue that report very soon. However, I

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
12

want to close with one very important and clear point, our rec-
ommendations are not just intended to be improvements around
the margin. Collectively the OIG must treat these as a multi-year
transformation effort in our view.
The good news is the IG has hundreds of dedicated public serv-
ants who take pride in their oversight mission. We talked to many
of these folks during our work. Involving and communicating with
every single person in the organization will be key. This is not just
my opinion, this is what we at GAO know after decades of looking
at successful transformations across the Government.
This completes my statement and I look forward to your ques-
tions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRIS CURRIE

APRIL 21, 2021
GAO HIGHLIGHTS

Highlights of GAO–21–452T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland Se-
curity, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
DHS OIG has a critical role in providing independent and objective oversight of
DHS, which encompasses multiple operational and support components. OIGs are
expected to maintain high standards of professionalism and integrity in light of
their mission, according to quality standards developed by the community of Federal
inspectors general. However, DHS OIG has faced a number of challenges that have
affected its ability to carry out its oversight mission effectively.
This statement is based on GAO’s draft report on DHS OIG’s management and
operations, which is currently at the agency for comment. It provides preliminary
observations on DHS OIG’s strategic planning processes; quality assurance proc-
esses; and reporting time frames for work from DHS OIG’s offices of Audits and
Special Reviews and Evaluations.
To develop these preliminary observations, GAO reviewed relevant Federal laws
and quality standards for Federal OIGs as well as DHS OIG documentation, includ-
ing organizational policies; internal communications such as emails and memo-
randa; and DHS OIG’s semiannual reports to Congress and published reports. GAO
also analyzed DHS OIG project data from fiscal years 2015 through 2020, and inter-
viewed DHS OIG leaders and other staff.
What GAO Recommends
GAO will complete its review and make recommendations, as appropriate, in the
final report.
DHS OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL.—PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON LONG-
STANDING MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES

What GAO Found
GAO’s preliminary work has identified a number of management and operational
challenges, including frequent leadership turnover, since fiscal year 2015 that have
impeded the overall effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Office of Inspector General (OIG). DHS OIG senior leaders have acknowledged that
these challenges have contributed to organizational weaknesses, and have taken
steps to begin addressing some of them. GAO’s preliminary work has identified
issues in the following areas, among others:
• Strategic planning.—DHS OIG has not consistently developed strategic plans,
which are a necessary input for developing the organization’s other guiding doc-
uments and governance framework. Specifically, DHS OIG has operated for 4
of the past 6 years without a strategic plan, and the plan it adopted for fiscal
years 2018–2019 included some, but not all, of the elements considered stand-
ard for Federal entities. In 2020, DHS OIG contracted with a nonprofit academy
of Government experts to develop a strategic plan for fiscal years 2021–2025,
with expected delivery in June 2021.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
13
• Quality assurance.—Internal and external reviews have reported on concerns
about quality assurance in some of DHS OIG’s work. In 2017 and 2018, after
an internal review found that some reports issued by DHS OIG may not have
adhered to the professional standards cited, DHS OIG retracted 13 audit re-
ports that had been issued over a 5-year period. In 2018, an external review
determined that DHS OIG needed to improve its system of quality control.
Though DHS OIG concurred with all of the recommendations from that external
review, it did not fully implement them. In addition, DHS OIG has not estab-
lished roles and responsibilities for an organization-wide quality assurance pro-
gram. Moreover, GAO’s preliminary work indicates that current staff allocations
may limit DHS OIG’s quality assurance reviews to focusing on audit work and
not on the other types of work it produces, including inspections, evaluations,
special reviews, and management alerts.
• Timeliness.—DHS OIG project time frames for work from its offices of Audits
and Special Reviews and Evaluations have increased over the 4 fiscal years
GAO assessed. For example, in fiscal year 2017, 79 of 102 Office of Audits
projects were completed in 1 year or less and 8 of 102 took more than 18
months. In fiscal year 2020, 7 of 67 reports were completed in 1 year or less
and more than half (35 of 67) took more than 18 months. In addition, DHS OIG
has not assessed time frames for work completed by these offices, though timeli-
ness in reporting is a key element of effective oversight and DHS OIG staff con-
sidered it an organizational weakness.
GAO will complete its evaluation of these and other management and operational
areas, and will issue a final report in the coming months.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss preliminary observations from our work
on the management and operations of the Department of Homeland Security’s
(DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG).
DHS OIG has a critical role in strengthening accountability throughout DHS and
a responsibility to provide independent and objective oversight of the Department
and its 15 operational and support components, approximately 240,000 staff, and
tens of billions of dollars in budgetary resources. However, in the past 6 years, DHS
OIG has faced a number of challenges that have affected its ability to carry out its
oversight mission effectively.
In 2017 and 2018, DHS OIG retracted 13 audit reports issued between fiscal
years 2013 and 2017 after an internal review found those reports may not have ad-
hered to Government auditing standards.1 In 2018, peer reviewers, organized under
the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), gave DHS
OIG a ‘‘pass with deficiency’’ rating for its audit work, indicating that the peer re-
view team concluded DHS OIG did not have reasonable assurance that its work con-
formed with applicable professional standards in one important respect.2 The rating
was based on the peer reviewers’ determination that DHS OIG’s processes did not
assure compliance with Government auditing standards.
In addition, there have been allegations of improper conduct against DHS OIG
senior leaders. For example, in the summer of 2020, the inspector general an-
nounced the termination of a member of the office’s leadership team and that an-
other member had been placed on administrative leave. DHS OIG hired a law firm
to review the conduct of these 2 individuals, as well as a third former leader. The
investigation concluded that 1 DHS OIG senior leader, with the assistance of the
other 2 individuals, engaged in unprofessional conduct to the detriment of DHS OIG
and its mission.3

1 Government Auditing Standards provides a framework for conducting high-quality audits
with competence, integrity, objectivity, and independence. GAO, Government Auditing Stand-
ards 2018 Revision, GAO–18–568G (Washington, DC: July 17, 2018).
2 CIGIE’s mission is to support the work of Federal inspectors general by, among other things,
developing policies, standards, and approaches to aid inspectors general in their oversight work.
CIGIE also administers a peer review program to support Federal OIGs in their compliance with
professional standards and statutory requirements. For a given period under review, peer re-
viewers determine whether the audit organization’s system of quality control was suitably de-
signed and whether the audit organization is complying with that system. External peer reviews
of an OIG must be performed by an audit entity of the Federal Government (for example, an-
other OIG). Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–452, §1A4(b)(2), 92 Stat. 1103, as
amended.
3 According to the report of investigation, the law firm reviewed 88 allegations pertaining to
these senior leaders and found evidence that 1 leader, with the assistance of the others, engaged
in unprofessional conduct that elevated individual interests over those of the public. The inves-
Continued

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
14
DHS OIG has also experienced frequent leadership turnover in recent years. Dur-
ing fiscal years 2015 through 2020, DHS OIG had 4 confirmed or acting inspectors
general. Several key leadership positions—including the assistant inspector general
for audits, assistant inspector general for investigations, assistant inspector general
for special reviews and evaluations, and counsel—had similarly high turnover.4
DHS OIG senior leaders have acknowledged that these challenges have contrib-
uted to organizational weaknesses, and have taken steps to begin addressing some
of those weaknesses, as we describe later in this statement.
My statement today is based on our draft report on DHS OIG’s management and
operations, which is currently at the agency for comment. Specifically, this state-
ment provides preliminary observations on DHS OIG’s:
1. strategic planning processes;
2. quality assurance processes; and
3. reporting time frames for work from its offices of Audits and Special Reviews
and Evaluations.
We focused on DHS OIG management and operations from fiscal year 2015
through fiscal year 2020 and included more recent information on the status of on-
going efforts. To develop our preliminary observations in all 3 areas, we reviewed
relevant Federal laws about the management and operations of Federal OIGs, as
well as applicable CIGIE quality standards.5 We also reviewed documentation about
DHS OIG’s organizational policies; internal communications such as emails and
memoranda; and public documents, such as DHS OIG’s semiannual reports to Con-
gress and published reports.6 We interviewed DHS OIG senior leaders—members of
the Senior Executive Service—as well as leaders of divisions or functions and other
staff knowledgeable about the organization’s operations, referred to us by senior
leaders we interviewed.7 We also reviewed and analyzed DHS OIG internal assess-
ments of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats conducted in fiscal year
2017 and fiscal year 2019.
To describe the timeliness of work by the offices of Audits and Special Reviews
and Evaluations, we analyzed project time frames for projects initiated after the be-
ginning of fiscal year 2015 and completed by the end of fiscal year 2020 using data
in DHS OIG’s project tracking system.8 To assess the reliability of these data, we
reviewed the information for obvious errors and interviewed knowledgeable agency
officials about processes for collecting, maintaining, and checking the accuracy of
these data. Based on the information we collected, we determined that the data
were sufficiently reliable for us to report on the start and end dates for DHS OIG
projects.
We requested technical comments from DHS OIG on this statement, but none
were provided.
We are conducting the work upon which this statement is based in accordance
with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require
that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to pro-
vide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objec-
tives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our find-
ings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

tigation did not find evidence substantiating many of the other allegations, including that these
individuals engaged in illegal conduct.
4 DHS OIG leadership created the Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations in 2018. It in-
cludes the former Office of Inspections and Evaluations. The Office of Inspections and Evalua-
tions also had high leadership turnover.
5 For the purposes of our draft report and this statement, the scope of our work on quality
assurance processes and time frames includes work from the Offices of Audits and Special Re-
views and Evaluations. We did not include work completed by the Office of Investigations be-
cause our methodology relied on reviewing publicly-available reports—both for content related
to professional standards and information to inform data reliability of time frames for com-
pleting work. Investigative reports are generally not made publicly available. Additionally, we
could not evaluate the time frames for completing investigations because the scope and timing
of most investigations are determined by the allegations of misconduct and, unlike other OIG
work such as audits, are not planned or scoped in advance.
6 The Inspector General Act of 1978 requires OIGs to report twice yearly to Congress about
significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and op-
erations at the agency for which it provides oversight; a description of the recommendations for
corrective action made; and a summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the
prosecutions and convictions which have resulted, among other requirements. Inspector General
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–452, § 5(a), 92 Stat. 1103, as amended.
7 We conducted our interviews between March 2020 and February 2021 with officials who
were employed by DHS OIG at the time we interviewed them.
8 We reviewed data for projects initiated after October 1, 2014 and completed by September
30, 2020.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
15
BACKGROUND

DHS OIG
DHS OIG is led by an inspector general, who serves under the general supervision
of the Secretary of Homeland Security. By statute, inspectors general have a dual
and independent reporting relationship to the agency head and to the Congress.9
With about 700 employees on board as of September 2020, DHS OIG is structured
as shown in figure 1.

DHS OIG includes 3 offices whose primary mission is to directly conduct oversight
of DHS components, programs, and activities.
• Office of Audits.—Plans, conducts, and reports the results of financial and per-
formance audits, attestation engagements, and inspections and evaluations
across DHS and its components. Provides services in support of program office
work, including system testing, data analytics, and statistical analysis.
• Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations.—Plans, conducts, and reports the re-
sults of inspections, evaluations, and special reviews across DHS and its compo-
nents.
• Office of Investigations.—Investigates allegations of criminal, civil, and adminis-
trative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors, grantees, and pro-
grams, which may result in criminal prosecutions, fines, and personnel actions,
among other outcomes.
DHS OIG also includes 5 offices that support oversight activities and management
of the organization. They are: (1) Executive Office, (2) Office of Counsel,10 (3) Office

9 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–452, § 5(d), 92 Stat. 1103, as amended.
10 In addition to support activities, the Office of Counsel also investigates allegations of whis-

tleblower retaliation.

h:\seals\11771.eps
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
16
of External Affairs, (4) Office of Management, and (5) Office of Integrity and Quality
Oversight.11
CIGIE AND FEDERAL OIG QUALITY STANDARDS

Composed of 73 inspectors general, CIGIE is an independent entity within the Ex-
ecutive branch that was statutorily established by the Inspector General Reform Act
of 2008.12 CIGIE’s mission is to support the work of Federal inspectors general by,
among other things, developing policies, standards, and approaches to aid inspectors
general in their oversight work. CIGIE also facilitates the peer review process for
OIGs’ audit, investigation, and inspection and evaluation work.
The community of Federal inspectors general, organized through CIGIE, collec-
tively formulated and adopted CIGIE quality standards for OIGs to guide the man-
agement, operations, and conduct of Federal OIGs. CIGIE quality standards for
OIGs include professional standards for planning, establishing an efficient and effec-
tive organization, managing risk, maintaining quality assurance, and ensuring staff
possess the requisite qualifications to produce quality work, among others.13
CIGIE quality standards for OIGs also state that OIGs are expected to maintain
high standards of professionalism and integrity in light of their mission, as inde-
pendent and objective units, to review agency activities. CIGIE developed and adopt-
ed these quality standards to guide the conduct of OIGs because of that expectation
for the OIG community.
DHS OIG HAS NOT CONSISTENTLY DEVELOPED STRATEGIC PLANS

Our preliminary work indicates that DHS OIG did not have a strategic plan in
fiscal years 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2020, and the plan it adopted for fiscal years
2018–2019 included some, but not all, of the elements considered standard in stra-
tegic plans for Federal entities.14 As of April 2021, DHS OIG has actions under way
to develop a strategic plan for fiscal years 2021–2025.
The strategic plan for fiscal years 2018–2019 articulated DHS OIG’s mission, stra-
tegic goals, and the associated objectives, but did not include the strategies to
achieve those goals or a description of the organizational risks that might affect
achievement. According to DHS OIG officials we interviewed, the strategic plan for
fiscal years 2018–2019 was intended to guide the organization in the short-term
while DHS OIG staff built the capability to develop a 3- to 5-year strategic plan that
is more common.15
In addition, the strategic plan for fiscal years 2018–2019 did not articulate per-
formance goals, though DHS OIG later developed performance output targets that
were documented elsewhere. Specifically, the strategic plan for fiscal years 2018–
2019 did not include specific, quantifiable, and measurable targets that were aligned
to the overall strategy and against which DHS OIG could measure progress and
identify areas for improvement.16 The plan included a section for organization-level

11 One of 4 divisions in the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight conducts oversight re-
views of DHS component internal affairs offices in addition to reviews of DHS OIG investiga-
tions offices. The other 3 divisions conduct oversight of DHS OIG, according to OIG documenta-
tion.
12 Pub. L. No. 110–409, § 7(a), 122 Stat. 4305; 5a U.S.C. § 11. All inspectors general whose
offices are established under Section 2 or Section 8G of the Inspector General Act of 1978, in-
cluding those that are Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed and those that are ap-
pointed by agency heads (designated Federal entities), are members of CIGIE. 5a U.S.C. § 11.
13 CIGIE standards also incorporate by reference the professional standards for audit, inves-
tigation, and inspection and evaluation work, as well as Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government.
14 The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which was amended and
expanded by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA) includes an organizational per-
formance management framework that describes strategic plan content and publication time
lines in relation to strategic planning standards. GPRAMA requirements to develop a strategic
plan apply at the Departmental level (e.g., DHS), and do not explicitly apply to DHS OIG. How-
ever, we have previously stated that GPRAMA requirements can serve as leading practices at
lower organizational levels within Federal agencies, such as individual divisions, programs, or
initiatives, which would include an OIG. For example, see Chemical Assessments: Annual EPA
Survey Inconsistent with Leading Practices in Program Management, GAO–21–156, (Wash-
ington, DC: Dec. 18, 2020).
15 OMB Circular A–11 Preparation, Submission, Execution of the Budget, which provides guid-
ance on implementing GPRAMA, directs agencies to establish strategic goals and objectives in
their strategic plans for a period of not less than 4 years forward from the fiscal year in which
it is published (Section 230.4 of Circular A–11).
16 OMB Circular A–11 Preparation, Submission, Execution of the Budget describes the stand-
ard content of a strategic plan, which includes performance goals (Section 210.4 of Circular A–
11), and defines such goals as a statement of the level of performance to be accomplished within

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
17
performance indicators. However, the items listed described expected improvements
and not measurable outcomes linked to a performance goal and strategic objective,
as indicators in this context are generally defined.17 For example, DHS OIG’s per-
formance indicators included: (1) Products that identify more efficient and effective
ways for DHS to carry out its mission and (2) employee feedback tool that improves
operations and enhances employee satisfaction. For 2019, DHS OIG developed quan-
titative output goals for the heads of some DHS OIG offices and aligned them to
the strategic plan to supplement the descriptive outcomes. These output goals in-
cluded goals for: (1) Reports published and (2) employee engagement improvements
implemented.
In the spring of 2019, DHS OIG took some steps to prepare a successor strategic
plan, but ultimately changed course following a leadership change. Specifically, DHS
OIG staff initiated strategic planning activities and in the summer of 2019, staff
drafted a short-term strategic plan for fiscal years 2020–2022. Those staff rec-
ommended developing 4-year plans thereafter, starting in fiscal year 2023. However,
the inspector general did not adopt the draft strategic plan for fiscal years 2020–
2022 and instead initiated a process to contract with the National Academy for Pub-
lic Administration to develop DHS OIG’s next strategic plan.18
As of April 2021, DHS OIG has actions under way to develop a long-term strategic
plan, but will have operated for almost 2 years without a strategic plan when the
new plan is delivered in June 2021. DHS OIG finalized a contract for strategic plan-
ning work in August 2020 and, based on the contract’s terms, the contractor is ex-
pected to deliver a strategic plan to cover fiscal years 2021–2025 in June 2021. Ac-
cording to one DHS OIG senior leader, the inspector general sees value in the rig-
orous strategic planning process that the contractor is facilitating and in having a
plan that is reflective of his priorities.
We have previously reported that effective management of staff performance in-
cludes aligning individual performance to the organization’s goals, which cannot be
done if those goals have not been defined.19 A strategic plan is also a necessary
input for developing the organization’s other guiding documents and governance
framework that collectively provide reasonable assurance that its objectives will be
achieved.
DHS OIG HAS NOT IMPLEMENTED A QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM

Quality Assurance Program
Our preliminary work indicates that DHS OIG has not established roles and re-
sponsibilities for an organization-wide quality assurance program, and particularly
for internal quality assurance activities—that is, the activities DHS OIG undertakes
to ensure the objective, timely, and comprehensive appraisal of its operations.20 A
quality assurance program aims to ensure DHS OIG’s work: (1) Adheres to estab-
lished policies and procedures; (2) meets established standards of performance, in-
cluding applicable professional standards; and (3) is carried out economically, effi-
ciently, and effectively.
DHS OIG leadership established the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight as
the organization’s quality assurance office; however, its role has not been clearly de-
fined. In 2013, DHS OIG created the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight to
enhance organizational independence and oversight of DHS OIG’s operations. Offi-
cials from the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight told us that it is their un-
derstanding that the office is to lead quality assurance efforts, including ensuring
that the OIG’s structure supports alignment with professional standards and that
quality assurance elements, such as training, supervision, and risk assessment are
in place. However, the scope of the office’s responsibilities has not been formalized
in a quality assurance program.

a time frame, expressed as a tangible, measurable objective or as a quantitative standard, value,
or rate (Section 200.14 of Circular A–11).
17 OMB Circular A–11 Preparation, Submission, Execution of the Budget defines performance
indicators as the measurable values that are used to track progress toward a goal or target
within a time frame (Section 200.15 of Circular A–11).
18 The National Academy for Public Administration is a Congressionally-chartered, non-
partisan, nonprofit academy whose mission is to provide Government leaders with expert sup-
port in building and managing more effective, efficient, equitable, accountable, and transparent
organizations.
19 GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual Performance
and Organizational Success, GAO–03–488 (Washington, DC: March 14, 2003).
20 By contrast, external quality assurance refers to the reviews conducted by outside entities
of an OIG’s audits, investigations, inspections, evaluations, and other activities. The peer re-
views organized under CIGIE are an example of an external quality assurance activity.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
18
Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight staff have taken steps to formally estab-
lish such an OIG-wide quality assurance program, however, senior leaders have not
taken action to implement such a program. In the fall of 2019, staff in the Office
of Integrity and Quality Oversight wrote a draft directive to establish policies and
procedures for maintaining an overarching quality assurance program and shared
that draft directive with DHS OIG leadership. However, DHS OIG senior leaders
told us that they prioritized issues other than implementing a quality assurance
program. As of April 2021, DHS OIG had not implemented that directive and there
is no organization-wide quality assurance program in place.
In addition, our preliminary work indicates that resource constraints in the Office
of Integrity and Quality Oversight may affect the scope of DHS OIG’s internal qual-
ity assurance efforts. As of September 2020, 4 staff were assigned to the division
responsible for internal quality assurance reviews of DHS OIG’s audit, inspection,
and evaluation work. According to officials in the Office of Integrity and Quality
Oversight, as a result of resource constraints, their quality assurance reviews have
generally focused on audit work conducted under Government auditing standards
and have not focused on other types of work, including inspections, evaluations, spe-
cial reviews, and management alerts.
Quality Assurance for Audits
Our preliminary work also indicates that internal and external reviews have re-
ported on concerns about quality assurance in some of DHS OIG’s audit work con-
ducted under Government auditing standards. Although there are recent indications
of improvement, including updated guidance for audit staff, officials told us that
staff are still developing the skills necessary to produce high-quality audit work.
For example, in 2018, peer reviewers organized under CIGIE gave DHS OIG a
‘‘pass with deficiency’’ rating for its audit work. In their report, the peer reviewers
made 4 recommendations to DHS OIG: (1) Identify the root cause for departures
from audit standards in certain work; (2) update its policies and procedures to ad-
dress the deficiencies; (3) verify that changes in the system of quality control re-
solved the deficiencies; and (4) schedule an off-cycle peer review to verify that the
changes provide reasonable assurance that its work is adhering to audit standards.
DHS OIG concurred with all of the recommendations and considered them re-
solved, but we found that some were not fully implemented.21 For example, in re-
sponse to the second and third recommendations, the Office of Audits updated its
audit manual and established the Quality Management and Training Branch. The
Quality Management and Training Branch was to provide additional quality over-
sight of audit work and perform in-process quality reviews of audit work to evaluate
the effectiveness of the Office of Audits’ corrective actions.22 However, officials in
this branch told us that they stopped doing in-process quality reviews for approxi-
mately 10 months in fiscal year 2020 to focus on other priorities—including comple-
tion of the audit manual and related job aids. Eight in-process quality reviews were
affected by this reprioritization, including 4 reviews that were under way as of Octo-
ber 2019 and were not completed until September 2020. As a result, in 2020, audit
teams issued draft and final reports that did not incorporate the in-process quality
reviewers’ findings. As of January 2021, Office of Audits officials told us that they
continue to conduct in-process quality reviews and that such reviews are a priority
for their office.
TIME FRAMES FOR DHS OIG’S WORK HAVE INCREASED IN RECENT YEARS

Our preliminary work indicates that the time DHS OIG Office of Audits and Of-
fice of Special Reviews and Evaluations teams take to complete their work—that is,
from the time a team initiates a project until it publishes the final report—increased
for reports completed between fiscal year 2017 and 2020.23 In addition, DHS OIG
has not assessed time frames for completing such work, though report timeliness

21 According to DHS OIG’s semiannual reports to Congress, DHS OIG closed all of the 2018
audit peer review’s recommendations, as of September 2020. DHS OIG, Semiannual Report to
the Congress: October 1, 2019–March 31, 2020 (Washington, DC: 2020) and DHS OIG, Semi-
annual Report to the Congress: April 1, 2020–September 30, 2020 (Washington, DC: 2020).
22 In-process quality reviews refers to an assessment of an on-going project’s documentation
to determine whether the project team is conducting the project consistent with relevant profes-
sional standards and DHS OIG procedures prior to publication so the team could take corrective
action, if needed.
23 We reviewed project tracking data for projects initiated after October 1, 2014 and completed
by September 30, 2020. In order to compare time frames for completed reports across years, we
identified the first year in which reports initiated after October 1, 2014 were completed. We de-
termined that 2017 was the first such year. As a result, we report on time frames for reports
initiated after October 1, 2014 and completed in fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2020.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
19
is a recognized problem for DHS OIG. For example, a 2019 internal report summa-
rizing the results of interviews with DHS OIG staff from across the organization
noted that staff considered report timeliness a weakness for the organization.
Based on our preliminary work, the time it takes DHS OIG teams to complete
reports has increased over the 4 fiscal years we assessed.24 DHS OIG’s project
tracking system captures certain project milestones, such as the start date of
projects and date reports are issued, and acts as the office’s system of record for
reviewing and distributing reports and other work products. Our analysis of Office
of Audits and Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations project time frames using
data from this system found that time frames for individual projects vary. However,
the proportion of projects taking 18 to 24 months and more than 24 months gen-
erally increased from fiscal year 2017 to 2020, as shown in figure 2.25

24 For the purposes of this analysis, the Office of Audits includes time frames for reports com-

pleted by the Office of Audits, the former Office of Information Technology Audits, and the
former Office of Emergency Management Oversight. The Office of Specials Reviews and Evalua-
tions includes time frames for reports completed by the former Office of Inspections and Evalua-
tions and the former Special Reviews Group.
25 These time frames correspond to reports published in the stated fiscal year. Reports pub-

lished in fiscal year 2020, for example, may have been initiated in fiscal year 2020 or in any
prior fiscal year. Office of Audits officials told us that the longer time frames are because the
Office of Audits now conducts performance audits of the Federal Emergency Management Agen-
cy, which take longer than the compliance audits of grant applicants that the office conducted
in the past. As illustrated in figure 2, a small portion of Office of Audits reports took more than
18 months to complete in fiscal year 2017. In fiscal years 2019 and 2020, respectively, a signifi-
cantly larger portion of Office of Audits reports took more than 18 months to complete, although
fewer reports were completed in those years compared to 2017.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
20

As shown, 79 of 102 reports the Office of Audits completed in fiscal year 2017
(about 77 percent) took 1 year or less, and 8 of 102 (about 8 percent) took more than
18 months. In fiscal year 2020, in contrast, 7 of 67 Office of Audits reports (about
10 percent) took 1 year or less and 35 of 67 (about 52 percent) took more than 18
months. Time frames for Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations projects have
increased similarly over time, although the office is smaller and completes far fewer
projects each year. In fiscal years 2017 and 2018, the Office of Special Reviews and
Evaluations issued 15 and 19 reports, respectively. In each year, one report took
more than 18 months to complete. In fiscal year 2020, 5 of the 11 reports the office
issued took more than 18 months.
Our preliminary work also indicates that DHS OIG has not comprehensively eval-
uated timeliness at the organization or program office level to provide assurance

h:\seals\11772.eps
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
21
that its work is timely. Program office leaders we spoke with told us that the rea-
sons for increased project time frames varied because each project is different. How-
ever, according to these officials, neither DHS OIG nor program office leaders have
systematically assessed the timeliness of the office’s work. A project team within the
Office of Audits developed and, as of February 2021, is piloting a project tracking
dashboard to visually represent project statuses and milestones. This initiative is
a positive step and, in the future, could be a way for DHS OIG to centrally monitor
project time frames and better understand factors contributing to them.
We will complete our review of these and other management and operational
areas and make recommendations, as appropriate, in our final report, which will be
published in the coming months.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the committee,
this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any ques-
tions that you may have at this time.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you for your testimony.
I know recognize Inspector General Cuffari to summarize his
statement for 5 minutes, but he is having some technical difficul-
ties and he will be giving that testimony at this point on telephone
until the problems are resolved.
Dr. Cuffari.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH V. CUFFARI, INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. CUFFARI. Thank you, Chairman Thompson.
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of
the committee, before I begin I offer you my condolences on the loss
of your colleague, Representative Hastings. I understand many of
you were attending his memorial earlier today.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the Department
of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, our important
mission, and my on-going efforts to make it a model workplace.
Throughout my more than 40 years in public service I have
worked hard to find process improvements, efficiencies, and better
ways of doing business at every station. This includes considering
feedback from important oversight agencies, such as the GAO. I am
also very grateful for this committee’s support. I have had the
pleasure to meet personally with the Chairman, Ranking Member,
and more than half of this committee Members to keep you ap-
prised of our important work. With your support and confidence in
our office we have made significant strides.
Since this time last year we have had many accomplishments to
be proud of. Most notably, we maintained our efficiency and mo-
mentum despite the pandemic. Our Fiscal Year 2020 Federal Em-
ployee Viewpoint Survey scores hit a 5-year high. We increased
productivity and enhanced quality. We adopted a data-driven, risk-
based, decision-making model. We have more than 90 on-going au-
dits, inspections, and evaluations, including remote unannounced
inspections of immigration detention facilities, and we recently
passed 3 CIGIE peer reviews within the last 12 months.
We have left behind a tumultuous 5-year period in the IG’s brief
history and our ship is heading in the right direction. For the past
21 months I have worked diligently to build my senior leadership
team and to identify, understand, and address the issues that have
plagued our office. Since my confirmation I have met with more
than 70 Members of Congress, and over the past several months
I have also had very productive meetings with then-President-Elect

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
22

Biden’s DHS transition team and several one-on-one discussions
with Secretary Mayorkas.
I have also adopted initiatives to improve employee morale, in-
cluding increased communication through weekly update messages,
more than 60 small group meetings with my IG staff, I have had
several town hall meetings, and I have increased flexibility by im-
plementing a 100 percent telework policy and expanded schedule so
all my employees can address challenges brought on by the pan-
demic.
We appreciate the work that Mr. Currie and his team at GAO
have done. We view GAO’s recommendation as a tool to aid our of-
fice’s continuing progress and we appreciate GAO’s input and pro-
fessionalism. Even prior to receiving GAO’s draft report, my office
was already in the process of implementing improvements. For ex-
ample, we contracted with the Congressionally-chartered National
Academy of Public Administration to create a 5-year strategic plan
which will anchor our planning efforts. We have also expanded an
option on our NAPA contract to help us implement many of GAO’s
recommendations.
I have made several recent organizational adjustments, creating
2 new offices, the Office of Integrity and the Office of Innovation.
This change better aligns DHS IG’s organizational structure with
our larger peer agencies, such as the DOD IG and Health and
Human Services IG. We follow GAO model practices to implement
these changes, which will improve our quality assurance.
I present the committee with these final thoughts. The issues
within DHS IG that GAO identified in its draft report did not
manifest overnight. Therefore, it would be presumptuous to suggest
that these issues could be fixed overnight. But I am so wholly com-
mitted to the staff of the DHS IG, this committee, Congress, and
the American people, that I will spare no effort to build a stronger
and better organization. Our improvements over the last 21 months
show we are headed in the right direction and I have every con-
fidence in our future success.
This concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cuffari follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH V. CUFFARI
Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Katko, and Members of the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG), our important mission, and my on-
going efforts to make it a model workplace.
I look forward to discussing with you the Government Accountability Office’s
(GAO) draft report about our office, GAO’s observations and recommendations, and
the ways in which DHS OIG will continue to strive for excellence. Throughout my
more than 40 years in public service—in the U.S. Air Force, the Reserves, the Air
National Guard, and as a career civil servant—I have worked hard to find process
improvements, efficiencies, and better ways of doing business at every station. This
includes considering feedback from important oversight agencies such as GAO.
I am also grateful for this committee’s support of our office. I have had the pleas-
ure to meet personally with the Chairman, Ranking Member, and over half of the
Members of this committee to keep you apprised of our important work. With your
support and confidence in our office, we have made significant strides since my con-
firmation in July 2019.
A great example of our forward progress is the report that we released today on
the Department’s deployment of law enforcement officers to Portland, Oregon last
summer. In this report, we assessed the authority, preparation, and activities of

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
23
DHS law enforcement officers deployed to Portland to protect Federal property. We
concluded that DHS did not properly exercise its authority to designate and deploy
DHS component law enforcement officers to help the Federal Protective Service
(FPS) protect Federal facilities. Moreover, DHS was unprepared to effectively exe-
cute cross-component activities in Portland. Specifically, not all officers had com-
pleted required training, had the necessary equipment, or used consistent uniforms,
devices, and operational tactics.
We have maintained our efficiency and momentum despite a myriad of challenges
due to COVID–19. We have increased productivity and enhanced quality, adopted
a data-driven, risk-based decision-making model, and passed 3 Council of the In-
spectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) peer reviews within a 12-
month span. Our recently released Fiscal Year 2020 Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey scores hit a 5-year high. In short, we have left behind a tumultuous 5-year
period (2014–2019) in DHS OIG’s brief history, and our organization’s compass is
now pointing in the right direction.
OIG—THEN AND NOW

Prior to my confirmation in July 2019 as only the third Senate-confirmed DHS
Inspector General, DHS OIG was an office beset with persistent structural, morale,
and ethical challenges. As the committee noted in December 2019 correspondence
to me, morale was low, work products were not always produced to the standards
required by CIGIE, and I was inundated with internal employee complaints about
senior leadership. I was faced with innumerable challenges as the new leader of
DHS OIG—most notably repairing the troubling situations that occurred prior to my
confirmation:
• A former acting inspector general and 2 information technology managers are
alleged to have taken actions that led to their indictment on Federal criminal
charges for stealing OIG database information.
• Under the supervision of another acting inspector general, DHS OIG was forced
to rescind over a dozen audit reports in 2017 and 2018 because the reports did
not meet required CIGIE standards.
• In June and July 2019, a member of OIG leadership falsely held herself out as
the acting inspector general for 6 weeks.
For the past 21 months, I have worked diligently to build my senior leadership
team and to identify, understand, and address the issues that have plagued our of-
fice. Starting in August 2019, I began speaking with Members of this committee,
your colleagues, and staff members on a bipartisan basis about these issues. Since
my confirmation, I have met with over 70 Members of Congress from our House and
Senate oversight committees, as well as numerous members of the Senate Whistle-
blower Protection Caucus. Over the last several months, I have also had very pro-
ductive meetings with then President-Elect Biden’s DHS transition team and sev-
eral one-on-one discussions with Secretary Mayorkas.
Sitting before you today, I am proud to discuss the following accomplishments we
have achieved in my short time as Inspector General.
Improved Morale
Our fiscal year 2020 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey scores hit a 5-year high,
demonstrating that employee morale is heading in the right direction. Improve-
ments were noted in employee engagement overall, and specifically in the areas of
leadership, supervision, intrinsic work experience, and global satisfaction. These re-
sults were not by chance. Since my confirmation, I have implemented the following
initiatives to improve employee morale:
• Increased communication.—I send weekly and ad hoc messages to all OIG staff
with updates from senior leadership and highlights of noteworthy accomplish-
ments.
• Small group meetings.—I conducted over 60 small group meetings with OIG
staff. These virtual meetings typically involved 10–15 employees at a time,
where I updated staff on a range of topics including our budget, laptop refresh,
organizational changes, and status of work products. All OIG employees were
invited to a small group meeting and were provided the opportunity to send
questions in advance or ask them in an open forum.
• Town Hall meetings.—Since July 2019, I have held 2 town hall-style meetings,
in November 2019 and June 2020, where all OIG employees were invited to at-
tend. I anticipate scheduling another town hall meeting this summer.
• Increased flexibility.—Understanding the additional stress this unprecedented
global pandemic has put on almost everyone, I maximized workplace flexibility
options for OIG employees. In March 2020, I implemented a 100 percent
telework policy as well as a work schedule we refer to as ‘‘any–80.’’ This entitles

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
24
employees to work any 80 hours within a 2-week pay period. I have received
positive feedback from many employees who say this flexibility has helped with
unforeseen burdens brought on by the pandemic, such as child care needs, vir-
tual schooling, and aiding older family members.
Improved Work Products
A small percentage of our past work products were identified as not meeting OIG
community standards. Although that percentage was small, one unacceptable report
is still one too many. We took several actions to rectify this issue, including:
• Bolstered Review Process.—Implementation of rigorous review of all reports to
ensure the quality of our work. Even with this enhanced review process, we in-
creased our productivity of audit and inspection reports issued from 64 in fiscal
year 2019 to 80 in fiscal year 2020. Our workload projections show that we are
on track to meet or exceed fiscal year 2020 productivity in fiscal year 2021.
• Passing Peer Reviews.—Consistent with CIGIE requirements, our office under-
went 3 peer reviews within the last 12 months (Yellow Book, Blue Book, and
Investigations). Our office earned a score of ‘‘pass’’ for all 3 reviews, which is
an important improvement from the ‘‘pass with deficiencies’’ score DHS OIG re-
ceived in 2018 for our Yellow Book review.
• Engagement Planning.—With a Department of nearly 500,000 employees and
contractors to oversee, it is imperative that we select projects that will be the
most meaningful and impactful. I adopted a data-driven, risk-based decision-
making model for the selection of audit and inspection work which helps us
prioritize our oversight. Audit and inspection proposal discussions culminate in
a bi-weekly strategy meeting with senior leadership where we actively discuss
and select the audits and inspections that our office conducts.
• Strategic Planning.—Recognizing the importance of an aggressive but attain-
able plan for our future, in August 2020, we contracted with the National Acad-
emy of Public Administration (NAPA) to assist us in developing a 5-year stra-
tegic plan. We awarded this contract because it is the right way to bring about
real change. We plan to exercise an option in our contract for NAPA to help
us implement various GAO recommendations.
• Business Systems Modernization.—We have contracted with the Homeland Se-
curity Systems and Development Institute contractor, MITRE, to modernize, in-
tegrate, and streamline our business information systems and automate redun-
dant and antiquated manual tasks. This will significantly improve the efficiency
and quality of our work by leveraging available technology.
Office Reorganization
After I was confirmed and arrived at DHS OIG, I discovered that our Human Re-
source Management Division was positioned within the Office of Counsel, thereby
creating conflicts of interest. Therefore, in January 2020 I moved the Division to our
Office of Management—where it was originally located and where I believe it can
best serve our organization.
Second, I learned our Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU), which handles sen-
sitive and legally complex investigative cases of whistleblower retaliation, was posi-
tioned within the Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations. I returned attorneys
from WPU to our Office of Counsel, where it originally resided, so they would re-
ceive appropriate supervision and leadership. I also assigned a subject-matter expert
to oversee the unit and ensure it applies appropriate legal standards. In my on-
going commitment to reduce the WPU’s backlog of retaliation cases, I reassigned 4
attorneys from another division to supplement the WPU’s work and right-size the
unit. I am confident WPU’s backlog will continue to decline.
I continuously review our organizational structure to ensure that our programs
and offices are strategically aligned to efficiently achieve our mission. Last week,
I announced the creation of 2 new DHS OIG offices: The Office of Innovation and
the Office of Integrity.
The Office of Innovation will plan and lead change across the organization, focus-
ing on our business practices, information systems, and use of data analytics. The
Office of Integrity will uphold professional standards through a multidisciplinary
approach of inspections and investigations. We are recruiting for 2 senior executives
to lead these offices. As part of this reorganization, we retitled some of our senior
executive positions to more closely align with the practices of our fellow OIGs in
large agencies, such as the Department of Defense OIG and Health and Human
Services OIG. We followed GAO model practices to implement this realignment.
Addressing Senior Leadership Vacancies and Challenges
• Filling Senior Leadership Vacancies.—Since my confirmation, I have filled the
following senior leadership positions: Principal deputy inspector general, chief

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
25
of staff, general counsel, deputy IG for investigations, deputy IG for inspections
and evaluations, and assistant IG for investigations. We are in the process of
filling remaining vacancies including for the deputy IG for audits, assistant IG
for inspections and evaluations, and deputy counsel.
• Addressing Misconduct.—I have made it clear to all OIG staff that I will not
tolerate misconduct at any level of our organization. Making good on that com-
mitment, I have been transparent and forthcoming with information on the in-
vestigation into the misconduct of former senior officials within our office—in-
formation that I have also shared with this committee.
GAO’S DRAFT REPORT

In March 2020, 8 months after I was confirmed as the inspector general of DHS
OIG, GAO notified us it would be conducting an engagement on ‘‘Challenges Facing
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG).’’
At the time, understanding the challenges DHS OIG faced prior to my confirma-
tion, I welcomed an independent review of these issues. Throughout this engage-
ment, we have been responsive to GAO’s requests for documents and access to em-
ployees for interviews.
Only 10 days ago, on Monday, April 12, we received GAO’s draft report. The draft
report contains 21 recommendations. We are in the process of fully digesting the
draft report, evaluating its recommendations, and drafting our management re-
sponse which is due to GAO on May 12. With respect to the report’s recommenda-
tions, 3 themes have emerged: Strategic planning, report timeliness and procedures,
and quality assurance.
Prior to receiving the report, my office implemented changes that address several
of the recommendations in these areas. For example, we are leveraging our contract
with NAPA to incorporate improvements into our 5-year strategic plan which will
anchor our work and human resource planning efforts. Some of the previously dis-
cussed strategic changes to our organizational structure are aimed at bolstering
quality assurance. We view GAO’s recommendations as a tool to aid our office’s con-
tinued progress, and we appreciate GAO’s input and professionalism.
ON-GOING WORK

Today’s discussion would not be complete without including a sample of DHS
OIG’s recently completed and on-going work in areas of interest to the committee.
Pandemic Response Oversight
I serve as 1 of 9 statutory IGs who are members of the Pandemic Response Ac-
countability Committee (PRAC), created by the CARES Act, and we are coordinating
closely with the PRAC when necessary. We have also given training to the PRAC
and other IGs on some of our innovative investigative and inspection techniques.
For example, we developed an analytical dashboard to identify fraudulent Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) vendors who were contracted to provide
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for the National stockpile. The effort resulted
in high-impact investigations across the country.
To date, the DHS OIG has proactively generated or received a significant number
of COVID–19 fraud complaints Nation-wide. We have more than 60 on-going crimi-
nal investigations and are working with U.S. Attorney’s Offices around the country
on several COVID–19 fraud task forces, including the Department of Justice (DOJ)
National Stimulus Funds Fraud Working Group, the DOJ National Unemployment
Insurance Fraud Task Force, the DOJ Procurement Collusion Strike Force, the DOJ
Grant Fraud Working Group, and the National Center for Disaster Fraud.
We recently announced, with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District
of Virginia, a 9-count indictment of 4 defendants charged with:
(1) Conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with major disaster benefits; (2)
fraud in connection with major disaster benefits; and (3) mail fraud. The defendants
are accused of facilitating a scheme to file almost $500,000 in fraudulent unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) claims on behalf of prison inmates in Virginia.1 Our office is
co-leading a task force with the Department of Labor OIG to investigate fraudulent
UI claims, which have a DHS nexus because funding was provided through FEMA’s
Disaster Relief Fund under the CARES Act.
In February 2021, our office, along with the Veterans Affairs (VA) OIG and the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia, announced the guilty plea
of a defendant for making false statements in order to fraudulently obtain more

1 Press Release, Four Individuals Indicted for Fraudulently Obtaining Pandemic Unemploy-
ment Benefits for Virginia Prison Inmates, April 9, 2021.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
26
than $38 million in VA and FEMA contracts for PPE that he and his company did
not possess and could not supply.2
We also have numerous on-going audits and inspections of DHS’s pandemic re-
sponse, including:
• ICE’s Efforts to Prevent and Mitigate the Spread of COVID–19 in its Facilities
• DHS Prioritization of Front-line and Mission-Critical Employees for COVID–19
Vaccines
• Audit of USCIS’s Ability to Process and Administer Immigration and Natu-
ralization Benefits Requested During the COVID–19 Pandemic
• Review of DHS’s Priority Telecommunications Services and Capabilities During
the COVID–19 Pandemic
• FEMA’s Federal Coordination Efforts in Response to COVID–19
• FEMA’s Federal Medical Supply Chain in Response to COVID–19
• FEMA’s Administration of CARES Act Funding for the Emergency Food and
Shelter Program
• FEMA’s Contracting Practices During the COVID–19 Disaster Declaration
• FEMA’s Controls of Mission Assignments in Response to COVID–19
• Physical Storage and Security of COVID–19 Vaccines.
ICE Detention Oversight
We have a robust body of oversight work on-going regarding ICE detention, in-
cluding:
• Unannounced Inspections of ICE Detention Facilities
• Allegations about Inadequate Medical Care and Other Concerns at the Irwin
County Detention Center
• Evaluation of ICE’s Oversight and the Use of Segregation in ICE Detention Fa-
cilities
• Inadequate Prenatal Care and Staffing Deficiencies at ICE IHSC-run Facilities
• Medical Vacancies at ICE Detention Facilities
• Review of Removal of Separated Alien Families
• Audit of ICE’s Government Service Contracts.
We recently published the results of our first virtual unannounced inspection, Vio-
lations of Detention Standards Amidst COVID–19 Outbreak at La Palma Correc-
tional Center in Eloy, Arizona. We were able to adapt to pandemic conditions that—
for the safety of detainees, detention facility employees, and DHS OIG employees—
limited our ability to conduct in-person inspections.
Border Security Oversight
Earlier in my career, I gained extensive experience on the border as a special
agent with the DOJ OIG, where I was a member of a team responsible for unan-
nounced inspections of U.S. Border Patrol’s quality of care of unaccompanied chil-
dren and other migrants, for which I received a PCIE award in 2002. Today, I am
personally drawing on that experience as inspector general.
Members of my senior staff and I traveled to the Southwest Border during the
first week of April to meet with OIG staff in the field and personally observe condi-
tions. This followed a similar visit that we made to the Southwest Border in October
2019. Observations from our recent visit resulted in 2 new projects, listed below,
and will continue to inform our audit and inspection work in this area. Currently,
we have the following projects on-going:
• ICE’s Contract to House Migrants in Hotels
• DHS Border Admissibility Screening Operations During the 2021 Migrant Surge
• Extent of CBP’s Testing or Plans to Test Migrants for COVID–19 at the U.S.
Border with Mexico
• Review of a February 16, 2020 Childbirth at the Chula Vista Border Patrol Sta-
tion
• CBP’s Procedures for Detained Migrants Experiencing Serious Medical Condi-
tions
• DHS DNA Collection
• DHS Management and Oversight of Immigration Hearings in Temporary Courts
along the Southwest Border
• ICE’s Enforcement Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking
• CBP Leadership’s Knowledge of and Actions to Address Offensive Content Posted
on Facebook by CBP Employees
• CBP’s Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program
• CBP’s Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry
• CBP Management of Aviation Fleet

2 Press Release, CEO Pleads Guilty to Defrauding Multiple Federal Agencies, Feb. 3, 2021.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
27
• CBP’s Management of Radiation Portal Monitors.
We recently published 2 reports likely to interest the committee: DHS’s Frag-
mented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Ex-
tended Migrant Detention During the 2019 Surge and CBP Has Improved Southwest
Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain. We look forward to sharing
the results of our on-going work with you when it is complete.
Events of January 6, 2021
We initiated 2 reviews to examine the role and activity of DHS and its compo-
nents in preparing for and responding to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January
6, 2021. We are evaluating DHS’s responsibility for providing intelligence to law en-
forcement and the role of DHS law enforcement components in responding to the
attack. We also recently initiated a review of DHS’s role in preventing and pro-
tecting the Nation from domestic terrorism and violent extremism.
CONCLUSION

The issues within DHS OIG that GAO identified in its draft report did not mani-
fest overnight. They happened over the course of many years. Therefore, it would
be presumptuous to suggest that I can fix all of these issues overnight. I am wholly
committed to the staff of DHS OIG, this committee, Congress, and the American
people that I will spare no effort to build a stronger and better DHS OIG. I believe
our improved morale, superior work products, and revitalized leadership over the
past 21 months demonstrate that DHS OIG is now headed in the right direction.
I have every confidence in our future success.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the important work of the OIG and our
plans to work with the GAO to improve our operations. This concludes my testi-
mony, and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
28
APPENDIX A.—DECEMBER 6, 2019 LETTER FROM THE SENATE HOMELAND SECURITY
AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOME-
LAND SECURITY

h:\seals\11773.eps
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
29

h:\seals\11774.eps
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
30

h:\seals\11775.eps
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
31

Chairman THOMPSON. I thank both witnesses for their testimony.
I would remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes
to question the panel.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Currie, I understand that the soon-to-be-released report you
referenced in your testimony challenges and looks at the Depart-
ment Office of Inspector General for several years and that you
make 21 recommendations. Is this normal in terms of recommenda-
tions, or is that an unusually high number of recommendations?
Mr. CURRIE. Thank you, sir.

h:\seals\11776.eps
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
32

This is a very large number of recommendations, particularly
when we look at one specific office or sub office within a depart-
ment. It is not out of the question that we would make this many
recommendations in one report, especially if the scope is very large,
but this is definitely a very large number of recommendations
when looking at the management of one entity in the Government.
Chairman THOMPSON. I assume you have presented these rec-
ommendations to the IG’s office?
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir.
Chairman THOMPSON. When do you expect a response back?
Mr. CURRIE. The final response is due back by May 12.
Chairman THOMPSON. OK. Thank you very much.
Dr. Cuffari, as I assume we both are aware, on August 4, 2020
GAO found that Acting Secretary Wolf and Acting Deputy Sec-
retary Cuccinelli were serving in those roles pursuant to an invalid
order of succession. GAO referred that the DHS IG for questions.
In a September 2020 letter to this committee, the OIG declined
GAO’s referral and disputed its conclusion.
Now, I understand that at an August 19, 2020 meeting you in-
formed senior staff that you would meet with Acting Secretary Wolf
to discuss the GAO report before making a decision on how to pro-
ceed. Did Secretary Wolf tell you not to accept the GAO referral?
Mr. CUFFARI. Mr. Chairman, just to clarify, I don’t believe I actu-
ally had a meeting with the Secretary reference that matter. It was
probably regarding other on-going investigations that we had. I did
make a decision to review the GAO report. My determination after
considering input from my career professional staff was that it
would—that matter of question would best be addressed as an
inter-branch dispute by the Judiciary Branch. As a matter of fact,
I believe 6 U.S.—they are district courts, have been looking at that
issue and have ruled. Four additional ones are embarking on the
same issue.
Chairman THOMPSON. So you are saying that to say what?
Mr. CUFFARI. I am just filling in the blanks, sir. I don’t believe
I had a meeting with the Secretary involving this. My Office of
Counsel may have spoken with their counsel’s office, but I don’t be-
lieve I had a meeting with the Secretary about that. I issued my
conclusions.
Chairman THOMPSON. So you do understand the appearance of a
conflict in something this sensitive goes to the credibility of the In-
spector General’s Office. If there is any communication around this
issue for which you were asked by GAO to look into?
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, sir. Well, I just go back to my record. You
know, it speaks for itself. We have improved our FEVS scores, we
have increased productivity during the pandemic, and I have in-
creased the quality of my reports. I just got done passing 3 peer
reviews.
I am—again, I believe in July of last year this question may have
come up about outside influence of our office. Again, I will commit
to you and the other Members of this committee, and to Congress
at large, that I get no outside influence regarding my decisions to
undertake or not undertake a particular matter.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you.
Chair recognizes the Ranking Member for questions.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
33

Mr. KATKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Currie, in preparing for today’s testimony I was—I don’t
know if shock is the right word—but very surprised by the amount
of recommendations and findings in here. Twenty-one is an unbe-
lievable number for something like this. But I commend you for
your thoroughness, because if we don’t know there is a problem, we
don’t know how to fix it. That is what your role is and that is what
the role of OIG is in my opinion. You know, we have to ensure that
you are both performing at the top of your games.
So, Mr. Currie, briefly, this report spans from 2015 to 2020, am
I correct?
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir.
Mr. KATKO. OK. So much of this report predated the time that
Mr. Cuffari is in office, is that fair to say?
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir.
Mr. KATKO. OK. So what do you think would be the first steps
that the OIG should take to instill a culture of integrity and profes-
sionalism at OIG? What do you think they should be and have you
seen any signs that they are starting to go in that direction?
Mr. CURRIE. Well, I think all of our recommendations are—I cat-
egorize them as the building blocks or the steps. Some of them
need to be sequenced, some of them—you know, one comes after
another.
You know, one of the things that we talk about at the end of the
report is that I think that all of these things should be looked at
as an organizational transformation effort. There are very specific
protocols and best practices looking at decades of past Federal
transformations and reorganizations to guide this type of thing, be-
cause they work. So I think all of these things need to be put to-
gether into one transformational plan. It needs to have a dedicated
management leadership team that is responsible for it. There needs
to be, for example, a communication plan to all employee about
what the vision is, what the time lines are, what the metrics are,
and how do we know when we have reached success.
There needs to be constant communication with Congress and
others. There is a very specific process for doing this and it is not
impossible. It has been done before.
Mr. KATKO. Mr. Currie, I thank you very much for your profes-
sionalism and your thoroughness. It is a critically important thing
you are doing, so I guess I just want to say keep it up.
Dr. Cuffari, you have got a—you know, this is not a great report
for you to have. Obviously a lot of this predated your time there,
but, you know, you are the head of this now and I want to get a
feel from you, and some assurances, what you are doing to help
turn this ship around because you have got a monumental task in
front of you. We want to hear what your vision is and what you
are planning to do to turn this around.
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, sir. Thank you.
So, first off, you have my commitment that I am going to con-
tinue to work with my counterparts at GAO to continue to improve
our office here. We appreciate obviously the committee’s continued
support for our efforts.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, back in August 2020,
last summer, we contracted with NAPA to assist us in developing

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
34

a 5-year strategic plan. As you know, all subsequent organizational
functions flow from the top and the organizational plan is basically
our bedrock. We didn’t have one in the few years that I have been
here, and so subsequently I decided that I was going to follow Con-
gress’—you know, their recommendation in the sense that they
urge departments to strongly embrace NAPA and as NAPA pro-
vides expert nonpartisan advice in solving agencies’ management
challenges.
So we have done that, NAPA is poised to give us a report toward
the end of this summer. We are going to go and exercise a 1-year
extension option with them so that they will help us implement the
GAO recommendations.
Mr. KATKO. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman, before I yield back I just wanted to offer a sug-
gestion, a respectful suggestion that this to me is—should be the
first of a series of hearings with OIG, and maybe with—because we
have to get the report back and once we get the report I want to
see what progress is being made going down the road, looking at
the 21 deficiencies identified. So perhaps at some point, 6 months
from now or whatever, we need to revisit this issue and see what
progress is being made.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. I assure the Rank-
ing Member, as soon as the response is officially provided back to
GAO, we will take it back up before——
Mr. KATKO. Very good. Thank you, sir. Thank you.
Chairman THOMPSON [continuing]. Not too long.
The Chair now recognizes other Members for questions they may
wish to ask the witnesses.
As previously outlined, I will recognize Members in order of se-
niority, alternating between Majority and Minority. Members are
reminded to unmute themselves when recognized for questioning,
and to the extent practical, to leave their cameras on so they are
visible to the Chair.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee, for 5 minutes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much for
this very important hearing and thank you to the Ranking Mem-
ber.
Having been on the Homeland Security Committee for now 2 dec-
ades I know that in the midst of the leadership of any Secretary
of Homeland Security the IG is crucial.
So, Mr. Currie, let me raise questions with you before I ask the
new inspector general—at least a person different than what we
have dealt with—in my framework, or in the frame of my question,
I indicated the magnitude of responsibilities of the Homeland Secu-
rity Department. This committee, by the way, our Chairman and
along with those of us as Members first noted domestic terrorism
as one of America’s greatest threats. The responsibility of home-
land security is domestic security, National security.
So in the context of what you found that—operating without a
strategic plan, maybe not an effective system of internal quality as-
surance, have no way of knowing of its internal processes, the time
to complete projects is significantly increased—in that backdrop,

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
35

how dangerous is it in terms of the Nation’s security when you
don’t have these processes in place and really a strategic plan? Be-
cause this Department is the [inaudible] go-to Department on do-
mestic security. When we are not secure, it is the one who should
have provided the profile and notice to this Nation.
Mr. Currie.
Mr. CURRIE. Thank you, ma’am.
I think there are 2 things. The first concern I would have with
that is that you don’t know whether you are addressing the highest
risks. There is nothing that this Department does that isn’t sen-
sitive and sometimes controversial and in the public eye. Without
a strategic plan or a clearly communicated set of priorities, nobody
knows what the focus is, or maybe more important, why.
I think the second concern is without those things it leaves the
option in there for filling in—other people to fill in gaps as to why
certain issues are being addressed or the IG is taking on certain
work and not others. The way you combat that is very clear plan-
ning and clear communication about what your priorities are.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Does it endanger or does it lessen our quick
response and our ability to secure the Nation?
Mr. CURRIE. It can, ma’am. I mean if you are not doing the work
at the highest quality, the risk is that you are not identifying the
problem areas as quick as you could to address them as quick as
possible.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.
You might comment on that as well, to the new inspector gen-
eral. I have quick question for you, Mr. Cuffari. Thank you.
In the spring—on the fall of 2020, a group of us wrote—172
Members wrote a letter to the IG on the case of a whistleblower,
Ms. Wooton, at the Irving County Detention Center. We also had
as a case, Ms. Pauline Negegy Binam, who I had to work to get
off a plane as she was being deported, and she was one of the
women that said that her organs were taken out at this particular
facility.
I would be interested in whether your office is even aware of
this. We have been waiting for a report on this. If you would re-
spond to that, as well as my comment about the findings of the
GAO that you have no strategic plan. Is it your assessment that
we are less secure with no strategic plan and no ability to interact
with respect to internal quality assurance?
Inspector general.
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, ma’am. It is very nice to visit with you again.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.
Mr. CUFFARI. I appreciate Mr. Currie’s comments. I agree with
them. That is the reason that early on, even before GAO actually
ramped up and took a look at our organization, that I hired and
contracted with NAPA to help us develop this strategic plan. I be-
lieve that, again, that is the foundation for us going forward. It
gives us the solid rock and all the work flows from that.
Regarding the Irwin Detention Facility, ma’am, we opened a spe-
cial review in the summer of last year. I believe we have responded
to all the Members that that review was open by our office. We are
working that currently. We have interviewed Ms. Wooton on a
number of occasions with her attorney and we have interviewed

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
36

several of the female detainees. We have collected documents from
ICE and we have also interviewed several staff at the hospital
where the attending physician works. We are getting to the point
where we are completing that work and we are using our con-
tracted medical services team that you graciously were able to fund
for us last year, and we are looking at the health care that was
provided to those detainees.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman——
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentlelady’s——
Ms. JACKSON LEE. May I offer documents into the record at this
time, Mr. Chairman, or?
Chairman THOMPSON. Yes.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I know my time
has expired. Thank you so very much.
Let me offer into the record ‘‘A former DHS watchdog who got
too cozy with managers, was put on leave.’’ That was dated April
25, 2014, certainly before you, inspector general. And the bio-
graphical sketch of Ms. Pauline Negegy Binam, a woman who was
at the Irving and thought that she had organs removed without her
permission and was then almost deported. She obviously did not
get deported, but almost deported when she wanted to tell her
story.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman THOMPSON. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
ARTICLE BY GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE
FORMER DHS WATCHDOG WHO GOT TOO COZY WITH MANAGERS IS PUT ON LEAVE

Yearlong probe finds Charles Edwards violated principle of IG independence.
April 25, 2014
https://www.govexec.com/management/2014/04/dhs-watchdog-who-got-too-cozy-
managers-put-leave/83221/
The need for watchdogs to operate independently of their agencies prompted a
shakeup on Thursday at the Homeland Security Department inspector general’s of-
fice, resulting in a former IG being placed on leave.
Charles Edwards was removed from his interim post on the DHS science and
technology staff following the release of a Senate report detailing his inappropriate
socializing and sharing of draft documents with managers of the employees he was
investigating. Edwards had been the subject of a yearlong probe by a Senate Home-
land Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee.
‘‘The subcommittee found that Mr. Edwards jeopardized the independence of the
OIG,’’ said the report on the investigation, led by Sens. Claire McCaskill, D–Mo.,
and Ron Johnson, R–Wis, of the Financial and Contracting Oversight Sub-
committee. Edwards had an ‘‘inadequate understanding of the importance of OIG
independence’’ the report said. ‘‘Mr. Edwards did not obtain independent legal ad-
vice and directed reports to be altered or delayed to accommodate senior DHS offi-
cials. Mr. Edwards also did not recuse himself from audits and inspections that had
a conflict of interest related to his wife’s employment.’’
Edwards, an engineer with 20 years of Federal experience, including stints at the
Transportation Security Administration and the Postal Service, ‘‘socialized with sen-
ior D.H.S. officials outside of work over drinks and dinner,’’ the report said. ‘‘The
subcommittee obtained emails where Mr. Edwards told the D.H.S. chief of staff that
he truly valued his friendship and that his ‘support, guidance and friendship has
helped me be successful this year.’ ’’
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson, in placing Edwards on administrative
leave Thursday, told reporters, ‘‘Other individuals who are apparently and allegedly
implicated have already left DHS, and if additional information comes to light, I will
continue to take appropriate action.’’

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
37
Edwards was cleared of other allegations, such as abuse of Government resources
in travel and charges of nepotism, the subcommittee found. Allegations that he de-
stroyed records and favored certain employees and retaliated against others were
not substantiated, said the report, which was sent to the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency. ‘‘However, the subcommittee did find that there
was a wide-spread belief that Mr. Edwards engaged in those actions and that belief
contributed to an office environment characterized by low morale, fear, and general
dissatisfaction with Mr. Edwards’ leadership,’’ the report stated.
Edwards resigned from the IG’s office in December on the eve of scheduled Con-
gressional testimony, and has since been replaced by John Roth.
The drama at the Homeland Security IG’s office has been followed closely by advo-
cacy groups for Government transparency and accountability. Danielle Brian, execu-
tive director of the Project on Government Oversight, which tracked the issue to
highlight the role of whistleblowers in feeding information to the senators, told Gov-
ernment Executive on Friday, ‘‘We are seeing growing evidence that acting IGs
should be removed from consideration for the permanent jobs at their agencies.
Doing that would remove the incentive to improperly curry favor with the agency
management they’re supposed to be overseeing.’’
The nonprofit Cause of Action, which conducted its own 2-year probe of Edwards,
issued a statement noting that the inspectors general council continues to inves-
tigate his conduct. The group raised ‘‘concerns to President Obama about the de-
struction of records and complaints filed about his misconduct that would warrant
Edwards’ removal from office and potential criminal liability,’’ it stated. ‘‘We know
that the Office of Special Counsel forwarded at least one complaint about Edwards
to CIGIE.’’
Cause of Action sued the DHS IG office for failing to produce documents re-
quested under the Freedom of Information Act. ‘‘This transparency failure is now
costing time and resources in court for what could have been a simple compliance
with FOIA,’’ the group said. ‘‘CIGIE should complete its investigation as expedi-
tiously as possible and refer evidence of criminal conduct to the Department of Jus-
tice’’ given that Edwards is technically still a DHS manager.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MS. PAULINE NADEGE BINAM
Ms. Pauline Nadege Binam is a 30-year-old woman who has lived in the United
States since the age of 2 years. She has a 12-year-old daughter. She has a mother,
father, and 4 sisters, 2 are U.S. citizens and 2 are DACA. She has no immediate
relatives living in Cameroon.
On July 12, 2019 she was ordered removed from the United States and her appeal
was denied on January 21, 2020. Her attorney filed an emergency stay of removal
with ICE on September 15, 2020.
Factors weighted against her remaining in the United States involves her 2 ad-
missions of guilt in court proceeding in North Carolina: A shoplifting case at age
18 and at age 24 a misdemeanor possession both are listed as convictions.
The case: Ms. Pauline Nadege Binam
The individual is a 30-year-old woman from Cameroon who has lived in the
United States for the past 28 years.
She has been in ICE custody for the past 3 years, since October 2017 until now.
While in the Irwin County Detention Center in Georgia, the individual was told
she needed a D&C procedure, which removed tissue from inside the uterus.
• According to the Mayo Clinic, this procedure is used for the following medical
reasons:
• Clearing out tissues that remain in the uterus after a miscarriage or abortion
to prevent infection or heavy bleeding;
• Removing a tumor that forms instead of a normal pregnancy;
• Treating excessive bleeding after delivery by clearing out any placenta that re-
mains in the uterus; or
• Removing cervical or uterine polyps, which are usually benign.
The need for the D&C procedure alone raises questions regarding the conditions
of her detainment in the Irwin County Detention Center.
However, during what should have been a D&C procedure, she was put under an-
esthesia, and the doctor performed a salpingectomy instead, which removed one of
her fallopian tubes without the individual’s knowledge or consent.
The individual was never told why her fallopian tube was removed and was even-
tually transferred to the Montgomery Processing Center in Texas.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
38
This individual and the details surrounding her treatment and medical procedure
should be investigated.
On September 14, 2020, the nonprofit Project South, along with 3 other non-
profits, Georgia Detention Watch, Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights, and
South Georgia Immigrant Support Network, filed a complaint on behalf of detained
immigrants at the Irwin County Detention Center and of a nurse who worked at
the facility.
Despite this, ICE continued to carry through with her deportation.
Knowing this, I intervened on September 16, 2020, and disrupted her removal
while in process from the United States.
Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
New Jersey, Mr.—I am sorry, the Chair recognizes the gentleman
from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins, for 5 minutes.
Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Chairman Thompson and Ranking
Member Katko, for holding today’s hearing.
Although I believe it is important for the committee to have a
discussion about the operations of the inspector general within
DHS, we would be remiss not to note that there is a very urgent
matter to discuss, a humanitarian crisis at our Southern Border.
I look forward in the future where we can discuss and work to-
gether to resolve this threat to our sovereignty and the human
beings down there that are suffering incredibly. What we face is
unprecedented and should be addressed aggressively and in a bi-
partisan manner.
But thank you for holding this hearing. It is important as well.
Dr. Cuffari, I have not received your video feed, but I presume
that you are still here. You mentioned in your written testimony,
sir, that since your confirmation as inspector general employee mo-
rale has improved, to which you referred to as a 5-year high. We
have held hearings in the past that address this issue and I am
pleased to see improvement if that is the case. There is no question
that the crisis at the Southern Border is clearly overwhelming DHS
personnel, so much so that Secretary Mayorkas has asked for vol-
unteers to aid in the overwhelming number of migrants at the bor-
der.
Can you describe what steps your office is taking to ensure the
well-being of DHS front-line workers at the border please, sir?
Mr. CUFFARI. Well, Mr. Higgins, nice visiting with you again. My
video is not working. There is some buffering problems, but I am
on just audio.
Mr. HIGGINS. Understood. OK.
Mr. CUFFARI. OK. So regarding the border, I took a proactive ap-
proach. Two weeks ago a few of my senior staff and I visited the
Southwest Border in Texas. We spoke with subject-matter experts
from the Border Patrol and from ICE’s detention facilities, as well
as sheriffs, local individuals, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office. We
went to McAllen, Texas, Laredo, Del Rio, and Eagle Pass and took
a view. I have to tell you that as a father and as a grandfather,
I was terribly troubled that the cartels are making money hand
over fist and individuals down there are just abandoning children
in the desert.
We are opening a review to ensure that DHS is properly han-
dling and vaccinating their front-line employees and that we may
be opening a review as well to consider their staffing models, both
at the Border Patrol ports and the ports of entry.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
39

Mr. HIGGINS. You have mentioned some important steps there
and I presume you will keep the committee advised as progress is
made regarding your interaction with DHS front-line workers.
I have one last question in the interest of time—and just to ad-
vise my committee Members, colleagues, I cannot see the clock on
my screen, so if I am running out of time, I apologize. But you list-
ed in your testimony, sir, that—you mentioned the ICE detention
facilities and unannounced inspections. I would like you to share
with the committee and America some insight into that. Can you
describe any trends that you have seen and how these—give us an
overview of the unannounced inspections. Because I like that pro-
gram.
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, sir. So you do have my commitment to con-
tinue to keep the committees informed of our progress.
But regarding the unannounced inspections, we continue to do
those even in the COVID sort-of restricted environment. Our most
recent work was published a few months ago in March. It involves
the La Palma Detention Facility in Arizona. We opened that due
to a rising COVID spike of detainees. We issued a report. We did
that remotely to protect not only our employees but also the detain-
ees and the workers in the facility. But we issued several findings
and we have 8 recommendations that the Department is consid-
ering for implementation.
Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you.
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank
you very much.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey for 5 min-
utes, Mr. Payne.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, good to see
you and for this timely hearing.
Mr. Currie, throughout the last year-and-a-half this committee
has heard from numerous current and former employees about how
the IG fostered an environment of punishment for dissent and fear
of retaliation. In the unsolicited email you see on the screen, the
director of OIG’s Whistleblower Protection Unit said that although
I likely have information that is relevant to the issues that we are
looking at, I am concerned that my agency may not respect 5 USC
7211, the prohibition against interfering with or denying the right
of an employee to furnish information to a Congressional com-
mittee.
What did GAO find with respect to the morale of the employees
at the OIG and how has it affected the willingness of staff to share
their concerns?
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir. So we actually don’t have the most recent
morale scores from OPM. I think those are due to come out any day
now or any week now, so I am not sure what has happened in
terms of those numbers over the last year. But one of the things
that we have found pretty consistently across all the offices we
looked at is a lack of clear policies and procedures surrounding a
lot of different things. One of those things is human capital plans
and measures.
So, for example, we found that the IG did not have an anti-har-
assment policy, they had no performance management policy for its
employees at the time and there was question and confusion among

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
40

people about whether they did or didn’t. There was question about
whether certain policies were outdated, were in effect, or were not
in effect. I think what this did was this made people call into ques-
tion certain decisions they were observing from, you know, top-level
staff. This seems somewhat arbitrary. I think the problem is when
you have no clear policies or procedures and it is not transparent,
it is very difficult to be consistent in your application of those poli-
cies and procedures, and so people fill in the gaps and it creates
an environment sometimes where there is fear because there is no
consistency or transparency.
Mr. PAYNE. What kind of impact does this type of environment
have on OIG’s ability to achieve its mission and implement your
recommendations?
Mr. CURRIE. Well, I think first of all it is very—it makes it dif-
ficult to plan ahead. I mean, for example, one of the things we
found was a lack of a clear quality and review process for reports.
We heard from people who would complete their audit work and re-
ports and send reports up the chain for review. In one case we
heard they waited 6 months to hear back. They had no sense on
when things were going to be returned.
So I mean this just makes it very, very difficult to plan your
work and, frankly, just negatively impacts morale.
Mr. PAYNE. What kind of leadership do you think it will take to
solve the issues that DHS OIG faces?
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir. I mentioned in my opening statement, we
at GAO have looked at organizational transformation across Gov-
ernment so often over the decades that we have developed a set of
best practices that is not just academic theory, these are things
that we have seen successful organizations do. I think first of all,
one of the things it takes, it takes a very open and humble ap-
proach to working with the whole organization and the employees
to address these issues. If you do not have your employees on board
with you and they are not part of this and constantly commu-
nicated with, and it is just a top-down exercise, it will not be suc-
cessful. I think that the employees have to buy in.
Mr. PAYNE. Yes. Well, frankly, it is stunning that the OIG’s own
Whistleblower Protection Unit did not believe the office would up-
hold the law and thus refused to speak to Congress until he had
already left. I worry other employees are not coming forward for
fear of retaliation.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina for 5
minutes, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Currie, last month Senator Capito and 39 other Senators
submitted a request to GAO, and then I subsequently joined, as did
59 other House Members, to investigate the Biden administration’s
decision to halt Congressionally-appropriated funding for the bor-
der wall. It appears clear that the Biden administration violated
the Impoundment Control Act in taking this action. It is my under-
standing that news outlets have reported GAO will be opening an
investigation into this action by the Biden administration.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
41

As someone who is a subject-matter expert on reviewing DHS
policies at GAO, can you confirm that GAO is indeed opening an
investigation on whether President Biden violated the Impound-
ment Control Act?
Mr. CURRIE. Thank you, sir.
Border Security and Immigration is not my subject area, but I
am pretty sure what you said is accurate. I will get back to you
as soon as possible with a definitive answer to that.
Mr. BISHOP. If that in fact is correct, as you believe, how quickly
can we expect GAO to reach conclusions?
Mr. CURRIE. Well, thank you, sir.
I can’t answer that today. Our Office of General Counsel will be
conducting that review. But I will put you in touch with those folks
ASAP and get you an answer.
Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, sir.
If President Biden wishes to follow the law and comply with the
Impoundment Control Act, would you recommend that he restart
border wall construction immediately?
Mr. CURRIE. I don’t have a position on that, sir. That is not my
area of expertise.
Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Currie.
Dr. Cuffari, following up on your comments in response to Rep-
resentative Higgins about your visit to the Southwest Border, did
the conditions that you observe there constitute a crisis?
Mr. CUFFARI. It is so nice to meet with you again.
I heard that term be used to describe the on-going problems at
the border. It is not a term of art that I use. It is very deeply trou-
bling. What I can just share is what the subject-matter experts who
are dealing with this every day on the ground shared with me, and
that is they are overwhelmed, it is causing problems for morale
within CBP and for the Office of Port Enforcement. As a result we
have opened up—it informed our work—we have opened up 3 new
projects that we’ve told the Department about. One is to look at
ICE’s contract with the housing of migrants and hotels, we are
looking at border security screening operations, and we are looking
at DHS and Health and Human Services interoperability to pass
information about the status and whereabouts of particular mi-
grants.
Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Dr. Cuffari. Will OIG—will your office
investigate whether policy change is adopted by the Biden adminis-
tration caused these very troubling circumstances, to use your
words?
Mr. CUFFARI. No, sir. We don’t investigate policy decisions. We
investigate if policy is implemented in the law how those are—
whether they are being effective or not.
Mr. BISHOP. You made reference to how the Mexican drug cartels
are taking advantage of very unfortunate circumstances on the
Southern Border. Would you agree that the Department of Home-
land Security has a responsibility to avoid adopting policies that fa-
cilitate the criminal enterprises of Mexican cartels?
Mr. CUFFARI. I am sorry, I can’t comment on policies or whether
they should be implemented or not.
Mr. BISHOP. So that is just outside your purview, is that it?
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, sir. As an independent inspector general, it is.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
42

Mr. BISHOP. Very well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 min-
utes, Mr. Correa.
Mr. CORREA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can you hear me OK?
Chairman THOMPSON. We can hear you.
Mr. CORREA. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very
important hearing and thank you Inspector General Cuffari and
Mr. Currie for joining us today.
According to the GAO, from fiscal years 2015 to 2020 the Office
of Inspector General implemented a number of organizational
changes, however, those changes did not fully follow key practices
and thus had negative effects or consequences.
For example, some senior leaders describe the amount of fre-
quency of organizational change as negatively affecting morale.
Inspector General Cuffari, your office informed the committee
last week that you announced an organizational realignment based
on strategic priorities and on-going reviews that you initiated. This
realignment includes creating an Office of Innovation and an Office
of Integrity, among other things. Inspector General Cuffari, can
you please discuss when you started your review and who was in-
volved and when staff were informed of the review and realignment
decisions, sir?
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, sir. Good visiting with you again.
So my recent realignment of and the creation of those 2 offices
are actually the third phase of a multi-phase approach. My first
was to right-size my H.R. group. I needed to return that human re-
sources function back to the Office of Management where it be-
longed and get it out of the Counsel’s Office. I also set up the Pro-
fessional Whistleblower Unit in my Office of Counsel. The third
phase, which is the one you just mentioned, was to create these 2
offices, of Integrity and the Office of Innovation. It was a phased
approach. We took about 6 months getting into it, starting basically
back in the summer of last year. Now that—with the creation of
those 2 offices, my organization will now conform to classic struc-
tures that are benchmarked at larger organizations in the IG com-
munity, such as the Department of Defense and the Health and
Human Services Office.
I would like to point out that the Office of Integrity—to the
GAO’s credit—this office will have an internal quality review and
check functions for investigations and audits. My Office of Innova-
tion is going to be aligning my strategic planning and my data sci-
entist group.
Mr. CORREA. Thank you very much.
Mr. Currie, given your current work with you and the OIG for
the past year, what is your reaction to this latest reorganization?
Does it address the challenges that GAO has identified at the OIG?
Mr. CURRIE. I can definitely say that I don’t think it addresses
them yet because there hasn’t been enough time. We just found out
about this about a week ago. You know, I think it is absolutely in
the IG’s prerogative and the organization’s prerogative to make or-
ganizational changes. That is often a first step that is done in any

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
43

transformation or reorganization. But I can tell you, it is never the
full solution. Oftentimes it is just the start of the work.
Once there is a new office it has to be implemented effectively,
the employees have to clearly understand the vision, and it has to
establish the policies that are necessary so the whole organization
understands what it is going to do and what role it has played.
In fact, one of the problems we have identified over the past 6
years at the IG has been there has been so many organizational
changes made, sometimes without the people in those offices even
knowing about them or why, that that has created delays and con-
fusion and has stymied improvement efforts through the years too.
So I think what Dr. Cuffari has said and some of the reasoning
behind the reorganization seems to make a lot of sense, to be in
alignment with other similar organization, but we will just have to
see. We will monitor that as we look at how they are implementing
the recommendations.
Mr. CORREA. Mr. Ranking Member and Mr. Chair, I do hope we
have continuing hearings on this issue. It sounds like very much
the early stages of a work in progress.
Thank you very much. With that, I yield.
Chairman THOMPSON. I assure the gentleman from California we
will do just that.
Chair recognizes the young lady from Iowa, Ms. Miller-Meeks, for
5 minutes.
Ms. MILLER-MEEKS. Thank you so much, Chairman Thompson
and Ranking Member Katko. I appreciate your holding this hearing
and also the testimony of our witnesses.
Dr. Cuffari, I want to also personally thank you for taking seri-
ously your oversight function of the border crisis. During our visit
to the border with Homeland Security and Ranking Member Katko
we learned that Secretary Mayorkas made a trip to the border, but
remained at the airport. So it is hard to conduct oversight of policy
when you remain in an airport and receiving briefings or hearings.
We learned at that time, and Ranking Member Katko sent a let-
ter forward to HHS, learning that the current procedures wherein
a sponsor for an unaccompanied minor was to be verified and
checked and called, that this procedure was being ‘‘shortcutted’’, if
you will, not performed. Also background checks for those who
were supposed to have oversight and protection of unaccompanied
minors in HHS facilities was also being deleted.
So we are hoping that—I understand from you that you can’t
speak on policy, but that there be some investigation into the lack
of procedure and the lack of security for those unaccompanied mi-
nors coming across the border.
So I thank you for that.
Mr. Currie, in your professional opinion, and I know you have
mentioned this, but what additional steps should the IG take to
prevent this culture from continuing? Granted, that this, as you
said, has been going on since 2015 up until 2018 and predates Dr.
Cuffari.
Mr. CURRIE. Thank you.
There are many steps, so let me just pick a few important ones
that I think.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
44

One thing is is that there has to be a process for updating or de-
veloping policies around important management principles. So
things like what is your anti-harassment policy, what is your em-
ployee performance management policy, what is your grievance pol-
icy, what is your quality assurance process. You know, even down
into the level of who needs to review the reports and when, what
are the time frames, what is the synchronization of that. These are
all things that any audit organization, including ourselves at GAO,
we have very strict, clear policies and procedures, not just so our
own staff understand how to do the work and what to expect, but
so everyone outside externally understand that. You in Congress
and also as well the agency that gets audited. This creates a pre-
dictable process, it creates a trusted process with integrity, and
helps to avoid a lot of the miscommunications and problems that
can come up.
I mentioned in my statement, there is always going to be friction
between an auditor and auditee, but there are things that you can
put in place to make sure there is integrity in the process.
Ms. MILLER-MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Currie. I say this with all
compliments. My husband, who is a compliance officer, who started
compliance programs, I am hearing you echoing in my ears as you
have stated your policies and procedures, and he constantly re-
minds me of policies and procedures and their importance.
Given the breadth and depth of the misconduct—and, again, I
want to emphasize that you have done—that this has gone on from
2015 to 2020, and then you worry about the institutional knowl-
edge of those individuals who are from former past administrations
coming into an other administration and how that affects the cul-
ture within that department or facility. But given the depth of the
misconduct, the allegations, the lack of leadership surrounding the
DHS OIG—and again, Dr. Cuffari, knowing that you have only
come in recently and you are now having to handle this situation—
so over these numerous years, what can Congress do, what should
we do to help ameliorate the situation?
Mr. CURRIE. Thank you.
I think the biggest—well, this hearing is a great first step, be-
cause without this hearing, you know, the public would not know
about these issues and we couldn’t get into the depth in discussing
them. But I think, as we have mentioned, in addition to just, you
know, monitoring the recommendations we have made and are they
being implemented—and, of course, we communicate those things
to do as part of our routine work—I think this needs to be looked
at as a transformational effort. So I think extra oversight of this
will be key. Additional hearings I think would be a good way to do
that.
You know, you coming to an agreement with the Office of Inspec-
tor General of what you expect from them and when would be good
too, because deadlines are also very important.
Ms. MILLER-MEEKS. Thank you very much for that.
I think both Ranking Member Katko and Chairman Thompson
have both assured us that we will have continued hearings. Then
having some score card by which we can measure progress I think
would be important also.
Thank you so much and I yield back by time.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
45

Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from New York for 5 min-
utes, Ms. Clarke.
Ms. CLARKE. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our Rank-
ing Member for this very important hearing this afternoon.
Inspector General Cuffari, we have heard about the Wilmer Hale
report. You have publicly pushed both the Congress and media out-
lets about the results of an internal investigation that you con-
tracted to be conducted by Wilmer Hale.
According to a Project on Government Oversight article re-
leased—POGO—yesterday, you spent a lot of taxpayer money to
conduct this investigation, about $1.4 million, money that could
have been spent on more important matters than 3 individuals who
no longer work at the OIG who were ultimately found to have not
been engaged in any unwilful conduct.
I don’t want to waste time on personnel squabbles, but I do want
to know a little bit more about your decision to open and scope this
investigation. I am sure you were aware that there were claims
made to Congress and the Council of the Inspectors General on In-
tegrity and Efficiency at CIGIE about other employees than the
ones you have had investigated. Why were these, or those allega-
tions not referred to Wilmer Hale to investigate?
Mr. CUFFARI. Thank you, ma’am.
So I was confirmed as the inspector general of this department
in July 2019. When I arrived here, after discussions with Senate
staff and members of the HSGAC committee, I realized and was in-
formed I inherited a very, very dysfunctional leadership, senior
leadership team who were presenting to me series of misconduct at
the highest levels. It is well-documented. It was instability in this
organization, there was a conflict between leadership that predates
my arrival, including criminal misconduct by a former acting in-
spector general. I followed the counsel on IG recommendations and
fulfillment of my responsibilities to protect the integrity of this or-
ganization and ultimately decided, under competitive process, to
hire an outside entity. It turned out to be Wilmer Hale law firm,
whose senior partner conducted the investigation and provided us
with a copy of the report at the end of December of last year.
The cost of that report was less than 1 percent of my entire
budget. I think that is a very good use of resources to protect the
$190 million. I informed the oversight committees, I informed the
appropriators, and I informed our manager over at the Office of
Management and Budget, our examiner.
Ms. CLARKE. Well, on that point, General Cuffari, the Wilmer
Hale report makes clear there were several—also several allega-
tions against you. If you were committed to an independent review
of all related claims, you would have had those independent inves-
tigators look into those claims as well, but you did not. Is that cor-
rect?
Mr. CUFFARI. CIGIE actually looked into those allegations and
dismissed them.
Ms. CLARKE. OK.
POGO also noted in its article that the Wilmer Hale report in-
cluded investigating individuals who made Constitutionally- and le-
gally-protected communications to Congress and CIGIE. This is the

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
46

textbook definition of whistleblower retaliation. Do you know
whether you or other OIG employees were under investigation by
CIGIE for whistleblower retaliation?
Mr. CUFFARI. Not to my knowledge, no, ma’am.
Ms. CLARKE. Very well.
Well, Mr. Chairman, you know, I thank you for this opportunity
to have our conversation with the IG. I am just concerned that, you
know, we don’t have a conflict of interest and we are not getting
to the root of the challenges being faced within the Department of
Homeland Security, in particular the IG’s office.
So thank you for being so forthcoming with your responses, Mr.
IG. It looks like we are sort-of on some thin ice here and I would
like to continue to look into—you know, as you roll out your term
here, a lot more transparency to the American people.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Tennessee, Ms.
Harshbarger, for 5 minutes.
Ms. HARSHBARGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. Thank you to the witnesses.
Mr. Currie, you know, it is discouraging to know that there was
such a lack of policies and procedures, you know, that were not im-
plemented. You know, in the business world we look at things
from, for example, a six sigma basis, and, you know, those are
strategies that are set out to improve the quality of the output of
a process. It identifies and removes the problem’s effect by mini-
mizing the impact. You know, those are just common-sense things
that these agencies should be doing. That is the only way that I
can see that you can measure the outcome. Because when there is
no clear direction—as they say in the business world, if you don’t
bring your business, your employees do, because there is no clear
path.
I guess I have a question, how long has the management and
operational like this, as you found in your report, been in place at
the Department? I know the report went back to 2015.
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, ma’am.
Well, definitely back to 2015, but we talked about in our report
that those are just the things, the documents and the people we
talked to where we could really do a deep dive. There are examples
we talk about in the report, for example, several reports that were
retracted well before then, prior leaders who were indicted for mis-
conduct, and a lot of their challenges that have come up in the past
or in past peer reviews that indicated there were challenges.
As the Chairman said in his opening statement, we did a review,
albeit a lot more limited in scope, back in 2014 that identified a
few areas where there improvements were needed. But it is fair to
say this goes back many years.
Ms. HARSHBARGER. Yes, absolutely. Thank you.
Dr. Cuffari, I guess my question is, in your cover letter to the
Wilmer Hale report you wrote that the Council of the Inspector
General on Integrity and Efficiency didn’t act on your complaint re-
garding the 3 Senior Executive Service employees. Did they ever
provide you with a reason as to why they didn’t act on your com-
plaint, sir?

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
47

Mr. CUFFARI. Then they referred the matter back to me to com-
plete as I saw necessary.
Ms. HARSHBARGER. Really? OK.
Well, it looks like there has got to be—there is some work to be
done. You know, best practices is the best way to go forward and
hold people accountable. You know, I hate it for this agency be-
cause that is what—you know, when you investigate misconduct,
you expect an outcome.
So thank you for your time and I yield back.
Chairman THOMPSON. Thank you very much. The gentlelady
yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Swalwell, for 5 minutes.
Mr. SWALWELL. Thank you, Chairman. I also want to thank the
inspector general for appearing, and also for making his office
available for any questions that we have.
I first wanted to just see if the inspector general could give us
an update on the Brian Murphy case. As a Member of the House
Intelligence Committee we have been briefed on many allegations
by Mr. Murphy regarding the politicization of intelligence at the
Department—I am sorry, you hear a 2-year-old singing ‘‘Let It Go’’
from ‘‘Frozen’’ in the background—but this is a serious question,
which is what are you doing about Mr. Murphy’s allegations about
the politicization of intelligence under the Trump administration,
particularly as it related to Russia, as well as the Portland inves-
tigations?
Mr. CUFFARI. Sir, thanks for visiting with me a few days ago.
Certainly we can—I can provide you and other Members of the
committee with a closed-door Member briefing. This is public so I
can’t discuss on-going work, but I can tell you that I am available
at your discretion to receive a briefing—or to provide a briefing to
you and Members of the staff.
Mr. SWALWELL. Great.
Also, Inspector, would you agree that OIG should be as trans-
parent as possible in order for the public and Congress to hold the
Department accountable?
Mr. CUFFARI. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. SWALWELL. You know, at your confirmation hearing 2 years
ago Senator Rosen of Nevada asked how you would handle whistle-
blower retaliation complaints and you told her you would evaluate
all the facts and make a final decision and recommendations as it
related to decisions. However, we have not seen, you know, some
of the reports made public or provided to Congress. I was hoping
you could just give us an update on if it is your intent that you
will be releasing to the public or to the Congress these reports.
Mr. CUFFARI. Well, sir. I did make that to Senator Rosen. It was
a very good question. I answered it truthfully, obviously. I believe
obviously in maximum protection for whistleblowers. There is a
standing request from Chairman Thompson to my office, which I
am fulfilling, to provide ROIs of substantiated cases of whistle-
blower reprisals. We provided those and it is on a rolling basis. We
have already given some and will continue to do so.
Mr. SWALWELL. Further, just in your evaluation of the Depart-
ment, as we look on the authorizing and appropriating side, what

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
48

further resources do you need? I mean just recognizing this agency
now is approaching 20 years since the genesis of its creation, you
know, September 11 attack, and, you know, it is responsible for
homeland security, it is responsible for border security, FEMA, cy-
bersecurity. You know, what additional resources do you need to
make sure—particularly on the cyber side—to make sure that we
are protecting our Government against attacks from China and
Russia? What resources do you need so that you can adequately
evaluate them?
Mr. CUFFARI. Well, sir, first off, I want to thank the House, be-
cause it was House-led followed by a Senate increase in our budget
last year. We are at $190 million. We see need for increases in our
budget that would support increased oversight of COVID and also,
as you mentioned, of cybersecurity. Any help this committee can
give to us, I would greatly appreciate it.
Mr. SWALWELL. Thank you and I yield back.
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. GIMENEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
Ranking Member for this hearing.
I had a question of the GAO. There is a GAO—when you are
doing your—when you are doing this analysis and this study on the
IG, as you were formulating and you were getting to some findings,
were you communicating that with the IG’s office? Or did you hold
everything until the final—a final report could be issued?
Mr. CURRIE. Thank you for the question, sir.
We have a very strict process. In fact, Government auditing
standards outline the process that should be used so there are no
surprises at the end. So what we do is about—well, this happened
back in January. We sent over what we call a statement of fact,
which is most of the report in its entirety and all the factual infor-
mation and data from the report. We send that over, we have an
exit meeting with the auditee or the department we audit, in this
case the OIG. We sometimes have very significant back and forth,
multiple meetings, talking about what is in the report, clarifying
any information, correcting any information that goes on. That
process—in this case we actually granted extra time than we typi-
cally would because they wanted to provide us with a lot more doc-
umentation and information. So we accommodated that.
Then we send the draft report to them. We just sent it April 12.
At that time they have a chance to provide their official comment
and continue to provide any technical comments they see, well be-
fore public issuance.
Mr. GIMENEZ. No, I understand that. But that appears to me
that you were doing a final report, you did your final—basically a
preliminary report. You have a whole bunch of findings and then
that is—then, OK, I have got all these findings, now, you know,
you need to respond to this.
My question was as you are coming up with these findings, do
you communicate that, those individual findings to, you know, the
agency prior to putting out a draft report?
Mr. CURRIE. No, sir, because typically we are not finished, you
know, assessing all the evidence and applying it against the cri-

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
49

teria. So we don’t want to identify any deficiencies and potential
recommendations to the agency until we are 100 percent sure in
the work that we have done.
Mr. GIMENEZ. So you don’t put all—these findings that you have,
each individual finding only comes—you only put that together in
your first draft report? You don’t say, hey, we found this issue and
it is pretty significant? You are not—you don’t tell the IG that we
found this issue, it is pretty significant, until you have some kind
of a bigger draft report ready to go? Is that what you are telling
me?
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir.
Mr. GIMENEZ. OK. You think that is right?
Mr. CURRIE. Sir, part of the reason we do that is because Govern-
ment auditing standards are so strict and thorough that we don’t
want to release any information before it has been fully vetted.
We often find things in the course of our work——
Mr. GIMENEZ. I didn’t say—excuse me, I didn’t say that you
would release the information. I am talking about talking to the
agency themselves, all right. That you have found something and
that it is significant and you need to look at this before a final re-
port is issued, which could be, you know, a year or 2 down the
road. That is what I am saying. That is my point, OK?
I have got a couple of other points. You talk about the IG not
having rules, policies, procedures, et cetera. It would seem to me
that most IGs throughout the Federal agencies, their jobs would be
pretty similar. Is that a pretty accurate statement?
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, sir.
Mr. GIMENEZ. OK. So why in the world do we have separate
standard operating procedures and policies and rules for harass-
ment, et cetera that differ from one IG to another in different—why
do they have to create their own set of SOPs, et cetera?
Mr. CURRIE. Well, because they all operate within their own indi-
vidual departments. But the Council of Inspector Generals sets the
best practices for doing that, so it is pretty standard across the IGs.
Mr. GIMENEZ. It is not mandated that all IGs at least have a set
of basic principles, that these are the principles that the Federal
Government says you must adhere to? That is not standardized
throughout the Federal Government?
Mr. CURRIE. No, that is standardized. In fact, at GAO we issue
generally accepted auditing standards, which are the criteria and
the standards by which auditors are to follow in doing their audits.
They use——
Mr. GIMENEZ. No, I understand auditing, OK, but you also said
that they also—that they weren’t—they didn’t have a set of SOPs
for, you know, harassment, discrimination, et cetera, that it ap-
pears——
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman’s time from Florida has ex-
pired.
Mr. GIMENEZ. Thank you, sir.
Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Nevada for 5 minutes.
Ms. TITUS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Currie, previously you had Inspector General Cuffari testi-
fying or reporting to this committee that the OIG’s delay in issuing

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
50

reports was based on the fact that the reports were of such poor
quality that they required substantive edits. That is not much of
an admission. I must say that is pretty sorry to start with.
But, anyway, the committee reviewed all the drafts and the se-
lect brief of these reports, and it didn’t appear that that was an
adequate explanation for why these were taking such a long time.
Now, this is particularly troubling when you are reviewing any-
thing, but especially to me when we are talking about some of the
issues concerning family separation and conditions at ICE facilities.
Just this past October I joined a letter with several of my col-
leagues from this committee where we shared our concerns about
the welfare of children being expelled at the Southern Border. In-
spector General’s Office didn’t investigate this or get back to us, or
they were taking an awfully long time.
I wonder, Mr. Currie, if you could really identify the cause for
these delays? Was it because they needed so much editing? Was it
because they weren’t a priority? Was it because they didn’t have
the staff to do the reports? Could you address that?
Mr. CURRIE. Yes, ma’am.
We actually—that is exactly what we tried to identify. the results
of what we found are that, for example, there is no quality assur-
ance process or process for how the reviews are supposed to happen
at the end of these audits. So, for example, some of the staff told
us that when they would send completed work up for review they
just wouldn’t hear back from the front office, sometimes for up to
6 months.
So I think there was a lot of confusion. The staff themselves
raised that to us, that they didn’t even understand exactly why
some things were happening and moving forward and others were
not.
Ms. TITUS. Well, this is especially a problem when it is a time-
sensitive issue, like children at the border. You would think that
would be given kind-of a priority and they would get on that right
away. It makes you wonder if they just didn’t throw it in a drawer
and hope we forget about it, or the longer they stall maybe the
problem would go away.
So I think that is something that we definitely need to address
and get some straight answers about.
So I appreciate you having looked into it and realized that it is
a serious problem.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentlelady yields back.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan for 5 min-
utes, Mr. Meijer.
Mr. MEIJER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member,
and thank you to our guests who are here today. I appreciate both
the availability and the commitment to trying to reform the Office
of the Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security.
I will be very honest, the draft report, I have some very serious
concerns about the prolific use of acronyms within this.
I guess first, just a quick question, Mr. Currie, as I am going
through, the CIGIE, what is the best way to briefly—is that the
CIGIE? I mean how do you guys refer to that?
Mr. CURRIE. I think the acronym is referred to as the CIGIE.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
51

Mr. MEIJER. CIGIE? OK, thank you. I appreciate that.
You know, I guess I am always of the opinion that, you know,
in the Office of an Inspector General wants to be lean and focused.
I am aware, as not only Dr. Cuffari mentioned, but also as has
been brought up by many of my colleagues, that the issues outlined
in this report are stemming from multiple administrations over
multiple years and obviously Dr. Cuffari only took on the role I be-
lieve in July 2019 when he was confirmed as the inspector general.
Dr. Cuffari, I want to just dive into something a little bit more
on the Wilmer Hale report and just how that impacted the office
more broadly. I know that, you know, that audit, that was initially
requested by the Senate Homeland Committee in December 2019
and then Wilmer Hale was engaged in May 2020. What was the
interplay like between the initial beginning of that—you know, the
GAO audit, and then also the Wilmer Hale investigations occurring
simultaneously? What input or play was there between the two?
Mr. CUFFARI. Congressman, I don’t believe there was interplay
between GAO and Wilmer Hale. They were separate entities look-
ing at separate functions.
In the Wilmer Hale example, Wilmer Hale, their career senior
members of that organization reviewed allegations against 3 former
career senior executives of this office. It made investigative find-
ings, to include misconduct on the part of the 3 senior executives.
In the case of GAO, that was an independent investigation. In
the case of GAO—actually in both cases we cooperated fully with
both organizations. We provided them access to our employees and
to our documents. They reached their conclusions independent of
any input from anyone in my organization.
Mr. MEIJER. But you agree that they were both obviously high-
lighting evidence of—or highlighting incidents or allegations of mis-
conduct and just perhaps flagging morale and other organizational
and morale issues, correct?
Mr. CUFFARI. That is correct.
Mr. MEIJER. Can you just—really just say I mean how are you
thinking about, as the leader of this organization, as the inspector
general itself, changing that culture, changing—especially a culture
that has seen rapid transformation, both the organizational re-
structuring that has been undergone under your tenure, but then
also, you know, the turnover at the head of that office preceding
your time? Can you speak a little bit more about what you are
doing and how we can frankly help in those efforts to change that
culture and to—as we begin to also look to implement some of
those 21 recommendations?
Mr. CUFFARI. Sure.
So I owed it, Congressman, to the career senior staff in my office.
I have said 120 dedicated employees. I owed to them to dem-
onstrate that there is new leadership in this organization and that
mistreatment of others and retaliation will not be tolerated and ap-
propriate action would be taken.
I basically joined, been helping this committee to continue to do
robust oversight, regardless of what administration is in place, and
I am going to continue to do that with the committee’s assistance.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
52

Mr. MEIJER. Then do you expect that in the future the entities
like CIGIE and those standards we set, that that will continue to
be the standard that the DHS OIG is held to?
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes. We also use some standards, frankly, from the
Department that are published by OPF, since we are part of the
Executive branch.
Mr. MEIJER. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman’s time is expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida for 5 minutes,
Ms. Deming.
Ms. DEMINGS. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.
Mr. Cuffari, the GAO found that the IG senior leadership has not
communicated the criteria it uses to approve or decline proposed
work. This would leave of course the IG staff unsure why certain
projects are approved and other projects are not, resulting in what
we all would think is confusion and certainly morale issues, which
I have heard that word used earlier today. We know how important
it is.
I understand that at times the IG has said that his office’s work
must be data-driven. That makes sense. But this requirement ap-
pears to have been applied inconsistently. For example, in July of
last year, following the events in Lafayette Square in Portland—
I know my colleague, Mr. Swalwell, asked about this somewhat
earlier—but leaders on this committee—this committee among oth-
ers, sought reviews of DHS’s use of force. Your office responded
that it was opening a review of incidents in Portland, but never ad-
dressed the Secret Service use of force in Lafayette Park.
According to recent reports from the Project on Government
Oversight, your staff even prepared or proposed such a project that
would not overlap with the work of other IGs. Makes sense. But
you personally declined it.
You also declined a report related to what actions the Secret
Service took to protect its agents and the public from COVID. Ac-
cording to the Project on Government Oversight, as a result of your
refusal to review the incident at Lafayette Square, questions about
the Secret Service involvement and other questions remain unan-
swered.
I am concerned, as I think my colleagues would be on this com-
mittee, that in the absence of clear criteria and other consider-
ations, it creates an environment where politics, the politics of the
moment can influence those decisions.
So, Mr. Cuffari, could you tell me what objective criteria do you
rely on to—did you rely on to decline Congress’ request to review
the events in Lafayette Park?
Mr. CUFFARI. Thank you, ma’am.
Just so the record is clear, any suggestion by POGO or by the
Washington Post or anyone else I pull punches on conducting ro-
bust oversight of the Secret Service for political reasons is a com-
plete falsehood. Just not true.
Ms. DEMINGS. Well, I mentioned the Project on Government
Oversight, I did not mention the Washington Post. So are you say-

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
53

ing that the—you are referring to the Project on Government Over-
sight?
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, ma’am. I believe there was——
Ms. DEMINGS. OK. All right. Thank you.
Mr. CUFFARI [continuing]. A lot in the Post article as well.
But since I—just so the record is clear, since I was confirmed I
published 5 reports that include oversight of the Secret Service. I
just released one today, it is the DHS deployment of law enforce-
ment personnel to Portland, Oregon. I have 4 others that we did
within the last year. I have 4 on-going projects specifically looking
at the Secret Service basically——
Ms. DEMINGS. Specifically at Lafayette Park?
Mr. CUFFARI. Not at Lafayette Park, no, ma’am.
Ms. DEMINGS. My question involved their actions at Lafayette
Park. Specifically, have you looked into or do you have a report ad-
dressing Secret Service involvement, including use of force, protec-
tion of their agents and the public, at Lafayette Park?
Mr. CUFFARI. I coordinated with my colleague over in the Depart-
ment of the Interior whose Park Police was responsible for security
of Lafayette Park. I asked and he has agreed to take a look at the
small footprint of Secret Service’s involvement in that matter. I fa-
cilitated that IG’s access to individuals in Secret Service and in the
Department and the production of documents. I was told yesterday
that there will be a section on the Department of the Interior’s
final report, which will be coming out shortly, dealing with the U.S.
Secret Service.
Ms. DEMINGS. You feel that is adequate addressing—or at least
looking into, certainly as the IG, or the IG’s office, do you feel like
that is adequate oversight?
Mr. CUFFARI. Based on my limited resources it was. We had an-
other IG who was more ingrained in taking a look at the events
that occurred there.
Just for the record, I opened an inspection audit involving our
communications, as I mentioned, with Health and Human Services
to date. HHS has asked us to take a look at matters occurring
within HHS. They are going to facilitate our access. It is things
that we do in the IG community to help one another when we have
limited resources.
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentlelady’s time has expired.
Ms. DEMINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
Florida—I don’t see her. The Chair recognizes Mr. Pfluger from
Texas for 5 minutes.
Mr. PFLUGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the ability
to have the hearing today.
I know there has been a lot of discussions on, you know, different
aspects of the reports that—some of them dated and some of them,
you know, more recent.
But I want to focus on a couple of things. Just because it was
just mentioned, can you please elaborate on the investigation
with—or the report that you just mentioned on HHS and what the
Office is doing with HHS and communication? It seemed like that
was related to the transparency of the operations that are on-going.
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, sir.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
54

So that—in 2019—I believe it was November, maybe December
2019, we published the report basically looking at the technology
that was available to DHS at that time, whether they were using
it effectively to track and to merge—to track family units and to
merge family units with their minor children. This is an expansion
of that now, with the new surge at the border. In the last iteration
we worked with HHS. In this particular case HHS is going to ask
us to do that with their facilitation.
This is like an interoperability of systems between DHS and
Health and Human Services. It is the Office of the Refugee Reset-
tlement.
Mr. PFLUGER. Well, that is great and I will be very interested in
reading that. We have a facility in Midland, Texas.
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, sir.
Mr. PFLUGER. We have sent multiple requests, multiple written
requests and verbal requests and haven’t received any response yet
on how long the facility will be there, who is going to be put in the
facility, whether or not they have COVID, how the Office of Ref-
ugee Resettlement is actually working to get them to the right
place. Very simple things, up to and including the allegation of a
sexual assault that occurred there that we still can’t get any an-
swers on.
So very interested in that result.
I also want to go to the role that the IG plays in ensuring that
our Customs and Border Protection agents have the right re-
sources, training, and equipment to do their job on the border. Can
anyone please comment on that and whether or not that is being
looked at in the mechanism of which we are grading ourselves on
that?
Mr. CUFFARI. Mr. Currie, would you like to do that?
Mr. CURRIE. I think he was asking about the IG’s role on that.
Mr. CUFFARI. OK. So one of the—Congressman Pfluger, one of
the things that we are going to be looking at is during our discus-
sions down on the border, the subject-matter experts down there
told us that they are having a very difficult time backfilling exist-
ing vacancies. They were able to draw people from other out sta-
tions to come to the Southwest Border or to go to the Southwest
Border. The problem is their throughput is a hang-up at FLETC.
So because of the outbreak at FLETC, the training facility in
Brunswick, Georgia, they are unable to rapidly keep pace with the
vacancy rate and fill those vacancies.
So we are doing a virtual—we are doing a review right now of
FLETC’s ability, the effectiveness of them conducting virtual train-
ing to speed up sort-of their training qualifications.
Mr. PFLUGER. Let me reclaim just a little of time and expand on
that question. Multiple Border Patrol agents have specifically told
me that they are not getting the right resources, or they are seeing
something in the case of ‘‘gotaways’’, hundreds if not thousands
that are happening across the Southern Border right now. Are they
being heard? Is their voice being heard? If not, how can the IG help
to ensure an immediate course correction to get them the re-
sources, training, and personnel to secure the Southern Border?
Mr. CUFFARI. Well, we are—I am poised to have a meeting with
the Secretary in a few days and with the deputy secretary to dis-

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
55

cuss my observations at the border. I am sure we are going to have
a very good discussion. We have already met twice. He has been
very receptive to our inputs, but ultimately that is for the Sec-
retary to make a decision.
Mr. PFLUGER. Well, the fact is that there are folks that have
come across on the terror watch list, and that is being commu-
nicated by, you know, mid-level Border Patrol agents to Members
of Congress. We see that statement then redacted. I am worried
about the fact that there is a censoring of information. So this the
IG’s role, to make sure that anyone in the organization has a voice
and has the psychological safety to communicate to the leadership
what the issues are.
So this needs to have——
Chairman THOMPSON. The gentleman’s time from Texas has ex-
pired.
Mr. PFLUGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman THOMPSON. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
California for 5 minutes, Ms. Barragán.
Ms. BARRAGÁN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cuffari, in December 2019 your office released its findings
following an investigation into the death of 2 children in CBP cus-
tody in December 2018.
I am troubled that investigators neglected to even attempt to
speak with medical professionals that treated one of the children.
Your final public reports were merely 2-page summaries of the
deaths that cleared Border Patrol personnel of any wrongdoing, yet
failed to look at any systematic issues that might have led to the
children’s deaths.
One of these summaries includes inaccurate information on one
child’s diagnosis, which had to be corrected following a letter sent
by this committee.
At the committee’s July 2020 hearing on the death of children in
CBP custody you committed to providing the committee with a re-
port detailing broader recommendations about the care of children
in CBP custody by the end of the year. To my knowledge no such
report has been issued.
What is the delay and when will we see the report?
Mr. CUFFARI. No delay, ma’am. Actually we have a draft report
that is being reviewed. I am told by my team that this report
should be done at the Department. It is being—looked at CBP’s
procedures for providing medical care, quality of medical care to de-
tained migrants. We should have that out by the summer. We are
using the resources of our medical contract professionals that you
provided to us.
Ms. BARRAGÁN. OK. Mr. Cuffari, your reports on the 2 children,
Jakelin and Felipe, it took about a year. A third child’s death in
custody occurred in May 2019. In our July 2020 hearing you testi-
fied that the investigation into the deaths was near completion. It
has been 9 months since you made that statement and nearly 2
years since the child died and there is still no report.
I understand it is being reviewed, but Congress really needs to
be able to see this report and to do it publicly. These are things
that we learn from. Do you have an estimation of how much longer
this report will take?

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
56

Mr. CUFFARI. Ma’am, the 2 reports were published in Decem-
ber—I think in December 2019. I testified about those 2 closed re-
ports in July 2020. The report I am mentioning——
Ms. BARRAGÁN. Correct. They were——
Mr. CUFFARI [continuing]. Goes to your—it goes to your broader
question about the handling and the quality of medical care that
is being provided by CBP.
Ms. BARRAGÁN. OK. Do you—have you put a report out about the
third death?
Mr. CUFFARI. The third death——
Ms. BARRAGÁN. In May—the one of May—May 2019. His name
was Carlos from Guatemala.
Mr. CUFFARI. There is no—we don’t release investigative reports,
we release the investigative summaries, which they are part of the
documents that you just referenced for the 2 previous death cases.
We will do so in accordance with our agreement with the Chair-
man.
I committed in July to publishing all deaths in custody by sum-
mary.
Ms. BARRAGÁN. OK.
Mr. CUFFARI. Hello?
Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I thank the gentlelady for her ques-
tions.
Ms. BARRAGÁN. Yes——
Chairman THOMPSON. Since Mr. Cuffari referenced the Chair I
will make——
Ms. BARRAGÁN [continuing]. Making sure we—what is hap-
pening.
Chairman THOMPSON. Yes. Can you hear me now?
Mr. CUFFARI. I can hear you, Chairman, sir.
Chairman THOMPSON. Well, I think Ms. Barragán is having trou-
ble.
Ms. BARRAGÁN. Yes.
Chairman THOMPSON. We are going to go to Mr. Gottheimer for
5 minutes until we can get the gentlelady from California’s signal
back.
Mr. Malinowski, are you there?
Well, looks like we are having some technical difficulties. I hope
we can correct them.
But let me thank our witnesses again then call some folks. I was
trying to get us through this area.
But, however, based on the findings GAO concludes that the
work required to address the weaknesses is substantial and ex-
tends across organizations. The work amounts to a transformation
of the organization’s management and operations. Such trans-
formation can be a difficult complex endeavor.
IG Cuffari has significant work ahead of him. Based on what I
have observed and heard today, I have yet to be convinced that he
is up to the task at hand. His reorganization announced on the
same day as GAO’s draft report strikes me as the shuffling of the
deck chairs rather than something that was will resolve the chal-
lenges. As Mr. Currie noted, it would keep some of the very same
problems GAO identified.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
57

This hearing is a beginning of the committee’s engagement with
the OIG on these issues. Accordingly, the committee will be moni-
toring your implementation of GAO’s recommendations to date.
Now, Mr. Malinowski, we saw you, but I will yield to the gen-
tleman from New York, Mr. Torres, if he has a question.
Mr. TORRES [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The GAO and Homeland Security Committee have raised serious
questions about the integrity, independence, accountability, trans-
parency, and efficacy of the DHS Office of Inspector General. I see
the report as a comprehensive indictment of the office.
The report essentially portrays the OIG as a sinking ship and it
accuses the inspector general of constantly rearranging the decks
of his organization without any semblance of strategic planning.
My first question is about independence. The Homeland Security
Committee received an email from a whistleblower who accused
you, inspector general, of mishandling the ‘‘I’m 10–15’’ Facebook
group. The email claims that you were concerned about ‘‘demands
that an interview would impose on senior DHS leadership.’’ Is that
whistleblower claim true, yes or no?
Mr. CUFFARI. Mr. Torres, great visiting with you again.
The answer is no.
Mr. TORRES. OK. The email also claims that you advise your in-
spectors to ‘‘avoid any questions already publicly commented on by
those leaders.’’ Is that claim true or false?
Mr. CUFFARI. Incorrect.
Mr. TORRES. OK. In August 2020 the GAO issued a report find-
ing that Acting Secretary Wolf and Acting Deputy Cuccinelli were
improperly serving in their roles. The GAO referred the matter to
the IG. You declined the referral, correct?
Mr. CUFFARI. I reviewed the referral and declined to take a posi-
tion.
Mr. TORRES. For what it is worth, for me it is inexplicable that
the OIG would decline a referral regarding the improper exercise
of power at the highest echelons at DHS. If the OIG is not willing
to investigate the abuse of power at the highest levels of DHS, then
what is the inspector general for?
Is it true that you and your office said that you would discuss
the GAO referral and a potential investigation with Chad Wolf?
Mr. CUFFARI. No.
Mr. TORRES. OK.
In your confirmation hearing Senator Rosen asked you what you
would do in the event of a whistleblower retaliation. You testified
under oath that you would conduct an investigation evaluating all
the facts and make a recommendation. The word ‘‘recommendation’’
is the operative phrase here.
Despite promising to make recommendations during your con-
firmation hearing, you proceeded to announce in the summer of
2020 that you would no longer make recommendations, thereby
breaking your promise.
If your office found evidence of retaliation against a whistle-
blower but fails to recommend reinstatement, do you think that
DHS is more likely or less likely to reinstate a wrongfully fired
whistleblower in the absence of an OIG recommendation?

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
58

Mr. CUFFARI. Just for the record, I did as you suggested make
that comment to Senator Rosen. I was basing that comment on my
previous work with other IGs. I determined that that the—upon re-
view once I got here, the inspector general hat actually does not re-
quire making the recommendation——
Mr. TORRES. I am not asking about requirement, I am just ask-
ing if you fail to make a recommendation, if you fail to recommend
reinstatement, is DHS more likely or less likely to reinstate a
wrongfully fired whistelblower? I am asking about probability.
Mr. CUFFARI. I can’t comment on probability, sir.
Mr. TORRES. OK. I mean I can—I think common sense dictates
that DHS is more likely to reinstate if it is recommended explicitly
by the inspector general.
According to the former director of the Whistleblower Protection
Unit, Brian Volsky, an employee of yours, claims that you essen-
tially—your office essentially disclosed the identity of a whistle-
blower to the commandant and vice commandant of the U.S. Coast-
al Guard. Is it true that your chief of staff gave the commandant
and the vice commandant a heads-up about the investigation?
Mr. CUFFARI. I don’t—I don’t know if that occurred, sir.
Mr. TORRES. Is it true that the vice commandant thanked your
chief of staff for providing enough information to make the whistle-
blower identifiable?
Mr. CUFFARI. I actually don’t know.
Mr. TORRES. Can you provide us with a response in writing?
Mr. CUFFARI. Yes, sir.
Mr. TORRES. But you would agree that if the confidentiality of a
whistleblower were compromised that that is the kind of breach of
trust that would inflict irreparable damage to the integrity of an
inspector general? Would you agree with that assessment?
Mr. CUFFARI. I agree to protect whistleblowers’ identity, yes.
Mr. TORRES. Then, finally, during your confirmation hearing, you
promised to ensure that the Whistleblower Protection Unit would
be robustly staffed. But according to your former director of the
Whistleblower Protection Unit, you left the Unit understaffed.
In December 2019 Mr. Volsky drafted a memo sounding the
alarm about ‘‘mission failure’’ at the Whistleblower Protection Unit.
Is it true that in response to that warning of mission failure you
waited 4 months before hiring only 1 staffer? Is that true?
Mr. CUFFARI. It is true that we were in a budget deficit and until
I received budget allocations—I think we were in a Continuing Res-
olution, did not have vacancies available to fill, money to fill vacan-
cies. Once we got a full funding, as Mr. Volsky knows, we moved
the Whistleblower Protection Unit from our Office of Special Re-
view back to the Office of Counsel, where it belongs. We detailed
and hired now up to 8 attorneys or staff in that office.
Mr. TORRES. I see my time has expired and—all right. I thank
the witnesses for the testimony and the Members for their ques-
tions.
The Members of the committee may have additional questions for
the witnesses and we ask that you respond expeditiously in writing
to those questions.
Without objection, the committee record shall be kept open for 10
days.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
59

Hearing no further business, the committee stands adjourned.
Thank you.
Mr. CUFFARI. Thank you, Mr. Torres. Take care. Have a good
rest of the day, everyone.
[Whereupon, at 4 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
APPENDIX

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER JOHN KATKO FOR JOSEPH V. CUFFARI
Question 1a. What are the specific steps the IG is taking to improve the audit
quality guidance and processes that led to the complete redaction of 13 reports on
FEMA?
Question 1b. Has the OIG fully implemented the recommendations from the inter-
nal review of the 13 FEMA reports (OIG–19–41), and if not, why not?
Answer. In 2017 and 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office
of Inspector General (OIG) retracted 13 Emergency Management Oversight Team
(EMOT) reports that evaluated the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s initial
response to declared disasters. DHS OIG leaders determined that the reports may
not have adequately answered objectives and, in some cases, may have lacked suffi-
cient and appropriate evidence to support conclusions. Since that time, DHS OIG
has implemented various corrective actions. We have revised Office of Audits (OA)
policies and procedures, established a Quality Management and Training Branch
(QMT) within OA, revised our audit manual, developed job aids regarding audit
planning, and conducted various auditor training regarding the planning and index-
ing and referencing processes to improve audit quality.
In March 2018, the former Acting Inspector General also initiated an internal root
cause review of the deficiencies identified in the EMOT reports, recusing himself
and delegating authority to the then-Acting Counsel. The root cause review resulted
in a May 2019 report, Review Regarding DHS OIG’s Retraction of Thirteen Reports
Evaluating FEMA’s Initial Response to Disasters (OIG–19–41), containing 5 rec-
ommendations. All recommendations in OIG–19–41 were fully implemented.
In addition, in August 2018, Environmental Protection Agency OIG completed an
external peer review of DHS OIG’s audit operations for the fiscal year ending Sep-
tember 30, 2017. As part of this peer review, EPA OIG evaluated 1 of the 13 re-
tracted EMOT reports and found that the audit did not comply with generally ac-
cepted Government auditing standards (GAGAS) and DHS OIG policies and proce-
dures. Audit organizations can receive a rating of pass, pass with deficiencies, or
fail in an external peer review. In the August 2018 review, DHS OIG received a rat-
ing of pass with deficiencies. EPA OIG made 4 recommendations aimed at address-
ing the deficiencies identified in the EMOT reports. All recommendations from the
EPA OIG peer review are also resolved and closed.
In March 2021, Department of Education OIG completed an external peer review
for DHS OIG’s audit operations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2020. On
this peer review, DHS OIG received a rating of pass. In the last year we have re-
ceived ‘‘pass’’ ratings in our investigative and inspections peer reviews as well.
Question 2. To what extent has the DHS OIG audit teams’ guidance and processes
been updated to align with internal controls, generally accepted Government audit-
ing standards, and other Federal standards? Please be specific, with documents and
time frames.
Answer. On November 14, 2019, DHS OIG Office of Audits (OA) distributed its
updated audit manual (November 1, 2019) to all OA employees. Subsequently, the
manual was updated again with minor clarifications on March 11, 2020. OA pro-
vided training to all staff on the revised audit manual, as well as the 2018 update
of the Government auditing standards (the Yellow Book), risk assessment, and
fraud assessment. OA supplemented the manual with job aids, training, and other
materials.
For example, the following job aids and checklists were developed and shared with
all OA employees:
• Developing the Audit Time Line (updated April 2020)
• Endnotes (December 2019)
• Assessing Data Reliability (March 2020)
• Assessing Fraud Risk (updated June 2020)
(61)

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
62
• Fieldwork Checklist (April 2020)
• Design Matrix (updated April 2020)
• Team Competency (March 2020)
• Potential Independence Impairments (May 2020)
• Planning and Survey Checklist (updated June 2020)
• Indexing and Referencing Requirements & Best Practices (June 2020)
• Reporting Checklist (June 2020).
Between October 2018 and June 2019, OA staff received training on audit plan-
ning (stressing assessment of audit risk and fraud, internal controls, and developing
objectives and the audit program), the assessment of evidence, and indexing and ref-
erencing at monthly ‘‘All Hands’’ meetings. OA staff provided 4 additional training
sessions on internal controls to OA employees between March and May 2021.
All updates, job aids, and training materials are shared with all OA employees
on an internal intranet site and communicated to all OA employees.
Finally, as mentioned in response to question 1, the Department of Education
(DOE) OIG conducted a peer review of the DHS OIG Office of Audits from October
2020 through March 2021, covering the fiscal year ending September 30, 2020. Spe-
cifically, DOE OIG reviewed the system of quality control for DHS OIG’s audit orga-
nization. A system of quality control encompasses DHS OIG’s organizational struc-
ture and the policies adopted and procedures established to provide it with reason-
able assurance of conforming in all material respects with Government Auditing
Standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements. In its Systems Review
Report, dated March 31, 2021, DOE concluded the system of quality control for the
audit organization of DHS OIG in effect for the year ended September 30, 2020, has
been suitably designed and complied with to provide DHS OIG with reasonable as-
surance of performing and reporting in conformity with applicable professional
standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements in all material respects.
Accordingly, we received a rating of pass.
Question 3. Dr. Cuffari, in light of the indictments a former acting DHS IG and
a subordinate for their alleged theft of proprietary software and confidential data-
bases contain personally identifying information (PII) from the U.S. Government,
what are you doing to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the OIG going forward?
Answer. Since my confirmation as inspector general, I have strived to create a cul-
ture of integrity, starting with the tone at the top of the organization. Fraud, mis-
conduct, and abuse within DHS OIG will not be tolerated. We are also constantly
striving to be an efficient organization, providing an excellent value to the taxpayer.
For fiscal year 2020, our return on investment was nearly 40:1—in other words, for
every $1 invested in DHS OIG by Congress, we identified $39.97 in questioned
costs, funds put to better use, fines, restitutions, and recoveries.
When the Enforcement Data System (EDS) Major Incident occurred in 2017, prior
to my tenure as IG, OIG pursued a number of short- and long-term corrective ac-
tions, which were fully implemented. DHS OIG immediately locked down access to
the system and contracted with an independent company to perform a 360-degree
security review of the case management system as well as the underlying develop-
ment process. Subsequently, the development and deployment processes were
changed to provide additional governance, oversight, internal controls, and security
features. We also hired an additional cyber contractor to serve as an Information
System Security Officer (ISSO).
Finally, OIG employees must meet annual, mandatory requirements for IT Secu-
rity Awareness Training, Insider Threat Training, and Ethics Training for Super-
visors.
GAO REPORT ON OIG

Question 4a. Strategic planning is an inherently Governmental function that
ought to be performed by Federal employees; you have contracted with the National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) for the creation of the next DHS OIG
strategic plan. Why did DHS OIG opt to pursue a contract for this important func-
tion?
Question 4b. How will you ensure that DHS OIG is better-positioned to develop
its next strategic plan in-house?
Answer. Recognizing the importance of an aggressive but attainable plan for our
future, in August 2020, we contracted with the Congressionally-chartered non-par-
tisan, non-profit National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to assist us in
developing a 5-year strategic plan. We awarded this contract because it is the right
way to bring about real change and a Congressionally-endorsed model practice in
the Federal Government. NAPA is assisting us, as they have assisted many other
Federal agencies, in our strategic planning efforts, not developing our plan outright.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
63
The assistance that NAPA is providing is not an inherently Governmental function,
defined in statute as ‘‘a function so intimately related to the public interest as to
require performance by Federal Government employees.’’ Further, Office of Manage-
ment & Budget Policy Letter 2011–23165, which provides detailed guidance on in-
herently Governmental functions, does not indicate that a Federal agency is pre-
cluded from seeking contractor assistance in developing strategic plan. With NAPA’s
assistance, we will adopt a strategic plan covering fiscal years 2021 through 2025
later this summer. At this point in time, we are unsure what approach we will take
to develop our 2026 through 2030 strategic plan, but whether it is developed in-
house or with assistance from NAPA, employees in our newly-created Office of Inno-
vation will play an important role.
Question 5a. There are several other governance documents that derive from a
strategic plan.
Does the contract with NAPA include support for developing those additional doc-
uments, and if not, what plans does DHS OIG have to ensure that governance
framework is appropriately developed and in place as soon as possible?
Question 5b. What are the immediate next steps that follow receipt of the stra-
tegic plan and what plans and time frames do you have for these next steps?
Answer. Under NAPA’s Statement of Work, their first task is to assist OIG with
development of a revised Strategic Plan. The Strategic Plan will include goals, objec-
tives, performance indicators, measures, and strategies. We expect the plan to be
completed by the end of June 2021. Once finalized, these goals, objectives, and
measures will form the basis for guiding fiscal year 2022 executive performance
plans and, in turn, cascade throughout the organization through the normal per-
formance management cycle.
Question 6a. The issues that GAO has identified span many offices at the OIG.
Conceivably, almost everyone in the OIG will have a role in addressing these chal-
lenges, and it should not just be a top-down effort.
How do you plan to support and develop the leaders of each office to be able to
effectively address these challenges?
Question 6b. How will you ensure effective communication and collaboration with
employees throughout these changes?
Question 6c. GAO’s report describes staff-led efforts to address DHS OIG weak-
nesses in a variety of areas. In some cases, these efforts didn’t materialize because
they were overlooked or otherwise didn’t have leadership commitment. How do you
plan to leverage the skills and expertise of staff who have been proposing solutions
to these problems over the years?
Answer. Since my confirmation in July 2019, I have been focused on creating a
workplace where all employees are valued and have a voice. I have built a strong
track record of communicating with DHS OIG employees. For example, I send week-
ly and ad hoc messages to all OIG staff with updates from senior leadership and
highlights of noteworthy accomplishments. I also conducted more than 60 small
group meetings with DHS OIG employees, typically involving 10–15 employees at
a time who were invited to send questions in advance or ask them in an open forum.
I hold semi-annual townhalls with all OIG employees. We also established an Em-
ployee Advisory Council that serves as a forum of communication between OIG em-
ployees and leadership.
I empowered DHS OIG’s senior executives to create individual initiatives in each
program office to facilitate employee communication, feedback, and employee-driven
process improvements for how we do our work. For example, staff in the Office of
Inspections and Evaluations initiated enhanced training and on-boarding for new
employees including an introduction to planning, quality assurance procedures, and
CIGIE standards for Inspections and Evaluations.
Question 7a. In recent weeks, you decided to implement more agency-wide
changes that will affect the structure and function of numerous offices at the OIG.
When will these changes go into effect, and how did you engage with OIG employ-
ees as you determined what changes to make?
Question 7b. To what extent have your plans for these changes detailed roles and
responsibilities of each office and identified the resources needed?
Question 7c. What are you doing to make sure that these changes will be imple-
mented more effectively than changes in the past?
Answer. In March 2021, I directed a realignment of OIG functions and program
offices to facilitate maximum efficiency and effectiveness in conducting the OIG’s
mission. The realignment began to take effect April 12, when I made an announce-
ment to all staff explaining the purpose of and expectations for the changes. While
some changes occurred quickly, certain documentation to appropriately record per-
sonnel movements, and key updates to systems of record used to support the work-

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
64
force—such as financial management systems and time and attendance records—
may take up to 120 days to be fully implemented.
To implement the changes effectively, OIG leadership adhered to GAO’s key prac-
tices for organizational transformation to the maximum extent possible, by:
• Exercising a communications strategy, which involved meeting with staff from
all affected organizational units to address their questions and developing en-
terprise-wide messaging.
• Exhibiting commitment from top leadership, including a video from the IG de-
scribing the changes to the workforce.
• Establishing an implementation team, led by human resources professionals, to
oversee the tasks required to smoothly carry out the reorganization.
• Thoroughly documenting goals, priorities, and implementation time lines, as de-
scribed below.
The roles and responsibilities for the realigned offices were laid out in a manage-
ment memorandum. The realignment plan established the Office of Innovation
(OIN), which develops new and innovative approaches to achieve the OIG’s strategic
direction and improve performance of the mission. The primary focus of this office
is to plan, communicate, implement, and lead change across the organization, with
a focus on modernizing the agency’s enterprise business information systems, and
advancing the agency’s data analytics program. The intended outcome for this new
program office is to enable the OIG to effectively and efficiently achieve its expand-
ing mission requirements and implement the required changes for increased produc-
tivity.
The realignment plan also established a new Office of Integrity (OI). OI estab-
lishes a program responsible for upholding the agency’s professional standards
through a multidisciplinary approach of inspections and investigations. OI promotes
organizational integrity by conducting independent reviews of agency programs and
operations, and impartially investigating allegations of serious employee and con-
tractor misconduct. OI will provide agency senior leadership with an independent
assessment of programmatic compliance with requirements of agency policies, proce-
dures, and standards.
The plan realigned functions of the chief data officer and data analytics program
to the Office of Innovation (OIN). The OIN Data Analytics Division will focus on
assisting the entire enterprise to leverage data and incorporate data analytics in all
aspects of DHS OIG’s mission. The division will provide support with respect to data
analysis and visualization for more effective reporting. The division will leverage
project-tracking data to provide operational effectiveness insights to OIG mission
support functions in the organization, as well as to inform narratives with external
stakeholders about the OIG’s work. The division will conduct audits to assess the
quality of the data DHS uses for essential mission operations and maintains the
OIG data analytics infrastructure and deploy advanced analytic capabilities to ex-
plore, acquire, and assess the quality of DHS data.
Question 8. The Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight plays an important role
in organization-wide quality assurance, yet this office is the subject of some signifi-
cant changes the OIG has planned. How do you plan to structure and resource qual-
ity assurance efforts in the new organizational structure?
Answer. Quality assurance is an office-wide responsibility that does not just re-
side in one DHS OIG division. We take the fact that we recently passed 3 separate
peer reviews (audit, inspection, investigative) in the last 12 months to indicate that
our quality assurance program is operating effectively. We fully anticipate that our
new Office of Integrity will continue to strengthen our quality assurance efforts
through improved documentation, additional resources, and targeted expertise.
That said, the Office of Integrity is well-positioned to monitor the quality of DHS
OIG performance and products. Now that we have integrated all internal-oriented
functions within one office, we expect increased synergy between these functions.
Question 9a. GAO identified numerous concerns about quality assurance and pro-
fessional standards.
How are you ensuring that your quality assurance function is appropriately
staffed and trained?
Question 9b. How do you ensure that program offices are responsive to the OIG’s
quality assurance program?
Question 9c. How are you ensuring that all the OIG’s work is subject to quality
assurance reviews?
Answer. We take the fact that we recently passed 3 separate peer reviews (audit,
inspection, investigative) in the last 12 months to indicate that our quality assur-
ance program is operating effectively. DHS OIG’s principal quality assurance func-
tion is positioned to proactively monitor and address quality, including the applica-
tion of professional standards. This function, housed in the Office of Integrity, em-

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
65
ploys well-trained compliance and assurance experts who monitor DHS OIG prod-
ucts and performance in a data-driven, risk-based manner. They work in frequent
communication with DHS OIG senior leadership to implement enhancements
throughout the organization. These activities—paired with other program office
quality control activities (such as supervisory reviews, fact/figure checking, inde-
pendent referencing, and the like)—help ensure the consistent reliability and effec-
tiveness of DHS OIG’s work.
While these activities in the Office of Integrity are at the ‘‘tip of the spear,’’ as
mentioned in response to question 8, quality assurance is an office-wide responsi-
bility that does not reside in just one DHS OIG division. For example, in October
2018, the Office of Audits (OA) established the Quality Management and Training
Branch (QMT). QMT develops quality control guidance and procedures to com-
plement GAGAS and OIG policy for OA. It also identifies strategies to improve prod-
uct quality and maintain a skilled workforce. QMT’s Audit Policy and Compliance
Unit conducts In-Process Quality Reviews (IPQRs) of on-going audits and reviews
to determine whether corrective actions are needed to comply with GAS require-
ments.
Regarding training, QMT’s Audit Training and Tracking Unit tracks and supports
OA staff training activities. The unit manages OA’s in-house training program, in-
cluding developing a training calendar, scheduling classes, registering students, as-
signing instructors, and/or designing and facilitating classes. The unit communicates
with the Office of Management’s Training and Workforce Development Division to
identify training opportunities. It also communicates with the Council of the Inspec-
tors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) and other outside training agencies
and vendors to identify training opportunities that will benefit the organization.
QMT communicates these training opportunities to OA staff and other OIG program
units through email announcements and/or blog posts.
Likewise, in the Office of Inspections and Evaluations, staff received training on
inspection planning and internal controls including project proposals, report index-
ing, report referencing and external peer reviews through our annual training pro-
gram. Training regarding planning and quality assurance is also being incorporated
into our new employee on-boarding training beginning in May 2021.
Inspections and Evaluations reports go through a rigorous quality assurance proc-
ess which includes:
• Supervisory Review (which ensures the project supervisors review documenta-
tion and analysis that is used to develop Inspection reports);
• Report Indexing (which outlines the support for all findings included in an In-
spections report);
• Report Referencing (which ensures another qualified inspector who did not per-
form the inspection work on the project reviews the support provided and can
draw the same conclusion); and
• Senior Management Review (which includes a review by the Office of General
Counsel, Reports Quality Assurance, Deputy Inspector General for Inspections
and Evaluations, Chief of Staff, Principal Deputy Inspector General and the In-
spector General).
The DHS OIG received, and passed, its first peer review of its Inspections and
Evaluations work from June to September 2020. The CIGIE External Peer Review
Team consisted of experienced Office of Inspector General inspection and evaluation
professionals from the Department of Defense, the Department of Energy, the De-
partment of State, and the Department of Veterans Affairs. The review team con-
ducted an external peer review of 2 offices within the Department of Homeland Se-
curity OIG—the Office of Audits and the Office of Inspections and Evaluations.
The review team assessed the extent to which the DHS OIG met 7 quality stand-
ards as required by the CIGIE Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation
(Blue Book), January 2012. These included: Quality control, planning, data collec-
tions and analysis, evidence, records maintenance, reporting, and follow-up. This as-
sessment included a review of DHS OIG’s internal policies and procedures imple-
menting the 7 required Blue Book standards. The assessment also included a review
of 4 selected inspection and evaluation reports issued between July 1, 2019, and
June 30, 2020, to determine whether the reports complied with the covered Blue
Book standards and DHS OIG’s internal policies and procedures.
The peer review team determined that DHS OIG’s internal policies and proce-
dures generally met the 7 covered Blue Book standards addressed in the external
peer review, and the 4 reviewed reports generally met the Blue Book standards and
complied with DHS OIG’s internal policies and procedures. There were no rec-
ommendations associated with this external peer review.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
66
Question 10a. GAO’s analysis shows that reports are taking longer to produce.
GAO has found that DHS OIG has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of
time frames.
Although you may not have a comprehensive assessment at this time, what do
you see as the factors contributing to report time frames?
Question 10b. GAO’s analysis includes work that began before you began your
tenure at the OIG. What steps are you taking to ensure the timeliness of work that
is currently under way?
Answer. We published 80 reports in fiscal year 2020, which is 13 more than we
did in fiscal year 2019. Many factors go into the amount of time that it takes reports
to get finalized, and the time frames can vary greatly depending on the cir-
cumstances of a particular audit or inspection. Office of Integrity reviews often in-
clude assessing timeliness as part of its quality assurance efforts.
Recently, the Office of Inspections and Evaluations established new benchmarks
and tracking to ensure projects are done effectively and efficiently. Both project su-
pervisors and project staff have visibility of the project tracking to ensure projects
are completed in a timely manner. Each project plan establishes a time line based
on the scope of the project, to determine the appropriate time frame for completion.
If projects are going to extend beyond established time frames, project supervisors
would document these extensions including the rationale and approval for an exten-
sion. The Office of Audits will be following suit. Empowered with new initiatives in
benchmarking, metrics, and milestone tracking, DHS OIG will be increasingly posi-
tioned to monitor timeliness and apply these means to maximize our efficiency.
Finally, we will be updating our report review directive, including reviewer roles,
responsibilities, and time frames, for draft and final report reviews. We will also de-
velop and implement a process to ensure that we consistently use data to track
project milestones.
INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO MISCONDUCT

Question 11a. Dr. Cuffari, please explain how the process to select Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP (Wilmer Hale) to investigate misconduct by 3 Senior Ex-
ecutive Service employees was conducted.
Question 11b. How many firms submitted proposals to conduct this investigation?
Question 11c. What selection criteria did you, or others in the OIG, use to select
the recipient?
Answer. On April 7, 2020, DHS OIG sent a Request for Proposal (RFP) utilizing
specific Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 13.5 procedures to 4 vendors:
WilmerHale, Baker Hostetler, Davis Polk, and Global Security Innovative Strate-
gies. The competitive solicitation informed the recipients that the procurement
would be conducted using a Phased Approach. Phase One consisted of interested
parties returning the DHS OIG non-disclosure agreement and registering in the
General Services Administration System for Award Management. Failure to partici-
pate in Phase One of the solicitation precluded any further consideration of an Of-
feror. Phase Two required submission of: (1) Capabilities of Proposed Personnel; (2)
Demonstrated Prior Experience and Past Performance Reference Checks; and (3)
Price. WilmerHale and DavisPolk submitted proposals, and the solicitation closed on
April 17, 2020.
A Technical Evaluation Team (TET) assessed and rated the proposals in accord-
ance with the solicitation. On April 27, 2020, the TET reached a consensus rating
and recommendation. On April 29, 2020, the contracting officer determined that
WilmerHale presented the lowest price and offered the best value to the Govern-
ment. The contracting officer awarded Contract no. 70VT1520C00003 to WilmerHale
(Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP) on May 4, 2020.
I did not review the proposals, I was not part of the TET, I had no involvement
in the TET’s deliberations, I have no financial interest in or personal connection to
WilmerHale, and I had no communication with the Contracting Officer about the
proposals either before or after the award.
Question 12a. Dr. Cuffari, what steps did Wilmer Hale take to ensure that the
investigation into allegations of misconduct would be independent?
Question 12b. To what extent were you involved in selecting the firm, or guiding
its work, if at all?
Answer. As mentioned in response to question 11, I was not at all involved in the
process for selecting WilmerHale. I was also not involved in guiding the work of the
firm. WilmerHale personnel carried out their work under the supervision of a senior
partner in that firm, Ronald Machen, who served as U.S. Attorney for the District
of Columbia under President Obama. WilmerHale decided who would be inter-
viewed, what documents and other evidence it needed, how the final report would

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
67
be organized, and most importantly, what the final report said. I did not engage an
outside firm with a particular outcome in mind, nor did I or anyone at DHS OIG
telegraph a particular outcome to WilmerHale.
Question 13. Dr. Cuffari, based on the findings of the Wilmer Hale investigation
into allegations of misconduct by 3 Senior Executive Service officials at the DHS
OIG, what are you doing to ensure similar behaviors and allegations are avoided
in the future?
Answer. WilmerHale found that 3 senior executives at DHS OIG committed seri-
ous misconduct over a sustained period. The 3 senior executives are no longer em-
ployed at DHS OIG. I have worked very deliberately to build an executive team that
models the highest standards of honesty and integrity in all actions, as do I. I have
strived to create a culture of integrity, starting with the tone at the top of the orga-
nization. I have also created a culture at DHS OIG of ‘‘see something, say some-
thing,’’ encouraging employees to come forward with concerns.
I have created a new division of DHS OIG, the Office of Integrity, the function
of which is to standardize the treatment of internal complaints and the conduct of
internal investigations (which had been weaponized by the 3 senior executives
against employees who complained about their bad acts). I have instituted regular
management training on topics such as the Merit System Principles; Prohibited Per-
sonnel Practices; performance management; and whistleblower protections. I have
held dozens of small-group meetings in which I broadcast my vision for DHS OIG
and field questions from DHS OIG employees. Now that pandemic conditions have
improved, I resumed in-person visits to DHS OIG field offices.
The committee should be aware, however, that 3 weeks after my April 21, 2021
testimony, the Integrity Committee of the Council of Inspectors General for Integ-
rity and Efficiency (CIGIE IC) notified me that it is investigating whether I author-
ized the WilmerHale investigation in ‘‘retaliation’’ for unspecified protected activity
of unspecified persons. I have never heard anyone dispute the findings that
WilmerHale made after a comprehensive independent investigation carried out ac-
cording to the highest standards. Yet, the CIGIE IC is trying to erase the historical
record compiled by WilmerHale. It is not for me to say why the CIGIE IC is at-
tempting to undermine my attempts to clean up DHS OIG, which I promised to do
during my 2019 confirmation process, but make no mistake—that is what is hap-
pening. The CIGIE IC investigation is sending exactly the wrong message. Namely,
that the 3 senior executives who WilmerHale found to have ‘‘often planted and then
cultivated seeds of divisiveness, disorder, and dissension to the detriment of DHS
OIG and its mission’’ are actually victims. I disagree, and instead believe that it was
the DHS OIG workforce, DHS OIG stakeholders, and ultimately, the American pub-
lic, who were the victims of the 3 senior executives’ serious misdeeds. Sweeping
WilmerHale’s findings under the rug, as the CIGIE IC is attempting to do, will de-
stroy DHS OIG.
Question 14. We and other Congressional committees have received complaints
from staff about favoritism at DHS OIG. We understand that there were concerns
about favoritism in connection with the leaders who were the subject of an inves-
tigation, but not all the complaints we’ve received have been connected to those indi-
viduals. How do you plan to ensure equitable treatment of employees, particularly
as it relates to promotions and performance appraisals?
Answer. DHS OIG takes seriously its obligations to uphold the Merit System
Principles and to prevent Prohibited Personnel Practices. Within the past year,
every supervisory employee and senior executive has undergone comprehensive, live
training on both topics with in-house experts. In addition, senior executives partici-
pated in mandatory, live training to underscore some of these topics with the Office
of Special Counsel.
Complaints about preferential treatment within the DHS OIG are not taken light-
ly. Allegations such as this can harm a team’s morale and lead to more serious prob-
lems. In order to avoid favoritism or preferential treatment, in appearance or in
practice, we work to ensure fair and equitable human capital practices are used,
such as:
• Ensuring performance is rated equitably and that leadership identifies potential
variables within the construct of an individual performance plan.
• The performance management system includes 2 levels of review for appraisals.
All new employees are briefed on our performance management programs. In
addition, our supervisors, over the past year, have had 2 management training
sessions that focus on Performance Management, and another 2 sessions that
have focused on Merit System Principles and Prohibited Personnel Practices.
• Enhancing our overall communications within the organization, hosting over 60
small-group roundtables between senior leadership and employees. These ses-

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH
68
sions provided employees the opportunity to hear directly from me and afforded
our employees the ability to convey issues they may be facing.
• With respect to the recently announced organizational realignment, communica-
tion has been a key area of emphasis, and leadership has hosted meetings to
discuss changes with impacted teams.
• OIG award and incentive programs are based on merit and screened at the ini-
tial submission stage by multiple supervisory levels. This is to ensure that of-
fices advance the most deserving employees and that everyone has an equal op-
portunity for success and recognition.
• End-of-year time off or monetary awards for exceptional performance are dis-
tributed using a standardized, consistent methodology. Of note, in 2020, DHS
OIG took a corporate approach, setting standardized award amounts for the en-
tire General Schedule workforce based on an employee’s performance appraisal
result. All General Schedule employees, regardless of office or function, were eli-
gible for standardized awards if rated in the 2 highest achievement levels.
Question 15. In your cover letter to the Wilmer Hale report, you wrote that the
Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) did not act
on your complaints regarding the 3 Senior Executive Service employees. Did CIGIE
ever provide you a reason as to why they did not act on your complaints?
Answer. No, CIGIE did not provide a reason.
Question 16a. The Wilmer Hale investigative report you provided to us mentions
that an employee referenced a culture at DHS OIG where no clear-cut structured
guidance or policies are in place. GAO’s draft report includes similar concerns.
What are your plans for addressing these policy needs to ensure equitable treat-
ment for all staff and improve the quality of OIG’s products?
Question 16b. How do you plan to assess and overcome some of the key cultural
challenges at the OIG, whether they’re related to policy or other topics?
Answer. All of DHS OIG’s directives and policies are published on our intranet
page and made available to all employees. Policies should be periodically evaluated
to determine whether updates or changes are required, and we have developed and
are near adopting a comprehensive delegation of authorities to guide DHS OIG’s
policy development and review processes. We are in the process of recruiting for a
senior policy advisor, an SL position in the DHS OIG front office. We are also work-
ing to update the Special Agent Handbook, the comprehensive set of policies appli-
cable to our criminal investigations. Finally, we are elevating the policy function
within the newly-established Office of Innovation.
Question 17a. Since January, the Office of Audits has been without a permanent
leader. What is the status of filling that vacancy?
Question 17b. GAO’s draft report identified that the Office of Audits conducts
work under GAGAS and CIGIE inspection and evaluation standards. Do you expect
to hire someone with expertise in both sets of standards to ensure consistent appli-
cation of standards in the Office of Audits?
Answer. I selected an experienced senior leader to join DHS OIG as the deputy
inspector general for audits. He entered on duty at DHS OIG on May 23, 2021. Our
new deputy IG for audits has prior experience in the IG community leading work
conducted in accordance with both GAGAS (Yellow Book) and CIGIE Inspection and
Evaluation (Blue Book) standards. He has over 20 years of oversight experience to
include 3 years as the assistant inspector general for audits and inspections at the
Department of Energy (DOE). He is well-known and respected within his field of
work and his experience will ensure the Office of Audits excels with its work under
both GAGAS and the CIGIE inspection and evaluation standards.

VerDate Mar 15 2010 15:42 Jun 09, 2021 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6011 H:\117TH\21FL0421\21FL0421 HEATH

File and source

File: chrg_chrg-117hhrg44634_chrg-117hhrg44634.pdf
Size: 1,351,598 bytes
SHA-256: 2fbb099ee2d4b91c75963668f655a9e9004f92e7989b412d29698918b58ac4e8
Our copy: chrg_chrg-117hhrg44634_chrg-117hhrg44634.pdf
Original: www.govinfo.gov