Opinion — United States v. Lucas, No. 23-20602 (5th Cir., Document 124-1, April 18, 2025)
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An opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States of America v. William Dexter Lucas, No. 23-20602, Document 124-1, filed April 18, 2025, on appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The opinion by Circuit Judge Douglas states that Lucas fraudulently obtained small-business loans from the government and vehicle loans from private institutions and waived the right to appeal in a guilty plea for conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud. Lucas challenges two aspects of the restitution order, one on vehicle loans and one for social security benefits. The court affirms the restitution award for the vehicle loans, vacates the Social Security Administration restitution award, and denies the pending motion to dismiss as moot.
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“Opinion — United States v. Lucas, No. 23-20602 (5th Cir., Document 124-1, April 18, 2025).”
Original at www.ca5.uscourts.gov. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/case-ca5-23-20602-u-s-v-lucas-opinion-2025-04-18-41b97eb895/
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Case: 23-20602 Document: 124-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/18/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
No. 23-20602 April 18, 2025
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
William Dexter Lucas,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:20-CR-452-1
______________________________
Before Richman, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Dana M. Douglas, Circuit Judge:
This case pertains to Appellant William Dexter Lucas’s involvement
in various schemes through which he fraudulently obtained small-business
loans from the government and vehicle loans from private institutions. As
part of his guilty plea for conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, Lucas
waived his right to appeal. In addition to detailing the schemes regarding
Lucas’s defrauding of private institutions charged in his indictment, Lucas’s
presentence investigation report (“PSR”) discussed allegedly fraudulent
social security benefits he had been receiving. At sentencing, the district
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No. 23-20602
court ordered Lucas to pay restitution to both the private institutions and the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”).
Lucas now appeals his sentence, challenging two aspects of his
restitution order. First, he challenges the restitution award for his fraudulent
vehicle loans, arguing that it was ordered to the wrong victim and incorrectly
calculated. Second, he challenges the restitution award for the social security
benefits, arguing that he was entitled to the benefits and that this alleged
fraud was not part of the same scheme as the offenses in his indictment. We
AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part.
I
In early 2000, Bill Lucas met and married Diane Corpian, whose son
is Brian Corpian. When Lucas and Diane separated, Lucas started a
relationship with Deborah Lucas, whom he later married in 2006. After
Diane passed in 2014, Lucas—who claimed he was still married to Diane—
took ownership of Diane’s house at 20134 Larkspur Landing, Richmond.
Lucas, Deborah, and Brian all lived there. The house was also the listed
address for Jesus Survives Ministries (“JSM”), a registered corporation
organized for non-profit purposes with Lucas as the President, Brian as the
Vice President and Secretary, and Deborah as the Registered Agent. Despite
both Lucas and Deborah holding themselves out as JSM pastors, JSM held
no meetings nor any congregational/pastoral services.
Between 2017 and 2020, Lucas, Deborah, and Brian made false
statements and used false documents regarding JSM to fraudulently obtain
car loans and loans from the Small Business Administration. An initial nine-
count indictment was issued in September 2020, charging the three of them
with conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, making false statements to a
bank, and committing wire fraud. A superseding indictment, filed in April
2022, added more counts and offenses, including money laundering and
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making false statements to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). In
November 2022, a second superseding indictment was filed, which included
all the charges from the previous indictments, with additional counts of
witness tampering. 1
As alleged in the indictment, and included in the plea agreement, the
specific fraudulent activities Lucas engaged in were as follows: (1) Between
February 2017 and May 2020, Lucas, along with Deborah and Brian, made
false statements regarding their payroll from JSM while submitting car loan
applications to banks or financial lenders at multiple car dealerships; (2)
Between March and April 2020, Lucas made false certifications about JSM’s
gross revenue on applications for Economic Injury Disaster Loans
(“EIDL”) to the Small Business Administration; (3) In April 2020, Lucas
applied for Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans and included in the
applications false statements about JSM’s payroll and other activities; (4)
Between February and May 2020, Lucas filed, and caused Brian to file, false
reports to the FTC claiming that the debts associated with his car loans were
due to him being a victim of identity theft; and (5) In July and August 2020,
Lucas drafted false affidavits (claiming that Brian falsified documents and
applied for the PPP loans and EIDL without Lucas’s knowledge), directed
Brian to sign the affidavits, and assisted Brian with fleeing to California to
avoid testifying in the case against them.
In December 2022, Lucas pleaded guilty to count one: conspiracy to
commit bank and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. As part of the
_____________________
1
The final list of criminal counts is: (1) conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud
(count 1); (2) eight counts of false statements to banks (counts 2, 9–15); (3) ten counts of
wire fraud (counts 4–8, 16–20); (4) money laundering (count 21); (5) three counts of false
statements to the FTC (counts 22–24); (6) and three counts of tampering with a witness,
victim, or informant (counts 25–28). The second superseding indictment also contained a
notice of criminal forfeiture.
3
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agreement, Lucas expressly waived his right to appeal his conviction,
sentence, or restitution. Regarding restitution, Lucas agreed “to pay full
restitution to the victim regardless of the count of conviction.” He further
agreed “that as a result of his criminal conduct, the victim incurred a
monetary loss of at least $50,000” and that “the Court will determine the
amount of restitution to fully compensate the victim.”
Lucas’s various fraudulent schemes were discussed in detail in the
PSR. In addition to the schemes discussed above, the PSR discussed an
additional fraud perpetrated by Lucas against the SSA that was discovered
in early 2023 and not included in any of the indictments or the plea
agreement. Since 2018, Lucas had been receiving widow disability benefits
based on his marriage to Diane. Lucas applied for the benefits in February
2018, four years after Diane’s death. As part of the application, Lucas
claimed that he was previously married to Diane and that he was not
currently married. The PSR explained that Lucas was not qualified to
receive the widow disability benefits because he had remarried Deborah.
The PSR calculated restitution amounts that Lucas was responsible
for regarding each of the above-mentioned schemes, with the total amount of
actual loss being $410,950.81. Lucas objected to various aspects of the PSR.
In relevant part, he objected to the vehicle loans restitution calculation,
arguing that (1) the dealerships themselves did not suffer any harm because
the loans were funded by financial institutions that were not named as
victims, and (2) all but one of the vehicles were returned, so the fair market
value of those vehicles should not have been included in any loss calculation.
He also objected to the inclusion of the SSA fraud, claiming that he was
entitled to the widow disability benefits and that, in any event, this conduct
could not be included in the restitution order because it was not part of the
same fraud or common scheme alleged in the operative indictment.
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The district court addressed Lucas’s various objections during
sentencing. On the vehicle loans fraud, the district court agreed with Lucas
that if the victims “went on to sell certain vehicles and reduced the amount
that they were out on the loan,” then it was appropriate to take that into
account when calculating restitution. The court gave probation time to
recalculate the proper restitution amounts. After assisting with the
recalculation, Lucas’s counsel agreed with the new restitution amount
announced by probation. Lucas’s counsel never raised the issue of whether
the dealerships were proper victims during sentencing.
On the SSA fraud, however, the district court overruled Lucas’s
objections. It first found that Lucas’s statement to the SSA that he was “not
married now” on his 2018 application for benefits was fraudulent because he
was married to Deborah at the time. The court further explained that
determining whether conduct is part of the same scheme depends on the
“level of generality,” and here, the SSA fraud was part of the same conduct
as the fraud alleged in the indictment because they both involved “false
submission to government entities for government benefits.”
Ultimately, the district court ordered restitution totaling $286,359.14
and sentenced Lucas to 97 months in prison. Lucas now appeals, challenging
several aspects of the restitution order. 2
II
We review de novo whether an appeal waiver bars an appeal. United
States v. Leal, 933 F.3d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 2019). If an appeal is not barred by
the waiver, we review legal questions related to the restitution order and the
_____________________
2
On June 28, 2024, the Government moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by the
appeal waiver. The motion’s panel ordered the motion to be carried with the case and
expressed no opinion on the merits of the Government’s appeal waiver argument.
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methods of calculation de novo. United States v. King, 93 F.4th 845, 850 (5th
Cir. 2024). The amount of restitution is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Id. Moreover, we review any factual findings made by the district court in
determining the loss and restitution amounts for clear error. United States v.
Matthew, 916 F.3d 510, 515 (5th Cir. 2019). But, where a defendant failed to
preserve an objection in the district court, we review for plain error. United
States v. Kasali, 111 F.4th 637, 648 (5th Cir. 2024).
III
On appeal, Lucas challenges the restitution awards to the SSA for the
widow disability benefits and to the car dealerships for the fraudulent vehicle
loans. He raises four claims. For the SSA benefits, Lucas argues that the
district court erred in awarding the SSA restitution because (1) his conduct
concerning the SSA was not part of the same conspiracy or scheme as
described in the indictment, and (2) he was entitled to the widow disability
benefits. For the vehicle loans, Lucas argues that (3) the dealerships were
not entitled to restitution because they are not victims under the statute, and
(4) the district court miscalculated the amount of restitution owed to the
dealerships.
Lucas contends that these challenges are not barred by his appeal
waiver because they fall within the exception for challenges to a sentence that
exceeds the statutory maximum. The Government asserts that the appeal
waiver forecloses Lucas’s claims entirely, and it also disputes his challenges
on the merits. We address each issue in turn.
IV
To begin, an overview of the legal landscape for the interaction
between appeal waivers and restitution orders is pertinent.
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Though defendants are generally free to waive their appeal rights, we
have held that “an otherwise valid appeal waiver is not enforceable to bar a
defendant’s challenge on appeal that his sentence, including the amount of a
restitution order, exceeds the statutory maximum.” United States v. Kim,
988 F.3d 803, 811 (5th Cir. 2021). That said, this exception is not an “appeal-
authorizing escape hatch.” United States v. Meredith, 52 F.4th 984, 987 (5th
Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. Bond, 414 F.3d 542, 546 (5th Cir. 2005)).
Rather, it only permits an appeal when the district court exceeds “the upper
limit of punishment that Congress has legislatively specified for violations of
a statute.” Id. (quoting Bond, 414 F.3d at 546). Therefore, when a defendant
invokes the exceeds-the-statutory-maximum exception to circumvent an
appeal waiver, courts must carefully “consider[] the relevant statute” to
determine whether the challenge properly falls within the exception. United
States v. Reinhart, No. 22-10103, 2023 WL 5346053, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 16,
2023). Moreover, because appeal waivers are not jurisdictional, the court
may pretermit consideration of that issue if it disagrees on the merits of the
defendant’s claim. United States v. Borino, 123 F.4th 233, 239 n.1 (5th Cir.
2024) (collecting cases).
In recent years, we have analyzed the relationship between appeal
waivers and restitution imposed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act (“MVRA”) and the Victim Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”).
Regarding the latter, in Meredith, the defendant pleaded guilty to securities
fraud and waived his right to appeal any “monetary penalty or obligation.”
52 F.4th at 986. The district court ordered approximately $6.8 million in
restitution under the VWPA, which the defendant appealed, arguing that the
restitution award exceeded the statutory maximum. Id. The panel held that
the appeal was barred by the waiver. Id. at 987. It explained that under the
VWPA, the district court could order any restitution “to the extent agreed
to by the parties in a plea agreement.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting 18
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U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3)). Thus, because the defendant agreed in his plea deal to
an unspecified amount of restitution, to be determined by the district court,
the maximum restitution permitted by statute was any amount the district
court ordered. Id. (“[H]aving agreed to let the district court handle the
arithmetic, [the defendant] cannot now complain about how the numbers
shook out.”)
On the other hand, the MVRA places “statutory limits on restitution
awards” that the VWPA does not. Id. at 987 n.1. To illustrate, in Reinhart,
the district court ordered the defendant to pay roughly $40 million in
restitution under the MVRA for wire fraud. 2023 WL 5346053, at *1. The
defendant had waived his appeal rights but then challenged the restitution
award as being based on conduct for which he was not responsible. Id. at *2.
In upholding the defendant’s right to appeal, the panel noted that, although
the MVRA grants district courts discretion in calculating the value of a
victim’s loss, “the district court does not have authority to order
restitution at all” under the statute “unless the loss was directly and
proximately caused by the defendant’s offense of conviction.” Id. at *4
(emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Sharma, 703 F.3d 318, 323
(5th Cir. 2012)); see 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1)–(2). The panel distinguished
between challenges to a district court’s valuation of the loss (which the
appeal waiver bars) and challenges to the court’s authority to award
restitution for that loss in the first place (which is not barred). Id. Put
differently, a defendant can avoid his appeal waiver only when “challenging
the district court’s restitution order as exceeding [a statute’s] upper limit,
rather than asserting a mere error in restitution calculation within that limit.”
Id.
This topic was further discussed in United States v. West, 99 F.4th 775
(5th Cir. 2024). There, the defendant pleaded guilty to the production of
child pornography and waived his right to appeal. Id. at 778. After the district
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court ordered him to pay $6,000 in restitution, the defendant appealed,
arguing that the district court failed to conduct the requisite proximate-cause
analysis. Id. The panel agreed, explaining that an order of restitution absent
a proximate-cause analysis is an illegal sentence that exceeds the statutory
maximum. Id. at 780. Additionally, the panel explained that a challenge to
the calculation of restitution by a district court that did conduct some form of
a proximate-cause analysis is precluded by the appellate waiver. Id. As such,
“an appeal waiver . . . applies if the defendant’s argument is that there was a
calculation error, but not if the district court failed to conduct the mandatory
proximate-cause analysis altogether.” Id.
In sum, given that restitution orders under the VWPA are not subject
to the same statutory limits as the MVRA, if a defendant agrees to allow the
district court to determine restitution under the VWPA, he cannot appeal
that order as exceeding the statutory maximum. See Meredith, 52 F.4th at
987. And under the MVRA, a defendant may only challenge whether the
district court had the authority to issue restitution in the first place; he may
not challenge the district court’s calculations. See Reinhart, 2023 WL
5346053, at *4. Further, we have clarified that a defendant cannot challenge
the methods used by a district court to conduct its restitution analysis at all
so long as the district court performed some sort of analysis; a defendant may
only challenge a restitution order if the district court failed to conduct the
necessary analysis entirely. See West, 99 F.4th at 780.
V
Lucas contends that the SSA restitution was improper because his
fraud against the SSA was not the same type of scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern of criminal activity as the frauds charged in the indictment. We agree.
As a threshold matter, this argument is not barred by the appeal
waiver. The MVRA authorizes restitution to any “victim,” which it defines
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as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission
of an offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), (2). “Generally, restitution is
limited to losses arising from underlying conduct of the defendant’s offense
of conviction.” United States v. Benns, 810 F.3d 327, 329 (5th Cir. 2016).
However, under certain conditions, the MVRA permits restitution for
harms caused by conduct beyond the offense of conviction. Specifically, for
an “offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of
criminal activity,” the statute permits restitution to “any person directly
harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme,
conspiracy, or pattern,” even if that conduct was not the actual offense of
conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). In other words, a person can be a
“victim” authorized to receive restitution under the MVRA even if they
were harmed by conduct beyond the conviction, but only when that conduct
was part of the same scheme, conspiracy, or pattern as the conviction.
Here, Lucas challenges the SSA restitution award by arguing that it
was not part of the same scheme, conspiracy, or pattern as his conviction. In
essence then, he argues that the SSA is not a proper victim under the
MVRA. Recall that a restitution award in the absence of proximately caused
harm is one that exceeds the statutory maximum. See, e.g., Reinhart, 2023
WL 5346053, at *4. And since the MVRA defines “victim” as someone who
was proximately harmed by the defendant’s offensive conduct, a non-victim
necessarily is someone who was not proximately harmed. See § 3663A(a)(1)–
(2). Therefore, it flows from the statute and our precedent that the crux of
Lucas’s challenge—that the SSA was a non-victim for restitution—is
equivalent to challenging the restitution order for lack of proximate cause; it
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is a challenge that the order exceeds the statutory maximum, and thus is not
barred on appeal. 3
Proceeding to the merits, we find that the district court’s order of
restitution for the SSA fraud was erroneous. Because Lucas preserved this
challenge before the district court, we review de novo. King, 93 F.4th at 850.
As mentioned above, restitution is generally limited to the conduct
underlying the offense of conviction, but the MVRA makes an exception for
_____________________
3
The Government offers two responses. First, in its motion to dismiss the appeal,
the Government states that Lucas’s restitution was determined under the VWPA, not the
MVRA, and it specifically points to the provision of the VWPA authorizing a district court
to award restitution “to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement.” ECF 45
at 8 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3)). The Government asserts that this provision—in
conjunction with their interpretation that Lucas “agreed to an unspecified amount of
restitution” in his plea to be determined by the district court—signifies that the statutory
maximum exception is inapplicable. We see it differently. Though the district court never
explicitly stated whether it was ordering restitution under the VWPA or the MVRA, the
court did state that its award of restitution was “mandatory,” which is only true of
restitution under the MVRA. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 94 F.4th 434, 440 (5th Cir.
2024) (explaining that, while the district court did not specify the statutory basis for its
restitution order, by its terms, the MVRA applies whenever the offense is one that the
statute ordinarily covers, including “any offense committed by fraud or deceit”). Even
assuming the restitution order was authorized by the VWPA, the Government’s position
relies on a stretched interpretation of the plea agreement by claiming that Lucas agreed to
any restitution amount as ordered by the district court without limit. A more accurate
assessment is that Lucas agreed that the district court would “determine the amount of
restitution to fully compensate the victim.” So regardless of the statutory basis for the
restitution, it was limited—either statutorily or by agreement—to an amount necessary to
compensate the victims.
The Government’s second response appears in its appellate brief. There, the
Government omits its prior contention that the restitution order was imposed under the
VWPA, instead highlighting both the MVRA and VWPA provisions permitting district
courts to order restitution to persons other than a victim “if agreed to by the parties in a
plea agreement.” ECF 61, 36 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(1)(A), 3663A(a)(3)).
Nonetheless, this observation is inconsequential, as there is nothing in the plea agreement
suggesting that Lucas agreed to pay non-victims. Indeed, the relevant paragraph in the
agreement repeatedly references Lucas’s consensus to pay “the victim” of his conduct.
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offenses that include as an element “a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of
criminal activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). If the offense includes one of
these elements, then courts may include in the restitution award any harm
resulting from “the defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.” Id. Here, Lucas pleaded to and was
convicted of conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, for which
“conspiracy” is an element. So the question is whether the SSA-related
conduct was performed “in the course of [that] conspiracy.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663A(a)(2).
In determining whether conduct is part of the same conspiracy, we
focus “on the actions alleged in the indictment and their temporal scope.”
United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279, 289 (5th Cir. 2002). For example, in
United States v. Bevon, 602 F. App’x 147, 153–54 (5th Cir. 2015), the
defendant was convicted of mail and wire fraud for fraudulently opening a
credit card and fraudulently sending a wire transfer. During sentencing, the
district court included in the restitution the defendant’s fraudulent activities
on a different credit card. Id. at 150. On appeal, the panel rejected that this
conduct was part of the schemes underlying the defendant’s offense because
it involved a distinct credit card and occurred a month after the conduct for
which she was convicted. Id. at 153. 4
Here, the indictment described the scheme and conspiracy in which
Lucas was engaged with particularity. It states that the purpose of the
scheme “was for the Defendants to make false statements and use false
_____________________
4
By contrast, our circuit authorized restitution for harm caused by a defendant
when he collided with another vehicle while engaging in a conspiracy for drug possession.
United States v. Gutierrez-Avascal, 542 F.3d 495, 498 (5th Cir. 2008). But the panel there
explained that the harm from the collision was directly caused by the defendant’s criminal
conduct in the course of the conspiracy, and thus the district court’s award of restitution
for such harm was appropriate. Id.
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documents regarding JSM to fraudulently obtain loan proceeds.” And it
describes the conspiracy as an agreement between the defendants to
“execute a scheme and artifice to defraud financial institutions . . . to obtain
money, funds, and property . . . by means of false and fraudulent pretenses,
representations and promises.” The indictment goes on to detail the acts
taken in furtherance of the scheme and discusses the different frauds
perpetrated by Lucas, Deborah, and Brian, all of which involved falsifying
documents about JSM submitted to obtain loans from various financial
institutions. The SSA fraud discussed in the PSR, however, was different
from the schemes recounted in the indictment in many ways. It implicated
Lucas only, it did not involve any false information about JSM, it centered
on receiving social security benefits as opposed to money loans, and it was
not directed at any financial institution. 5
In concluding otherwise, the district court stated that because both the
SSA fraud and the charged offenses involved false submissions to
government entities for government benefits, “at a level of generality, [they
are] the same thing.” But it is not enough that there be similar conduct at a
level of generality. The statute requires that the conduct occur “in the course
of the scheme [or] conspiracy,” § 3663A(a)(2), and case law instructs that
relevant conduct be interpreted in light of the conspiracy or scheme
contained in the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Stouffer, 986 F.2d 916,
_____________________
5
To be sure, our circuit has stated that, when there is a plea agreement, we “look
beyond the charging document” and define “the underlying scheme by referring to the
mutual understanding of the parties.” United States v. Adams, 363 F.3d 363, 366 (5th Cir.
2004) (citing Cothran, 302 F.3d at 289–90). But nothing in the plea agreement here hints
at a broader conspiracy or scheme; it discusses the same conduct, in the same terms, as the
indictment. There is no indication from the plea agreement that the parties’ mutual
understanding was to redefine the scope of Lucas’s scheme beyond anything discussed in
the indictment. Accordingly, the plea does not suggest that the SSA fraud was part of the
same conspiracy or scheme as Lucas’s charged or convicted offenses.
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928 (5th Cir. 1993). We recognize that the SSA fraud, which began in 2018,
occurred around the same time as the offenses listed in the indictment, which
occurred between 2017 and 2020. But while temporal connection is a point
of focus when assessing whether an action was taken in the course of a
conspiracy, see Cothran, 302 F.3d at 289, that alone is insufficient in this case
where there is no connection between Lucas’s claim for SSA benefits and
the loan schemes detailed in his indictment, other than that both activities
generally involved fraud.
Thus, we hold that the district court erred in concluding that the SSA
fraud could be included in the restitution as criminal conduct performed in
the course of the same scheme or conspiracy as the charged offenses. 6
VI
Regarding the vehicle loans restitution order, Lucas first claims that
the dealerships were not entitled to restitution because the financial
lenders—not the dealerships—were the actual victims who suffered a loss.
We need not parse whether this claim is barred by the appeal waiver, as we
find that it fails on the merits. See Borino, 123 F.4th at 239 n.1.
First, the argument “is inadequately addressed on appeal.” Lewis v.
Univ. of S. Miss., 227 F. App’x 340, 341 (5th Cir. 2007). Lucas offers a single
conclusory sentence in his opening brief in support of this argument that is
“devoid of any factual or legal argument.” Armbruster v. C.I.R., 335 F. App’x
473, 473 (5th Cir. 2009). 7 Without more, Lucas fails to “press [his] claims.”
_____________________
6
Given our decision to reverse the district court’s restitution order for the SSA
fraud on this issue, we need not address Lucas’s additional argument that the order should
be vacated because he was entitled to the widow disability benefits he received.
7
The sentence reads: “In his second point of error, Appellant argues that the
district court erred in ordering restitution to the Auto Dealerships because it was lenders
for the motor vehicle loans that suffered loss.”
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U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 761 F.3d 409, 425 (5th Cir.
2014). Moreover, because Lucas is liable for the same amount of restitution
irrespective of the victim, any error in the restitution recipient is harmless to
Lucas. See United States v. Okulaja, 21 F.4th 338, 344 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A
sentencing error may be reviewed for harmlessness.”). 8 To the extent the
district court awarded restitution to the wrong recipient, that error may be
corrected under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. See United States v.
Fults, 71 F.4th 328, 329 (5th Cir. 2023).
Lucas’s second challenge to the vehicle loans restitution order is that
the district court awarded the wrong restitution amount because it
miscalculated the correct value of several cars that had been repossessed and
resold. Here, Lucas does not challenge the district court’s authority to order
restitution for the vehicle loans, only the specific calculation it reached. Such
an appeal—that merely challenges a district court’s calculation of the proper
restitution amount—does not constitute a challenge that the restitution
award exceeds the statutory maximum and is therefore barred by the appeal
waiver. See West, 99 F.4th at 780; Reinhart, 2023 WL 5346053, at *4.
As Lucas’s first challenge fails on the merits, and his second is
prohibited by the appeal waiver, we see no reason to reverse the district
court’s restitution order concerning the vehicle loans.
VII
On the SSA restitution, Lucas’s claim that the award was erroneous
because it was not part of the same scheme or conspiracy as the offenses in
_____________________
8
The Government argues that Lucas failed to preserve this objection and so he
should be required to show that this error affected his “substantial rights.” But because
the argument fails even the more lenient “harmless error” test, there is no need to decide
whether the objection was preserved.
15
Case: 23-20602 Document: 124-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/18/2025
No. 23-20602
his indictment is not barred by his appeal waiver and succeeds on the merits.
On the vehicle loans restitution, Lucas’s claim that the dealerships are not
proper victims falls short on the merits, and his challenge that the restitution
was miscalculated is barred by his appeal waiver. Therefore, we AFFIRM
the district court’s restitution award as to the vehicle loans but VACATE
the SSA restitution award. The Government’s pending motion to dismiss is
DENIED as moot.
16
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