Additional Actions Needed to Address Gaps in the Nation's Emergency Management Capabilities (GAO-20-297)
Summary
A GAO report to congressional requesters, GAO-20-297, dated May 2020, on national preparedness. It examines how the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) National Preparedness System and associated grants have built emergency management capabilities across five mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery. GAO reports that from fiscal years 2013 through 2018 jurisdictions directed almost 90 percent of FEMA preparedness grants ($7.3 of $8.3 billion) to crosscutting, response and prevention capabilities. It finds that jurisdictions have consistently rated select capabilities, such as disaster housing and cybersecurity, in the lowest category since 2013.
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United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Requesters
May 2020
NATIONAL
PREPAREDNESS
Additional Actions
Needed to Address
Gaps in the Nation’s
Emergency
Management
Capabilities
GAO-20-297
May 2020
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS
Additional Actions Needed to Address Gaps in the
Nation’s Emergency Management Capabilities
Highlights of GAO-20-297, a report to
congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found
FEMA uses the National The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Preparedness
Preparedness System to help System and associated grants have helped build some emergency management
assess the nation’s emergency capabilities, but gaps remain. Capabilities fall in five mission areas: (1)
management capabilities in prevention—preventing imminent acts of terrorism, (2) protection—protecting
preparing for disasters and, in part, citizens and assets, (3) mitigation—mitigating the loss of life and property, (4)
to help prioritize federal response—responding quickly to save lives, and (5) recovery—timely restoration
preparedness grants it provides to of infrastructure and housing, among other things. From fiscal years 2013
state and local jurisdictions. Since through 2018, jurisdictions directed almost 90 percent of FEMA preparedness
2002, FEMA has provided over $52
grants ($7.3 of $8.3 billion) to capabilities in the crosscutting (i.e., benefit all five
billion in such grants intended to
mission areas), response, and prevention areas (figure below). Jurisdictions
enhance preparedness capabilities.
reported a higher level of preparedness in these areas compared to capabilities
GAO was asked to examine national in the other mission areas—recovery, mitigation, and protection. Jurisdictions
preparedness. This report examines have consistently rated select capabilities in these three mission areas—such as
the extent to which: (1) FEMA’s disaster housing and cybersecurity—in the lowest category since 2013. FEMA
National Preparedness System and does not limit jurisdictions’ use of preparedness grants for select capabilities, but
associated preparedness grants it has encouraged jurisdictions to address the known gaps.
have assisted jurisdictions in
preparing for disasters; (2) FEMA FEMA Preparedness Grants by Mission Area, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018
has strengthened the National
Preparedness System and what
steps remain; and (3) FEMA is using
after-action reports to identify
lessons learned and strengthen
future preparedness. GAO
evaluated agency guidance,
analyzed 2013 to 2017 capability
data—the most current available;
conducted site visits to five states;
and interviewed FEMA, state, and
local emergency management FEMA is taking steps to strengthen the national preparedness system, but has
officials. yet to determine what steps are needed to address the nation’s capability gaps
across all levels of government. Specifically, FEMA is implementing a new
What GAO Recommends methodology to collect more quantitative data on capabilities at the state,
territory, and local levels—as GAO recommended in 2011—and also plans to
GAO is making four
begin assessing the federal government’s capabilities. Including the federal
recommendations that FEMA (1)
government in such an assessment would enable FEMA and jurisdictions to
determine what steps are needed to
address emergency management assess national preparedness capabilities collectively. While these are positive
capability gaps, and communicate it steps that could meet the intent of the 2011 recommendation, FEMA has yet to
to key stakeholders (2) prioritize determine what steps are needed to address the capability gaps once they are
completion of after-action reviews, identified, including jurisdictions’ capability gaps that have been known since
3) track corrective actions, and (4) 2012. By determining these steps and informing key stakeholders, such as
develop guidance on sharing Congress, about what resources will be needed across all levels of government,
findings externally. The Department FEMA will be better positioned to address the nation’s capability gaps.
of Homeland Security concurred and
FEMA after-action reports have identified areas for improvement and lessons
FEMA is taking actions in response.
learned following disasters, but has completed after-action reviews for only 29
View GAO-20-297. For more information, percent of disasters from 2017 through 2019. FEMA lacks a formal mechanism to
contact Chris Currie at (404) 679-1875 or
curriec@gao.gov. track corrective actions and does not have guidance on sharing after-action
reports with key external stakeholders, as appropriate.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Background 7
The National Preparedness System and Grants Have Helped
Build Some Emergency Management Capabilities, but Gaps
Remain 13
FEMA Is Taking Steps to Strengthen Assessments of Federal and
Jurisdiction Capabilities, but Opportunities Exist to Further
Enhance National Preparedness 25
FEMA Has Identified Some Areas for Improvement Following
Disasters but Could Strengthen After-Action Reviews and
Follow-Up 32
Conclusions 39
Recommendations for Executive Action 40
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40
Appendix I Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 46
Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 50
Tables
Table 1: Percent of Preparedness Ratings by States and
Territories That Identified Select Capabilities as Having
the Lowest Rating, from 2013 through 2017 18
Table 2: Example of Sheltering Capability Using Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s Updated Methodology
to Quantitatively Define Capability Gaps 28
Figures
Figure 1: National Preparedness Goal’s 32 Emergency
Management Core Capabilities by Mission Area 9
Figure 2: Percentages of the 2017 Capability Ratings within the
Lowest, Middle, and Highest Preparedness Categories 15
Figure 3: Federal Emergency Management Agency Preparedness
Grant Funding Directed to Mission Areas, Fiscal Years
2013 through 2018 20
Page i GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Figure 4: Percent of Preparedness Grant Funds Jurisdictions
Directed to the Recovery Mission Area by Capability,
Fiscal Years 2013-2018 21
Figure 5: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Use
of National and Jurisdictional-level Capability
Assessments to Collectively Identify the Nation’s
Emergency Management Capability Gaps 29
Figure 6: Status of Federal Emergency Management Agency
After-Action Reviews for Disasters Occurring from
January 1, 2017 through January 8, 2020 34
Abbreviations
DHS Department of Homeland Security
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
SPR Stakeholder Preparedness Review
THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment
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Page ii GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Letter
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
May 4, 2020
Congressional Requesters
The 2017 and 2018 hurricanes, wildfires, and other recent disasters
highlight the challenges that all levels of government face in preparing for
and responding effectively to disasters—in terms of both immediate
response and long-term recovery efforts. According to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) 2017 Hurricane Season
After-Action Report, the 2017 hurricanes collectively affected 47 million
people, and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria all rank among the top
five costliest hurricanes ever recorded. 1 The 2018 hurricane season
followed with Hurricanes Florence and Michael causing nearly $50 billon
of damage, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. In addition, in 2018, the Camp Fire in northern California
destroyed more than 18,500 buildings and was the costliest and deadliest
wildfire in California’s history. 2
The rising number of natural disasters and increasing state, local, and
tribal reliance on federal disaster assistance is a key source of federal
fiscal exposure. 3 Since 2005, federal funding for disaster assistance has
totaled at least $460 billion, which consists of obligations for disaster
assistance from 2005 through 2014 totaling at least $278 billion 4 and
select appropriations for disaster assistance from 2015 through 2019
1According to the 2017 Hurricane Season After-Action Report, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) identified the five costliest hurricanes on record being
Hurricanes Katrina ($161 billion), Harvey ($125 billion), Maria ($90 billion), Sandy ($71
billion), and Irma ($50 billion).
2NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information, U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and
Climate Disasters (2019). https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/
3GAO, Fiscal Exposures: Improving Cost Recognition in the Federal Budget, GAO-14-28
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2013).
4This total include $278 billion that GAO found that the federal government had obligated
for disaster assistance from 2005 through 2014. See GAO, Federal Disaster Assistance:
Federal Departments and Agencies Obligated at Least $277.6 Billion during Fiscal Years
2005 through 2014, GAO-16-797 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2016).
Page 1 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
totaling $183 billion. 5 Most of this funding was appropriated for
catastrophic hurricanes, flooding, wildfires, and other losses in 2017 and
2018. 6 Disaster costs are projected to increase as extreme weather
events become more frequent and intense due to climate change—as
observed and projected by the U.S. Global Change Research Program
and the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 7
FEMA—a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—is
the lead federal agency responsible for disaster preparedness, response,
and recovery. We previously reported that FEMA faced challenges in
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from Hurricane Maria, which
largely affected Puerto Rico in 2017. 8 After major disasters, FEMA’s
standard practice is to prepare an after-action report that identifies
strengths, areas for improvement, and potential best practices identified
during response and recovery efforts. FEMA’s 2017 Hurricane Season
After-Action Report recognized the challenges of Hurricane Maria, among
other disasters, and found that the agency must better prepare for
sequential, complex disasters and address logistical challenges that may
complicate efforts to deploy resources to remote areas. We have also
reported on the challenges in assessing state and local jurisdiction
5This total includes, for fiscal years 2015 through 2019, $143 billion in supplemental
appropriations to federal agencies for disaster assistance and approximately $40 billion in
annual appropriations to the Disaster Relief Fund. It does not include other annual
appropriations to federal agencies for disaster assistance. See Pub. L. No. 114-223, §
145, 130 Stat. 857, 916 (2016); Pub. L. No. 114-254, 130 Stat. 1005, 1019 (2016); Pub. L.
No. 115-56, div. B, 131 Stat. 1129, 1136 (2017); Pub. L. No. 115-72, div. A, 131 Stat.
1224, 1224 (2017); Pub. L. No. 115-123, div. B, subdiv. 1, 132 Stat. 64, 65 (2018); Pub. L.
No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186, 3531 (2018); Pub. L. No. 116-20, 133 Stat. 871 (2019). See
also Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39, 55 (2015); Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242,
2507 (2015); Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 417 (2017); Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132
Stat. 348, 620 (2018); Pub. L. No. 116-6, 133 Stat. 13, 31 (2019).
6GAO, High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on
High-Risk Areas, GAO-19-157SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2019).
7Managing fiscal exposure due to climate change has been on our high-risk list since
2013, in part, because of concerns about the increasing costs of disaster response and
recovery efforts. See GAO, Climate Change: Information on Potential Economic Effects
Could Help Guide Federal Efforts to Reduce Fiscal Exposure, GAO-17-720 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 28, 2017) and GAO-19-157SP.
8GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires: Initial Observations on the Federal Response and
Key Recovery Challenges, GAO-18-487 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2017).
Page 2 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
preparedness for emergencies and disasters. 9 In March 2011, we
reported that FEMA needed to improve its oversight of preparedness
grants by establishing a framework with measurable performance
objectives for assessing urban area, state, territory, and tribal capabilities
to identify gaps and prioritize investments. 10 Specifically, we
recommended that FEMA complete a national preparedness assessment
of capability gaps at each level based on tiered, capability-specific
performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding. As of
March 2020, this recommendation has not been implemented.
FEMA uses the National Preparedness System to help assess the
nation’s emergency management capabilities and, in part, to help
prioritize federal preparedness grants it provides to state and local
communities to fill gaps in their emergency management capabilities.
Specifically, the National Preparedness System is designed to help
communities measure and assess their 32 distinct emergency
management capabilities (“core capabilities”) and, in part, to prioritize
preparedness grants. According to DHS, from fiscal years 2002 through
2019, DHS awarded over $52 billion in preparedness grants to enhance
and strengthen the capabilities of state, local, tribal, and territorial grant
recipients to prevent, protect, mitigate against, respond to, and recover
from terrorist attacks and other disasters. 11
You asked us to review a broad range of issues related to disaster
preparedness. This report examines:
1. the extent to which the National Preparedness System and associated
preparedness grants assisted jurisdictions in preparing for disasters;
2. the extent to which FEMA has strengthened the National
Preparedness System and what steps remain to prepare for future
disasters; and,
9GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Progress and Continuing Challenges in
National Preparedness Efforts, GAO-16-560T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 12, 2016). GAO,
National Preparedness: FEMA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Grant Management, But
Challenges Remain in Assessing Capabilities, GAO-18-512T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 23,
2018). GAO, FEMA: Strengthening Regional Coordination Could Enhance Preparedness
Efforts, GAO-16-38, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4, 2016).
10GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save
Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011).
11For the purposes of this report, states, territories, urban areas, tribal nations, and local
governments are defined as “jurisdictions.”
Page 3 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
3. the extent to which FEMA uses after-action reports following major
disasters to identify lessons learned and strengthen future
preparedness activities.
To determine the extent to which the National Preparedness System and
associated preparedness grants assisted jurisdictions in preparing for
disasters, we reviewed FEMA’s 2012 guidance, which jurisdictions used
to prepare assessments of their emergency management capabilities
from 2012 through 2017—the most current data available at the time of
our review. After reviewing the guidance, we reviewed 10 jurisdictions’
assessments of their emergency management capabilities for 2013
through 2018 to examine the extent to which their capability ratings were
being enhanced or sustained over that period. 12 We selected these
jurisdictions because they had prepared assessments prior to 2018 and
were also impacted by the 2017 and 2018 hurricanes and wildfires. We
also reviewed DHS notices announcing the availability of preparedness
grants and FEMA case studies examining jurisdictions’ use of grant
funds, to determine the extent to which FEMA requires or encourages
grant recipients to use the funds to improve the capabilities. Further, we
analyzed data submitted by jurisdictions from their emergency
management capability assessments on the 32 core capabilities, broken
down annually by state, territory, and, to the extent possible, by Urban
Area Security Initiative regions, which encompass major metropolitan
areas throughout the United States. To validate FEMA’s assessment of
the submitted jurisdictions’ data, we conducted the same analysis that
FEMA conducted on the emergency management capability assessments
submitted by the 50 states, District of Columbia, and 5 territories from
2013 through 2017. 13 The results of both analyses proved to be
consistent with one another. We also compared our data analysis to
12The 10 jurisdictions were the states of California, Florida, New York, North Carolina, and
Texas; the cities of Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York; and Puerto Rico. We
reviewed these assessments through 2018, but did not include the 2019 submissions
because jurisdictions were not required to submit capability ratings across all mission
areas for the 2019 annual cycle.
13While the 2018 capability ratings submitted by jurisdictions provide useful information,
we did not include capability ratings from 2018 in our data analysis. The annual DHS
National Preparedness Reports (NPR) categorized core capability ratings from the 50
states, District of Columbia, and 5 territories’ capability assessments across three
performance groups (i.e., high, medium, and low), from 2012 to 2017. The capability
ratings from 2018 were not included in the 2019 NPR and not used in our analysis
because FEMA updated its methodology to collect and report the data. As such, we did
not use 2018 data to conduct a comparative analysis to prior years.
Page 4 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
FEMA’s data analysis to help ensure the reliability of the data. In addition,
we interviewed FEMA officials to determine how, and to what extent, the
data can be used to report on national preparedness. We determined that
these data were reliable for the purpose of our reporting objectives.
We also reviewed FEMA’s current guidance, which was updated in 2018
and included instructions to the jurisdictions on how to measure and
assess their capabilities in a manner that would allow them to define their
capability gaps quantitatively moving forward. In addition, we reviewed
FEMA’s strategic planning documents and the Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 101, which provides additional guidance jurisdictions
use to develop preparedness plans and report on their capabilities. 14 We
also conducted interviews and site visits with state emergency
management officials in California, Florida, New York, North Carolina,
and Texas to discuss their process for identifying and preparing for
specific threats, hazards, and risks. 15 Four of the five states we visited
experienced major disasters during 2017 and 2018. In addition to the four
states that incurred damages during 2017 and 2018, we visited New
York, which was not impacted by the 2017 and 2018 hurricanes or
wildfires. However, New York has multiple threats, risks, and hazards-and
receives preparedness grants annually. We interviewed officials from the
state and city of New York to, in part, discuss their use of preparedness
grant funds. Additionally, within the five states we visited, we interviewed
emergency management officials in four cities and 11 counties to obtain
their views on the response and recovery to the 2017 and 2018
hurricanes and wildfires, as well as their perspectives on various
preparedness activities they participate in as part of the National
Preparedness System. 16 We selected the counties and cities based on
the high level of damages they incurred during the 2017 and 2018
disasters and by whether they receive preparedness grant funding. The
14Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Threat and Hazard identification and Risk
Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide:
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, 3rd Edition, May 2018. DHS,
Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans, Comprehensive Preparedness
Guide (CPG) 101, Version 2.0, November 2010.
15Threats and hazards can be (1) natural hazards or acts of nature; (2) technological
hazards that are accidents or failures of systems and structures; or (3) human-caused
incidents with intentional actions.
16The five cities and 12 counties within the five states include the following: Texas-City of
Houston and Counties of Harris, Brazoria, and Jefferson; Florida-City of Miami and
Counties of Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Lee; North Carolina-City of New Bern and Counties
of Craven, New Hanover, and Onslow; California-City of Los Angeles and Counties of Los
Angeles and Butte, and New York-New York City.
Page 5 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
information obtained during these site visits are specific to the state and
local officials we interviewed and are not generalizable to all state and
local emergency management officials or recipients of preparedness
grants, but their perspectives provide insights into how the National
Preparedness System and associated preparedness grants are helping
jurisdictions prepare for disasters.
To determine the extent to which FEMA has strengthened the National
Preparedness System and what, if any, steps remain to prepare for future
disasters, we conducted interviews with officials in FEMA’s National
Preparedness Directorate and the National Preparedness Assessment
Division to gain their perspectives on FEMA’s implementation and use of
the National Preparedness System. We reviewed relevant information
from our prior testimony to Congress on national capabilities and
analyzed FEMA documents—such as the 2019 National Threat and
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (National THIRA) Overview
and Methodology. 17 In addition, we interviewed state and local officials
from the five states we visited to discuss the implementation of the 2018
methodology that recipients of preparedness grants use to conduct state,
local, and territorial threat assessments.
To determine the extent to which FEMA is using after-action reports
following major disasters to strengthen future preparedness activities, we
interviewed officials from FEMA’s headquarters and its regional staff
(Regions II, IV, VI, and IX) who are responsible for conducting, collecting,
and analyzing FEMA’s after-action reports; and collected and analyzed
available after-action reports. We selected these FEMA regions because
of their proximity to the five states we visited and their experiences
assisting in the response and recovery efforts during the 2017 and 2018
disasters. The FEMA regional officials we interviewed are responsible for
coordinating disaster assistance and preparedness activities in California,
Florida, New York, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, Texas, and U.S. Virgin
Islands. While the regional officials’ views add important context to our
findings, their statements cannot be generalized and are not
representative of all FEMA Regional officials. In addition, we reviewed
prior GAO reports, in which we reviewed coordination among FEMA’s
regional offices and headquarters, in part, to assess their process for
17FEMA, 2019 National Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)
Overview and Methodology, July 25, 2019. GAO, Managing Preparedness Grants and
Assessing National Capabilities: Continuing Challenges Impede FEMA’s Progress,
GAO-12-526T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2012).
Page 6 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
conducting and using after-action reports. 18 We also reviewed FEMA
program guidance related to FEMA’s after-action reporting protocols. 19
We then compared FEMA’s efforts to identify and address lessons
learned with the provisions in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act) as well as the standards for
conducting lessons learned efforts outlined in The Standards for Program
Management. 20 We also assessed FEMA’s efforts against DHS’s National
Response Framework, which specifies that evaluation and continual
process improvement are cornerstones of effective preparedness. 21
We conducted this performance audit from July 2018 to April 2020 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
National Preparedness Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Post-Katrina Act required FEMA
Goal to develop a national preparedness system and assess preparedness
capabilities to determine the nation’s disaster preparedness. 22 In
September 2011, DHS issued the National Preparedness Goal: a secure
and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole
community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover
18GAO-16-38. GAO, Disaster Response: FEMA Has Made Progress Implementing Key
Programs, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-16-87 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
5, 2016).
19FEMA Directive 107-1, Continuous Improvement Program, May 2019.
20The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to analyze real-world events to identify and
disseminate lessons learned and best practices, and to generate and disseminate, as
appropriate, after-action reports to participants in real-world events. 6 U.S.C. § 750.
Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management ®.
21Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, Third Edition
(Washington, D.C.: June 2016).
226 U.S.C. §§ 744, 749.
Page 7 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk. 23 The National
Preparedness Goal also defined the “whole community” as individuals
and communities, the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based
organizations, and all governments (local, regional/metropolitan, state,
tribal, territorial, insular area, and federal). The National Preparedness
Goal identifies and defines 32 core capabilities across five broad mission
areas. These capabilities form the foundation for measuring overall
national preparedness and assisting the nation in allocating resources to
fill identified preparedness gaps. Three of the 32 core capabilities affect
all mission areas and are considered to be “crosscutting” (see fig. 1). The
five broad mission areas are:
• Prevention. Preventing an imminent threat, or actual act of terrorism.
• Protection. Protecting citizens, residents, visitors, and assets in a
manner that allows interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive.
• Mitigation. Mitigating the loss of life and property by lessening the
impact of future disasters.
• Response. Responding quickly to save lives, protect property and the
environment, and meet basic human needs in the immediate
aftermath of an incident.
• Recovery. Recovering through a focus on the timely restoration,
strengthening, and revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and a
sustainable economy, as well as the health, social, cultural, historic,
and environment fabric of communities affected by an incident.
23The White House released Presidential Policy Directive 8 on National Preparedness in
March 2011. It directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to design a national
preparedness system to address the threats posing the greatest risk to the security of the
nation and issue various policy and planning documents designed to strengthen national
preparedness. Additionally, it required the Secretary to develop a National Preparedness
Goal that identifies the core capabilities necessary to achieve preparedness.
Page 8 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Figure 1: National Preparedness Goal’s 32 Emergency Management Core Capabilities by Mission Area
Since 2012, DHS has produced a National Preparedness Report
annually, which assesses progress toward the National Preparedness
Page 9 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Goal of achieving a secure and resilient nation. A key element of the
National Preparedness Report is that it evaluates and measures the
extent to which jurisdictions have strengthened their 32 core capabilities.
From 2012 to 2017, all 50 states, District of Columbia, and 5 territories
were required to assess the preparedness levels of their 32 capabilities
by providing a rating of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest preparedness
rating. 24 Emergency management capabilities with a rating of 1 or 2 are
considered to have the largest capability gaps. FEMA used this
assessment process to inform the National Preparedness Report by
illustrating which threats and hazards occurred in the past and which
capabilities have the largest gaps. 25
FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate, which includes the National
Preparedness Assessment Division, is responsible for assisting
communities in becoming more resilient by developing the capabilities
needed to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate
against all threats and hazards. The Directorate provides guidance,
programs, and processes to assist communities in completing the
requirements associated with the National Preparedness System.
Jurisdictions’ Emergency To help jurisdictions more comprehensively assess their gaps, FEMA
Management Capability required they complete the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholders Preparedness Review (SPR).
Assessments
The THIRA is conducted by jurisdictions every 3 years to, in part, identify
threats and hazards that are both reasonably likely to affect the
community and would most challenge the community’s ability to deliver
one or more of its capabilities; and estimate and describe the potential
impacts of those threats and hazards. 26 The types of threats and hazards
24The Post-Katrina Act requires any state that receives federal preparedness assistance
to submit a report on the state’s level of preparedness to FEMA. See 6 U.S.C. § 752(c).
25FEMA’s analysis of the preparedness data for 2017 relied on the 50 states, District of
Columbia, and 5 territories to submit ratings for each of the five functional areas (planning,
organizing, equipping, training, and exercising) for every core capability, resulting in
approximately 280 scores for each core capability. From the 280 ratings, FEMA identified
the percentage of ratings that fell into one of three preparedness score categories: 1 or 2
represented the lowest preparedness score; ratings of 3 represented the middle
preparedness score; and ratings of 4 or 5 represented the highest preparedness score.
26States, territories, and high-risk urban areas are required to complete a THIRA and SPR
for all 32 core capabilities. Also beginning in 2019, jurisdictions are only required to submit
a THIRA every three (3) years to establish a consistent baseline for assessment. While
the THIRA will be only required every 3 years, jurisdictions will continue to be required to
submit an SPR annually.
Page 10 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
are defined as (1) natural hazards or acts of nature; (2) technological
hazards that are accidents or failures of systems and structures; and (3)
human-caused incidents resulting from intentional actions. Jurisdictions
are to conduct the SPR annually to, among other things, identify
capability gaps by assessing the capabilities against the types of threats
and hazards identified in the THIRA.
In 2012-2013, FEMA issued its initial guidance to jurisdictions to help
them understand how to identify the threats and hazards through the
THIRA, and assess their core capabilities. 27 In 2018, FEMA issued new
guidance for the THIRA and SPR requiring jurisdictions to change the
methodology, moving away from proficiency-based ratings to a process
that relies more on quantitative data to measure gaps across the core
capabilities. In 2018, FEMA required jurisdictions to begin using the new
methodology to assess the core capabilities within the response and
recovery mission areas. Beginning in 2019, FEMA required jurisdictions
to begin using the new methodology to assess the core capabilities
across all mission areas. FEMA’s 10 regions provide technical assistance
and training to help jurisdictions become more proficient in completing
these capability assessments. FEMA also sponsors exercises with states,
territories, tribes, and localities to help them assess their emergency
management capabilities.
In addition to the jurisdictions’ THIRAs and SPRs, in 2019, FEMA initiated
an effort to assess the federal government’s emergency management
capacity. According to FEMA, the effort is intended to provide a national
THIRA and SPR that assesses the federal government’s capabilities
against the nation’s threats and hazards. The Disaster Recovery Reform
Act of 2018 (DRRA) requires FEMA, among other things, to provide
congressional committees updates every 6 months on its progress in
completing a national preparedness assessment until the assessment is
complete. 28 In July 2019, FEMA issued its 2019 National Threat and
27Guidance to help jurisdictions understand how to identify threats and hazards was DHS,
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide, Comprehensive
Preparedness Guide 201, Supplement 1: Toolkit, First Edition, April 2012 and later
updated in DHS, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Guide,
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201, Second Edition, August 2013. Guidance to help
jurisdictions assess their core capabilities was FEMA, State Preparedness Report (SPR),
Survey Tool Users Guide, Version 1.0, July 2012.
28Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. D, § 1242, 132 Stat. 3438, 3467. In October 2018, the DRRA
was enacted, containing provisions that address many areas of emergency management,
including wildfire mitigation, public assistance, and individual assistance, among others.
Page 11 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (National THIRA): Overview
and Methodology, describing its approach to completing a national-level
risk assessment (i.e., a National THIRA). According to FEMA, the
National THIRA was completed in 2020, and will be included in the 2020
National Preparedness Report. 29
FEMA Preparedness DHS, through FEMA, provides jurisdictions preparedness grants, which
Grants are used, in part, to strengthen the 32 core capabilities across the five
mission areas. FEMA has traditionally provided three primary
preparedness grants that jurisdictions can use to strengthen their
emergency management core capabilities. 30 Two of the three grants, the
State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security
Initiative, were established after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. As established by federal law, these grants are intended to help
states and localities prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to
acts of terrorism.
• State Homeland Security Grant Program. Provides funding to assist
state, local, and tribal governments in preventing, preparing for,
protecting against, and responding to acts of terrorism. 31 Helps
support states’ implementation of homeland security strategies to
address the identified planning, organization, equipment, training, and
exercise needs at the state and local levels. In fiscal year 2019, the
total funding available to all 50 states, District of Columbia and 5
territories was $415 million.
• Urban Area Security Initiative. Provides federal assistance to
address the unique needs of high-threat, high-density urban areas,
and assists the areas in building a capacity to prevent, prepare for,
29FEMA, 2019 National Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Overview
and Methodology, July 25, 2019.
30FEMA’s Grant Program Directorate provides preparedness grants to state, local, tribal,
and territorial governments, as well as to transportation authorities; nonprofit
organizations; and the private sector; to improve the nation’s readiness in preventing,
protecting against, responding to, recovering from and mitigating terrorist attacks, major
disasters and other emergencies. FEMA also provides other grants to jurisdictions that
could help enhance national preparedness—such as the Port Security Grants Program,
which focuses on transportation infrastructure security activities.
31The State Homeland Security Program was codified by the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. See 6 U.S.C. § 605.
Page 12 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism. 32 In fiscal year 2019,
the total funding available to the 31 urban areas was $590 million.
• Emergency Management Performance Grant. Provides federal
assistance to states to assist state, local, and tribal governments in
preparing for all hazards. 33 The program plays a valuable role in
strengthening and sustaining the 32 core capabilities across the five
mission areas. In fiscal year 2019, the total funding available to states,
local governments, and tribes was $315 million.
The National Preparedness System and associated preparedness grants
The National have helped jurisdictions strengthen and sustain their emergency
Preparedness management capabilities. More specifically, according to National
Preparedness Reports since calendar year 2012, states and territories
System and Grants generally have rated their capabilities within the prevention and response
Have Helped Build mission areas, as well as their crosscutting capabilities—which involve all
five mission areas, as having the highest preparedness levels. By
Some Emergency contrast, states and territories generally have rated their capabilities in the
Management recovery and protection mission areas as having lower preparedness
levels, and these ratings showed little to no improvement from 2013 to
Capabilities, but Gaps 2017. 34 Additionally, since 2013, jurisdictions have directed nearly 87
Remain percent of their FEMA preparedness grants toward sustaining or
strengthening capabilities in the crosscutting, prevention, and response
mission areas, and around 13 percent on enhancing or sustaining
capabilities in the protection, mitigation, and recovery mission areas.
FEMA has encouraged jurisdictions to invest future preparedness grants
to strengthen their capabilities that have lower preparedness ratings and
to address emerging threats, such as cybersecurity. However, FEMA
32The Urban Area Security Initiative was codified by the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. See 6 U.S.C. § 604. State Homeland Security Grant
program and Urban Area Security Initiative funds may also be used in a manner that
enhances preparedness for disasters unrelated to acts of terrorism, if such use assists
such governments in achieving capabilities related to preventing, preparing for, protecting
against, or responding to acts of terrorism.
33The Emergency Management Performance Grant program was codified by the Post-
Katrina Act. See 6 U.S.C. § 762.
34From 2012 to 2017, FEMA required states and territories to prepare the capabilities
assessment referred to as the State Preparedness Report. In 2018, FEMA expanded the
requirement to include large urban areas and tribal nations that receive preparedness
grants and renamed the report as the Stakeholders Preparedness Review. While the 2018
data provides useful information, we did not use that data as part of our comparative
analysis when assessing the 2013 through 2017 data submitted under the previous
methodology.
Page 13 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
officials told us their efforts to help jurisdictions enhance their capabilities,
including the distribution of existing preparedness grants, will likely not be
sufficient to address the capability gaps that have been identified by
jurisdictions.
Preparedness Data Show States and territories’ 2017 preparedness data showed that eight core
Capabilities Are Strongest capabilities in the response and crosscutting mission areas had the
highest level of preparedness (a rating of 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale). For
in the Crosscutting,
example, as shown in figure 2 below, over 50 percent of the assessment
Prevention, and Response ratings by the states and territories identified crosscutting capabilities,
Areas; Lowest in the such as public information and warning and operational coordination, in
Protection and Recovery the highest category of preparedness. 35 Similarly, 57 percent of the
Areas assessment ratings by states and territories identified on-scene security,
protection, and law enforcement capabilities within the response mission
area in the highest preparedness categories.
35Operational coordination is to establish and maintain a unified and coordinated
operational structure and process that integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the
execution of core capabilities. Critical tasks include mobilizing all critical resources and
establish command, control, and coordination structures within the affected community.
Public information and warning is to deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable
information to the whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and
culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding
any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the assistance
being made available.
Page 14 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Figure 2: Percentages of the 2017 Capability Ratings within the Lowest, Middle, and Highest Preparedness Categories
In our discussions with local officials who were impacted by the 2017 and
2018 hurricanes, they told us that the operational coordination and public
information and warning capabilities were effective during their response
Page 15 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
efforts. For example, Craven County, NC, officials told us that in response
to the flooding from Hurricane Florence, their emergency operations
center was instrumental in communicating with first responders. In doing
so, they were able to keep county wells running while working with utility
companies to prioritize areas that needed electrical power, such as
hospitals and grocery stores. Additionally, Onslow County, NC officials
said their emergency operations center was instrumental in
communicating and coordinating the rescue operations of around 700
residents through the use of the county’s swift water rescue teams, with
assistance from the U.S. Marine Corps, North Carolina’s National Guard,
and the local fire and police departments. In addition, Brazoria County,
TX, officials told us that in response to Hurricane Harvey they used
videos and social media to get warning messages out to the residents
and businesses about evacuation assistance as well as information on
hurricane preparedness.
Supply chain integrity and security Preparedness data from 2017 show that almost 40 percent of
Hurricane Florence caused significant jurisdictions’ ratings identified five capabilities in the recovery and
flooding in and around New Hanover County, protection mission areas in the lowest category of preparedness (a rating
North Carolina. County officials told us the
state’s National Guard high wheel clearance
of a 1-2 on a 5-point scale). For example, within the recovery mission
trucks had to be used to transport food, area, 51 percent of the ratings identified disaster housing in the lowest
water, fuel, and generators throughout the category of preparedness. Similarly, within the protection mission area,
flooded areas to isolated communities
because the county did not have the 46 percent of the assessment ratings identified cybersecurity in the lowest
capability to deliver these commodities. category. 36 Additionally, these capabilities have been consistently rated in
According to the North Carolina National
Guard, the high-water vehicles were also the lowest preparedness categories from 2013 through 2017 and have
used to evacuate citizens to shelters and shown little-to-no change. For example, under the recovery mission area,
transport essential civilian personnel such as
nurses, doctors, and first responders.
56 percent of the assessment ratings by states and territories identified
disaster housing in the lowest category in 2013, with minimal changes
Source: North Carolina National Guard. | GAO-20-297
36Cybersecurity is securing the cyber environment and infrastructure from unauthorized or
malicious access, use, or exploitation while protecting privacy, civil rights, and other civil
liberties. Critical tasks include implementing countermeasures, technologies, and policies
to protect physical and cyber assets, networks, applications, and systems.
Page 16 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
through 2017. 37 Some of the capabilities that had the lowest
preparedness ratings in 2013 were:
• Economic recovery. The ability to return economic and business
activities (including agricultural) to a state of health and develop new
economic opportunities that result in a sustainable and economically
viable community.
• Natural and cultural resources. The ability to preserve, conserve,
rehabilitate, and restore historic property consistent with post-disaster
community priorities and best practices and in compliance with
environmental and historic preservation laws and executive orders.
• Disaster housing. The ability to address pre- and post-disaster
housing issues and coordinate the delivery of federal resources and
activities to assist local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area
governments as they rehabilitate and reconstruct destroyed and
damaged housing.
• Supply chain integrity and security. The ability to secure and make
resilient key nodes, methods of transport between nodes, and
materials in transit between a supplier and consumer.
Table 1 shows the percentages of the lowest-rated capabilities from 2013
through 2017.
37The disaster housing core capability is intended to address pre- and post-disaster
housing issues and coordinate the delivery of federal resources and activities to assist
local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments as they rehabilitate and
reconstruct destroyed and damaged housing. Housing resources include, but are not
limited to, available funding for repairs or reconstruction; and available land for
development; contractors and trades capable of reconstructing homes; availability of
building materials; and the availability of housing for short or long-term rental.
Page 17 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Table 1: Percent of Preparedness Ratings by States and Territories That Identified
Select Capabilities as Having the Lowest Rating, from 2013 through 2017
Capabilities 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Economic recovery 55 49 47 50 43
Disaster housing 56 54 53 50 51
Natural and cultural 52 46 47 43 38
resources
Cybersecurity 54 55 54 49 46
Supply chain integrity 42 43 35 35 43
and security
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) documents I GAO-20-297
Note: States and territories preparedness ratings were based on the State Preparedness Report data
provided to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and reported in the annual DHS National
Preparedness Report. The analysis of how the states and territories preparedness ratings were
grouped into 3 categories (1 -2), (3), (4-5) where category (1-2) represented the lowest preparedness
scores.
Disaster housing While the National Preparedness System may help jurisdictions assess
Following Hurricane Florence, FEMA’s their preparedness using emergency preparedness capability
solution to housing disaster victims was to assessments, jurisdictional officials we spoke with told us that real-life
bring in hundreds of recreational vehicles
(e.g., travel trailers).That solution proved to
disasters sometimes show jurisdictions to be less prepared than their
be problematic, according to state officials. In capability assessments previously indicated. As a result, some states
Craven County, NC, hundreds of disaster have lowered their preparedness ratings in subsequent capability
victims remained in emergency shelters while
travel trailers remained unoccupied due to of assessments following a disaster. For example, after the 2017 and 2018
a series of coordination problems with the hurricanes, some states told us they lowered their preparedness rating in
contractors needed to deliver and prepare the
trailers for occupancy. their 2019 assessments for disaster housing because they realized the
capability gap was larger than they previously believed. Officials from the
North Carolina Division of Emergency Management said that in 2018,
they lowered their preparedness rating for housing because their housing
capacity was not able to meet the needs of disaster victims who needed
immediate housing assistance.
Source: Richard Stradling, The News & Observer I
GAO-20-297
Page 18 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
From Fiscal Years 2013 From fiscal years 2013 through 2018, jurisdictions received approximately
through 2018, $8.3 billion in preparedness grants funds primarily from the State
Homeland Security Program, Urban Area Security Initiative, and the
Jurisdictions Directed Emergency Management Performance Grant. 38 Of this amount,
Almost 90 Percent of jurisdictions directed about $7.3 billion—or about 87 percent of the
FEMA Preparedness funds—to capabilities in the crosscutting, prevention, and response
Grant Funding to the mission areas, which constitute the highest-rated mission areas. 39 For
Crosscutting, Prevention, example, in California, $1.9 million in Urban Area Security Initiative grants
were used to strengthen crosscutting and prevention capabilities by
and Response Mission providing situational awareness to first responders and emergency
Areas managers working on active threats to infrastructure. Additionally, in
Florida, up to $2.8 million of the State Homeland Security grant was used
to create a system intended to strengthen crosscutting and prevention
capabilities by enabling the state’s law enforcement agencies to more
easily share information. 40
Of the $8.3 billion in preparedness grant funding from fiscal years 2013
through 2018, about $1.1 billion—or about 13 percent—was directed to
capabilities in the mitigation, protection, and recovery mission areas,
which constitute the lowest-rated mission areas. During this time,
jurisdictions directed the least amount of preparedness grant funds on the
recovery mission area—$78 million, or about 1 percent (see fig. 3).
Jurisdictions also directed about 5 percent of the $1.1 billion to
capabilities within the mitigation mission area, though preparedness
38Other preparedness grants used by the jurisdictions include Operation Stonegarden and
the Nonprofit Security Grant Program.
39These values reflect grant awards in fiscal years 2013-2018, but jurisdictional spending
may not necessarily occur during the same time frame. Jurisdictions generally have a 3-
year period of performance, which means jurisdictions may spend grant funds from other
fiscal years during this time frame as well. The capabilities and mission areas associated
with grant awards are derived from the investment justifications submitted by jurisdictions
as part of their grant applications. According to FEMA, it is possible that the states and
territories could change funding allocations year to year.
40In 2016 and 2018, FEMA conducted grant effectiveness studies with California and
Florida to determine how states were using grant funds to increase their ability to respond
to, recover from, and mitigate the impacts of natural and man-made disasters and real-
world events. Specifically, FEMA examined how the states invested federal, state, and
local funds to address lessons learned from previous disasters, to close capability gaps,
and to determine whether these investments resulted in improved preparedness. FEMA
also reviewed the processes the states and local jurisdictions used to allocate and
prioritize FEMA grant investments. As illustrated by the case studies, grant expenditures
are largely being used to support capabilities in the crosscutting, prevention, and response
mission areas.
Page 19 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
ratings in the mitigation mission area generally showed improvements
each year. In 2017, 43 percent of the assessment ratings by states and
territories rated three of the four mitigation-related capabilities in the
highest category. Improvements in the mitigation mission area could be,
in part, attributable to FEMA providing jurisdictions with grant funds other
than preparedness grants, such as post-disaster grants, which include
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds. 41
Figure 3: Federal Emergency Management Agency Preparedness Grant Funds
Directed Towards Mission Areas, Fiscal Years 2013 through 2018
Further, state and local decisions on how to prioritize preparedness grant
awards resulted in about 1 percent—$78 million—being directed to
capabilities within the recovery mission area between 2013 and 2018. As
41FEMA’s Strategic Plan 2018–2022, Appendix A, identifies a performance measure for
implementing the National Mitigation Investment Strategy by quadrupling the investment in
mitigation. Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds and other recent investments intended
to strengthen the nation’s resilience, in part, could be having a positive impact on
jurisdictions’ mitigation-related capabilities. FEMA has also begun implementing the
Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities grant program, as authorized by the
DRRA, which is intended to strengthen mitigation efforts and could help strengthen state,
local, tribal, and territorial mitigation capabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 5133(i).
Page 20 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
shown in figure 4, jurisdictions directed approximately 79 percent of the
$78 million (about $62 million) in the recovery mission area to the
infrastructure systems capability, which is intended to, in part, allow
jurisdictions to re-establish critical infrastructure in disaster-impacted
areas to support life sustainment activities, ongoing emergency response
operations, and to help facilitate recovery efforts. 42 Additionally, about 3
percent of the $78 million—about $2.4 million—was directed to disaster
housing capabilities, such as implementing housing solutions that
effectively support the temporary housing needs of an impacted
jurisdiction.
Figure 4: Percent of Preparedness Grant Funds Jurisdictions Directed to the
Recovery Mission Area by Capability, Fiscal Years 2013-2018
State officials from New York and North Carolina, as well as officials from
five localities, said they often prioritize and use preparedness grants to
maintain existing capabilities within the crosscutting, prevention, and
42National Infrastructure Protection Plan defines the nation’s critical infrastructure as the
framework of interdependent networks and systems comprising identifiable industries,
institutions (including people and procedures), and distribution capabilities that provide a
reliable flow of products and services essential to the defense and economic security of
the United States.
Page 21 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
response capabilities, rather than enhancing capabilities where gaps are
known to exist, such as those in the recovery and protection areas. In
addition, state officials from Texas, as well as officials from two localities
told us that they need to use portions of their limited grant funds—
especially from Emergency Management Performance Grant funds—to
hire and retain local emergency management personnel, which leaves
fewer funds for them to devote to enhancing lower-rated emergency
management capabilities. For example, some county governments may
not have the resources necessary to fund a single emergency manager,
which requires them to use Emergency Management Performance Grant
funds to hire and retain necessary staff.
Another reason why jurisdictions do not use more of the grants toward
lower-rated mission areas is because some view certain capabilities in
the recovery and mitigation mission areas to be the responsibility of the
federal government. Both FEMA and state officials told us that sometimes
jurisdictions do not use these grants to strengthen capabilities such as
housing because they consider the federal government responsible for
filling the gaps. For example, preparedness data from 2013 to 2017
showed the percent of jurisdictions identifying the federal government as
responsible for providing housing solutions to disaster survivors increased
from 46 to 53 percent. According to state officials from North Carolina, it
would not be a prudent use of grant funds for the state to purchase and
store temporary housing units that may not be needed inside the borders
of the state for several years. Following a major disaster declaration,
FEMA coordinates with jurisdictions to provide disaster housing
assistance to people displaced from their homes. For example, following
Hurricane Florence, FEMA provided financial rental assistance and grants
under its Individuals and Households program to help make repairs to
damaged homes. 43 In addition, FEMA, in coordination with the state of
North Carolina, delivered travel trailers and manufactured housing units
43DHS, through FEMA, identified the framework of how federal housing assistance is to be
provided to jurisdictions that are impacted by disasters. Through Recovery Support
Functions, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)—and the
supporting federal agencies, such as FEMA—are to coordinate the delivery of housing
resources to jurisdictions impacted by disasters. In addition, HUD is to assist jurisdictions
in identifying permanent housing solutions and provide technical assistance to help
facilitate the timely construction of housing.
Page 22 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
(i.e., mobile homes) to displaced disaster victims through FEMA’s Direct
Temporary Housing Assistance program. 44
FEMA Has Encouraged FEMA has encouraged jurisdictions to make investments in core
Jurisdictions to Invest capabilities that have the largest preparedness gaps (i.e., the lowest
preparedness scores). From 2013 to 2018, DHS identified investment
More Grant Funds on the
priorities in its annual announcements of preparedness grant funding
Largest Capability Gaps, opportunities. The priorities focused on select capabilities where
and Has Proposed New jurisdictions had reported lower preparedness scores, such as
Grants to Address Such cybersecurity, disaster housing, economic recovery, natural and cultural
Gaps resources, and supply chain integrity and security. Specifically, FEMA
officials told us cybersecurity remains a high priority for all jurisdictions for
2020 and has identified areas from lessons learned where cybersecurity
could be strengthened. Jurisdictions are considering investments in
cybersecurity such as adding more information technology equipment and
hiring personnel with cybersecurity expertise. However, according to state
officials from New York and Texas, jurisdictions often lack the resources
necessary to hire and retain personnel skilled enough to prepare for,
respond to, and recover from cyberattacks.
Preparedness grants, in general, are designed to allow jurisdictions
discretion to spend the funds as they see fit on projects that meet
eligibility requirements. While FEMA encourages jurisdictions to invest
grant funds to address their capability gaps, it does not require or direct
jurisdictions to spend grant funding in a certain area. In light of these
challenges, FEMA has taken a number of other steps to try to address
these capability gaps.
• FEMA proposed creating a new National Priorities Security Grant in
the President’s 2019 and 2020 budget proposals, which could be
used to address new and emerging threats and gaps, such as those
in cybersecurity. FEMA proposed that the program’s priorities be
assessed frequently and shift as needed to address emerging threats
and capability gaps. In fiscal years 2019 and 2020, the President’s
budget proposed $522 and $430 million respectively. The proposed
grant program was not approved by Congress.
44FEMA’s travel trailers are generally an interim solution until repairs to homes can be
completed (in less than a year) while its manufactured housing units are a longer-term
solution for disaster victims whose repairs will take longer to complete due to greater
degree of damage.
Page 23 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
• In 2019, FEMA established the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness
Grant Program to help jurisdictions address known capability gaps in
disaster housing as well as logistics and supply chain management. In
fiscal year 2019, FEMA awarded $10 million in these grants to eight
local governments. 45
• In 2019, FEMA began implementing the Building Resilient
Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) program to provide
jurisdictions with funding to make their infrastructure more resilient in
future disasters. 46 According to FEMA, grant recipients could use
future funding to strengthen capability gaps in the recovery and
mitigation mission areas. FEMA plans to issue a Notice of Funding
Opportunity in the summer of 2020, followed by an application period.
Based on historical disaster expenditures, FEMA anticipates BRIC will
be funded between $300 million and $500 million per year on
average. It is too early to assess the extent to which this program will
help address capability gaps.
While FEMA is taking steps to encourage jurisdictions to enhance their
lower-rated capabilities, FEMA officials told us their efforts combined with
existing preparedness grants, will likely not be sufficient to fully address
jurisdictions’ capability gaps. Specifically, FEMA officials told us that the
current suite of preparedness grants lacks the flexibility needed to
address some of the long-standing capability gaps, in part, because the
grants are required to be spent on capabilities that have a nexus to
terrorism. In addition, as described earlier, one state official, and two local
officials, suggested that the level of funding for the Emergency
Management Performance Grant will likely not allow states and localities
to hire and retain local emergency management personnel while also
making the investments needed to address the capability gaps identified
through the National Preparedness System. For example, one emergency
management official from a county explained that without using the
Emergency Management Performance Grant to offset his own salary, the
county would not have an emergency management department with the
45The eight local governments awarded grants in fiscal year 2019 were: (1) San
Francisco, California; (2) District of Columbia; (3) Jacksonville, Florida; (4) Baltimore,
Maryland; (5) Boston, Massachusetts; (6) El Paso, Texas; (7) Houston, Texas; and (8)
Snohomish County, Washington.
46DRRA established the National Public Infrastructure Pre-Disaster Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program. 42 U.S.C. § 5133(i).This program, which FEMA named the Building
Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC), will be funded through the Disaster
Relief Fund as a 6 percent set-aside from estimated disaster assistance grant
expenditures.
Page 24 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
capability to complete many of the FEMA requirements associated with
receiving disaster assistance.
In addition to the steps FEMA has already taken to attempt to address the
capability gaps, FEMA has developed a new methodology for assessing
national preparedness capabilities that uses more quantitative methods.
According to FEMA, such methods could enable jurisdictions to more
tangibly define what resources are needed to fill identified gaps. We
describe this methodology in more detail below.
FEMA Is Taking Steps
to Strengthen
Assessments of
Federal and
Jurisdiction
Capabilities, but
Opportunities Exist to
Further Enhance
National
Preparedness
FEMA Is Implementing a FEMA has taken steps to enhance its methodology for assessing
New Methodology to jurisdictions’ emergency management capabilities by requiring
jurisdictions to collect more quantitative preparedness data to support
Strengthen How
their capability ratings. We reported in March 2011 that FEMA needed to
Jurisdictions Assess improve its oversight of preparedness grants by establishing a framework
Preparedness with measurable performance objectives for assessing urban area, state,
territory, and tribal capabilities to identify gaps and prioritize
investments. 47 Specifically, we recommended that FEMA complete a
national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level of
government based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to
enable prioritization of grant funding.
We also reported in March 2013 that FEMA has made some progress in
assessing its preparedness capabilities, but continued to face challenges
47See GAO-11-318SP.
Page 25 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
developing a national preparedness system that could assist FEMA in
prioritizing preparedness grant funding. 48 FEMA’s issuance of the 2020
National Preparedness Report could provide an assessment of capability
gaps at each level of government—including an assessment of the
federal government’s capabilities for the first time—and help FEMA
address the intent of the 2011 recommendation. However, as discussed
before, prioritizing jurisdictions’ preparedness grant funding alone may
not effectively address the nation’s emergency management capability
gaps. An assessment that also considers the federal government’s
emergency management capabilities could help determine what
capabilities federal agencies could provide to assist in the wake of
disasters when jurisdictions’ capabilities become overwhelmed or are not
otherwise available. Once the assessment is completed, FEMA and its
federal budgeting stakeholders (i.e., Congress and the Office of
Management and Budget) could use such an assessment to identify the
potential costs of establishing and maintaining capabilities, not only at the
jurisdictional level, but also at the federal level.
FEMA has continued to take steps to implement the 2011
recommendation, but has not yet fully addressed it as of January 2020.
For example, FEMA published new guidance in May 2018 to update the
methodology for how jurisdictions are to evaluate their preparedness
levels when completing THIRAs and SPRs. The intent was to allow
communities to collect more specific, quantitative data to compare their
capability targets to current capabilities, thereby more accurately defining
their capability gaps. 49 Beginning in 2018, jurisdictions used the new
methodology to assess their capabilities in the crosscutting, response,
and recovery mission areas. Beginning in 2019, jurisdictions were
required to use the new methodology to assess the capabilities across all
five mission areas: prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and
recovery.
48GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress in Improving Grant
Management and Assessing Capabilities, but Challenges Remain, GAO-13-456T
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 19, 2013).
49GAO recommended that FEMA complete a national preparedness assessment of
capability gaps at each level of government based on tiered, capability-specific
performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funds. See also GAO-12-526T. In
addition, the DRRA required FEMA to submit to congressional committees updates on its
progress to complete a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level
based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant
funding. Pub. L. No. 115-254, div. D, § 1242, 132 Stat. 3438, 3467.
Page 26 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
According to FEMA, this new methodology improves on the prior one
because the new methodology will allow jurisdictions to more accurately
determine what amount of resources are needed to address specific
threats and hazards. Specifically, as a result of using more quantitative
data, such as the specific number of disaster victims able to be sheltered
following a disaster, jurisdictions may be able to better define their
capability gaps when compiling their SPRs. For example, if jurisdictions
are able to understand that their current capability is less than their
needed capability target, they will be able to define their capability gaps in
quantitative terms. According to FEMA officials, the new methodology, if
implemented successfully, will allow jurisdictions to know what additional
resources and capabilities—beyond their own current capabilities—may
be needed during future disasters. Table 2 shows an example of how
FEMA’s updated methodology provides a more quantitative assessment
to more accurately define their capabilities.
Page 27 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Table 2: Example of Sheltering Capability Using Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s Updated Methodology to Quantitatively Define Capability Gaps
Capability target – Estimated current capability = Capability gap
Within 48 hours of an Within 48 hours of an event, Within 48 hours of an
event, provide emergency provide emergency event, provide emergency
sheltering for 20,000 sheltering for 17,000 sheltering for 3,000
residents, including 4,000 residents including 3,000 residents including 1,000
with special needs for 14 with special needs for 14 with special needs for 14
days. days. days.
Source: GAO Analysis of Department of Homeland Security, Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment and Stakeholder
Preparedness Review Guide: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 201, 3rd Edition, May 2018. I GAO-20-297
FEMA Is Using Its New In 2019, FEMA began working on its first National Threat and Hazard
Methodology to Assess Identification and Risk Assessment (National THIRA) to identify what
federal government capabilities will be needed to address the greatest
the Federal Government’s
threats to the nation. According to FEMA, the results of this effort are
Emergency Management expected to be included in FEMA’s annual National Preparedness Report
Capacity and Better in 2020, which is expected to be published late in calendar year 2020.
Define the Nation’s FEMA’s effort is intended to provide a quantitative assessment of federal
Capability Gaps capabilities, which when combined with state, territory, urban area, and
tribal THIRAs and SPRs, could provide a more meaningful assessment of
the nation’s overall preparedness. Figure 5 below shows how national
and jurisdiction risk assessments are intended to work together to provide
a collective picture of overall capability gaps. As subsequent iterations of
the National THIRA and National SPR are produced, FEMA intends to
consolidate them with the THIRA and SPR assessments submitted by
jurisdictions to provide a comprehensive overview of national
preparedness.
Page 28 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Figure 5: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Use of National and
Jurisdictional-level Capability Assessments to Collectively Identify the Nation’s
Emergency Management Capability Gaps
FEMA officials told us that they have begun to assess and measure the
federal government’s capabilities in the crosscutting, response, and
recovery mission areas. In conducting the 2019 National THIRA—that
FEMA officials told us will be included in the 2020 National Preparedness
Report—FEMA coordinated with over a dozen federal departments and
agencies, as well as selected national laboratories and the White House
to solicit feedback on the most challenging threats and hazards facing the
nation. The 2019 National THIRA consists of nine catastrophic incident
scenarios and 22 capability targets across the crosscutting, response,
and recovery mission areas. For example, FEMA used catastrophic
scenarios, such as a pandemic (see sidebar) or New Madrid Earthquake,
to assess the nation’s emergency management capacity. 50
Examples of the 22 capability targets FEMA developed in collaboration
with other federal partners include:
• how quickly water service can be restored to customers;
50FEMA removed context descriptions for two of its nine threat scenarios from the
National THIRA because they were deemed too sensitive for inclusion in a public
document. For more information on each threat, see FEMA’s 2019 National Threat and
hazard Identification and Risk Assessment: Overview and Methodology.
Page 29 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Pandemic Scenario • how quickly power service can be restored to customers;
In early October, the Centers for Disease • how quickly life-sustaining commodities can be delivered to people;
Control and Prevention (CDC) reports a new
strain of influenza virus in the National Capital • how quickly emergency sheltering, food, and water can be provided to
Region. Less than 2 weeks after the first
confirmed case is identified at a local people; and,
hospital, the illness causes hundreds of
fatalities and thousands of people seeking • how quickly affected healthcare facilities can restore function. 51
medical attention. As the virus spreads,
approximately 30 percent of the population
across the United States and other countries In the aftermath of the sequential 2017 disasters, FEMA’s 2017 Hurricane
becomes severely ill. Conventional flu Season FEMA After-Action Report recognized the need to more
vaccines are ineffective against the current
strain, and the CDC estimates that a new
effectively scale response efforts for concurrent, complex incidents. 52 As
vaccine could be months away from mass a result, in addition to the nine catastrophic scenarios, the National
production. Because of the pandemic, social THIRA considered the challenges associated with managing concurrent
distancing is in widespread effect. Utilities,
police, fire, government, and other essential incidents. To examine the potential impacts of managing concurrent
services are disrupted due to social incidents, FEMA developed a set of “plausible concurrent operations.”
distancing and employee absenteeism.
Businesses close, resulting in a large-scale FEMA acknowledged that the agency and its federal partners “will almost
loss of services across the region (e.g. certainly be engaged in ongoing disaster operations at the time of any
banking, food stores, gas stations). There is a
shortage of medical supplies, equipment,
catastrophic-level incident” and gathered data from historical incidents
beds, and healthcare workers as hospitals from recent years, including the sequential disasters that took place in
are quickly overwhelmed, with up to millions 2017; three large hurricanes and wildfires in California, among others.
of individuals seeking outpatient medical care
and millions more requiring hospitalization. FEMA found that combining the impacts of a National THIRA scenario
Civil disorder contributes to the high rate of with the set of plausible concurrent operations more accurately reflects
absenteeism and the overcrowding of
hospitals and medical centers.
the challenges the nation would need to address should one of the threat
Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 2019 scenarios identified in the National THIRA occur. However, given that
National Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment: Overview and Methodology. I GAO-20-297
FEMA has yet to finalize inclusion of the National THIRA into the 2020
National Preparedness Report, it is too early to determine the extent to
which it helps FEMA more accurately define the nation’s emergency
management capability gaps and results in the nation being better
prepared for future catastrophic disasters.
FEMA Has Yet to As discussed above, the National Preparedness System has identified
Determine What Steps gaps in jurisdictions’ emergency management capabilities since 2012.
While jurisdictions have used preparedness grants to strengthen select
Need to be Taken to
capabilities, preparedness data shows that they have not used the grants
Address Capability Gaps to address capability gaps across all the mission areas. Furthermore,
at the Federal and while FEMA has encouraged jurisdictions to use grant funding to address
Jurisdictional Levels capabilities that have the largest capability gaps, such as those in the
51FEMA acknowledged that there are some limitations in its approach to measuring
national preparedness through the creation of the National THIRA. For example, the
modeling for the scenarios does not include cascading or future incidents, such as
aftershocks following an earthquake.
52FEMA, 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report.
Page 30 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
recovery and cybersecurity areas, they do not require that jurisdictions do
this. However, if FEMA were to require jurisdictions to use their grant
funds to address lower-rated capabilities, it could affect jurisdictions’
ability to sustain other core capabilities—or to fund emergency
management personnel in select jurisdictions, some of which only have
one full-time employee. As FEMA implements its new methodology and
begins to more fully assess both federal and jurisdictional capabilities, the
agency is expected to have better and more quantitative information on
capability gaps in order to better prioritize grant funds and resources.
According to FEMA, the agency and its partners will better understand the
extent of the nation’s emergency management capability gaps when they
issue the National Preparedness Report by December 2020.
While these actions may allow FEMA to address our 2011
recommendation and better measure the nation’s overall preparedness,
the agency has yet to determine what additional actions may be needed
to close the remaining gaps once the 2020 National Preparedness Report
is issued. Further, while FEMA has taken some steps to close the gaps
jurisdictions have identified since 2012, such as proposing the National
Priorities Security Grant, this program has not been approved by
Congress, and thus, will not help to address the gaps. According to FEMA
officials, preparedness grants alone are unlikely to address the gaps in an
effective manner. In addition, the National Preparedness Goal states that
analyzing current performance against intended capabilities allows the
emergency management community the opportunity to determine
necessary resource levels, inform resource allocation, and help guide
federal investments in preparedness. 53 Such information could help
inform budget decisions across the preparedness enterprise and help
prioritize limited resources. For example, determining what steps need to
be taken, following the issuance of the 2020 National Preparedness
Report, could help FEMA inform key decision makers, such as Congress
and the Office of Management and Budget, about the necessary level of
resources—including the allocation of resources—that are needed to
address the nation’s capability gaps. Such an effort could be a significant
step toward enhancing the capability gaps that have been identified since
2012 and help determine the nation’s overall preparedness levels, as
called for in the Post-Katrina Act.
53Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition,
September 2015.
Page 31 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
FEMA Has Identified
Some Areas for
Improvement
Following Disasters,
but Could Strengthen
After-Action Reviews
and Follow-Up
FEMA Has Policies and The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to analyze real-world events to
Processes for Using After- identify and disseminate lessons learned and best practices, and to
generate and disseminate, as appropriate, after-action reports to
Action Reviews to Identify participants after real-world events. 54 After major disasters occur, FEMA’s
Areas for Improvement policy is to conduct an after-action review that identifies strengths, areas
following a Major Disaster for improvement, and potential best practices identified during response
and recovery efforts. Lessons learned from past disasters are to provide
collective knowledge and diverse experiences for improving disaster
response and recovery. Further, FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan calls
for sharing lessons learned from disasters and exercises with the whole
community to help prioritize investments and anticipate known challenges
during future disasters.
In July 2018, FEMA published its 2017 Hurricane Season After-Action
Report, which discussed findings and recommendations based on a
review of the agency’s preparation for, immediate response to, and initial
recovery operations for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. 55 According
to FEMA, the agency is implementing recommendations to address the
challenges outlined in the after-action report, which include the following
focus areas:
• scaling and staffing for concurrent complex incidents;
• improving logistics capabilities during response;
• improving response to long-term infrastructure outages; and,
546 U.S.C. § 750.
55FEMA, 2017 Hurricane Season FEMA After-Action Report.
Page 32 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
• improving mass care to initial disaster housing operations based on
innovations developed during the 2017 hurricane season.
According to FEMA, the agency has taken a number of actions in
response to this after-action report. For example, it increased its incident
management workforce strength by 19 percent since Hurricane Harvey
and updated hurricane plans, annexes, and procedures for the
continental United States and for states and territories outside the
continental United States, among other things.
FEMA’s Continuous Improvement Program is responsible for collecting
observations and conducting after-action reviews after disasters. The
program is intended to consolidate feedback and information from
regional, headquarters, and field operations staff and provide information
to FEMA leadership and program offices to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the agency’s disaster operations. The regional role in the
Continuous Improvement Program is to identify lessons learned and best
practices from disaster events in their regions, conduct after-action
reviews, and track corrective actions and improvement plans applicable to
the region through Continuous Improvement Working Groups. FEMA
officials told us that after-action report findings that cannot be resolved at
the regional level are elevated to headquarters for resolution. According
to FEMA officials, FEMA headquarters reviews completed after-action
reports to identify any areas for improvement that may need to be
addressed through changes in policies and procedures.
FEMA Conducts After- Although FEMA’s policy requires after-action reviews be conducted after
Action Reviews for Select every presidentially-declared major disaster, we found that the agency
does not consistently conduct after-action reviews after all major disasters
Disasters, but Has Not
and has not instituted time frames for following up on incomplete after-
Developed Guidance to action reviews. As of January 2020 FEMA had completed after-action
Assist Regional Officials in reviews for 29 percent of disasters since January 2017, with 43 percent
Prioritizing Which pending or in the process of being completed, and 27 percent having
Disasters Should Result in been deferred (i.e., not completed or status unknown), as shown in figure
6. Our review of relevant policy indicates that FEMA does not specify time
an After-Action Review frames for when after-action reviews are to be completed. This is
consistent with what we heard from FEMA officials who explained they do
not have any time frames for when a certain region is to complete after-
action reviews.
Page 33 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Figure 6: Status of Federal Emergency Management Agency After-Action Reviews
for Disasters Occurring from January 1, 2017 through January 8, 2020
Note: “Deferred” means that FEMA did not complete an after-action review for the disaster or does
not know the status of the after-action review. Percentages do not add up to 100 due to rounding.
FEMA has recently updated its Continuous Improvement Program. For
example, in 2019, FEMA updated the Continuous Improvement Directive
to formalize an annual Summary of Findings that consolidates the field,
regional, and headquarters’ observations from the year’s incidents in
order to identify the strengths, best practices, and lessons learned that
should be addressed the following year. 56 However, FEMA officials noted
that this had only been done once in 2019, and would be completed in
future years.
Officials from FEMA’s Continuous Improvement Program in one region
cited challenges with capacity, staffing, and the number of on-going after-
action reviews as reasons for not being able to complete all of their after-
action reports. According to FEMA officials, in 2017 each region was
assigned one to two continuous improvement advisors who are
responsible for developing the region’s after-action reviews. However,
56FEMA Directive #107-1, Continuous Improvement Program. The directive applies to all
FEMA offices, which includes FEMA headquarters components, regions, and field
establishments, such as Joint Field Offices. This directive supersedes FD-107-1, Lessons
Learned/Continuous Improvement Program, dated February 8, 2013, and other existing
FEMA processes and standard operating procedures pertaining to the agency’s internal
management of lessons learned and corrective actions.
Page 34 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
FEMA officials in one region said that in 2019, they faced challenges in
having the staff resources necessary to operate the Continuous
Improvement Program due to competing priorities, such as responding to
active disasters. In addition, FEMA officials stated that due to limited staff,
the regions have to prioritize which after-action reviews they can
complete based on the severity and impact of the disaster. For example,
in 2017, FEMA focused resources on reviewing the agency’s response
and recovery for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. According to FEMA
regional and headquarters officials, competing priorities, such as
responding to active disasters, often result in staff being unavailable to
conduct after-action reviews.
While we acknowledge staffing is limited and that FEMA may need to
prioritize completing some after-action reviews over others, FEMA
officials have not established a process or framework by which regional
offices are to prioritize after-action reviews. Based on our analysis of the
after-action reviews since 2017 and discussions with FEMA headquarters
and regional staff, we found that FEMA does not have a formal process to
prioritize after-action reviews and has not established general time frames
for how long following a disaster an after-action review should be
completed, or followed-up on. FEMA officials agreed that having a formal
process to prioritize after-action reviews, including establishing time
frames for following up on incomplete after-action reviews, could provide
the agency additional opportunities to improve response and recovery
operations for future disasters. According to FEMA Regional officials,
timely after-action reviews are useful. For example, as a result of the
2017 Hurricanes Season After-Action Report, Region II was able to
update response plans for Puerto Rico, which could prove to be beneficial
for future disasters.
According to The Standards for Program Management, agencies should
collect, measure, and disseminate performance information, analyze
program trends, and point to areas in need of adjustment. 57 In addition,
leading practices for program management indicate that project
schedules should be developed to define project milestones and identify
and sequence activities in order to determine start and end dates for each
activity. 58 Additionally, in other branches of FEMA, the agency provides
time frames for completing after-action reports. For example, states and
57Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management ®.
58GAO, Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, GAO-16-89G
(Washington, D.C.: December, 2015)
Page 35 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
territories are expected to submit after-action reports within 90 days of
exercises that are funded by the Homeland Security Grant Program. .
Similarly, FEMA policy requires Urban Search and Rescue teams to
submit after-action reports 30 days after returning from deployment.
Developing a process by which regional offices are to prioritize after-
action reviews could help FEMA ensure that regions have a common
framework to work from when determining what disasters should be
prioritized for review and could help FEMA prioritize staff resources more
effectively across the Continuous Improvement Program. Furthermore,
establishing time frames for following up on incomplete after-action
reviews could provide FEMA with greater assurance that the reviews will
be conducted in a timely fashion, so that other FEMA Regions and key
stakeholders can benefit from the lessons learned.
FEMA Headquarters As described earlier, FEMA regional offices Continuous Improvement
Lacks a Formal Working Groups are responsible for developing and tracking, to the extent
possible, corrective actions and best practices identified through after-
Mechanism to Document
action reviews. These working groups are to elevate to FEMA
and Track Best Practices, headquarters any issues that cannot be resolved at the regional-level.
Lessons Learned, and However, FEMA does not have a formal mechanism at the headquarters
Corrective Actions level for documenting and tracking best practices, lessons learned, and
Identified through After- corrective actions that have been elevated from the regional working
groups. According to FEMA, it has taken steps to track best practices and
Action Reviews lessons learned through a serious of Microsoft Excel files, but it is not a
long term or ideal operating solution due to its lack of accessibility, ease
of use, and ability to be queried.
In February 2016, we recommended that FEMA implement a process to
document, track, and analyze recommendations and implement lessons
learned after disaster deployments. 59 FEMA concurred with this
recommendation and implemented the recommendation by using the
Department of Defense’s Joint Lessons Learned Information System as
its primary system to capture and manage lessons learned data.
However, according to FEMA officials, as of July 2019, it no longer uses
the system to capture lessons learned data. FEMA officials also said the
Joint Lessons Learned Information System was not user-friendly.
FEMA officials stated that they hold a quarterly meeting, as required by
FEMA Directive 107-1, with FEMA’s Associate Administrators to review
national priorities and issues that have been elevated to headquarters for
59GAO-16-87.
Page 36 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
resolution. According to FEMA officials, this group performs the function
that a Continuous Improvement Working Group does at the regional level
by monitoring issues that need adjudication by senior management
officials. While the quarterly meeting may be helpful, it does not serve as
a mechanism, such as a data system, for documenting and tracking best
practices, lessons learned, and corrective actions identified after a major
disaster.
Additionally, continuous improvement coordinators from the regions we
interviewed stated that once a finding is elevated to FEMA’s
headquarters, in general the region does not have visibility into what
steps, if any, FEMA headquarters is taking or plans to take to address the
issue. Having a mechanism, such as a database, to record after-action
report findings, such as corrective actions or best practices, could help
FEMA facilitate awareness across the agency about the status of FEMA’s
efforts to address them.
According to the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA should conduct remedial action
tracking and long-term trend analysis. 60 Furthermore, the National
Response Framework specifies that evaluation and continual process
improvement are cornerstones of effective preparedness. 61 The
framework notes that effective practices with continuity planning ensures
the capabilities contained in the framework can continue to be executed
regardless of the threat or hazard. Without a mechanism to document and
track best practices, lessons learned, and corrective actions identified
through after-action reviews across the regions and headquarters, FEMA
may not be able to provide assurance that it is effectively leveraging best
practices and lessons learned or taking corrective actions to improve its
response and recovery programs.
FEMA Lacks Guidance on As described earlier, the Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to generate and
Sharing After-Action disseminate, as appropriate, after-action reports to participants in
exercises and real-world events. In addition, FEMA’s stated policy on
Report Findings with
knowledge sharing after disasters is to collaborate with public and private
External Stakeholders sector partners to share insights on critical issues facing emergency
Following a Disaster management, promote best practices, and discuss ways in which FEMA
itself can improve. However, based on a query of FEMA’s website for
after-action reports on disasters, since January 1, 2017, FEMA has
606 U.S.C. § 750.
61Issued by DHS in June 2016, the third edition of the National Response Framework is a
guide to how the Nation responds to all types of disasters and emergencies.
Page 37 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
placed on-line one after-action report on the 2017 hurricane season. In
addition, state officials from Florida, as well as officials from ten localities
told us that there has been no communication from FEMA specifically in
regards to its 2017 Hurricane Season After-Action Report to ask
jurisdictions to provide feedback on the final product or its findings.
In addition to FEMA not communicating with jurisdictions about its final
product or its findings, state and local officials we spoke with said that
FEMA does not consistently share after-action reports with affected
jurisdictions. For example, officials from the state of Florida and four
localities told us that FEMA does not consistently share its reports after
each disaster, while officials from the state of California stated that FEMA
has regularly shared after-action reports from disasters. One FEMA
regional official noted that it would be helpful to know who, when, and to
what extent lessons learned should be shared with external partners.
Further, according to FEMA, knowledge sharing allows communities
impacted by disasters to prioritize investments and anticipate known
challenges during disasters. According to The Standards for Program
Management, agencies should collect, measure, and disseminate
performance information and analyze program trends, and point to areas
in need of adjustment.
FEMA has guidance for sharing after-action reports internally within the
agency, but according to FEMA officials has not developed guidance for
when after-action reports, or findings from after-action reports, should be
shared with external stakeholders. According to some state and local
officials we spoke with, having access to disaster after-action reports
could be useful to FEMA’s external stakeholders. For example, because
FEMA’s 2017 Hurricanes Season After-Action Report was accessible,
New York City officials said they were able to be proactive in areas that
needed to be strengthened in the event of delayed federal assistance,
such as providing disaster housing services.
Lessons learned can be produced through after-action reports and are
relevant to key stakeholders, such as state and local governments, which
are instrumental in disaster preparedness, response, and recovery, and
would play a key role in any future disasters. 62 However, without guidance
to help officials determine when it is appropriate to share after-action
62A “lesson learned” is a resolved issue or best practice that improves operations or
activities and results in an internalized change to capability, process, or procedure. See
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instructions 3150.25G, Joint Lessons Learned
Program (Jan. 31, 2018).
Page 38 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
reports, FEMA may miss opportunities to share lessons learned. Further,
FEMA’s Strategic Plan states that building a culture of preparedness
requires continued learning, improvement, innovative ideas, and
engagement of the whole community. As such, all sectors of society,
including governments, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector,
will need to be involved in preparedness for future disasters. The plan
further states that insights can be gained through observations from after-
action reports and through feedback from stakeholders. A FEMA official
from one of the region’s Continuous Improvement Program agreed that
developing guidance to determine when it is appropriate to share after-
action reports, could help stakeholders better prepare for future disasters.
By developing guidance for sharing after-action reports or their relevant
findings—when appropriate—with key external stakeholders, FEMA could
help communities better prepare for future disasters through knowledge
sharing.
FEMA has taken numerous steps to continue to strengthen national
Conclusions preparedness, such as distributing grant funds. However, FEMA has not
fully defined the capability gaps and determined what steps are needed to
enhance capabilities across all levels of government. Informing key
stakeholders, such as the Office of Management and Budget and
Congress, about what resources will be necessary to address the gaps—
across all levels of government—will be critical in addressing the nation’s
emergency management capability gaps.
In addition, opportunities exist to enhance FEMA’s after-action review
process. More specifically, until FEMA prioritizes when—and for what
disasters—after-action reviews should be completed and establishes time
frames for following up on incomplete after-action reports, the agency will
not be able to guarantee that FEMA and its stakeholders can leverage
lessons learned from recent disasters and apply corrective actions before
future disasters occur. Further, without a mechanism to document and
track best practices, lessons learned, and corrective actions throughout
the agency, FEMA may not be able to effectively leverage best practices
and lessons learned or implement corrective actions to improve its
response and recovery operations. By addressing areas needing
improvement (i.e., corrective actions) once after-action reviews are
completed, FEMA could improve response and recovery operations in the
wake of future disasters. In addition, FEMA could help communities better
prepare for future disasters by developing guidance to share its after-
action reports or findings from its after-action reports—when
appropriate—with key stakeholders, allowing them to provide feedback on
Page 39 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
the findings or adjust their own operational plans to be better prepared to
work with FEMA during future disasters.
We are making the following four recommendations to the FEMA
Recommendations for Administrator:
Executive Action
Following the completion of the 2021 National Preparedness Report,
determine what steps are needed to address the nation’s emergency
management capability gaps across all levels of government and inform
key stakeholders, such as the Office of Management and Budget and
Congress, about what level of resources will be necessary to address the
known gaps. 63 (Recommendation 1)
Develop guidance to help determine which after-action reviews should be
prioritized based on factors, such as the severity of disasters and
availability of staff and resources to conduct the review, and implement
time frames for following up on incomplete after-action reports.
(Recommendation 2)
Develop a mechanism to consistently track best practices, lessons
learned, and corrective actions that have been elevated to headquarters
for resolution. (Recommendation 3)
Develop guidance on sharing after-action reports and their relevant
findings with external stakeholders, when appropriate. (Recommendation
4)
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security
Agency Comments (DHS) for their review and comment. DHS provided written comments,
and Our Evaluation which are reproduced in appendix I. In its comments, DHS concurred with
the four recommendations and described actions under way or planned to
address them by March 31, 2022. DHS provided technical comments,
which we incorporated as appropriate.
DHS concurred with our first recommendation to determine what steps
are needed to address the nation's emergency management capability
63In the Department of Homeland Security response to this report, FEMA stated that it
does not believe that the cost of national resource gaps can be estimated without first
accounting for existing federal capabilities, which will be incorporated into the 2021
National Preparedness Report. The collection of necessary information was scheduled to
begin in 2020, but was delayed due to the response operations for the COVID-19
pandemic. As such, the recommendation has been updated to reflect the updated
timeframe following the publication of the 2021 National Preparedness Report.
Page 40 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
gaps across all levels of government and inform key stakeholders about
what level of resources will be necessary to address the known gaps.
According to DHS, this recommendation is consistent with the
requirements outlined in the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018
(DRRA) noting that FEMA complete a national preparedness assessment
of capability gaps at each level based on tiered, capability-specific
performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding; and
identify the potential costs for establishing and maintaining those
capabilities at each level and determine what capabilities federal
agencies should provide.
DHS also stated that while the 2020 National Preparedness Report will
include a nation-wide assessment of community capability against
national capability targets to help understand gaps and inform grant
investments, it will not include data on federal capabilities. The collection
of that information, through the National Stakeholder Preparedness
Report, was scheduled to begin in 2020 but was delayed due to response
operations for the COVID-19 pandemic. According to DHS, this
information will be incorporated into the 2021 National Preparedness
Report, helping to form a more complete picture of national capabilities.
FEMA stated that the costs to address the nation’s resource gaps cannot
be estimated without first accounting for existing federal capabilities.
According to DHS, the anticipated date for the 2020 National
Preparedness Report, pending response operations to the COVID-19
pandemic, is October 30, 2020, and the 2021 National Preparedness
Report is planned to be released in October 2021. DHS stated that once
the 2021 National Preparedness Report is released, FEMA will develop
and socialize a plan to work with the federal interagency to identify
resources needed to address the national gaps identified in the 2021
National Preparedness Report.
If implemented effectively, these actions combined with the steps taken to
inform key stakeholders could meet the intent of our recommendation.
Due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to finalize
the 2021 National Preparedness Report prior to being able to account for
the federal government’s existing capabilities, we are adjusting the
wording of this recommendation to follow the issuance of the 2021
National Preparedness Report. DHS estimates the expected completion
date to be March 2022.
DHS concurred with our second recommendation to develop guidance to
help determine which after-action reviews should be prioritized and
implement timeframes for following up on incomplete after-action reports.
Page 41 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
According to DHS, FEMA will address the prioritization of disaster after-
action reports as the Continuous Improvement Program’s first priority for
2020. Additionally, FEMA plans to identify and develop timeframes for
following up on after-action reports as part of a broader program
evaluation effort in 2020. These actions, if implemented effectively, could
meet the intent of our recommendation. While FEMA originally anticipated
completing this guidance during 2020, the COVID-19 response extended
this timeline. DHS estimates the expected completion date to be March
31, 2021.
DHS concurred with our third recommendation to develop a formal
mechanism to consistently track best practices, lessons learned, and
corrective actions. DHS stated that FEMA, in December 2019,
implemented an issue elevation and resolution system for tracking best
practices, lessons learned, and corrective actions that are elevated to
FEMA headquarters level for resolution, as appropriate. However,
according to FEMA in April 2020, the agency has taken steps to track
best practices and lessons learned through a serious of Microsoft Excel
files, but this is not considered to be a long term or ideal operating
solution due to its lack of accessibility, ease of use, and ability to be
queried. Further, in April 2020, FEMA stated that it is working to identify
resources to build an actual application that will be used for this purpose.
These actions, if implemented effectively, could meet the intent of our
recommendation.
DHS concurred with our fourth recommendation that FEMA develop
guidance on sharing after-action reports and their relevant findings with
external stakeholders, when appropriate. According to DHS, FEMA is
drafting program guidance for the Continuous Improvement Program to
address the sharing of after action reports and their relevant findings with
external stakeholders. These actions, if implemented effectively, could
meet the intent of the recommendation. Due to the ongoing COIVD-19
pandemic, FEMA estimates its completion date to be March 31, 2021.
Page 42 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the FEMA Administrator, and the appropriate congressional
committees. If you or your staff have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix II. In addition, the report will be available at no charge
on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
Chris P. Currie
Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Page 43 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
List of Requesters
The Honorable Michael B. Enzi
Chairman
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
The Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Rand Paul, M.D.
Chairman
Subcommittee on Federal Spending, Oversight and Emergency
Management
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Marco Rubio
Chairman
Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship
United States Senate
The Honorable Maxine Waters
Chairwoman
Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Nydia Velázquez
Chairwoman
Committee on Small Business
House of Representatives
Page 44 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
The Honorable Peter DeFazio
Chairman
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
The Honorable Carolyn Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable Jim Jordan
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives
The Honorable Al Green
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Emanuel Cleaver II
House of Representatives
The Honorable Michael McCaul
House of Representatives
The Honorable Gary Palmer
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ann Wagner
House of Representatives
Page 45 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Appendix I: Comments from the Department
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of
Homeland Security
of Homeland Security
Page 46 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of
Homeland Security
Page 47 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of
Homeland Security
Page 48 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of
Homeland Security
Page 49 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Chris P. Currie, (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov
GAO Contact
In addition to the contact named above, Aditi Archer (Assistant Director),
Staff Robert Denton Herring (Analyst-in-Charge), Erin Guinn-Villareal, James
Acknowledgments Lawson, Ben Ayres, Eric Hauswirth, Tracey King, Amanda Miller, Kevin
Reeves, and Minette Richardson made significant contributions to this
report.
(102889) Page 50 GAO-20-297 National Preparedness
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