Actions Needed to Address Deployment and Staff Development Challenges (GAO-20-360)
Summary
A GAO report to congressional requesters, GAO-20-360, dated May 2020, on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) disaster workforce. It describes how FEMA qualifies and deploys staff through its Qualification System and an automated deployment process. GAO notes that FEMA deployed 14,684 and 10,328 personnel at the peak of the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons and reported staffing shortages. Drawing on focus groups with over 100 incident staff members and interviews with field and regional officials, it finds that FEMA's qualification and deployment processes did not provide reliable and complete staffing information to field officials.
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United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Requesters
FEMA DISASTER
May 2020
WORKFORCE
Actions Needed to
Address Deployment
and Staff
Development
Challenges
GAO-20-360
May 2020
FEMA DISASTER WORKFORCE
Actions Needed to Address Deployment and Staff
Development Challenges
Highlights of GAO-20-360, a report to
congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found
During the 2017 and 2018 disaster The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has established
seasons, several large-scale disasters mechanisms to qualify and deploy staff to disasters. For example, the FEMA
created an unprecedented demand for Qualification System tracks training and task performance requirements for
FEMA’s workforce. FEMA deployed disaster workforce positions and has a process to designate staff as qualified in
14,684 and 10,328 personnel at the their positions once they have completed these requirements. FEMA’s
peak of each of these seasons and deployment process uses an automated system to deploy staff members to
reported staffing shortages during the disasters that match field requests for positions and proficiency levels. The
disasters. GAO was asked to review process depends on the agency’s qualification and deployment systems to
issues related to the federal response
identify staff qualification status and skillsets to meet field needs.
to the 2017 disaster season.
However, FEMA’s qualification and deployment processes did not provide
This report addresses (1) how FEMA’s
disaster workforce is qualified and
reliable and complete staffing information to field officials to ensure its workforce
deployed, (2) how effective FEMA’s was effectively deployed and used during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons.
qualification and deployment Specifically, GAO’s focus groups with over 100 incident staff members and
processes were during the 2017 and interviews with field and regional officials indicate that disaster personnel
2018 disaster seasons in ensuring experienced significant limitations with qualification status matching performance
workforce needs were met in the field, in the field, due in part to challenges with how staff are evaluated through the
and (3) the extent to which FEMA’s qualification process. In all focus groups with applicable incident personnel,
disaster workforce receives staff participants cited issues with staff members who were qualified in the FEMA
development to enhance skills and Qualification System not having the skills or experience to effectively perform
competencies. GAO analyzed their positions. For example, one participant described supervising staff members
documentation and data on incident who were qualified in the system but did not know the eligibility requirements for
workforce qualification and applicants to receive housing assistance, or what information needed to be
deployment; conducted 17 focus included in the applicant’s file. In addition, participants in the majority of the focus
groups with 129 staff members; and groups reported challenges with using FEMA’s deployment processes to fully
interviewed FEMA officials in identify staff responsibilities, specialized skillsets, and experience. FEMA
headquarters, field, and regional headquarters officials acknowledged the identified information challenges but
offices. said they have not developed a plan to address them in part because of
What GAO Recommends competing priorities. Developing a plan to address identified challenges with
providing reliable staffing information to field officials would enhance FEMA’s
GAO is making three ability to use staff as flexibly and effectively as possible to meet disaster needs.
recommendations, including that
FEMA develop (1) a plan to address Further, FEMA’s disaster workforce experienced challenges with receiving staff
identified challenges that have development through the agency’s existing methods to enhance the skills and
hindered its ability to provide reliable competencies needed during disaster deployments—challenges FEMA
information to field officials about staff headquarters officials acknowledged. Specifically, GAO’s focus groups and
skills and abilities and (2) a staff interviews indicate that disaster personnel encountered challenges related to the
development program for its disaster availability of courses, providing and receiving on-the-job training and mentoring,
workforce that addresses training and consistently receiving performance evaluations. For example, in 10 of 17
access, delivery of on-the-job training, focus groups, participants cited barriers to taking courses that in their view would
and other development methods. The help them better perform their jobs. In addition, participants in seven focus
Department of Homeland Security groups stated that they did not receive coaching or feedback on the job.
concurred with GAO’s Relatedly, FEMA data show that at the start of deployments during the 2017 and
recommendations. 2018 disaster seasons, 36 percent of staff did not have an official assigned to
coach and evaluate task performance—the primary mechanism the agency
View GAO-20-360. For more information, depends on for coaching. Creating a staff development program would help
contact Christopher Currie at (404) 679-1875 better ensure FEMA’s disaster workforce develops the skills and competencies
or curriec@gao.gov.
needed to meet mission needs in the field.
United States Government Accountability Office
Contents
Letter 1
Background 6
FEMA Has Mechanisms in Place to Qualify and Deploy Staff to
Disasters and Faced Staffing Shortages during the 2017 and
2018 Disaster Seasons 13
FEMA Did Not Provide Reliable and Complete Staffing Information
to Field Officials during Disasters and Lacks Mechanisms to
Assess How Effectively It Deployed Staff 23
FEMA Staff and Managers Experienced Challenges with Staff
Development Efforts Intended to Enhance the Skills and
Competencies Needed During Deployments 36
Conclusions 43
Recommendations for Executive Action 43
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 44
Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 48
Appendix II Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Cadre List and
Descriptions 54
Appendix III Comments from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 57
Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 61
Tables
Table 1: Percentage of Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) Staff That Declined Deployment Requests for Key
Major Disasters during the 2017 and 2018 Disaster
Seasons 21
Table 2: Perspectives from Focus Groups and Field and Regional
Interviews on the Reliability of Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Qualification System
Designations 25
Page i GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Table 3: Examples of Challenges Experienced by Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Field Officials
during Disasters Due to the Unreliability of FEMA
Qualification System Designations 26
Table 4: Number of GAO Focus Groups with Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Participants in Incident
Management Positions at Selected Locations 50
Table 5: Cadre List and Descriptions 54
Figures
Figure 1: Time Line of Key Major Disasters during the 2017 and
2018 Disaster Seasons 2
Figure 2: Summary of Employee Types in the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Workforce 8
Figure 3: Federal Disaster Workforce Deployed by Employee
Type at Peak Deployment Dates during the 2017 and
2018 Disaster Seasons 9
Figure 4: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Disaster Workforce Cadres and Their Peak Deployments
during Hurricane Florence 11
Figure 5: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Position Tiers and Titles 12
Figure 6: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Qualification System Process 16
Figure 7: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)
Workforce Cadres with 25 Percent or Less Staff Available
to Deploy at the Start of Key Major Disasters during the
2017 and 2018 Disaster Seasons 20
Page ii GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Abbreviations
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
CORE Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees
DHS Department of Homeland Security
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Page iii GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Letter
441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548
May 4, 2020
Congressional Requesters
During the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons, several sequential, large-
scale disasters created an unprecedented demand for federal resources.
In 2017, weather and climate-related disasters, including hurricanes
Harvey, Irma, and Maria, caused over $300 billion in damages in the
United States. Along with the severe 2017 California wildfires, these
disasters collectively affected 47 million people—nearly 15 percent of the
nation’s population. In 2018, hurricanes Florence and Matthew and
another severe California wildfire season again necessitated a major
federal response. We have previously reported that the rising number and
costs of disasters and the increasing reliance on the federal government
for disaster assistance will likely continue to rise as the climate changes. 1
Figure 1 shows the time line for key major disasters during the 2017 and
2018 disaster seasons. 2
1GAO, Climate Change: Information on Potential Economic Effects Could Help Guide
Federal Efforts to Reduce Fiscal Exposure, GAO-17-720 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28,
2017). Managing fiscal exposure due to climate change has been on our high risk list
since 2013, in part, because of concerns about the increasing costs of disaster response
and recovery efforts. See GAO, High-Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve
Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas, GAO-19-157SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2019);
also
http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/limiting_federal_government_fiscal_exposure/why_did_study
2We defined the 2017 disaster season as the period beginning on August 23, 2017 and
ending January 31, 2018 and the 2018 disaster season as the period beginning
September 7, 2018 and ending November 25, 2018. These dates represent the start of
the FEMA incident period of major hurricanes in both years through the end of the incident
period for the California wildfire season for both years. The disasters included in figure 1
are major hurricanes and wildfires that occurred during these time periods.
Page 1 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Figure 1: Time Line of Key Major Disasters during the 2017 and 2018 Disaster Seasons
a
The October 8, 2017 wildfires included the Tubbs, Nuns, Atlas, and Pocket fires, among others.
b
The December 4, 2017 wildfires included the Thomas, Creek, and Rye fires, among others.
c
The November 8, 2018 wildfires included the Camp, Woolsey, and Hill fires.
Note: This figure includes major hurricanes and wildfires that occurred during the 2017 and 2018
disaster seasons and does not include all major disaster declarations or all locations where the
disaster hit. Dates indicate when the disaster began or made landfall in the states and territories
listed.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinated the
federal response to these disasters and relied heavily on its workforce to
meet its mission. The agency deployed 14,684 personnel at the peak of
the 2017 disaster season and 10,328 personnel at the peak of the 2018
season. The numbers for each of these seasons are more than double
the number deployed at the peak of the 2016 disaster season, which was
about 5,000 personnel. The concurrent nature of the disasters in both the
2017 and 2018 disaster seasons highlighted the complex challenges
facing FEMA’s workforce. The 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons required
FEMA management to redeploy response personnel from one disaster to
the next, and the agency reported facing staffing shortfalls throughout the
response to these disasters. Additionally, a large influx of new employees
added to challenges with providing timely, program-specific training.
FEMA’s disaster workforce is expected to be in high demand for the
foreseeable future. According to FEMA, at the end of fiscal year 2019,
there were 64 open presidentially declared disasters that required federal
assistance.
In recent years, we have reported on long-standing workforce
management challenges within FEMA. For example, in September 2018,
Page 2 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
we reported on the workforce capacity and training challenges FEMA
faced in the wake of the 2017 disasters. 3 In November and December
2017, we reported on staffing challenges in FEMA’s Public Assistance
grant program, which provides funding to state and local governments,
among others, to help them respond to and recover from disasters. 4 In
our March 2019 report on the status of recovery efforts in Puerto Rico, we
also reported Puerto Rico officials’ concerns about FEMA staff turnover
and lack of knowledge among FEMA staff about how disaster assistance
grant procedures are to be applied in Puerto Rico. 5 While FEMA has
taken actions to address several of our workforce management-related
recommendations since 2016, a number of recommendations remained
open at the start of the 2019 hurricane season. 6
You asked us to review a broad range of issues related to disaster
response and recovery following the 2017 disaster season, including the
response and recovery to hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, and the
California wildfires. Because of the importance of addressing workforce
issues to meet future disaster response and recovery needs, this report
addresses
1. how FEMA’s disaster workforce is qualified and deployed, and
workforce staffing levels during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons;
2. how effective FEMA’s qualification and deployment processes were
during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons in helping ensure
workforce needs were met in the field; and
3GAO, 2017 Hurricanes and Wildfires: Initial Observations on the Federal Response and
Key Recovery Challenges, GAO-18-472 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018).
4GAO, Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions Would Improve Data Quality and Timeliness
of FEMA’s Public Assistance Appeals Processing, GAO-18-143 (Washington, D.C.: Dec.
15, 2017), and GAO, Disaster Assistance: Opportunities to Enhance Implementation of
the Redesigned Public Assistance Grant Program, GAO-18-30 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 8,
2017).
5 GAO, Puerto Rico Hurricanes: Status of FEMA Funding, Oversight, and Recovery
Challenges, GAO-19-256 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2019).
6For example, recommendations remain open in the following reports—GAO-18-30; GAO,
Disaster Response: FEMA Has Made Progress Implementing Key Programs, but
Opportunities for Improvement Exist, GAO-16-87 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 5, 2016); and
GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Workforce Planning and Training Could
Be Enhanced by Incorporating Strategic Management Principles, GAO-12-487
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2012).
Page 3 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
3. the extent to which FEMA’s disaster workforce receives staff
development to enhance skills and competencies to support the
agency’s disaster missions.
To address all three objectives, we focused on FEMA staff members who
deploy to disaster sites. We analyzed documentation and data on disaster
workforce qualification, deployment, staffing levels, and development. For
example, we reviewed FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, 2017 Incident
Management Handbook, 2015 and 2019 FEMA Qualification System
guides, 2019 Deployment Guide, and documentation on FEMA’s staffing
targets. We also analyzed data from FEMA’s Deployment Tracking
System to determine staffing levels and to evaluate efforts FEMA has
taken to develop its staff, and human capital data to determine the
number of new staff FEMA hired. To assess the reliability of the data, we
interviewed officials at FEMA headquarters about their data quality control
procedures and reviewed documentation about these data systems. For
the Deployment Tracking System, we also conducted electronic testing
and reviewed the data for obvious errors and omissions. We found these
data sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.
In addition, we conducted focus groups with members of FEMA’s disaster
workforce and interviewed FEMA officials in the agency’s field and
regional offices to obtain perspectives on, and experiences with, the level
of staffing and skillsets of personnel deployed to disasters, FEMA’s
processes to qualify and deploy staff, and how staff were trained and
developed. Specifically, we conducted 17 focus groups with a total of 129
participants at FEMA joint field offices in Florida and Puerto Rico, FEMA’s
regional office in Texas, and headquarters. 7 We selected these locations
based on where staff members who were deployed during the 2017
disaster season were located at the time of our review and to obtain
variation in geographic location to the extent possible, among other
things. Participants were selected using a stratified random sample from
those who had been deployed to a disaster during the 2017 disaster
season. Participants in each focus group were of the same employee
type, and we conducted separate groups with participants in supervisory
7Joint field offices are temporary facilities established to manage federal disaster
response and recovery programs after a presidential disaster declaration. Also, FEMA
arranges states and territories into 10 regions that carry out guidance from headquarters.
The Region VI office is located in Texas and covers Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Texas.
Page 4 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
and nonsupervisory positions so they could speak more freely. 8 We also
selected participants to obtain a mix of staff from different program areas
and qualification designations.
For our interviews with FEMA field and regional officials, we spoke with
FEMA leadership and managers who worked in various programmatic
areas in joint field offices in Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Puerto Rico and regional offices in Colorado, Texas, and Washington. 9
We selected the joint field offices and regions as locations for interviews
based on our focus group locations and to obtain variation in geographic
location and disaster activity. We evaluated the interviews with field and
regional officials and transcripts from audio-recordings of the focus
groups using systematic content analysis to identify key themes
concerning the topics our report addresses. The results from our analyses
of the focus groups and interviews are not generalizable, but provide
important perspectives on how effectively FEMA qualifies, deploys, and
develops staff for disasters.
Finally, we interviewed senior officials in FEMA headquarters to obtain
their perspectives on the staffing levels of the disaster workforce and how
the workforce is qualified, deployed, and developed. In addition, we
obtained information from these officials on the actions FEMA has taken
to address the challenges we identified through our focus groups,
interviews with field and regional officials, and data analysis. We
compared the results of our analysis and the information we gathered
with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, The
Standard for Program Management, FEMA strategic documents and
guidance, and our prior reports on strategic human capital
8Employee types include, for example, permanent full-time employees who support FEMA
steady-state operations on a daily basis and reservists who are on-call employees that
work intermittently as required during an incident, among other types.
9Officials we spoke with at the joint field offices included federal coordinating officers,
chiefs of staff, section chiefs, and branch directors, among others. Officials we spoke with
in FEMA’s regional offices included regional administrators and response and recovery
division managers.
Page 5 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
management. 10 Appendix I provides further details about our scope and
methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2018 to May 2020 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background
Overview of FEMA’s The federal disaster workforce is designed to scale up or down depending
Disaster Workforce on the timing and magnitude of disasters. Specifically, FEMA has the
authority to augment its permanent full-time staff with temporary
personnel and deploy non-FEMA staff members when needed. FEMA
has historically relied on both permanent and temporary staff members to
respond to presidentially declared disasters. FEMA’s disaster workforce is
organized according to position categories, employee types, functions,
and job titles.
Every FEMA employee is assigned to one or more of four position
categories. Staff assigned to incident management positions deploy to
disaster sites to administer federal emergency response and recovery
programs. Staff assigned to the other three position categories—incident
support, ancillary support, and mission essential—provide support
services to deployed incident management staff, as well as to FEMA
more generally. For example, incident support staff assist with disaster
operations at the regional or national level, while mission essential staff
maintain basic agency operations, such as payroll and information
technology.
10GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G
(Washington, D.C.: September 2014); Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard
for Program Management—Fourth Edition (2017); GAO, A Model of Strategic Human
Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002); and GAO,
Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the
Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2004).
Page 6 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
FEMA has several different employee types that operate out of the
agency’s national headquarters, regional offices, and joint field offices at
specific disaster locations. Each of the different employee types hold one
or more of the four position categories described above.
• Permanent full-time employees are steady-state federal employees
that support FEMA’s mission areas and operations on a daily basis. 11
• Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery Employees (CORE) are a type
of temporary full-time employee hired to directly support response and
recovery efforts related to disasters for a 2- to 4-year term. These
positions may be renewed if there is ongoing disaster work and
funding is available. 12
• Incident Management COREs are a type of CORE employee that
maintain a regular state of readiness to provide emergency-state
support and can be deployed up to 300 days a year in mission
areas.
• Incident Management Assistance Teams are rapid-response
teams of CORE employees that deploy to disaster sites with little
to no notice and remain at disaster sites for unspecified amounts
of time, depending on mission needs. Members generally receive
4-year appointments.
• Reservists are on-call employees who work intermittently as required
during incident management operations. Reservists must be available
to deploy as needed on 24 hours’ notice at all times during their 24
month appointment. 13
FEMA also has the authority to augment its disaster workforce with
temporary employees. This includes local hires, Surge Capacity Force
volunteers, and FEMA Corps members. FEMA further augments its
workforce with technical assistance contractors, who are specialized
11Under Title 5, which is the section of the United States Code that establishes the law for
managing human resources in the federal government, employees can be hired on either
a full- or part-time basis.
12CORE employees are generally eligible for the same benefits as permanent full-time
staff members, but gain competitive status—enhancing their ability to compete for
permanent full-time positions—after 3 years of service. See 42 U.S.C. § 5149(c).
13If a reservist is on preapproved leave, they do not have to deploy. Additionally, if a
reservist declines three deployments within one calendar year without reasonable cause,
which can include a life event, military activation, or already receiving a deployment order,
they can be terminated.
Page 7 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
contractors hired to perform specific responsibilities. 14 See figure 2 for
more information on FEMA’s employee types.
Figure 2: Summary of Employee Types in the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Disaster Workforce
a
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) generally
defines the federal government’s role during response and recovery after a presidential major
disaster or emergency declaration and establishes key programs and processes through which the
federal government provides disaster assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.
b
Title 5 refers to the section of the United States Code that establishes the law for managing human
resources in the federal government. Title 5 employees can be hired on a permanent or temporary,
full- or part-time basis.
As shown in figure 3, reservists made up the largest portion of FEMA’s
deployed workforce during peak deployments for the 2017 and 2018
disaster seasons. In 2017, reservists made up about 32 percent of
FEMA’s deployed workforce, followed by COREs, permanent full-time
staff, and local hires. In 2018, reservists made up about 44 percent of
14Local hires are hired for 120 days, and their term of employment may be extended in
increments of 120 days for up to 1 year. Surge Capacity Force volunteers can deploy up
to 45 days, and may be deployed for a maximum of 3 months; FEMA Corps members
serve 10-month terms.
Page 8 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
FEMA’s deployed workforce, followed by local hires, COREs, and
permanent full-time staff. 15
Figure 3: Federal Disaster Workforce Deployed by Employee Type at Peak
Deployment Dates during the 2017 and 2018 Disaster Seasons
Note: “Other” includes FEMA Corps, Incident Management Assistance Teams, Incident Management
CORE, and temporary full-time employees, among other types of staff.
Organizational Structures FEMA’s incident management workforce is organized into 23 cadres.
for Incident Management Cadres are groups organized by operational or programmatic functions.
They are composed of full-time equivalent and intermittent staff members
Staff
who perform incident-related duties during disaster response. For
example, the Public Assistance cadre administers financial assistance to
state, local, tribal, and territorial communities for debris removal,
implementation of emergency protective measures, and permanent
restoration of infrastructure.
15As shown in figure 3, FEMA augmented its workforce with the Surge Capacity Force,
and this made up the second-largest portion of deployed staff during peak deployment in
the 2017 disaster season.
Page 9 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
FEMA’s incident management workforce performs functions to support its
response, recovery, and mitigation missions. 16 Each cadre supports at
least one of these missions, and some cadres perform functions across
more than one. Cadres also generally deploy to an incident at varying
points in the response and recovery phases, depending on their
functions. For example, FEMA officials said that the Logistics cadre,
which coordinates and monitors all aspects of resource planning,
movement, and order tracking, typically deploys staff to an incident before
the Hazard Mitigation cadre, which supports risk reduction activities later
during the recovery phase. See figure 4 for an example of peak
deployment by cadre during Hurricane Florence and appendix II for a
description of each cadre and their primary duties.
16Response missions include responding quickly to save lives, protect property and the
environment, and meet basic human needs in the aftermath of a catastrophic incident;
recovery missions include recovering through a focus on the timely restoration,
strengthening, and revitalization of infrastructure, housing, and a sustainable economy, as
well as the health, social, cultural, historic, and environmental fabric of communities
affected by a catastrophic incident; mitigation missions include mitigating the loss of life
and property by lessening the impact of future disasters.
Page 10 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Figure 4: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Workforce
Cadres and Their Peak Deployments during Hurricane Florence
Note: This figure demonstrates the peak deployment for cadres during a major disaster using
Hurricane Florence as an example. The timing of cadre deployments may vary by disaster, and some
cadres may have more than one peak.
Page 11 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
FEMA manages the staffing, training, and deployment of its cadres at the
national level. 17 FEMA employees whose primary responsibilities are
incident management and disaster response, such as Incident
Management CORE and reservists, are generally considered national
assets and may be deployed to a disaster anywhere in the country,
regardless of permanent duty station.
FEMA organizes incident management positions into four tiers denoted
by increasing levels of leadership managerial responsibilities and further
categorizes senior leaders and officers by level of disaster complexity
experience. See figure 5 for more information on FEMA’s position tiers
and titles.
Figure 5: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Position Tiers and Titles
All FEMA incident management employees have a primary title, which
specifies their principal roles and responsibilities, and may also hold
subordinate titles for additional roles and responsibilities that the
employee can perform. Incident management staff members have one
primary incident management title and may have multiple subordinate
17Cadre management is responsible for the management and performance of the cadre;
administering the FEMA Qualification System, which FEMA uses to standardize and
manage the agency’s incident workforce capabilities, for incident management staff within
the cadres; and policies and procedures related to day-to-day cadre management.
Page 12 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
titles. 18 FEMA may also assign specialties—categories used to identify a
specific measured (documented or credentialed) skill, task, experience, or
certification that may enhance performance of an associated position—to
certain staff. For example, a full-time equivalent staff member who works
day-to-day in FEMA’s Office of Policy and Program Analysis could hold a
primary incident management title as a Facilities Manager in FEMA’s
Logistics cadre and a subordinate title of Logistics Specialist in the same
cadre, and may be certified to operate certain types of forklifts. 19
FEMA Has
Mechanisms in Place
to Qualify and Deploy
Staff to Disasters and
Faced Staffing
Shortages during the
2017 and 2018
Disaster Seasons
FEMA Designed and FEMA designed and implemented the FEMA Qualification System in
Implemented a System to 2012 to standardize and manage the agency’s incident workforce
capabilities through prerequisite experience, training, and demonstrated
Ensure Standards for
performance. FEMA uses the system to track requirements for incident
Disaster Workforce management positions and the proficiency level of staff members in those
Qualifications and positions.
Capabilities
According to the 2019 FEMA Qualification System Guide, training and
demonstrated performance are foundational elements of the system. 20
18Subordinate incident management titles are generally within a given staff member’s
career progression track, and are most often in a lower-level position for which they were
previously qualified, such as a manager holding a subordinate title in a specialist position.
19The Logistics cadre coordinates and monitors all aspects of resource planning,
movement, ordering, tracking, and property management of initial response resources
teams, and accountable property throughout an incident.
20In August 2019, FEMA updated its qualification system guide, which details the
requirements and process for FEMA employees to become qualified. This guide replaced
the 2015 guide that was in place during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons.
Page 13 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Required qualification system training consists of courses designed to
build competency in specific position responsibilities and is offered in a
variety of settings, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Center for Domestic Preparedness or at a joint field office, and through a
variety of mediums, such as in a classroom, online, or on the job. 21
Demonstrated performance involves validation of the ability to
successfully and independently perform specific tasks. According to
FEMA, employees conduct required training concurrently with
demonstrated performance so that training builds on previous experience
and coursework. After FEMA assigns an incident management position to
staff, they are issued an electronic position task book, which lists and
tracks the training and demonstrated performance requirements for that
position. 22
Tasks in the position task book need to be signed off by a coach-and-
evaluator—an individual that is trained and designated as a subject
matter expert by their cadre to evaluate one or more FEMA Qualification
System positions. After staff members have worked with a coach-and-
evaluator to complete the tasks and trainings included in their task book,
they may submit it to cadre management as part of their qualification
application package. 23
Submitted qualification packages go through a number of rounds of
review before a final decision is made. First, FEMA’s Qualification System
Branch conducts an initial review to validate qualification package
21In addition to completing training for incident management positions, staff also must
complete certain FEMA mandatory courses along with annual refresher training, or
training to maintain their qualification. Some cadres also include training that must be
completed outside FEMA.
22For each FEMA Qualification System position title, the position task book includes
behaviors and tasks, required training, professional certifications, and other information.
23The 2019 FEMA Qualification System Guide does not establish a set time or number of
deployments in which a trainee or candidate must complete their position task book but
states that a trainee or candidate should generally be able to complete it within 4 years.
Other components of the qualification application package include any required additional
materials (i.e., licenses, certifications, or letters of recommendations) and a deployment
history form.
Page 14 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
completion and requirement waivers, among other things. 24 The branch
then forwards the qualification package to cadre management for review.
Cadre management reviews employees’ applications for all positions,
including specialists and first-line supervisors, and a Qualification Review
Board also reviews employees’ applications for leadership, upper
management, and middle management positions. 25 See figure 6 for an
overview of FEMA’s qualification system process.
24On rare occasions, a cadre may decide to waive a requirement. For example, from late
October 2017 through April 1, 2018, FEMA waived certain training requirements for staff
deployed to hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, as well as the California wildfires, due to
the duration and complexity of these disaster response operations. Waivers require
justification, and it is the sole discretion of cadre management whether to implement the
waiver.
25According to the 2019 FEMA Qualification System Guide, the Qualification Review
Board consists of permanent full-time employees, temporary full-time employees, and
COREs from across FEMA who are qualified in incident management positions. The
board meets regularly to review qualification packages: quarterly and in-person for
leadership and upper management positions, and monthly and virtually for middle
management positions.
Page 15 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Figure 6: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Qualification System Process
FEMA Has a Process to A regional or national Incident Management Assistance Team is generally
Deploy Its Workforce to among the first FEMA units to arrive on the ground at a disaster site to,
among other things, set up federal facilities, establish a joint field office,
Disasters
and coordinate with officials from the impacted region and other relevant
federal, state, tribal, territorial, or local partners. If there are staffing
shortages among regional full-time equivalent staff members, FEMA
leadership in the region where the disaster occurs may submit a
deployment request for additional incident management staff members
through the Deployment Tracking System. 26 After the Incident
Management Assistance Team stands up a joint field office, the Federal
26FEMA’s Deployment Tracking System is the system FEMA uses to coordinate and
manage the deployment of all federal emergency response and recovery personnel.
Page 16 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Coordinating Officer assumes authority over all emergency response and
recovery efforts for the disaster, which includes filling staffing needs.
To determine the number and type of incident management personnel
needed in each position to meet FEMA requirements for any given
disaster, the Federal Coordinating Officer coordinates with regional
leadership, the joint field office’s Chief of Staff, and cadre management.
The basis of this determination is a variety of factors related to the nature
and scope of the disaster. For example, Individual Assistance and Public
Assistance needs are based in part on preliminary damage assessments
to determine the level of program assistance that may be required. To fill
identified staffing needs, field leadership uses a standard process to
request specific FEMA Qualification System titles and proficiency levels.
Once a standard deployment request is approved, the Deployment
Tracking System identifies staff members that match the requested
positions, skill sets, and qualification status using a preprogrammed,
automated process. The Deployment Tracking System then notifies staff
members selected in a rotational order based on length of time since their
last deployment, among other things. 27 If an employee declines a
deployment request, the Deployment Tracking System automatically
sends a request to the next staff member with that incident management
position title on the deployment order list. 28 Standard deployment
requests are filled by deploying employee types in the following order: 29
1. Incident Management COREs
2. Reservists
27 According to FEMA officials, the Deployment Tracking System uses an algorithm to
select staff for deployment in order to make the deployment process more fair and
equitable.
28In addition to the Deployment Tracking System’s standard deployment process, field
leadership may also make a name request for a specific incident management employee.
According to FEMA headquarters officials, name requests are used on a very limited
basis, require a detailed justification, and go through a multi-step review process.
29As discussed earlier in this report, FEMA has the authority to augment its disaster
workforce with FEMA Corps members and Surge Capacity Force volunteers. According to
FEMA officials, FEMA Corps teams and Surge Capacity Force volunteers are not part of
the Deployment Tracking System’s deployment algorithm and are not deployed in place of
other incident management staff, such as Incident Management COREs, reservists, and
full-time staff.
Page 17 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
3. Full-time equivalent employees other than Incident Management
COREs
At the incident, the Federal Coordinating Officer and other field leadership
staff are responsible for overseeing coordinating the responders working
for FEMA. Generally, after response operations and programs are
initiated, staffing needs may change. At this point, field leadership may
decide to demobilize some personnel deployed in certain cadres. The
decision to do so is based on workload, complexity of operations, and
disaster needs.
FEMA Faced Staffing According to FEMA’s 2017 Hurricane Season After-Action Report, FEMA
Shortages in Key Cadres did not meet its annual staffing target for disaster personnel during the
2017 hurricane season. FEMA uses force structure and force strength
during the 2017 and 2018
targets to estimate staffing requirements for incidents and analyze the
Disaster Seasons number of staff the agency has available against these targets. FEMA
establishes a longer-term target for the number of incident management
staff needed to meet mission needs, called force structure, and tracks the
actual number of incident management staff who can deploy at a point in
time, which it calls force strength. 30 FEMA uses its force strength
measure to track progress towards meeting staffing goals set out in the
force structure target and also sets interim targets each fiscal year for
reaching the longer-term force structure target.
In 2015, FEMA’s Workforce Management Division conducted a review of
FEMA’s workforce in coordination with the 23 cadres and adopted a force
structure target of 16,305. 31 According to FEMA, this target was
established based on a number of considerations, including potential
incident levels and historical staffing data for incident management staff
deployed to different level events. The agency’s force strength at the end
of fiscal year 2017 was 11,656. On average, reservists had the largest
gap between force strength and established annual targets. For example,
at the end of fiscal year 2017, FEMA’s force strength for reservists was
6,793, which was 15 percent short of its target of 7,982 for that year. In
2019, FEMA’s Workforce Management Division completed a similar
review of its incident management workforce and updated its force
30These are personnel who have completed the administrative requirements for
deployment and do not include FEMA employees who do not have a primary incident
management title, among other things.
31According to FEMA officials, FEMA’s goal for fiscal year 2018 was to achieve 80 percent
of the force structure target established in 2015.
Page 18 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
structure target to 17,670 incident management personnel, which it aims
to achieve by 2025. This new target was established using an updated
methodology based on information on historical disasters and deployed
incident management staff, along with input from each cadre’s
management and other officials with expertise on staffing patterns
throughout disasters.
According to FEMA’s 2017 Hurricane Season After-Action Report, FEMA
faced shortages across over half of its cadres when disasters made
landfall or began during the 2017 season, and we found that FEMA faced
similar shortages during the 2018 disaster season. For instance,
according to FEMA’s deployment data, 18 of 23 cadres operated with 25
percent or fewer staff available to deploy when Hurricane Maria made
landfall shortly after Hurricane Irma hit Florida, including the Individual
Assistance, Logistics, and Hazard Mitigation cadres. See figure 7 for
more information on cadre staffing levels at the start of major disasters
during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons.
Page 19 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Figure 7: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Workforce Cadres with 25 Percent or Less Staff Available to
Deploy at the Start of Key Major Disasters during the 2017 and 2018 Disaster Seasons
Note: Dashes indicate the cadre had greater than 25 percent of its staff available for deployment.
Dates indicate when the disaster began or made landfall in the states and territories listed. If the data
were not available for that particular date, we selected an alternative date that was close to the
beginning of the disaster. Responders are considered available when they 1) are not already
deployed to disasters or training; 2) have no preapproved nonavailability scheduled in the next thirty
Page 20 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
days; 3) have no administrative issues; 4) are not rostered on a team that cannot receive standard
deployment requests; or 5) are not restricted to in-region-only deployments.
In addition, many staff members who showed availability to deploy
declined when requested to do so. 32 For example, according to FEMA
officials, the austere conditions in Puerto Rico and fatigue from previous
deployments to hurricanes Harvey and Irma contributed to the high
declination rate for Hurricane Maria deployment requests. In addition,
FEMA officials stated that permanent full-time employees may not
consistently update their availability or may be unavailable to deploy
because of their steady-state responsibilities. Further, reservists may
decline deployment requests because of the lack of employment
protections, which can create difficulties with leaving their jobs to work
intermittently in disasters. See table 1 for the declination rates for eight
major disasters during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons.
Table 1: Percentage of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Staff That
Declined Deployment Requests for Key Major Disasters during the 2017 and 2018
Disaster Seasons
Disaster season Disaster Declination rate
2017 Hurricane Harvey 30%
Hurricane Irma 43%
Hurricane Maria 48%
October California wildfires 42%
December California wildfires 18%
2018 Hurricane Florence 38%
Hurricane Michael 42%
November California wildfires 40%
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA data. | GAO-20-360
According to FEMA officials, the agency’s staffing shortages may have
originated in part from policy changes in 2012. 33 Specifically, officials said
32A declination is when a member of FEMA’s incident workforce does not accept a
deployment order when in available status. A reasonable cause declination can include,
among other reasons, a sudden medical emergency or the medical emergency of a family
member. If a reservist receives a deployment order, they must respond within 24 hours or
this will result in a declination. If a reservist declines three deployment orders within one
year, the reservist may be terminated.
33FEMA did not have reliable force strength data available for years prior to fiscal year
2016.
Page 21 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
that a large number of incident management staff left the agency after
changes were made to the agency’s reservist program and qualification
system for disaster personnel in 2012. 34 For instance, officials told us
many reservists with years of experience and technical skills left FEMA
when the reservist program increased the number of days they were
required to deploy or when many were assigned to positions in the
qualification system with lower levels of responsibility than what they
previously held in order to meet force structure targets. 35
FEMA took various actions to address the staffing shortages during the
2017 and 2018 disaster seasons and used new approaches to augment
its workforce. For example, in 2017, FEMA reported that it coordinated
the deployment of 2,740 Surge Capacity Force volunteers from eight DHS
components. DHS also expanded the Surge Capacity Force to other
federal agencies outside DHS for the first time in 2017, including 34
federal departments and agencies in the program, increasing the Surge
Capacity Force by 1,323 employees. Additionally, FEMA used local hires
to augment its workforce and expedited the local hiring process in
response to hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, resulting in the
onboarding of 4,095 local hires from August to November 2017. The
Federal Coordinating Officer who initially managed the Puerto Rico joint
field office instituted a goal of having a staff composed of 90 percent local
hires for recovery efforts. According to the official, investing heavily in
local hires and converting them to COREs will help build FEMA’s disaster
workforce for long-term Puerto Rico recovery efforts and any future
disasters that may occur in the region.
As mentioned previously, FEMA also conducted a review of its incident
management workforce in 2018 to determine the force structure needed
to effectively respond to disasters moving forward. FEMA officials we
spoke with said the agency has taken several steps to meet its new force
structure, such as establishing a program management office that is
34For example, in December 2012, FEMA transitioned its Disaster Assistance Employees
to the National Disaster Reservist Program. Among other things, the reservist program
established that reservists are national assets and may be deployed to any disaster site
regardless of its location, and in a rotational order based on position, qualification status,
and length of time since their last deployment. FEMA officials told us that these changes
were an agency effort to centralize resources, promote equal opportunities for FEMA
reservist personnel, and streamline the qualification process.
35Under the prior system, the Disaster Assistance Employee Program, staff could be
activated for up to a maximum of 78 weeks during each 104-week appointment cycle.
Under the new National Disaster Reservist Program, reservists may be deployed for up to
50 consecutive weeks a year.
Page 22 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
dedicated to achieving the agency’s staffing targets. Cadre management
officials we spoke with said that FEMA has hiring initiatives in place or
planned to help meet the staffing needs established from the review and
noted that it will take time for new staff to develop the skills and
experience to meet mission needs in the field.
FEMA’s qualification and deployment processes did not provide reliable
FEMA Did Not and complete information on staff skills and abilities to ensure its
Provide Reliable and workforce was effectively deployed and used to meet field needs during
the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons. In addition, FEMA lacks
Complete Staffing mechanisms to assess deployment outcomes or the extent to which it
Information to Field deployed the right mix of staff at the right time to meet mission needs.
Officials during
Disasters and Lacks
Mechanisms to
Assess How
Effectively It
Deployed Staff
FEMA’s Qualification and FEMA field officials in our focus groups and interviews said they
Deployment Processes experienced a number of challenges with the reliability of information from
FEMA’s qualification and deployment processes and systems during the
Did Not Provide Reliable
2017 and 2018 disaster seasons. Specifically, these officials reported that
Staffing Information to qualification status was not an accurate indicator of ability to perform,
Ensure Its Workforce Was which affected disaster assistance delivery and created difficulties with
Effectively Deployed and ensuring the right mix of staff were deployed and effectively assigning
Used in the Field responsibilities at disaster sites. Officials also reported other challenges
with identifying and leveraging staff skills, including lack of information
about specialized abilities and expertise. In response to its experience
with recent disaster seasons, FEMA has taken or planned some actions
to improve its qualification and deployment processes. However, these
actions have not been fully implemented and do not fully address the
information shortcomings that field officials experienced, as discussed
below.
Page 23 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Field Officials Reported FEMA’s qualification and deployment processes and systems do not
Qualification Status Was Not a provide accurate and complete information about staff members’ abilities
Reliable Indicator of Staff’s to ensure field leadership and managers get staff with the right skills at
Ability to Perform Their the right time or to most effectively employ and leverage the staff that are
Positions in the Field deployed to support FEMA’s missions. As discussed earlier in this report,
field leadership use the Deployment Tracking System to request staff
based on mission needs. The system uses an automated process to
select who to deploy from a list of available staff by position and
qualification status, and relies on the FEMA Qualification System to
identify staff members who are qualified in their positions and those who
are trainees. 36 Qualified staff members are expected to be able to
successfully and independently perform the duties of their position.
However, as shown in table 2, our focus groups with incident
management staff and interviews with field and regional officials indicate
that disaster personnel experienced significant limitations with
qualification status in the FEMA Qualification System matching
performance in the field. Very few found that it was a good indicator of
staff abilities. For example, participants in two of 14 focus groups
described positive experiences with qualification status as an indicator of
staff abilities; while, in all 14 groups, participants stated that staff
members who were designated as qualified in the system did not have
the skills or experience to perform effectively in their positions. 37 Officials
in 15 of our 29 field and regional office interviews had similar
experiences. For example, Individual Assistance managers in one of the
joint field offices we visited said that they had 20 staff members who were
designated as qualified but not capable of performing basic tasks, such
as knowing how to access the program’s information system. Hazard
Mitigation managers from the same joint field office said that about half of
their staff who were designated as qualified could not proficiently perform
their job duties.
36As discussed earlier in this report, field leadership can request staff by name in limited
situations instead of using the Deployment Tracking System’s automated selection
process. According to FEMA’s 2019 Deployment Guide, such requests require a detailed
justification to demonstrate how the responder being requested is the only responder
capable of meeting incident needs.
37The number of focus groups in this section excludes the three focus groups we
conducted with local hires. We excluded them from the counts because local hires do not
consistently use the FEMA Qualification System.
Page 24 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Table 2: Perspectives from Focus Groups and Field and Regional Interviews on the Reliability of Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Qualification System Designations
Number of focus groups with Number of interviews with field and
incident management staff in which regional leadership and managers in
statements were made (n=14) which statements were made(n=29)a
Participants stated that qualification status in the 2 3
FEMA Qualification System was a reliable
indicator of staff abilities
Participants stated that staff members who were 14 15
qualified in the FEMA Qualification System did not
have the skills or experience to effectively perform
their positions
Participants stated that staff members who were 10 8
not qualified in the FEMA Qualification System did
have the skills or experience to effectively perform
their positions
Source: GAO analysis of focus groups with FEMA incident management staff and interviews with field and regional leadership and managers. | GAO-20-360
a
These issues were not raised in all of our interviews.
Participants in our focus groups and field leadership and managers we
interviewed cited numerous operational challenges that resulted from
qualification status not being an accurate indicator of staff abilities.
Specifically, they stated that (1) staff designated as qualified who lacked
the skills and knowledge to perform their positions negatively affected
disaster assistance delivery, staff workload, and morale and (2) the
unreliability of qualification designations hindered their cadre’s ability to
staff disasters with the right mix of staff at the right time and effectively
assign responsibilities. Table 3 provides examples of the challenges they
experienced.
Page 25 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Table 3: Examples of Challenges Experienced by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Field Officials during
Disasters Due to the Unreliability of FEMA Qualification System Designations
Challenges with disaster assistance • In one of FEMA’s joint field offices we visited, field leadership and managers stated that the
delivery, staff workload, and morale lack of reliability of FEMA qualification status resulted in having staff designated as
qualified in their positions who were unaware of the agency’s most recent policies and
procedures and unfamiliar with program forms and applications. They noted that
supervisors were unable to trust that staff who were designated as qualified could perform
their responsibilities and needed to spend time assessing their skills and providing training
to them.
• In one supervisory-level focus group with FEMA incident management officials, a
participant described encountering staff members who were designated as qualified in the
system but did not know how to use the information system for FEMA’s Individual
Assistance program, the eligibility requirements for applicants to receive housing
assistance, or what documentation and information needed to be included in the applicant’s
file.
• Planning managers in a joint field office we visited said that staff members who were
inaccurately designated as qualified were sometimes only able to produce half of what was
expected of them, which hindered the cadre’s ability to support mission needs and put a
burden on others to complete their tasks. They noted that this affected morale, added to
others’ workload, and could turn a 12-hour day into a 14-hour day.
• Regional Recovery Division managers in one of the FEMA regional offices we selected for
interviews said FEMA’s qualification system created a pool of staff that could not perform
their Public Assistance program positions, which resulted in regional staff having to be
deployed to a disaster to fix errors in how the program had been administered. They also
noted that the lack of reliability with qualification status can be especially challenging in
smaller disasters, where staffing numbers are low. They mentioned one instance in which
staff members in the Public Assistance cadre who were designated as qualified were
deployed to a smaller disaster but could not perform their positions and were sent home.
This left only one supervisor to do the work.
Challenges with staffing disasters • Field leadership and managers said it is optimal to have more qualified and experienced
with the right mix of staff at the right staff during the earlier stages of disaster response because of the chaotic environment and
time and assigning responsibilities need to work quickly. For example, a Logistics Section Chief in one of the joint field offices
we visited said it is important to deploy staff members that the cadre knows can do their
jobs in the early response phases and then be able to replace them with less experienced
staff as the disaster moves toward recovery. This manager noted that issues with the
reliability of FEMA’s qualification designations hamper the cadre’s ability to get the
appropriate balance of experienced staff and trainees at the right time.
• A participant in one of our supervisory-level focus groups said that FEMA’s qualification
system creates challenges with assigning job responsibilities. Specifically, he noted that his
cadre would like to use qualification designations to help assign subgrantee jurisdictions to
program delivery managers. However, without qualification status being a reliable indicator
of proficiency, it is difficult to assess if a qualified staff member has the skills and
experience to handle the complexities of a large city or if they should be assigned to a
smaller locality.
Source: GAO interviews with field leadership and managers in selected FEMA joint field offices and regions and focus groups with FEMA incident management staff. | GAO-20-360
Note: We conducted 17 focus groups with FEMA incident management officials, seven of which were
with staff members in supervisory-level positions when deployed. We also conducted interviews with
leadership and managers in three FEMA regional offices.
Participants in our focus groups also cited a range of challenges with
position task books and the qualification process that in their view
Page 26 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
contributed to qualification status not being an accurate indicator of staff
proficiency. For example:
Position task book tasks. In 12 of our 14 focus groups with FEMA
incident management staff, participants said the tasks in the position task
books did not fully reflect the skills or competencies needed to perform
positions. For example, a participant in one focus group said that the
tasks in her book did not incorporate sufficient soft skills, such as the
ability to communicate with sensitivity and empathy and other
interpersonal skills, which are important because staff in her cadre often
interact with disaster survivors who have suffered great losses.
Coach-and-evaluator process. Participants in 12 of our 14 focus groups
also raised concerns with how coach-and-evaluators endorsed tasks,
such as lack of consistency and objectivity with signing off on tasks.
These issues included coach-and-evaluators signing off on large numbers
of tasks too quickly or easily, which participants in 12 focus groups said
occurred. Some participants who functioned as coach-and-evaluators
said they felt pressure from staff to endorse tasks because reservists
receive salary increases when they get qualified. Participants also told us
that cadre management may push for staff to be qualified to meet
qualification rate targets. A participant in one of our supervisory-level
focus groups said he felt pressure from both these sources and admitted
to signing off on tasks even though he did not feel the staff member could
proficiently perform them. He said that the staff member was qualified in
the FEMA Qualification System and later deployed to a smaller disaster,
where she was the sole person responsible for her functional area and
unable to do the job.
Difficulties completing position task books. Participants in all 14 of
our focus groups also raised various challenges with completing their task
books. These challenges include a lack of available coach-and-evaluators
to sign-off on tasks; lack of opportunities to deploy or perform certain
tasks; and being unable to complete all the training courses in their task
books because classes were unavailable, full, or conflicted with mission
needs; among others. As a result, staff members who are able to perform
their positions may not be designated as qualified in FEMA’s qualification
system.
Page 27 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Field Officials Cited Challenges Participants in our focus groups and leadership and managers in our field
with Using FEMA’s and regional office interviews reported other challenges with being able to
Qualification and Deployment fully identify and use staff skills and experience during disasters. For
Processes to Fully Identify and example:
Use Staff Skills and
Experience Position titles not fully reflecting staff abilities. FEMA allows staff to
have one primary position title in which they are qualified or have an open
task book (trainee or candidate status). 38 Officials in 14 of our 29 field and
regional interviews and participants in eight of our 14 focus groups with
incident management staff raised concerns with this policy. 39 Specifically,
officials noted that many employees have experience and expertise in
multiple cadres or programs within a cadre, but their full abilities are not
reflected in FEMA’s qualification and deployment systems. As a result,
field leadership and managers may not be able to fully identify and use
the available skills and experience of FEMA’s workforce during disasters,
which can limit FEMA’s capacity and flexibility to meet disaster needs,
especially when demand is high. For example, one regional official said
the Deployment Tracking System has Operations Section Chief as her
position title but does not capture her ability to deploy as an Individual
Assistance Branch Director, another position in which she has
considerable experience.
Overly broad position titles and lack of information on specialized
skills. In addition, participants in our focus groups told us that some
cadre position titles are overly broad (five of 14 groups) and that FEMA’s
qualification and deployment systems do not include information on
specialized skillsets and experience that would be useful for making
deployment and staffing decisions (10 of 14 groups). Officials in 14 of our
29 field and regional interviews raised one or more of these same issues.
For example, Logistics managers in one of the joint field offices we visited
said that the Logistics Specialist title is too general and captures the
majority of warehouse personnel without specifying the actual
responsibilities they are able to perform. They noted that, as a result,
management needs to query staff members when they arrive to help
determine their skills and, in many cases, assign responsibilities by trial
38According to FEMA officials, a staff member’s primary title determines cadre
membership. As discussed earlier in this report, staff members may hold subordinate
position titles but these are generally previously qualified positions within their career
progression track, such as a manager holding a subordinate title in a specialist position.
39The number of focus groups in this section excludes the three focus groups we
conducted with local hires. We excluded them from the counts because local hires
generally do not have visibility over the areas addressed.
Page 28 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
and error. According to officials, this can create a safety hazard because
some responsibilities require specific skills, such as the ability to operate
a certain type of forklift. They also noted that while the Deployment
Tracking System allows cadres to input specific skillsets, such as forklift
certification, this field has not been consistently filled in.
Limitations with fully capturing permanent full-time employee and
CORE qualifications. In seven of our eight focus groups with permanent
full-time employees and COREs, participants stated that it is not a priority
for them to complete their task books because they have little or no
incentives to be designated as qualified in the FEMA Qualification
System. For example, some participants noted that unlike reservists, their
pay and professional development is not directly tied to their qualification
status or position. Another participant said that he has been deployed to
many disasters and does not have any tasks in his task book endorsed
because he is focused on meeting mission needs and does not care
enough about being qualified in the system to take the time to complete
his task book. Some regional and field officials also raised the same
issues. For example, Response Division managers in one of the regions
we selected for interviews said that some of the best talent at FEMA,
such as staff members with years of experience who work full-time in
positions similar to their incident management titles, have never opened
or completed a task book because there is no incentive for them to do so.
As a result, FEMA may not be fully capturing the qualifications and skills
of permanent full-time employees and COREs.
FEMA Has Taken Actions to FEMA has taken a number of actions intended to help address some of
Help Improve Its Qualification the challenges with its qualification and deployment processes that
and Deployment Processes, hindered its ability to provide accurate and complete staffing information
but These Actions Do Not Fully to field officials. FEMA headquarters officials acknowledged the
Address the Key Challenges challenges we identified with the FEMA Qualification System and noted
Field Officials Identified that the system is still evolving. Key efforts to improve the reliability of
qualification designations include:
Qualifying staff members who could proficiently perform their
positions. During the 2017 hurricane season, FEMA took steps to qualify
staff members who were not designated as qualified in the FEMA
Qualification System but could proficiently perform the duties of their
position. For example, according to the agency’s after-action report for
the hurricane season, FEMA temporarily changed qualification
procedures during the season to more rapidly qualify employees who had
demonstrated their skills outside the traditional process. FEMA
headquarters officials stated that this helped qualification designations
Page 29 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
better reflect the skills and abilities of these staff members. Other actions
that FEMA has taken to help qualify staff include allowing cadre
management to waive certain tasks or training, allowing specified tasks to
be signed-off on during training exercises, and, as discussed later in this
report, conducting a pilot on deploying staff to specifically serve as coach-
and-evaluators during disasters.
Revising position task books. FEMA headquarters officials said they
began reviewing task books in spring 2017 to help ensure that tasks are
measurable and better align with the knowledge, skills, and abilities
needed to perform positions. Officials said this project was completed in
November 2018 and the revised task books have been implemented.
They noted that this will help streamline the qualification process, allow
for more objective evaluation, and help ensure tasks better reflect the
skills needed on the job. According to FEMA officials, they plan to
continue to work with the cadres to ensure task books align with the skills
and competencies required to complete disaster missions.
Enhanced coach-and-evaluator training. FEMA revised its training for
coach-and-evaluators to provide more guidance and tools for how to
accurately evaluate staff and improve the integrity of the evaluation
process. Specifically, in October 2017, FEMA updated the coach-and-
evaluator training class and added material on, for example, techniques
for evaluating with integrity, types of observation, and documenting task
performance by including comments in the task books. All staff members
must pass the class by performing a capstone exercise and taking a
written exam before being able to serve as a coach-and-evaluator.
Additional controls in the qualification process. Since 2017, FEMA
has established additional controls to provide more oversight on the
qualification process. For example, headquarters officials said that as part
of the qualification review process, officials may review the qualification
packages to check how many tasks were endorsed during a given period
of time. If the number is unusually large, they may note it for cadre
management to consider when making qualification decisions. This step
was incorporated in the new FEMA Qualification System Guide that was
issued in August 2019. The guide also includes changes to the
Qualification Review Board process, such as requiring candidates for
leadership and upper-level management positions to attend the review in
person and answer questions about their deployments, training history,
and task book completion.
Page 30 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
FEMA has also taken some initial actions and considered options to
better identify and use staff skills and experience in the field. For
example, FEMA headquarters officials said they are aware that limiting
staff to one primary position or one open task book may not fully capture
their experience and abilities and are exploring ways to address it.
However, they stated that this is a complex issue and allowing staff to
hold multiple primary positions could affect the time it takes for staff to
complete task books and, on a broader level, pay scales, career
progression paths, and training budgets. They also noted that this could
create complications with how to deploy staff if multiple cadres need
positions filled during times of scarce resources. FEMA headquarters
officials told us that staff can be deployed in positions other than their
FEMA Qualification System positions but acknowledged that because
these other positions are not systematically recorded in the Deployment
Tracking System, leadership would need to be aware of staff skills and
abilities through informal means. Further, FEMA headquarters officials
said that as part of its review of the incident management workforce, they
have revised the position titles for certain cadres, which they noted could
potentially result in the titles better reflecting staff roles and
responsibilities. Officials added that they need to balance the enhanced
staffing information that more specific titles provide with the flexibility of
broader titles, particularly for entry-level positions. FEMA has also
included information on assigning specialized skills to staff in the
Deployment Tracking System in its new FEMA Qualification System and
deployment guides.
While FEMA has taken some steps to improve its qualification and
deployment systems, its efforts primarily affect the qualification process
moving forward and do not fully address field officials’ experiences with
not having reliable information on staff qualifications and skills to
effectively use the available workforce to meet mission needs. For
example, the changes to the position task books, coach-and-evaluator
program, and FEMA Qualification System guide do not affect staff
members who have already been qualified in the system but cannot
perform their duties, and as discussed later in this report, FEMA currently
does not have an effective performance evaluation system in place to
identify and address skill deficiencies. In addition, the agency has not
taken actions to address the challenges with identifying staff who can
serve multiple incident management positions and fully capturing the
qualifications of permanent full-time employees and COREs. Also,
headquarters officials stated that FEMA has revised some of its position
titles, but not all the cadres that reported challenges with overly broad
titles had adjustments made to their positions. Further, this initiative is in
Page 31 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
the early stages of implementation and it is too soon to assess whether
the revised positions will provide better information to field officials on
staff members’ specific responsibilities. 40
Further, the lack of reliability of qualification status as an accurate
indicator of staff skills and abilities has been a persistent issue with the
FEMA Qualification System. For example, we stated in our 2015 report on
FEMA workforce management that in five of 11 focus groups with
permanent full-time employees and COREs, participants cited concerns
about the implementation of the FEMA Qualification System, and some
observed employees whose training and experience did not reflect the
position and qualification level to which they were assigned. 41 Also, in a
2016 report on the reservist workforce, the DHS Office of the Inspector
General stated that in five of the seven disaster deployments included in
their review, joint field office staff encountered problems obtaining
capable reservists with position titles under the FEMA Qualification
System. These officials said that reservists sometimes lacked the
experience and training to perform their duties, and as a result, were
reassigned to positions outside their system titles. 42
One of the purposes of the FEMA Qualification System is to ensure
consistency in skill identification and deployable assets for positions
across the agency. In addition, FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan states
that the agency should guarantee that the FEMA Qualification System
maximizes the ability of FEMA staff to use their skills and talents to
deliver the best outcomes possible. However, as discussed above, FEMA
experienced challenges with achieving these objectives. In addition,
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government directs
management to use quality information to achieve the agency’s
40According to FEMA headquarters officials, as of December 2019, the new positions
have been approved and the agency is working toward moving staff members to those
positions and revising position task books to reflect the changes to the positions.
41GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Additional Planning and Data
Collection Could Help Improve Workforce Management Efforts, GAO-15-437
(Washington, D.C.: July, 9, 2015). We did not make recommendations related to the
FEMA Qualification System in this report because, at the time the work was conducted,
the system was too new for us to evaluate its effect on the operational environment.
42DHS Office of Inspector General, FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of
Its Disaster Incident Workforce, OIG-16-127-D (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2, 2016). The
DHS Office of Inspector General made broader recommendations on workforce targets,
training and performance management, and did not have recommendations on FEMA
Qualification System designations in this report.
Page 32 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
objectives. 43 It states that, as part of designing control activities for human
capital management, management should continually assess the
knowledge, skills, and ability needs of the agency to help achieve
organizational goals. According to the standards, only when the right
personnel for the job are on board and are provided the right
responsibilities, among other things, is operational success possible. In
addition, according to The Standard for Program Management, program
monitoring, reporting, and controls include the development of plans to
respond to identified issues. 44 It also states that program management
should include timeframes and milestones for achieving program benefits
and obtaining feedback from stakeholders to better understand the
concerns related to the program and impact of the program.
Given the complexity of FEMA’s workforce and the persistent issues with
the reliability of qualification designations and other challenges with
identifying the knowledge, skills, and abilities of its staff, FEMA would
benefit from developing a comprehensive plan—with timeframes and
milestones—to address issues with the quality of information its
qualification and deployment processes and systems provide to field
officials. Such a plan would also benefit from the inclusion of perspectives
from field leadership who depend on the information. FEMA officials
acknowledged the staffing information challenges we identified and noted
that they have not developed a plan to address them because the issues
are multifaceted—changes in policy can potentially affect numerous areas
of the workforce—and they had been focused on other initiatives, such as
revising force structure targets and streamlining the qualification process.
However, they said that such a plan would be useful. Developing a plan
to address the challenges that hindered FEMA’s ability to provide reliable
and complete information about staff skills to field leaders and managers
would better enable the agency to use its disaster workforce as flexibly
and effectively as possible to meet mission needs in the field.
43GAO-14-704G
44Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Program Management—Fourth
Edition (2017).
Page 33 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
FEMA Does Not Have FEMA does not have mechanisms to assess the extent to which its
Mechanisms to Assess deployment strategies met mission needs in the field during disasters.
FEMA’s Deployment Guide states that for the agency to fulfill its
How Effectively Its
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation missions, it must be
Disaster Workforce Was able to effectively and efficiently deploy its responders through a process
Deployed to Meet Field that sends the right people to the right place at the right time with the right
Needs qualifications. FEMA has measures and collects data related to staffing
levels and availability, such as comparing cadre force strength to annual
targets, comparing staff qualification rates to targets, determining the
percent of staff in each cadre that show availability in the Deployment
Tracking System, and tracking the number of staff deployed to disasters.
However, none of these measures or data directly demonstrate
deployment outcomes or how effectively FEMA deployed available staff to
meet mission needs.
Headquarters officials said that, among other things, they generally have
looked at the number of staff members that were deployed to disasters,
as well as declinations, to assess the extent to which they were able to
meet staffing needs. They noted that this assumed the number, type, and
timing of staff deployments matched field needs. However, our focus
groups and interviews with field officials indicate that this was not
generally the case. For example, in all 17 of our focus groups,
participants experienced challenges with the staffing, skill, or experience
levels of the deployed workforce, such as having too few staff members
with the right technical skills to perform their missions efficiently and
effectively. Further, in 12 of the 17 focus groups we conducted,
participants said that there were challenges with the timing of
deployments, such as staff from certain cadres being deployed too early
or redeploying staff from key positions when the mission need was still
high. In most of our interviews with field leadership and managers,
officials described similar challenges with the number, skill level, or timing
of staff deployments. Participants in our focus groups and field officials
we interviewed said they make every effort to meet mission needs despite
challenges with staff deployment, but noted that these challenges with
deployment outcomes not meeting field needs can increase staff
workload and delay disaster assistance, among other impacts and
inefficiencies.
Our work on strategic human capital management states that effective
geographic and organizational deployment strategies can enable an
organization to have the right people, with the right skills, doing the right
jobs, in the right place, at the right time by making flexible use of its
Page 34 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
internal workforce. 45 Additionally, Standards for Internal Controls in the
Federal Government states that management should establish and
operate monitoring activities to continually monitor the internal control
system, evaluate results, and remediate any deficiencies identified on a
timely basis. As part of remediating deficiencies, the standards advise
management to report and evaluate issues that were identified as a result
of the monitoring and take corrective actions to address them. 46
As discussed earlier in this report, field leadership request staff based on
cadres’ anticipated needs using estimates of the severity of damage and
the nature and scope of the disaster, among other factors. However,
FEMA headquarters officials told us their data systems cannot determine
the extent to which field deployment requests were met during
disasters. 47 In addition, these officials noted that they have not
established other mechanisms to assess deployment outcomes because
this is extremely complex and they are considering how best to do so.
They noted that they have been working with in-house data science
experts to consider what kinds of measures and metrics they could
design to assess deployment outcomes, but they did not have any
concrete proposals or time frames for when this might be completed.
Without mechanisms to assess deployment outcomes, FEMA officials in
headquarters lack critical information to monitor and evaluate the extent
to which its deployment policies and strategies effectively placed staff
with the right skills in the right place at the right time to meet mission
needs in the field. As a result, FEMA may miss opportunities to identify
when corrective actions are required to better deploy its workforce to
meet field needs, such as adjusting the timing and staging of
deployments, and the amount of staff deployed.
45GAO-02-373SP.
46GAO-14-704G.
47FEMA headquarters officials stated that if the field makes a request for a certain position
and qualification status and it is not met, field staff may submit the same request at a later
time. Because the Deployment Tracking System cannot link these multiple requests for
the same position, FEMA cannot track the extent to which staffing requests were met.
Page 35 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
We found significant shortcomings in FEMA’s ability to ensure staff
FEMA Staff and development—which consists of courses, on-the-job-learning, and
Managers coaching and mentoring—for the skills and abilities needed in the field.
Specifically, although the current approach to developing staff includes
Experienced efforts to provide training courses, opportunities for on-the-job training
Challenges with Staff and mentoring, and a performance evaluation system, each of these
elements has limitations as implemented, and they are not effectively
Development Efforts coordinated to help ensure systematic and comprehensive staff
Intended to Enhance development. Staff and managers cited certain recurrent challenges with
staff development in focus groups and interviews, such as (1) limitations
the Skills and on the ability to take useful classroom training, (2) challenges providing or
Competencies receiving on-the-job training and mentoring, (3) inconsistent use of
performance evaluations, and (4) difficulty with ongoing development
Needed During when not deployed to a disaster.
Deployments
Some Staff and Managers One way staff members develop skills and competencies is through
Cited Challenges with the completing required courses in their position task books. However, in 10
of our 17 focus groups, participants discussed barriers to taking courses
Ability to Take Useful
through FEMA’s qualification system that in their view would help them
Classroom Training better perform their jobs, such as being unable to take courses that are
not in their position task books or if they are already qualified in their
positions. Officials in 11 of the 29 field and regional interviews we
conducted raised the same issue. FEMA headquarters officials stated that
staff are generally required to obtain cadre management approval before
they can register for incident management-related courses that are not
specifically listed in their position task books, but staff told us it can be
difficult to receive approval because of funding limitations. For example, a
Hazard Mitigation official at one joint field office we visited described a
situation where a staff member wanted to take a course on mitigation and
engineering techniques for coastal construction that would have
benefitted the work the person was doing, but was not able to get
approval. Participants in our focus groups also told us that staff deployed
to a position other than their FEMA Qualification System title had been
unable to take courses related to the work they were doing.
Moreover, staff members said the FEMA Qualification System limits
training opportunities for those already qualified in their positions. For
example, some staff members said that once they had completed their
position task book, they were sometimes unable to get training that
included new information on updated policies or procedures specific to
their work. An official in one of the FEMA regions we selected for
Page 36 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
interviews said that some staff members in the region who were qualified
would have preferred to be designated as trainees in the FEMA
Qualification System because it would allow them to take relevant
courses. In March 2020, FEMA officials told us the agency has recently
taken actions to make it easier for cadres to send staff to courses that are
not required in their position task book or for positions where the person
is qualified.
Finally, participants in our focus groups with permanent full-time staff
members reported challenges with being able to take courses to develop
their incident management competencies. These participants told us it is
challenging for them to take disaster-related courses while performing
their steady-state work. They said this is because there is no budget for
localized disaster-related courses in their offices and it can be difficult to
get approval and take time from their duties to travel for this type of
training.
Some Staff and Managers Focus group participants frequently said developing skills on the job was
Cited Challenges with the most useful type of training they receive. Specifically, participants in
12 of our 17 focus groups said on-the-job training was the most useful
Providing and Receiving
kind of training and participants in 13 of the 17 focus groups said this is
On-the-Job Training and how they received most of their training. In addition, headquarters officials
Mentoring during in the Individual Assistance cadre said one of the benefits of on-the-job
Disasters training during deployments is that it provides an opportunity for staff to
learn and practice their craft in a setting that is difficult to simulate during
training.
The FEMA Qualification System Guide states that FEMA uses coach-
and-evaluators as the primary mechanism for staff to learn the specific
skills needed for each position. However, staff members we spoke with
said they have difficulties developing their skills through the qualification
process. Specifically, in seven of the 17 focus groups, participants told us
they did not get feedback or coaching on the job. According to staff in our
focus groups, the coach-and-evaluator aspect of the qualification system
is not the ideal mechanism to support on-the-job training and
development because it often emphasizes the evaluation role over the
coaching role. In nine of 14 focus groups, participants told us the position
task book process focuses more on completing tasks than on
performance, development, or building competencies. 48 Officials in eight
48We excluded three focus groups with local hires because they do not consistently use
position task books.
Page 37 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
of our 29 field and regional interviews reported similar experiences. Some
staff who did receive coaching said it was often based on the interest
level and time that an individual who was willing to invest and was not
done in a systematic or consistent way.
Moreover, a commonly cited challenge—in 11 of our 14 focus groups—
was the lack of coach-and-evaluators to sign off on position task books. 49
Officials in 16 of our 29 field and regional interviews raised the same
issue. Participants in our focus groups said they had difficulties finding
available coach-and-evaluators at disaster sites. For example, our
analysis of FEMA data found that 36 percent of FEMA’s incident
management workforce did not have a coach-and-evaluator at the start of
their deployment during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons. In addition,
according to staff in our focus groups and interviews, coach-and-
evaluators at the disaster often do not have time to coach staff. For
example, officials at one of the joint field offices we visited said mission
needs always come first and coaching and evaluating responsibilities are
often not anyone’s priority.
In addition to on-the-job training challenges related to the FEMA
Qualification System, focus group participants also reported more general
challenges with on-the-job training. For instance, multiple supervisors in
the Logistics cadre at one joint field office said that in addition to doing
their own work, experienced staff members need to spend significant time
training others, which competes with performing their mission.
Furthermore, participants in seven of the 17 focus groups said providing
on-the-job training was particularly challenging at the beginning of a
disaster, when the disaster is often hectic and at its busiest. Recovery
Division officials in a FEMA regional office said a challenge at the start of
the disaster is finding staff members who know what to do and have the
time to train those who do not. Staff members also described difficulties
with providing and receiving on-the-job training in later phases of a
disaster. In one focus group with supervisors, a participant said that once
the disaster has reached a pace where they have time to train, staff
members are often redeployed.
Finally, in 16 of our 29 field and regional interviews, officials said there
was a lack of mentoring and sustained staff development across
disasters. For example, officials at one joint field office told us that once
49We excluded three focus groups with local hires because they generally do not have
coach-and-evaluators.
Page 38 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
staff members complete their position task book, they generally do not
receive any additional coaching or mentoring in that position. This official
stated that reservists have a more difficult time identifying mentors than
other employee types because they deploy intermittently and likely have
different supervisors and coach-and-evaluators each time they deploy. In
addition, FEMA officials said coach-and-evaluators are not meant to
serve as mentors. FEMA human capital officials said that different offices
can develop their own mentoring programs but these may not be
available to all employee types. As a result, not all staff members know to
ask for, or expect to receive, mentoring.
FEMA headquarters officials acknowledged some of these staff
development challenges and described actions they have planned, or are
underway, to help address some of them. Specifically, FEMA revised the
coach-and-evaluator course in 2017 to place a greater emphasis on the
coaching responsibilities of the coach-and-evaluator role. For example,
the revised course teaches effective coaching strategies, including how to
give effective, actionable feedback. Also, in summer 2019, FEMA
conducted a pilot with the National Disaster Recovery Support cadre to
deploy a single coach-and-evaluator solely in that position and
communicated to cadre management that this individual was not to be
used for other disaster-related responsibilities. FEMA officials said this
pilot was a success. In evaluating the pilot, FEMA said the coach-and-
evaluator was able to devote time to proper training and answering any
questions presented. Finally, the agency revised the FEMA Qualification
System Guide in August 2019, which included clarifying differences
between coaching and evaluating. The revised guide states that, as part
of the position task book process, a coach explains, demonstrates, trains,
assesses, and documents an individual’s task performance while an
evaluator observes, assesses, documents, and endorses an employee’s
independent performance of specific tasks.
FEMA Officials Reported Headquarters officials told us that during the 2017 and 2018 disaster
Inconsistent Use of seasons, disaster workforce employees inconsistently received
performance evaluations when deployed. Performance evaluations at
Performance Evaluations
disasters are to be completed on a paper form by a temporary duty
at Disasters supervisor. If the staff member has a coach-and-evaluator, the temporary
supervisor may request input regarding progress toward mastering the
skills covered by the position task book. The temporary supervisor is
supposed to provide that evaluation to cadre management if an
evaluation was completed. However, FEMA officials told us there are no
mechanisms in place to ensure these steps occur or that the evaluations
Page 39 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
will be used to help develop staff competencies, and it is not something
FEMA officials monitor.
Further, FEMA headquarters officials stated there are no controls in place
to ensure supervisors rate staff consistently from supervisor to supervisor.
These officials told us they are aware of some problems with how the
agency conducts performance evaluations for the disaster workforce and
are developing changes to address them. For example, in the months
prior to the 2017 disasters, the agency began revising its performance
evaluation system, but suspended its efforts when that year’s disasters
occurred. In 2019, FEMA resumed this initiative and agency officials told
us they expect it will be implemented by June 2020. They said the new
system will include replacing the paper form with an electronic program
that will be integrated into FEMA’s other personnel systems, such as the
Deployment Tracking System. Further, in March 2020, FEMA officials told
us they are finalizing a directive intended to provide guidance to
supervisors at disasters on how they are to provide deployment
performance evaluations. In addition, in April 2020, FEMA issued
guidance for the administration, implementation, and oversight of a
performance management process that will provide reservists with annual
performance appraisals. 50 FEMA officials told us this will help ensure that
reservist performance appraisals accurately reflect their job performance
and assist them in maintaining and improving performance in the future.
The agency’s reservist performance management initiative is expected to
be completed by January 2021, but officials have not provided specific
interim milestones or target dates.
Staff and Managers Cited Many disaster workforce staff members are not likely to get ongoing
Difficulties with Receiving development directly from their cadre management when they are not
deployed. According to data from FEMA, there was one cadre supervisor
Staff Development When
of record for every 128 reservists and Incident Management CORE staff
Not Deployed to a as of June 1, 2019. 51 During the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons, this
Disaster ratio was higher in certain cadres. For example, there was one supervisor
of record for every 807 reservists and Incident Management CORE staff
50Seventy percent of the appraisal will be based on reservists’ performance when
deployed. Thirty percent will be based on how timely they respond to deployment requests
and unexcused absences or not meeting training requirements.
51Ratios include only supervisors of record, who are managers that conduct employee
performance evaluations of the disaster workforce. FEMA officials stated that some
cadres have additional managers who perform other supervisory functions or provide input
into evaluations that were not included in the data.
Page 40 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
as of June 1, 2017 in the Individual Assistance cadre. 52 FEMA
headquarters officials told us they are assessing what the right mix of
supervisors to reservists should be across the cadres.
Further, staff members told us they have difficulties getting ongoing
development through hands-on training outside of a disaster. While
FEMA headquarters officials told us that cadres periodically conduct
mission rehearsal trainings each year to prepare their staff for disasters,
they also said not all staff can attend them because cadre management
determines which staff to invite. These trainings are designed for staff
members to simulate a potential disaster scenario while in a training
environment.
Finally, FEMA headquarters officials stated that receiving ongoing
development for staff who do not deploy frequently, such as reservists,
can be a challenge. The only instances when reservists are paid while not
deployed occur when they complete 40 hours a year of mandatory
training or 32 hours a year coordinating with their cadre. In addition, an
individual in one of our focus groups with permanent full-time employees
said reservists had difficulties accessing online mandatory training
because they did not have a FEMA laptop. A recovery manager in a
FEMA regional office told us that it can be challenging to provide staff
development for reservists because they are generally sent to the field to
do a discrete job and have limited opportunities to develop their skills and
competencies when not deployed.
As discussed above, FEMA’s disaster workforce reported challenges
receiving staff development through the agency’s existing methods, which
consists primarily of classroom training, on-the-job training and
mentoring, and performance evaluations. While FEMA has taken actions
to address some of the challenges staff experienced, opportunities
remain to ensure more effective and consistent staff development.
Specifically, FEMA does not have a staff development program in place
to provide assurance of effective and comprehensive staff development of
the skills and abilities needed during deployments. Further, FEMA
headquarters officials said it is primarily the responsibility of staff
members to find available coach-and-evaluators at disaster sites and the
agency has not developed a mechanism to help ensure deployed staff
are consistently paired with coach-and-evaluators. In addition, FEMA
52FEMA officials told us there were 11 Individual Assistance cadre managers at this time
and two of these managers were supervisors of record.
Page 41 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
headquarters has not taken actions to address the challenges we
identified with the lack of mentoring for staff deployed to disasters.
Further, given that FEMA’s performance evaluation initiatives are not yet
implemented, it is too early to assess how effective they will be in
enhancing staff development, including whether they will have
mechanisms in place to ensure employees receive useful evaluations or
the extent to which they will be coordinated with other development
activities, such as coaching through on-the-job training.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that
management recruits, develops, and retains competent personnel to
achieve the entity’s objectives. 53 This includes enabling individuals to
develop competencies appropriate for key roles, reinforcing standards of
conduct, and tailoring training based on the needs of the role. It also
includes mentoring to develop individual performance based on standards
of conduct and expectations of competence that align the individual’s
skills and expertise with the entity’s objectives and help personnel adapt
to an evolving environment. In addition, we have previously reported that
identifying where an agency’s development process is lacking can help
address barriers that hinder its ability to achieve meaningful results. 54 We
also reported that it is important for agencies to treat continuous learning
as an investment in success as it can address employees’ career
development issues, skill-specific training needs, and provide managers
with opportunities to identify where training and development is
appropriate.
Effective and consistent staff development is particularly important
because FEMA has hired a large number of reservists over the past few
years. Our analysis of FEMA data shows that from June 1, 2017 to May
31, 2019, the agency hired over 3,200 reservists, which was 40 percent of
the agency’s entire reservist workforce as of June 1, 2019. Creating a
staff development program that systematically and comprehensively
addresses staff development through courses, on-the-job training and
mentoring, performance evaluation, and ongoing developmental
opportunities would provide better assurance that staff develop the skills
and competencies needed to meet mission needs during field operations
and help ensure the best results for disaster survivors.
53GAO-14-704G.
54GAO-04-546G.
Page 42 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
The large-scale and concurrent disasters during the 2017 and 2018
Conclusions disaster seasons highlighted the complex challenges facing FEMA’s
workforce. The agency deployed 14,684 and 10,328 personnel,
respectively, at the peak of each of these disaster seasons, and the
increased demand for its workforce is expected to continue. Without
accurate and complete information on the knowledge, skills, and abilities
of these staff members, field officials face challenges with efficiently
providing disaster assistance, managing staff workload, and assigning
responsibilities. FEMA has taken some initial actions to improve the
information provided by its qualification and deployment systems, such as
establishing additional controls in its qualification process. However,
developing a plan to address the information challenges experienced
during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons would be beneficial to
enhance field leadership’s ability to identify and leverage staff skills and,
given the persistence of some of these challenges, help ensure they do
not continue to affect FEMA’s ability to support mission needs in future
disasters. Further, in light of the staffing constraints that FEMA faces, it is
important that the agency be able to assess how effectively it deploys
available staff to disasters to meet field needs. Developing a mechanism
to assess FEMA’s deployment outcomes would provide officials in
headquarters with critical information to monitor and evaluate the extent
to which its deployment policies and strategies effectively place staff with
the right skills in the right place at the right time to meet mission needs
and take corrective actions if needed. Finally, creating a staff
development program for its disaster workforce that addresses access to
training, delivery of on-the-job training and mentoring, use of performance
evaluations, and developmental opportunities when not deployed would
help FEMA ensure more consistent and comprehensive development of
the skills and abilities needed during deployments. Consistent and
effective staff development is particularly important to help build the skills
of staff who are qualified in the FEMA Qualification System but unable to
proficiently perform their duties and develop the large number of staff that
FEMA has recently hired to meet its new disaster workforce targets.
We are making the following three recommendations to FEMA:
Recommendations for
Executive Action The FEMA Administrator should develop a plan—with time frames and
milestones and input from field leadership—to address identified
challenges that have hindered FEMA’s ability to provide reliable and
complete information to field leaders and managers about staff
knowledge, skills, and abilities. (Recommendation 1)
Page 43 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
The FEMA Administrator should develop mechanisms, including
collecting relevant data, to assess how effectively FEMA’s disaster
workforce was deployed to meet mission needs in the field.
(Recommendation 2)
The FEMA Administrator should create a staff development program for
FEMA’s disaster workforce that, at a minimum, addresses access to
training, delivery of on-the-job training and mentoring, use of performance
evaluations, and consistent developmental opportunities regardless of
deployment status. (Recommendation 3)
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS
Agency Comments provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix III and
and Our Evaluation summarized below. In its comments, DHS concurred with our three
recommendations and provided a number of ongoing and planned actions
that it intends to leverage in addressing them. DHS also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
With regard to our first recommendation for FEMA to develop a plan to
address identified challenges with providing reliable and complete staffing
information to the field, DHS reiterated some of the steps described in this
report that FEMA has taken to improve the coach-and-evaluator program.
DHS noted that FEMA plans to engage field leaders on these initiatives to
develop a plan to address identified challenges. DHS also reported that
FEMA plans to increase training offerings and align its curriculum so that
FEMA Qualification System status matches workforce capability. DHS
anticipates these efforts will be completed by March 31, 2021. While
these are positive initial steps, they focus solely on the coach-and-
evaluator program and staff training. Our report identified a number of
complex and interrelated challenges with the agency’s qualification and
deployment processes that hindered FEMA’s ability to provide reliable
information to field officials about staff members’ skills and abilities,
including their qualifications, specialized skillsets, and experience within
and across program areas. As such, in developing the plan we
recommended, it will be important for FEMA to take a comprehensive
approach and consider solutions that may cut across multiple systems
and processes. We will monitor DHS’s and FEMA’s efforts in this area to
assess the extent to which they fully implement our recommendation.
With regard to our second recommendation for FEMA to develop
mechanisms to assess how effectively FEMA’s disaster workforce was
deployed to meet mission needs in the field, DHS reiterated the actions
described in this report that FEMA took to establish new force structure
Page 44 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
targets for its incident management workforce. DHS also reported that
FEMA plans to convene subject matter experts to develop mechanisms
that demonstrate how effectively FEMA’s disaster workforce deploys to
meet mission needs in the field, which are expected to be completed by
March 31, 2021. When they are complete, we will assess the
mechanisms to determine the extent to which they address our
recommendation.
Regarding our third recommendation for FEMA to create a staff
development program, DHS reiterated some of the actions FEMA has
taken to develop its disaster workforce that were described in this report.
Our report identified recurrent challenges with FEMA’s efforts to develop
staff through training courses, on-the-job training and mentoring, and
performance evaluations and noted that the agency’s current and planned
efforts do not fully address these challenges. In creating the staff
development program we recommended, it is important for FEMA to
consider how its overall control environment and the initiatives it puts in
place are coordinated to ensure staff receive comprehensive and
consistent development to build the skills needed during disaster field
operations. DHS anticipates that FEMA’s efforts to implement our
recommendation will be completed by March 31, 2021. At that time, we
will assess the agency’s actions to determine the extent to which they
address the intent of our recommendation.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the FEMA
Administrator, and other interested parties. If you or your staff have any
questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1875 or
curriec@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report.
GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix
IV.
Chris P. Currie
Director
Homeland Security and Justice
Page 45 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
List of Requesters
The Honorable Michael B. Enzi
Chairman
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
The Honorable Ron Johnson
Chairman
The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Marco Rubio
Chairman
Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship
United States Senate
The Honorable Rand Paul, M.D.
Chairman
Subcommittee on Federal Spending Oversight and Emergency
Management
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Maxine Waters
Chairwoman
Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives
The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable Jim Jordan
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives
Page 46 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
The Honorable Nydia M. Velázquez
Chairwoman
Committee on Small Business
House of Representatives
The Honorable Peter DeFazio
Chairman
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
House of Representatives
The Honorable Al Green
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Emanuel Cleaver, II
House of Representatives
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul
House of Representatives
The Honorable Gary J. Palmer
House of Representatives
The Honorable Ann Wagner
House of Representatives
Page 47 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Methodology
This report addresses (1) how the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s (FEMA) disaster workforce is qualified and deployed, and
workforce staffing levels during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons; (2)
how effective FEMA’s qualification and deployment processes were
during the 2017 and 2018 disaster seasons in helping ensure workforce
needs were met in the field; and (3) the extent to which FEMA’s disaster
workforce receives staff development to enhance skills and competencies
to support the agency’s disaster missions.
Our review focused on FEMA’s incident management workforce, which is
composed of FEMA staff who deploy to disaster sites. We defined the
2017 and 2018 disaster seasons as the time periods from August 23,
2017 through January 31, 2018, and September 7, 2018 through
November 25, 2018. The 2017 dates represent the start of the FEMA
incident period for Hurricane Harvey through the end of the incident
period for the California wildfire season. The 2018 dates represent the
start of the FEMA incident period for Hurricane Florence through the end
of the incident period for the California wildfires.
To address all three objectives, we (1) analyzed documentation and data
on incident management workforce qualification, deployment, staffing
levels, and development; (2) conducted focus groups with members of
FEMA’s incident workforce across a range of employee types—
permanent full-time employees, Cadre of On-Call Response/Recovery
Employees (CORE), Incident Management CORE, reservists and local
hires; and (3) interviewed FEMA officials in headquarters and field and
regional offices. 1 We compared the results of our analysis and the
information we gathered with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government, The Standard for Program Management, FEMA strategic
1Permanent full-time employees are steady-state federal employees that support FEMA’s
mission areas and operations on a daily basis; CORE are temporary full-time employees
hired to directly support response and recovery efforts; Incident Management CORE are a
type of CORE employee that maintain a regular state of readiness to provide emergency-
state support; reservists are on-call employees that work intermittently as required during
incident management operations; and local hires are local residents who are hired on a
temporary basis.
Page 48 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
documents and guidance, and our prior reports on strategic human
capital management and strategic training and development. 2
We analyzed documentation on how FEMA’s incident management
Analysis of FEMA workforce is qualified, deployed, and developed. Documentation included
Workforce the agency’s 2017 Incident Management Handbook, 2015 CORE
Program Manual, 2017 Reservist Program Directive, 2015 and 2019
Documents and Data FEMA Qualification System guides, 2019 Coach-and-Evaluator Program
Directive, coach-and-evaluator training materials, 2014 Incident
Workforce Deployment Directive, and 2019 Deployment Guide. In
addition, we analyzed FEMA’s 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, 2017 Hurricane
Season After-Action Report, and documentation on FEMA’s staffing
targets for its incident management workforce.
We analyzed data from FEMA’s Deployment Tracking System to
determine incident management staffing levels, the number of staff
deployed to a disaster, the number of incident management staff that had
a coach-and-evaluator assigned, and the ratio of managers to incident
management staff. We also analyzed data FEMA provides to the National
Finance Center to determine the number of new staff the agency hired. 3
To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed officials at FEMA
headquarters about their data quality control procedures and reviewed
documentation about these data systems. For the Deployment Tracking
System, we also conducted electronic testing and reviewed the data for
obvious errors and omissions. We found the data to be sufficiently reliable
for the purposes of this report.
As shown in table 4, to obtain perspectives on how effectively FEMA
Focus Groups with qualifies, deploys, and develops its disaster workforce, we conducted 17
Incident Management focus groups with a total of 129 participants who were deployed in
incident management positions during the 2017 disaster season, and in
Staff Members some cases, the 2018 disaster season.
2GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO-14-704G
(Washington, D.C.: September 2014); Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard
for Program Management—Fourth Edition (2017); GAO, A Model of Strategic Human
Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002); and GAO,
Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and Development Efforts in the
Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, D.C.: March 2004).
3FEMA uses the National Finance Center to provide payroll services to its employees.
Page 49 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
Table 4: Number of GAO Focus Groups with Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Participants in Incident
Management Positions at Selected Locations
Total number of focus Total number of
groups participants Locations of focus groups
Permanent full-time employees 2 supervisor and 31 (17 supervisors, FEMA headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
2 nonsupervisor groups 14 nonsupervisors) and Region VI office in Denton, Texas
Cadre of On-Call 2 supervisor and 32 (17 supervisors, Joint field office in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico;
Response/Recovery Employees 2 nonsupervisor groups 15 nonsupervisors) FEMA headquarters in Washington, D.C.;
(CORE) and Region VI office in Denton, Texas
Incident Management CORE 1 supervisor and 10 (6 supervisors, 4
1 nonsupervisor group nonsupervisors) Joint field offices in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico
Reservists 2 supervisor and 31 (13 supervisors, and Tallahassee, Florida
2 nonsupervisor groups 18 nonsupervisors)
Local hires 3a 25
Total 17 129 (53 supervisors,
76 nonsupervisors)
Source: GAO | GAO-20-360
a
Local hires are generally not supervisors.
The focus group locations were selected based on where staff members
who were deployed during the 2017 disaster season were located at the
time of our review. 4 We also selected these locations to reflect where the
2017 disasters occurred and to obtain variation in geographic location to
the extent possible. Participants were selected using a stratified random
sample from a universe of incident management staff members who were
deployed to a federally declared disaster during the 2017 hurricane and
wildfire season. For each employee type, we conducted separate focus
groups with participants in supervisory and nonsupervisory positions so
they could speak more freely. We also selected participants to obtain a
mix of staff from different cadres and a mix of staff that were qualified and
not qualified in the FEMA Qualification System. If selected staff members
indicated they could not attend, we replaced them with the next individual
on our randomized list who had similar attributes. There were between
three to 11 participants in each focus group, with an average of eight in
4Many staff members who were deployed during the 2017 disaster season (1) remained
or were deployed in the joint field office in Puerto Rico, (2) deployed to other joint field
offices to respond to the disasters that occurred during the 2018 season, or (3) returned to
FEMA offices in headquarters or the regions.
Page 50 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
each. 5 These focus group discussions were guided by a moderator who
used a structured list of discussion topics. 6 The topics focused on staff
members’ perspectives on, and experiences with, the level of staffing and
skill sets their team had, how they were trained and developed, and the
FEMA Qualification System and its qualification determinations. 7
Supervisors were also asked about their staff’s skill sets, training, and
qualification status.
Focus group sessions were audio recorded and transcribed. We
evaluated the transcripts using systematic content analysis to identify key
themes on how effective FEMA’s qualification and deployment processes
were in helping to meet field needs and the extent to which staff members
received staff development to enhance their skills and competencies. An
analyst coded the transcripts and a second analyst validated the coding.
Any discrepancies were resolved by both analysts agreeing on the coding
of the associated statement by a participant. If needed, a third analyst
adjudicated any continued disagreement between coders. The results of
our focus group analysis are not generalizable to all incident management
staff members. However, they provided valuable first-hand experiences
with staffing levels and skill sets during disasters, FEMA’s deployment
processes, the FEMA Qualification System and the reliability of its
qualification designations, and how well staff were trained and developed.
We conducted site visits to FEMA’s joint field offices in Columbia, South
Interviews with FEMA Carolina; Durham, North Carolina; Guaynabo, Puerto Rico; and
Officials in Field and Tallahassee, Florida, to obtain officials’ perspectives on staffing levels
and skill sets, the effectiveness of FEMA’s qualification and deployment
Regional Offices and processes and systems in meeting field needs, and the extent to which
Headquarters FEMA’s deployed staff receive coaching and development to enhance
their skills and competencies. Officials we interviewed at the joint field
offices included federal coordinating officers; chiefs of staff; training
managers; and managers in the Individual Assistance, Public Assistance,
Hazard Mitigation, and Logistics cadres, among others. We also
5One focus group with permanent full-time nonsupervisors included three participants. We
included these comments because they were relatively similar to our other focus group
with permanent full-time nonsupervisors, which had 11 participants.
6We also conducted seven focus groups pretests and made revisions to the discussion
topics afterward as necessary.
7Local hires were not asked about the FEMA Qualification System because they did not
consistently use the system or have knowledge of staff qualification status.
Page 51 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
interviewed an official who was previously a federal coordinating officer at
a federally-declared wildfire in California. In addition, we interviewed
leadership and managers for FEMA regions VI, VIII, and X to obtain the
perspectives of regional officials on the topics above. 8 In each of the
regions, we interviewed the regional administrator and managers in both
the response and recovery divisions, among others. 9
We selected the joint field offices and regions to conduct interviews based
on our focus group locations and to obtain variation in geographic location
and disaster activity. We conducted systematic content analysis of this
work using the same approach we used to analyze the focus groups. The
results from this analysis are not generalizable to all field and regional
officials, but provide important perspectives from leadership and
managers on FEMA’s mechanisms to qualify, deploy, and develop
incident management staff.
In addition, we conducted interviews with multiple senior officials in FEMA
headquarters. For example, we interviewed officials in the Field
Operations Directorate and management in the Individual Assistance,
Public Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation cadres to obtain information
about how FEMA’s incident management workforce and staff in their
cadres are qualified, deployed, and developed, and how the Deployment
Tracking System and the FEMA Qualification System are used for these
purposes. We also interviewed officials in the Office of the Chief
Component Human Capital Officer to learn how FEMA trains and
develops this workforce. We obtained information from these officials on
the actions FEMA has taken to address the challenges we identified
through our focus groups, interviews with field and regional officials, and
data analysis.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2018 to May 2020 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
8FEMA divides the country into 10 regions with states and territories that are
geographically close to each other in order to execute the direction received from
headquarters. Region VI is composed of Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
and Texas. Region VIII is composed of Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Utah, and Wyoming; and Region X is composed of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and
Washington.
9The Regional Administrator in each of the regional offices is responsible for the day-to-
day management and administration of regional activities and staff.
Page 52 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Page 53 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix II: Federal Emergency Appendix II: Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Cadre List and Descriptions
Management Agency (FEMA) Cadre List and
Descriptions
Table 5: Cadre List and Descriptions
Cadre Managing organization Description
Acquisitions Mission Support: Office of the Chief • Provides timely, full-range acquisition services during
Procurement Officer disaster and emergency response and recovery operations
in support of FEMA’s programs, partners, and the public.
Alternative Dispute Office of Chief Counsel • Supports field employees, leads, supervisors, and
Resolution managers by providing a range of decision-making, conflict
prevention, and conflict resolution services on request to
prevent escalation into formal actions or complaints.
Disaster Emergency Office of Response and Recovery: • Deploys, installs, operates, maintains, and protects
Communications Recovery Directorate telecommunications and operations assets in response to
all-hazards disasters and in support of planned special
events.
Disaster Field Training Resilience: National Preparedness • Plans, develops, promotes, and delivers disaster
Operations Directorate performance improvement and training opportunities with
the Emergency Management Institute and Regional Offices.
Disaster Survivor Office of Response and Recovery: • Establishes a timely presence on the ground in the affected
Assistance Recovery Directorate areas to address disaster survivors’ immediate and
emerging needs by meeting survivors at their homes or in
their communities.
Disability Integration Office of Disability Integration and • In accordance with federal civil rights laws and regulations,
Coordination provides guidance, tools, methods, and strategies to
integrate and coordinate emergency preparedness,
response and recovery for children and adults with
disabilities and others with access and function needs,
during and after disaster.
Environmental and Historic Resilience: Federal Insurance and • Facilitates timely delivery of disaster assistance to
Preservation Mitigation Administration communities and individuals. Provides appropriate technical
expertise and develops necessary tools to address and
resolve any potential environmental or historic preservation
issues related to the compliance review and approval
process for actions proposed to be funded by FEMA during
emergency and recovery operations.
Equal Rights Office of Equal Rights • Responsible for equal rights and civil rights function and
diversity initiatives.
• Reviews reasonable accommodation requests and receives
accessible electronic and information technology requests in
support of multiple statutory requirements.
External Affairs Office of External Affairs • Communicates with and responds to FEMA stakeholders in
Congress; the media; state, tribal, and local governments;
the private sector; and internal FEMA employees.
Field Leadership Office of Response and Recovery: • Leads FEMA staff in field operations.
Field Operations Directorate • Ensures the integration of federal emergency management,
resource allocation, and the integration of federal activities
in coordination with state, tribal, and local government
requirements.
Page 54 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix II: Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Cadre List and Descriptions
Cadre Managing organization Description
Financial Management Office of Chief Financial Officer • Creates, monitors, and verifies allocations and obligations in
appropriate FEMA financial systems—including the National
Emergency Management Information System and the
Integrated Financial Management Informational System—
and prepares financial reports at incident field offices.
Hazard Mitigation Resilience: Federal Insurance and • Manages risk reduction activities from natural hazards to
Mitigation Administration include public education, private sector partnership,
technical assistance to local and state governments, grants
management, insurance coordination, and community
planning.
Human Resources Mission Support: Office of the Chief • Identifies, acquires, sustains, and maintains a quality
Component Human Capital Officer workforce to meet the FEMA mission.
Individual Assistance Office of Response and Recovery: • Ensures families and individuals affected by disasters have
Recovery Directorate access to the full range of FEMA programs in a timely
manner and that the best possible level of service is
provided to applicants in the administration of these
programs.
Information Technology Mission Support: Office of the Chief • Provides efficient, expeditious, and cost saving information
Information Officer services at all incident locations during initial setup,
continuation of operations, phase down, and closure.
Logistics Office of Response and Recovery: • Coordinates and monitors all aspects of resource planning,
Logistics Management Directorate movement, ordering, tracking, and property management of
initial response resources, teams, and accountable property
during the life of an incident.
National Disaster Recovery Office of Response and Recovery: • Assists the Federal Coordinating Officer or Federal Disaster
Support Office of Federal Coordination Recovery Coordinator in facilitating disaster recovery
coordination and collaboration between the federal, state,
tribal, and local governments; the private sector; and
voluntary and faith-based community organizations.
Office of Chief Counsel Office of Chief Counsel • Ensures FEMA field operations are consistent with all
applicable statutes, regulations, and agency policies,
directives, and standards.
Operations Office of Response and Recovery: • Encompasses the integration of federal, state, tribal, and
Response Directorate local response programs to ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of immediate assistance to individuals and
communities impacted by major disasters, emergencies, or
acts of terrorism.
• Functionally, operations describes the employment of
tactics, initiation of actions and commitment of resources in
response to an incident requiring federal support.
Planning Office of Response and Recovery: • Plans, collects, evaluates, disseminates, and manages
Response Directorate information regarding the threat or incident and the status of
federal resources.
Public Assistance Office of Response and Recovery: • Provides assistance for debris removal, implementation of
Recovery Directorate emergency protective measures, and permanent restoration
of infrastructure to assist states, local governments, and
certain private nonprofit entities under the Stafford Act.
Page 55 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix II: Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Cadre List and Descriptions
Cadre Managing organization Description
Safety Mission Support: Office of the Chief • Provides a safe work environment for FEMA employees and
Administrative Officer its emergency management partners at fixed sites, incident
operations, and facilities.
Security Mission Support: Office of the Chief • Implements and manages physical security programs in
Security Officer support of FEMA’s all-hazards emergency management
programs for the protection of personnel, property, and
facilities.
Source: FEMA | GAO-20-360
Page 56 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S.
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Homeland Security
Page 57 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Page 58 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Page 59 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix III: Comments from the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Page 60 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments
Acknowledgments
Chris Currie, (404) 679-1875 or curriec@gao.gov
GAO Contact
In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Godfrey (Assistant
Staff Director), Johanna Wong (Analyst-in-Charge), James Cook, Lawrence
Acknowledgments Crockett, Elizabeth Dretsch, Ricki Gaber, Eric Hauswirth, Tracey King,
Ronald La Due Lake, Rebecca Mendelsohn, Amanda Miller, and Adam
Vogt made key contributions to this report.
(102843)
Page 61 GAO-20-360 FEMA Disaster Workforce
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