H.R. 3524, Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act
Summary
H.R. 3524, the Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act (EAGLE Act), is a bill to revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. It was introduced in the House of Representatives May 25, 2021, by Mr. Meeks and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and other committees. This reported version records that the Committee on Foreign Affairs reported it with an amendment on December 30, 2022. The table of contents begins with Title I, Investing in American Competitiveness, with subtitles on science and technology, global infrastructure and energy development, economic diplomacy and leadership, and financial diplomacy and leadership.
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“H.R. 3524, Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act.”
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IB
Union Calendar No. 486
117TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION
H. R. 3524
[Report No. 117–667, Part I]
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and
engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 25, 2021
Mr. MEEKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Serv-
ices, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Se-
lect), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each
case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of
the committee concerned
DECEMBER 30, 2022
Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]
DECEMBER 30, 2022
Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intel-
ligence (Permanent Select) discharged; committed to the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on May 25, 2021]
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A BILL
To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, invest-
ment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and
globally.
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1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘En-
5 suring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act’’
6 or the ‘‘EAGLE Act’’.
7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
8 this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 6. Rules of construction.
TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
Subtitle A—Science and Technology
Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply
chain diversification and management.
Sec. 102. Report on national technology and industrial base.
Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development
Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment
standards.
Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from the People’s Republic of China.
Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
Sec. 115. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign en-
ergy development.
Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership
Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order.
Sec. 122. Review of trade and economic engagement globally of the People’s Re-
public of China.
Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pa-
cific.
Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation.
Sec. 125. Strategy on deterrence of economic coercion.
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Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
Sec. 127. Digital trade agreements.
Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.
Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition.
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Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership
Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy.
Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leader-
ship.
Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets.
Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to cross-
border payment and financial messaging systems.
TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters
Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation.
Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group.
Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
Sec. 206. Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries.
Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership.
Sec. 209. Taiwan diplomatic review.
Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act.
Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act.
Sec. 212. Taiwan Fellowship Program.
Sec. 213. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the
Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking.
Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utiliza-
tion of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018.
Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International Development Fi-
nance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing.
Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic
national security and economic objectives.
Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center.
Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic.
Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
Sec. 219D. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and
the Caribbean.
Sec. 219E. China Watcher Program.
Sec. 219F. Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language.
Sec. 219G. Oversight of funds made available through the American Rescue Plan
Act of 2021.
Sec. 219H. Requirements relating to vaccine branding.
Subtitle B—International Security Matters
Sec. 221. Appropriate committees of Congress.
Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training
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in the Indo-Pacific.
Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international
waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial
land features in the South China Sea.
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Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners.
Sec. 225. Statement of policy regarding the threat posed by the Chinese Com-
munist Party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Sec. 226. Identification of PLA–supported institutions.
Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power
Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement.
Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America’s multilateral engagement.
Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations.
Sec. 234. Junior professional officers.
Sec. 235. Report on American employment in international organizations.
Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power
Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the
world.
PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations.
Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding China’s arbitrary imprisonment of Cana-
dian citizens.
Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human
rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in
Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean re-
garding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive
surveillance technologies.
Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China’s Belt and Road
Initiative.
Sec. 250. United States-Caribbean Resilience Partnership.
Sec. 251. Countering China’s educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin Amer-
ica.
Sec. 252. Narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean.
PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS
Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on transatlantic relationships.
Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China.
Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector fi-
nance.
Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and be-
tween China and Russia.
PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia.
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Sec. 263. Indian Ocean region strategic review.
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PART IV—AFRICA
Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People’s
Republic of China in Africa.
Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa.
Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa.
Sec. 274. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative.
Sec. 275. Africa broadcasting networks.
Sec. 276. Africa energy security and diversification.
PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East
and North Africa.
Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement.
Sec. 283. Sense of Congress on People’s Republic of China-Iran relationship.
PART VI—ARCTIC REGION
Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy.
Sec. 286. Statement of policy regarding observer status for Taiwan on the Arctic
Council.
PART VII—OCEANIA
Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap.
Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue.
Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships.
PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS
Sec. 295. Short title.
Sec. 296. Findings.
Sec. 297. Statement of policy.
Sec. 298. Definition.
Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports.
Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies and partners.
Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299D. International law enforcement academy for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299E. Security assistance for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299F. Countering transnational crime.
Sec. 299G. Emergency preparedness initiative for the Pacific Islands.
Sec. 299H. Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands.
TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES
Sec. 301. Statement of Congress on the continued violation of rights and freedoms
of the people of Hong Kong.
Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong
Kong.
Sec. 303. Hong Kong people’s freedom and choice.
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Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police force.
Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor.
Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection.
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Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that
commit human rights abuses.
Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet.
Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the succession or
reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Ti-
betan Buddhists.
Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall
circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong.
Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China.
Sec. 313. Modifications to and reauthorization of sanctions with respect to human
rights violations.
Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to inter-
national abuses of human rights.
Sec. 316. Policy toward the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII
Paralympic Winter Games.
Sec. 317. Review and controls on export of items with critical capabilities to en-
able human rights abuses.
Sec. 318. Sense of Congress on commercial export control policy.
Sec. 319. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abor-
tion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implanta-
tion in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Sec. 320. Sense of Congress regarding censorship of political speech.
Sec. 321. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China ex-
ploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and protec-
tions.
Sec. 322. Sense of Congress regarding annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices.
Sec. 323. Sense of Congress regarding press freedom in the People’s Republic of
China.
Sec. 324. United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province.
Sec. 325. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group.
Sec. 326. Public disclosure on BIS licensing information.
TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT
Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the People’s Republic of China’s industrial
policy.
Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams.
Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy.
Sec. 404. Annual report on Chinese surveillance companies.
TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY
Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.
Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of China
on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues.
Sec. 503. Countering the People’s Republic of China’s proliferation of ballistic
missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle East.
TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE
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Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with the People’s
Republic of China and other countries account for environmental
issues and climate change.
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Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate disruptions.
Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China.
Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the People’s Republic
of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and economic
interests.
Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy.
Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, adaptation, and
security.
Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and high-
GWP hydrofluorocarbons.
Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological innovation
through the Green Climate Fund.
Sec. 610. Ensuring a whole-of-government response to climate action.
Sec. 611. Working with international partners to reduce deforestation.
Sec. 612. Controlling the export of electronic waste to protect United States sup-
ply chains.
1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
2 In this Act:
3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term ‘‘appro-
5 priate congressional committees’’ means—
6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
7 the Senate; and
8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
9 House of Representatives.
10 (2) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese
11 Communist Party.
12 (3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The
13 terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean
14 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.
15 (4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and
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16 ‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China.
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1 SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
2 Congress makes the following findings:
3 (1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is
4 leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili-
5 tary, technological, and ideological power to become a
6 strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United
7 States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC
8 in these domains are contrary to the interests and
9 values of the United States, its partners, and much
10 of the rest of the world.
11 (2) A number of policies being pursued by the
12 PRC—
13 (A) threaten the future character of the
14 international order and are shaping the rules,
15 norms, and institutions that govern relations
16 among states;
17 (B) will put at risk the ability of the
18 United States to secure its national interests;
19 and
20 (C) will put at risk the future peace, pros-
21 perity, and freedom of the international commu-
22 nity in the coming decades.
23 (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with
24 the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked
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25 to advance the PRC’s economic and social develop-
26 ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefited
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1 from, the free and open international order. The
2 United States pursued these goals and contributed to
3 the welfare of the Chinese people by—
4 (A) increasing the PRC’s trade relations
5 and access to global capital markets;
6 (B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the
7 World Trade Organization;
8 (C) providing development finance and
9 technical assistance;
10 (D) promoting research collaboration;
11 (E) educating the PRC’s top students;
12 (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge
13 technologies and scientific knowledge; and
14 (G) providing intelligence and military as-
15 sistance.
16 (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to
17 pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an
18 increasingly authoritarian governance model at home
19 through increased restrictions on personal freedoms,
20 and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These
21 policies frequently and deliberately undermine United
22 States interests and are contrary to core United
23 States values and the values of other nations, both in
24 the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this stra-
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25 tegic decision of the CCP, the United States has been
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1 compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy to-
2 wards the PRC and reanimate its defense of the inter-
3 national order.
4 (5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the
5 Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Xi
6 Jinping, has elevated the ‘‘Great Rejuvenation of the
7 Chinese Nation’’ as central to the domestic and for-
8 eign policy of the PRC. His program demands—
9 (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;
10 (B) concentration of military power;
11 (C) a dominant role for the CCP in the
12 state and the economy;
13 (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking
14 control over broadly asserted territorial claims;
15 and
16 (E) the denial of any universal values and
17 individual rights that are deemed to threaten the
18 CCP.
19 (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of govern-
20 ance as superior to, and at odds with, the constitu-
21 tional models of the United States and other democ-
22 racies. This approach to governance is lauded by the
23 CCP as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a
24 global leader, and to shaping the future of the world.
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25 In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, ‘‘We
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1 firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese charac-
2 teristics develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that
3 the superiority of our socialist system will be increas-
4 ingly apparent . . . [and] our country’s road of devel-
5 opment will have increasingly greater influence on the
6 world.’’.
7 (7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish re-
8 gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use
9 that dominant position to propel the PRC to become
10 the ‘‘leading world power’’, shaping an international
11 order that is conducive to the its interests. Achieving
12 these objectives requires turning the PRC into a
13 wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a
14 strong military and advanced technological capability
15 to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of other
16 countries’ interests.
17 (8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
18 national order, which is built upon the rule of law
19 and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
20 ducting global information and influence operations,
21 seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
22 align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the le-
23 gitimacy of internationally recognized human rights,
24 and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of
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25 multinational organizations for the benefit of the
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1 PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense
2 of the interests of the United States and the inter-
3 national community.
4 (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to
5 follow its model of development and governance. Dur-
6 ing the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Sec-
7 retary Xi said that the PRC could serve as a model
8 of development for other countries by utilizing ‘‘Chi-
9 nese wisdom’’ and a ‘‘Chinese approach to solving
10 problems’’.
11 (10) The PRC is promoting its governance model
12 and attempting to weaken other models of governance
13 by—
14 (A) undermining democratic institutions;
15 (B) subverting financial institutions;
16 (C) coercing businesses to accommodate the
17 policies of the PRC; and
18 (D) using disinformation to disguise the na-
19 ture of the actions described in subparagraphs
20 (A) through (C).
21 (11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming
22 the global leader in science and technology. In May
23 2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to
24 reach ‘‘prosperity and rejuvenation’’, it needs to ‘‘en-
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25 deavor to be a major world center for science and in-
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1 novation’’. The PRC has invested the equivalent of
2 billions of dollars into education and research and de-
3 velopment and established joint scientific research
4 centers and science universities.
5 (12) The PRC’s drive to become a ‘‘manufac-
6 turing and technological superpower’’ and to promote
7 ‘‘innovation with Chinese characteristics’’ is coming
8 at the expense of human rights and longstanding
9 international rules and norms with respect to eco-
10 nomic competition, and presents a challenge to
11 United States national security and the security of
12 allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the
13 PRC advances its illiberal political and social poli-
14 cies through mass surveillance, social credit systems,
15 and a significant role of the state in internet govern-
16 ance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct
17 and indirect government control over its citizens’ ev-
18 eryday lives. Its national strategy of ‘‘civil-military
19 fusion’’ mandates that civil and commercial research,
20 which increasingly drives global innovation, is lever-
21 aged to develop new military capabilities.
22 (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means
23 to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing
24 and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-di-
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25 rected industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to
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1 ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP
2 engages in and encourages actions that actively un-
3 dermine a free and open international market, such
4 as intellectual property theft, forced technology trans-
5 fers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and manda-
6 tory CCP access to proprietary data as part of busi-
7 ness and commercial agreements between Chinese and
8 foreign companies.
9 (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13)
10 are designed to freeze United States and other foreign
11 firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competi-
12 tion in other important markets. The heavy subsidiza-
13 tion of Chinese companies includes potential violation
14 of its World Trade Organization commitments. In
15 May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC
16 aims to keep the ‘‘initiatives of innovation and devel-
17 opment security . . . in [China’s] own hands’’.
18 (15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives
19 through a variety of avenues, including its signature
20 initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in
21 this section as ‘‘BRI’’), which is enshrined in the Chi-
22 nese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road
23 and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a
24 straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all
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25 countries. Eventually, it seeks to create a web of eco-
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1 nomic relations with the PRC at its center, making
2 it the most concrete geographical representation of the
3 PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the economic
4 influence of state-owned PRC firms in global markets,
5 enhances the PRC’s political leverage with govern-
6 ment leaders around the world, and provides greater
7 access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways.
8 Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference
9 through economic dependence.
10 (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish re-
11 gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace
12 the United States from the region. As a Pacific
13 power, the United States has built and supported en-
14 during alliances and economic partnerships that se-
15 cure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of
16 law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo-
17 Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and mili-
18 tary coercion in the region to secure its own interests.
19 (17) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep
20 the United States military from operating in the
21 Western Pacific and erodes United States security
22 guarantees.
23 (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive
24 control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air
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25 space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually
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1 exercising greater influence beyond the region. This
2 includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy
3 exploration, transport, and the exercise of security op-
4 erations in areas permitted under international law.
5 (19) The PRC seeks so-called ‘‘reunification’’
6 with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately
7 be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called ‘‘re-
8 unification’’ is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal
9 inherently coercive. In January 2019, General Sec-
10 retary Xi stated that the PRC ‘‘make[s] no promise
11 to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option
12 of taking all necessary means’’. Taiwan’s embodiment
13 of democratic values and economic liberalism chal-
14 lenges General Secretary Xi’s goal of achieving na-
15 tional rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Tai-
16 wan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island
17 Chain and to project power into the Second Island
18 Chain and beyond.
19 (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-
20 cuted an illegal island-building campaign that threat-
21 ens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of com-
22 merce, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA
23 power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimi-
24 dates other regional claimants in an effort to advance
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25 its unlawful claims and control the waters around
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1 neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi’s
2 September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC
3 was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the
4 2017 19th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi an-
5 nounced that ‘‘construction on islands and reefs in
6 the South China Sea have seen steady progress’’.
7 (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA
8 to attain a level of capacity and capability superior
9 to the United States in terms of equipment and con-
10 duct of modern military operations by shifting its
11 military doctrine from having a force ‘‘adequate [for]
12 China’s defensive needs’’ to having a force ‘‘commen-
13 surate with China’s international status’’. Ultimately,
14 this transformation could enable China to impose its
15 will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of
16 military force. In 2017, General Secretary Xi estab-
17 lished the following developmental benchmarks for the
18 advancement of the PLA:
19 (A) A mechanized force with increased
20 informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.
21 (B) The complete modernization of China’s
22 national defense by 2035.
23 (C) The full transformation of the PLA into
24 a world-class force by 2050.
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1 (22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting policies
2 described in this section undermine United States in-
3 terests, such as—
4 (A) upholding a free and open international
5 order;
6 (B) maintaining the integrity of inter-
7 national institutions with liberal norms and val-
8 ues;
9 (C) preserving a favorable balance of power
10 in the Indo-Pacific;
11 (D) ensuring the defense of its allies;
12 (E) preserving open sea and air lanes;
13 (F) fostering the free flow of commerce
14 through open and transparent markets; and
15 (G) promoting individual freedom and
16 human rights.
17 (23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has inten-
18 sified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s be-
19 havior and therefore increased the need for United
20 States global leadership and a competitive posture.
21 The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the
22 COVID–19 pandemic by—
23 (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong
24 Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called
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25 ‘‘national security law’’ on Hong Kong;
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1 (B) aggressively imposing its will in the
2 East and South China Seas;
3 (C) increasing its territorial aggression in
4 South Asia, including against India; and
5 (D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
6 ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
7 scure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up
8 the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion
9 about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
10 credit the United States, its allies, and global
11 health efforts.
12 (24) The CCP’s disinformation campaign re-
13 ferred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included—
14 (A) concerted efforts, in the early days of
15 the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope
16 of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well
17 as cases of person-to-person transmission;
18 (B) claims that the virus originated in
19 United States biological defense research at Fort
20 Detrick, Maryland;
21 (C) Chinese state media reports insinuating
22 a possible link between the virus and other
23 United States biological facilities; and
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1 (D) efforts to block access to qualified inter-
2 national infectious disease experts who might
3 contradict the CCP’s narrative.
4 (25) In response to the PRC’s strategy and poli-
5 cies, the United States must adopt a policy of stra-
6 tegic competition with the PRC to protect and pro-
7 mote our vital interests and values.
8 (26) The United States policy of strategic com-
9 petition with respect to the People’s Republic of
10 China is part of a broader strategic approach to the
11 Indo-Pacific and the world that aligns with coopera-
12 tion with United States allies and partners to ad-
13 vance shared values and interests and to preserve and
14 enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-
15 based, stable, and diverse region.
16 (27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
17 (Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive
18 framework for promoting United State security inter-
19 ests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pa-
20 cific region, investing $7,500,000,000 over 5 years—
21 (A) to support greater security and defense
22 cooperation between the United States and allies
23 and partners in the Indo-Pacific region;
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1 (B) to advance democracy and the protec-
2 tion and promotion of human rights in the Indo-
3 Pacific region;
4 (C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation be-
5 tween the United States and partners in the
6 Indo-Pacific;
7 (D) to deepen people-to-people engagement
8 through programs such as the Young Southeast
9 Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth
10 Volunteers program; and
11 (E) to enhance energy cooperation and en-
12 ergy security in the Indo-Pacific region.
13 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
14 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United States
15 to pursue the following objectives:
16 (1) The United States global leadership role is
17 sustained and its political system and major founda-
18 tions of national power are secured for the long-term
19 in the political, economic, technological, and military
20 domains.
21 (2) The United States position as an indispen-
22 sable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sus-
23 tained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and en-
24 gagement.
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1 (3) The United States deters military confronta-
2 tion with the PRC and both nations work to reduce
3 the risk of conflict.
4 (4) The United States and its allies maintain a
5 stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with
6 China. The United States and its allies maintain un-
7 fettered access to the region, including through free-
8 dom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, con-
9 sistent with international law and practice.
10 (5) The allies and partners of the United
11 States—
12 (A) maintain confidence in United States
13 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
14 cific region;
15 (B) can withstand and combat subversion
16 by the PRC; and
17 (C) work closely with the United States in
18 setting global rules, norms, and standards that
19 benefit the international community.
20 (6) The combined economic and military
21 strength of the United States and its allies and part-
22 ners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of at-
23 tempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential
24 benefits.
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1 (7) The United States leads the free, open, and
2 rules-based international order, which comprises resil-
3 ient states and institutions that uphold and defend
4 principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, indi-
5 vidual freedom, and human rights. The international
6 order is strong enough to withstand attempts at desta-
7 bilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors.
8 (8) The key rules, norms, and standards of inter-
9 national engagement in the 21st century are main-
10 tained, including—
11 (A) the protection of human rights, commer-
12 cial engagement and investment, and technology;
13 and
14 (B) that such rules, norms, and standards
15 are in alignment with the values and interests of
16 the United States, its allies and partners, and
17 other stakeholders in the liberal international
18 order.
19 (9) The United States counters attempts by the
20 PRC to—
21 (A) undermine open and democratic soci-
22 eties;
23 (B) distort global markets;
24 (C) manipulate the international trade sys-
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25 tem;
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1 (D) coerce other nations via economic,
2 cyber, and military means; or
3 (E) use its technological advantages to un-
4 dermine individual freedoms or other states’ na-
5 tional security interests.
6 (10) The United States deters military con-
7 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to re-
8 duce the risk of conflict.
9 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in
10 pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—
11 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic
12 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic
13 growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
14 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that
15 improve the ability of the United States to pursue its
16 vital economic, foreign policy, and national security
17 interests;
18 (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition
19 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic,
20 development, security, informational, and techno-
21 logical realms to maximize the United States’
22 strengths and increase the costs for the PRC of harm-
23 ing the interests and values of the United States and
24 its partners and allies;
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1 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international
2 system characterized by the rule of law, open markets
3 and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commit-
4 ment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes,
5 human rights, good and transparent governance, and
6 freedom from coercion;
7 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
8 ances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral
9 and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance
10 shared interests and values and bolster partner coun-
11 tries’ confidence that the United States is and will re-
12 main a strong, committed, and reliable partner that
13 respects the views and interests of its allies and
14 friends;
15 (5) to encourage and collaborate with United
16 States allies and partners in boosting their own capa-
17 bilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect
18 shared interests and values, free from coercion and ex-
19 ternal pressure;
20 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and
21 healthy, constructive competition in United States-
22 China economic relations by—
23 (A) advancing policies that harden the
24 United States economy against unfair and ille-
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1 gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
2 ercion of United States businesses; and
3 (B) improving United States laws and reg-
4 ulations as necessary to prevent any PRC at-
5 tempts to harm United States economic competi-
6 tiveness;
7 (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led
8 growth in emerging markets around the world, in-
9 cluding through the use of United States Government
10 tools that—
11 (A) support greater private sector invest-
12 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives
13 that are grounded in the rule of law;
14 (B) promote open markets;
15 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory
16 frameworks;
17 (D) improve the management of key eco-
18 nomic sectors;
19 (E) combat corruption;
20 (F) foster and support greater collaboration
21 with and among partner countries and the
22 United States private sector to develop secure
23 and sustainable infrastructure; and
24 (G) support American workers and create
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25 American jobs;
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1 (8) to play a leading role in advancing inter-
2 national rules and norms that foster free and recip-
3 rocal trade and open and integrated markets;
4 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in
5 support of United States companies and businesses in
6 partner countries that seek fair competition;
7 (10) to ensure that the United States is second
8 to none in the innovation of critical and emerging
9 technologies, such as next-generation telecommuni-
10 cations, artificial intelligence, quantum computing,
11 semiconductors, and biotechnology, by—
12 (A) providing necessary investment and
13 concrete incentives for the private sector to accel-
14 erate development of such technologies;
15 (B) modernizing export controls and invest-
16 ment screening regimes and associated policies
17 and regulations;
18 (C) enhancing the role of the United States
19 in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues
20 for developing norms regarding the use of emerg-
21 ing critical technologies;
22 (D) reducing United States barriers and in-
23 creasing incentives for collaboration with allies
24 and partners on the research and co-development
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25 of critical technologies;
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1 (E) collaborating with allies and partners
2 to protect critical technologies by—
3 (i) coordinating and aligning export
4 control measures;
5 (ii) building capacity for defense tech-
6 nology security;
7 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in stra-
8 tegically critical supply chains; and
9 (iv) ensuring diversification; and
10 (F) designing major defense capabilities for
11 export to vetted allies and partners;
12 (11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies
13 and other willing partners to promote ideals and
14 principles that—
15 (A) advance a free and open international
16 order;
17 (B) strengthen democratic institutions;
18 (C) protect and promote human rights; and
19 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
20 porting;
21 (12) to develop comprehensive strategies and
22 policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns;
23 (13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the
24 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other
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25 multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity
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1 and effectiveness of these organizations in facilitating
2 solutions to global challenges;
3 (14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental
4 freedoms and human rights in the United States rela-
5 tionship with the PRC;
6 (15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
7 tilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a
8 free and open order and address regional and global
9 challenges posed by the Government of the PRC re-
10 garding—
11 (A) violations and abuses of human rights;
12 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and
13 (C) the undermining and abrogation of
14 treaties, other international agreements, and
15 other international norms related to human
16 rights;
17 (16) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re-
18 pression, and coercion to attain unfair economic ad-
19 vantages or compel other nations to defer to its polit-
20 ical and strategic objectives in ways that threaten the
21 United States or its allies and partners;
22 (17) to maintain United States access to the
23 Western Pacific, including through necessary invest-
24 ments in United States military capabilities, policies,
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25 and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust co-
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1 operation, exercises, and interoperability with allies
2 and partners;
3 (18) to deter the PRC from—
4 (A) initiating armed conflict;
5 (B) coercing nations; or
6 (C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of
7 armed conflict;
8 (19) to strengthen United States-PRC military-
9 to-military communication and improve both mili-
10 tary and civilian crisis avoidance and management
11 procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the
12 risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level
13 visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and
14 military officials and other measures, in alignment
15 with United States interests; and
16 (20) to strengthen stability and reduce sus-
17 picions, cooperate with the PRC when interests align,
18 including through bilateral or multilateral means and
19 at the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially
20 in the following areas—
21 (A) global fight against climate change;
22 (B) nuclear security; and
23 (C) global financial stability.
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1 SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
2 It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the pol-
3 icy described in section 3(b) requires the following actions:
4 (1) Revitalizing American leadership globally
5 and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United
6 States—
7 (A) to marshal sustained political will to
8 protect its vital interests, promote its values, and
9 advance its economic and national security ob-
10 jectives; and
11 (B) to achieve this sustained political will,
12 persuade the American people and United States
13 allies and partners of—
14 (i) the current challenges facing the
15 international rules based order; and
16 (ii) the need for long-term investments
17 and engagement to defend shared interests
18 and values.
19 (2) The United States must coordinate closely
20 with allies and partners to compete effectively with
21 the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners
22 to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing
23 and checking aggressive PRC behavior.
24 (3) Effective United States strategy toward
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25 China requires—
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1 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress;
2 and
3 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful col-
4 laboration and consultation between the executive
5 branch and Congress.
6 (4) The United States must ensure close integra-
7 tion among economic and foreign policymakers and
8 provide support to the private sector, civil society,
9 universities and academic institutions, and other rel-
10 evant actors in free and open societies to enable such
11 actors—
12 (A) to collaborate to advance common inter-
13 ests; and
14 (B) to identify appropriate policies—
15 (i) to strengthen the United States and
16 its allies; and
17 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of
18 a free and open order.
19 (5) The United States must ensure that all Fed-
20 eral departments, agencies, and overseas missions are
21 organized and resourced to effectively defend and ad-
22 vance United States interests, by—
23 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-
24 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in
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25 Washington, DC;
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1 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign serv-
2 ice officers, international development profes-
3 sionals, members of the foreign commercial serv-
4 ice, intelligence professionals, and other United
5 States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific
6 region; and
7 (C) ensuring that this workforce has the
8 training, demonstrated proficiency in language
9 and culture, technical skills, and other com-
10 petencies required to advance a successful strat-
11 egy in relation to the PRC.
12 (6) The United States must place renewed pri-
13 ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary
14 instruments of national power, including diplomacy,
15 information, technology, economics, foreign assistance
16 and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and
17 law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the
18 challenges posed by the PRC.
19 (7) The United States must sustain military ca-
20 pabilities necessary to achieve United States political
21 objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including—
22 (A) promoting regional security in the
23 Indo-Pacific;
24 (B) reassuring allies and partners while
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1 (C) deterring PRC aggression and pre-
2 venting unwanted conflict.
3 (8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful
4 adaptation to the information environment of the 21st
5 century. United States public diplomacy and mes-
6 saging efforts must effectively—
7 (A) promote the value of partnership with
8 the United States; and
9 (B) counter CCP propaganda and
10 disinformation that threatens United States in-
11 terests.
12 SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
13 (a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON
14 ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.—Nothing in
15 this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede,
16 or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United
17 States Government under section 620M of the Foreign As-
18 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of
19 title 10, United States Code.
20 (b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY
21 FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-
22 izing the use of military force.
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1 TITLE I—INVESTING IN
2 AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS
3 Subtitle A—Science and Technology
4 SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-
5 PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-
6 SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.
7 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The
8 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
9 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate
10 the contracting by the Department of State for the profes-
11 sional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee
12 for service basis, to assist interested United States persons
13 and business entities with supply chain management issues
14 related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), includ-
15 ing—
16 (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating
17 certain production facilities to locations outside the
18 PRC;
19 (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-
20 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of
21 the PRC;
22 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
23 lenges in the course of the activities described in para-
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24 graphs (1) and (2); and
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1 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
2 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including
3 through providing market intelligence, facilitating
4 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate,
5 and other services.
6 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons con-
7 tracted to perform the services described in subsection (a)
8 shall—
9 (1) be under the authority of the United States
10 Chief of Mission in the country in which they are
11 hired, in accordance with existing United States laws;
12 (2) coordinate with Department of State and De-
13 partment of Commerce officers; and
14 (3) coordinate with United States missions and
15 relevant local partners in other countries as needed to
16 carry out the services described in subsection (a).
17 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
18 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in sub-
19 section (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small-
20 , and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters
21 described in subsection (a).
22 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
23 authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal
24 years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying out
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1 (e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY FOR-
2 EIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated pur-
3 suant to this section may be provided to an entity—
4 (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
5 fluence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP, or
6 other foreign adversary;
7 (2) determined to have beneficial ownership from
8 foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direc-
9 tion, or influence of foreign adversaries; and
10 (3) that has any contract in effect at the time of
11 the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract with-
12 in the previous one year that is no longer in effect,
13 with—
14 (A) the Government of the PRC;
15 (B) the CCP;
16 (C) the PLA;
17 (D) an entity majority-owned, majority-
18 controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern-
19 ment of the PRC, the CCP, or the PLA; or
20 (E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an
21 entity described in subparagraph (D).
22 (f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms ‘‘foreign ownership, con-
23 trol, or influence’’ and ‘‘FOCI’’ have the meanings given
24 to those terms in the National Industrial Security Program
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1 Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor docu-
2 ment.
3 SEC. 102. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUS-
4 TRIAL BASE.
5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
6 that—
7 (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated
8 approach, which leverages economies of scale with
9 major allies, is necessary for the United States to re-
10 tain its lead in defense technology;
11 (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer
12 of defense-related technologies and services to members
13 of the national technology and industrial base (as de-
14 fined in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code)
15 would advance United States security interests by
16 helping to leverage the defense-related technologies and
17 skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the de-
18 pendence on other countries, including countries that
19 pose challenges to United States interests around the
20 world, for defense-related innovation and investment;
21 and
22 (3) it is in the interest of the United States to
23 continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Can-
24 ada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
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25 Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-related
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1 technology and services and leverage the investments
2 of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maxi-
3 mize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology
4 innovation.
5 (b) REPORT.—
6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
8 State shall submit a report to the appropriate con-
9 gressional committees that—
10 (A) describes the Department of State’s ef-
11 forts to facilitate access among the national tech-
12 nology and industrial base to defense articles
13 and services subject to the United States Muni-
14 tions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms
15 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and
16 (B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, for-
17 eign policy, or other challenges or considerations
18 that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include
19 any gaps in the respective export control regimes
20 implemented by United Kingdom of Great Brit-
21 ain and Northern Ireland, Australia, or Canada.
22 (2) FORM.—This report required under para-
23 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a
24 classified annex.
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1 Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure
2 and Energy Development
3 SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
4 FINED.
5 In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of
6 Congress’’ means—
7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
8 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and
9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
10 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
11 resentatives.
12 SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-
13 ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-
14 ARDS.
15 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COLLABORATIVE STAND-
16 ARDS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
17 should initiate collaboration among governments, the pri-
18 vate sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of
19 the standards for quality global infrastructure development
20 advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with re-
21 spect to the following issues:
22 (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in
23 which infrastructure investments are made.
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24 (2) Anti-corruption.
25 (3) Rule of law.
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1 (4) Human rights and labor rights.
2 (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.
3 (6) Social and governance safeguards.
4 (7) Transparency.
5 (8) Environmental and energy standards.
6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMITMENT TO CO-
7 OPERATION.—It is the sense of Congress that the United
8 States should launch a series of fora around the world show-
9 casing the commitment of the United States and partners
10 of the United States to high-quality development coopera-
11 tion, including with respect to the issues described in sub-
12 section (a).
13 SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM
14 THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
15 (a) FINDING.—It is in the national interest of the
16 United States to establish a coordinated interagency strat-
17 egy to marshal the resources of the United States Govern-
18 ment to provide foreign countries with financing that
19 strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore
20 reduces a foreign government’s need to enter into agree-
21 ments with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), includ-
22 ing to obtain support from its Belt and Road Initiative.
23 (b) STRATEGY.—
24 (1) AUTHORITY.—Not later than 180 days after
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25 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
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1 shall develop and submit a strategy to the relevant
2 congressional committees to use the resources of Fed-
3 eral agencies to counteract offers of assistance and fi-
4 nancing from the PRC to foreign governments that
5 are of strategic importance to the United States.
6 (2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy
7 shall—
8 (A) identify primary sectors where the
9 United States could provide a competitive ad-
10 vantage to increase a country’s economic inde-
11 pendence;
12 (B) select countries with corresponding eco-
13 nomic needs, with priority given to those who
14 are vulnerable to Chinese economic influence;
15 (C) identify any corresponding existing fi-
16 nancing available from United States Govern-
17 ment entities to prioritize and devise specific fi-
18 nancing tailored to the needs of such foreign gov-
19 ernments if none are currently available;
20 (D) identify any cooperative and com-
21 plementary assistance and financing from
22 friendly foreign governments, including coordi-
23 nated assistance and co-financing;
24 (E) create a streamlined decision-making
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25 process, directed by the National Security Coun-
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1 cil, to devise financing and make agency deci-
2 sions and commitments on a timely basis to sup-
3 port United States competitive offers;
4 (F) establish a formal G7+European Com-
5 mission Working Group to develop a comprehen-
6 sive strategy to develop alternatives to the PRC’s
7 Belt and Road Initiative for development fi-
8 nance; and
9 (G) integrate existing efforts into the strat-
10 egy, including efforts to address the Government
11 of the PRC’s use of the United Nations to ad-
12 vance the Belt and Road Initiative, including
13 the proliferation of memoranda of understanding
14 between the PRC and United Nations funds and
15 programs regarding the implementation of the
16 Belt and Road Initiative.
17 (3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating
18 Federal agencies should include the Department of
19 State, Department of the Treasury, United States
20 Agency for International Development (USAID),
21 United States International Development Finance
22 Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation,
23 United States Trade and Development Agency, De-
24 partment of Commerce, and other Federal depart-
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25 ments and agencies as appropriate.
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1 (4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President
2 should issue an Executive Order to implement the
3 strategy and make such changes in agency regulations
4 and procedures as are necessary to put the strategy
5 into effect.
6 (5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—
7 In this section, the term ‘‘relevant congressional com-
8 mittees’’ means—
9 (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the
10 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Com-
11 mittee on Financial Services of the House of
12 Representatives; and
13 (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the
14 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Com-
15 mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
16 of the Senate.
17 (c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
18 tion with the Administrator of the USAID, is authorized
19 to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as the
20 ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’,
21 under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with
22 other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented
23 on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may
24 carry out various programs to advance the development of
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1 sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure
2 worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by—
3 (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to
4 improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and
5 procurement environments, and project preparation
6 capacity of countries that are partners of the United
7 States in such development;
8 (2) providing transaction advisory services and
9 project preparation assistance to support sustainable
10 infrastructure; and
11 (3) coordinating the provision of United States
12 assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-
13 cluding infrastructure that uses United States manu-
14 factured goods and services, and catalyzing invest-
15 ment led by the private sector.
16 (d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the
17 ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’ de-
18 scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au-
19 thorized to provide support, including through the Trans-
20 action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost
21 the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and
22 assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential
23 infrastructure projects, including through providing serv-
24 ices such as—
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25 (1) legal services;
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1 (2) project preparation and feasibility studies;
2 (3) debt sustainability analyses;
3 (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and
4 (5) other services relevant to advancing the devel-
5 opment of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality
6 infrastructure.
7 (e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.——
8 (1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastructure
9 Transaction and Assistance Network’’ described under
10 subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to
11 provide support, including through the Strategic In-
12 frastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project
13 preparation, pipeline development, and other infra-
14 structure project support.
15 (2) JOINT STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE
16 PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infra-
17 structure Fund should be used in coordination with
18 the Department of Defense, the International Develop-
19 ment Finance Corporation, like-minded donor part-
20 ners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to sup-
21 port joint infrastructure projects that are in the na-
22 tional security interest of the United States and vul-
23 nerable to strategic competitors.
24 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
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25 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022
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1 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and
2 Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 should be made
3 available for the Transaction Advisory Fund.
4 SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-
5 ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.
6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com-
7 prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
8 sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lend-
9 ing and financing, including in the form of providing sup-
10 port to companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of
11 China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the Govern-
12 ment of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing coun-
13 tries.
14 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to—
15 (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted en-
16 ergy needs and capacities of developing countries, and
17 analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state-
18 owned industries and other companies incorporated
19 in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and
20 financing of energy projects, including direct financ-
21 ing by the PRC government, PRC financial institu-
22 tions, or direct state support to state-owned enter-
23 prises and other companies incorporated in the PRC;
24 (2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
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25 portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power sec-
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1 tor reforms, to expand the development and deploy-
2 ment of advanced energy technologies in developing
3 countries;
4 (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and
5 other financial products on terms that advance do-
6 mestic economic and local employment opportunities,
7 utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage pri-
8 vate sector growth, and, when appropriate United
9 States equity and sovereign lending products as alter-
10 natives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chi-
11 nese financial institutions;
12 (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-
13 national financial and multilateral institutions to le-
14 verage investment in advanced energy technologies in
15 developing countries; and
16 (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the
17 cooperative development of advanced energy tech-
18 nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-
19 ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the ef-
20 fects of energy engagement by the PRC through preda-
21 tory lending or other actions that negatively impact
22 other countries.
23 (c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.—
24 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
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25 this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary
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1 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall
2 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a United
3 States Government strategy to increase United States ex-
4 ports of advanced energy technologies to—
5 (1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
6 oping countries;
7 (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and trans-
8 parent energy markets;
9 (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy
10 trading relationships; and
11 (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.
12 SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S
13 INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL-
14 OPMENT.
15 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
17 for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
18 priate committees of Congress a report that—
19 (1) identifies priority countries for deepening
20 United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
21 cordance with the economic and national security in-
22 terests of the United States and where deeper energy
23 partnerships are most achievable;
24 (2) describes the involvement of the Government
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25 of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and compa-
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1 nies incorporated in the PRC in the development, op-
2 eration, financing, or ownership of energy generation
3 facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy re-
4 sources in the countries identified in paragraph (1);
5 (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
6 implications for United States national interests and
7 the interests of the countries identified in paragraph
8 (1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and influ-
9 ence in developing country energy production or
10 transmission; and
11 (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the
12 United States to partner with the countries identified
13 in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support
14 shared interests between the United States and such
15 countries.
16 (b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in sub-
17 section (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s
18 website.
19 Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy
20 and Leadership
21 SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER.
22 Congress makes the following findings:
23 (1) The United States played a leadership role
24 in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms
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25 governing the international economic order following
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1 the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic
2 economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability.
3 (2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from
4 the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic
5 pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered
6 40 percent of the world economy, leading the 11 re-
7 maining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the Com-
8 prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa-
9 cific Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting
10 high-standard rules for regional economic engage-
11 ment.
12 (3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association
13 of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea,
14 China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed
15 the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
16 (RCEP), the world’s biggest trade deal in terms of
17 GDP.
18 (4) Reduced United States economic engagement
19 has led United States allies and partners to question
20 the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific re-
21 gion. Despite its distortive and unfair trade practices,
22 the People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of
23 this vacuum by deepening its partnerships in the re-
24 gion and promoting its own state-led economic model.
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1 (5) The United States is increasingly on the out-
2 side looking in with regards to economic pacts in the
3 Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these agree-
4 ments puts it at both a strategic and competitive dis-
5 advantage in the region and allows competitors to ex-
6 pand their economic influence at the United States’
7 expense.
8 (6) Given that these partnerships and agree-
9 ments will define the rules and norms that will gov-
10 ern regional commerce over the coming decades, the
11 United States is currently not well positioned to
12 shape the coming economic landscape.
13 (7) It is in the United States’ vital interest to
14 upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in
15 the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to
16 strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully par-
17 ticiple in the region’s economic dynamism.
18 SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT
19 GLOBALLY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
20 CHINA.
21 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
22 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-
23 ordination with the United States Trade Representative
24 and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to
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25 the appropriate congressional committees that describes the
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1 global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement of
2 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade,
3 including any bilateral or plurilateral trade and invest-
4 ment agreements it has signed, and their impact on the
5 United States economy, American companies and workers,
6 as well as on the countries that have entered into agree-
7 ments with the PRC and the global economy as a whole.
8 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall in-
9 clude the following:
10 (1) A survey and comparison of the PRC’s inter-
11 national economic practices, which will—
12 (A) provide an overview of the PRC’s dis-
13 tortive trade policies;
14 (B) list the PRC’s trade and investment
15 agreements globally, both agreements it has
16 signed or entered into and any ongoing negotia-
17 tions it has with individual countries or groups
18 of countries;
19 (C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC
20 uses to advance its international economic objec-
21 tives, including economic and commercial dia-
22 logues and BRI related activities;
23 (D) compare the United States and Chinese
24 approaches and priorities on trade and invest-
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1 ment with major global economies, United States
2 allies, and for each region of the world; and
3 (E) outline what further steps the PRC may
4 take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its eco-
5 nomic position and influence.
6 (2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC’s
7 trade and investment policies, including—
8 (A) the impact of these trade and invest-
9 ment agreements on the PRC’s economy, with a
10 focus on its trade and investment profile, the im-
11 pact on the PRC’s economic growth and per-cap-
12 ita income, and the impact on the profitability
13 and market share of Chinese companies and
14 SOEs;
15 (B) the impact of these agreements on the
16 PRC’s political and diplomatic relations with
17 the countries it entered into agreements with and
18 by region; and
19 (C) the impact of the PRC’s trade and in-
20 vestment relationships with other countries on
21 the market share of United States companies.
22 SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC
23 DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
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25 that United States national interests and the primacy of
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1 United States power in the Indo-Pacific are intimately tied
2 to the following economic objectives:
3 (1) Deepening United States trade and invest-
4 ment relationships in the region, especially with key
5 allies and partners.
6 (2) Confirming American leadership and par-
7 ticipation in global regional economic organizations
8 and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-
9 operation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization
10 (WTO).
11 (3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral
12 agreements on trade and investment, as well as nego-
13 tiations at the WTO to reassert United States eco-
14 nomic leadership by writing the rules of the road on
15 critical economic questions.
16 (4) Building secure and resilient supply chains
17 for industries critical for United States national in-
18 terest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and per-
19 sonal protective equipment.
20 (5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a
21 market-based economic model.
22 (b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the
23 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
24 in coordination with the United States Trade Representa-
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25 tive and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report
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1 to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents the
2 steps the United States is taking and plans to take to
3 achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) and in-
4 cludes specific action plans for the following:
5 (1) Enhancing United States trade and invest-
6 ment relationships in the region bilaterally and
7 plurilaterally, especially with United States allies
8 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
9 (2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component
10 of the region’s economic architecture.
11 (3) Work to ensure that the United States ab-
12 sence from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-
13 ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional
14 Comprehensive Economic Partnership do not under-
15 mine the United States’ ability to shape regional
16 trade and investment rules.
17 (4) Working with allies and partners to build re-
18 silient and trusted supply chains especially for crit-
19 ical and emerging technologies, including semiconduc-
20 tors, and products and components critical for na-
21 tional health, including vaccines and related mate-
22 rials and personal protective equipment.
23 (5) Driving the formation and adoption of high-
24 standards and rules for the region in the following
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1 (A) Advanced technologies and the digital
2 sphere.
3 (B) Labor practices and environmental
4 standards.
5 (C) Intellectual property rights.
6 (6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the
7 PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices, with a
8 specific focus on—
9 (A) subsidies and unfair competition by
10 state-owned enterprises; and
11 (B) corruption and politicized infrastruc-
12 ture.
13 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
14 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees
15 of Congress’’ means—
16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
17 Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs;
18 and
19 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
20 Committee on Energy and Commerce.
21 SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER
22 AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
23 ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
24 It is the sense of Congress that—
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1 (1) the United States has benefitted from the re-
2 gional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pa-
3 cific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum since its
4 inception in 1989;
5 (2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for
6 21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted for
7 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global
8 trade;
9 (3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in
10 trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and en-
11 hanced access to global value chains, while raising the
12 profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sustain-
13 ability, gender parity, and inclusive growth;
14 (4) it is in the United States interest to engage
15 and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive
16 regional economy that benefits United States workers,
17 consumers, and businesses and better integrates the
18 United States economy with others in the region;
19 (5) when the United States last hosted APEC in
20 2011, it was able to promote United States interests,
21 while reassuring allies and partners about its strong
22 commitment to the region in the economic arena;
23 (6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum
24 to make progress on several United States priorities,
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1 that are shared by United States allies and partners,
2 including—
3 (A) making regional commerce more inclu-
4 sive;
5 (B) fostering innovation and digitization;
6 and
7 (C) addressing climate change and environ-
8 mental protection;
9 (7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous
10 opportunity to leverage American leadership to shape
11 the regional economic agenda;
12 (8) hosting APEC would allow the United States
13 to advance several of its own priorities in the region,
14 including to—
15 (A) expand the participation of APEC
16 stakeholders to include labor groups, environ-
17 mental advocates, and other part of civil society;
18 (B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and
19 promote small and medium enterprises;
20 (C) spotlight best practices and plans to up-
21 grade skills for the next-generation of technology
22 jobs;
23 (D) advance a climate and sustainable
24 trade and development agenda with a focus on
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1 green technologies, infrastructure and finance;
2 and
3 (E) advance work on digital trade, includ-
4 ing by expanding rules on data privacy, pro-
5 moting digital inclusiveness and promoting the
6 free flow of data; and
7 (9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United
8 States should immediately announce its interest to
9 host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secre-
10 tariat and like-minded APEC members to build sup-
11 port.
12 SEC. 125. STRATEGY ON DETERRENCE OF ECONOMIC COER-
13 CION.
14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date
15 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
16 the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-govern-
17 ment strategy to deter Chinese economic coercion against
18 third countries that includes the following:
19 (1) An explanation of the means available to the
20 United States, with the cooperation of allies, to enable
21 a country with a smaller economy to withstand such
22 coercion.
23 (2) A description of the role that the Secretary
24 of State, acting through the Under Secretary of State
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1 the imposition of reputational costs on the PRC for
2 conducting economic coercion.
3 (3) Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the
4 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
5 national Development, the Secretary of Defense, the
6 head of each element of the intelligence community
7 (as such term is defined by section 3 of the National
8 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Secretary
9 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the
10 United States Trade Representative, and the United
11 States International Development Finance Corpora-
12 tion in implementing such strategy.
13 (b) UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years after the date
14 of the submission of the strategy under subsection (a), and
15 every 2 years thereafter for 8 years, the President shall sub-
16 mit to the appropriate congressional committees an assess-
17 ment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy,
18 lessons learned from the past year, and planned changes
19 to the strategy.
20 (c) FORM.—The strategy and update required by sub-
21 sections (a) and (b), respectively, shall be submitted in clas-
22 sified form with an unclassified summary.
23 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
24 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres-
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25 sional committees’’ means—
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1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
2 mittee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee
3 on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives;
4 and
5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
6 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
7 tation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
8 Urban Affairs of the Senate.
9 SEC. 126. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY
10 ISSUES.
11 (a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SET-
12 TING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
13 must lead in international bodies that set the governance
14 norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies
15 in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a
16 free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.
17 (b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It is
18 the sense of Congress that the United States, along with al-
19 lies and partners, should lead an international effort that
20 uses all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal
21 to combat the expanding use of information and commu-
22 nications technology products and services to surveil, re-
23 press, and manipulate populations (also known as ‘‘digital
24 authoritarianism’’).
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1 (c) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL
2 AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
3 should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
4 mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish
5 information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained
6 as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral
7 mechanism for communication.
8 (d) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOP-
9 MENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OR
10 HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress that the
11 United States should lead a global effort to develop and
12 adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical
13 technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies can-
14 not be abused by malign actors, whether they are govern-
15 ments or other entities, and that they do not threaten demo-
16 cratic governance or human rights.
17 SEC. 127. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS.
18 It is the sense of Congress that—
19 (1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated
20 United States dependence on digital tools, inter-
21 national rules around digital governance and trade
22 have remained largely piecemeal;
23 (2) the People’s Republic of China is operating
24 under and advancing a set of digital rules that are
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1 contrary to United States values and interests, and
2 those of United States allies and partners;
3 (3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and
4 bilateral digital trade agreements, including the Com-
5 prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa-
6 cific Partnership, the Singapore-Australia Digital
7 Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-New Zealand-
8 Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have
9 emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States
10 should be driving;
11 (4) the United States has already underscored
12 the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.-
13 Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 and
14 including a robust digital trade or e-commerce chap-
15 ter in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement;
16 (5) a regional deal on digital governance and
17 trade would allow the United States to unite a group
18 of like-minded economies around common standards
19 and norms, including the principles of openness, in-
20 clusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow
21 of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the
22 global economy;
23 (6) such an agreement would facilitate the cre-
24 ation of common rules and standards that govern
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25 cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, and
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1 cybersecurity at a time of growing digital
2 vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and insti-
3 tutions around the world;
4 (7) such an agreement would facilitate the par-
5 ticipation of small and medium-sized enterprises in
6 the global economy through trade facilitation meas-
7 ures, including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-pay-
8 ment; and
9 (8) the United States Trade Representative, in
10 consultation with the Secretary of State should nego-
11 tiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or ar-
12 rangements relating to digital trade with the like-
13 minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the Eu-
14 ropean Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes
15 intelligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and
16 allies, as appropriate.
17 SEC. 128. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY
18 PARTNERSHIP.
19 (a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY
20 PARTNERSHIP.—The President is authorized to establish a
21 program, to be known as the ‘‘Digital Connectivity and Cy-
22 bersecurity Partnership’’ to help foreign countries—
23 (1) expand and increase secure Internet access
24 and digital infrastructure;
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1 (2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that
2 foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and
3 secure internet, equitable access, the free flow of data,
4 multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and
5 pro-competitive and secure information and commu-
6 nications technology (ICT) policies and regulations;
7 (3) promote and protect human rights and
8 counter corruption and predatory behavior through-
9 out communications and cybersecurity policy and im-
10 plementation;
11 (4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime,
12 disinformation and misinformation, and the use of
13 digital technology and services to carry out criminal
14 activity or human rights violations;
15 (5) bolster the role of civil society in informing
16 ICT policy and regulations;
17 (6) promote exports of United States ICT goods
18 and services and increase United States company
19 market share in target markets;
20 (7) promote the innovation and diversification of
21 ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant
22 on imports from the People’s Republic of China;
23 (8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-
24 operability, and promote best practices for a national
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25 approach to cybersecurity; and
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1 (9) enhance the security of their digital infra-
2 structure to facilitate better information sharing with
3 the United States and United States allies and part-
4 ners, as appropriate.
5 (b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
7 of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency
8 for International Development shall jointly submit to the
9 appropriate congressional committees an implementation
10 plan for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the sub-
11 mission of the plan to advance the goals identified in sub-
12 section (a). The implementation plan shall also include a
13 description of interagency responsibilities to carry out im-
14 plementation, a description of any barriers to successful im-
15 plementation, and a description of any additional resources
16 or authorities needed for successful implementation.
17 (c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the implementa-
18 tion plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State
19 and the Administrator of the United States Agency for
20 International Development shall consult with—
21 (1) the appropriate congressional committees;
22 (2) leaders of the United States industry;
23 (3) civil society leaders with expertise in tech-
24 nology, telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic
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1 development and competitiveness, and human rights,
2 including from the Open Technology Fund;
3 (4) representatives from relevant United States
4 Government agencies; and
5 (5) representatives from like-minded allies and
6 partners.
7 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
8 authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for
9 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this
10 section.
11 SEC. 129. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COMPETI-
12 TION.
13 It is the sense of Congress that National Security Advi-
14 sor Jake Sullivan correctly observed that the United States
15 and likeminded democracies are in an ideological competi-
16 tion with the People’s Republic of China, under the direc-
17 tion and control of the Chinese Communist Party, when he
18 stated, ‘‘China is essentially making the case that the Chi-
19 nese model is better than the American model. . . This is
20 not any longer some kind of implied contrast. It is an ex-
21 plicit statement that there is an alternative model to the
22 democratic market economy model that the United States
23 has been advancing over the course of decades.’’.
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1 Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy
2 and Leadership
3 SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL
4 POLICY.
5 Congress makes the following findings:
6 (1) The People’s Republic of China operates a
7 system of state-owned financial institutions including
8 retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and
9 insurers which are given favorable treatment under
10 Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have
11 strict restrictions on their ability to operate in the
12 PRC.
13 (2) In order to join the World Trade Organiza-
14 tion (WTO) in 2001, the PRC Government committed
15 to opening the credit card payment business to for-
16 eign firms by 2006.
17 (3) After years of the PRC refusing to open its
18 payment market, the United States brought a case
19 against the PRC before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO
20 mandated that the PRC open its card payment mar-
21 ket to global competitors.
22 (4) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Gov-
23 ernment refused to comply with the ruling and main-
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24 tained a rule that required all yuan-denominated
25 payment cards to use the PRC’s Union Pay network.
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1 Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had
2 grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government ap-
3 prove the application of foreign firms to enter the
4 market.
5 (5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive
6 capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese market
7 to foreign investors while hamstringing its own citi-
8 zens ability to control their money.
9 (6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi
10 Jinping announced that the PRC would launch a
11 technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai
12 Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22,
13 2019.
14 (7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire
15 Jack Ma referred to ‘‘pawnshop mentality’’ of state-
16 owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public of-
17 fering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by Chi-
18 nese regulators.
19 (8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use
20 of a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the
21 world’s first central bank backed digital currency,
22 and the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong
23 Monetary Authority have already begun testing the
24 cross-border functionality of the digital currency.
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1 SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN-
2 CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP.
3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
4 that—
5 (1) the dominance of the dollar as the global re-
6 serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the
7 United States and the American people by allowing
8 the United States to maintain economic independ-
9 ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance
10 government outlays;
11 (2) American global leadership has benefited
12 from the United States monetary stability, credit-
13 worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech-
14 nology innovations;
15 (3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of
16 American national security rely on the United States
17 role as the global financial leader, hub of global trade,
18 and source of economic opportunity;
19 (4) by cracking down on dissent in the key fi-
20 nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of
21 a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing for-
22 ward a Central Bank digital currency, the People’s
23 Republic of China is attempting to become the leading
24 hub of finance in the world; and
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1 (5) the United States must maintain its position
2 as a global financial leader to continue its broader
3 global leadership role around the world.
4 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
5 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-
6 ordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit
7 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that—
8 (1) lists and examines the benefits to American
9 foreign policy that derive from the United States fi-
10 nancial leadership and the dollar’s status as the
11 world’s global reserve currency;
12 (2) describes the actions taken by the People’s
13 Republic of China that could cement China’s role as
14 the world’s leading financial center;
15 (3) analyzes the possible impact on American
16 national security and foreign policy were the yuan to
17 supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve cur-
18 rency;
19 (4) outlines how the United States can work dip-
20 lomatically with allies, partners, and other nations to
21 preserve a financial system that is free, open, and
22 fair; and
23 (5) identifies steps the United States can take to
24 preserve its status as the world’s leading financial
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1 center and maintain the dollar’s position as the glob-
2 al reserve currency.
3 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
4 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees
5 of Congress’’ means—
6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
7 House of Representatives;
8 (2) the Committee on Financial Services of the
9 House of Representatives;
10 (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
11 Senate; and
12 (4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
13 Urban Affairs of the Senate.
14 SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED
15 STATES CAPITAL MARKETS.
16 (a) FINDINGS.—
17 (1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese
18 companies sought to raise capital and list shares on
19 American stock markets.
20 (2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese
21 firms were delisted from the New York Stock Ex-
22 change as a result of fraud, accounting scandals, and
23 other corporate governance failures.
24 (3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the
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25 United States Government, the Public Company Ac-
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1 counting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signed a memo-
2 randum of understanding with the China Securities
3 Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry of
4 Finance for the production and exchange of audit
5 documents.
6 (4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regu-
7 lators continue to hinder the PCAOB’s access to rel-
8 evant documents that are necessary for the PCAOB to
9 carry out its enforcement duties.
10 (5) In August 2020, the Department of State
11 sent a letter to American universities warning about
12 national security implications related to Chinese
13 stock holdings.
14 (6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the
15 President signed the Holding Foreign Companies Ac-
16 countable Act (Public Law 116–222), which requires
17 foreign companies listed on American stock markets
18 to comply with PCAOB auditing rules within three
19 years. Under the legislation, issuers not in compliance
20 within three years will be delisted.
21 (b) REPORT.—
22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
23 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
24 State, in coordination with the Secretary of the
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1 sional committees a report that describes the costs and
2 benefits to the United States posed by the presence of
3 companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of
4 China (PRC) that are listed on American stock ex-
5 changes or traded over the counter, in the form of
6 American depository receipts.
7 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
8 shall—
9 (A) identify companies incorporated in the
10 PRC that—
11 (i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
12 eral stock exchanges within the United
13 States, including over-the-counter market
14 and ‘‘A Shares’’ added to indexes and ex-
15 change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
16 changes in the PRC; and
17 (ii) based on the factors for consider-
18 ation described in paragraph (3), have
19 knowingly and materially contributed to—
20 (I) activities that undermine
21 United States national security;
22 (II) serious abuses of internation-
23 ally recognized human rights; or
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1 (III) a substantially increased fi-
2 nancial risk exposure for United
3 States-based investors;
4 (B) describe the activities of the companies
5 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and
6 their implications for the United States; and
7 (C) develop policy recommendations for the
8 United States Government, State governments,
9 United States financial institutions, United
10 States equity and debt exchanges, and other rel-
11 evant stakeholders to address the risks posed by
12 the presence in United States capital markets of
13 the companies identified pursuant to subpara-
14 graph (A).
15 (3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.—
16 In completing the report under paragraph (1), the
17 President shall consider whether a company should be
18 identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) because the
19 company has—
20 (A) materially contributed to the develop-
21 ment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated pro-
22 curement by the PLA, of lethal military equip-
23 ment or component parts of such equipment;
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1 (B) contributed to the construction and
2 militarization of features in the South China
3 Sea;
4 (C) been sanctioned by the United States or
5 has been determined to have conducted business
6 with sanctioned entities;
7 (D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of
8 intellectual property theft;
9 (E) engaged in corporate or economic espio-
10 nage;
11 (F) contributed to the proliferation of nu-
12 clear or missile technology in violation of United
13 Nations Security Council resolutions or United
14 States sanctions;
15 (G) contributed to the repression of religious
16 and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including
17 in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or
18 Tibet Autonomous Region;
19 (H) contributed to the development of tech-
20 nologies that enable censorship directed or di-
21 rectly supported by the Government of the PRC;
22 or
23 (I) contributed to other activities or behav-
24 ior determined to be relevant by the President.
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1 (4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDA-
2 TIONS.—In completing the report under paragraph
3 (1), the President shall weigh the national security
4 implications and consider the following factors identi-
5 fied pursuant to paragraph (3) (except that such re-
6 port should exclude from its analysis the delisting or
7 potential delisting of companies from United States
8 markets as a result of failing to retain a Public Com-
9 pany Accounting Oversight Board-registered public
10 accounting firm as required by section 104 of the
11 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7214)):
12 (A) The possibility that banning or
13 delisting companies from United States markets
14 could lead to an outflow of companies to list in
15 the PRC.
16 (B) The possibility that banning or
17 delisting companies from United States markets
18 could impact the status of the United States as
19 the world’s leading capital markets center, par-
20 ticularly vis-à-vis the PRC.
21 (C) The impact on American foreign policy
22 and national security if United States leadership
23 in capital markets was weakened vis-à-vis the
24 PRC.
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1 (c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
2 section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
3 (d) PUBLICATION.—The report required under sub-
4 section (b) shall be made accessible to the public online
5 through relevant United States Government websites.
6 SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLI-
7 CATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER
8 PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYS-
9 TEMS.
10 (a) REPORT.—
11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
13 State, in coordination with the Secretary of the
14 Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congres-
15 sional committees a report on the diplomatic and eco-
16 nomic implications of cross-border payment systems.
17 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
18 quired under paragraph (1) shall—
19 (A) assess the extent to which American di-
20 plomacy and global leadership hinge upon the
21 current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of
22 cross-border payment and financial messaging
23 systems;
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1 (B) examine the durability of the Society
2 for Worldwide Interbank Financial Tele-
3 communication cooperative;
4 (C) review and analyze ways in which the
5 Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems,
6 cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital cur-
7 rencies could erode this system; and
8 (D) analyze how changes to global cross-bor-
9 der payment systems could undermine United
10 States national security interests including im-
11 pacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the countering
12 of terrorist finance, and the enforcement of anti-
13 money laundering provisions.
14 (b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
15 section (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form.
16 (c) PUBLICATION.—The report under subsection (a)(1)
17 shall be made accessible to the public online through rel-
18 evant United States Government websites.
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1 TITLE II—INVESTING IN
2 ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS
3 Subtitle A—Strategic and
4 Diplomatic Matters
5 SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
6 FINED.
7 In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of
8 Congress’’ means—
9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
10 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
11 Appropriations of the Senate; and
12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
13 mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap-
14 propriations of the House of Representatives.
15 SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR
16 ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.
17 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
18 that—
19 (1) the United States treaty alliances in the
20 Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to
21 the United States and are among the Nation’s most
22 precious assets, enabling the United States to advance
23 its vital national interests, defend its territory, ex-
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24 pand its economy through international trade and
25 commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies
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1 while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent
2 the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its sur-
3 rounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power
4 or powers, and deter potential aggressors;
5 (2) the Governments of the United States, Japan,
6 South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thai-
7 land are critical allies in advancing a free and open
8 order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling chal-
9 lenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to
10 advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas
11 such as defense and security, economic prosperity, in-
12 frastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms;
13 (3) the United States greatly values other part-
14 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with
15 India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand,
16 and Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilat-
17 eral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the
18 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
19 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which
20 are essential to further shared interests;
21 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific
22 demands consistent United States and allied commit-
23 ment to strengthening and advancing alliances so
24 that they are postured to meet these challenges, and
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25 will require sustained political will, concrete partner-
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1 ships, economic, commercial, technological, and secu-
2 rity cooperation, consistent and tangible commit-
3 ments, high-level and extensive consultations on mat-
4 ters of mutual interest, mutual and shared coopera-
5 tion in the acquisition of key capabilities important
6 to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the
7 face of political, economic, or military coercion;
8 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
9 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
10 versaries and weaken the collective ability to advance
11 shared interests;
12 (6) the United States must work with allies to
13 prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific
14 region;
15 (7) as the report released in August 2020 by the
16 Expert Group of the International Military Council
17 on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled ‘‘Climate
18 and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific’’ noted, the
19 Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulner-
20 able to climate impacts, and as former Deputy Under
21 Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environ-
22 ment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS,
23 noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the
24 Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian re-
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25 sponse costs and impacting security throughout the
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1 region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food
2 insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more
3 frequent;
4 (8) the United State should continue to engage
5 on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners
6 of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as
7 laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub-
8 lic Law 115–409), in the areas of—
9 (A) forecasting environmental challenges;
10 (B) assisting with transnational coopera-
11 tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re-
12 sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity
13 and access to safe drinking water;
14 (C) fisheries and marine resource conserva-
15 tion; and
16 (D) meeting environmental challenges and
17 developing resilience;
18 (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with
19 the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the
20 United States Agency for International Development,
21 should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific cli-
22 mate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on
23 internal and external actions needed—
24 (A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk
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25 reduction, and resilience to weather-related im-
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1 pacts on strategic interests of the United States
2 and partners and allies of the United States in
3 the region; and
4 (B) to address humanitarian and food secu-
5 rity impacts of weather-related changes in the re-
6 gion; and
7 (10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mecha-
8 nisms remain essential to the evolving institutional
9 architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.
10 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of
11 the United States—
12 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security
13 cooperation with and among United States allies in
14 the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including through
15 diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy
16 security and development, scientific and health part-
17 nerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intel-
18 ligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-re-
19 lated initiatives;
20 (2) to uphold the United States multilateral and
21 bilateral treaty obligations, including—
22 (A) defending Japan consistent with the
23 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Be-
24 tween the United States of America and Japan,
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25 done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all
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1 related and subsequent bilateral security agree-
2 ments and arrangements concluded on or before
3 the date of enactment of this Act;
4 (B) defending the Republic of Korea con-
5 sistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between
6 the United States and the Republic of Korea,
7 done at Washington, October 1, 1953, and all re-
8 lated and subsequent bilateral security agree-
9 ments and arrangements concluded on or before
10 the date of enactment of this Act;
11 (C) defending the Philippines consistent
12 with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
13 tween the United States and the Republic of the
14 Philippines, done at Washington, August 30,
15 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral se-
16 curity agreements and arrangements concluded
17 on or before the date of enactment of this Act;
18 (D) defending Thailand consistent with the
19 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (‘‘Ma-
20 nila Pact’’), done at Manila, September 8, 1954,
21 understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk commu-
22 nique of 1962, and all related and subsequent bi-
23 lateral security agreements and arrangements
24 concluded on or before the date of enactment of
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25 this Act; and
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1 (E) defending Australia consistent with the
2 Security Treaty Between Australia and the
3 United States of America, done at San Fran-
4 cisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and
5 subsequent bilateral security agreements and ar-
6 rangements concluded on or before the date of en-
7 actment of this Act;
8 (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States’
9 bilateral and regional partnerships, including with
10 India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand;
11 (4) to cooperate with allies and partners to pro-
12 mote human rights across the Indo-Pacific region bi-
13 laterally and through regional and multilateral fora
14 and pacts;
15 (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
16 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
17 ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
18 Indonesia, and India; and
19 (6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustain-
20 able development of the Mekong River Basin, includ-
21 ing by providing support for environmental conserva-
22 tion and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-re-
23 gion and through assistance to Cambodia, Laos, Thai-
24 land, and Vietnam, whose governments comprise the
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25 Mekong River Commission (MRC). United States ef-
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1 forts should focus on increasing MRC member coun-
2 tries’ capacity in the sustainable conservation and
3 management of natural resources.
4 SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION.
5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
6 that—
7 (1) as a Pacific power, the United States should
8 continue to strengthen its cooperation with Australia,
9 India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as the
10 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ‘‘Quad’’) to en-
11 hance and implement a shared vision to meet regional
12 challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, re-
13 silient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by re-
14 spect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market-
15 driven economic growth, and that is free from undue
16 influence and coercion;
17 (2) the United States should expand dialogue
18 and cooperation through the Quad with a range of
19 partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navi-
20 gation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes,
21 democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to
22 uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen demo-
23 cratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific;
24 (3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad
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25 leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the
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1 economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including
2 expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine pro-
3 duction and equitable access, and to address shared
4 challenges, including in cyberspace, critical tech-
5 nologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure in-
6 vestment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster
7 relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances
8 the important cooperation among Quad nations that
9 is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region;
10 (4) building upon their announced commitment
11 to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines
12 by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region,
13 the United States International Development Finance
14 Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation
15 Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Co-
16 operation, including through partnerships other mul-
17 tilateral development banks, should also venture to fi-
18 nance development and infrastructure projects in the
19 Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent,
20 and sustainable;
21 (5) the United States should participate in the
22 Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus-
23 tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar
24 initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health,
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25 economic, and national security sectors to the United
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1 States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded
2 countries; and
3 (6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen-
4 tary Working Group could—
5 (A) sustain and deepen engagement between
6 senior officials of the Quad countries on a full
7 spectrum of issues; and
8 (B) be modeled on the successful and long-
9 standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups
10 between the United States and Mexico, Canada,
11 and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal
12 and informal parliamentary exchanges.
13 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—
14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
16 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
17 committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and
18 cooperation with the Quad.
19 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy
20 required by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
21 (A) A description of how the United States
22 intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in
23 the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engage-
24 ment with India, Japan, and Australia on
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25 shared interests and common challenges.
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1 (B) A summary of—
2 (i) current and past Quad initiatives
3 across the whole of the United States Gov-
4 ernment, including to promote broad based
5 and inclusive economic growth, trade, and
6 investment, and to advance technology co-
7 operation, energy innovation, climate miti-
8 gation and adaptation, physical and digital
9 infrastructure development, education, dis-
10 aster management, and global health secu-
11 rity;
12 (ii) proposals shared among Quad
13 countries to deepen existing security co-
14 operation, intelligence sharing, economic
15 partnerships, and multilateral coordination;
16 and
17 (iii) initiatives and agreements under-
18 taken jointly with Quad countries, in addi-
19 tion to other like-minded partners in the
20 Indo-Pacific, on areas of shared interest.
21 (C) A description of efforts to jointly—
22 (i) expand ongoing COVID–19 co-
23 operation to prepare for the next pandemic
24 by focusing on medium-term vaccine and
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1 medical supply production and building a
2 broader dialogue on global public health;
3 (ii) combat economic coercion, deepen
4 regional economic engagement and integra-
5 tion, and strengthen regional rules and
6 standards around trade and investment;
7 (iii) strengthen climate actions on
8 mitigation, adaptation, resilience, tech-
9 nology, capacity-building, and climate fi-
10 nance;
11 (iv) facilitate the development of qual-
12 ity infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific
13 through joint financing, investment, tech-
14 nical assistance, and standards setting;
15 (v) enhance joint maritime security
16 and maritime domain awareness initiatives
17 to protect the maritime commons and sup-
18 port international law and freedom of navi-
19 gation in the Indo-Pacific; and
20 (vi) develop international technology
21 standards and share or co-develop new in-
22 novative technologies of the future.
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1 SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMEN-
2 TARY WORKING GROUP.
3 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
5 shall seek to enter into negotiations with the governments
6 of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the
7 United States, known as the ‘‘Quad’’) with the goal of
8 reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra-
9 Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer coopera-
10 tion on shared interests and values.
11 (b) UNITED STATES GROUP.—
12 (1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the govern-
13 ments of the Quad countries enter into a written
14 agreement described in subsection (a) to establish a
15 Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, there
16 shall be established a United States Group, which
17 shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra-
18 Parliamentary Working Group.
19 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—
20 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States
21 Group shall be comprised of not more than 24
22 Members of Congress.
23 (B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of
24 Congress appointed to the United States Group
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25 under subparagraph (A)—
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1 (i) half shall be appointed by the
2 Speaker of the House of Representatives
3 from among Members of the House, not
4 fewer than four of whom shall be members
5 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and
6 (ii) half shall be appointed by the
7 President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based
8 on recommendations of the majority leader
9 and minority leader of the Senate, from
10 among Members of the Senate, not fewer
11 than four of whom shall be members of the
12 Committee on Foreign Relations (unless the
13 majority leader and minority leader deter-
14 mine otherwise).
15 (3) MEETINGS.—
16 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States
17 Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than
18 annually with representatives and appropriate
19 staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and
20 India, and any other country invited by mutual
21 agreement of the Quad countries.
22 (B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in
23 subparagraph (A) may be held—
24 (i) in the United States;
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1 (ii) in another Quad country during
2 periods when Congress is not in session; or
3 (iii) virtually.
4 (4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.—
5 (A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of
6 the House of Representatives shall designate the
7 chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation
8 of the United States Group from the House from
9 among members of the Committee on Foreign Af-
10 fairs.
11 (B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President
12 Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the
13 chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation
14 of the United States Group from the Senate from
15 among members of the Committee on Foreign
16 Relations.
17 (5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
18 (A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
19 appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal years
20 2022 through 2025 for the United States Group.
21 (B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—
22 (i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year
23 for which an appropriation is made for the
24 United States Group, half of the amount
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1 gation from the House of Representatives
2 and half of the amount appropriated shall
3 be available to the delegation from the Sen-
4 ate.
5 (ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The
6 amounts available to the delegations of the
7 House of Representatives and the Senate
8 under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouch-
9 ers to be approved by the chairperson of the
10 delegation from the House of Representa-
11 tives and the chairperson of the delegation
12 from the Senate, respectively.
13 (6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States
14 Group may accept gifts or donations of services or
15 property, subject to the review and approval, as ap-
16 propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of
17 Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the
18 Senate.
19 (7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The
20 certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from
21 the House of Representatives or the delegation of the
22 Senate of the United States Group shall be final and
23 conclusive upon the accounting officers in the audit-
24 ing of the accounts of the United States Group.
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1 (8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group
2 shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
3 the House of Representatives and the Committee on
4 Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fis-
5 cal year for which an appropriation is made for the
6 United States Group, including a description of its
7 expenditures under such appropriation.
8 SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH
9 ASEAN.
10 It is the policy of the United States to—
11 (1) stand with the nations of the Association of
12 Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to
13 COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in build-
14 ing capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics
15 and other public health challenges;
16 (2) support high-level United States participa-
17 tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year;
18 (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-
19 ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi-
20 nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and sup-
21 port the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC)
22 goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable
23 long-term economic growth and cooperation with the
24 United States that focuses on innovation and capac-
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1 management, food security, human rights, and trade
2 facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest coun-
3 tries;
4 (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster
5 greater integration and unity within the ASEAN
6 community, as well as to foster greater integration
7 and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and
8 security partners, including Japan, the Republic of
9 Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India;
10 (5) recognize the value of strategic economic ini-
11 tiatives such as United States-ASEAN Connect, which
12 demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC
13 and builds upon economic relationships in the region;
14 (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mari-
15 time and territorial disputes in a constructive man-
16 ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-
17 matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and
18 international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with
19 international law, including through the adoption of
20 a code of conduct in the South China Sea that rep-
21 resents the interests of all parties and promotes peace
22 and stability in the region;
23 (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and
24 territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
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1 ing the Government of the People’s Republic of
2 China—
3 (A) to cease any current activities, and
4 avoid undertaking any actions in the future,
5 that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-
6 late disputes through the use of coercion, intimi-
7 dation, or military force;
8 (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals,
9 and other features, and refrain from new efforts
10 to militarize, including the construction of new
11 garrisons and facilities and the relocation of ad-
12 ditional military personnel, material, or equip-
13 ment;
14 (C) to oppose actions by any country that
15 prevent other countries from exercising their sov-
16 ereign rights to the resources in their exclusive
17 economic zones and continental shelves by enforc-
18 ing claims to those areas in the South China Sea
19 that lack support in international law; and
20 (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
21 ministrative and military districts in contested
22 areas in the South China Sea;
23 (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
24 tions that cause permanent physical damage to the
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1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
2 and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
3 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the re-
4 gion;
5 (9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common
6 approach to encourage China and the Philippines to
7 comply with the decision of the Permanent Court of
8 Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of
9 the Philippines in the case against the People’s Re-
10 public of China’s excessive maritime claims;
11 (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United
12 States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt
13 human smuggling and trafficking in persons and
14 urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mech-
15 anisms to provide assistance and support to refugees
16 and migrants;
17 (11) support the Mekong-United States Partner-
18 ship;
19 (12) support newly created initiatives with
20 ASEAN nations, including the United States-ASEAN
21 Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Imple-
22 mentation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innova-
23 tion Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health
24 Futures;
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1 (13) encourage the President to communicate to
2 ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule
3 of law and open and transparent government,
4 strengthening civil society, and protecting human
5 rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing
6 politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary
7 killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-
8 dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of
9 speech and expression;
10 (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN
11 that address corruption in the public and private sec-
12 tors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery
13 criminalization in the private sector, and build bene-
14 ficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN–
15 USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South
16 East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA–PAC);
17 (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders
18 Initiative as an example of a people-to-people part-
19 nership that provides skills, networks, and leadership
20 training to a new generation that will create and fill
21 jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships,
22 and rise to address the regional and global challenges
23 of the future;
24 (16) support the creation of initiatives similar to
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25 the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for
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1 other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-peo-
2 ple partnerships with an emphasis on civil society
3 leaders;
4 (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that
5 have fully upheld and implemented all United Na-
6 tions Security Council resolutions and international
7 agreements with respect to the Democratic People’s
8 Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile pro-
9 grams and encourage all other ASEAN governments
10 to do the same; and
11 (18) allocate appropriate resources across the
12 United States Government to articulate and imple-
13 ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-
14 ports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports
15 ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem-
16 solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific com-
17 munity.
18 SEC. 206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.
19 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
20 ‘‘Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Act’’ or the
21 ‘‘YSEALI Act’’.
22 (b) YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—
23 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in
24 the Department of State the Young Southeast Asian
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25 Leaders Initiative (‘‘YSEALI’’) program.
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1 (2) GOALS.—The YSEALI program shall seek to
2 build to capacity of young leaders in Southeast Asia
3 to—
4 (A) support young leaders from Southeast
5 Asia by offering professional development and a
6 global network to share expertise, including in
7 the areas of civic engagement, economic em-
8 powerment and social entrepreneurship, edu-
9 cation and environmental issues; and
10 (B) further strengthen the enduring part-
11 nership between the United States and Southeast
12 Asia and connect United States experts with
13 YSEALI participants.
14 (3) YSEALI PROGRAMS.—
15 (A) YSEALI ACADEMIC FELLOWS PRO-
16 GRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Aca-
17 demic Fellows Program to bring students from
18 YSEALI partner countries to the United States
19 for the purposes of building practical expertise,
20 leadership skills, and professional networks relat-
21 ing to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The
22 Secretary of State may award fellowships under
23 the Academic Fellows Program to eligible indi-
24 viduals based on the following:
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1 (i) Citizenship and residency in a
2 YSEALI partner country.
3 (ii) Status as a full-time under-
4 graduate student, or recent graduate of col-
5 lege, university, or other institutions of
6 higher learning.
7 (iii) Other criteria determined appro-
8 priate by the Secretary.
9 (B) YSEALI PROFESSIONAL FELLOWS PRO-
10 GRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Profes-
11 sional Fellows Program to bring professionals
12 from YSEALI partner countries to the United
13 States for the purposes of building practical ex-
14 pertise, leadership skills, and professional net-
15 works relating to one or more of the YSEALI
16 themes. The Secretary of State may award fel-
17 lowships under the Professional Fellows Program
18 to eligible individuals based on the following:
19 (i) Citizenship and residency in a
20 YSEALI partner country.
21 (ii) Status as an emerging leader in
22 government, civil society, or the private sec-
23 tor, and demonstrated expertise relating to
24 one or more of the YSEALI themes.
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1 (iii) Current employment, and two or
2 more years of professional work experience
3 relevant to one or more YSEALI themes.
4 (iv) Other criteria determined appro-
5 priate by the Secretary.
6 (C) OTHER INITIATIVES.—The Secretary of
7 State may designate other initiatives as YSEALI
8 initiatives under this section if they advance the
9 goals of the YSEALI program as described in
10 paragraph (2).
11 (4) ACTIVITIES.—
12 (A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.—
13 The Secretary of State shall oversee all United
14 States-based activities carried out under the
15 YSEALI program, including the participation of
16 YSEALI Academic Fellows in a program at a
17 United States university or college, and the par-
18 ticipation of YSEALI Professional Fellows at
19 United States private and public sector organi-
20 zations for individually-tailored work place-
21 ments. Both fellowships may include site visits,
22 professional networking opportunities, leadership
23 training, community service, and organized cul-
24 tural activities, as appropriate.
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1 (B) SOUTHEAST ASIA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—
2 The Secretary of State should continue to sup-
3 port overseas initiatives of the program, includ-
4 ing the following:
5 (i) Quality leadership training, profes-
6 sional development, and networking oppor-
7 tunities for YSEALI alumni.
8 (ii) Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI
9 Professional Fellows Program’s United
10 States professional hosts and interlocutors
11 to support post-United States exchange ac-
12 tion plans and other related public diplo-
13 macy goals, as appropriate.
14 (iii) Opportunities for networking with
15 YSEALI alumni and professionals and ex-
16 perts who are American and Southeast
17 Asian.
18 (iv) The YSEALI Regional Workshop
19 program, offering networking, mentoring,
20 hands-on training, and the tools necessary
21 to lead communities in addressing eco-
22 nomic, environmental, educational, and
23 civic engagement issues.
24 (v) The YSEALI Seeds for the Future
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25 program, providing small, competitive
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1 grants to young leaders in Southeast Asia
2 to improve their communities, countries,
3 and the region towards one or more of the
4 themes of civic engagement, economic em-
5 powerment and social entrepreneurship,
6 education, or environmental issues.
7 (vi) The YSEALI Academy at Ful-
8 bright University Vietnam, offering execu-
9 tive-level seminars for entry to mid-level
10 professionals around the themes of tech-
11 nology and innovation, public policy, and
12 entrepreneurship.
13 (vii) The YSEALI Women’s Leader-
14 ship Academy Program, enhancing people-
15 to-people ties and engagement with young
16 and emerging leaders by promoting gender
17 equality and advancing the status of women
18 and girls, such as in the public health sector
19 (C) ALUMNI PLATFORM.—The Secretary of
20 State is authorized to convene current YSEALI
21 participants and YSEALI alumni through a
22 platform to promote networking opportunities
23 within the YSEALI community.
24 (D) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this
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1 sular posts, the Secretary of State, and agency
2 external partners managing and implementing
3 the YSEALI program—
4 (i) shall promote United States policy
5 goals in Southeast Asia by providing tools
6 and resources to help young Southeast
7 Asian leaders develop important skills and
8 connections, including through online cam-
9 paigns and public diplomacy initiatives;
10 (ii) shall establish a system for moni-
11 toring, evaluating, and improving the
12 YSEALI program; and
13 (iii) may accept financial contribu-
14 tions from foundations, corporations, pri-
15 vate donors, program partners, and imple-
16 menting agency external partners intended
17 to foster the goals of the YSEALI program.
18 (5) REPORTS.—
19 (A) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State
20 shall submit to the appropriate congressional
21 committees a strategy for implementing the
22 YSEALI program, including the following:
23 (i) YSEALI program goals, targets,
24 and planned outcomes for each year and,
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25 separately, for the YSEALI program gen-
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1 erally during the duration of its implemen-
2 tation.
3 (ii) The continuation of YSEALI pro-
4 gram monitoring and evaluation plan, in-
5 cluding metrics for measuring YSEALI pro-
6 gram progress identification of annual
7 YSEALI program goals, and targets.
8 (B) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than 1
9 year after the date of the enactment of this sec-
10 tion, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the
11 Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
12 priate congressional committees and publish on a
13 publicly available website of the Department a
14 report on—
15 (i) YSEALI program progress and an
16 assessment of the metrics, goals, targets, and
17 outcomes described in subparagraph (A)(i),
18 including information relating to YSEALI
19 program implementation and outcome ac-
20 tivities during the year covered by each re-
21 port; and
22 (ii) recommendations for improvements
23 or amendments to the YSEALI program
24 and strategy, if any, that would improve
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1 their effectiveness during subsequent years
2 of YSEALI program implementation.
3 (C) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than the
4 date of the submission of the last report required
5 under subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State
6 shall submit to the appropriate congressional
7 committees a final assessment report that evalu-
8 ates YSEALI program implementation and out-
9 comes during the entire duration of YSEALI
10 program operation, including recommendations
11 regarding whether the YSEALI program should
12 be reauthorized and any changes that would im-
13 prove its effectiveness.
14 (6) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
15 (A) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
16 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional
17 committees’’ means—
18 (i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
19 the House of Representatives;
20 (ii) the Committee on Appropriations
21 of the House of Representatives;
22 (iii) the Committee on Foreign Rela-
23 tions of the Senate; and
24 (iv) the Committee on Appropriations
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25 of the Senate.
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1 (B) IMPLEMENTING AGENCY EXTERNAL
2 PARTNERS.—The term ‘‘implementing agency ex-
3 ternal partners’’ means any external partner
4 that is not a United States Government agency,
5 and may include one or more of the following en-
6 tities:
7 (i) Local or multinational corpora-
8 tions.
9 (ii) Nongovernmental organizations.
10 (iii) Universities.
11 (iv) Regional institutions.
12 (C) YSEALI THEME.—The term ‘‘YSEALI
13 theme’’ means—
14 (i) civic engagement;
15 (ii) economic empowerment and social
16 entrepreneurship;
17 (iii) education;
18 (iv) environmental issues; or
19 (v) any other theme included by the
20 Secretary of State.
21 (D) YSEALI PARTNER COUNTRIES.—The
22 term ‘‘YSEALI partner countries’’ includes each
23 member country of the Association of Southeast
24 Asian Nations and each other country or polit-
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25 ical entity the Secretary of State determines ap-
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1 propriate to include in the programs established
2 under this section.
3 SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7
4 AND G20 COUNTRIES.
5 It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting
6 through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda
7 with G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to economic
8 and democratic freedoms, including relating to the fol-
9 lowing:
10 (1) Trade and investment issues and enforce-
11 ment.
12 (2) Building support for international infra-
13 structure standards, including standards agreed to at
14 the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.
15 (3) The erosion of democracy and human rights.
16 (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.
17 (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-
18 tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-
19 nies, and other policies and practices.
20 (6) Predatory international sovereign lending
21 that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic
22 Cooperation and Development and Paris Club prin-
23 ciples.
24 (7) International influence campaigns.
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25 (8) Environmental standards.
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1 (9) Coordination with like-minded regional part-
2 ners that are not in the G7 and G20.
3 SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-
4 NERSHIP.
5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
6 United States—
7 (1) to support the close economic, political, and
8 security relationship between Taiwan and the United
9 States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the
10 approach to the United States Indo-Pacific;
11 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its de-
12 mocracy a vital national security interest of the
13 United States;
14 (3) to reinforce all existing United States Gov-
15 ernment commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the
16 Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three
17 joint communiques, and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’;
18 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its
19 asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities
20 identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;
21 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spend-
22 ing in order to fully resource its defense strategy;
23 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
24 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
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25 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop
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1 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti-
2 ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, ad-
3 vanced command, control, communications, com-
4 puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
5 and resilient command and control capabilities, into
6 its military forces;
7 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s
8 meaningful participation in international organiza-
9 tions, including the World Health Assembly, the
10 International Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter-
11 national Criminal Police Organization, and other
12 international bodies as appropriate;
13 (8) to advocate for information sharing with
14 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on
15 Cancer;
16 (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among
17 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded
18 partners;
19 (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-
20 tially through new agreements or resumption of talks
21 under the Trade and Investment Framework Agree-
22 ment;
23 (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-
24 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement;
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1 (12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
2 logical cooperation, including improving supply
3 chain security;
4 (13) to support United States educational and
5 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
6 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
7 tory, and politics in Taiwan; and
8 (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
9 tween the United States and Taiwan.
10 (b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND
11 EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.—
12 (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-
13 TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The
14 Secretary of State should consider establishing an
15 independent nonprofit entity that—
16 (A) is dedicated to deepening ties between
17 the future leaders of Taiwan and the United
18 States; and
19 (B) works with State and local school dis-
20 tricts and educational institutions in the United
21 States to send high school and university stu-
22 dents to Taiwan to study the Chinese language,
23 culture, history, politics, and other relevant sub-
24 jects.
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1 (2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts
2 and educational institutions, including public univer-
3 sities, in the United States are encouraged to partner
4 with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representa-
5 tive Office in the United States to establish programs
6 to promote an increase in educational and cultural
7 exchanges.
8 SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW.
9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
10 (1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22
11 U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United
12 States to ‘‘promote extensive, close, and friendly com-
13 mercial, cultural, and other relations between the peo-
14 ple of the United States and the people of Taiwan’’.
15 (2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to
16 the American Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination
17 Council for North American Affairs, was renamed the
18 ‘‘Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs’’.
19 (3) It is the policy of the United States to refer
20 to Taiwan as ‘‘Taiwan’’, not ‘‘Taipei’’ or ‘‘Chinese
21 Taipei’’.
22 (4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep-
23 resentative Office is inaptly named as it works to cul-
24 tivate the extensive, close, and friendly commercial,
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25 cultural, and other relations between the people of the
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1 United States and the people, organizations, and en-
2 terprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Taipei.
3 (b) NEGOTIATIONS TO RENAME TECRO.—Reflective of
4 the substantively deepening ties between Taiwan and the
5 United States, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into
6 negotiations with appropriate officials of the Taipei Eco-
7 nomic and Cultural Representative Office in the United
8 States with the objective of renaming its office in Wash-
9 ington, D.C., the Taiwan Representative Office in the
10 United States, and its subsidiary offices in the United
11 States, accordingly.
12 SEC. 210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT.
13 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
14 ‘‘Taiwan Peace and Stability Act’’.
15 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
16 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
17 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
18 tees’’ means—
19 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
20 House of Representatives; and
21 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
22 the Senate.
23 (2) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term
24 ‘‘international organization’’ includes United Nations
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1 bodies, as well as other organizations outside of the
2 United Nations system that the Secretary of State de-
3 termines appropriate, in consultation with other rel-
4 evant Federal departments and agencies.
5 (3) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term ‘‘One-
6 China Principle’’ means only the PRC’s policy to-
7 ward Taiwan.
8 (4) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term
9 ‘‘civil society organizations’’ means international
10 civil society organizations that are critical to main-
11 taining Taiwan’s international space and enabling
12 Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in the
13 global community.
14 (5) POTENTIAL PLA CAMPAIGNS.—The term ‘‘po-
15 tential PLA campaigns’’ means—
16 (A) a naval blockade of Taiwan;
17 (B) an amphibious assault and ground in-
18 vasion of Taiwan, especially such invasion de-
19 signed to accomplish a fiat accompli before inter-
20 vention is possible; or
21 (C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s
22 outlying islands.
23 (c) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
24 (1) The United States has consistently sought to
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1 element of United States foreign policy toward the re-
2 gion.
3 (2) The Government of the People’s Republic of
4 China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai
5 Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam-
6 paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi-
7 cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to
8 erode United States policy and create a fait accompli
9 on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future.
10 (3) In order to ensure the longevity of United
11 States policy and preserve the ability of the people of
12 Taiwan to determine their future independently, it is
13 necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic,
14 and physical space.
15 (4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani-
16 tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases
17 such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever
18 in countries around the world. During the COVID–
19 19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of
20 personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests to
21 countries in need.
22 (5) Since 2016, the Gambia, São Tomé and
23 Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina
24 Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati
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1 have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in
2 favor of diplomatic relations with China.
3 (6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the
4 World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making
5 body of the World Health Organization, as an ob-
6 server annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the
7 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increas-
8 ingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA.
9 Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017,
10 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.
11 (7) The Taipei Flight Information Region re-
12 portedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 pas-
13 sengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan
14 International Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the
15 world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating
16 at the International Civil Aviation Organization
17 since 2013.
18 (8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution
19 2758 (1971) does not address the issue of representa-
20 tion of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations,
21 nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the
22 people on Taiwan.
23 (d) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
24 United States to—
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1 (1) maintain the position that peace and sta-
2 bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, secu-
3 rity, and economic interests of the United States, and
4 are matters of international concern; and
5 (2) work with allies and partners to promote
6 peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter
7 military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that
8 would undermine regional stability.
9 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL
10 PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.—It is
11 the sense of Congress that—
12 (1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous,
13 is home to 23,500,000 people, and is an important
14 contributor to the global community;
15 (2) multiple United States Government Adminis-
16 trations have taken important steps to advance Tai-
17 wan’s meaningful participation in international or-
18 ganizations and to enhance cooperation with Taiwan
19 to provide global public goods, including through de-
20 velopment assistance, humanitarian assistance, and
21 disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral fora;
22 (3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy,
23 and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan’s
24 meaningful participation in the international com-
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1 (4) efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with other
2 parts of the global community could be further en-
3 hanced through a systematic approach, along with
4 greater attention from Congress and the American
5 public to such efforts.
6 (f) STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL
7 PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.—
8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
9 the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary
10 of State, in consultation with other Federal depart-
11 ments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to
12 the appropriate congressional committees a strategy—
13 (A) to advance Taiwan’s meaningful par-
14 ticipation in a prioritized set of international
15 organizations; and
16 (B) that responds to growing pressure from
17 the PRC on foreign governments, international
18 organizations, commercial actors, and civil soci-
19 ety organizations to comply with its ‘‘One-China
20 Principle’’ with respect to Taiwan.
21 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy
22 required under paragraph (1) shall include—
23 (A) an assessment of the methods the PRC
24 uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its ‘‘One-
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1 against governments, international organiza-
2 tions, and civil society organizations and pres-
3 sure on commercial actors, to the extent relevant
4 in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful participa-
5 tion international organizations;
6 (B) an assessment of the policies of foreign
7 governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to
8 identify likeminded allies and partners who
9 might become public or private partners in the
10 strategy;
11 (C) a systematic analysis of all inter-
12 national organizations, as practicable, to iden-
13 tify those that best lend themselves to advancing
14 Taiwan’s participation, including—
15 (i) the organization’s policy on the re-
16 quirements to obtain membership and ob-
17 server status, as well as the foundational
18 documents defining membership require-
19 ments and observer status within the orga-
20 nization;
21 (ii) the organization’s participation
22 rules;
23 (iii) the processes for developing mem-
24 bership requirements and participation
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1 (iv) the policies of current members re-
2 garding Taiwan’s political status; and
3 (v) the organization’s relative reliance
4 on contributions from the PRC and how it
5 may affect internal decision-making;
6 (D) an evaluation of the feasibility and ad-
7 visability of expanding economic, security, and
8 diplomatic engagement with countries that have
9 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-
10 graded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns
11 with United States interests;
12 (E) a survey of international organizations
13 that have allowed Taiwan’s meaningful partici-
14 pation, including an assessment of whether any
15 erosion in Taiwan’s engagement has occurred
16 within those organizations and how Taiwan’s
17 participation has positively strengthened the ca-
18 pacity and activity of these organizations, pro-
19 viding positive models for Taiwan’s inclusion in
20 other similar forums;
21 (F) a list of not more than 20 international
22 organizations at which the United States Gov-
23 ernment will prioritize using its voice, vote, and
24 influence to advance Taiwan’s meaningful par-
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1 the date of enactment of this Act, to be derived
2 from the organizations identified pursuant to
3 subparagraph (C); and
4 (G) a description of the diplomatic strate-
5 gies and the coalitions the United States Govern-
6 ment plans to develop to implement subpara-
7 graph (F).
8 (3) FORM.—The strategy required under para-
9 graph (1) shall be submitted in classified form but
10 may include an unclassified summary.
11 (4) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State
12 shall consult with the appropriate congressional com-
13 mittees—
14 (A) not later than 90 days after the date of
15 enactment of this Act, with respect to the inter-
16 national organizations identified pursuant to
17 paragraph (2)(C); and
18 (B) not later than 180 days after the date
19 of the submission of the strategy required under
20 paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter for
21 2 years, regarding the development and imple-
22 mentation of the strategy required.
23 (g) EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOP-
24 MENT COOPERATION.—
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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Adminis-
3 trator of the United States Agency for International
4 Development (USAID), in consultation with the
5 United States International Development Finance
6 Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate
7 congressional committees a report on cooperation with
8 Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development
9 initiatives, through the American Institute in Taiwan
10 as appropriate.
11 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
12 quired in paragraph (1) shall include the following:
13 (A) A comprehensive review of existing co-
14 operation mechanisms and initiatives between
15 USAID or DFC and relevant departments and
16 agencies in Taiwan, including, but not limited
17 to Taiwan’s International Cooperation and De-
18 velopment Fund (ICDF).
19 (B) An assessment of how USAID and DFC
20 development cooperation with relevant depart-
21 ments and agencies in Taiwan compares to com-
22 parable cooperation with partners of similar eco-
23 nomic size and foreign assistance capacity.
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1 (C) An analysis of the opportunities and
2 challenges the cooperation described in subpara-
3 graph (A) has offered to date, including—
4 (i) opportunities collaboration has of-
5 fered to expand USAID’s and DFC’s ability
6 to deliver assistance into a wider range
7 communities;
8 (ii) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF,
9 other relevant agencies and departments in
10 Taiwan, or the organizations’ implementing
11 partners, have a comparative advantage in
12 providing assistance; and
13 (iii) opportunities to transition virtual
14 capacity building events relevant depart-
15 ments and agencies in Taiwan, through the
16 Global Cooperation and Training Frame-
17 work and other forums, into in-person, en-
18 during forms of development cooperation.
19 (D) An assessment of any legal, policy,
20 logistical, financial, or administrative barriers
21 to expanding cooperation in trilateral or multi-
22 lateral development, including—
23 (i) availability of personnel at the
24 American Institute in Taiwan responsible
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1 for coordinating development assistance co-
2 operation;
3 (ii) volume of current cooperation ini-
4 tiatives and barriers to expanding it;
5 (iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal bar-
6 riers facing the United States or other part-
7 ners to including Taiwan in formal and in-
8 formal multilateral development cooperation
9 mechanisms;
10 (iv) resource or capacity barriers to ex-
11 panding cooperation facing the United
12 States or Taiwan; and
13 (v) geopolitical barriers that com-
14 plicate United States-Taiwan cooperation
15 in third countries.
16 (E) Recommendations to address the chal-
17 lenges identified in subparagraph (D).
18 (F) A description of any additional re-
19 sources or authorities that expanding cooperation
20 might require.
21 (3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph
22 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
23 include a classified annex.
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1 (h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED
2 STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.—It is the
3 sense of the Congress that—
4 (1) expanding United States economic relations
5 with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the
6 United States and Taiwan; and
7 (2) the United States should explore opportuni-
8 ties to deepen, and where possible expand, economic
9 ties between Taiwan and the United States, through
10 dialogue, and by developing the legal templates re-
11 quired to support potential future agreements.
12 (i) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY
13 IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.—It is the sense of Congress that—
14 (1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, includ-
15 ing through high rates of PRC sorties into air space
16 near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises
17 near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United
18 States position that differences in cross-Strait rela-
19 tions must be resolved peacefully;
20 (2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict
21 to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any in-
22 crease in the risk of conflict demands attention and
23 obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most
24 viable means to prevent war;
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1 (3) Taiwan should continue to implement its
2 asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in
3 cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also
4 strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve
5 and civil defense forces, and those capabilities in-
6 clude, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise
7 missiles; and
8 (4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essen-
9 tial to maintain open and effective crisis communica-
10 tion and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to
11 reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately,
12 conflict.
13 (j) STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A
14 CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.—
15 (1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after
16 the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall
17 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
18 whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence
19 over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC
20 and Taiwan.
21 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy
22 shall include the following:
23 (A) A comprehensive review of existing dip-
24 lomatic, economic, and military tools to establish
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1 deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an as-
2 sessment of their efficacy.
3 (B) An examination of the present and fu-
4 ture capabilities of the United States and Tai-
5 wan to respond to the potential PLA campaigns
6 against Taiwan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The
7 analysis shall include an assessment of the
8 progress Taiwan has made in developing the
9 cost-effective and resilient capabilities needed to
10 respond to its strategic environment, as well as
11 any additional personnel, procurement, or train-
12 ing reforms required.
13 (C) An evaluation of the feasibility of ex-
14 panding coordination with United States allies
15 and partners to enhance deterrence over a cross-
16 Strait conflict. The review shall include a review
17 of the following matters:
18 (i) Expanding coordination of public
19 or private messaging on deterrence vis-à-vis
20 Taiwan.
21 (ii) Coordinating use of economic tools
22 to raise the costs of PRC military action
23 that could precipitate a cross-Strait con-
24 flict.
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1 (iii) Enhancing codevelopment and co-
2 deployment of military capabilities related
3 to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or
4 enhancing coordination on training of Tai-
5 wan’s military forces.
6 (D) Recommendations on significant addi-
7 tional diplomatic, economic, and military steps
8 available to the United States Government, uni-
9 laterally and in concert with United States allies
10 and partners, to enhance the clarity and credi-
11 bility of deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict.
12 (E) A description of any additional re-
13 sources or authorities needed to implement the
14 recommendations identified in subparagraph
15 (D).
16 (3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph
17 (1) shall be submitted classified form but may include
18 an unclassified annex.
19 (4) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days
20 after the date of enactment of this Act, and not less
21 frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7 years,
22 the President (or a designee), as well as representa-
23 tives from the agencies and departments involved in
24 developing the strategy required in paragraph (1),
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1 mittees regarding the development and implementa-
2 tion of the strategy required in this subsection. The
3 representatives from the relevant agencies and depart-
4 ments shall be at the Under Secretary level or above.
5 (k) STRENGTHENING TAIWAN’S CIVILIAN DEFENSE
6 PROFESSIONALS.—
7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
8 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
9 State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
10 shall present to the appropriate congressional com-
11 mittees a plan for strengthening the community of ci-
12 vilian defense professionals in Taiwan, facilitated
13 through the American Institute in Taiwan as appro-
14 priate.
15 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan re-
16 quired by paragraph (1) shall include the following:
17 (A) A comprehensive review of existing
18 United States Government and non-United
19 States Government programmatic and funding
20 modalities to support Taiwan’s civilian defense
21 professionals in pursuing professional develop-
22 ment, educational, and cultural exchanges in the
23 United States, including—
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1 (i) opportunities through Department
2 of State-supported programs, such as the
3 International Visitor Leaders Program; and
4 (ii) opportunities offered through non-
5 governmental institutions, such as think
6 tanks, to the extent the review can prac-
7 ticably make such an assessment.
8 (B) A description of the frequency that ci-
9 vilian defense professionals from Taiwan pursue
10 or are selected for the programs reviewed pursu-
11 ant to subparagraph (A).
12 (C) An analysis of any funding, policy, ad-
13 ministrative, or other barriers preventing greater
14 participation from Taiwan’s civilian defense
15 professionals in the opportunities identified pur-
16 suant to subparagraph (A).
17 (D) An evaluation of the value expanding
18 the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subpara-
19 graph (A) would offer for strengthening Taiwan’s
20 existing civilian defense community, and for in-
21 creasing the perceived value of the field for young
22 professionals in Taiwan.
23 (E) An assessment of options the United
24 States Government could take individually, with
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1 ments, or nongovernmental partners, to expand
2 the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subpara-
3 graph (A).
4 (F) A description of additional resources
5 and authorities required by the options assessed
6 pursuant to subparagraph (E).
7 (3) FORM.—The plan required by paragraph (1)
8 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may in-
9 clude a classified annex.
10 SEC. 211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT.
11 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
12 ‘‘Taiwan International Solidarity Act’’.
13 (b) CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS
14 GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758.—Subsection (a) of
15 section 2 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and
16 Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law
17 116–135) (relating to diplomatic relations with Taiwan)
18 is amended by adding at the end the following new para-
19 graphs:
20 ‘‘(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
21 tion 2758 (1971) established the representatives of the
22 Government of the People’s Republic of China as the
23 only lawful representatives of China to the United
24 Nations. The resolution did not address the issue of
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25 representation of Taiwan and its people in the United
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1 Nations or any related organizations, nor did the res-
2 olution take a position on the relationship between the
3 People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include
4 any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty.
5 ‘‘(11) The United States opposes any initiative
6 that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the con-
7 sent of the people.’’.
8 (c) UNITED STATES ADVOCACY FOR INTERNATIONAL
9 ORGANIZATIONS TO RESIST THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
10 CHINA’S EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE ‘‘ONE CHINA’’ POSI-
11 TION.—Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International Protec-
12 tion and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019
13 (relating to the policy of the United States regarding Tai-
14 wan’s participation in international organizations) is
15 amended—
16 (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the
17 semicolon at the end;
18 (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at
19 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
20 (3) by adding at the end the following new para-
21 graph:
22 ‘‘(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives
23 of the United States Government in all organizations
24 described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and
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1 nizations to resist the People’s Republic of China’s ef-
2 forts to distort the decisions, language, policies, or
3 procedures of such organizations regarding Taiwan.’’.
4 (d) OPPOSING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S
5 EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE TAIWAN’S TIES AND PARTNER-
6 SHIPS INTERNATIONALLY.—Subsection (a) of section 5 of
7 the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhance-
8 ment Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strength-
9 ening ties with Taiwan) is amended—
10 (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the
11 semicolon at the end;
12 (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at
13 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and
14 (3) by adding at the end the following new para-
15 graph:
16 ‘‘(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States al-
17 lies and partners to oppose the People’s Republic of
18 China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s official diplo-
19 matic relationships and its partnerships with coun-
20 tries with which it does not maintain diplomatic re-
21 lations.’’.
22 (e) REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S
23 ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE ITS ‘‘ONE CHINA’’ POSITION.—
24 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 5 of
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1 hancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating
2 to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended by in-
3 serting before the period at the end the following: ‘‘,
4 as well as information relating to any prior or ongo-
5 ing attempts by the People’s Republic of China to un-
6 dermine Taiwan’s membership or observer status in
7 all organizations described in section (4)(1) and Tai-
8 wan’s ties and relationships with other countries in
9 accordance with subsection (a) of this section’’.
10 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by
11 paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the en-
12 actment of this Act and apply beginning with the
13 first report required under subsection (b) of section 5
14 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and
15 Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as
16 amended by paragraph (1), that is required after such
17 date.
18 SEC. 212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.
19 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
20 ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Act’’.
21 (b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.—
22 (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
23 (A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law
24 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United
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1 close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and
2 other relations between the people of the United
3 States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the
4 people on the China mainland and all other peo-
5 ples of the Western Pacific area’’.
6 (B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance
7 Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the
8 United States has grown its strategic partner-
9 ship with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of
10 23,000,000 people.
11 (C) Despite a concerted campaign by the
12 People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan
13 from its diplomatic partners and from inter-
14 national organizations, including the World
15 Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a
16 global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic
17 response, including by donating more than
18 2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical
19 equipment to the United States.
20 (D) The creation of a United States fellow-
21 ship program with Taiwan would support—
22 (i) a key priority of expanding people-
23 to-people exchanges, which was outlined in
24 President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 Na-
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1 (ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s com-
2 mitment to Taiwan, ‘‘a leading democracy
3 and a critical economic and security part-
4 ner’’, as expressed in his March 2021 In-
5 terim National Security Strategic Guid-
6 ance; and
7 (iii) April 2021 guidance from the De-
8 partment of State based on a review re-
9 quired under the Taiwan Assurance Act of
10 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF
11 of Public Law 116–260) to ‘‘encourage U.S.
12 government engagement with Taiwan that
13 reflects our deepening unofficial relation-
14 ship’’.
15 (2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section
16 are—
17 (A) to further strengthen the United States-
18 Taiwan strategic relationship and broaden un-
19 derstanding of the Indo-Pacific region by tempo-
20 rarily assigning officials of agencies of the
21 United States Government to Taiwan for inten-
22 sive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement
23 as Fellows with the governing authorities on
24 Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution;
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1 (B) to expand United States Government
2 expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills
3 and understanding of the politics, history, and
4 culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region
5 by providing eligible United States personnel the
6 opportunity to acquire such skills and under-
7 standing through the Taiwan Fellowship Pro-
8 gram established under subsection (c); and
9 (C) to better position the United States to
10 advance its economic, security, and human
11 rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific re-
12 gion.
13 (c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.—
14 (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
15 (A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term ‘‘agency
16 head’’ means, in the case of the executive branch
17 of United States Government, or in the case of
18 a legislative branch agency specified in subpara-
19 graph (B), the head of the respective agency.
20 (B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOV-
21 ERNMENT.—The term ‘‘agency of the United
22 States Government’’ includes the Government Ac-
23 countability Office, the Congressional Budget Of-
24 fice, the Congressional Research Service, and the
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1 view Commission of the legislative branch, as
2 well as any agency of the executive branch.
3 (C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional
5 committees’’ means—
6 (i) the Committee on Appropriations,
7 the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the
8 Committee on Armed Services of the House
9 of Representatives; and
10 (ii) the Committee on Appropriations
11 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of
12 the Senate.
13 (D) DETAILEE.—The term ‘‘detailee’’ means
14 an employee of an agency of the United States
15 Government on loan to the American Institute in
16 Taiwan, without a change of position from the
17 agency at which such employee is employed.
18 (E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term
19 ‘‘implementing partner’’ means any United
20 States organization described in section
21 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
22 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of
23 such Code that—
24 (i) is selected through a competitive
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1 (ii) performs logistical, administrative,
2 and other functions, as determined by the
3 Department of State and the American In-
4 stitute of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan
5 Fellowship Program; and
6 (iii) enters into a cooperative agree-
7 ment with the American Institute in Tai-
8 wan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship
9 Program.
10 (2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP
11 PROGRAM.—
12 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of
13 State shall establish the ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship
14 Program’’ (referred to in this section as the
15 ‘‘Program’’) to provide a fellowship opportunity
16 in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible United
17 States citizens through the cooperative agreement
18 established in subparagraph (B). The Secretary
19 of State, in consultation with appropriate coun-
20 terparts at the American Institute in Taiwan
21 and the implementing partner, may modify the
22 name of the Program.
23 (B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.—
24 (i) IN GENERAL.—The American Insti-
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1 priated pursuant to the authorization under
2 paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual
3 or multi-year cooperative agreement with
4 an appropriate implementing partner.
5 (ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary of
6 State, in consultation with the American
7 Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate,
8 the implementing partner, shall award to
9 eligible United States citizens, subject to
10 available funding—
11 (I) not fewer than five fellowships
12 during the first two years of the Pro-
13 gram; and
14 (II) not fewer than ten fellowships
15 during each of the remaining years of
16 the Program.
17 (C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLE-
18 MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days
19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
20 American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation
21 with the Secretary of State, shall—
22 (i) begin negotiations with the Taipei
23 Economic and Cultural Representative Of-
24 fice, or with another appropriate entity, for
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25 the purpose of entering into an agreement
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1 to facilitate the placement of fellows in an
2 agency of the governing authorities on Tai-
3 wan; and
4 (ii) begin the process of selecting an
5 implementing partner, which—
6 (I) shall agree to meet all of the
7 legal requirements required to operate
8 in Taiwan; and
9 (II) shall be composed of staff who
10 demonstrate significant experience
11 managing exchange programs in the
12 Indo-Pacific region.
13 (D) CURRICULUM.—
14 (i) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year
15 of each fellowship under this subsection,
16 each fellow should study—
17 (I) the Mandarin Chinese lan-
18 guage;
19 (II) the people, history, and polit-
20 ical climate on Taiwan; and
21 (III) the issues affecting the rela-
22 tionship between the United States and
23 the Indo-Pacific region.
24 (ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the second
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25 year of each fellowship under this section,
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1 each fellow, subject to the approval of the
2 Secretary of State, the American Institute
3 in Taiwan, and the implementing partner,
4 and in accordance with the purposes of this
5 section, shall work in—
6 (I) a parliamentary office, min-
7 istry, or other agency of the governing
8 authorities on Taiwan; or
9 (II) an organization outside of the
10 governing authorities on Taiwan,
11 whose interests are associated with the
12 interests of the fellow and the agency of
13 the United States Government from
14 which the fellow had been employed.
15 (E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.—
16 Notwithstanding any requirement under this sec-
17 tion, the Secretary of State, in consultation with
18 the American Institute in Taiwan and, as ap-
19 propriate, the implementing partner, may award
20 fellowships that have a duration of between nine
21 months and two years, and may alter the cur-
22 riculum requirements under subparagraph (D)
23 for such purposes.
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1 (F) SUNSET.—The Program shall terminate
2 ten years after the date of the enactment of this
3 section.
4 (3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—
5 (A) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A
6 United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship
7 under this section if he or she—
8 (i) is an employee of the United States
9 Government;
10 (ii) has at least two years of experience
11 in any branch of the United States Govern-
12 ment;
13 (iii) has received at least one exem-
14 plary performance review in his or her cur-
15 rent United States Government role within
16 at least the last three years prior to begin-
17 ning the fellowship;
18 (iv) has a demonstrated professional or
19 educational background in the relationship
20 between the United States and countries in
21 the Indo-Pacific region; and
22 (v) has demonstrated his or her com-
23 mitment to further service in the United
24 States Government.
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1 (B) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each
2 recipient of a fellowship under this section shall
3 agree, as a condition of such fellowship—
4 (i) to maintain satisfactory progress in
5 language training and appropriate behavior
6 in Taiwan, as determined by the Depart-
7 ment of State, the American Institute in
8 Taiwan and, as appropriate, its imple-
9 menting partner;
10 (ii) to refrain from engaging in any
11 intelligence or intelligence-related activity
12 on behalf of the United States Government;
13 and
14 (iii) to continue Federal Government
15 employment for a period of not less than
16 four years after the conclusion of the fellow-
17 ship, or for not less than two years for a fel-
18 lowship that is one year or shorter.
19 (C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING
20 PARTNER.—
21 (i) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The im-
22 plementing partner, in close coordination
23 with the Secretary of State and the Amer-
24 ican Institute in Taiwan, shall—
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1 (I) make efforts to recruit fellow-
2 ship candidates who reflect the diver-
3 sity of the United States;
4 (II) select fellows for the Program
5 based solely on merit, with appropriate
6 supervision from the Department of
7 State and the American Institute in
8 Taiwan; and
9 (III) prioritize the selection of
10 candidates willing to serve a fellowship
11 lasting one year or longer.
12 (ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing
13 partner should provide each fellow in the
14 first year (or shorter duration, as jointly
15 determined by the Secretary of State and
16 the American Institute in Taiwan, for those
17 who are not serving a two-year fellowship)
18 with—
19 (I) intensive Mandarin Chinese
20 language training; and
21 (II) courses in the politic, culture,
22 and history of Taiwan, China, and the
23 broader Indo-Pacific.
24 (iii) WAIVER TRAIN-
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OF REQUIRED
25 ING.—The Secretary of State, in coordina-
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1 tion with the American Institute in Taiwan
2 and, as appropriate, the implementing
3 partner, may waive any of the training re-
4 quired under clause (ii) to the extent that a
5 fellow has Mandarin Chinese language
6 skills, knowledge of the topics described in
7 clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons
8 approved by the Secretary of State and the
9 American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the
10 training requirements are waived for a fel-
11 low serving a two-year fellowship, the train-
12 ing portion of his or her fellowship may be
13 shortened to the extent appropriate.
14 (iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple-
15 menting partner, in consultation with the
16 Secretary of State and the American Insti-
17 tute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office
18 and at least one full-time staff member in
19 Taiwan to—
20 (I) liaise with the American Insti-
21 tute in Taiwan and the governing au-
22 thorities on Taiwan; and
23 (II) serve as the primary in-coun-
24 try point of contact for the recipients
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1 of fellowships under this section and
2 their dependents.
3 (v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The imple-
4 menting partner should perform other func-
5 tions in association in support of the Pro-
6 gram, including logistical and administra-
7 tive functions, as included in the coopera-
8 tive agreement entered into pursuant to
9 paragraph (2)(B) by the Secretary of State
10 and the American Institute in Taiwan.
11 (D) NONCOMPLIANCE.—
12 (i) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails
13 to comply with the requirements under this
14 section shall reimburse the American Insti-
15 tute in Taiwan for—
16 (I) the Federal funds expended for
17 the fellow’s participation in the fellow-
18 ship, as set forth in clauses (ii) and
19 (iii); and
20 (II) interest accrued on such
21 funds (calculated at the prevailing
22 rate).
23 (ii) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fel-
24 low who violates clause (i) or (ii) of sub-
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1 ican Institute in Taiwan in an amount
2 equal to the sum of—
3 (I) all of the Federal funds ex-
4 pended for the fellow’s participation in
5 the fellowship; and
6 (II) interest on the amount speci-
7 fied in subclause (I), which shall be
8 calculated at the prevailing rate.
9 (iii) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—
10 Any fellow who violates subparagraph
11 (B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Insti-
12 tute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the
13 difference between—
14 (I) the amount specified in clause
15 (ii); and
16 (II) the product of—
17 (aa) the amount the fellow
18 received in compensation during
19 the final year of the fellowship,
20 including the value of any allow-
21 ances and benefits received by the
22 fellow; multiplied by
23 (bb) the percentage of the pe-
24 riod specified in subparagraph
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25 (B)(iii) during which the fellow
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1 did not remain employed by the
2 United States Government.
3 (E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90
4 days after the selection of the first class of fellows
5 under this section and annually thereafter for 10
6 years, the Secretary of State shall offer to brief
7 the appropriate congressional committees regard-
8 ing the following:
9 (i) An assessment of the performance of
10 the implementing partner in fulfilling the
11 purposes of this section.
12 (ii) The number of applicants each
13 year, the number of applicants willing to
14 serve a fellowship lasting one year or
15 longer, and the number of such applicants
16 selected for a fellowship.
17 (iii) The names and sponsoring agen-
18 cies of the fellows selected by the imple-
19 menting partner and the extent to which
20 such fellows represent the diversity of the
21 United States.
22 (iv) The names of the parliamentary
23 offices, ministries, other agencies of the gov-
24 erning authorities on Taiwan, and non-
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1 governmental institutions to which each fel-
2 low was assigned.
3 (v) Any recommendations, as appro-
4 priate, to improve the implementation of
5 the Program, including added flexibilities
6 in the administration of the program.
7 (vi) An assessment of the Program’s
8 value upon the relationship between the
9 United States and Taiwan or the United
10 States and Asian countries.
11 (F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—
12 (i) IN GENERAL.—The financial
13 records of any implementing partner shall
14 be audited annually in accordance with
15 generally accepted auditing standards by
16 independent certified public accountants or
17 independent licensed public accountants
18 who are certified or licensed by a regulatory
19 authority of a State or another political
20 subdivision of the United States.
21 (ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under
22 clause (i) shall be conducted at the place or
23 places where the financial records of the im-
24 plementing partner are normally kept.
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1 (iii) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The
2 implementing partner shall make available
3 to the accountants conducting an audit
4 under clause (i)—
5 (I) all books, financial records,
6 files, other papers, things, and prop-
7 erty belonging to, or in use by, the im-
8 plementing partner that are necessary
9 to facilitate the audit; and
10 (II) full facilities for verifying
11 transactions with the balances or secu-
12 rities held by depositories, fiscal
13 agents, and custodians.
14 (iv) REPORT.—
15 (I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than
16 180 days after the end of each fiscal
17 year, the implementing partner shall
18 provide a report of the audit conducted
19 for such fiscal year under clause (i) to
20 the Secretary of State and the Amer-
21 ican Institute in Taiwan.
22 (II) CONTENTS.—Each audit re-
23 port under subclause (I) shall—
24 (aa) set forth the scope of the
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25 audit at issue;
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1 (bb) include such statements,
2 along with the auditor’s opinion
3 of those statements, as may be
4 necessary to present fairly the im-
5 plementing partner’s assets and
6 liabilities, surplus or deficit, with
7 reasonable detail;
8 (cc) include a statement of
9 the implementing partner’s in-
10 come and expenses during the
11 year; and
12 (dd) include a schedule of—
13 (AA) all contracts and
14 cooperative agreements re-
15 quiring payments greater
16 than $5,000; and
17 (BB) any payments of
18 compensation, salaries, or
19 fees at a rate greater than
20 $5,000 per year.
21 (III) COPIES.—Each audit report
22 shall be produced in sufficient copies
23 for distribution to the public.
24 (4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERN-
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25 MENT SERVICE.—
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1 (A) IN GENERAL.—
2 (i) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the
3 approval of the Secretary of State, an agen-
4 cy head may detail, for a period of not
5 more than two years, an employee of the
6 agency of the United States Government
7 who has been awarded a fellowship under
8 this Act, to the American Institute in Tai-
9 wan for the purpose of assignment to the
10 governing authorities on Taiwan or an or-
11 ganization described in paragraph
12 (2)(D)(ii)(II).
13 (ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall
14 enter into a written agreement with the
15 Federal Government before receiving a fel-
16 lowship, in which the fellow shall agree—
17 (I) to continue in the service of
18 the sponsoring agency at the end of fel-
19 lowship for a period of at least four
20 years (or at least two years if the fel-
21 lowship duration is one year or short-
22 er) unless such detailee is involuntarily
23 separated from the service of such
24 agency; and
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1 (II) to pay to the American Insti-
2 tute in Taiwan any additional ex-
3 penses incurred by the United States
4 Government in connection with the fel-
5 lowship if the detailee voluntarily sep-
6 arates from service with the sponsoring
7 agency before the end of the period for
8 which the detailee has agreed to con-
9 tinue in the service of such agency.
10 (iii) EXCEPTION.—The payment
11 agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be
12 required of a detailee who leaves the service
13 of the sponsoring agency to enter into the
14 service of another agency of the United
15 States Government unless the head of the
16 sponsoring agency notifies the detailee be-
17 fore the effective date of entry into the serv-
18 ice of the other agency that payment will be
19 required under this subsection.
20 (B) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.—
21 A detailee under this paragraph—
22 (i) is deemed, for the purpose of pre-
23 serving allowances, privileges, rights, senior-
24 ity, and other benefits, to be an employee of
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25 the sponsoring agency;
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1 (ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and
2 benefits from funds available to such agen-
3 cy, which is deemed to comply with section
4 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and
5 (iii) may be assigned to a position
6 with an entity described in paragraph
7 (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position
8 does not involve—
9 (I) the taking of an oath of alle-
10 giance to another government; or
11 (II) the acceptance of compensa-
12 tion or other benefits from any foreign
13 government by such detailee.
14 (C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING
15 AGENCY.—
16 (i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the
17 United States Government from which a
18 detailee is detailed should provide the fellow
19 allowances and benefits that are consistent
20 with Department of State Standardized
21 Regulations or other applicable rules and
22 regulations, including—
23 (I) a living quarters allowance to
24 cover the cost of housing in Taiwan;
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1 (II) a cost of living allowance to
2 cover any possible higher costs of living
3 in Taiwan;
4 (III) a temporary quarters sub-
5 sistence allowance for up to seven days
6 if the fellow is unable to find housing
7 immediately upon arriving in Taiwan;
8 (IV) an education allowance to
9 assist parents in providing the fellow’s
10 minor children with educational serv-
11 ices ordinarily provided without charge
12 by public schools in the United States;
13 (V) moving expenses to transport
14 personal belongings of the fellow and
15 his or her family in their move to Tai-
16 wan, which is comparable to the allow-
17 ance given for American Institute in
18 Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan;
19 and
20 (VI) an economy-class airline
21 ticket to and from Taiwan for each fel-
22 low and the fellow’s immediate family.
23 (ii) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—The
24 American Institute in Taiwan and its im-
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25 plementing partner, with the approval of
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1 the Department of State, may modify the
2 benefits set forth in clause (i) if such modi-
3 fication is warranted by fiscal cir-
4 cumstances.
5 (D) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The Amer-
6 ican Institute in Taiwan, the implementing
7 partner, and any governing authorities on Tai-
8 wan or nongovernmental entities in Taiwan at
9 which a fellow is detailed during the second year
10 of the fellowship may not be held responsible for
11 the pay, allowances, or any other benefit nor-
12 mally provided to the detailee.
13 (E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be de-
14 tailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimburse-
15 ment to the United States by the American Insti-
16 tute in Taiwan.
17 (F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—
18 Detailees may be paid by the American Institute
19 in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed
20 in subparagraph (C).
21 (5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year be-
22 fore the sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph
23 (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United States
24 shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
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25 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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1 of the House of Representatives a report that includes
2 the following:
3 (A) An analysis of United States Govern-
4 ment participants in the Program, including the
5 number of applicants and the number of fellow-
6 ships undertaken, and the places of employment.
7 (B) An assessment of the costs and benefits
8 for participants in the Program and for the
9 United States Government of such fellowships.
10 (C) An analysis of the financial impact of
11 the fellowship on United States Government of-
12 fices that have detailed fellows to participate in
13 the Program.
14 (D) Recommendations, if any, on how to
15 improve the Program.
16 (6) FUNDING.—
17 (A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
18 TIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated
19 to the American Institute in Taiwan—
20 (i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of
21 which $500,000 should be made available to
22 an appropriate implementing partner to
23 launch the Program; and
24 (ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc-
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25 ceeding fiscal year, $2,400,000.
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1 (B) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The implementing
2 partner selected to implement the Program may
3 accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of
4 services or property in carrying out such pro-
5 gram, subject to the review and approval of the
6 American Institute in Taiwan.
7 SEC. 213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL
8 AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PA-
9 CIFIC.
10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
11 (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State
12 allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in
13 bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources, in-
14 cluding as authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia
15 Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–
16 409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in the fiscal
17 year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These
18 amounts represent only 5 percent of the diplomatic
19 engagement budget and only 4 percent of the total De-
20 partment of State-USAID budget.
21 (2) Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engage-
22 ment budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific
23 averaged only 5 percent of the total, while foreign as-
24 sistance resources averaged only 4 percent of the total.
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1 (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a
2 process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure
3 that its personnel footprint matches the demands of
4 great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pa-
5 cific.
6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
7 that—
8 (1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps
9 must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging
10 challenges of the 21st century, including those in the
11 Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere;
12 (2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary
13 for the success of the United States diplomatic corps
14 and integral to its ability to meet national security
15 objectives;
16 (3) the increase must be designed to meet the ob-
17 jectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on
18 strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of
19 countries that adhere to and uphold the rules-based
20 international order; and
21 (4) the increase must be implemented with a
22 focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and
23 public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative
24 increase of at least 200 Foreign Service officer gener-
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25 alists, to—
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1 (A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade
2 and open investment environments for United
3 States entities, and engaged in increased com-
4 mercial diplomacy in key markets;
5 (B) better articulate and explain United
6 States policies, strengthen civil society and
7 democratic principles, enhance reporting on glob-
8 al activities, promote people-to-people exchanges,
9 and advance United States influence; and
10 (C) increase capacity at small- and me-
11 dium-sized embassies and consulates in the Indo-
12 Pacific and other regions around the world, as
13 necessary.
14 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of
15 the United States to—
16 (1) ensure Department of State funding levels
17 and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the
18 region’s high degree of importance and significance to
19 United States political, economic, and security inter-
20 ests; and
21 (2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign
22 assistance funding and the quantity of personnel
23 dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the
24 Department of State’s total budget.
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1 (d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the
2 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
3 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees
4 of Congress an action plan that includes the following ele-
5 ments:
6 (1) Identification of requirements to advance
7 United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific
8 and the personnel and budgetary resources for the De-
9 partment of State needed to satisfy such objectives, as-
10 suming an unconstrained resource environment.
11 (2) A plan to increase the portion of the Depart-
12 ment’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms
13 of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and
14 security assistance.
15 (3) A plan to increase the number of positions
16 at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with
17 responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a
18 description of increases at each post or bureau, a
19 breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of
20 how such increases in personnel will advance United
21 States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.
22 (4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese-
23 language speakers and translation specialists at posts
24 in the Indo-Pacific region and within bureau offices
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1 with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, in-
2 cluding in INR.
3 (5) A description of any staffing or other train-
4 ing or personnel reforms that may be required to
5 quickly increase departmental capacity to address the
6 inter-disciplinary, interconnected opportunities and
7 challenges presented in the Indo-Pacific, including
8 but not limited to issues related to climate change,
9 public health, supply chains, cybersecurity, and dig-
10 ital technology issues.
11 (6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks
12 that the Department will meet in implementing the
13 action plan.
14 (7) A description of any barriers to imple-
15 menting the action plan and recommendations to ad-
16 dress these barriers, noting whether additional au-
17 thorities or resources from Congress is needed to ad-
18 dress these barriers.
19 (e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 180
20 days after the submission of the action plan described in
21 subsection (d) for not more than 3 years, the Secretary of
22 State shall submit an update and brief the appropriate con-
23 gressional committees on the implementation of such action
24 plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assess-
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25 ment of benchmarks reached.
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1 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
2 authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022,
3 $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance
4 resources to carry out the purposes of part I and chapter
5 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
6 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and
7 $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the
8 Indo-Pacific region.
9 (g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU-
10 ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.—
11 Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f)
12 include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to
13 section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of
14 2018 (Public Law 115–409).
15 (h) BENCHMARKS UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years
16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
17 of State shall report to the appropriate congressional com-
18 mittees on the extent to which the strategic objectives de-
19 scribed in the action plan in subsection (d) have been satis-
20 fied or progress toward such satisfaction has been made.
21 SEC. 214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS
22 CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING.
23 (a) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND
24 SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180
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1 retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the
2 appropriate congressional committees a written report de-
3 tailing—
4 (1) a description of United States Government
5 efforts to gain a commitment from the Government of
6 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to submit un-
7 regulated fentanyl precursors such as 4–AP to con-
8 trols;
9 (2) a plan for future steps the United States
10 Government will take to urge the PRC to combat il-
11 licit fentanyl production and trafficking originating
12 in the PRC;
13 (3) an assessment of the intersection between il-
14 licit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and il-
15 licit environmental trade and possible relationships of
16 trade-based money laundering; and
17 (4) an assessment of the intersection between il-
18 licit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and
19 counterfeit medicines and medical supplies in the
20 United States.
21 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under
22 subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with
23 a classified annex.
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1 SEC. 215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVEST-
2 MENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF
3 INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT
4 ACT OF 2018.
5 (a) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT
6 OF 1990.—Section 1421(c) of the Better Utilization of In-
7 vestments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C.
8 9621(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
9 ‘‘(7) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT RE-
10 FORM ACT OF 1990.—
11 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subpara-
12 graphs (B) and (C), support provided under
13 paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be
14 considered to be a Federal credit program that is
15 subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990
16 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of applying
17 the requirements of such Act to such support.
18 ‘‘(B) DETERMINATION OF COST.—
19 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of
20 section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform
21 Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et seq.) the
22 cost of support provided under paragraph
23 (1) with respect to a project shall be the net
24 present value, at the time when funds are
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25 disbursed to provide the support, of the fol-
26 lowing estimated cash flows:
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1 ‘‘(I) The purchase price of the
2 support.
3 ‘‘(II) Dividends, redemptions, and
4 other shareholder distributions during
5 the term of the support.
6 ‘‘(III) Proceeds received upon a
7 sale, redemption, or other liquidation
8 of the support.
9 ‘‘(IV) Adjustments for risk of esti-
10 mated losses, if any.
11 ‘‘(ii) CHANGES IN TERMS INCLUDED.—
12 The estimated cash flows described in sub-
13 clauses (I) through (IV) of clause (i) shall
14 include the effects of changes in terms re-
15 sulting from the exercise of options included
16 in the agreement to provide the support.
17 ‘‘(C) REESTIMATE OF COST.—When the esti-
18 mated cost of support provided under paragraph
19 (1) with respect to a project made in a single fis-
20 cal year is reestimated in a subsequent year, the
21 difference between the reestimated cost and the
22 previous cost estimate shall be paid from the bal-
23 ances available in the Corporate Capital Account
24 established under section 1434.’’.
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1 (b) MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.—Section 1433
2 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop-
3 ment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking
4 ‘‘$60,000,000,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$100,000,000,000’’.
5 (c) FUNDING FOR CORPORATE CAPITAL ACCOUNT.—
6 Section 1434(b) of the Better Utilization of Investments
7 Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9634(b))
8 is amended—
9 (1) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the
10 end;
11 (2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as para-
12 graph (7); and
13 (3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the fol-
14 lowing:
15 ‘‘(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pursu-
16 ant to section 1421(c); and’’.
17 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
18 of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of
19 the United States International Development Finance Cor-
20 poration shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
21 mittees and the Committee on Appropriations of the House
22 of Representatives and the Senate a report on—
23 (1) a plan to expand the Corporation’s financing
24 to support United States national security and devel-
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25 opment priorities in critical regions; and
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1 (2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic
2 resources that would be required in order to carry out
3 the plan required by this subsection.
4 SEC. 216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES
5 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
6 CORPORATION FOR VACCINE MANUFAC-
7 TURING.
8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Development Finance Corpora-
9 tion is authorized to provide financing to entities in India
10 and in other less developed countries to increase vaccine
11 manufacturing capacity for the following purposes:
12 (1) Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Author-
13 ization (SRA) or World Health Organization (WHO)
14 Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines.
15 (2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency
16 Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms re-
17 lated to COVID–19.
18 (3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies
19 needed for preventing, detecting and treating COVID–
20 19, including ventilators, personal protective equip-
21 ment, oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines.
22 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180
23 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief
24 Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation,
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1 in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide
2 a report to the appropriate congressional committees—
3 (1) outlining the countries where DFC financing
4 could be most impactful for vaccine manufacturing
5 and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion
6 COVID–19 vaccines by 2022;
7 (2) including a detailed explanation of the
8 United States and partner country interests served by
9 the United States providing support to such projects;
10 (3) including a detailed description of any sup-
11 port provided by other United States allies and part-
12 ners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection
13 (a); and
14 (4) including a detailed description of any sup-
15 port provided by the People’s Republic of China in
16 support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a).
17 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-
18 section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a
19 classified annex if necessary.
20 SEC. 217. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS
21 ALIGN WITH AMERICAN STRATEGIC NA-
22 TIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJEC-
23 TIVES.
24 (a) FINDING.—With 276 embassies and other rep-
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25 resentative offices globally, China now has more diplomatic
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1 posts around the world than any other country, including
2 the United States. Many of Beijing’s new missions can be
3 found in countries that recently broke ties with Taiwan
4 (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the
5 Gambia, and São Tomé and Principe) or do not have any
6 United States diplomatic physical presence despite these
7 countries asking for increased United States engagement
8 and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica).
9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress,
10 that the Department of State should conduct an assessment
11 of all United States diplomatic missions and posts to verify
12 such missions and posts align with United States national
13 security and economic interests, as well as ensuring that
14 these locations position the United States appropriately
15 with its strategic competitors to advance the national inter-
16 est in every country worldwide, including those countries
17 currently lacking any physical United States diplomatic
18 presence, whether an embassy, consulate general, or prin-
19 cipal officer post.
20 (c) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter
22 for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
23 priate congressional committees a report assessing the num-
24 ber, location, and objectives of each of its diplomatic mis-
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25 sions and posts worldwide, including an assessment of any
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1 gaps that exist compared to other country strategic competi-
2 tors. The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the heads
3 of other Federal departments and agencies having an over-
4 seas presence at any United States diplomatic mission or
5 post to ensure such assessment reflects all Federal Govern-
6 ment equities and viewpoints.
7 SEC. 218. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE
8 FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.
9 There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year
10 period beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to pro-
11 mote education, training, research, and foreign language
12 skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance
13 with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural
14 Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).
15 SEC. 219. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-
16 TERING DISINFORMATION.
17 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF USAGM APPROPRIATIONS.—
18 There is authorized to be appropriated for the United States
19 Agency for Global Media $100,000,000 for each of fiscal
20 years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new programs
21 to support local media, build independent media, combat
22 CCP disinformation inside and outside of the People’s Re-
23 public of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship,
24 and monitor and evaluate such programs, of which—
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1 (1) not less than $50,000,000 shall be directed to
2 a grant to Radio Free Asia language services;
3 (2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made
4 available to serve populations in China through Man-
5 darin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language
6 services; and
7 (3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made avail-
8 able for digital media services—
9 (A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese
10 populations in foreign countries; and
11 (B) to counter propaganda of Chinese popu-
12 lations in China through ‘‘Global Mandarin’’
13 programming.
14 (b) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of
15 State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for
16 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Adminis-
17 trator of the United States Agency for International Devel-
18 opment, acting through the Assistant Administrator for De-
19 velopment, Democracy, and Innovation, shall jointly sup-
20 port and train foreign journalists on investigative tech-
21 niques necessary to ensure public accountability, promote
22 transparency, fight corruption, and support the ability of
23 the public to develop informed opinions about pressing
24 issues facing their countries.
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1 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau of
2 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to
3 support internet freedom programs.
4 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
5 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
6 and United States Agency for International Development
7 $170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,
8 for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom,
9 training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appro-
10 priated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to re-
11 main available until expended and shall be in addition to
12 amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to support
13 press freedom, training, and protection of journalists.
14 SEC. 219A. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.
15 (a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global Engage-
16 ment Center to ‘‘direct, lead, and coordinate efforts’’ of the
17 Federal Government to ‘‘recognize, understand, expose, and
18 counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and
19 disinformation globally’’.
20 (b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National De-
21 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C.
22 2656 note) is amended by striking ‘‘the date that is 8 years
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act’’ and inserting
24 ‘‘December 31, 2027’’.
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1 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
2 that the Global Engagement Center should expand its co-
3 ordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through the
4 exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and
5 agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering
6 foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director
7 of National Intelligence and Special Operations Com-
8 mand’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center.
9 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
10 authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year
11 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign
12 state and non-state sponsored propaganda and
13 disinformation.
14 SEC. 219B. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID–19 PAN-
15 DEMIC.
16 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
17 that—
18 (1) it is critical to understand the origins of the
19 COVID–19 pandemic so the United States can better
20 prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health
21 threats in the future;
22 (2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic
23 on all Americans, the American people deserve to
24 know what information the United States Govern-
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1 ment possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as ap-
2 propriate;
3 (3) it is critical for independent experts to have
4 full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi-
5 ronmental data, biological sample, research, and per-
6 sonnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak rel-
7 evant to determining how this pandemic emerged;
8 (4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the
9 United States Government and 13 other foreign gov-
10 ernments that the international team of experts dis-
11 patched to the People’s Republic of China by the
12 World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori-
13 gins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was ‘‘significantly de-
14 layed and lacked access to complete, original data
15 and samples’’;
16 (5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Direc-
17 tor-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom
18 Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative
19 team had encountered ‘‘difficulties’’ in accessing nec-
20 essary raw data, that ‘‘we have not yet found the
21 source of the virus’’, and that ‘‘all hypotheses remain
22 on the table’’;
23 (6) the G7 communique expressing support for
24 full implementation of the International Health Reg-
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25 ulations, including ‘‘a timely, transparent, expert-led,
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1 and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID–19
2 Origins study including, as recommended by the ex-
3 perts’ report, in China’’ is a valuable commitment by
4 the United States and its allies to investigating the
5 origins of COVID–19 in order to better prepare for
6 future pandemics; and
7 (7) Congress supports the effort announced by
8 President Biden, directing the intelligence community
9 to conduct a 90 day review to further analyze infor-
10 mation pointing to the origins of COVID–19.
11 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days
12 after enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to
13 the appropriate committees of Congress a report consisting
14 of—
15 (1) an assessment of the most likely source or or-
16 igin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a detailed
17 review of all information the United States possesses
18 that it has identified as potentially relevant to the
19 source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including
20 zoonotic transmission and spillover, or other sources
21 of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on the in-
22 formation the United States Government has to date;
23 (2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and
24 (3) challenges identified to its ability to make
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25 such an assessment.
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1 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall
2 be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classi-
3 fied annex.
4 (d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
5 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees
6 of Congress’’ means—
7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
8 Senate;
9 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
10 Senate;
11 (3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor,
12 and Pensions of the Senate;
13 (4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
14 sources of the Senate;
15 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
16 House of Representatives;
17 (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
18 ligence of the House of Representatives; and
19 (7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
20 the House of Representatives.
21 SEC. 219C. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE
22 ACT OF 2018.
23 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
24 that—
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1 (1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of
2 the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic op-
3 portunities, as well as many challenges to United
4 States interests and values as a result of the growth
5 in authoritarian governance in the region and by
6 broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the
7 changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to
8 human rights principles and obligations;
9 (2) the People’s Republic of China poses a par-
10 ticular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally
11 recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic
12 and trade practices, disregards international laws
13 and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign
14 influence operations, and enables global digital
15 authoritarianism;
16 (3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018
17 (‘‘ARIA’’) enhances the United States’ commitment in
18 the Indo-Pacific region by—
19 (A) expanding its defense cooperation with
20 its allies and partners;
21 (B) investing in democracy and the protec-
22 tion of human rights;
23 (C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives;
24 and
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1 (D) supporting people-to-people engagement
2 and other shared priorities; and
3 (4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific
4 Strategy Report concludes that ARIA ‘‘enshrines a
5 generational whole-of-government policy framework
6 that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and
7 open Indo-Pacific region’’.
8 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—The Asia
9 Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409)
10 is amended—
11 (1) in section 201(b), by striking
12 ‘‘$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019
13 through 2023’’ and inserting ‘‘$2,000,000,000 for each
14 of fiscal years 2022 through 2026’’;
15 (2) in section 215(b), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and in-
16 serting ‘‘2026’’;
17 (3) in section 306(a)—
18 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘5 years’’
19 and inserting ‘‘8 years’’; and
20 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘2023’’
21 and inserting ‘‘2026’’;
22 (4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and
23 inserting ‘‘2026’’;
24 (5) in section 410—
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1 (A) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘2023’’
2 and inserting ‘‘2026’’; and
3 (B) in subsection (d), in the matter pre-
4 ceding paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and
5 inserting ‘‘2026’’; and
6 (6) in section 411, by striking ‘‘2023’’ and in-
7 serting ‘‘2026’’.
8 SEC. 219D. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AF-
9 RICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB-
10 BEAN.
11 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—
12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish
13 United States strategies to promote, facilitate, and in-
14 crease trade and investment and development in Afri-
15 ca and Latin America and the Caribbean.
16 (2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required
17 by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing two-way
18 trade and investment with Africa and Latin America
19 and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value
20 by the date that is 5 years after the date of the enact-
21 ment of this Act.
22 (3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—
23 (A) UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO PRO-
24 MOTE TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AF-
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25 RICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN.—
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1 Not later than 180 days after the date of the en-
2 actment of this Act, the President, in consulta-
3 tion with the heads of the relevant Federal de-
4 partments and agencies, shall submit to the ap-
5 propriate congressional committees and make
6 publicly available a government-wide strategy
7 for Africa, to be known as the Prosper Africa
8 Strategy, and for Latin America and the Carib-
9 bean, that provides detailed descriptions of how
10 the United States intends to fulfill the policy ob-
11 jectives described in paragraph (2). The strate-
12 gies shall—
13 (i) support and be aligned with other
14 existing United States Government strate-
15 gies; and
16 (ii) include specific and measurable
17 goals, benchmarks, performance metrics,
18 timetables, and monitoring and evaluation
19 plans to ensure the accountability and effec-
20 tiveness of all policies and initiatives car-
21 ried out under the strategy.
22 (B) SPECIFIC PLANS FOR DEPARTMENTS
23 AND AGENCIES.—The strategies submitted pursu-
24 ant to subparagraph (A) shall also include spe-
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1 the recommendations and activities of the Eco-
2 nomic Diplomacy Action Group under section
3 708 of the Championing American Business
4 Through Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C.
5 9904), from each of the relevant Federal depart-
6 ments and agencies that describes—
7 (i) the anticipated contributions of the
8 department or agency, including technical,
9 financial, and in-kind contributions, to im-
10 plement the strategies;
11 (ii) the efforts of the department or
12 agency to ensure that the policies and ini-
13 tiatives carried out pursuant to the strate-
14 gies are designed to achieve maximum im-
15 pact and effectiveness; and
16 (iii) recommendations on necessary re-
17 sources, including staffing, to expand efforts
18 to promote trade and investment between
19 the United States and Africa, and the
20 United States and Latin America and the
21 Caribbean.
22 (C) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The
23 strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph
24 (A) shall include plans for coordinating with rel-
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25 evant departments and agencies the implementa-
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1 tion of agency-specific plans described in sub-
2 paragraph (B), particularly as it relates to ad-
3 vancing two-way trade and investment trans-
4 actions and business enabling environment re-
5 forms.
6 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the sub-
7 mission of the strategies required by subsection (a)(3), and
8 annually thereafter until 2026, the President shall submit
9 to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in co-
10 ordination with the report required by section 707 of the
11 Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act
12 of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9903) that—
13 (1) summarizes and evaluates the implementa-
14 tion of United States diplomatic efforts and foreign
15 assistance programs, projects, and activities to ad-
16 vance the policy objectives set forth in subsection
17 (a)(2);
18 (2) describes the nature and extent of the coordi-
19 nation among the relevant Federal departments and
20 agencies, including summary of activities and engage-
21 ments of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group; and
22 (3) describes the monitoring and evaluation
23 tools, mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress
24 made on the policy objectives of this section.
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1 (c) EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR AFRICA AND LATIN
2 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—
3 The President shall designate an individual to serve as the
4 Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in
5 Africa, also known as the Prosper Africa Executive Direc-
6 tor, and an individual to serve as Executive Director for
7 Trade and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the
8 Caribbean to—
9 (1) oversee the development and implementation
10 of the strategies required by subsection (a); and
11 (2) coordinate developing and implementing the
12 strategy with the Office of the United States Trade
13 Representative, the Office of Management and Budget,
14 and the relevant departments and agencies.
15 (d) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGES WITH AF-
16 RICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—It is the
17 sense of Congress that, not later than one year after the
18 date of the enactment of this Act, high-level officials of rel-
19 evant departments and agencies of the United States Gov-
20 ernment with responsibility for promoting trade, invest-
21 ment, financing, and development should conduct joint ac-
22 tivities to advance the strategies described in subsection(a),
23 including business development exchanges with public and
24 private sector representatives from Africa and Latin Amer-
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1 ica, and the Caribbean who are focused on promoting two-
2 way trade and investment.
3 (e) TRAINING, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND IN-
4 FORMATION SHARING.—The President shall develop a
5 plan—
6 (1) to standardize the training received by
7 United States and Foreign Commercial Service offi-
8 cers, economic officers of the Department of State,
9 and economic officers of the United States Agency for
10 International Development with respect to the pro-
11 grams and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of
12 the United States, the United States International
13 Development Finance Corporation, the Small Busi-
14 ness Administration, and the United States Trade
15 and Development Agency; and
16 (2) to ensure that—
17 (A) not later than one year after the date
18 of the enactment of this Act—
19 (i) all personnel referred to in para-
20 graph (1) receive the training described in
21 that paragraph; and
22 (ii) relevant departments and agencies
23 share information on trade and investment
24 transactions facilitated by the United States
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1 Government and funded by the public or
2 private sector;
3 (B) not later than 60 days after the date of
4 the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of
5 USAID and the Chief Executive Officer of DFC
6 shall develop a plan to enhance coordination and
7 expedite information sharing that includes—
8 (i) a process for sharing of information
9 in a timely fashion, and at least monthly,
10 on—
11 (I) active and early stage leads on
12 transactions initiated, promoted, or fa-
13 cilitated by DFC;
14 (II) transactions deemed ineligible
15 for DFC support or not being pursued
16 by DFC for other reasons; and
17 (III) transaction opportunities
18 identified by USAID or other relevant
19 United States departments and agen-
20 cies submitted for DFC consideration;
21 and
22 (ii) any training required for DFC,
23 USAID, or other interagency staff to imple-
24 ment the plan;
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1 (C) the Executive Directors and their ap-
2 pointed staff shall be responsible for coordinating
3 implementation of this plan; and
4 (D) DFC and USAID shall, in consultation
5 with the Executive Directors and Congress, iden-
6 tify targets for DFC’s financial commitments
7 and any private capital mobilized to finalize a
8 transaction.
9 (f) DATA SHARING PLATFORM.—
10 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Administrator of
11 USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Di-
12 rectors and relevant department and agencies, estab-
13 lish an interoperable digital platform maintained by
14 the staff of the Executive Directors to—
15 (A) facilitate interagency information shar-
16 ing and collaboration on trade and investment
17 transactions; and
18 (B) ensure relevant department and agen-
19 cies use such platform to review, track, and de-
20 velop consensus on transactions and their rel-
21 ative priorities.
22 (2) COORDINATION.—The Executive Directors
23 shall coordinate regularly with the leadership of rel-
24 evant Federal department and agencies to—
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25 (A) advance and finalize transactions; or
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1 (B) provide a written justification for any
2 transaction deemed ineligible for United States
3 Government financing under existing authori-
4 ties.
5 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
6 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
7 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit-
8 tees’’ means—
9 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
10 the Senate;
11 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the
12 Senate;
13 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
14 House of Representatives; and
15 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the
16 House of Representatives.
17 (2) RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND
18 AGENCIES.—The term ‘‘relevant Federal departments
19 and agencies’’ includes—
20 (A) the Department of State;
21 (B) the Department of the Treasury;
22 (C) the Department of Commerce;
23 (D) the United States Agency for Inter-
24 national Development (USAID);
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25 (E) the Millennium Challenge Corporation;
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1 (F) the United States International Devel-
2 opment Finance Corporation (DFC);
3 (G) the United States Trade and Develop-
4 ment Agency;
5 (H) the United States African Development
6 Foundation;
7 (I) the Export Import Bank;
8 (J) the Small Business Administration;
9 (K) the Department of Agriculture; and
10 (L) any other entity deemed appropriate by
11 the President.
12 (3) EARLY-STAGE LEAD.—The term ‘‘early-stage
13 lead’’ means a prospective transaction which is being
14 evaluated by DFC staff, prior to DFC holding an in-
15 ternal screening meeting or accepting an application.
16 (4) TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The
17 term ‘‘two-way trade and investment’’ means United
18 States exports to Africa and Latin America and the
19 Caribbean, United States public and private invest-
20 ment in Africa and Latin America and the Carib-
21 bean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the
22 Caribbean to the United States, and Africa and Latin
23 America and the Caribbean investment in the United
24 States.
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1 SEC. 219E. CHINA WATCHER PROGRAM.
2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, acting
3 through the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
4 Pacific Affairs, and in coordination with relevant offices
5 and bureaus of the Department of State, shall implement
6 a ‘‘China Watcher Program’’ within the Department of
7 State to—
8 (1) monitor and combat Chinese malign influ-
9 ence across economic and political sectors in foreign
10 countries; and
11 (2) augment the capacity of United States Gov-
12 ernment engagement with foreign countries and re-
13 gional and international economic and political orga-
14 nizations and institutions relating to policy coordina-
15 tion regarding China and such Chinese malign influ-
16 ence.
17 (b) PLACEMENT.—In carrying out the China Watcher
18 Program under this section, the Secretary of State shall
19 place Foreign Service officers in positions in select United
20 States diplomatic and consular posts, at the discretion of
21 the Secretary of State, to engage both Chinese and third-
22 country nationals, including host governments, on the mat-
23 ters described in subsection (a).
24 (c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Each diplomatic or consular
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25 post with a China Watcher Program shall produce an an-
26 nual report outlining the steps each such post has taken
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1 to advance the mission, trends observed, and the nature and
2 extent of Chinese foreign direct investment and influence
3 in key economic and political sectors, including technology,
4 manufacturing, transportation, energy, metals, agriculture,
5 and real estate.
6 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS.—
7 There is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal
8 year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter to carry out this
9 section.
10 SEC. 219F. LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE
11 LANGUAGE.
12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
13 that—
14 (1) as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the
15 United States Government should invest heavily into
16 alternative programs and institutions that ensure
17 there remains a robust pipeline of Americans learning
18 China’s many languages; and
19 (2) in a 21st century that will be dominated by
20 a strategic competition between the United States and
21 China, it is in the national security interests of the
22 United States to ensure that Americans continue to
23 invest in Chinese language skills, as well as Tibetan,
24 Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while ensuring
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1 they can do so in a context free of malign political
2 influence from foreign state actors.
3 (b) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR
4 STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.—The Secretary of
5 State shall establish in the Department of State the ‘‘Liu
6 Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language’’ to fund
7 study by United States persons of Mandarin and Cantonese
8 Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contem-
9 porary spoken languages of China, abroad or in the United
10 States.
11 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are
12 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State
13 for fiscal year 2021 and every fiscal year thereafter,
14 $10,000,000 to carry out the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study
15 of the Chinese Language.
16 (d) REQUIRED ACTIVITIES.—Amounts authorized to be
17 appropriated pursuant to subsection (c) shall—
18 (1) be designed to advance the national security
19 and foreign policy interests of the United States, as
20 determined by the Secretary of State;
21 (2) favor funding mechanisms that can maxi-
22 mize the total number of United States persons given
23 the opportunity to acquire full conversational lin-
24 guistic proficiency in Mandarin and Cantonese Chi-
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1 nese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contem-
2 porary spoken languages of China;
3 (3) favor funding mechanisms that provide op-
4 portunities for such language study to areas tradi-
5 tionally under-served by such opportunities;
6 (4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative process
7 taking into account design inputs of—
8 (A) civil society institutions, including Chi-
9 nese diaspora community organizations;
10 (B) language experts in Mandarin and
11 Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian,
12 and other contemporary spoken languages of
13 China;
14 (C) organizations representing historically
15 disadvantaged socioeconomic groups in the
16 United States; and
17 (D) human rights organizations; and
18 (5) favor opportunities to fund the study of Man-
19 darin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mon-
20 golian, and other contemporary spoken languages of
21 China at Alaska Native-serving institutions, Asian
22 American and Native American Pacific Islander-serv-
23 ing institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, his-
24 torically Black college or universities, Native Amer-
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25 ican-serving nontribal institutions, Native Hawaiian-
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1 serving institutions, Predominantly Black institu-
2 tions, Tribal Colleges or Universities.
3 (e) REPORT.—
4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act and annually
6 thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in
7 consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal
8 departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall sub-
9 mit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
10 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Re-
11 lations of the Senate a report detailing activities and
12 disbursements made to carry out this Act over the im-
13 mediately preceding academic year.
14 (2) REPORT CONTENTS.—Each report required
15 under paragraph (1) shall include details on—
16 (A) which institutions, programs, or entities
17 received funds through the Liu Xiaobo Fund for
18 Study of the Chinese Language;
19 (B) funds distribution disaggregated by in-
20 stitution, program, or entity, including identi-
21 fication of the State or country in which such
22 institution, program, or entity is located;
23 (C) the number of United States persons
24 who received language study under the Liu
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25 Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language,
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1 and the average amount disbursed per person for
2 such study;
3 (D) a comparative analysis of per dollar
4 program effectiveness and efficiency in allowing
5 United States persons to reach conversational
6 proficiency Mandarin or Cantonese Chinese, Ti-
7 betan, Uyghur, Mongolian, or other contem-
8 porary spoken languages of China;
9 (E) an analysis of which of the languages
10 referred to in subparagraph (D) were studied
11 through the funding from the Liu Xiaobo Fund
12 for Study of the Chinese Language; and
13 (F) any recommendations of the Secretary
14 of State for improvements to the authorities, pri-
15 orities, or management of the Liu Xiaobo Fund
16 for Study of the Chinese Language.
17 (f) INTERAGENCY FUNDS TRANSFERS AUTHORIZA-
18 TION.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Sec-
19 retary of State to carry out this Act are authorized to be
20 transferred to the heads of other appropriate Federal de-
21 partments and agencies for similar purposes, subject to
22 prior notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
23 the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
24 Relations of the Senate. Such heads shall consult with the
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1 Secretary in the preparation of the report required under
2 subsection (e).
3 (g) LIMITATIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appro-
4 priated to carry out this Act may only be made available
5 for the costs of language study funded and administration
6 incurred by the Department of State or programs carried
7 out by the Department of State (or by another Federal de-
8 partment or agency pursuant to subsection (f)) to carry out
9 this section.
10 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
11 (1) ALASKA NATIVE-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The
12 term ‘‘Alaska Native-serving institution’’ has the
13 meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the
14 Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).
15 (2) ASIAN AMERICAN AND NATIVE AMERICAN PA-
16 CIFIC ISLANDER-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term
17 ‘‘Asian American and Native American Pacific Is-
18 lander-serving institution’’ has the meaning given
19 such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education
20 Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
21 (3) HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term
22 ‘‘Hispanic-serving institution’’ has the meaning given
23 such term in section 502 of the Higher Education Act
24 of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).
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1 (4) HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNIVER-
2 SITY.—The term ‘‘historically Black college or univer-
3 sity’’ means a part B institution described in section
4 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (22
5 U.S.C. 1061(2)).
6 (5) NATIVE AMERICAN-SERVING NONTRIBAL IN-
7 STITUTION.—The term ‘‘Native American-serving
8 nontribal institution’’ has the meaning given such
9 term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act
10 of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
11 (6) NATIVE HAWAIIAN-SERVING INSTITUTION.—
12 The term ‘‘Native Hawaiian-serving institution’’ has
13 the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the
14 Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)).
15 (7) PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTION.—The
16 term ‘‘Predominantly Black institution’’ has the
17 meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the
18 Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)).
19 (8) TRIBAL COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term
20 ‘‘Tribal College or University’’ has the meaning given
21 such term in section 316(b) of the Higher Education
22 Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).
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1 SEC. 219G. OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE
2 THROUGH THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN ACT
3 OF 2021.
4 (a) AUTHORITIES AND CONDITIONS.—Amounts au-
5 thorized and appropriated under title X of the American
6 Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–2) to carry out
7 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.)
8 shall be subject to the applicable authorities and conditions
9 for funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assist-
10 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and division K
11 of Public Law 116–260.
12 (b) OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.—Amounts au-
13 thorized and appropriated under sections 10001 and 10002
14 of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 may be transferred
15 to the Inspector General of the Department of State and
16 the Inspector General of the United States Agency for Inter-
17 national Development to expand the capacity of such In-
18 spectors General to conduct effective oversight of the foreign
19 assistance programs and activities under such Act.
20 (c) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL
21 FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA
22 COVID–19 RESPONSE MECHANISM.—United States con-
23 tributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis,
24 and Malaria COVID–19 Response Mechanism under section
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25 10003(a)(2) of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021—
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1 (1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner
2 that incentivizes other public and private donor con-
3 tributions; and
4 (2) shall be subject to the reporting and with-
5 holding requirements under subsections (c),
6 (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C), (d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of
7 section 202 of the United States Leadership Against
8 HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003
9 (22 U.S.C. 7622).
10 SEC. 219H. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO VACCINE BRAND-
11 ING.
12 The President shall ensure that every vaccine donated
13 or otherwise procured and financed by the United States
14 Government shall be clearly branded with the United States
15 flag.
16 Subtitle B—International Security
17 Matters
18 SEC. 221. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.
19 In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of
20 Congress’’ means—
21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
22 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
23 Appropriations of the Senate; and
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1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
2 mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap-
3 propriations of the House of Representatives.
4 SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILI-
5 TARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE
6 INDO-PACIFIC.
7 There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fis-
8 cal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department
9 of State, out of amounts authorized to be appropriated or
10 otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of
11 part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
12 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education
13 and training assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the
14 Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this subtitle. Funds
15 may be disbursed only after vetting of individuals proposed
16 to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M of
17 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and
18 2378d).
19 SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM
20 OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-
21 WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC
22 AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE
23 SOUTH CHINA SEA.
24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—
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1 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or
2 the use of force to impede freedom of navigation oper-
3 ations in international airspace by military or civil-
4 ian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize
5 the Indo-Pacific region;
6 (2) urges the Government of the People’s Repub-
7 lic of China to refrain from implementing the de-
8 clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification
9 Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea,
10 where contrary to freedom of overflight in inter-
11 national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar
12 provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re-
13 gion;
14 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of
15 Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on
16 both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s
17 claims to offshore resources across most of the South
18 China Sea are unlawful; and
19 (4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for
20 failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Ar-
21 bitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a
22 state party to the United Nations Convention on the
23 Law of the Sea.
24 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of
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25 the United States to—
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1 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
2 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
3 ing with respect to the mutual defense treaties with
4 Indo-Pacific allies;
5 (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights,
6 freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace
7 above it, that are available to all countries, and op-
8 pose the militarization of new and reclaimed land
9 features in the South China Sea;
10 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the
11 PRC claims in the South China Sea, specifically—
12 (A) that PRC claims in the South China
13 Sea, including to offshore resources across most
14 of the South China Sea, are unlawful;
15 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a
16 maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in
17 areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration
18 found to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Eco-
19 nomic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf;
20 (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
21 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived
22 from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands;
23 and
24 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial
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1 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
2 destabilizing activities, including environmentally
3 harmful and provocative land reclamation;
4 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without in-
5 timidation, coercion, or force;
6 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust
7 claims in accordance with international law;
8 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and
9 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
10 torial seas, must derive from land features and other-
11 wise comport with international law;
12 (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
13 tions covering disputed areas in the South China Sea,
14 regulations which have raised tensions in the region;
15 (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that
16 Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast
17 Asian claimant countries and does not serve as a ve-
18 hicle for the People’s Republic of China to advance its
19 unlawful maritime claims;
20 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
21 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
22 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea,
23 done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is suf-
24 ficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the
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1 United States Armed Forces and the forces of other
2 countries, including the People’s Republic of China;
3 (11) support the development of regional institu-
4 tions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional
5 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus,
6 the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN
7 Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in
8 the region and reinforce the role of international law;
9 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships
10 with other countries in the region for maritime do-
11 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
12 forts by the United States Government to explore the
13 development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms
14 for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the South China
15 Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would
16 serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior
17 and deter risky and dangerous activities;
18 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent
19 any other country from exercising its sovereign rights
20 to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
21 and continental shelf by making claims to those areas
22 in the South China Sea that have no support in
23 international law; and
24 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the
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25 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including,
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1 when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and
2 allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and over-
3 flight and other lawful uses of the sea.
4 SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-
5 PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.
6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
7 that—
8 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and
9 strengthen existing measures under the United States
10 Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capa-
11 bilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed-
12 on division of responsibility for alliance roles, mis-
13 sions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-
14 ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with
15 United States strategic imperatives;
16 (2) the United States should design for export to
17 Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical
18 to maintaining a favorable military balance in the
19 region, including long-range precision fires, air and
20 missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land
21 attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic sys-
22 tems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
23 capabilities, and command and control systems con-
24 sistent with law, regulation, policy, and international
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1 (3) the United States should pursue, to the max-
2 imum extent possible, anticipatory technology secu-
3 rity and foreign disclosure policy on the systems de-
4 scribed in paragraph (2);
5 (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with
6 the Secretary of Defense, should—
7 (A) urge allies and partners to invest in
8 sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contin-
9 gency requirements and avoid the need for ac-
10 cessing United States stocks in wartime; and
11 (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such mu-
12 nitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ ca-
13 pacity to produce such munitions; and
14 (5) it is in the United States interest to not au-
15 thorize arms transfers or security cooperation to gov-
16 ernments that demonstrate patterns of gross violations
17 of human rights if such arms or security cooperation
18 could be used to commit or support such violations.
19 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In
20 this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’
21 means—
22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
23 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on
24 Appropriations of the Senate; and
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1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
2 mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap-
3 propriations of the House of Representatives.
4 (c) REPORT.—
5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
7 State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
8 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
9 gress a report that describes United States priorities
10 for building more capable security partners in the
11 Indo-Pacific region.
12 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
13 quired under paragraph (1) shall—
14 (A) provide a priority list of defense and
15 military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and
16 partners must possess for the United States to be
17 able to achieve its military objectives in the
18 Indo-Pacific region;
19 (B) identify, from the list referred to in sub-
20 paragraph (A), the capabilities that are best pro-
21 vided, or can only be provided, by the United
22 States;
23 (C) identify—
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1 (i) actions required to expedite fielding
2 the capabilities identified in subparagraph
3 (B); and
4 (ii) steps needed to fully account for
5 and a plan to integrate all means of United
6 States foreign military sales, direct com-
7 mercial sales, security assistance, and all
8 applicable authorities of the Department of
9 State and the Department of Defense;
10 (D) assess the requirements for United
11 States security assistance, including Inter-
12 national Military Education and Training, in
13 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means
14 to deliver critical partner capability require-
15 ments identified in subparagraph (B);
16 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet
17 the requirements for United States security as-
18 sistance, and identify resource gaps;
19 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
20 requirements for United States security assist-
21 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
22 sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative
23 and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
24 cific partner countries;
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1 (G) identify limitations on the ability of the
2 United States to provide such capabilities, in-
3 cluding capabilities identified under subpara-
4 graph (B), because of existing United States
5 treaty obligations, United States policies, includ-
6 ing sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign As-
7 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and
8 2378d), or other regulations;
9 (H) recommend improvements to the process
10 for developing requirements for United States
11 partner capabilities; and
12 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
13 ommendations for infrastructure and posture,
14 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.
15 (3) FORM.—The report required under this sub-
16 section shall be unclassified, but may include a classi-
17 fied annex.
18 SEC. 225. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE THREAT
19 POSED BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
20 TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZA-
21 TION.
22 It is the policy of the United States to—
23 (1) urge NATO allies to work closely with like-
24 minded partners, in particular with the European
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25 Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen
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1 resilience, maintain a technological edge, and address
2 the challenges to the rules-based international order
3 posed by the Chinese Communist Party;
4 (2) encourage NATO allies to explore how to
5 monitor and defend against any activity of the Chi-
6 nese Communist Party that could impact collective
7 defense, military readiness, or resilience in the Su-
8 preme Allied Commander Europe’s Area of Responsi-
9 bility, including by identifying vulnerabilities of key
10 sectors and supply chains, in coordination with the
11 European Union;
12 (3) push for NATO allies to establish a consult-
13 ative body to bring together such allies, and other in-
14 stitutions and partners as relevant, to exchange infor-
15 mation, share experiences, and discuss all aspects of
16 such allies’ security interests with respect to the Chi-
17 nese Communist Party; and
18 (4) prioritize urging all NATO allies to share the
19 burden that comes with collective security in an in-
20 creasingly complex security environment by reaching
21 by 2024 the pledge set at the 2014 Wales Summit to
22 spend two percent of GDP on defense spending and
23 20 percent of annual defense spending on major new
24 equipment.
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1 SEC. 226. IDENTIFICATION OF PLA–SUPPORTED INSTITU-
2 TIONS.
3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
5 the Secretary of State shall publish and disseminate to
6 United States institutions and places of study a list identi-
7 fying the research, engineering, and scientific institutions
8 that the Secretary determines are affiliated with, or funded
9 by, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
10 (b) FORM.—The list published and disseminated under
11 subsection (a) shall be unclassified and publicly accessible,
12 but may include a classified annex.
13 Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies
14 to Bolster American Power
15 SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT.
16 Congress finds the following:
17 (1) Every UN member state is legally required to
18 finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure that
19 these missions are properly resourced, and assessment
20 rates are renegotiated every three years by the UN
21 General Assembly.
22 (2) While the United States is the largest single
23 financial contributor to the UN system, the current
24 model is beneficial because it requires all UN member
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1 the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets at speci-
2 fied levels.
3 (3) Failing to meet our financial commitments
4 to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised
5 our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable
6 partner and is seeking to leverage its own contribu-
7 tions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in ways
8 that run counter to United States interests and val-
9 ues.
10 (4) The People’s Republic of China is now the
11 second largest financial contributor to UN peace-
12 keeping, having gone from an assessment rate of just
13 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent today, and
14 is the ninth largest troop-contributor to UN missions,
15 providing more personnel than the other four perma-
16 nent members of the Security Council combined.
17 (5) With greater engagement comes greater influ-
18 ence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their ex-
19 panded clout to push back against the human rights,
20 civilian protection, and gender-based violence aspects
21 of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United States
22 funding shortfalls as a pretext.
23 (6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to
24 fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals cur-
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25 rently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15 spe-
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1 cialized agencies, while the United States occupies
2 only one.
3 (7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections
4 for the heads of UN specialized agencies and five for
5 major UN funds and programs. With the exception of
6 the World Food Programme, none are currently led by
7 Americans.
8 (8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector Gen-
9 eral Inspection found that the Bureau for Inter-
10 national Organizations did not have a standard oper-
11 ating procedure for tracking and promoting the em-
12 ployment of American Citizens in the UN system, and
13 their recommendation to the department to establish
14 one remains open.
15 SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA’S MULTILAT-
16 ERAL ENGAGEMENT.
17 It is the policy of the United States that—
18 (1) the Permanent Representative of the United
19 States to the United Nations serves as a standing
20 member of the cabinet;
21 (2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be
22 paid in full in a timely fashion;
23 (3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities
24 under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and
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25 subpart C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (re-
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1 lating to detail and transfer of Federal employees to
2 international organizations), to detail or transfer em-
3 ployees to relevant international organizations;
4 (4) the Secretary of State should assist the De-
5 partment of State and other Federal agencies in car-
6 rying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent;
7 (5) the Secretary of State should support quali-
8 fied American candidates in their bid to win election
9 to United Nations-related leadership positions; and
10 (6) the Secretary of State should support the
11 placement of Junior Professional Officers sponsored
12 by the United States in United Nations-affiliated
13 agencies.
14 SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NA-
15 TIONS.
16 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is au-
17 thorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bu-
18 reau of International Organization Affairs an Office of
19 Multilateral Strategy and Personnel.
20 (b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection
21 (a) of this section shall be responsible for—
22 (1) promoting United States leadership and par-
23 ticipation in the United Nations system, with a focus
24 on issue areas where authoritarian nations are exer-
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1 cising increased influence in and determining the
2 agenda of the United Nations system;
3 (2) establishing and implementing a standard
4 operating procedure for the promotion and efficient
5 tracking of United States citizen employment at the
6 United Nations and other international organizations
7 that includes Mission Geneva;
8 (3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations
9 jobs and identifying qualified United States citizens
10 and other qualified nationals to promote for such po-
11 sitions;
12 (4) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
13 tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and
14 developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of like-
15 minded countries are assembled to ensure leadership
16 races are not won by countries that do not share
17 United States interests;
18 (5) eliminating current barriers to the employ-
19 ment of United States citizens in the United Nations
20 Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and
21 (6) increasing the number of qualified United
22 States candidates for leadership and oversight posi-
23 tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro-
24 grams, agencies, and at other international organiza-
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1 SEC. 234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS.
2 (a) INCREASE IN JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER PO-
3 SITIONS.—The Secretary of State should increase the num-
4 ber of Junior Professional Officer positions sponsored by
5 the United States within the United Nations system.
6 (b) REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each
7 year, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate
8 congressional committees information regarding the
9 amount of funding each bureau has designated during the
10 immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional
11 Officer positions in the United Nations system and the
12 number of such positions that exist as of the end of the prior
13 fiscal year.
14 SEC. 235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTER-
15 NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
17 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter,
18 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of
19 other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate,
20 shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional
21 committees a report on how many Federal employees are
22 currently detailed or transferred to an international orga-
23 nization during the immediately preceding 1-year period
24 and a strategy for increasing the number of Federal em-
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1 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re-
2 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following:
3 (1) The number of Federal employees detailed or
4 transferred to an international organization under
5 section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and sub-
6 part C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relat-
7 ing to the detail and transfer of Federal employees to
8 international organizations), including—
9 (A) an identification of the Federal agency
10 from which such employees were detailed or
11 transferred; and
12 (B) an identification of the international
13 organizations to and from which such employees
14 have been so detailed or transferred.
15 (2) A list of international organizations to and
16 from which the United States previously detailed or
17 transferred Federal employees.
18 Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to
19 Bolster American Power
20 SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH
21 ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD.
22 It is the policy of the United States—
23 (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with
24 like-minded countries around the globe; and
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1 (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and
2 partners—
3 (A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-
4 nomic, and military challenges posed by the Peo-
5 ple’s Republic of China (PRC);
6 (B) to deter the PRC from pursuing mili-
7 tary aggression;
8 (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of ter-
9 ritorial disputes in accordance with inter-
10 national law;
11 (D) to promote private sector-led long-term
12 economic development while countering efforts by
13 the Government of the PRC to leverage predatory
14 economic practices as a means of political and
15 economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and
16 beyond;
17 (E) to promote the values of democracy and
18 human rights, including through efforts to end
19 the repression by the PRC of political dissidents,
20 Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, Tibetan
21 Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic minori-
22 ties;
23 (F) to respond to the crackdown by the
24 PRC, in contravention of the commitments made
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1 and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legiti-
2 mate aspirations of the people of Hong Kong;
3 and
4 (G) to counter the PRC Government’s efforts
5 to spread disinformation in the PRC and beyond
6 with respect to its response to COVID–19.
7 PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE
8 SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED
9 STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.
10 It is the sense of Congress that—
11 (1) the United States and Canada have a unique
12 relationship based on shared geography, extensive per-
13 sonal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense
14 commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democ-
15 racy, human rights, and the rules based international
16 order established after World War II;
17 (2) the United States and Canada can better ad-
18 dress the People’s Republic of China’s economic, polit-
19 ical, and security influence through closer cooperation
20 on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship,
21 transparent practices in public procurement and in-
22 frastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and
23 connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations,
24 bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy,
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1 (3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United
2 States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives
3 to address border management, commercial and trade
4 relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with
5 respect to the People’s Republic of China, and
6 transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy
7 security, and environmental stewardship;
8 (4) the United States and Canada should en-
9 hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation,
10 influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
11 ganda efforts;
12 (5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc-
13 ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
14 cations technology, extraction of natural resources,
15 and port infrastructure, pose national security risks
16 for the United States and Canada;
17 (6) the United States should share, as appro-
18 priate, intelligence gathered regarding—
19 (A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and
20 (B) the PRC government’s intentions with
21 respect to 5G expansion;
22 (7) the United States and Canada should con-
23 tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-
24 ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada
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1 Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development
2 Collaboration; and
3 (8) the United States and Canada should
4 prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in
5 the Arctic, including by modernizing the North Amer-
6 ican Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) sensor
7 architecture to provide effective warning and tracking
8 of threats by peer competitors, including long-range
9 missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern
10 Hemisphere.
11 SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA’S ARBI-
12 TRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITI-
13 ZENS.
14 It is the sense of Congress that—
15 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of
16 China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive
17 treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and
18 Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-
19 ernment of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deep-
20 ly concerning;
21 (2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-
22 national leadership by—
23 (A) upholding the rule of law and com-
24 plying with its international legal obligations,
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1 dition Treaty Between the United States of
2 America and Canada, signed at Washington De-
3 cember 3, 1971; and
4 (B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-
5 bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,
6 which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the
7 European Union, and reaffirms well-established
8 prohibitions under international human rights
9 conventions against the arbitrary detention of
10 foreign nationals to be used as leverage in coun-
11 try-to-country relations; and
12 (3) the United States continues to join the Gov-
13 ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-
14 lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for
15 due process for Canadian national Robert
16 Schellenberg.
17 SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH
18 CANADA.
19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
20 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit
21 to the appropriate congressional committees, and the Com-
22 mittees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of
23 Representatives, a strategy that describes how the United
24 States will enhance cooperation with the Government of
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1 Canada in managing relations with the Government of the
2 People’s Republic of China.
3 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
4 section (a) shall—
5 (1) identify key policy points of convergence and
6 divergence between the United States and Canada in
7 managing relations with the People’s Republic of
8 China in the areas of technology, trade, economic
9 practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and
10 critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;
11 (2) include a description of United States devel-
12 opment and coordination efforts with Canadian coun-
13 terparts to enhance the cooperation between the
14 United States and Canada with respect to—
15 (A) managing economic relations with the
16 People’s Republic of China;
17 (B) democracy and human rights in the
18 People’s Republic of China;
19 (C) technology issues involving the People’s
20 Republic of China;
21 (D) defense issues involving the People’s Re-
22 public of China; and
23 (E) international law enforcement and
24 transnational organized crime issues;
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1 (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to
2 work with Canada to counter the People’s Republic of
3 China’s projection of an authoritarian governing
4 model around the world;
5 (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
6 cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
7 nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to
8 Huawei’s 5G technology;
9 (5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration—
10 (A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
11 dian priorities for responsible stewardship in the
12 Arctic Region; and
13 (B) to counter the People’s Republic of Chi-
14 na’s efforts to project political, economic, and
15 military influence into the Arctic Region; and
16 (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
17 ada to track and counter the People’s Republic of Chi-
18 na’s attempts to exert influence across the multilat-
19 eral system.
20 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section
21 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made
22 available to the public, but may include a classified annex,
23 if necessary.
24 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the
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25 date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently
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1 than every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Secretary
2 of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional
3 committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the
4 Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the de-
5 velopment and implementation of the strategy required
6 under this section.
7 SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETI-
8 TIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS,
9 AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA
10 AND THE CARIBBEAN.
11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
13 in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the
14 Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of
15 the United States Agency for International Development
16 (USAID), the Attorney General, the United States Trade
17 Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the
18 United States International Development Finance Corpora-
19 tion, shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
20 tees, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee
21 on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the
22 Committee on Finance and the Committee on Appropria-
23 tions of the Senate a multi-year strategy for increasing
24 United States economic competitiveness and promoting
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25 good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in
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1 Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in
2 the areas of—
3 (1) investment;
4 (2) equitable, inclusive, and sustainable develop-
5 ment;
6 (3) commercial relations;
7 (4) anti-corruption activities; and
8 (5) infrastructure projects.
9 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required
10 under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-
11 ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—
12 (1) enhance the technical capacity of Latin
13 American and Caribbean countries to advance the
14 sustainable and inclusive development of equitable
15 economies;
16 (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between
17 such countries;
18 (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and com-
19 petitive environment for United States businesses in
20 the region;
21 (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
22 view long term financial sustainability and security
23 implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-
24 tors or services, including transportation, commu-
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25 nications, natural resources, and energy;
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1 (5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclu-
2 sive infrastructure project selection and procurement
3 processes that promote transparency, supplier diver-
4 sity, open competition, financial sustainability, ad-
5 herence to robust global standards, and the employ-
6 ment of a diverse local workforce and management;
7 (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust
8 democratic governance, fair competition, combatting
9 corruption, and ending impunity; and
10 (7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equi-
11 table access to the internet and digital infrastructure
12 in the Western Hemisphere.
13 (c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one
14 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annu-
15 ally thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, after
16 consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sec-
17 retary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United
18 States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the
19 United States International Development Finance Corpora-
20 tion, shall brief the congressional committees specified in
21 subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this section,
22 including examples of successes and challenges.
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1 SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
2 TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN
3 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.
4 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
5 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees
6 of Congress’’ means—
7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
8 Senate;
9 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
10 Senate;
11 (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Sen-
12 ate;
13 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
14 House of Representatives;
15 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
16 ligence of the House of Representatives; and
17 (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the
18 House of Representatives.
19 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—
20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
22 State, in coordination with the Director of National
23 Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence
24 Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall
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25 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
26 report that assesses the nature, intent, and impact on
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1 United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic
2 activity aimed at influencing the decisions, proce-
3 dures, and programs of multilateral organizations in
4 Latin America and the Caribbean, including the
5 World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organi-
6 zation of American States, and the Inter-American
7 Development Bank.
8 (2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required
9 under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of
10 the nature, intent, and impact on United States stra-
11 tegic interests of Chinese military activity in Latin
12 America and the Caribbean, including military edu-
13 cation and training programs, weapons sales, and
14 space-related activities in the military or civilian
15 spheres, such as—
16 (A) the satellite and space control station
17 the People’s Republic of China constructed in
18 Argentina; and
19 (B) defense and security cooperation carried
20 out by the People’s Republic of China in Latin
21 America and the Caribbean, including sales of
22 surveillance and monitoring technology to gov-
23 ernments in the region such as Venezuela, Cuba,
24 Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of
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1 such technologies as tools of Chinese intelligence
2 services.
3 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-
4 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and
5 include classified annexes.
6 SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND
7 THE CARIBBEAN.
8 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
9 priated to the Department of State $13,500,000 for the
10 International Military Education and Training Program
11 for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal
12 years 2022 through 2026.
13 (b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall
14 modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding
15 in accordance with subsection (a) to ensure that such pro-
16 grams are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice
17 for international military education and training for Latin
18 American and Caribbean partners.
19 (c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred to
20 in subsection (a) shall—
21 (1) provide training and capacity-building op-
22 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-
23 rity services;
24 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for—
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1 (A) improving the functioning and organi-
2 zation of security services in Latin America and
3 the Caribbean;
4 (B) creating a better understanding of the
5 United States and its values; and
6 (C) using technology for maximum effi-
7 ciency and organization;
8 (3) promote and ensure that security services in
9 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian au-
10 thority and operate in compliance with international
11 norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including
12 a respect for human rights, and full compliance with
13 requirements under section 620M of the Foreign As-
14 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly re-
15 ferred to as the ‘‘Leahy law’’); and
16 (4) receive funds only after vetting of individuals
17 proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B
18 and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
19 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d).
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1 SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN
2 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING
3 ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
4 RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-
5 NOLOGIES.
6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
7 that—
8 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of
9 China is exporting its model for internal security and
10 state control of society through advanced technology
11 and artificial intelligence; and
12 (2) the inclusion of communication networks and
13 communications supply chains with equipment and
14 services from companies with close ties to or that are
15 susceptible to pressure from governments or security
16 services without reliable legal checks on governmental
17 powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ private infor-
18 mation, increased censorship, violations of human
19 rights, and harassment of political opponents.
20 (b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of
21 State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-
22 ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and
23 the Caribbean to—
24 (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil
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25 liberties posed by technologies and services described
26 in subsection (a); and
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1 (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate
2 such risks.
3 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Exec-
4 utive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media,
5 who may work through the Open Technology Fund of the
6 Agency, and the Secretary of State, working through the
7 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet
8 Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall
9 expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship
10 technology and services to journalists in Latin America and
11 the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely
12 access or share digital news and information.
13 (d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of
14 State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United
15 States Agency for International Development, shall work
16 through nongovernmental organizations to—
17 (1) support and promote programs that support
18 internet freedom and the free flow of information on-
19 line in Latin America and the Caribbean;
20 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
21 able access to internet in Latin America and the Car-
22 ibbean;
23 (3) provide integrated support to civil society for
24 technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and
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1 applied research programs in Latin America and the
2 Caribbean;
3 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in
4 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative
5 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability
6 and prevent government overreach in the digital
7 sphere;
8 (5) assist independent media outlets and journal-
9 ists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build
10 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth
11 news reports covering governance and human rights
12 topics;
13 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
14 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to
15 improve transparency and accountability in govern-
16 ment and the private sector;
17 (7) provide training on investigative reporting of
18 incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business,
19 and commercial practices;
20 (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to
21 strengthen their capacity to monitor the incidents and
22 practices described in paragraph (7); and
23 (9) identify local resources to support the pre-
24 ponderance of activities that would be carried out
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25 under this subsection.
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1 SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE
2 TO CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE.
3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
4 (1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily
5 reliant upon imported oil to provide for approxi-
6 mately 90 percent of their energy production.
7 (2) The level of dependence is even higher includ-
8 ing—
9 (A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9
10 percent of its electricity;
11 (B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96
12 percent of its electricity;
13 (C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil
14 for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and
15 (D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100
16 percent of its electricity.
17 (3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had
18 a detrimental effect on economic development, growth,
19 and competitiveness in the Caribbean.
20 (4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Carib-
21 bean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal develop-
22 ment and pollution. Soot particulates and climate
23 change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously
24 damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source of
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25 tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural
26 beauty.
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1 (5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for elec-
2 tricity—
3 (A) has serious health impacts in the form
4 of higher rates of asthma and other lung ail-
5 ments; and
6 (B) can also exacerbate climate change.
7 (6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulner-
8 able to sea level rise and stronger storms.
9 (7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of
10 the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated
11 by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance,
12 which—
13 (A) offered preferential terms for oil sales;
14 and
15 (B) supplies some countries with up to 40
16 percent of their energy production needs.
17 (8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and
18 political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Govern-
19 ment of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the
20 Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional
21 power. Only Cuba still receives preferential
22 Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela,
23 while other Petrocaribe member countries are experi-
24 encing a destabilized flow of oil.
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1 (9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000
2 on energy projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent
3 of which was spent in Latin America and the Carib-
4 bean. Although the majority of this spending was for
5 oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the largest in-
6 vestor in clean energy globally for almost a decade.
7 (10) The World Bank estimates that the Carib-
8 bean will need $12,000,000,000 in power investments
9 through 2035.
10 (11) Renewable energy technology costs have de-
11 creased dramatically in recent years, offering a more
12 viable economic alternative for energy production.
13 Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent since
14 2008, causing significant market growth, and accord-
15 ing to data released by the International Renewable
16 Energy Agency, 1⁄3 of global power capacity is based
17 in renewable energy.
18 (12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund
19 estimated that transportation accounted for 36 per-
20 cent of the total primary energy consumed in the Car-
21 ibbean subregion.
22 (13) According to the United Nations Environ-
23 ment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean
24 could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 and
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25 a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 by 2050 if
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1 the region’s energy and transport sectors reach net
2 zero emissions.
3 (14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore
4 and offshore resources needed for renewable energy,
5 including sun, wind, geothermal, and some hydro-
6 power production capacity.
7 (15) The United States Government is deeply en-
8 gaged in providing technical and policy assistance to
9 countries of the Caribbean on energy issues through—
10 (A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of
11 the Americas;
12 (B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and
13 (C) bilateral assistance programs.
14 (16) On February 19, 2014, at the North Amer-
15 ican Leaders’ Summit, President Barack Obama,
16 Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, and
17 President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico reaffirmed
18 their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and
19 increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while
20 opening wider markets for clean energy and green
21 technology.
22 (17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack
23 Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security
24 Initiative, which would partner with individual
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25 countries—
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1 (A) to transform its energy sector;
2 (B) to work to increase access to finance,
3 good governance, and diversification; and
4 (C) to maximize the impact of existing
5 donor effects.
6 (18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Car-
7 ibbean-Central American Energy Summit, the energy
8 security task force formally launched the Caribbean
9 Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C–
10 SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordi-
11 nation and action on energy security and agreed to
12 expand the regional market and transmission system.
13 (19) The United States has an important oppor-
14 tunity—
15 (A) to deepen this engagement;
16 (B) to work as a partner with Caribbean
17 countries on a more regional and coordinated
18 basis;
19 (C) to help ease the region’s dependence on
20 imported oil; and
21 (D) to promote affordable alternative
22 sources of energy.
23 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:
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1 (1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term ‘‘Carib-
2 bean countries’’ means countries in the Caribbean re-
3 gion, but does not include Cuba or Venezuela.
4 (2) CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.—The term ‘‘Car-
5 ibbean governments’’ means the national governments
6 of the Caribbean countries.
7 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
8 United States to help Caribbean countries—
9 (1) achieve greater energy security and improve
10 domestic energy resource mobilization;
11 (2) lower their dependence on imported fuels;
12 (3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil,
13 other petroleum products, and coal for the generation
14 of electricity;
15 (4) increase production of renewable energy; and
16 (5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of
17 their national determined contributions to the Paris
18 Agreement.
19 (d) STRATEGY.—
20 (1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after
21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
22 State, in coordination with the Administrator of the
23 United States Agency for International Development
24 (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate congres-
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25 sional committees a multi-year strategy that describes
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1 how the Department of State will promote regional
2 cooperation with Caribbean countries—
3 (A) to lower dependence on imported fuels,
4 grow domestic clean energy production in the re-
5 gion, strengthen regional energy security, and
6 lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions;
7 (B) to decrease dependence on oil in the
8 transportation sector;
9 (C) to increase energy efficiency, energy
10 conservation, and investment in alternatives to
11 imported fuels;
12 (D) to improve grid reliability and mod-
13 ernize electricity transmission networks;
14 (E) to advance deployment of innovative so-
15 lutions to expand community and individuals’
16 access to electricity;
17 (F) to help reform energy markets to en-
18 courage good regulatory governance and to pro-
19 mote a climate of private sector investment; and
20 (G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions
21 from the energy and transportation sector.
22 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under
23 subsection (a) shall include—
24 (A) a thorough review and inventory of
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25 United States Government activities that are
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1 being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in
2 coordination with multilateral institutions—
3 (i) to promote energy and climate secu-
4 rity in the Caribbean region; and
5 (ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on
6 oil for electricity generation;
7 (B) opportunities for marshaling regional
8 cooperation—
9 (i) to overcome market barriers result-
10 ing from the small size of Caribbean energy
11 markets;
12 (ii) to address the high transportation
13 and infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean
14 countries;
15 (iii) to ensure greater donor coordina-
16 tion between governments, multilateral in-
17 stitutions, multilateral banks, and private
18 investors; and
19 (iv) to expand regional financing op-
20 portunities to allow for lower cost energy
21 entrepreneurship;
22 (C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean
23 government has—
24 (i) an independent utility regulator or
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25 equivalent;
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1 (ii) affordable access by third party in-
2 vestors to its electrical grid with minimal
3 regulatory interference;
4 (iii) effective energy efficiency and en-
5 ergy conservation;
6 (iv) programs to address technical and
7 nontechnical issues;
8 (v) a plan to eliminate major market
9 distortions;
10 (vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and
11 (vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean
12 energy solutions; and
13 (D) recommendations for how United States
14 policy, technical, and economic assistance can be
15 used in the Caribbean region—
16 (i) to advance renewable energy devel-
17 opment and the incorporation of renewable
18 technologies into existing energy grids and
19 the development and deployment of micro-
20 grids where appropriate and feasible to
21 boost energy security and reliability, par-
22 ticularly to underserved communities;
23 (ii) to increase the generation of clean
24 energy sufficiently to replace and allow for
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1 the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy
2 generation units in Caribbean countries;
3 (iii) to create regional financing op-
4 portunities to allow for lower cost energy
5 entrepreneurship;
6 (iv) to deploy transaction advisors in
7 the region to help attract private investment
8 and break down any market or regulatory
9 barriers; and
10 (v) to establish a mechanism for each
11 host government to have access to inde-
12 pendent legal advice—
13 (I) to speed the development of en-
14 ergy-related contracts; and
15 (II) to better protect the interests
16 of Caribbean governments and citizens.
17 (3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy
18 under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall
19 work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult
20 with—
21 (A) the Secretary of the Interior;
22 (B) the Secretary of Commerce;
23 (C) the Secretary of the Treasury;
24 (D) the Board of Directors of the Export-
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25 Import Bank of the United States;
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1 (E) the Board of Directors of the Develop-
2 ment Finance Corporation;
3 (F) the Administrator of the United States
4 Agency for International Development;
5 (G) the Caribbean governments;
6 (H) the Inter-American Development Bank;
7 (I) the World Bank Group; and
8 (J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services
9 Corporation.
10 SEC. 250. UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PART-
11 NERSHIP.
12 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:
13 (1) The United States shares with the Caribbean
14 a collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which
15 affects the lives and the economies of our citizens.
16 (2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La
17 Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devasta-
18 tion caused by the many natural disasters the Carib-
19 bean confronts each year and the region’s vulner-
20 ability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the
21 largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts
22 of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes
23 Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across
24 the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According
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25 to IMF research, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide
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1 to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds
2 (324) have been in the Caribbean.
3 (3) This region is seven times more likely to ex-
4 perience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when
5 one occurs, it will incur as much as six times more
6 damage.
7 (4) Extreme weather events and other environ-
8 mental impacts will only worsen over the coming
9 years, and if not addressed, we will see only increas-
10 ing economic shocks on these countries, driving irreg-
11 ular migration.
12 (5) While the United States has considerable ex-
13 pertise and capacity in assisting countries with dis-
14 aster response, there remains a need for stronger part-
15 nerships that build regional resilience through effi-
16 cient and interoperable platforms, protecting people
17 and speeding recovery.
18 (6) The People’s Republic of China has dramati-
19 cally increased its engagement in the Caribbean in
20 the past five years, including offering loans and
21 grants related to disaster response and resilience and
22 sought to acquire property rights in the Caribbean
23 that would be detrimental to United States national
24 security interests.
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1 (7) In 2019, the United States launched a new
2 U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen co-
3 operation and investment to strengthen our disaster
4 resilience throughout the Caribbean region, includ-
5 ing—
6 (A) to streamline early warning response
7 networks and formalize communication channels;
8 (B) to enhance, encourage, and work col-
9 laboratively on further developing aviation dis-
10 aster resilience plans and partnerships;
11 (C) to prioritize regional technical exchange
12 in energy planning, risk reduction, and resil-
13 ience;
14 (D) to increase communications network
15 interoperability between Caribbean partners and
16 the United States;
17 (E) to utilize storm surge mapping data
18 and share real-time information in preparation
19 for potential damage resulting from tropical cy-
20 clones and tsunamis;
21 (F) to use meteorological services to
22 strengthen and deepen physical and communica-
23 tions infrastructure, data collection networks,
24 and human and technical capacity throughout
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1 the region, as well as interactions with the pub-
2 lic;
3 (G) to understand that while the use of
4 international and military and civil defense as-
5 sets in disaster response may only be considered
6 as a last resort, when local, national, and inter-
7 national civilian capabilities are overwhelmed,
8 civil-military coordination should occur, in sup-
9 port of the affected nation;
10 (H) to develop a framework that would gov-
11 ern the deployment of international military and
12 civil defense assets in disaster response when
13 local, national, and international civilian capa-
14 bilities are overwhelmed, in support of the af-
15 fected nation;
16 (I) to seek common mechanisms for ensur-
17 ing rapid disaster response and recovery, includ-
18 ing waiving or expediting diplomatic clearances,
19 waiving of or reducing customs fees, stream-
20 lining overflight and airspace clearance, and en-
21 suring that the first responders have the ability
22 to rapidly respond to disasters in other coun-
23 tries;
24 (J) to promote the integration and coordi-
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25 nation of regional response mechanisms in the
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1 Caribbean, including through the Caribbean Dis-
2 aster Emergency Management Agency, the Re-
3 gional Security System, United States Govern-
4 ment Agencies, and allies in ways that facilitate
5 more effective and efficient planning, mitigation,
6 response, and resilience to natural disasters;
7 (K) to share best practices in improved
8 building codes with national disaster organiza-
9 tions, including building better programs, at re-
10 gional, national and community levels; and
11 (L) to promote community-based disaster
12 preparedness and mitigation activities, particu-
13 larly in underserved communities, with the aim
14 of increasing broad public participation and re-
15 silience.
16 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to
17 help Caribbean countries—
18 (1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural
19 disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and
20 a changing environment;
21 (2) partner with United States Federal, State,
22 and local agencies and engage in technical coopera-
23 tion, dialogue, and assistance activities;
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1 (3) harmonize standards and practices related to
2 paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased invest-
3 ment and integration;
4 (4) increase investment from United States com-
5 panies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, adap-
6 tation, and climate-related mitigation efforts;
7 (5) promote regional cooperation and ensure ef-
8 forts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and
9 international partners complement each other; and
10 (6) further assist with the efforts described in
11 subsection (a)(7).
12 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date
13 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-
14 ordination with the heads of other Federal departments and
15 agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
16 mittees a multi-year strategy that describes how the Depart-
17 ment of State will achieve the policies described in sub-
18 section (b).
19 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are
20 authorized to be appropriated for activities, programs, tech-
21 nical assistance, and engagement under this section the fol-
22 lowing:
23 (1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022.
24 (2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023.
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1 (3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each
2 fiscal year thereafter.
3 (e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.—
4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to
5 be appropriated each fiscal year pursuant to sub-
6 section (d), at least five percent of all programming
7 funding allocation shall support and be directed to-
8 ward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effec-
9 tiveness.
10 (2) ENGAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION.—The
11 Department of State shall ensure that at least 20 per-
12 cent of amounts authorized to be appropriated pursu-
13 ant to subsection (d) directly support the training of,
14 engagement with, collaboration with, and exchange of
15 expertise on resilience between United States Federal,
16 State, and local officials and their Caribbean govern-
17 ment counterparts. Such amounts should also sup-
18 port, as appropriate, increased academic, civil soci-
19 ety, media, and private sector engagement in the
20 fields of resilience-building, adaptation, and mitiga-
21 tion.
22 SEC. 251. COUNTERING CHINA’S EDUCATIONAL AND CUL-
23 TURAL DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA.
24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:
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1 (1) According to a report by the National En-
2 dowment for Democracy, China has spent the equiva-
3 lent of billions of dollars to shape public opinion and
4 perceptions around the world through thousands of
5 people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities, edu-
6 cational programs, and the development of media en-
7 terprises and information initiatives with global
8 reach.
9 (2) Educational and exchange programs are a
10 core element of United States public diplomacy, ele-
11 vating our culture, policies, and interests worldwide.
12 (3) These programs provide students with access
13 to international knowledge, an opportunity to learn
14 foreign languages, and a unique environment for de-
15 veloping cultural understanding, all of which are val-
16 uable skills in today’s global economy.
17 (4) 90 percent of ECA’s appropriation is spent
18 in the United States or invested directly in American
19 citizens or American organizations.
20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress
21 that—
22 (1) China’s efforts to mold public opinion and
23 influence educational institutions undermine United
24 States’ influence in Latin America and the Caribbean
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1 and threaten democratic institutions and practices in
2 the region;
3 (2) the United States Government should expand
4 current educational and cultural exchange programs
5 in Latin America and the Caribbean, which are cost-
6 effective and strengthen people-to-people diplomacy, to
7 promote national security and foreign policy interests
8 of the United States; and
9 (3) educational exchanges foster linguistic, cul-
10 tural, and educational skills that advance United
11 States economic competitiveness, strengthen alliances,
12 and support democracies worldwide.
13 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date
14 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting
15 through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational
16 and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the Assist-
17 ant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic Growth,
18 Education, and Environment at the United States Agency
19 for International Development, shall devise a strategy—
20 (1) to evaluate and expand existing programs
21 and, as necessary, design and implement new edu-
22 cational, professional, and cultural exchanges and
23 other programs to—
24 (A) create and sustain mutual under-
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25 standing with other countries necessary to ad-
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