Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up — Committee of Public Accounts, Fiftieth Report of Session 2021–22
Summary
House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts report, Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up (Fiftieth Report of Session 2021–22), ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 20 April 2022 and published on 27 April 2022. The summary says the Department estimates that £17 billion of taxpayers' money given out in loans will be lost, £4.9 billion of which is the result of fraud. It says the Scheme delivered 1.5 million loans totalling £47 billion. The introduction says the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy launched the Scheme in May 2020, with loans of up to £50,000 and a fixed interest rate of 2.5%.
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“Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up — Committee of Public Accounts, Fiftieth Report of Session 2021–22.”
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House of Commons
Committee of Public Accounts
Bounce Back Loans
Scheme: Follow-up
Fiftieth Report of Session 2021–22
Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report
Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 20 April 2022
HC 951
Published on 27 April 2022
by authority of the House of Commons
The Committee of Public Accounts
The Committee of Public Accounts is appointed by the House of Commons
to examine “the accounts showing the appropriation of the sums granted by
Parliament to meet the public expenditure, and of such other accounts laid before
Parliament as the committee may think fit” (Standing Order No. 148).
Current membership
Dame Meg Hillier MP (Labour (Co-op), Hackney South and Shoreditch) (Chair)
Shaun Bailey MP (Conservative, West Bromwich West)
Dan Carden MP (Labour, Liverpool, Walton)
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown MP (Conservative, The Cotswolds)
Rt Hon Mark Francois MP (Conservative, Rayleigh and Wickford)
Mr Louie French MP (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Peter Grant MP (Scottish National Party, Glenrothes)
Kate Green MP (Labour, Stretford and Urmston)
Antony Higginbotham MP (Conservative, Burnley)
Craig Mackinlay MP (Conservative, Thanet)
Sarah Olney MP (Liberal Democrat, Richmond Park)
Kate Osamor MP (Labour (Co-op), Edmonton)
Angela Richardson MP (Conservative, Guildford)
Nick Smith MP (Labour, Blaenau Gwent)
Helen Whately MP (Conservative, Faversham and Mid Kent)
James Wild MP (Conservative, North West Norfolk)
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Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
Contents
Summary 3
Introduction 4
Conclusions and recommendations 5
1 Scheme risks and management 9
The Bounce Back Loan Scheme
Understanding scheme losses 9
Reliance on lenders for recoveries 11
The effectiveness of counter-fraud measures 13
2 Lessons learned 15
Long-term impact of the Scheme 15
Unintended impacts of the Scheme on the lending market 16
Lessons learnt from the Scheme and future preparedness 17
Formal minutes 19
Witnesses 20
Published written evidence 20
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 21
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 3
Summary
When we examined the Bounce Back Loan Scheme in December 2020, we warned that
the Department for Business Energy & Industrial Strategy’s (the Department) focus on
the speed of delivery had exposed the taxpayer to potentially huge losses. The latest data
shows that business survival has come at a cost to the taxpayer: the Department estimates
that an eye-watering £17 billion of taxpayers’ money given out in loans will be lost, £4.9
billion of which is the result of fraud. These losses are money that could have been
spent on improving existing public services, reducing taxes or to reduce government
borrowing. The Department admits that fraud within the Scheme is well outside what
it would normally consider tolerable but cannot specify what that level should be. We
are not yet convinced that it had done all in its power to prevent fraud. The Department
and the British Business Bank (the Bank) missed opportunities to prevent fraud and the
Department’s focus on ‘top-tier’ fraudsters could put other government schemes at risk
due to the lack of a deterrent effect.
The Bank delivered the Scheme at impressive speed, but the Scheme’s long-term impact
is uncertain and will need careful management. Early indications show that the Scheme
has helped businesses to survive the pandemic in the short-term. But it is only when
borrowers reach the end of their six- or ten-year loan period and either repay their
loans, or they are written off if businesses have not survived, that we will be able to
judge the Scheme’s impact. So far, the Scheme met its initial goal to get money to a range
of businesses quickly, delivering 1.5 million loans totalling £47 billion, with most issued
within the first two months.
The Department is relying heavily on lenders to fix credit and fraud risks. As the taxpayer
underwrites the scheme it is vital that lenders pursue debt but at present the scheme
does not incentivise lenders to do this. Lenders did not always know the business they
were lending to (the speed and limited number of original lenders contributed to this).
The department has also lacked data to hold lenders to account. It is unacceptable that
the Department has no long-term plans for recovering overdue debts and it cannot
just accept the current level of accepted debt. Government as a whole must to learn the
lessons from this Scheme to plan more effectively for future crises and protect taxpayers’
money.
4 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
Introduction
The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (the Department) launched
the Bounce Back Loan scheme (the Scheme) in May 2020. It is the largest of three Covid-19
related business loan support schemes. The Scheme targeted the smallest businesses and
sought to provide them with loans of up to £50,000, or a maximum of 25% of annual
turnover, to maintain their financial health during the pandemic. The loans have a fixed
interest rate of 2.5% and a maximum length of either six or ten years. In the first year of
the loan there are no capital repayments due, and Government pays the interest—making
it interest-free for the borrower. The Scheme closed for new applicants in March 2021 and
in total it has provided 1.5 million loans worth £47 billion to businesses across the UK.
We examined the Scheme in December 2020 and warned that the Department’s focus
on the speed of delivery had exposed the taxpayer to potentially huge losses. In addition,
we concluded that Government lacked data to assess the levels of fraud. The Department
estimated in its Annual Report and Accounts 2020–21 that it would lose £17 billion as a
result of the Scheme, of which £4.9 billion was because of fraud.
The Scheme aimed, in most cases, to deliver money to borrowers within 24 to 48 hours of
applying. To make the process as fast as possible, the Scheme did not require lenders to
check the information on the loan application form or to perform credit and affordability
checks. Borrowers are expected to repay the loans in full and lenders are required to
conduct basic counter fraud tests. But owing to the absence of credit checks, Government
provides lenders a 100% guarantee on the loans. In practice, this means that if the borrower
does not repay the loan, Government will.
The British Business Bank (the Bank) manages the Scheme on the Department’s behalf
and the loans are delivered through 24 commercial lenders such as banks and building
societies. The commercial lenders are also responsible for administering loan repayments
and pursuing borrowers for missed repayments for up to 12 months after the issue of a
formal demand. There is no minimum on the amount of time lenders need to pursue
borrowers before claiming on the guarantee and lenders can claim on the guarantee
before they complete pursuing borrowers for the full 12 months. Because loans did not
begin repayment until May 2021, and borrowers can seek a further six-month repayment
holiday, there is limited repayment data to analyse.
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 5
Conclusions and recommendations
1. The Department and the Bank delivered the Scheme at breakneck speed, but the
long-term impact of the Scheme is uncertain. The Scheme was launched within 11
days of its announcement. The Scheme met its initial goal to get money to a range
of businesses quickly, delivering most of the £47 billion of loans to businesses in its
first two months. The Department asserts that early indications are that the Scheme
has helped business survival in the short term. While most businesses have started
to repay loans, it is only when borrowers reach the end of their six- or ten-year loan
period and either repay their loans, or the loans are written off if businesses have
not survived, that we will be able to judge the Scheme’s impact. The Department
estimated, however, that between 31% and 48% of loans will not be repaid—a
narrowing on the estimate in its 2019–20 Annual Report & Accounts that up to 60%
of loans would not be repaid. The Scheme is already expected to lose an estimated
£17 billion of taxpayers’ money as a result of both genuine borrowers who are unable
to repay and because of fraud. The Department has evaluation plans covering the
next three years and it expects the first tranche of the evaluation in February 2022.
But it has yet to identify the necessary control group of similar companies who took
out loans in order to measure the success of the Schemes.
Recommendation: The Department should put in place a clear strategy to manage
the long-term legacy of the Scheme within a month of the publication of its
evaluation report.
The Bank should also write to us with details of its plans to measure the Scheme’s
long-term impact, including identifying a reliable control group, within a month
of the publication of Department’s strategy.
2. The potential Scheme losses are eye-watering, and we are not convinced the
Department has the data it needs to manage the risks to the taxpayer. The
Department estimated in its 2020–21 Annual Report and Accounts that it would
lose £17 billion as a result of the Scheme, of which £4.9 billion was because of
fraud. We have seen similarly high levels of expected losses due to fraud in other
Covid-19 business support schemes, with losses from fraud and error within the
furlough and self-employment schemes estimated at £5.7 billion. This staggering
amount of taxpayer money could have been spent on improving existing public
services. The Department admits that fraud within the Scheme falls well outside
what it would consider a tolerable level, although it cannot tell us what that level
should be. Its fraud estimate does not include all potential types of fraud, such as
suspected turnover inflation fraud to claim larger loans than a borrower is entitled
to. To date, it has allocated just £32 million to countering fraud and does not know
whether lenders or other stakeholders, including law enforcement agencies, have the
resources they need to counter fraud. The Department reports its estimates of losses
once each year and these have a high level of uncertainty. The Bank’s loan data from
the 24 commercial lenders under the Scheme has data limitations as each lender
categorises and reports data in a slightly different way. The Department is trying to
improve its approach to quantifying losses in the Scheme, but it is almost two years
since its launch.
6 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
Recommendation: The Department should, within the next 3 months, develop a
strategy setting out the increase needed in Scheme counter-fraud resources for all
relevant government stakeholders to both reduce fraud levels to a tolerable level
and to maximise recoveries.
As part of its Treasury Minute response, the Department should explain how it
intends to improve the accuracy and timeliness of its estimates of losses within the
Scheme.
3. The Department has been complacent in preventing Scheme fraud and its
prioritisation of ‘top tier’ fraudsters puts other government Schemes at risk.
The risks that we identified at the outset of the Scheme have now materialised.
The Department requested, and received, a ministerial direction at the start of
the Scheme as it expected high levels of losses. Even so, counter-fraud measures
were introduced too slowly. For example, it took a month after the Scheme’s launch
to set up checks to prevent duplicate applications because of delays in joining up
information held by different parties. The Scheme did not require lenders to check a
businesses’ claimed turnover against its records for existing customers; this meant
some borrowers received a larger loan than they were entitled to. It also took the
Department 8 months to introduce checks to ensure businesses’ claimed turnover
was correct, by which time 93% of the loans by value had been issued and some
received more than they were entitled to. The Department and the Bank have placed
less emphasis on tackling those smaller scale fraudsters who deliberately misstated
their details, such as turnover, than on organised crime. The consequences of
fraudulent activity include the individual being banned from being a company
director or being able to borrow in the future, but this assumes they are pursued
and caught. The Department’s response for ‘smaller’ fraudulent claims is limited
and may mean that fraudsters will walk away with the money – something the
Department’s fraud-loss estimates suggests is a real risk. We are concerned that
its complacency towards smaller scale fraud and turnover misstatement provides a
limited deterrent effect and could encourage fraudsters to try to take advantage of
other government schemes.
Recommendation: Next time the Department launches an emergency business
support scheme, it should be explicit on the trade-offs and level of fraud it is
prepared to tolerate from the outset.
The Department should urgently outline how it will change its plans to adopt
a more robust approach to reducing all types of fraud, and should commit to
including anti-fraud measures from the outset so that it acts as a deterrent effect
for other schemes.
4. We are concerned that the Department is placing too much reliance on lenders to
minimise taxpayer losses without incentivising them to do so. When the Scheme
launched the Department relied solely on lenders to prevent taxpayer losses by
requiring them to do ‘know your customer’, and ‘anti-money laundering’ and some
basic counter-fraud checks. It is also relying on lenders to recover overdue loans rather
than doing so itself, as it considers commercial lenders to be the experts in this field
and already follow similar recovery processes for standard commercial loans. The
Scheme guarantees to cover 100% of lenders’ losses which offers limited commercial
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 7
incentives for them to pursue borrowers for more than the minimum period under
scheme rules. The Department relies on contractual, legal and regulatory obligations
to ensure lenders comply with the Scheme. Evidence on the effectiveness of the
lenders’ operations is slim, but there are some worrying indicators. The Bank runs
a lender assurance programme to test whether lenders adhere to Scheme rules; and
the commercial lending regulator wrote to lenders in July 2021 to remind them of
their obligations to report fraud and put in place adequate counter-fraud resources.
But none of the witnesses could tell us how much lenders are spending on this. The
department now plans to create a simple dashboard of management information to
improve its ability to hold lenders to account. Together this gives an unconvincing
picture of how lenders are bearing down on large amounts of outstanding debt and
we are not convinced that lender audits are a replacement for commercial incentives.
Recommendation: The Department should, as part of its Treasury Minute
response, set out how it will use legal, regulatory and contractual incentives to
improve the lenders’ performance in managing the loans and the risks to the
taxpayer. Furthermore, it should report to the Committee on individual lender
performance using the dashboard data which was due to be presented to the new
cross-Whitehall counter fraud board.
5. It is unacceptable that the Department has no plans to recover outstanding debt
after lenders have pursued borrowers for up to 12 months. There is no minimum
term that lenders are required to pursue borrowers for payments. Lenders are not
expected to continue to pursue borrowers after 12 months. Lenders can claim
on the government guarantee before the end of the 12-month period if they have
conducted what they consider to be a “sufficient and robust level of recoveries” and
have concluded that no further payment is likely. The Bank and the Department
assert that lenders could pursue overdue payments for longer than 12 months if
they chose to do so, and believe it would be in the borrower’s commercial interest to
repay if they want to maintain their bank account with that lender. The Department
was also not in a position to state what the shortest time period had been for a lender
to claim their guarantee. We are concerned that this presents an overly optimistic
view about lenders’ incentives to recover funds and how the Bank’s lender assurance
programme would work towards recovering unpaid loans beyond this 12-month
period. The Department has, however, agreed to consider alternative approaches to
recovering loans.
Recommendation: The Department should, as part of its Treasury Minute
response, set out its strategy for collecting overdue payments after the lenders have
completed their 12-month requirements. In addition, the Department should
write to the Committee and provide further information on what the shortest time
period has been for a lender to claim on their guarantee to date and how this
compares to the average.
6. The Scheme has distorted the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) lending
market in favour of the largest UK banks, which goes against the Bank’s objective
of creating a diverse finance market for SMEs. The Scheme’s low interest rate made
it uneconomical for smaller or alternative lenders to participate to the same extent as
larger lenders. This meant that some smaller lenders did not take part in the Scheme
and larger lenders, who traditionally are less active in the SME lending market, lent
8 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
relatively more. This resulted in the largest UK banks taking a 90% share in the
Scheme’s lending to SMEs, distorting competition in the SME lending market as
the Department and Bank expected at scheme launch. While we are encouraged
to hear that the Department believes diversity is returning to the lending market,
we remain concerned about its ability to identify and address any unintended or
unforeseen consequences and the longer-term impact of the Scheme on the lending
market.
Recommendation: The Bank should develop a strategy to mitigate the negative
impact of the Scheme on the SME lending market and publish its findings in its
next Small Business Finance Market report.
The Department should, alongside its Treasury Minute response, identify the
unintended consequences of the scheme and what impact these have had.
7. The Department has not yet identified how it will share the lessons from the
Scheme. The Department asserts that it has applied some of the lessons it has learned
from this Scheme in the subsequent Recovery Loan Scheme, such as introducing
additional reporting requirements on lenders. It also recognises that it needs to
ensure stronger counter-fraud capability and data-sharing across government to
be in place from the start of any future scheme. Yet these learnings should have
been obvious following the Department’s experience in the Financial Crisis when its
approach was similarly reactive. We are surprised that the Department and the Bank
were so ill-prepared to respond an economic shock, irrespective of the nature of the
pandemic. The Department recognises that it would have been possible to design
the outline of the Scheme five years ago, but it would not have planned for a scheme
of this type because its pandemic preparedness plan did not foresee an event of such
gravity. In responding to the pandemic, the Department was able to draw on some
of the planning from its experience during the UK’s exit from the EU. Carrying
lessons forward to future schemes, however, is hindered by the Department’s lack
of corporate memory, with staff moving to other roles. The Department is shortly
due to publish the findings of its first of three evaluations of the Scheme, as part of
its three-year Scheme evaluation programme, but it has not shared any plans about
how it would disseminate the lessons-learned across government.
Recommendation: The Department and the Bank should establish a strategy on
how it intends to share lessons from the scheme within a month of the publication
of their first evaluation report.
The Bank should develop a business case for an emergency loan scheme for future
crisis within 6 months of publication of this report.
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 9
1 Scheme risks and management
The Bounce Back Loan Scheme
1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence
from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (the Department) and
the British Business Bank (the Bank) about the Bounce Back Loan Scheme. We also took
evidence from HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority (the FCA).1
2. The Department launched the Bounce Back Loan scheme (the Scheme) on 4
May 2020, and it closed for new applications on 31 March 2021. The Chancellor of the
Exchequer announced the Scheme on 27 April 2020, 11 days before its launch. The Scheme
targeted the smallest businesses and sought to provide them with quick access to loans
of up to £50,000, or a maximum of 25% of annual turnover, to maintain their financial
health during the pandemic. The loans have a fixed interest rate of 2.5% and a maximum
length of ten years; in the first year of the loan there are no capital repayments due, and
Government pays the interest—making it interest-free for the borrower. It is the largest
of three Covid-19 related business loan support schemes, providing 1.5 million loans
totalling £47 billion with most issued within the Scheme’s first two months.2
3. HM Treasury developed the Scheme with the Department, and the Bank manages
the Scheme on the Department’s behalf. Loans are delivered through commercial lenders
such as banks and building societies. Borrowers are expected to repay the loans in full
and lenders are required to conduct basic counter-fraud tests. The commercial lenders are
also responsible for administering loan repayments and pursuing borrowers for missed
repayments for up to 12 months after the issue of a formal demand. Repayments for
the first borrowers started in May 2021, and borrowers could seek a further six-month
repayment holiday.3
4. The Scheme aimed, in most cases, to deliver money to borrowers within 24 to 48
hours of applying. To make the process as fast as possible, the Scheme did not require
lenders to perform credit and affordability check or to check the information on the loan
application form—allowing borrowers to ‘self-certify’ their information. Owing to the
absence of credit checks, Government provides lenders a 100% guarantee on the loans:
if the borrower does not repay the loan, Government will. Lenders can claim on the
guarantee before they complete pursuing borrowers for the full 12 months.4 We examined
the Scheme in December 2020, and warned that the Department’s focus on delivery speed
had risked all other aspects of value for money, with no measures of the Scheme’s success.5
Understanding scheme losses
5. Both HM Treasury and the Department recognised the risks to the taxpayer of
prioritising speed over checking information in loan applications, and issued a Ministerial
Direction on 3 May 2020 on the grounds that the Scheme would breach HM Treasury rules
1 C&AG’s Report, The Bounce Back Loan Scheme: an update, Session 2021–22, HC 861, 3 December 2021.
2 C&AG’s report, paras 1–2, 6, Appendix Three, Figure 17
3 C&AG’s report, paras 2–3, 1.7, 1.13, Appendix Two, Figure 16
4 C&AG’s report, paras 4, 1.2, 3.5
5 Public Accounts Committee, Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme, Thirty-Third Report of Session 2019–21, HC
687, 16 December 2020
10 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
on value for money. The Department estimated in its 2020–21 financial Annual Report
and Accounts that it would lose £17 billion as a result of loans that will not be repaid, of
which £4.9 billion are because of fraud. Credit losses relate to borrowers who want to
repay, whereas fraud losses relate to those who were dishonest, for example not eligible for
a loan or took out a loan with no intention of paying it back.6 We have seen high levels of
losses in our examination of other Covid-19 business support schemes; losses from fraud
and error in the furlough and self-employment schemes, for example, are estimated at
£5.7 billion.7 In addition, losses from fraudulent benefit claims are estimated at a further
£8 billion.8 We observed that these high levels of fraud represented a significant amount
of taxpayer money which could have been used to fund public services.9
6. The Department admitted that the estimated fraud losses on the Scheme were “well
outside” what it would consider tolerable. The Bank added that “no level of fraud is
tolerable”.10 The Department explained that the risks that it expected at the beginning of
the process had “come to pass” and that it was not surprised by the high levels of losses.11
It asserted that the losses were “in line” with what it thought would happen but it did
not specify what an acceptable level of losses should be.12 Despite this, by October 2020,
the Department had allocated only a £32 million budget to countering fraud internally,
arguing that lenders had made significant investments in resourcing to recover scheme
losses.13 The Financial Conduct Authority explained that it had sent lenders a letter
reminding them of their obligations to have appropriate levels of resources in relation to
fraud control. However, neither it nor the Bank were able to provide further detail on the
amount of resources the lenders have committed to counter fraud.14
7. We asked the Department what data it uses to manage the risk of credit and fraud
losses to the taxpayer. The National Audit Office (NAO) reported that the Department’s
fraud estimate had “known limitations”, for example it does not include all potential
types of fraud, including suspected turnover inflation fraud. The Department told us that,
since our last report on the Scheme in December 2020, it had been trying to improve
its understanding and quantification of the fraud risk in particular. The Department
recognised that its estimates, however, have “real and meaningful uncertainty” because
they are based on sampling and only reported annually despite a “moving” picture of
business survival rates.15
8. The Department’s estimate of the credit loss within the Scheme is also uncertain, as
there is no credit score data for borrowers because this was not a scheme requirement.
Repayments will also be affected by future macroeconomic conditions which are
themselves uncertain. In addition, because loans did not begin repayment until May 2021
6 C&AG’s Report, Key facts, (page 4), paras 5, 13
7 HM Revenue & Customs, Annual report and accounts 2020–21, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General,
para 3.11. See also Public Accounts Committee, HMRC Annual Report and Accounts 2020–21, HC 641, 1 December
2021.
8 Public Accounts Committee, The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2020–21 – Fraud and error
in the benefits system, Twenty-Fifth Report of Session 2021–22, HC 633, 17 November 2021, para 4. See also:
Department for Work & Pensions, Annual Report and Accounts 2020–21, HC 422, para 6.
9 Q 81
10 Qq 54–55
11 Q 90
12 Q 51
13 Q 62, C&AG’s Report, para 17
14 Qq 30, 63–64
15 Qq 17, 55; C&AG’s Report, para 2.8
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 11
and borrowers can seek a further six-month repayment holiday, there is limited repayment
data to analyse. With this repayment profile it will take some time for the Department
to measure the total losses to the taxpayer of this Scheme. The Department told us that
its credit and fraud estimates will become more accurate over time and that it is likely
that fraud losses will become apparent before credit losses. However, it acknowledged that
“there will always be a level of uncertainty in our estimates”.16
9. The Bank began collecting Scheme loan data from the 24 Scheme lenders in July
2021, where lenders provide data to the Bank via a collections system. The Bank said that
it holds loan data from lenders across 70 different datapoints, including the name and
address of the borrower, term of the loan and size. It explained that it was aggregating this
data from all of the Scheme lenders and interrogating it to spot trends and errors.17 Despite
the Department and the Bank telling us that they had a “rich” and “comprehensive” loan
dataset, the NAO found that lender data can be unreliable as the system depends on lenders
submitting accurate and timely data, and each lender reports it on a different basis.18 Some
lenders might choose not to report suspected fraud, which makes comparisons subjective;
while some lenders do not share their underlying data.19 The Bank wrote to us and told
us that it was working with lenders to understand what was driving these differences,
such as different business models, or that some lenders might not have had a pre-existing
relationship with Scheme borrowers.20
Reliance on lenders for recoveries
10. The Scheme rules required commercial lenders to deliver loans and pursue recovery
processes in line with their existing business-as-usual standards. The Department and
HM Treasury stated that the majority of recoveries and counter-fraud efforts comes from
lenders. The Department told us that the commercial banking sector was the “best of the
best” at managing the Scheme’s recovery process in line with equivalent standard loans,
with the Bank adding that lenders have “decades, if not centuries” of related expertise.21
The Department had therefore concluded that it would not make sense for it to recover
loans because lenders undertook that role. It explained that the Department, therefore
spends a “tiny fraction” of budget on loan recovery compared with the resources among
lenders and law enforcement agencies. Instead, the Department and the Bank told us
that it saw its role to define the minimum standards and make sure the overall system is
working well.22
11. Although the Department referred to lenders as the “arms and legs” of the Scheme,
none of the witnesses could tell us how much lenders are spending on counter-fraud
activities. The FCA said, for example, that lenders had “scaled up quite significantly”,
but it could not tell us when they had done so and it recognised that it still needed to
discuss with lenders the size and scale of resources in place. It had issued some guidance
to lenders; as the NAO reported, it wrote to lenders in July 2021 to remind them of their
16 Qq 17, 55; C&AG’s Report, Appendix One, para 12
17 Qq 19, 21, 53; C&AG’s Report, Appendix One, para 6
18 Qq 17, 53; C&AG’s Report, Appendix One, para 7
19 C&AG’s Report, para 2.29
20 Correspondence from Catherine Lewis La Torre, Chief Executive, British Business Bank, Re Bounce Back Loans, 27
January 2022, published 31 January 2022
21 Qq 28, 55, 57, 62, 92; C&AG’s Report, para 2.27
22 Qq 28, 62
12 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
obligations to report fraud and have an adequate level of resources.23 The Bank explained
that lenders were not keen on doing a detailed cost allocation exercise to identify the level
of resources, but lenders were reporting their activity to a lender forum for sharing best
practice. In its letter to us after our evidence session, the Bank told us that lenders had so
far identified 1.4% of the loans by value (£631.5 million) as having suspected fraud, but it
expected this number to increase.24
12. The Scheme requires lenders to pursue borrowers for missed repayments for up to 12
months after the issue of a formal demand. The Department initially told us that lenders
had to wait until after the 12 month period to make a claim on the guarantee.25 However,
it wrote to us after our evidence session to confirm that lenders do not have to wait until
the 12 month recovery period has elapsed in order to make a claim. It explained that
lenders were permitted to claim under the guarantee within a “reasonable period” after
the date on which they had made an initial repayment demand.26 As part of our inquiry
on the Department’s Annual Report and Accounts, we asked the Department to clarify
the arrangements. The Department told us that there was no minimum term that lenders
were required to pursue borrowers. It explained that although it expected in most cases
lenders would pursue borrowers for “many months” before claiming on the government
guarantee, lenders can claim before the end of the 12-month period if they have conducted
“sufficient and robust level of recoveries” and no further payment is likely. Lenders are not
required to continue to pursue borrowers after 12 months, although the Department noted
that there would be some situations where lenders did so if, for example, a repayment plan
had already started27
13. The NAO reported that the arrangements for pursuing borrowers offered limited
commercial incentive for lenders to maximise recovery of overdue loans.28 In contrast,
the Bank told us that it believed that lenders have strong legal, contractual and regulatory
obligations to recover loans. This included oversight by the FCA and lender audits by
the Bank to ensure lenders are complying with the Scheme rules.29 The Department
subsequently explained at the time of the launch ministers made the decision that 12
months was a reasonable cap for the recovery process and it can claim back any guarantee
from a lender if lender audits show they have not followed the required Scheme rules.30
The Bank told us that, so far, it had audited every lender, but that this had focused on their
loan disbursement rather than recovery activity because repayments have only recently
started. It explained that the second phase of the Bank’s audit will focus on recoveries and
23 Qq 30, 62–64, 67; Comptroller & Auditor General, Investigation into the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, Session
2019–2021, HC 860, 7 October 2020, para 2.29
24 Q 63; Correspondence from Catherine Lewis La Torre, Chief Executive, British Business Bank, Re Bounce Back
Loans, 27 January 2022, published 31 January 2022
25 Q 73
26 Correspondence from Sarah Munby Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy
& Industrial Strategy, re PAC hearing on the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, dated 9 February 2022, published 22
February 2022
27 Qq 1–4, Public Accounts Committee, Oral Evidence: BEIS Annual Report and Accounts, 2020–21, HC 1052, 23
February 2022; and Comptroller & Auditor General, Investigation into the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, Session
2019–2021, HC 860, 7 October 2020, para 3.8
28 C&AG’s Report, para 20
29 Qq 14, 24
30 Qq 24–26, 74–75; Correspondence from Sarah Munby Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Department for
Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, re PAC hearing on the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, dated 9 February 2022,
published 22 February 2022; Q1, Public Accounts Committee, Oral Evidence BEIS Annual Report and Accounts,
2020–21, HC 1052, 23 February 2022, Qq1
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 13
it planned to report its initial findings in March 2022.31 We asked the Department what
incentives there were for lenders to continue to pursue borrowers for payment and whether
it was hoping that the system would self-regulate.32The Bank and the Department told us
that they believed it was in the borrowers’ commercial interest to repay if they wanted to
run a business in the UK, maintain their bank account with the current lender, or get a
loan from elsewhere.33
14. Almost 86,000 borrowers have been in arrears for more than 90 days as of 10 January
2022.34 We asked the Department what steps it was taking to ensure that its approach to
recovering loans was as effective as possible and made best use of the data available to it.
We received written evidence from Equifax, which told us that methods widely used by
creditors included using credit bureau data on borrowers to understand their financial
health; and then grouping together similar borrowers and debts—ranging from those in
borrowers who are insolvent to those who are able to repay—and identifying the best
action for each group. It explained that, for some, this might be to write off the debt, but
for many it might need a bespoke plan for further collection activity using specialist debt
collection agencies.35 The Department agreed to consider what more it could do itself to
reduce the value of loans written off, including the suggestions made by Equifax.36
The effectiveness of counter-fraud measures
15. The Department and the Bank recognised that there was a trade-off between getting
loans to businesses quickly by removing lender checks and slowing down the delivery of
the loans by putting in place more counter-fraud measures. The Bank said that this would
have had consequences for the economy, but argued that the existing ‘know your customer’
and ‘anti money-laundering’ checks had prevented in excess of £2 billion of fraud. The
Department did not set out at the outset of the Scheme, or in our evidence session, the
level of fraud that it was prepared to tolerate as a result of such trade-offs.37 Although
it knew from the start that the limited fraud prevention measures in place would make
the scheme risky, it was slow to introduce detection and post-loan controls. It took eight
months to bring in processes to verify borrowers’ self-declared turnover against existing
HMRC data—by which time 93% of the loans by value had been issued. Similarly, the
Department introduced a check to identify and prevent multiple applications on 2 June
2020, a month after the scheme’s launch—and made them mandatory by end of June when
60% of loans had already been made.38 The Department said that the delay was because of
the time needed to set up data sharing processes.39 To date the Bank has identified 13,000
possible duplicate loan applications .40
16. The Scheme has also made trade-offs in its response to countering fraud and the
associated deterrent effects. The Department based its counter-fraud response on the
31 Qq 15, 16
32 Qq 74–75
33 Qq 74–75, 83
34 Correspondence from Catherine Lewis La Torre, Chief Executive, British Business Bank, Re Bounce Back Loans, 27
January 2022, published 31 January 2022
35 Equifax Written Evidence, BLS0001.
36 Q71
37 Qq 56–58, 61
38 Qq 61, 66, 79–80; C&AG’s Report, Figure 10
39 Qq 59, 60
40 Correspondence from Catherine Lewis La Torre, Chief Executive, British Business Bank, Re Bounce Back Loans, 27
January 2022, published 31 January 2022
14 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
return on investment from recovering fraudulent loans within three groups: top-tier, mid-
tier and bottom-tier fraud cases. The Department defined top-tier fraud cases as those
involving organised crime groups with sums of more than £100,000; mid-tier fraud cases
as having some evidence that individuals acted dishonestly but not on a large scale; and
bottom-tier cases as those where individuals might have received loans dishonestly, for
example, by misstating their turnover on the application. It is focusing its efforts on the
top-tier cases of organised crime; and decided not to focus its investigative resource on
borrowers who have overstated turnover by less than 25%, if there were no other fraud risk
indicators.41
17. We asked the Department if it was confident that enough was being done to tackle
medium and bottom-tier fraud, to ensure there is a sufficient deterrent for smaller-scale
fraud. It recognised that deterrence is “important” and was “on their minds”. In such
cases, the Department said that although criminal prosecution was unlikely, there were
“personal consequences” for businesses who wish to take out credit in the future, or for
company directors who may face disqualification by the Insolvency Service.42 We noted,
however, that this might not be a sufficient deterrent effect for some individuals, such as
fraudsters who have no interest in running a business or being a company director in the
future.43
41 C&AG’s Report, paras 2.13, 2.15
42 Qq 65, 70, 83
43 Qq 87–89
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 15
2 Lessons learned
Long-term impact of the Scheme
18. We reported previously that the Department had no apparent plans to measure
the Scheme’s long-term impact, and no agreed performance measures.44 In its Treasury
Minute response to our report, the Department gave a high-level summary of the Scheme’s
evaluation plans which aimed for an initial assessment by Autumn 2021. However, it did
not provide any detail on how it intended to measure performance.45 As a follow-up, we
asked the Department for its latest views on the wider impact of the Scheme, and how it
was gaining assurance that the Scheme was working. It said that the Scheme had met its
initial goals, in terms of the pace of delivery and the diversity of firms supported, which
it considered was reassuring. The NAO found that the Scheme delivered 90% of loans
to micro-businesses in the first two months. The Department told us that initial signs
showed that there had been no “big spike in failures” that might have happened without
the Scheme in place.46
19. We asked the Department whether it currently had the information that it needed
to determine whether the Scheme had been a success. The Department told us that it
considered that the quality of information that it had about what was currently happening
with the Scheme was “very good”, but there was “very limited information” to tell whether
the Scheme was working over the longer term. It explained that “it is very early days” given
the 6 or 10-year term of the loans and the limited repayment data available so far.47 While
most borrowers have started to repay loans, not all are in repayment as some borrowers
took a payment holiday. The Department estimated that 31% to 48% of loans will not be
repaid as of 31 March 2021, with its ‘most likely’ estimate being £17 billion worth of loans.
This is a narrowing on the estimate in its 2019–20 Annual Report & Accounts that stated
up to 60% of loans would not be repaid.48 The Department acknowledged that it will be
able to judge whether the Scheme has made a difference as it sees firms’ survival rates over
the longer term.49
20. Business survival rates are a key metric for measuring the Scheme’s impact. The
Bank has commissioned an external evaluation study, which will report in stages over the
next three years.50 We therefore asked the Department when we could expect to see the
results from the first stage of its evaluation. The Department told us that it expected the
first stage shortly from Ipsos MORI and London Economics. The Department agreed to
write to us to confirm the exact timing for publishing the findings.51 The NAO explained
that the Bank’s evaluation over the next three years will seek to draw lessons from both
an operational perspective (‘process evaluation’) and economic perspective (‘impact
evaluation’). The process evaluation will examine the effectiveness of the Scheme’s design
and delivery mechanisms and will report in 2022. The NAO reported, however, that
44 Public Accounts Committee, Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme, Thirty-Third Report of Session 2019–21, HC
687, 16 December 2020
45 Treasury Minutes, CP 389, February 2021, para 6.2
46 Q 8; C&AG’s Report, Figures 2 and 3
47 Qq 9, 10
48 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Annual report and accounts 2019–20, Page 223
49 Qq 9–10; C&AG’s Report paras 6, 13
50 Q 10; C&AG’s Report, para 24
51 Qq 10, 12, 99–101
16 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
measuring the Scheme’s impact will be challenging as there is a lack of reliable data to
compare the recovery of businesses that used the Scheme with a similar group that did
not.52 The Department and the Bank recognised that finding a counterfactual for this
Scheme and other Covid support schemes is an issue. The Bank assured us that it was
confident that it would be able to find a control group from businesses that did not take a
loan, which would allow it to understand if the Scheme itself had made a difference.53
Unintended impacts of the Scheme on the lending market
21. Lenders used their own funds to make Scheme loans, with government guaranteeing
to reimburse lenders if borrowers do not repay. How lenders raise funds differs according
to size and type of lender; the more cheaply they can raise funds the more profitable the
loans might be. While many large lenders can take advantage of cheap funding offered
by the Bank of England, smaller and alternative lenders cannot. Before the launch of the
Scheme, the Department and the Bank recognised that the 2.5% interest rate borrowers
were asked to pay on the loans would make it economically unviable for many smaller
and alternative lenders to participate in the Scheme. The Department highlighted in its
direction letter that this may increase the market position of the main UK banks in the
SME lending market and thus impact competition levels.54
22. The NAO reported that there were seven accredited lenders when the Scheme
launched in May 2020, consisting of five main UK banks and two other banks.55 The Bank
acknowledged that it took several months to accredit the additional 21 of 28 lenders in
total to the Scheme, by which time most of the loans had been already been handed out.56
The NAO highlighted analysis by Innovate Finance, a representative body for non-bank
lenders, which showed that in 2020 the main banks increased their market share from
35% to 56%—while alternative lenders’ total lending remained constant year-on-year.57
The Bank explained that the main UK banks were responsible for 90% of the Scheme
lending but that they had a smaller market share in other COVID-19 related loans schemes
like the Coronavirus Business Interruptions Loan Scheme or the Recovery Loan Scheme.
Alternative lenders and smaller banks provide nearly 95% of lending under the Bank’s
other core loan schemes, according to the Bank.58
23. The Bank recognised that it was “absolutely true that [the Scheme] had a distortive
effect” but suggested that this was “diluting over time”.59 It confirmed that it still had
an objective of encouraging diversity in lending markets. It explained that it reports on
market shares of lenders in its annual small business finance report and its next publication
was due in March 2022. The Bank told us that it had seen encouraging signs that diversity
in small business lending market was starting to come back, with the amount of lending
by alternative lenders remaining stable and their market share in new lending increasing
again.60 The loans under the Scheme provided, however, lenders with a foothold in the
52 C&AG’s Report, paras 24, 3.13–3.14
53 Qq 11, 94
54 Qq 96, 101; C&AG’s Report, 3.10
55 C&AG’s Report, para 3.8
56 Qq 103–104, British Business Bank correspondence, 27 January 2022, which states that a total of 28 lenders were
accredited to the Scheme
57 C&AG’s Report, para 3.10
58 Qq 97, 104; British Business Bank correspondence, 27 January 2022
59 Q101
60 Qq 98, 101, 102
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 17
SME lending market for up to 10 years, and we expressed our concerns about the long-
term distortive effect that this may create. We highlighted in our first report on Bounce
Back Loans that the Department had no business case at the launch of the Scheme. We
were still concerned that the Bank was just waiting for its evaluation findings and that it
was hoping that the Scheme had not had a long-term distortive effect.61
Lessons learnt from the Scheme and future preparedness
24. We highlighted previously that government needed to use the lessons learned from this
Scheme to inform future schemes.62 We therefore asked the Department about examples
of where it had identified and responded to lessons from the Scheme. The Department
said that it had implemented learnings in the new Recovery Loan Scheme where it has
applied different data requirements on lenders. In addition, the Department explained
that it had made “big progress” on its capability on data and data-sharing. It asserted
that such data capability would put it in a “stronger position” if it were to do something
similar again; for example in adapting ongoing support in local authority grant schemes.63
Alongside having data capability from the start, the Department highlighted that it will
retain its “stronger fraud capability” from its initial counter-fraud team of two full-time
equivalent staff.64
25. We were concerned that the Department should have identified these lessons when
it supported businesses in the 2008 Financial Crisis. In 2010, the NAO’s report on the
Department’s support to business during a recession concluded that the “impact [of the
Department’s response to the financial crisis] could have been improved by thinking
through how it might respond at an earlier stage”.65 We asked the Department whether
more preparation could have been done for a situation such as the pandemic, and why
there had not appeared to be the degree of forward planning or contingency planning that
would have proved useful. The Department explained it was able to apply some contingency
plans from its preparation for a no-deal exit from the European Union. However, neither
the Department nor the Bank foresaw the desperate situation that the economy found itself
in as a result of the pandemic, and they maintained that it was not something government
would have planned for.66 The Bank, however, recognised that it would have been in a
better starting position for delivering loans if it had invested in data management and IT
infrastructure earlier.67 The Department acknowledged that ‘corporate memory’ was a
challenge, and we welcome the Department’s planned evaluation of the Scheme to draw
lessons learnt. However, neither the Department nor the Bank provided any plans on how
it intends to share the lessons-learned across government.68
26. We asked whether, with hindsight and more time, it would have been possible to
design a scheme that would have had significantly less exposure to fraud and error than
61 Q104; Public Accounts Committee, Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme, Thirty-Third Report of Session 2019–21,
HC 687, 16 December 2020, para 19
62 Public Accounts Committee, Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme, Thirty-Third Report of Session 2019–21, HC
687, 16 December 2020, para 6
63 Qq 22, 69, 89–90
64 Qq 89–90; C&AG’s Report, para 17
65 Comptroller & Auditor General, Support to businesses during a recession, Session 2009–2010, HC 490, 26 March
2010, para 18
66 Q 68
67 Q 91
68 Qq 10, 105
18 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
the Scheme. The Department explained that a situation where it needs to introduce a
support scheme with a 100% guarantee and achieve a fast disbursement would “probably
be more infrequent than once-in-a-generation events”. However, it acknowledged that it
would now be better prepared as it has better data sharing in place and can take advantage
of counter-fraud measures like “duplicate flags” or the “HMRC turnover checks”.69
69 Qq 68, 70
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 19
Formal minutes
Wednesday 20 April 2022
Members present:
Dame Meg Hillier, in the Chair
Shaun Bailey
Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown
Dan Carden
Mr Louie French
Peter Grant
Kate Green
Sarah Olney
Nick Smith
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
Draft Report (Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up), proposed by the Chair, brought up
and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 26 read and agreed to.
Summary agreed to.
Introduction agreed to.
Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Fiftieth of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the
provisions of Standing Order No. 134.
Adjournment
Adjourned till Monday 25 April at 3:30pm
20 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
Witnesses
The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications
page of the Committee’s website.
Monday 10 January 2022
Sarah Munby, Permanent Secretary, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy; Charles Roxburgh, Second Permanent Secretary, HM Treasury;
Catherine Lewis La Torre, Chief Executive, British Business Bank; Sheldon Mills,
Executive Director Consumers and Competition, Financial Conduct Authority;
Patrick Magee, Chief Commercial Officer, British Business Bank Q1–105
Published written evidence
The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications
page of the Committee’s website.
BLS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.
1 Equifax Ltd (BLS0001)
2 College of Business, Law and Social Sciences, University of Derby; and Professor Paul
Nightingale (Professor, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex Business
School) (BLS0002)
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 21
List of Reports from the Committee
during the current Parliament
All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the
Committee’s website.
Session 2021–22
Number Title Reference
1st Low emission cars HC 186
2nd BBC strategic financial management HC 187
3rd COVID-19: Support for children’s education HC 240
4th COVID-19: Local government finance HC 239
5th COVID-19: Government Support for Charities HC 250
6th Public Sector Pensions HC 289
7th Adult Social Care Markets HC 252
8th COVID 19: Culture Recovery Fund HC 340
9th Fraud and Error HC 253
10th Overview of the English rail system HC 170
11th Local auditor reporting on local government in England HC 171
12th COVID 19: Cost Tracker Update HC 173
13th Initial lessons from the government’s response to the HC 175
COVID-19 pandemic
14th Windrush Compensation Scheme HC 174
15th DWP Employment support HC 177
16th Principles of effective regulation HC 176
17th High Speed 2: Progress at Summer 2021 HC 329
18th Government’s delivery through arm’s-length bodies HC 181
19th Protecting consumers from unsafe products HC 180
20th Optimising the defence estate HC 179
21st School Funding HC 183
22nd Improving the performance of major defence equipment HC 185
contracts
23rd Test and Trace update HC 182
24th Crossrail: A progress update HC 184
25th The Department for Work and Pensions’ Accounts 2020–21 – HC 633
Fraud and error in the benefits system
26th Lessons from Greensill Capital: accreditation to business HC 169
support schemes
27th Green Homes Grant Voucher Scheme HC 635
22 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
Number Title Reference
28th Efficiency in government HC 636
29th The National Law Enforcement Data Programme HC 638
30th Challenges in implementing digital change HC 637
31st Environmental Land Management Scheme HC 639
32nd Delivering gigabitcapable broadband HC 743
33rd Underpayments of the State Pension HC 654
34th Local Government Finance System: Overview and Challenges HC 646
35th The pharmacy early payment and salary advance schemes in HC 745
the NHS
36th EU Exit: UK Border post transition HC 746
37th HMRC Performance in 2020–21 HC 641
38th COVID-19 cost tracker update HC 640
39th DWP Employment Support: Kickstart Scheme HC 655
40th Excess votes 2020–21: Serious Fraud Office HC 1099
41st Achieving Net Zero: Follow up HC 642
42nd Financial sustainability of schools in England HC 650
43rd Reducing the backlog in criminal courts HC 643
44th NHS backlogs and waiting times in England HC 747
45th Progress with trade negotiations HC 993
46th Government preparedness for the COVID-19 pandemic: HC 952
lessons for government on risk
47th Academies Sector Annual Report and Accounts 2019/20 HC 994
48th HMRC’s management of tax debt HC 953
49th Regulation of private renting HC 996
1st Special Fifth Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public HC 222
Report Accounts
Session 2019–21
Number Title Reference
1st Support for children with special educational needs and HC 85
disabilities
2nd Defence Nuclear Infrastructure HC 86
3rd High Speed 2: Spring 2020 Update HC 84
4th EU Exit: Get ready for Brexit Campaign HC 131
5th University technical colleges HC 87
6th Excess votes 2018–19 HC 243
Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up 23
Number Title Reference
7th Gambling regulation: problem gambling and protecting HC 134
vulnerable people
8th NHS capital expenditure and financial management HC 344
9th Water supply and demand management HC 378
10th Defence capability and the Equipment Plan HC 247
11th Local authority investment in commercial property HC 312
12th Management of tax reliefs HC 379
13th Whole of Government Response to COVID-19 HC 404
14th Readying the NHS and social care for the COVID-19 peak HC 405
15th Improving the prison estate HC 244
16th Progress in remediating dangerous cladding HC 406
17th Immigration enforcement HC 407
18th NHS nursing workforce HC 408
19th Restoration and renewal of the Palace of Westminster HC 549
20th Tackling the tax gap HC 650
21st Government support for UK exporters HC 679
22nd Digital transformation in the NHS HC 680
23rd Delivering carrier strike HC 684
24th Selecting towns for the Towns Fund HC 651
25th Asylum accommodation and support transformation HC 683
programme
26th Department of Work and Pensions Accounts 2019–20 HC 681
27th Covid-19: Supply of ventilators HC 685
28th The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s management of HC 653
the Magnox contract
29th Whitehall preparations for EU Exit HC 682
30th The production and distribution of cash HC 654
31st Starter Homes HC 88
32nd Specialist Skills in the civil service HC 686
33rd Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme HC 687
34th Covid-19: Support for jobs HC 920
35th Improving Broadband HC 688
36th HMRC performance 2019–20 HC 690
37th Whole of Government Accounts 2018–19 HC 655
38th Managing colleges’ financial sustainability HC 692
39th Lessons from major projects and programmes HC 694
40th Achieving government’s long-term environmental goals HC 927
24 Bounce Back Loans Scheme: Follow-up
Number Title Reference
41st COVID 19: the free school meals voucher scheme HC 689
42nd COVID-19: Government procurement and supply of Personal HC 928
Protective Equipment
43rd COVID-19: Planning for a vaccine Part 1 HC 930
44th Excess Votes 2019–20 HC 1205
45th Managing flood risk HC 931
46th Achieving Net Zero HC 935
47th COVID-19: Test, track and trace (part 1) HC 932
48th Digital Services at the Border HC 936
49th COVID-19: housing people sleeping rough HC 934
50th Defence Equipment Plan 2020–2030 HC 693
51st Managing the expiry of PFI contracts HC 1114
52nd Key challenges facing the Ministry of Justice HC 1190
53rd Covid 19: supporting the vulnerable during lockdown HC 938
54th Improving single living accommodation for service personnel HC 940
55th Environmental tax measures HC 937
56th Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund HC 941
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