CBP's Response to COVID-19 (GAO-21-431)
Summary
A GAO report to congressional committees, GAO-21-431, dated June 2021, on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) response to COVID-19. According to CBP data, through February 2021 over 7,000 Office of Field Operations (OFO) and U.S. Border Patrol employees reported being infected with COVID-19 and 24 died due to COVID-19-related illnesses. Over 20,000 OFO and Border Patrol employees were unable to work at some point in the same period because of illness or quarantining. The report also discusses executive actions the administration issued with the intention of decreasing the number of individuals entering the U.S.
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United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Committees
BORDER SECURITY
June 2021
CBP’s Response to
COVID-19
GAO-21-431
June 2021
BORDER SECURITY
CBP’s Response to COVID-19
Highlights of GAO-21-431, a report to
congressional committees
Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found
The COVID-19 pandemic impacted According to data from the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs
nearly all aspects of society, including and Border Protection (CBP), through February 2021, over 7,000 Office of Field
travel to and from the U.S. In response Operations (OFO) and U.S. Border Patrol employees reported being infected
to COVID-19, the administration issued with COVID-19, and 24 died due to COVID-19-related illnesses. In addition, over
executive actions with the intention of 20,000 OFO and Border Patrol employees were unable to work at some point
decreasing the number of individuals due to COVID-19-related illnesses or quarantining in the same time period. OFO
entering the U.S. and reducing officials noted that employee absences due to COVID-19 did not generally have
transmission of the virus. Within CBP, a significant impact on port operations, given relatively low travel volumes. In
OFO is responsible for implementing
contrast, officials interviewed by GAO at three of four Border Patrol locations said
these actions at ports of entry through
that COVID-19 absences had impacted operations to some extent.
which travelers enter the U.S., and
Border Patrol is responsible for COVID-19 Cases within Customs and Border Protection, through February 2021
patrolling the areas between ports of
entry to prevent individuals and goods
from entering the U.S. illegally. Based
on their role in facilitating legitimate
travel and trade and securing the
borders, CBP employees risk exposure
to COVID-19 in the line of duty.
GAO was asked to review how CBP
managed its field operations in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
This report describes: (1) available
data on the number of CBP employees
diagnosed with COVID-19 and unable
to work; (2) actions CBP has taken
related to protecting its workforce and CBP regularly updated guidance, used workplace flexibilities, and implemented
the public from COVID-19; and (3) the safety precautions against COVID-19. Between January and December 2020,
extent to which CBP adjusted CBP updated guidance on COVID-19 precautions and how managers should
operations in response to the address possible exposures. CBP also used a variety of workplace flexibilities,
pandemic and related travel including telework and weather and safety leave to minimize the number of
restrictions. GAO reviewed key employees in the workplace, when appropriate. Meanwhile, CBP field locations
guidance documents and analyzed moved some processing functions outdoors, encouraged social distancing, and
data on travel and trade at ports of provided protective equipment to employees and the public. In addition, some
entry, Border Patrol enforcement, and field locations took steps to modify infrastructure to prevent the spread of COVID-
COVID-19 exposures among CBP 19, such as installing acrylic barriers or improving airflow in facilities. Challenges
employees. GAO also interviewed implementing operational changes included insufficient equipment for telework at
officials at CBP headquarters, three field locations, and shortages of respirators at a quarter of the ports of entry
employee unions’ representatives, and GAO contacted.
12 CBP field locations, selected for CBP adjusted operations in response to COVID-19 and executive actions. As
factors such as geographic diversity, travel and trade volumes declined, some ports of entry reallocated personnel to
traffic levels, and COVID-19 infection other operations, such as cargo processing. In contrast, starting in May 2020
rates. Border Patrol encounters with noncitizens steadily increased. As a result, Border
Patrol requested additional resources. It also shifted its deployment strategy to
operate as closely to the border as practical to intercept individuals who could be
infected with COVID-19. Accordingly, some Border Patrol sectors modified
View GAO-21-431. For more information,
contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 interior operations, such as limiting resources at immigration checkpoints. CBP
or GamblerR@gao.gov. also assisted in implementing a Centers for Disease Control order that provided
the ability to quickly expel apprehended individuals.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Background 6
CBP Data Indicate Over 7,000 CBP Employees Tested Positive
for COVID-19 and Over 20,000 Quarantined through February
2021 11
CBP Updated Guidance, Used Workplace Flexibilities, and
Implemented Safety Precautions Related to COVID-19 14
CBP Adjusted Operations in Response to Executive Actions
Restricting Travel 26
Agency Comments 41
Appendix I GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 45
Figures
Figure 1: Timeline of Key COVID-19 Pandemic Executive Actions
Relevant to U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Operations 10
Figure 2: COVID-19 Cases within Offices of Field Operations and
U.S. Border Patrol, February 2020 through February
2021 12
Figure 3: Percentage of Employees Unable to Work for at Least
Some Period of Time Each Month, February 2020
through February 2021 13
Figure 4: COVID-19 Protection Requirements for Customs and
Border Protection Personnel, Per Agency Job Hazard
Analysis Guidance 16
Figure 5: Monthly Percentage Change of Traffic through Ports of
Entry from 2019 to 2020 27
Figure 6: Monthly Border Patrol Encounters, Northern and
Southwest Borders, 2018-2020 36
Page i GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Abbreviations
CARES Act Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
DHS Department of Homeland Security
JFK John F. Kennedy International Airport
OFO Office of Field Operations
PPE personal protective equipment
Sea-Tac Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
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Page ii GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Letter
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
June 14, 2021
Congressional Committees
The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has impacted
nearly all aspects of society, including sharply reducing travel to and from
the United States due to constraints caused by rising infection rates and
public health safety measures. In fiscal year 2020, the volume of
international air travelers entering the U.S. decreased by about 54
percent, and travelers entering through all modes of transportation
decreased by 42 percent from the previous year. Within the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
is the lead federal agency charged with the dual mission of facilitating the
flow of legitimate travel and trade at our nation’s borders while also
keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and
inadmissible noncitizens out of the country. 1 Within CBP, the Office of
Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for operating ports of entry through
which travelers enter the U.S., and the Border Patrol is responsible for
securing the areas between ports of entry to prevent individuals and
goods from entering the U.S. illegally. 2 Based on their role in processing
international travelers and preventing illegal entries along the border, the
more than 52,000 OFO and Border Patrol employees run the risk of being
exposed to COVID-19 in the line of duty.
In response to COVID-19, in 2020 the Trump administration enacted
executive actions with the intention of decreasing the number of
individuals entering the U.S. and reducing transmission of the virus. 3
These actions apply to travel through land, sea, and air ports of entry as
1In this report, we generally use the term “noncitizen” to refer to individuals who would
meet the definition of “alien”. The Immigration and Nationality Act defines the term “alien”
as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).
2A port of entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land border
location) where DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear passengers and
merchandise, collect duties, and enforce customs laws, and where DHS officers inspect
persons entering or applying for admission into, or departing, the U.S. pursuant to U.S.
immigration law and travel controls.
3Executive actions include actions taken by the administration, such as presidential
proclamations, as well as actions taken by executive agencies, such as Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) orders and DHS travel restrictions. See, e.g., 85
Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (Mar. 26, 2020); see also, e.g., 85
Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 13, 2020).
Page 1 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
well as to apprehensions of individuals attempting to enter the country
illegally between ports of entry. For example, OFO implemented
presidential proclamations suspending entry into the U.S. by noncitizens. 4
OFO also implemented restrictions limiting entry from Canada and
Mexico at land ports of entry and has ceased entry of cruise ships into
U.S. ports. 5 These restrictions have affected OFO’s day-to-day operations
by significantly decreasing the number of people permitted to enter the
U.S. at ports of entry. In addition, both OFO and Border Patrol have
assisted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the
enforcement of its March 2020 order, under Title 42 of the U.S. code,
which temporarily suspends entry into the U.S. by certain individuals
traveling from Canada or Mexico who would otherwise be detained in
group settings, and generally remains in effect as of April 2021. 6 This
CDC order under Title 42 does not apply to U.S. citizens or legal
permanent residents, but to those who would be housed in detention
facilities or otherwise detained by CBP. Instead, individuals subject to the
order are to be immediately expelled to their country of last transit.
We were asked to review how CBP managed its field operations in
response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) includes a provision for
GAO to monitor and oversee, offer regular briefings, and publish reports
on activities and funding under the CARES Act or any other act to
address the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on the health, economy,
and public and private institutions of the United States, including the
4Air travel has been restricted, with exceptions for individuals traveling on essential
business, who were physically present in certain countries during the 14-day period
preceding their entry or attempted entry into the U.S., from mainland China, Iran, Ireland,
the United Kingdom, Europe’s 26-country Schengen Area (Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland), Brazil, and South Africa.
5No Sail Order and Suspension of Further Embarkation, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,628 (Mar. 24,
2020).
6Pursuant to the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention’s March 2020 order and
interim final rule, as amended and extended, the introduction of foreign nationals into the
U.S. who are subject to the order is temporarily suspended, with limited exceptions, such
as for lawful permanent residents and members of the armed forces and their spouses
and children. See 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (Mar. 26,
2020); see also, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 13, 2020). This order and rulemaking are
referred to as “Title 42” because they direct the processing of inadmissible noncitizens
under the title of the U.S. Code that pertains to public health (Title 42) as opposed to the
title of the U.S. Code that pertains to immigration and nationality (Title 8).
Page 2 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
federal government’s public health and homeland security efforts. 7 This
report: (1) describes available data on the number of OFO and Border
Patrol employees diagnosed with COVID-19 and unable to work; (2)
describes actions CBP has taken related to protecting its workforce and
the public from COVID-19; and (3) addresses the extent to which CBP
adjusted operations in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and related
travel restrictions.
To address each of our objectives, we conducted interviews with CBP
personnel at the headquarters level, including OFO, Border Patrol, the
OFO Coronavirus Coordination Cell, the Border Patrol Emergency
Operations Center, and CBP’s Occupational Safety and Health Division.
To obtain information from field personnel, we interviewed managers and
frontline staff at selected ports of entry and Border Patrol locations. We
selected OFO and Border Patrol field locations for our interviews based
on the following factors: geographic variation; a variety of operational
environments including land, air, and sea ports of entry for OFO and
stations with and without checkpoint operations for Border Patrol; high
volumes of passenger traffic or encounters with individuals crossing the
border illegally; high numbers of COVID-19 cases among personnel; and
recommendations from agency and union officials. Specifically, within
OFO, we conducted interviews with CBP officers and managers at a
nonprobability sample of eight ports of entry, including three land ports,
four airports, and one seaport. 8 For each of these locations, we
interviewed officers and managers separately, to ensure that all parties
could speak candidly. We also interviewed officials with the Laredo and
Seattle OFO field offices, which oversee the ports of entry within their
geographic areas of responsibility. Within Border Patrol, we conducted
interviews with a nonprobability sample of four Border Patrol sectors on
the northern and southern borders, including some stations with
7Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010(b), 134 Stat. 281, 580 (2020). We regularly issue
government-wide reports on the federal response to COVID-19. For the latest report, see
GAO, COVID-19: Sustained Federal Action Is Crucial as Pandemic Enters Its Second
Year, GAO-21-387 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2021). Our next government-wide report
will be issued in July 2021 and will be available on GAO’s website at
https://www.gao.gov/coronavirus.
8We conducted interviews with OFO officials at Laredo, San Ysidro, and Detroit land ports
of entry; John F. Kennedy International Airport, Chicago O’Hare International Airport,
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, and Toronto Pearson International Airport; and the
Miami Seaport.
Page 3 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
checkpoint operations. 9 For each Border Patrol sector, we conducted one
interview with sector managers, as well as one interview with agents from
two stations in the sector and one interview with managers from the same
two stations, to gain a broader perspective of how COVID-19 affected
their duties. While the views of CBP field officials are not generalizable to
all locations, these views provided valuable insight into the impacts the
COVID-19 pandemic has had on the OFO and Border Patrol workforce,
as well as operational changes made during the pandemic.
To determine the extent to which CBP employees were diagnosed with
COVID-19 and unable to work, we analyzed CBP data on employee
COVID-19 cases from March 2020 through February 2021, including
confirmed cases, hospitalizations, deaths due to COVID-19, and
quarantined employees. These data are maintained in CBP’s Workforce
Incident Tracker, which was established in July 2020, according to CBP
officials. To assess the reliability of the data, we conducted electronic
testing, reviewed documentation such as guidance for entering data, and
interviewed relevant CBP headquarters officials involved with establishing
the Workforce Incident Tracker and verifying case data. We found the
data are sufficiently reliable to provide approximate summary data of
COVID-19 cases, hospitalizations, and deaths among CBP’s workforce,
as well as the approximate number of employees in quarantine status
each month. We also interviewed CBP officials at headquarters and used
information from field location interviews, as noted above, to gather
perspectives on the extent to which employee illness and quarantine
affected operations at ports of entry and Border Patrol stations.
To determine actions CBP took to protect its workforce and the public
from COVID-19, we analyzed guidance on COVID-19 precautions and
processes, including internal memos and each of seven iterations of the
COVID-19 Job Hazard Analysis and each of five iterations of Guidance
for Leadership, Medical Officers, and Supervisors. We reviewed how
CBP’s COVID-19 guidance had evolved between January and December
2020. We also examined key CBP policies and procedures enacted to
reduce the spread of COVID-19, such as infrastructure modifications,
social distancing measures, the use of protective equipment, the use of
contact tracing and other precautions, and human capital policies and
flexibilities. We conducted interviews with officials at CBP headquarters,
union officials, and field locations, as described above, to learn about the
9We conducted interviews with Border Patrol officials from the Rio Grande Valley, San
Diego, Swanton, and Tucson sectors.
Page 4 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
actions CBP has taken to protect its workforce. We also used information
from field location interviews to describe how selected locations
implemented guidance on COVID-19 precautions and to gain their
perspectives on the challenges frontline personnel faced during the
pandemic.
For three of those CBP field locations—selected to include one airport,
one land port of entry, and one Border Patrol sector with high levels of
traffic—we reviewed monitoring camera footage for selected dates and
times to provide insight into how the CBP workforce implemented
guidance on COVID-19 precautions. Dates and times were selected to
provide footage of the busiest time at each location on two separate dates
as far apart as possible given the length of time each location maintained
the footage. To do so, we recorded actions taken by CBP employees in
the footage and assessed whether they were consistent with the
guidance in effect at the time the footage was recorded. We then verified
the observations through a second review, resolving any differences
through discussion between the two reviewers.
To determine the extent to which CBP adjusted operations in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic and related travel restrictions, we reviewed
travel and trade data at ports of entry and Border Patrol enforcement
encounter data to provide context for how CBP’s workload changed
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, we reviewed summary data
compiled by the Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, including data on pedestrian, personal vehicle, and commercial
truck traffic through ports of entry for calendar years 2019 and 2020. This
allowed us to compare OFO’s workload at ports of entry during the
COVID-19 pandemic to workloads in prior years. To assess the reliability
of these data, we reviewed relevant documentation and conducted
interviews with knowledgeable officials to understand how the data are
processed and validated. We found these data sufficiently reliable for
describing OFO’s workload before and during the pandemic. We also
analyzed Border Patrol enforcement encounter data collected by CBP
from calendar year 2018 through 2020 to describe changes during the
pandemic. To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed system
documentation, such as data input instructions, and interviewed Border
Patrol officials that manage the data system. We found these data
sufficiently reliable for describing changes in cross-border traffic.
We also reviewed CBP guidance for implementing executive actions
intended to limit the spread of COVID-19, such as travel restrictions at
ports of entry and CBP’s assistance in implementing the CDC order under
Page 5 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Title 42. Finally, we conducted interviews with CBP headquarters officials
in OFO and Border Patrol, including the CBP Occupational Safety and
Health Division, the OFO Coronavirus Coordination Cell, and the Border
Patrol Emergency Operations Center, to gather headquarters
perspectives on operational changes.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2020 to June 2021 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
CBP Roles and CBP is the lead federal agency charged with a dual mission of facilitating
Responsibilities the flow of legitimate travel and trade at our nation’s borders while also
keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and
inadmissible noncitizens out of the country. Within CBP, OFO is
responsible for operating ports of entry through which travelers enter the
U.S., and the Border Patrol is responsible for patrolling the areas between
ports of entry to prevent individuals and goods from entering the U.S.
illegally. 10
OFO operates 20 field offices overseeing 328 air, land, and sea ports of
entry, and employs more than 32,000 employees. Upon arrival at a port of
entry, CBP officers conduct a primary inspection to determine compliance
with U.S. law and admissibility to the U.S. A CBP officer is to examine
travel documents to ensure their validity and visually match the traveler to
the photo identification to confirm the traveler’s identity. If further
information is required, CBP conducts a secondary inspection, which may
include a CBP officer conducting further questioning of travelers or
additional examination of the traveler, vehicle, or cargo. In fiscal year
10In addition to processing travelers and cargo, OFO enforces import and export laws and
regulations of the U.S. and protects the U.S. from foreign animal and plant pests,
diseases, and invasive species, among other things. These enforcement actions involve a
targeting process in which OFO uses law enforcement, intelligence, and other
enforcement data to identify higher-risk individuals, vehicles, or cargo for additional
scrutiny upon their arrival at a U.S. port of entry.
Page 6 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
2019, OFO processed over 410 million traveler arrivals into the U.S. and
nearly 29 million cargo containers.
The Border Patrol has 20 sector offices that coordinate operations at 131
stations across the northern and southern borders of the U.S. It also
operates immigration checkpoints within the U.S., in addition to patrolling
the land and coastal borders. In fiscal year 2019, nearly 20,000 Border
Patrol agents apprehended over 850,000 individuals along U.S. borders.
Under its general authority under Title 8 of the U.S. Code, which governs
immigration and nationality, Border Patrol has the authority to hold
apprehended individuals for general processing prior to transferring them
to the appropriate agency for continued custody or release.
At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, both OFO and Border Patrol
established COVID-19 response teams. Specifically, in February 2020,
OFO created the Coronavirus Coordination Cell and in January 2020,
Border Patrol activated its Emergency Operations Center and
Coronavirus Task Force. These response teams served as
clearinghouses intended to ensure that information distributed to the field
was consistent with the Department of Health and Human Services’ CDC
guidance and to provide subject matter experts to answer questions
related to COVID-19 precautions and response for CBP employees.
Other CBP offices have also been involved in the response to COVID-19.
The CBP Occupational Safety and Health Division, located within the
Office of Human Resources Management, provides technical guidance to
protect the workforce, including guidance on COVID-19. The CBP
Medical Office worked in conjunction with the Occupational Safety and
Health Division to provide expertise on the health aspect of the crisis.
Outside of CBP, the CDC provided the public and government agencies,
including CBP, with guidance on subjects such as infection control,
personal protective equipment (PPE) use, and engineering controls.
CBP Implementation of In response to COVID-19, the Trump administration issued the following
Executive Actions related executive actions with the intention of decreasing the number of
individuals entering the U.S. and reducing transmission of the virus.
to COVID-19
These actions apply to travel through land, sea, and air ports of entry as
well as to apprehensions of individuals attempting to enter the country
illegally between ports of entry.
• On March 20, 2020, the Secretary of Homeland Security temporarily
limited travel from both Mexico and Canada into the U.S. via land
border, ferry crossing, or rail for any travel that is not deemed
Page 7 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
essential. 11 CBP limited entry to the U.S. to essential travel for
medical or educational purposes, work in the U.S., emergency
response or public health, or legal cross-border trade, for individuals
who are not citizens or legal residents. Individuals engaged in official
government or military travel and members of the U.S. Armed Forces
and their families were also permitted to enter. The action did not
restrict entry into the U.S. by citizens or legal residents.
• In March 2020, CDC published a No Sail Order directing cruise ships
not voluntarily suspending operations to comply with safety measures
as well as a health notice warning to all travelers to defer cruise ship
travel. 12 In a revision and renewal to that order in April 2020, cruise
lines were required to submit plans to prevent, mitigate, and respond
to the spread of COVID-19 on board their ships to ensure a safe work
environment for crew members. 13 In October 2020, the CDC began a
phased approach to allowing cruise ship operations in U.S. waters,
although as of January 2021, no U.S. cruise lines were operating
cruises. 14
• Beginning in January 2020, Presidential proclamations restricted air
travel from certain countries, including mainland China, Iran, the
United Kingdom, Europe’s 26-country Schengen Area, Brazil, and
South Africa, citing sustained person-to-person transmission of
COVID-19. 15 Under the Presidential proclamations, travel from those
countries was prohibited for noncitizens who had been present in
these countries during the 14 days preceding entry into the U.S. In
addition, travelers who had been in any of those countries within 2
11These restrictions do not apply to air, freight rail, or sea travel between the U.S. and
Canada and/or Mexico.
12No Sail Order and Suspension of Further Embarkation, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,628 (Mar. 24,
2020).
13No Sail Order and Suspension of Further Embarkation; Notice of Modification and
Extension and Other Measures Related to Operations, 85 Fed Reg. 21,004 (Apr. 15,
2020).
14No Sail Order and Suspension of Further Embarkation; Third Modification and Extension
of No Sail Order and Other Measures Related to Operations, 85 Fed. Reg. 62,732 (Oct. 5,
2020).
15See Proclamation No. 9984, 85 Fed. Reg. 6709 (Jan. 31, 2020). The 26 Schengen Area
countries are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland.
Page 8 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
weeks of their arrival in the U.S. were to be referred to the CDC for an
enhanced entry health screening before departing the airport. 16 In
September, the CDC ceased this screening, stating that it would
instead dedicate resources to other mitigation strategies, including
health education for travelers, voluntary collection of contact
information from travelers using electronic means, potential testing,
country-specific risk assessments, and enhancing training and
education of partners in the transportation sector and at U.S. ports of
entry.
• Finally, a March 2020 CDC order and interim final rule under Title 42
of the U.S. Code allows the government to suspend the introduction of
individuals from foreign countries to prevent the spread of
communicable diseases. 17 CDC temporarily suspended the
introduction of certain individuals who would be detained in
congregate settings at land ports of entry traveling from Canada or
Mexico to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Title 42 does not apply to
U.S. citizens or legal residents, but to those who would be housed in
processing centers or otherwise detained by CBP. Instead, these
individuals are to be immediately expelled to their country of last
transit.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the timing of executive actions in
relation to developments in the COVID-19 pandemic.
16After being referred to CDC for enhanced screening, travelers were observed for signs
of illness, had their temperature taken, completed a questionnaire about symptoms and
exposure to persons with COVID-19 and provided contact information in the U.S. Ill
travelers and those disclosing exposure to COVID-19 in the previous 14 days were
referred for additional public health assessment by a medical officer or to a local health
care facility.
17See 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (Mar. 26, 2020); see
also, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 13, 2020). In assisting CDC with implementing the
CDC Order under Title 42, CBP is operating pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 268(b), aiding CDC
in the enforcement of its authority pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 265, 42 C.F.R. § 71.40.
Page 9 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Figure 1: Timeline of Key COVID-19 Pandemic Executive Actions Relevant to U.S. Customs and Border Protection Operations
Notes:
a
A Public Health Emergency of International Concern is an extraordinary event which is determined to
constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease; and to
potentially require a coordinated international response.
b
Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex M. Azar, II, Determination that a Public Health
Emergency Exists, https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/2019-nCoV.aspx
(Jan. 31, 2020).
c
The Schengen Area of Europe includes 26 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland. Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-
19) Outbreak, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020).
d
The No Sail Order stated that, among other things, for cruise ships not voluntarily suspending
operations, cruise ships must disembark passengers and crew members only as directed by the U.S.
Page 10 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Coast Guard and not re-embark any passengers or crew or continue operations except as approved
by the U.S. Coast Guard or other federal authorities as appropriate.
e
Pursuant to the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention’s March 2020 order and interim final rule,
as amended and extended, the introduction of foreign nationals into the U.S. who are subject to the
order is temporarily suspended, with limited exceptions, such as for lawful permanent residents and
members of the armed forces and their spouses and children. See 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24,
2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (Mar. 26, 2020); see also, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 13, 2020).
f
This order exempts legal U.S. residents; medical professionals, members of the military, and their
families; individuals applying for visas under the Immigrant Investor Program; noncitizens under 21
years of age who are the children or prospective adopted children of U.S. citizens; and other
exceptions as approved by the Secretaries of State or Homeland Security.
g
Executive Order on Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and International Travel and the CDC
Order Regarding the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks While on Public Conveyances and at
Transportation Hubs, Exec. Order 13998, Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and International
Travel, 86 Fed. Reg. 7205 (Jan. 21, 2021).
As frontline workers, CBP officers and Border Patrol agents continue to
CBP Data Indicate perform public-facing duties during the pandemic, and some have
Over 7,000 CBP contracted COVID-19. As shown in figure 2, CBP data indicate that at
least 3,730 OFO employees tested positive for COVID-19 and 8,394 were
Employees Tested unable to work due to illness or quarantine between February 2020 and
Positive for COVID- February 2021. 18 During the same period, 3,327 Border Patrol field
employees tested positive for COVID-19 and 12,081 were unable to work
19 and Over 20,000 due to quarantine.
Quarantined through
February 2021
18CBP counts presumed positive cases of COVID-19 along with positive test results. An
individual may be presumed to be positive for COVID-19 if a medical professional
determined they had COVID-19, based on symptoms, possible exposure, or other
information, and the individual was not tested. We cannot determine whether CBP
employees contracted COVID-19 on the job or in some other setting.
Page 11 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Figure 2: COVID-19 Cases within Offices of Field Operations and U.S. Border Patrol, February 2020 through February 2021
According to CBP data, an average of approximately 2.5 percent of OFO
employees and 5.9 percent of Border Patrol employees were unable to
work for at least some time each month for COVID-related reasons
between February 2020 and February 2021 (see figure 3). Officials in
CBP’s Occupational Safety and Health Division noted that infection rates
among CBP employees generally followed the infection rates of the area
in which they were located.
Page 12 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Figure 3: Percentage of Employees Unable to Work for at Least Some Period of Time Each Month, February 2020 through
February 2021
Note: Averages are based on total employees in OFO as of October 2020 and in Border Patrol as of
August 2020.
Officials at ports of entry told us that employee absences related to
COVID-19 illness or quarantine did not generally have a significant impact
on operations, and in cases where an impact was felt, they were able to
adjust to meet staffing needs. For example, managers at three ports of
entry we spoke with said that there were never more than a few
employees out of work at the same time due to COVID-19, so impacts on
operations were minimal. In addition, OFO managers at one airport noted
that relatively low passenger volumes lessened the impact and
challenges of absent officers. However, officials from one OFO field office
said that the impact of officers quarantining was more significant for
small- and medium-sized ports of entry because one or two officers in
quarantine comprises a larger percentage of that port’s workforce, making
it difficult to fully staff each shift. To address these situations, CBP
authorized overtime and temporarily detailed officers from larger ports of
entry to ensure shifts were appropriately staffed. Officials in CBP
Page 13 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
headquarters told us that no ports of entry had to close or modify their
hours due to employee absences attributed to COVID-19.
In contrast, three of the four Border Patrol sectors we spoke with told us
that COVID-19-related absences had impacted their operations to some
extent. For instance, at one location, all agents in two specialized units
were quarantined for 14 days. Managers told us that these agents’
functions could not be performed while they were out because members
of those units have certifications not common among other agents. In
another instance, a group of training instructors was quarantined at the
same time, so their station did not have training capabilities for the 14-day
quarantine period. However, officials in headquarters told us that no
stations had been unable to complete their missions or had to close due
to COVID-19.
CBP provided guidance to its workforce on COVID-19 precautions and
CBP Updated contact tracing, updating the guidance as understanding of COVID-19
Guidance, Used and effective precautions evolved. The agency also implemented
flexibilities for its workforce intended to reduce exposure to co-workers
Workplace and the public, including Weather and Safety Leave, telework for
Flexibilities, and employees able to do so, and accommodations within the workplace for
employees with risk factors for severe COVID-19. Finally, the agency
Implemented Safety implemented COVID-19 precautions at some field locations, such as
Precautions Related moving processing outdoors, encouraging social distancing, and making
changes to field location infrastructure. CBP field locations we met with
to COVID-19 generally reporting having sufficient PPE and cleaning supplies, but noted
that there were some shortages early in the pandemic.
CBP Provided Guidance Since the onset of the pandemic, CBP has provided guidance to its
on Workplace Actions to employees on COVID-19 precautions and on how managers should
address possible exposure, which is available on its internal website. 19
Reduce the Spread of
CBP’s primary COVID-19 guidance document—the Job Hazard
COVID-19 Analysis—identifies the protective measures CBP personnel should take
according to the relative risk level of their occupation and work activities.
The Job Hazard Analysis was developed by the Occupational Safety and
19CBP developed a COVID-19 Resource Portal for its internal website, which includes
links to COVID-19 guidance.
Page 14 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Health Division with input from other CBP components to provide safe
work practices and PPE requirements for each risk level. 20
CBP released seven iterations of the Job Hazard Analysis between
January and December 2020 as guidance evolved with increased
understanding of the COVID-19 virus (see Figure 4 below). CBP officials
told us that they developed each version to clarify questions they had
received and to remain consistent with guidance from CDC and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. For example, CBP’s
January 2020 guidance instructed personnel in low-risk environments to
take minimal precautions and to wear surgical masks only with a
supervisor’s approval. In contrast, the guidance issued in October 2020
required the use of cloth face coverings or surgical masks in low-risk
environments where social distancing could not be maintained. CBP’s
October guidance also instructed personnel to carry face coverings at all
times in preparation for situations in which they could not maintain social
distancing. Similarly, while the January 2020 version of the Job Hazard
Analysis required employees to wear disposable gloves in medium-risk
situations, by December 2020, requirements for the same situation
required N95 respirators and face protection in addition to disposable
gloves. Each iteration of the guidance also contains references to
relevant guidance from CDC and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration.
20CBP develops a specific Job Hazard Analysis for pandemic strains or emerging
infectious diseases, such as Ebola, Zika Virus, and COVID-19.
Page 15 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Figure 4: COVID-19 Protection Requirements for Customs and Border Protection Personnel, Per Agency Job Hazard Analysis
Guidance
Notes:
COVID-19 precautions were referred to as recommendations rather than requirements in the January
and February 2020 iterations of the Job Hazard Analysis.
As of October 2020, neck gaiters are not approved as face coverings for OFO employees.
In our review of video footage from three field locations, we observed that
Border Patrol agents and CBP officers largely used PPE and surgical
Page 16 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
masks in accordance with CBP guidance. 21 However, at one location, we
observed that officers generally did not wear masks when interacting with
one another, even in cases where they were not maintaining a distance of
6 feet between individuals. Although CBP guidance did not require them
to do so at the time, local managers told us that this was not consistent
with local guidelines, under which employees should be wearing masks
when less than 6 feet apart. They further said they planned to work with
officers to make sure they understood the guidance.
Contact tracing. In addition to the Job Hazard Analysis, CBP issued
guidance on contact tracing to help agency managers determine the level
of risk in an employee’s exposure to a traveler, detainee, or fellow
employee diagnosed with COVID-19. Managers were to use work
schedules and detention logs to determine what individuals were in
contact with the ill person and inform them of their exposure. Officials in
field locations told us that some aspects of the contact tracing guidance
were unclear early in the pandemic, but that the guidance has evolved
over time due to updates in more recent iterations. For instance,
managers at one OFO location reported that they were initially confused
regarding whether contact tracing should be performed based on the date
of a positive COVID-19 test or the date on which an employee began to
show symptoms, although they were able to obtain clarification by
contacting headquarters. Further, a November 2020 update of contact
tracing guidance provided more detail, noting that managers should
identify personnel exposed to the infected person beginning 2 days prior
to the onset of COVID-19 symptoms or a COVID-19 test.
As part of the contact tracing guidance, CBP developed a decision tree
with information on actions to take based on the level of exposure for
each employee who had contact with the infected individual. Perspectives
on the usefulness of contact tracing guidance varied between front-line
personnel and managers. For instance, front-line personnel we spoke
with at four of the 12 locations specifically commented that the decision
tree was not applied consistently at the beginning of the pandemic. For
example, one officer told us he was not asked to quarantine after
exposure to a traveler who tested positive for COVID-19, while officers
who were not directly exposed to that traveler were placed on Weather
and Safety Leave for 14 days. A union representing CBP field employees
expressed similar concerns in September 2020, noting that the decision
21To observe operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, we reviewed video footage
recorded on selected dates from June through August 2020 at one Border Patrol facility
and two ports of entry.
Page 17 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
tree was applied inconsistently, and managers were not focused on
understanding the procedures because they may not regularly deal with
COVID-19 exposures. However, when asked about CBP guidance,
managers at two locations we spoke with singled out the exposure
decision tree as being helpful in determining when to send employees
home to quarantine and when to keep them at work, and that it was easy
to understand. Field officials also noted that the guidance has been
updated and clarified over time, and a manager at one location noted that
the guidance on the risk of COVID-19 exposures was expanded over time
and the most recent iteration encompassed all necessary information.
Training. In addition to written guidance, CBP also provided two virtual
training modules on COVID-19 precautions through its online training
system. The first was intended for all employees, and provided
information about the virus, such as symptoms and methods of
transmission, hygiene, social distancing, and mask use. The second was
specific to managers and focused on workforce management during the
pandemic. None of the officials we spoke with expressed a need for
additional training on COVID-19, and some noted that they have regular
training on recognizing communicable illnesses and receive training on
use of N95 respirators during fit-testing. Officials at one OFO field office
told us they put together 8-hour monthly virtual trainings that included
topics like the proper use of PPE, social distancing, how employees
should conduct themselves outside of work to avoid large gatherings, and
other precautions specific to the field office area of responsibility.
CBP Utilized Workplace To minimize the risk of exposure to COVID-19 for its employees, CBP
Flexibilities Intended to utilized a variety of workplace flexibilities, including telework, Weather and
Safety Leave, and modifying assignments to accommodate employees at
Minimize Spread of
a higher risk of developing severe COVID-19 illness.
COVID-19
Telework. CBP officers and Border Patrol agents are not generally
eligible for telework because their duties are not portable and must be
performed on-site, according to CBP officials. However, the agency has
permitted administrative employees at both OFO and Border Patrol to
telework during the COVID-19 pandemic to decrease transmission. For
instance, OFO reported that around 8 percent of the OFO workforce was
allowed to telework, comprising over 2,200 employees. In some cases,
field locations employed strategies to further decrease the number of
individuals at field locations and decrease officers’ potential exposure to
COVID-19. For instance, managers at one port of entry implemented
monthly training days during which officers at ports of entry could
complete required training from home, rather than at their work location.
Page 18 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Despite agency support, officials at several locations reported challenges
implementing employee telework. At three locations we spoke with,
managers told us they did not have sufficient numbers of laptops and
other equipment to facilitate telework for all administrative employees. In
one case, the location was able to obtain additional equipment to allow
staff to telework, but in the others, managers told us that telework was
limited by the lack of equipment. Headquarters officials attributed this
shortage to aging computer equipment and an increased number of
employees teleworking, and noted that they had not received additional
funding in 2020 to meet the increased demand. In fiscal year 2021, they
planned to replace desktop computers with laptop computers where
possible to facilitate increased telework.
Weather and Safety Leave. OFO used regularly-scheduled Weather and
Safety Leave, which allows executive agencies to approve paid leave if
the employees are prevented from safely performing work at their
approved location, to reduce the number of individuals in a location and
therefore allow greater social distancing and less exposure to others. 22 In
contrast, Border Patrol officials told us they did not grant regularly-
scheduled Weather and Safety Leave because the workload for Border
Patrol employees did not change, and doing so would cause a strain on
accomplishing the component’s mission. OFO told us that beginning in
March 2020, it granted its officers up to two days of Weather and Safety
Leave in each 2-week pay period, allowing for 3,800 CBP officers to be
on leave every day. In April 2020, OFO ended regularly-scheduled
Weather and Safety Leave to supply additional operational support to
other CBP components, such as Border Patrol. According to managers at
field locations we spoke with, the amount of regularly-scheduled Weather
and Safety Leave provided to employees was dependent on workload
and manager discretion. The use of regularly-scheduled Weather and
Safety Leave was available for a longer period of time in some locations
and was rescinded in some areas of ports of entry before others. For
instance, officers working in the cargo inspection area of one port of entry
were not eligible for regularly-scheduled Weather and Safety Leave, while
those who inspected travelers were allowed to use this form of leave.
Headquarters officials told us that field offices had discretion on when to
initiate the phaseout of regularly-scheduled Weather and Safety Leave.
In addition, officials from OFO field offices and ports of entry told us that
they had a small number of officers on long-term provisional Weather and
22See 5 U.S.C. § 6329c.
Page 19 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Safety Leave due to high-risk health concerns. For example, managers at
one port of entry said that approximately 50 of their 800 officers have
been granted ongoing Weather and Safety Leave because they have
high-risk health conditions or are pregnant or lactating. No Border Patrol
locations reported extending this flexibility to agents, instead
implementing workplace accommodations that allowed agents to
decrease contact with others to the extent possible. Both OFO and
Border Patrol also used Weather and Safety Leave to allow personnel to
quarantine if they were exposed to someone with COVID-19, which is
consistent with CBP guidance. According to CBP guidance, if an
employee has a medium- or high-risk exposure to COVID-19, they may
be granted up to 14 days of Weather and Safety leave for quarantine. 23 In
some cases, CBP personnel we interviewed reported confusion over the
use of Weather and Safety Leave for quarantine due to changes in the
policy over time. For instance, officers at one OFO location said that in
the beginning of the pandemic, they were told that Weather and Safety
Leave would be used to prevent officers with COVID-19 from reporting to
work, but some visibly ill officers were not granted Weather and Safety
Leave to quarantine. 24 CBP managers at each of the 12 locations we
spoke with told us that the iteration of guidance on Weather and Safety
Leave in effect at the time of our interviews was clear.
In addition, at some OFO locations, managers told us they had placed a
small number of officers on provisional Weather and Safety Leave due to
the officer having risk factors for severe COVID-19 symptoms. In
November 2020, CBP provided guidance to managers on reintegration of
the workforce, which recommended extending flexibilities such as
telework for high-risk employees. Officials in CBP headquarters told us
that as part of the reasonable accommodation evaluations, managers
were asked to consider what tasks could be performed by officers in
telework and remote environments. They further told us that employees
who had been granted provisional Weather and Safety Leave were
assigned duties that could be performed via telework, such as addressing
backlogs of Freedom of Information Act requests or completing
paperwork on penalties, fines, and forfeitures.
23If the employee develops symptoms of COVID-19, they are required to take sick leave
for the rest of their time outside of the office.
24According to headquarters officials, CBP does not require employees to be tested for
COVID-19 upon exposure or to return to work, nor does it provide COVID-19 tests for
employees. Rather, managers are to encourage employees to go to their personal doctor
or utilize public health entities if they wish to be tested.
Page 20 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Workplace accommodations. Managers in both OFO and Border Patrol
told us that they make workplace accommodations for agents with risk
factors for severe COVID-19 illness. For instance, managers at two ports
of entry and one field office told us that they worked to find locations in
which high-risk individuals would not be exposed to co-workers or
travelers. Similarly, managers at one Border Patrol station identified
agents who were not eligible for telework but were at higher risk or had
high-risk family members, and placed those agents in lower-risk
environments, such as monitoring field cameras. At the same sector,
station managers told us that lower-risk individuals volunteered for long-
term higher-risk assignments, such as transporting detainees or
processing apprehensions to allow higher-risk colleagues to perform safer
tasks. To protect agents in vehicles, officials at two Border Patrol sectors
told us they modified the way in which station vehicles were used to
accommodate agents at high risk of COVID-19 complications. For
instance, one sector instructed stations to assign agents with risk factors
to their own vehicles where possible, so they would not be exposed to
another agent for several hours in close quarters. The other sector told us
they had a designated pool of vehicles for higher-risk agents which
undergo enhanced cleaning between uses.
Local officials told us that flexibility in work schedules had the added
benefit of allowing for greater social distancing. Officials at one Border
Patrol sector reported that stations had scheduled agents to begin and
end work at different times so agents were not clustering upon arrival at
the station. With this approach, two or three agents arrive for a shift at a
time, receiving updated intelligence and assignments, before departing to
work in the field. According to officials, doing this created additional work
for managers, but had the benefit of providing more individualized
attention for agents and improving morale. Border Patrol also allowed
agent schedules to include one hour at the beginning or end of a shift for
exercise at an off-site location, further decreasing the time agents spent
in close contact with one another and discouraging use of station physical
fitness centers.
CBP Implemented CBP field locations took a variety of actions intended to protect their
Precautions Intended to workforce and the traveling public from contracting COVID-19, such as
moving processing functions outdoors when possible, encouraging social
Decrease the Risk of
distancing, and providing surgical masks to travelers upon request.
COVID-19 Transmission at
Field Locations Outdoor processing. Although ports of entry are designed to process
travelers indoors, in a few cases, OFO locations have moved processing
outdoors to decrease the risk of COVID-19 transmission. For instance, at
Page 21 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
the sea port in our review, CBP officials we spoke with said that as a
COVID-19 precaution, they now examine crew members’ documents in
the facility while the crew remains on board the ship. As the crew
disembarks, the officers confirm that photographs on the documents are
consistent with each individual, then return the documents, all while
remaining outdoors. Similarly, officials at one land port of entry told us
they were able to conduct inspections of vehicle passengers outside—
removing the traveler from their vehicle, inspecting the traveler, and then
returning them directly to the vehicle. At this northern port of entry,
supervisors noted that they intended to continue outdoor inspections even
in winter conditions.
Border Patrol locations have also moved some processes outdoors. To
prevent detainees from spending time in congregate settings, Border
Patrol directed sectors to identify procedures to limit COVID-19 in their
facilities, including processing apprehended individuals in the field when
possible. In response, officials at each of the four Border Patrol stations
we spoke with told us that they had moved processing outdoors to
prevent having to bring detainees into Border Patrol station buildings
whenever possible.
Outdoor processing areas pose some challenges, however. For instance,
managers at two stations said that the equipment that was moved
outdoors is not designed for outdoor use, and does not work most of the
time. As a result, they must process apprehended individuals inside the
station. Another sector we spoke with has been processing individuals
where they are apprehended then transporting them directly to the
nearest land port of entry for expulsion. However, managers in that sector
said that processing individuals in the field is hampered by a lack of
mobile connectivity in many areas where individuals cross the border
illegally. CBP officials in headquarters reported that in response, they
accelerated the procurement and deployment of devices that allow agents
to collect information without internet connectivity, which facilitates
identification when the devices are able to sync with the CBP network.
Headquarters officials also told us that they provided additional devices to
every station that requested them.
Social distancing. To reduce the spread of COVID-19 at ports of entry,
OFO encourages its employees to maintain social distancing when
possible, according to officials. For example, at one land port of entry,
OFO officials told us that only one officer at a time is permitted in
inspection booths, whereas there would normally be two officers working
in one booth, and no more than 10 officers may gather in one place. For
Page 22 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
travelers arriving at air and land ports, OFO officials told us they
encourage travelers to social distance. For example, officials noted they
installed signs and distance markers in the CBP inspection areas to
provide visual cues for travelers to maintain social distance. OFO officials
noted, however, that at airports they are not responsible for enforcing
social distancing in the CBP inspection areas. Rather, OFO relies on
airport operators to control the flow of passengers and ensure they
remain distanced.
Border Patrol officials also told us they encourage social distancing
among both agents and apprehended individuals. Officials at one station
reported that it had installed social distancing markers in the break room
to remind agents to maintain distance. Officials at three of the four sectors
we spoke with noted that they moved meetings involving all agents
working a particular shift to a larger space and required agents to remain
at a 6-foot distance from one another. To protect both parties, officials
also reported limiting contact between agents and individuals who have
been apprehended. For instance, officials at one sector told us that the
first agent to encounter a group or individual was responsible for all
continuing contact with that party, whereas prior to the pandemic, several
agents would have been involved in processing and transporting them.
Use of face masks for travelers. On February 2, 2021, CBP began
enforcing a requirement that travelers wear face masks at all air, land,
and sea ports of entry. This was in accordance with the Executive Order
on Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and International Travel and
the CDC Order Regarding the Requirement for Persons to Wear Masks
While on Public Conveyances and at Transportation Hubs. 25 Prior to this
order, CBP officers and agents told us they did not enforce the use of
face masks for travelers, though they said they did provide surgical
masks to members of the public who requested them. According to the
CBP Job Hazard Analysis, employees are to provide a surgical mask to
any member of the public suspected of being infected with COVID-19.
Officers at one land port of entry said they offer travelers surgical masks
when reviewing documents during secondary inspections. Similarly,
managers at two Border Patrol stations told us that agents carry masks
with them to provide to each person they apprehend when on patrol.
25Exec. Order 13998, Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and International Travel,
86 Fed. Reg. 7205 (Jan. 21, 2021).
Page 23 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
CBP Field Locations OFO and Border Patrol locations have taken steps to modify their
Modified Infrastructure in infrastructure to prevent the spread of COVID-19, such as installing
acrylic barriers. CBP does not require field locations, such as ports of
Response to the COVID-
entry and Border Patrol stations and facilities, to modify infrastructure
19 Pandemic because each location is unique, which may affect their ability to make
such modifications. However, CBP officials told us that field locations are
encouraged to install acrylic barriers as much as possible, and CBP has
provided specifications for local managers that choose to install them.
CBP’s Office of Occupational Safety and Health has also recommended
modifications such as improved ventilation. Officials we spoke with at
three of the Border Patrol sectors told us they use isolation cells to house
detainees who may have COVID-19.
Regarding acrylic barriers, officials at we spoke with at three of the four
airports said that their managers had worked with airport operators to
install acrylic barriers between officers and arriving passengers at
inspection booths. Officials we spoke with at Border Patrol locations told
us they had installed acrylic barriers in armories, processing areas, and
vehicles. Sector officials noted that installation of acrylic barriers in the
stations is at the impetus of stations, not under the purview of the sector.
Officials at field locations also described additional infrastructure changes
made to protect employees, including improving airflow and disinfection
capabilities. For instance, managers at one airport said that the airport
operator installed a state-of-the-art air purification system. Similarly,
officials at two Border Patrol sectors said their stations had negative-
pressure detention cells, in which potentially infectious individuals can be
isolated from others. Managers at one of these sectors told us that at the
beginning of the pandemic, the sector inspected each stations’ negative
pressure cells to verify that they were functioning properly. In addition,
officials we spoke with at one Border Patrol sector purchased sprayer
systems to disinfect vehicles and indoor spaces at each station.
CBP Field Locations Officials at CBP field locations we interviewed told us that there were
Generally Reported some shortages of PPE and cleaning supplies early in the pandemic, but
that they generally had sufficient equipment and supplies, although there
Sufficient PPE and
were some differences in views between front-line personnel and
Cleaning Supplies, but managers. More specifically, CBP officers we spoke with at a quarter of
Noted Some Shortages the ports of entry cited shortages of N95 respirators, which as of
Early in the COVID-19 December 2020 were required in both medium- and high-risk settings.
Pandemic For example, officers at one location said N95 respirators have been
scarce and it is rare to obtain a respirator that fits properly based on fit-
Page 24 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
testing. 26 Officers at this location added they had been instructed by
managers that surgical masks were a substitute for N95 respirators in all
situations, which is not consistent with CBP’s guidance. However,
managers at that location told us that they had not experienced difficulty
obtaining N95 respirators at any point during the pandemic. Officers at
another location said they did not have access to the appropriate type of
respirator because their location could not obtain the particular brand and
sizes of N95 respirators officers were fit-tested on, despite OSHA
requirements for N95 use. In contrast, managers at the same location
said they always had N95 respirators available to employees, although
they did not specify that they had the appropriate sizes and brands. OFO
officials at headquarters told us that due to stressors on the supply of N95
respirators throughout the country, some models were not available to
OFO locations after local supplies were depleted, but they were unaware
of any locations with continuing shortages.
As with PPE, officials in OFO and Border Patrol field locations we spoke
with told us that although there were some challenges acquiring cleaning
materials at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, shortages had
been resolved. Officials at five of the twelve locations we interviewed
noted that national shortages early in the pandemic led to difficulty
purchasing supplies, such as disinfecting wipes or nitrile gloves. For
example, agents at one Border Patrol station told us that when
disinfectant spray was in short supply at the beginning of the pandemic,
the safety and health coordinator at their station attempted to locate
supplies at local stores, but had to compensate by making disinfectant
from bleach and water when they were unable to locate ready-made
disinfectant. However, the shortages were addressed as the supply chain
recovered and cleaning supplies became more readily available
throughout the U.S., according to officials.
To ensure that its field locations have sufficient supplies, CBP established
a tracking system for PPE and cleaning supplies. The tracking system
records total number of N95 respirators, ounces of hand sanitizer, pairs of
latex gloves, and surgical masks and calculates how many days the
supply will last for each location. However, CBP officials told us the
tracking system does not record the models or sizes of N-95 respirators
26According to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, N95 respirators
must be fit-tested to determine the most acceptable fit from a selection of respirator
models and sizes and to ensure a seal between the respirator and the user’s face.
Subsequently, the user is approved to use only the fit-tested model of respirator. See
OSHA 1910.134.
Page 25 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
available to each location. OFO officials in headquarters also noted that
the agency is working to procure universal-fit N95 respirators, which have
recently been developed.
According to officials in CBP headquarters, OFO field offices were able to
utilize additional funding provided by the CARES Act to acquire supplies
or make infrastructure changes to implement COVID-19 precautions. 27
Border Patrol sectors were not provided additional funds from the budget,
according to officials, but were able to reallocate unused travel funds for
expenses related to COVID-19. For instance, one Border Patrol sector
purchased disinfectant sprayers for each station, and these costs were
borne by the sector. Additionally, in January 2021, some Border Patrol
sectors met the criteria for CARES funding, and have used it to provide
medical care to detainees when necessary.
Overall, officers and agents we spoke with told us that they felt
adequately protected from COVID-19, although they acknowledged the
risks inherent in performing public-facing jobs. For instance, agents at
one location noted that they have ample cleaning supplies, and it is up to
individual employees to use them appropriately. Similarly, in one case,
officers said that regardless of the protection provided by OFO, the nature
of their job requires them to interact with individuals who do not wear
masks or who are at high risk of contracting the virus, such as health-care
workers who cross the border daily for work. In a few cases, officers and
agents noted that CBP had provided adequate supplies and guidance,
but that it was up to individual employees to use those resources
appropriately to prevent the spread of COVID-19.
CBP Adjusted
Operations in
Response to
Executive Actions
Restricting Travel
27See Pub. L. No. 116–136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).
Page 26 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
As It Implemented Travel As travel and trade volumes declined due to travel restrictions intended to
Restrictions, OFO Shifted limit the spread of COVID-19, some ports of entry responded by
reallocating personnel to other operations, such as cargo processing, and
Resources to Cargo
increasing enforcement efforts. Figure 5 shows how monthly traffic
Processing and volumes entering the U.S. at ports of entry changed since the start of the
Enforcement Activities COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, compared to that same month in 2019.
Figure 5: Monthly Percentage Change of Traffic through Ports of Entry from 2019 to
2020
Note: The graphic shows the percentage change of total travel volumes, by category, of 2020 monthly
totals as compared to 2019 monthly totals. Cargo truck traffic refers to loaded truck containers.
After CBP implemented air travel restrictions in March 2020, the volume
of international air travelers entering the U.S. declined sharply, and has
Page 27 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
been slow to recover as of December 2020, as shown in figure 5 above. 28
Specifically, arrivals declined by 98 percent from more than 10 million
travelers in April 2019 to fewer than 200,000 in April 2020. By December
2020, the most recent month for which data are available, 2.3 million
international air travelers entered the U.S., a 76 percent decline from the
9.8 million arrivals in December 2019. In contrast, the volume of air cargo
imports increased about 70 percent over the previous year in February
and March 2020, the first two months after a public health emergency
was declared in the U.S. In addition, after falling 20 percent below 2019
levels in June 2020, air cargo volumes stabilized to within 10 percent of
2019 levels from August through November 2020, and increased nearly
15 percent above 2019 levels in December 2020.
As a result of these developments, OFO officials we spoke with at each of
the three U.S. airports said they reallocated officers from passenger
processing to cargo operations. For example, OFO managers at John F.
Kennedy International Airport (JFK Airport) told us that although their air
cargo volumes declined, they received more individual parcels during the
pandemic, including a large amount of PPE. They said it takes more time
to process a large number of small parcels than it does to process a
smaller number of large parcels, driving the decision to allocate additional
officers to this effort. OFO officials from two of the three airports said they
also shifted officers from passenger processing to mail processing, while
the other increased enforcement on air cargo leaving the country.
Travel volumes at land ports of entry also declined significantly due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, although less than at airports, while trade volumes
declined early in the pandemic but recovered quickly. The number of
personal vehicle passengers entering the U.S. in April 2020 declined by
74 percent compared to April 2019, from 14.3 million to 3.7 million.
Similarly, the number of pedestrians entering the U.S. in April 2020
declined by 79 percent compared to April 2019, from 4.3 million to about
900,000. By December 2020, personal vehicle passenger and pedestrian
volumes were 59 percent and 61 percent below 2019 levels, respectively.
Compared to passenger volumes, cargo truck volumes declined less
sharply and recovered more quickly. Specifically, the number of loaded
cargo truck containers entering the U.S. declined 34 percent, from about
766,000 in April 2019 to 506,000 in April 2020. After similar declines in
May, trade volumes increased over the summer, reaching 10 percent
28Air travel restrictions in place as of March 2020 included presidential proclamations
limiting travel to the U.S. from China, the Schengen Area of Europe, the United Kingdom,
and Iran.
Page 28 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
below 2019 levels in June 2020 and surpassing 2019 levels in December
2020.
OFO managers at land and sea ports of entry said the lower traveler
volumes allowed them to conduct additional inbound and outbound
enforcement operations. For instance, managers we spoke with said that
because additional personnel were available due to declines in traveler
volumes, they were able to redeploy those personnel to outbound
enforcement and mobile strike teams inspecting trucks and airplanes.
OFO managers at one land port of entry said that early in the pandemic
they increased outbound enforcement, resulting in an 80 percent increase
in outbound seizures from February to March 2020. OFO managers at
another land port of entry told us they were committing more resources to
enforcement activity than before the pandemic, resulting in historic levels
of marijuana, narcotics, and gun seizures. Similarly, after cruise ship
travel was halted by CDC’s No Sail Order in March 2020, officials at one
seaport said they increased enforcement by performing more inspections
of private vessels and low-risk cargo containers, among other things.
In addition to shifting officers to different tasks within their own ports of
entry, OFO detailed officers to supplement Border Patrol operations.
Specifically, in response to a request from Border Patrol for additional
resources, OFO asked for volunteers from ports of entry around the
country to deploy to the Laredo and Rio Grande Valley Border Patrol
sectors in Texas, resulting in two deployments totaling about 1,200
officers and supervisors. Rio Grande Valley sector officials we spoke with
said that CBP officers were detailed to the sector to backfill for Border
Patrol agents unavailable due to COVID-19 quarantine protocols. The first
deployment from August to October 2020 was comprised of CBP officers
from airports, while the second deployment from October to December
2020 included officers from land and sea ports as well, according to
Border Patrol field officials. The officials said that tasks conducted by
deployed CBP officers included serving as spotters monitoring high-traffic
areas along the border, and assisting Border Patrol immigration
checkpoint operations by searching vehicles, operating x-ray machines,
and reviewing travelers’ documents. In addition, some Border Patrol
sectors coordinated locally with ports of entry for officers to supplement
their operations. For example, Swanton Border Patrol sector managers
said they received officer detailees from nearby ports of entry that did not
have traffic to process because the Canadian ports of entry had closed
during the pandemic.
Page 29 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Local Airports Quickly On March 11, 2020 the Trump administration announced presidential
Developed Plans to proclamations restricting air travel from Europe that went into effect on
March 13, 2020.
Implement Travel
Restrictions Developing air travel screening procedures. OFO officials at all three
U.S. airports we spoke with told us that they coordinated with airport
operators to quickly develop plans to implement the presidential
proclamations restricting travel from Europe. This was due to the short
time between the issuance of the proclamations and the date they went
into effect. All three airport operators we spoke with said they did not
have sufficient guidance from CBP during the 2 days between the
issuance and implementation of the travel restrictions. Specifically, one
operator said that the day before the travel restrictions went into effect,
local CBP and CDC officials had publicly available information about the
travel restrictions but did not yet have guidance from CBP headquarters
to use for planning purposes. As a result, the airport developed its own
plan to implement the restrictions, including separating higher-risk and
lower-risk travelers, and bringing in contracted staff to manage the flow of
travelers. The operator said that the local CBP officials ultimately received
guidance from CBP headquarters one hour before the restrictions took
effect. OFO airport managers said they worked to keep travelers and
OFO personnel safe, considering they received information on the travel
restrictions at the same time as the general public.
At airports across the U.S., local CBP and CDC officials coordinated with
airport operators to implement COVID-19 screening processes for
travelers arriving from presidential proclamation countries based on the
unique characteristics of each airport, according to airport operators and
CBP officials we spoke with. For example, at Chicago O’Hare
International Airport, local CBP officials and airport operators developed a
method to separate travelers from presidential proclamation countries
from travelers arriving from lower-risk countries. Specifically, CBP
managers at O’Hare said that due to the design of the international
arrivals terminal, operators were able to designate one side of the
terminal for flights from presidential proclamation countries, and the other
side for flights arriving from other countries. Each side of the terminal led
to a separate screening area, reducing the risk of travelers from higher-
risk countries potentially transmitting the virus to travelers from lower-risk
countries.
At both JFK Airport and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (Sea-Tac),
local CBP and airport officials developed a different approach to
screening international travelers, meeting flights from presidential
Page 30 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
proclamation countries at the gate prior to CBP processing. Specifically,
OFO officials at JFK airport told us that after learning about the travel
restrictions from Europe at the same time as the general public, local
OFO and CDC officials met all flights arriving directly from Europe at the
gate. If these officials identified travelers exhibiting COVID-19 symptoms,
they took these travelers to an alternate location for additional screening
by CDC. These health screenings prevented travelers arriving from
presidential proclamation countries from interacting with other
international travelers during the screening process, and helped maintain
normal wait times for screening, according to the officials. Similarly, OFO
managers at Sea-Tac told us that CDC officials met higher-risk flights, as
determined by CDC officials, at the gate for temperature checks before
travelers interacted with CBP officers.
Local CBP and CDC officials also coordinated to identify individuals that
required additional health screening, starting with the travel restrictions
from China in January 2020. For example, they asked travelers questions
about their travel history, and if they identified an issue they referred the
traveler for secondary screening, according to airport operators and OFO
officials. If a traveler appeared to be ill on a flight, CDC officials met them
at the gate and escorted them to a screening area to determine the issue.
In secondary screening, CDC officials in dedicated rooms took travelers’
temperatures and asked them additional questions. Based on the results
of the temperature screening and answers to these questions, a CDC
official would then determine if the traveler needed to be quarantined,
according to OFO officials.
Challenges implementing travel restrictions. Difficulty implementing
travel restrictions and related health and safety measures resulted in
major delays at one U.S. airport in March 2020. As it began implementing
air travel restrictions following the presidential proclamations, CBP used
its Automated Targeting System to assist the ports in identifying travelers
who could potentially pose a public health risk based on recent travel in
presidential proclamation countries. 29 Specifically, the Automated
Targeting System placed an “alert” on travelers arriving in the U.S. from
presidential proclamation countries. When an officer scanned a traveler’s
passport during primary processing, the system notified the officer if the
traveler may have traveled in one of these countries, according to OFO
29CBP’s Automated Targeting System is a web-based enforcement tool used to collect,
analyze, and disseminate information to help identify potential terrorists, transnational
criminals, and other travelers who may need additional scrutiny when attempting to enter
the U.S.
Page 31 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
officials. OFO officials at O’Hare said that on March 14, 2020—the first
full day travel restrictions from Europe were in effect—there were
significant delays in processing travelers because CBP required officers
with special access to its Automated Targeting System to individually
“clear” every traveler arriving from a presidential proclamation country. To
clear these travelers, officers referred them to secondary processing for
additional inspection before CDC screening. OFO managers at O’Hare
said that because a limited number of officers had access to the system
to clear travelers for entry, processing times increased from the typical
30-60 seconds to more than 5 minutes per traveler. 30 As a result of these
delays, there were thousands of travelers waiting in the Federal
Inspection Service area for hours without access to food, water, or
bathrooms, according to airport and CBP officials. 31
OFO managers at O’Hare told us they were not aware that every traveler
arriving from a presidential proclamation country would have an alert in
the Automated Targeting System. Following the delays in processing that
occurred on March 14, OFO officials at O’Hare told us they worked with
the National Targeting Center to get every airport officer access to the
system. They also requested that the National Targeting Center not place
alerts on travelers arriving directly from presidential proclamation
countries because CDC was automatically screening all travelers on
those flights. These fixes were in place on March 15, 2020, and although
a greater number of travelers arrived from presidential proclamation
countries on that day, wait times were significantly lower according to
OFO managers at O’Hare. In a statement on March 15, 2020, the acting
CBP Commissioner said that CBP increased staffing at all airports
receiving travelers from presidential proclamation countries to help
process travelers, and refined the screening process, which helped
reduce wait times.
OFO headquarters officials told us that on March 14, 2020, while an
insufficient number of officers at O’Hare were able to clear passengers for
entry, leading to major delays, it was an isolated incident not experienced
at other airports. In addition, they said that after initial implementation of
30In addition, OFO headquarters officials said that between August 2019 and May 2020,
OFO introduced a new technology solution for processing travelers at airports,
representing a change in the system officers used for managing referrals for secondary
inspection. They said that there were not enough officers trained in that system working at
O’Hare that day, contributing to delays.
31The Federal Inspection Service area is a secure area of the airport where CBP inspects
travelers applying for admission to the U.S. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a); 19 C.F.R. § 122-181.
Page 32 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
presidential proclamations at airports, OFO field offices identified and
shared best practices. For example, they said that at JFK Airport, they
paired CDC officials in booths with CBP officers to check temperatures
and complete enhanced entry health screenings while officers asked
questions about travel history and completed passport screening to
facilitate faster screening of travelers.
Another challenge implementing the travel restrictions was identifying
travelers who entered the U.S. on a flight from a non-presidential
proclamation country but had recently traveled in a presidential
proclamation country, according to OFO officials. 32 CBP made efforts to
mitigate the potential health risk posed by these individuals interacting in
the airport with other travelers. For example, OFO headquarters officials
said that CBP attempted to identify these travelers using its Automated
Targeting System. 33 OFO officials said that officers also attempted to
identify these individuals by asking travelers about their travel history as
part of the primary inspection process.
OFO headquarters officials told us that some airports were better
equipped to separate travelers who recently traveled in a presidential
proclamation country but arrived on a flight from a non-presidential
proclamation country. They said this was due to local conditions, such as
the layout and size of the airport. As a result, they said, some airports
were able to screen these travelers plane-side for indications of COVID-
19, while other airports were not able to. For example, OFO field officials
said that at Sea-Tac CDC officials would meet the travelers plane-side to
screen them for COVID-19 symptoms prior to allowing them to enter the
Federal Inspection Service area. However, at other airports CBP officers
would refer these travelers for CDC screening after primary inspection,
according to OFO field officials.
After the CDC ended enhanced entry health screening in September
2020, OFO largely returned air traveler processing to pre-COVID-19
procedures, according to OFO officials. For example, while OFO and its
32For example, this would include an individual who traveled from Wuhan to Tokyo, and
from Tokyo to Seattle within a few days.
33When the Automated Targeting System identified individuals who had recently traveled
in a presidential proclamation country, CBP notified the airline and the airline denied the
individual permission to board a flight to the U.S., unless they were a U.S. citizen or legal
resident, or met another exception, such as international students, according to OFO
headquarters officials.
Page 33 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
airport partners had been separating travelers arriving from presidential
proclamation countries from other travelers for CDC health screening, this
practice stopped when enhanced entry health screenings ceased. OFO
airport officials told us that, as was the case prior to the pandemic, CBP
refers passengers to the CDC for an assessment if they appear to be ill. 34
According to CDC guidance, CBP officers are to provide written and
verbal information to travelers about health precautions related to COVID-
19.
Land Ports of Entry On March 20, 2020, OFO began to assist the CDC in implementing its
Implemented Essential order under Title 42 of the U.S. Code limiting entry at land ports of entry
to essential travel. 35 While the restrictions do not apply to U.S. citizens or
Travel Restrictions
lawful permanent residents, other visitors must meet certain criteria as
outlined in the guidance, such as those traveling for education, business,
or medical reasons. 36
Union officials representing OFO employees, and some OFO field
officials we spoke with, told us that initially some officers found the
guidance for essential travel to be confusing and loosely defined. For
example, officers at one land port of entry told us that officers did not
know how to define essential travel, and said officers were granting entry
to travelers crossing to get fast food, as it could be considered travel to
procure food, which is essential. As the pandemic continued, OFO issued
updated guidance for defining essential travel. For example, updated
guidance in May 2020 explained that mail pickup is only essential if it is
for a necessary item, such as prescription medication. The updated
guidance also explained that travel to the U.S. for food and fuel is not
considered essential if it is readily available across the border in Canada
or Mexico.
34Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, CBP had processes in place for recognizing and
responding to travelers potentially infected with an infectious disease. In addition, prior to
the COVID-19 pandemic, CBP had guidance for responding to infectious diseases, such
as job hazard analyses and PPE assessments, that it had previously developed for other
emerging infectious diseases (such as Ebola, Pandemic Influenza, and Zika Virus).
35See 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (Mar. 26, 2020); see
also, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 13, 2020).
36CBP guidance defines essential travel as U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents
returning to the U.S.; individuals traveling for medical purposes, to attend educational
institutions, to work in the U.S., or for emergency response and public health purposes;
individuals engaged in lawful cross-border trade; individuals engaged in official
government travel or diplomatic travel; and members of the U.S. Armed Forces and their
families, among other conditions.
Page 34 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Using the essential travel guidance, officers said they stopped individuals
attempting to enter the country using fraudulent documents. For example,
officers at one southern border land port of entry said they saw an
increase in individuals using fraudulent medical documents to attempt to
cross the border, since CBP guidance states that travel to the U.S. for
medical procedures is considered essential. The officers said they
examine the documents and try to confirm whether the story is credible,
such as by following up with medical providers.
Border Patrol Shifted Its Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, Border Patrol encounters declined
Deployment Strategy to slightly, and then increased above 2018 and 2019 levels as Border Patrol
processed growing numbers of Title 42 expulsions under the CDC order,
Deploy Personnel Closer as shown in figure 6. 37 Overall, however, 2020 encounters increased 8
to the Border percent over 2018 levels, 38 after a 71 percent increase in 2019 driven by
historic migration flows on the southwest border. In April 2020, the first full
month after the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a
pandemic, Border Patrol encounters declined 47 percent, from nearly
31,000 the previous month to about 16,000. However, starting in May
2020, encounters increased steadily, reaching nearly 71,000 in December
2020, with expulsions under Title 42 authority making up the
overwhelming majority of encounters. Specifically, from April to December
2020, 89 percent of all Border Patrol encounters resulted in expulsions
under Title 42 authority, while 11 percent were apprehensions processed
under CBP’s Title 8 immigration authority.
37Border Patrol encounters include both Title 8 apprehensions and Title 42 expulsions.
Title 8 apprehensions are immigration enforcement actions processed under CBP’s
immigration authority in Title 8 of the U.S. Code. Beginning in March 2020 pursuant to the
Centers of Disease Control and Prevention’s March 2020 order and interim final rule
prohibiting the introduction of foreign nationals into the U.S. who are subject to the order.
See 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (Mar. 26, 2020); see also,
e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 13, 2020). In assisting CDC with implementing the CDC
Order, CBP is operating pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 268(b), aiding CDC in the enforcement of
its authority pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 265, 42 C.F.R. § 71.40.
38Unprecedented migration flows on the southwest border in 2019 led to a 71 percent
increase in enforcement actions. Apprehensions in fiscal year 2019 were the highest since
fiscal year 2007, driven primarily by migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
and an increase in asylum seekers and those escaping violence and domestic insecurity.
Page 35 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Figure 6: Monthly Border Patrol Encounters, Northern and Southwest Borders,
2018-2020
Note: Border Patrol encounters include both Title 8 apprehensions and expulsions under the CDC
Order. Title 8 apprehensions are immigration enforcement actions processed under U.S. Customs
and Border Protection’s immigration authority. On March 13, 2020 the Trump administration declared
the COVID-19 outbreak a national emergency. Beginning in March 2020, Border Patrol began
expulsions to the country of last transit or home country in the interest of public health under Title 42
pursuant to the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention’s March 2020 order and interim final rule
prohibiting the introduction of foreign nationals into the U.S. who are subject to the order. See 85 Fed.
Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (Mar. 26, 2020); see also, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg.
65,806 (Oct. 13, 2020). In assisting CDC with implementing the CDC Order, CBP is operating
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 268(b), aiding CDC in the enforcement of its authority pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 265, 42 C.F.R. § 71.40
As part of its response to the COVID-19 pandemic, on March 13, 2020
Border Patrol issued guidance instructing sectors to operate as closely to
the physical border as practical to intercept individuals who could be
infected with COVID-19, before potentially exposing the U.S. public. As a
result, some Border Patrol sectors modified their interior operations, such
as limiting the resources at immigration checkpoints, and nonessential
activities, such as community engagement programs, to focus resources
on the border.
Page 36 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
For example, in one sector we spoke with, managers at two different
stations said that they suspended checkpoint operations because
checkpoints were no longer a priority and they lacked the resources to
operate them while focusing resources directly on the border. On the
other hand, some sectors were able to leverage the reduced traffic at the
start of the pandemic to both patrol the border and increase other
operations. For instance, managers at one sector said the reduced
vehicular traffic associated with stay-at-home orders enabled them to
conduct 24/7 checkpoint operations for the first time in 10 years, resulting
in them interdicting numerous human smuggling events. However, they
said that as traffic later began to increase, they could no longer operate
the checkpoint continuously.
Border Patrol also encountered a shifting operational environment during
the pandemic. For example, the noncitizens crossing the border between
ports of entry have shifted from primarily family units or unaccompanied
children from Central America before the pandemic to primarily single
adults from Mexico during the pandemic. 39 Furthermore, the groups
primarily crossing the border before the pandemic actively sought out
Border Patrol agents to request asylum, according to Border Patrol
officials. However, they said the single adults crossing the border during
the pandemic have placed additional strain on Border Patrol personnel
because most have tried to evade Border Patrol so agents have had to
chase them.
CBP Utilized Title 42 Assisting with the enforcement of the CDC order under Title 42 authority
Authorities to Expedite significantly impacted Border Patrol operations by allowing agents to
quickly expel apprehended individuals at a nearby port of entry,
Expulsion of Apprehended
sometimes in less than an hour, according to station managers that we
Individuals during the
COVID-19 Pandemic
39CBP’s October 2015 National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search
defines a “family unit” to include one or more non-U.S. citizen juvenile(s) accompanied by
their parent(s) or legal guardian(s). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines an
“unaccompanied alien child” (referred to as “unaccompanied children) as a child who (A)
has no lawful immigration status in the U.S.; (B) has not attained 18 years of age; and (C)
with respect to whom—(i) there is no parent or legal guardian in the U.S.; or (ii) no parent
or legal guardian in the U.S. is available to provide care and physical custody. 6 U.S.C. §
279(g)(2).
Page 37 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
spoke with. 40 Prior to the issuance of the CDC order allowing rapid
expulsion under Title 42 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, agents brought
apprehended individuals into the station for processing, including
fingerprinting and interviews. Under Title 42, however, agents have
processed apprehended individuals in the field when possible—
specifically, collecting biometrics and biographical information and
checking for criminal and immigration records—according to Border
Patrol field officials. Managers at one Border Patrol sector we spoke with
said expulsions under Title 42 have made agents’ jobs easier because
more agents can be on the front lines rather than spending time
completing paperwork or otherwise processing apprehended individuals.
Specifically, prior to the ability to quickly expel apprehended individuals
under Title 42, they told us that up to 40 percent of frontline personnel
would be processing and overseeing detention and transport of
apprehended individuals at any given time. In contrast, they said
expulsions under Title 42 have allowed for more capacity to focus on
enforcement, which in turn increases the chances of interdicting anyone
crossing the border illegally.
While Border Patrol expels the vast majority of apprehended individuals
using Title 42 authority immediately through land ports of entry, they hold
a small percentage for repatriation flights. According to Border Patrol
headquarters officials, certain individuals are ineligible for immediate
expulsion at a land port of entry based on their nationality, and therefore
40See 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559 (Mar. 24, 2020); 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (Mar. 26, 2020); see
also, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. 65,806 (Oct. 13, 2020). In assisting CDC with implementing the
CDC Order, CBP is operating pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 268(b), aiding CDC in the
enforcement of its authority pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 265, 42 C.F.R. § 71.40. According to
Border Patrol guidance, an individual may not be expelled under Title 42 if they are
present in the Terrorist Screening Database; have been convicted of a Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude, an aggravated felony, or a non-immigration felony; or are injured. These
individuals would instead generally by processed under Border Patrol’s enforcement
authorities under Title 8, which could include being placed into removal proceedings and
referred for criminal prosecution, as appropriate.
Page 38 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
may be expelled via a flight to their country of citizenship. 41 Generally,
only citizens of Spanish-speaking countries are eligible for expulsion to
Mexico at land ports of entry, according to Border Patrol headquarters
officials. 42 About 8 percent of Title 42 expulsions have been through
repatriation flights, as opposed to through land ports of entry, through
December 2020. Border Patrol headquarters officials said they typically
have multiple repatriation flights daily to different countries up to 6 days
per week, but that they may need to hold individuals from certain
countries up to 72 hours or longer until the next available flight to that
country.
Border Patrol officials we spoke with had varied opinions on expulsions
under Title 42 and the balance between enforcement and employee
safety. For example, officials in each of the four sectors we spoke with
said that expulsions under Title 42 resulted in less risk of exposure to
COVID-19 for Border Patrol personnel because of the substantial
decrease in the amount of time apprehended individuals were in custody.
On the other hand, Border Patrol union officials acknowledged that Title
42 has been a helpful resource for agents and has saved lives by
reducing exposure to COVID-19. However, they added that quickly
expelling apprehended individuals limits Border Patrol’s ability to conduct
contact tracing and take preventive measures, such as by applying CBP
guidance and quarantining as appropriate because they lose the ability to
trace an outbreak back to an apprehended individual.
Border Patrol officials also indicated that expulsions under Title 42 have
negatively affected enforcement by reducing opportunities to gather
intelligence. For instance, field officials at two sectors we spoke with said
that by processing apprehended individuals in the field and quickly
41While the U.S. has repatriation agreements allowing air expulsions under Title 42
authorities to 10 countries: Brazil, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Nicaragua, officials told us it is currently
only conducting direct expulsions to Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Ecuador, and
Mexico due to the Northern Triangle, Nicaraguan, and Brazilian governments’ COVID-19
testing stipulations. According to CBP guidance, individuals on repatriation flights must be
medically cleared for travel, must have made an affirmative claim to country of citizenship,
and must not have made an affirmative, spontaneous and reasonably believable claim
that they fear torture in the country they are being sent back to. The guidance also states
that family units should not be separated.
42According to Border Patrol officials, there may be local agreements enabling expulsion
of certain individuals to Mexico from non-Spanish-speaking countries from certain
locations in the U.S. For example, they said Border Patrol has been able to expel some
Haitians with legal status granted by the Mexican government through a land port of entry,
but only from the San Diego sector.
Page 39 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
expelling them, agents are unable to thoroughly interview individuals in
custody about organizations and smugglers operating in the area. For
example, one sector manager cited two instances in which agents
apprehended groups of individuals and expelled them immediately under
Title 42, limiting the opportunity to gather information on illegal activity.
Prior to being able to expel individuals under Title 42, they said, each
subject would have been interviewed and, if possible, prosecuted.
Officials in all four sectors we spoke with, as well as Border Patrol union
officials, told us that they are unable to prosecute as many individuals as
they did in the past due to reduced capacity in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices,
COVID-19 safety precautions, or CBP’s assistance in enforcing the CDC
order under Title 42. According to Border Patrol guidance, agents should
only consider individuals who are not eligible for expulsion under Title 42,
or would otherwise be considered a high risk for the population (including
aggravated felons, 43 relations to terrorism, or agent assaults, among
others) for prosecution. 44 Station managers we spoke with said that due
to limited resources at the U.S. Attorney’s Office, immigration courts, and
U.S. Marshals, there are many cases in which individuals would normally
be prosecuted, but during the pandemic the cases are not being pursued.
Agents at those stations added that given limited prosecutorial resources,
even if a case meets the criteria for prosecution, prosecutions must still
be approved by senior management. Agents at another station we spoke
with said that a significant decrease in prosecutions for illegal entry has
been a side effect of safety precautions during the pandemic. 45
Specifically, they said that collecting the necessary information to support
prosecution requires extended exposure to individuals potentially infected
with COVID-19, which agents have been instructed to avoid.
Finally, both Border Patrol and OFO field officials told us that recidivism of
apprehended individuals expelled under of Title 42 has increased, in part
due to restrictions on the number of prosecutions. For example, the
43Aggravated circumstances could include endangerment to individuals being smuggled,
for example, such as being confined in a truck or toolbox from which they are unable to
escape, according to field officials.
44In accordance with Border Patrol guidance, for individuals who are ineligible be
processed under Title 42, agents are to generally process those individuals under Border
Patrol’s enforcement authorities under Title 8, which could include being placed into
removal proceedings and referred for criminal prosecution, as appropriate.
45The criminal offense of illegal entry, which is generally a misdemeanor offense, is
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1325.
Page 40 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
recidivism rate along the Mexican border increased from 7 percent in
fiscal year 2019 to 26 percent in fiscal year 2020, and 34 percent for the
first quarter of fiscal year 2021. 46 Agents we spoke with said there was a
lack of consequence or punishment for illegal entry beyond expulsions,
resulting in some individuals trying to cross the border multiple times per
day since they were not being prosecuted. Border Patrol officials in
headquarters and the field said that repatriation flights under Title 42
effectively decrease recidivism. However, agents in one sector noted that
resuming the flights during the pandemic resulted in prolonged contact
between agents and detainees, and station officials said the flights sent a
conflicting message to agents on health and safety.
In addition to Border Patrol, OFO assisted in enforcing the CDC’s order
under Title 42 at ports of entry, though to a more limited extent.
Specifically, from March 2020 through December 2020, OFO expelled
about 17,000 individuals under Title 42, while Border Patrol expelled
about 381,000 during that time period. OFO officials said that expulsions
under Title 42 brought public health benefits by helping to limit the spread
of COVID-19 in CBP facilities. For example, they said when individuals
attempt to illegally enter the U.S. at a port of entry, an officer could rapidly
expel them back across the border under Title 42. The officials said that
previously an officer would have had to take the apprehended individual
to secondary processing, which could put OFO personnel at risk of
exposure.
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. The
Agency Comments department did not provide formal written comments, but did provide
technical comments on the draft, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and other interested
parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO
website at www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for
46The recidivism rate refers to the percentage of individuals apprehended more than one
time by the Border Patrol within a fiscal year.
Page 41 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made significant
contributions to this report are listed in appendix I.
Rebecca Gambler
Director,
Homeland Security and Justice
Page 42 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
List of Committees
The Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Ron Wyden
Chairman
The Honorable Mike Crapo
Ranking Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
The Honorable Richard Burr
Ranking Member
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
United States Senate
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chair
The Honorable Rob Portman
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro
Chairwoman
The Honorable Kay Granger
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Republican Leader
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
Page 43 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
The Honorable John Katko
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable James Comer
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Richard E. Neal
Chairman
The Honorable Kevin Brady
Republican Leader
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives
Page 44 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov
GAO Contact
In addition to the contact named above, Adam Hoffman (Assistant
Staff Director), Miriam Hill (Analyst-in-Charge), Kelsey Burdick, Kelsey
Acknowledgments Carpenter, Eric Hauswirth, Daniel Kuhn, Ron La Due Lake, Grant Mallie,
and Heidi Nielson made key contributions to this report.
(104399)
Page 45 GAO-21-431 CBP's COVID-19 Response
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