Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673 (2012), U.S. Reports (Library of Congress copy)

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Pages of the United States Reports containing part of the Opinion of the Court in Armour v. Indianapolis, 566 U. S. 673 (2012), beginning at page 682. The opinion states that Indianapolis' classification has a rational basis and that the City's decision to stop collecting outstanding Barrett Law debts after switching to the STEP system finds rational support in administrative concerns. It notes that the Barrett Law debts involved monthly payments as low as $25 per household and that there were more than 40 Barrett Law projects. The opinion refers to the dissent of Roberts, C. J. The pages end with orders of March 26, 2012 denying certiorari in other cases.

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682               ARMOUR v. INDIANAPOLIS

                       Opinion of the Court

                                B
   In our view, Indianapolis’ classification has a rational basis.
Ordinarily, administrative considerations can justify a tax-
related distinction. See, e. g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal
& Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 511–512 (1937) (tax exemption for
businesses with fewer than eight employees rational in light
of the “[a]dministrative convenience and expense” involved);
see also Lehnhausen, supra, at 365 (comparing administra­
tive cost of taxing corporations versus individuals); Madden,
supra, at 90 (comparing administrative cost of taxing depos­
its in local banks versus those elsewhere). And the City’s
decision to stop collecting outstanding Barrett Law debts
finds rational support in related administrative concerns.
   The City had decided to switch to the STEP system.
After that change, to continue Barrett Law unpaid-debt col­
lection could have proved complex and expensive. It would
have meant maintaining an administrative system that for
years to come would have had to collect debts arising out of
20-plus different construction projects built over the course
of a decade, involving monthly payments as low as $25 per
household, with the possible need to maintain credibility by
tracking down defaulting debtors and bringing legal action.
The City, for example, would have had to maintain its Bar­
rett Law operation within the City Controller’s Office, keep
files on old, small, installment-plan debts, and (a City official
says) possibly spend hundreds of thousands of dollars keep­
ing computerized debt-tracking systems current. See Brief
for International City/County Management Association et al.
as Amici Curiae 13, n. 12 (citing Affidavit of Charles White
¶13, Record in Cox, Doc. No. 57–3). Unlike the collection
system prior to abandonment, the City would not have added
any new Barrett Law installment-plan debtors. And that
fact means that it would have had to spread the fixed admin­
istrative costs of collection over an ever-declining number of
debtors, thereby continuously increasing the per-debtor cost
of collection.
                   Cite as: 566 U. S. 673 (2012)            683

                      Opinion of the Court

   Consistent with these facts, the director of the City’s De­
partment of Public Works later explained that the City
decided to forgive outstanding debt in part because “[t]he
administrative costs to service and process remaining bal­
ances on Barrett Law accounts long past the transition to
the STEP program would not benefit the taxpayers” and
would defeat the purpose of the transition. App. 76. The
four other members of the Board have said the same. See
Affidavit of Gregory Taylor ¶6, Record in Cox, Doc. No. 57–
5; Affidavit of Kipper Tew ¶6, ibid., Doc. No. 57–6; Affidavit
of Susan Schalk ¶6, ibid., Doc. No. 57–7; Affidavit of Roger
Brown ¶6, ibid., Doc. No. 57–8.
   The rationality of the City’s distinction draws further sup­
port from the nature of the line-drawing choices that con­
fronted it. To have added refunds to forgiveness would
have meant adding yet further administrative costs, namely,
the cost of processing refunds. At the same time, to have
tried to limit the City’s costs and lost revenues by limiting
forgiveness (or refund) rules to Brisbane/Manning homeown­
ers alone would have led those involved in other Barrett Law
projects to have justifiably complained about unfairness.
Yet to have granted refunds (as well as providing forgive­
ness) to all those involved in all Barrett Law projects
(there were more than 40 projects) or in all open projects
(there were more than 20) would have involved even greater
administrative burden. The City could not just “cut . . .
checks,” post, at 691 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting), without
taking funding from other programs or finding additional
revenue. If, instead, the City had tried to keep the amount
of revenue it lost constant (a rational goal) but spread it
evenly among the apparently thousands of homeowners in­
volved in any of the Barrett Law projects, the result would
have been yet smaller individual payments, even more likely
to have been too small to justify the administrative expense.
   Finally, the rationality of the distinction draws support
from the fact that the line that the City drew—distinguish­
684               ARMOUR v. INDIANAPOLIS

                      Opinion of the Court

ing past payments from future obligations—is a line
well known to the law. Sometimes such a line takes the
form of an amnesty program, involving, say, mortgage pay­
ments, taxes, or parking tickets. E. g., 26 U. S. C. § 108(a)
(1)(E) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) (federal income tax provision
allowing homeowners to omit from gross income newly for­
given home mortgage debt); United States v. Martin, 523
F. 3d 281, 284 (CA4 2008) (tax amnesty program whereby
State newly forgave penalties and liabilities if taxpayer sat­
isfied debt); Horn v. Chicago, 860 F. 2d 700, 704, n. 9 (CA7
1988) (city parking ticket amnesty program whereby out­
standing tickets could be newly settled for a fraction of
amount specified). This kind of line is consistent with the
distinction that the law often makes between actions pre­
viously taken and those yet to come.

                               C
   Petitioners’ contrary arguments are not sufficient to
change our conclusion. Petitioners point out that the Indi­
ana Supreme Court also listed a different consideration,
namely, “financial hardship,” as one of the factors supporting
rationality. App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a. They refer to the
City’s resolution that said that the Barrett Law “may pre­
sent financial hardships on many middle to lower income
participants who most need sanitary sewer service in lieu of
failing septic systems.” App. 71. And they argue that the
tax distinction before us would not necessarily favor low-
income homeowners.
   We need not consider this argument, however, for the ad­
ministrative considerations we have mentioned are sufficient
to show a rational basis for the City’s distinction. The Indi­
ana Supreme Court wrote that the City’s classification was
“rationally related” in part “to its legitimate interests in re­
ducing its administrative costs.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 19a
(emphasis added). The record of the City’s proceedings is
consistent with that determination. See App. 72 (when de­
                   Cite as: 566 U. S. 673 (2012)             685

                      Opinion of the Court

veloping transition, the City “considered the current assess­
ments being made by participants in active Barrett Law
projects”). In any event, a legislature need not “actually
articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting
its classification.” Nordlinger, 505 U. S., at 15; see also Fitz­
gerald, 539 U. S., at 108 (similar). Rather, the “burden is on
the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it.” Madden,
309 U. S., at 88; see Heller, 509 U. S., at 320 (same); Lehn­
hausen, 410 U. S., at 364 (same); see also Allied Stores of
Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522, 530 (1959) (upholding
state tax classification resting “upon a state of facts that rea­
sonably can be conceived” as creating a rational distinction).
Petitioners have not “negative[d]” the Indiana Supreme
Court’s first listed justification, namely, the administrative
concerns we have discussed.
   Petitioners go on to propose various other forgiveness sys­
tems that would have included refunds for at least some of
those who had already paid in full. They argue that those
systems are superior to the system that the City chose. We
have discussed those, and other possible, systems earlier.
Supra, at 682–683. Each has advantages and disadvan­
tages. But even if petitioners have found a superior system,
the Constitution does not require the City to draw the per­
fect line nor even to draw a line superior to some other line
it might have drawn. It requires only that the line actually
drawn be a rational line. And for the reasons we have set
forth in Part II–B, supra, we believe that the line the City
drew here is rational.
   Petitioners further argue that administrative considera­
tions alone should not justify a tax distinction, lest a city
arbitrarily allocate taxes among a few citizens while forgiv­
ing many similarly situated citizens on the ground that it is
cheaper and easier to collect taxes from a few people than
from many. Brief for Petitioners 45. Petitioners are right
that administrative considerations could not justify such an
686               ARMOUR v. INDIANAPOLIS

                      Opinion of the Court

unfair system. But that is not because administrative con­
siderations can never justify tax differences (any more than
they can always do so). The question is whether reducing
those expenses, in the particular circumstances, provides a
rational basis justifying the tax difference in question.
   In this case, “in the light of the facts made known or gen­
erally assumed,” Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S., at 152, it
is reasonable to believe that to graft a refund system onto
the City’s forgiveness decision could have (for example) im­
posed an administrative burden of both collecting and paying
out small sums (say, $25 per month) for years. As we have
said, supra, at 682–684, it is rational for the City to draw a
line that avoids that burden. Petitioners, who are the ones
“attacking the legislative arrangement,” have the burden of
showing that the circumstances are otherwise, i. e., that the
administrative burden is too insubstantial to justify the clas­
sification. That they have not done.
   Finally, petitioners point to precedent that in their view
makes it more difficult than we have said for the City to
show a “rational basis.” With but one exception, however,
the cases to which they refer involve discrimination based
on residence or length of residence. E. g., Hooper v. Berna­
lillo County Assessor, 472 U. S. 612 (state tax preference
distinguishing between long-term and short-term resident
veterans); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U. S. 14 (state use tax
that burdened out-of-state car buyers who moved in state);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U. S. 869 (state
law that taxed out-of-state insurance companies at a higher
rate than in-state companies); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S.
55 (state dividend distribution system that favored long­
term residents). But those circumstances are not present
here.
   The exception consists of Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. Commission of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989). The
Court there took into account a State Constitution and re­
lated laws that required equal valuation of equally valuable
                    Cite as: 566 U. S. 673 (2012)             687

                       Opinion of the Court

property. Id., at 345. It considered the constitutionality of
a county tax assessor’s practice (over a period of many years)
of determining property values as of the time of the prop­
erty’s last sale; that practice meant highly unequal valua­
tions for two identical properties that were sold years or
decades apart. Id., at 341. The Court first found that the
assessor’s practice was not rationally related to the county’s
avowed purpose of assessing properties equally at true cur­
rent value because of the intentional systemic discrepancies
the practice created. Id., at 343–344. The Court then
noted that, in light of the State Constitution and related laws
requiring equal valuation, there could be no other rational
basis for the practice. Id., at 344–345. Therefore, the
Court held, the assessor’s discriminatory policy violated the
Federal Constitution’s insistence upon “equal protection of
the law.” Id., at 346.
   Petitioners argue that the City’s refusal to add refunds to
its forgiveness decision is similar, for it constitutes a refusal
to apply “equally” an Indiana state law that says that the
costs of a Barrett Law project shall be equally “appor­
tioned.” Ind. Code § 36–9–39–15(b)(3). In other words,
petitioners say that even if the City’s decision might other­
wise be related to a rational purpose, state law (as in Alle­
gheny) makes this the rare case where the facts preclude any
rational basis for the City’s decision other than to comply
with the state mandate of equality.
   Allegheny, however, involved a clear state-law require­
ment clearly and dramatically violated. Indeed, we have
described Allegheny as “the rare case where the facts pre­
cluded” any alternative reading of state law and thus any
alternative rational basis. Nordlinger, supra, at 16. Here,
the City followed state law by apportioning the cost of its
Barrett Law projects equally. State law says nothing about
forgiveness, how to design a forgiveness program, or
whether or when rational distinctions in doing so are permit­
ted. To adopt petitioners’ view would risk transforming
688              ARMOUR v. INDIANAPOLIS

                   Roberts, C. J., dissenting

ordinary violations of ordinary state tax law into violations
of the Federal Constitution.

                        *      *     *
   For these reasons, we conclude that the City has not vio­
lated the Federal Equal Protection Clause. And the Indiana
Supreme Court’s similar judgment is
                                                  Affirmed.

  Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia and
Justice Alito join, dissenting.
   Twenty-three years ago, we released a succinct and unani­
mous opinion striking down a property tax scheme in West
Virginia on the ground that it clearly violated the Equal Pro­
tection Clause. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commis­
sion of Webster Cty., 488 U. S. 336 (1989). In Allegheny
Pittsburgh, we held that a county failed to comport with
equal protection requirements when it assessed property
taxes primarily on the basis of purchase price, with no appro­
priate adjustments over time. The result was that new
property owners were assessed at “roughly 8 to 35 times”
the rate of those who had owned their property longer. Id.,
at 344. We found such a “gross disparit[y]” in tax levels
could not be justified in a state system that demanded that
“taxation . . . be equal and uniform.” Id., at 338; W. Va.
Const., Art. X, § 1. The case affirmed the commonsense
proposition that the Equal Protection Clause is violated by
state action that deprives a citizen of even “rough equality
in tax treatment,” when state law itself specifically provides
that all the affected taxpayers are in the same category for
tax purposes. 488 U. S., at 343; see Hillsborough v. Crom­
well, 326 U. S. 620, 623 (1946) (“The equal protection clause
. . . protects the individual from state action which selects
him out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to
taxes not imposed on others of the same class”).
                   Cite as: 566 U. S. 673 (2012)           689

                   Roberts, C. J., dissenting

   In this case, the Brisbane/Manning Sanitary Sewers Proj­
ect allowed 180 property owners to have their homes hooked
up to the city of Indianapolis’s (City) sewer system under the
State’s Barrett Law. That law requires sewer costs to “be
primarily apportioned equally among all abutting lands or
lots.” Ind. Code § 36–9–39–15(b)(3) (2011). In the case of
Brisbane/Manning, the cost came to $9,278 for each property
owner. Some of the property owners—petitioners here—
paid the full $9,278 up front. Others elected the option of
paying in installments. Shortly after hookup, the City
switched to a new financing system and decided to forgive
the hookup debts of those paying on an installment plan.
The City refused, however, to refund any portion of the pay­
ments made by their identically situated neighbors who had
already paid the full amount due. The result was that while
petitioners each paid the City $9,278 for their hookups, more
than half their neighbors paid less than $500 for the same
improvement—some as little as $309.27. Another quarter
paid less than $1,000. Petitioners thus paid between 10 and
30 times as much for their sewer hookups as their neighbors.
   In seeking to justify this gross disparity, the City ex­
plained that it was presented with three choices: First, it
could have continued to collect the installment plan pay­
ments of those who had not yet settled their debts under the
old system. Second, it could have forgiven all those debts
and given equivalent refunds to those who had made lump-
sum payments up front. Or third, it could have forgiven the
future payments and not refunded payments that had al­
ready been made. The first two choices had the benefit of
complying with state law, treating all of Indianapolis’s citi­
zens equally, and comporting with the Constitution. The
City chose the third option.
   And what did the City believe was sufficient to justify a
system that would effectively charge petitioners 30 times
more than their neighbors for the same service—when state
690               ARMOUR v. INDIANAPOLIS

                    Roberts, C. J., dissenting

law promised equal treatment? Two things: the desire to
avoid administrative hassle and the “fiscal[ ] challeng[e]” of
giving back money it wanted to keep. Brief for Respond­
ents 35–36. I cannot agree that those reasons pass constitu­
tional muster, even under rational basis review.
   The City argues that either of the other options for tran­
sitioning away from the Barrett Law would have been
“immensely difficult from an administrative standpoint.”
Id., at 36. The Court accepts this rationale, observing that
“[o]rdinarily, administrative considerations can justify a tax-
related distinction.” Ante, at 682. The cases the Court
cites, however, stand only for the proposition that a legisla­
ture crafting a tax scheme may take administrative concerns
into consideration when creating classes of taxable entities
that may be taxed differently. See, e. g., Lehnhausen v.
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356, 359 (1973) (a State
may “draw lines that treat one class of individuals or entities
differently from the others”); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S.
83, 87 (1940) (referring to the “broad discretion as to classifi­
cation possessed by a legislature”); Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 510–511 (1937) (discussing
permissible considerations for the legislature in establishing
a tax scheme).
   Here, however, Indiana’s tax scheme explicitly provides
that costs will “be primarily apportioned equally among
all abutting lands or lots.” Ind. Code § 36–9–39–15(b)(3)
(emphasis added). The legislature has therefore decreed
that all abutting landowners are within the same class. We
have never before held that administrative burdens justify
grossly disparate tax treatment of those the State has pro­
vided should be treated alike. Indeed, in Allegheny Pitts­
burgh the county argued that its unequal assessments were
based on “[a]dministrative cost[ ]” concerns, to no avail.
Brief for Respondent, O. T. 1988, No. 87–1303, p. 22. The
reason we have rejected this argument is obvious: The Equal
Protection Clause does not provide that no State shall “deny
                   Cite as: 566 U. S. 673 (2012)            691

                    Roberts, C. J., dissenting

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws, unless it’s too much of a bother.”
   Even if the Court were inclined to decide that adminis­
trative burdens alone may sometimes justify grossly dispar­
ate treatment of members of the same class, this would
hardly be the case to do that. The City claims it cannot
issue refunds because the process would be too difficult, re­
quiring that it pore over records of old projects to determine
which homeowners had overpaid and by how much. Brief
for Respondents 36. But holding that the City must refund
petitioners’ overpayments would not mean that it has to
refund overpayments in every Barrett Law project. The
Equal Protection Clause is concerned with “gross” disparity
in taxing. Because the Brisbane/Manning Project was initi­
ated shortly before the Barrett Law transition, the disparity
between what petitioners paid in comparison to their install­
ment plan neighbors was dramatic. Not so with respect to,
for example, a project initiated 10 years earlier, because
for those projects even installment plan payers will have
largely satisfied their debts, resulting in far less significant
disparities.
   To the extent a ruling for petitioners would require issuing
refunds to others who overpaid under the Barrett Law, I
think the City workers are up to the task. The City has in
fact already produced records showing exactly how much
each lump-sum payer overpaid in every active Barrett Law
project—to the penny. Record in Cox v. Indianapolis,
No. 1:09–cv–0435 (SD Ind.), Doc. 98–1 (Exh. A). What the
City employees would need to do, therefore, is cut the checks
and mail them out.
   Certainly the job need not involve the complicated proce­
dure the Court describes in an attempt to bolster its adminis­
trative convenience argument. Under the Court’s view the
City would apparently continue to accept monthly payments
from installment plan homeowners in order to gradually
repay the money it owes to those who paid in a lump sum.
692               ARMOUR v. INDIANAPOLIS

                    Roberts, C. J., dissenting

Ante, at 683, 686. But this approach was never dreamt of
by the City itself. See Brief for Respondents 18 (setting
out City’s “three basic [transition] options,” none of which
involved the Court’s gradual refund scheme).
   The Court suggests that the City’s administrative conven­
ience argument is one with which the law is comfortable.
The Court compares the City’s decision to forgive the install­
ment balances to the sort of parking ticket and mortgage
payment amnesty programs that currently abound. Ante,
at 683. This analogy is misplaced: Amnesty programs are
designed to entice those who are unlikely ever to pay their
debts to come forward and pay at least a portion of what
they owe. It is not administrative convenience alone that
justifies such schemes. In a sense, these schemes help rem­
edy payment inequities by prompting those who would pay
nothing to pay at least some of their fair share. The same
cannot be said of the City’s system.
   The Court is willing to concede that “administrative con­
siderations could not justify . . . an unfair system” in which
“a city arbitrarily allocate[s] taxes among a few citizens while
forgiving many similarly situated citizens on the ground that
it is cheaper and easier to collect taxes from a few people
than from many.” Ante, at 685–686. Cold comfort, that.
If the quoted language does not accurately describe this case,
I am not sure what it would reach.
   The Court wisely does not embrace the City’s alternative
argument that the unequal tax burden is justified because
“it would have been fiscally challenging to issue refunds.”
Brief for Respondents 35. “Fiscally challenging ” gives
euphemism a bad name. The City’s claim that it has already
spent petitioners’ money is hardly worth a response, and the
City recognizes as much when it admits it could provide
refunds to petitioners by “arrang[ing] for payments from
non-Barrett Law sources.” Id., at 36. One cannot evade
returning money to its rightful owner by the simple expedi­
ent of spending it. The “fiscal challenge” justification seems
particularly inappropriate in this case, as the City—with an
                   Cite as: 566 U. S. 673 (2012)            693

                    Roberts, C. J., dissenting

annual budget of approximately $900 million—admits that
the cost of refunding all of petitioners’ money would be ap­
proximately $300,000. Adopted 2012 Budget for the Consol­
idated City of Indianapolis, Marion County (Oct. 17, 2011),
p. 7; Tr. of Oral Arg. 17, 58.
   Equally unconvincing is the Court’s attempt to distinguish
Allegheny Pittsburgh. The Court claims that case was dif­
ferent because it involved “a clear state-law requirement
clearly and dramatically violated.” Ante, at 687. Nothing
less is at stake here. Indiana law requires that the costs of
sewer projects be “apportioned equally among all abutting
lands.” Ind. Code § 36–9–39–15(b)(3). The City has instead
apportioned the costs of the Brisbane/Manning Project such
that petitioners paid between 10 and 30 times as much as
their neighbors. Worse still, it has done so in order to avoid
administrative hassle and save a bit of money. To para­
phrase A Man for All Seasons: “It profits a city nothing to
give up treating its citizens equally for the whole world . . .
but for $300,000?” See R. Bolt, A Man for All Seasons, act
II, p. 158 (1st Vintage Int’l ed. 1990).
   Our precedents do not ask for much from government in
this area—only “rough equality in tax treatment.” Alle­
gheny Pittsburgh, 488 U. S., at 343. The Court reminds us
that Allegheny Pittsburgh is a “rare case.” Ante, at 687.
It is and should be; we give great leeway to taxing authori­
ties in this area, for good and sufficient reasons. But every
generation or so a case comes along when this Court needs
to say enough is enough, if the Equal Protection Clause is to
retain any force in this context. Allegheny Pittsburgh was
such a case; so is this one. Indiana law promised neighbor­
ing homeowners that they would be treated equally when it
came to paying for sewer hookups. The City then ended up
charging some homeowners 30 times what it charged their
neighbors for the same hookups. The equal protection vio­
lation is plain. I would accordingly reverse the decision of
the Indiana Supreme Court, and respectfully dissent from
the Court’s decision to do otherwise.
                           Reporter’s Note

   The next page is purposely numbered 901. The numbers between 693
and 901 were intentionally omitted, in order to make it possible to publish
the orders with permanent page numbers, thus making the official cita­
tions available upon publication of the preliminary prints of the United
States Reports.
            ORDERS FOR MARCH 20, THROUGH
                     JUNE 4, 2012



                        March 20, 2012
Certiorari Denied
  No. 11–9290 (11A875). Puckett v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct.
Miss. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre­
sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied.

                        March 23, 2012
Certiorari Denied
  No. 11–9373 (11A882). Mitchell v. Mississippi. Sup. Ct.
Miss. Application for stay of execution of sentence of death, pre­
sented to Justice Scalia, and by him referred to the Court,
denied. Certiorari denied.

                        March 26, 2012
Certiorari Granted—Vacated and Remanded
   No. 10–1240. Thaler, Director, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division v.
Arnold. C. A. 5th Cir. Reported below: 630 F. 3d 367; and
   No. 10–1557. Thurmer, Warden v. Kerr. C. A. 7th Cir.
Reported below: 639 F. 3d 315. Motions of respondents for leave
to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judg­
ments vacated, and cases remanded for further consideration in
light of Lafler v. Cooper, ante, p. 156.
  No. 10–8629. Smith v. Colson, Warden. C. A. 6th Cir. Re­
ported below: 381 Fed. Appx. 547;
  No. 10–11031. Cantu v. Thaler, Director, Texas Depart­
ment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Divi­
sion. C. A. 5th Cir. Reported below: 632 F. 3d 157;
                                                         901
902                    OCTOBER TERM, 2011

                           March 26, 2012                   566 U. S.

  No. 11–5067. Middlebrooks v. Colson, Warden. C. A. 6th
Cir. Reported below: 619 F. 3d 526;
  No. 11–6969. Newbury v. Thaler, Director, Texas De­
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Reported below: 437 Fed. Appx. 290;
and
  No. 11–7978. Woods v. Holbrook, Superintendent, Wash­
ington State Penitentiary. C. A. 9th Cir. Reported below:
655 F. 3d 886. Motions of petitioners for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted, judgments va­
cated, and cases remanded for further consideration in light of
Martinez v. Ryan, ante, p. 1.
   No. 10–10543. Lovell v. Duffey. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis granted. Cer­
tiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170 (2011).
Reported below: 629 F. 3d 587.
   No. 11–725. Association for Molecular Pathology et al.
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded for further con­
sideration in light of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prome­
theus Laboratories, Inc., ante, p. 66. Reported below: 653 F. 3d
1329.
  No. 11–6589. Rodriguez v. Oklahoma. Ct. Crim. App. Okla.
Motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
granted. Certiorari granted, judgment vacated, and case re­
manded for further consideration in light of Missouri v. Frye,
ante, p. 134.

Certiorari Dismissed
  No. 11–8362. Martin v. United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio. C. A. 6th Cir. Motion of
petitioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and
certiorari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.
   No. 11–8707. Tate v. Tucker, Secretary, Florida Depart­
ment of Corrections, et al. C. A. 11th Cir. Motion of peti­
tioner for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied, and certio­
rari dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.
                              ORDERS                              903

566 U. S.                  March 26, 2012

Miscellaneous Orders
  No. 11M87. Kaetz v. Kaetz; and
  No. 11M88. Jennings v. United States. Motions to direct
the Clerk to file petitions for writs of certiorari out of time denied.
  No. 11M89. Kirsch v. O’Neil et al. Motion to direct the
Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time under this
Court’s Rule 14.5 denied.
  No. 11M90. Arias v. United States. Motion to direct the
Clerk to file petition for writ of certiorari out of time denied.
Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of
this motion.
  No. 11–798. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, California, et al. C. A. 9th Cir. The Solicitor Gen­
eral is invited to file a brief in this case expressing the views of
the United States.
   No. 11–8363. In re Evans;
   No. 11–8384. Peterson v. Seaman. C. A. 11th Cir.;
   No. 11–8406. Birdette v. Georgia Department of Trans­
portation. C. A. 11th Cir.;
   No. 11–8501. Junfeng Han et al. v. Jianong Guo et al.
Ct. App. Cal., 2d App. Dist.;
   No. 11–8505. Fisher v. Vizioncore, Inc., et al. C. A. 7th
Cir.; and
   No. 11–8521. Aref v. Hickman et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Mo­
tions of petitioners for leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied.
Petitioners are allowed until April 16, 2012, within which to pay
the docketing fees required by Rule 38(a) and to submit petitions
in compliance with Rule 33.1 of the Rules of this Court.
  No. 11–9063. In re Patterson. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus denied.
  No. 11–884. In re Del Rio;
  No. 11–894. In re London;
  No. 11–920. In re Cathcart et al.;
  No. 11–8379. In re Bradin; and
  No. 11–8394. In re Ward. Petitions for writs of mandamus
denied.
904                  OCTOBER TERM, 2011

                          March 26, 2012                  566 U. S.

  No. 11–8478. In re Flynn. Motion of petitioner for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis denied, and petition for writ of manda­
mus dismissed. See this Court’s Rule 39.8.
  No. 11–8971. In re Crawford. Petition for writ of manda­
mus denied. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration
or decision of this petition.

Certiorari Granted
  No. 11–817. Florida v. Harris. Sup. Ct. Fla. Motion of
National Police Canine Association et al. for leave to file a brief
as amici curiae granted. Motion of respondent for leave to pro­
ceed in forma pauperis granted. Certiorari granted. Reported
below: 71 So. 3d 756.

Certiorari Denied
  No. 10–8116. Frye v. Missouri. Ct. App. Mo., Western Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 311 S. W. 3d 350.
 No. 10–9742. Cook v. Arizona. Super. Ct. Ariz., County of
Mohave. Certiorari denied.
   No. 10–10782. Williams v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Cer­
tiorari denied.
  No. 10–11036. Balentine v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex.
Certiorari denied.
   No. 11–457. Kitsap Alliance of Property Owners et al.
v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings
Board et al. Ct. App. Wash. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 160 Wash. App. 250, 255 P. 3d 696.
  No. 11–561. Smith et al. v. Fields et al. C. A. 7th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 653 F. 3d 550.
  No. 11–622. HTH Corp. et al. v. Frankl, Regional Direc­
tor of Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board,
for and on Behalf of the National Labor Relations
Board. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 650
F. 3d 1334.
   No. 11–677. Moore v. Guerrero et al. C. A. 4th Cir. Cer­
tiorari denied. Reported below: 442 Fed. Appx. 57.
                          ORDERS                           905

566 U. S.               March 26, 2012

  No. 11–741. Philip Morris USA Inc. et al. v. Campbell,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Campbell; and
  No. 11–756. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Campbell, Per­
sonal Representative of the Estate of Campbell. Dist.
Ct. App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 60
So. 3d 1078.
  No. 11–752. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Gray, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Gray. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 63 So. 3d 902.
  No. 11–754. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Martin, Per­
sonal Representative of the Estate of Martin. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 53 So.
3d 1060.
  No. 11–755. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Hall, Personal
Representative of the Estate of Hall. Dist. Ct. App. Fla.,
1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 70 So. 3d 642.
  No. 11–773. Guerra v. Shinseki, Secretary of Veterans
Affairs. C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
642 F. 3d 1046.
  No. 11–780. Howard v. Walgreen Co., dba Walgreens
Pharmacy. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 605 F. 3d 1239.
   No. 11–782. Marina Point Development Associates et al.
v. Center for Biological Diversity et al. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 446 Fed. Appx. 843.
  No. 11–786. Nampa Classical Academy et al. v. Goesling
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 447
Fed. Appx. 776.
  No. 11–800. Apotex Inc. et al. v. Allergan, Inc., et al.
C. A. Fed. Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 643 F. 3d
1366.
  No. 11–825. Frey et al. v. Comptroller of the Treasury
of Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 422 Md. 111, 29 A. 3d 475.
  No. 11–885. Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Insurance
Co. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 445 Fed.
Appx. 577.
906                  OCTOBER TERM, 2011

                         March 26, 2012                 566 U. S.

  No. 11–886. Kennedy v. Times Publishing Co. Dist. Ct.
App. Fla., 2d Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 73 So.
3d 768.
  No. 11–887. Pirila et al. v. Thomson Township, Minne­
sota, et al. Ct. App. Minn. Certiorari denied.
  No. 11–891. County of Los Angeles, California v. Associ­
ation for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 648 F. 3d 986.
  No. 11–892. Aster v. Aster. Ct. App. Cal., 6th App. Dist.
Certiorari denied.
  No. 11–893. Loudermilk et al. v. Danner et al. C. A. 9th
Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 449 Fed. Appx. 693.
  No. 11–900. Cabell v. Sony Pictures Entertainment,
Inc., et al. C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below:
425 Fed. Appx. 42.
  No. 11–906. PowerComm, LLC v. Holyoke Gas & Electric
Department et al. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Re­
ported below: 657 F. 3d 31.
  No. 11–910. Johnson v. Poway Uniąed School District
et al. C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 658
F. 3d 954 and 449 Fed. Appx. 696.
  No. 11–914. Houston v. Easton Area School District.
C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 444 Fed.
Appx. 523.
  No. 11–917. Nucor Corp. et al. v. Bennett et al. C. A.
8th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 656 F. 3d 802.
  No. 11–918. Siwula v. Town of Hornellsville, New York,
et al. App. Div., Sup. Ct. N. Y., 4th Jud. Dept. Certiorari de­
nied. Reported below: 82 App. Div. 3d 1662, 919 N. Y. S. 2d 457.
  No. 11–924. Rick et al. v. Wyeth et al. C. A. 8th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 662 F. 3d 1067.
  No. 11–933. Silva v. City of New Bedford, Massachu­
setts. C. A. 1st Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 660
F. 3d 76.
                           ORDERS                            907

566 U. S.                March 26, 2012

  No. 11–990. H. D. Smith Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v.
Smith et al. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 659 F. 3d 503.
  No. 11–1021. Edwards v. Ohio. Ct. App. Ohio, Hamilton
County. Certiorari denied.
  No. 11–1033. Joseph v. Attorney Grievance Commission
of Maryland. Ct. App. Md. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 422 Md. 670, 31 A. 3d 137.
  No. 11–1043. Kivisto v. Attorney Registration and Disci­
plinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Sup. Ct. Ill. Certiorari denied.
  No. 11–1048. Roncallo v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. C. A.
2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 447 Fed. Appx. 243.
  No. 11–5941. Sanders v. Kentucky. Sup. Ct. Ky. Certio­
rari denied. Reported below: 339 S. W. 3d 427.
  No. 11–6427. Foster v. Texas. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certio­
rari denied.
  No. 11–6472. McGehee v. Arkansas. Sup. Ct. Ark. Certio­
rari denied.
  No. 11–6594. Templet v. United States. C. A. 5th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 431 Fed. Appx. 270.
   No. 11–6624. Newbold v. North Carolina. Gen. Ct. Jus­
tice, Super. Ct. Div., Guilford County, N. C. Certiorari denied.
   No. 11–6891. Polk v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Cer­
tiorari denied. Reported below: 407 Ill. App. 3d 80, 942 N. E.
2d 44.
  No. 11–7098. White v. Longino, Deputy Warden, et al.
C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 428 Fed.
Appx. 491.
 No. 11–7120. Daker v. Warren, Sheriff, Cobb County,
Georgia. C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
  No. 11–7523. Duncan v. United States. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 643 F. 3d 1242.
908                 OCTOBER TERM, 2011

                         March 26, 2012                566 U. S.

  No. 11–7669. El-Mumit v. Louisiana. Sup. Ct. La. Certio­
rari denied. Reported below: 1988–0017 (La. 5/11/11), 68 So. 3d
435.
  No. 11–7838. Gonzales v. California; and
  No. 11–8133. Soliz v. California. Sup. Ct. Cal. Certiorari
denied. Reported below: 52 Cal. 4th 254, 256 P. 3d 543.
   No. 11–8066. Gibson v. United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri;
   No. 11–8067. McCorkle v. United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri;
   No. 11–8068. Watkins v. United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri; and
   No. 11–8481. Goldblatt v. United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri. C. A. 8th Cir. Cer­
tiorari denied.
  No. 11–8352. Vivas v. Florida Department of Children
and Families. Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied. Reported
below: 69 So. 3d 279.
 No. 11–8359. Zibbell et ux. v. Michigan Department of
Human Services et al. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
  No. 11–8369. McCall v. Texas. Ct. App. Tex., 9th Dist.
Certiorari denied.
  No. 11–8374. Judkins v. Illinois. App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 405 Ill. App. 3d 1199, 997
N. E. 2d 1009.
  No. 11–8376. Boomer v. New York. App. Div., Sup. Ct.
N. Y., 3d Jud. Dept. Certiorari denied.
  No. 11–8380. Miller v. Trammell, Warden. C. A. 10th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 439 Fed. Appx. 766.
  No. 11–8387. Nava v. Knowles, Warden. C. A. 9th Cir.
Certiorari denied. Reported below: 455 Fed. Appx. 756.
  No. 11–8388. McPherson v. Thaler, Director, Texas De­
partment of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions
Division. C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.


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