Accountability in Crisis: GAO's Recommendations to Improve the Federal Coronavirus Response, House hearing transcript (June 26, 2020), GovInfo CHRG-116hhrg41892, PDF
Summary
This is the printed (PDF) edition of the transcript of the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis hearing of June 26, 2020, at which Comptroller General Gene L. Dodaro presented GAO's report on the federal coronavirus response. Chairman Clyburn said GAO could not determine whether Paycheck Protection Program funds were reaching struggling small businesses because SBA had "failed to provide information critical to our review." Clyburn said SBA had obligated more than $512 billion to the program and that between 10 and 12 million economic impact payments had not yet been sent. Ranking Member Scalise said the program had made 4.5 million loans through more than 5,400 lenders.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
Full text
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CRISIS: GAO’S
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE
THE FEDERAL CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS
CRISIS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JUNE 26, 2020
Serial No. 116–100
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Reform
(
Available on: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
41–892 PDF WASHINGTON : 2020
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Chairwoman
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JIM JORDAN, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
Columbia PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JODY B. HICE, Georgia
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin
RAJA KRISHNAMOORTHI, Illinois JAMES COMER, Kentucky
JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland MICHAEL CLOUD, Texas
HARLEY ROUDA, California BOB GIBBS, Ohio
RO KHANNA, California CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana
KWEISI MFUME, Maryland RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida CHIP ROY, Texas
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland CAROL D. MILLER, West Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
JACKIE SPEIER, California KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois W. GREGORY STEUBE, Florida
MARK DESAULNIER, California FRED KELLER, Pennsylvania
BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan
STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
JIMMY GOMEZ, California
ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, New York
AYANNA PRESSLEY, Massachusetts
RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
KATIE PORTER, California
DAVID RAPALLO, Committee Staff Director
RUSS ANNELLO, Select Subcommittee Chief Counsel
FUNMI OLORUNNIPA, Select Subcommittee General Counsel
AMY STRATTON, Committee Clerk
CONTACT NUMBER: 202-225-5051
CHRISTOPHER HIXON, Minority Staff Director
----
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS
JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina, Chairman
MAXINE WATERS, California STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana, Ranking Minority
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York Member
NYDIA M. VELÁZQUEZ, New York JIM JORDAN, Ohio
BILL FOSTER, Illinois BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
ANDY KIM, New Jersey MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee
(II)
C O N T E N T S
Page
Hearing held on June 26, 2020 ............................................................................... 1
WITNESSES
The Honorable Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States,
Government Accountability Office
Oral Statement ........................................................................................................ 6
Orice Williams Brown, Director, Financial Markets and Community Invest-
ment (accompanying)
Oral Statement ........................................................................................................ 6
A. Nicole Clowers, Managing Director, The Healthcare Team (accompanying)
Oral Statement ........................................................................................................ 6
Written opening statements and the statement for the key witness are available
on the U.S. House of Representatives Document Repository at:
docs.house.gov.
INDEX OF DOCUMENTS
No additional documents were entered into the record during this hearing.
(III)
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CRISIS: GAO’S
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE
THE FEDERAL CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE
Friday, June 26, 2020
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS CRISIS
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND REFORM
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in room
1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. James E. Clyburn
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Clyburn, Waters, Maloney, Velázquez,
Foster, Raskin, Kim, Scalise, Jordan, Luetkemeyer, and Green.
Mr. CLYBURN. The committee will come to order.
Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess of
the committee at any time. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
Today, the Select Subcommittee is pleased to welcome Gene
Dodaro, the Comptroller General of the United States and head of
the General Accountability Office. GAO is an independent, non-
partisan watchdog, and it is essential to Congress’s oversight of the
executive branch. This oversight may be more important than ever
before. More than 120,000 Americans have died from the
coronavirus pandemic, the most of any country on earth. New infec-
tions have been rising for weeks, and two days ago, we reached the
highest number of new cases on record, more than 37,000 in a sin-
gle day. It is clear that the administration’s attempts to contain
this virus have failed thus far.
At the same time, huge numbers of Americans are out of work,
including 1.5 million who filed new unemployment claims in just
the past week. In the CARES Act, which passed with broad bipar-
tisan support, Congress directed the GAO to monitor and oversee
the Federal response to the coronavirus pandemic, and the spend-
ing of relief funds and to report its findings back to Congress.
Yesterday, GAO issued its first mandated report, and I have it
with me, and I think all of you have copies of the report.
It is also alarming the report identifies significant problems with
transparency and accountability in the Federal response. In par-
ticular, the Trump administration is refusing to cooperate with
GAO’s oversight, even though this cooperation is required by law.
For example, the Small Business Administration has obligated
more than $512 billion in taxpayer dollars to the Paycheck Protec-
tion Program. Yet, GAO reports that SBA has, and I quote, ‘‘failed
(1)
2
to provide information critical to our review,’’ end of quote. As a re-
sult, GAO cannot determine whether taxpayer funds are being ef-
fectively targeted at struggling small businesses, or, instead, are
being diverted by waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.
Last night, the SBA notified the select subcommittee that it is
now offering to provide GAO with loan data it had previously with-
held, with certain conditions. I am pleased that the SBA is finally
showing some willingness to obey the law and cooperate with GAO,
but it is troubling that the administration withheld this informa-
tion until the eve of a congressional hearing exposing their obstruc-
tion.
GAO’s report also raises serious concerns that the administration
is failing to effectively manage key programs and hold recipients of
Federal funds accountable.
For example, GAO found SBA failed to implement oversight
mechanisms that were essential to weed out fraud and abuse in
PPP programs. As a result, there is a significant risk that some
fraudulent or inflated applications were approved. GAO also found
that accuracy and reliability issues, which were just approved by
the Trump administration, resulted—and I am quoting here—‘‘re-
sulted in significant delays in testing nationwide during the critical
early weeks of the outbreak,’’ end of quote.
GAO also identifies serious problems with efforts to procure and
distribute critical protective equipment and medical supplies. GAO
reports that the administration learned about potential shortages
even before the pandemic but failed to act.
GAO’s report also highlights problems with the delivery of eco-
nomic impact payments authorized by the CARES Act. These pay-
ments were designed to help Americans get back on their feet
quickly. But according to a recent estimate, the IRS still has not
sent out between 10 and 12 million payments, nearly three months
after Congress passed the CARES Act.
As a result, many vulnerable Americans have yet to receive these
critical funds. The American people deserve to know how their tax-
payer dollars are being spent, and whether the government is
doing all it can to protect them from the coronavirus pandemic.
I am deeply troubled by GAO’s findings that the administration
is seeking to evade accountability by undermining GAO’s oversight
efforts. And make no mistake, the administration’s refusal to co-
operate with GAO is part of a broader effort to undermine, evade,
and ignore effective oversight during this pandemic.
The administration has removed inspectors general, withheld
basic information from Congress, and issued inaccurate legal opin-
ions to try to keep billions of dollars in spending a secret. The
American people deserve better.
I want to make something clear: The purpose of this oversight
is not to cast blame for past failures, but to make improvements
to ensure future success. The goals of the select committee are the
same as the goals of the administration, to save American lives and
livelihoods.
Our message to the administration is this: We want to help you
achieve these goals. In this time of national crisis, I sincerely hope
that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, as well as members
of the Trump administration, will recognize the value of being
3
transparent with each other, and with the American people. That
starts with cooperating with GAO as required by law.
I am grateful to Mr. Dodaro for appearing here today, and to all
of the dedicated professionals at GAO who have contributed to this
report. These are unprecedented times, and GAO has risen to the
challenge to help us ensure the Federal response to the coronavirus
pandemic is efficient, effective, equitable, and transparent.
Thank you.
I’ll now yield to the ranking member for an opening statement.
Mr. SCALISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you calling
this hearing, especially to have it here in person. This is something
that we have been asking for a long time. Our members feel strong-
ly that just the ability to interact in person in a committee setting
that can properly social distance while allowing us to do our busi-
ness here is much more effective, and gives us much more of the
ability to get the proper oversight that we expect and the people
of this country deserve.
I want to begin by thanking the GAO for producing an initial re-
port on the Federal Government’s response to the COVID pandemic
in such a short period of time. An analysis of the largest and fast-
est relief effort in American history, while that relief effort is still
being implemented, is a huge task.
The report has some important insights and recommendations,
but we should all recognize the limitations of this analysis. We
asked, and, in fact, we demanded, that the Federal Government
build a plane in mid-flight. The GAO report is an attempted assess-
ment before that plane has even landed.
Let’s start from the beginning. It is beyond doubt that the Chi-
nese Communist Party actively engaged in a cover-up and sup-
pressed doctors and journalists who attempted to warn the world
about a novel deadly virus. Senior Chinese leaders knew a pan-
demic was ongoing weeks before it was announced.
During a critical period in December and January, China with-
held evidence of the virus, evidence that confirmed human-to-
human transmission of the virus, evidence of the extent of the
spread. China refused entry of American and other medical experts
from around the world for weeks, and during this time, China
hoarded medical supplies, like masks, gowns, and other life-saving
PPE. Chinese exports of surgical masks, gowns, and gloves were
stifled by the Chinese Communist Party during this period. China
knew the danger posed by the virus, and while they hid the truth,
they used this vital time to stock up on vital medical supplies.
While Chinese authorities limited domestic flights from Wuhan
to other Chinese cities, like Beijing and Shanghai, China’s govern-
ment urged international carriers to maintain their flight sched-
ules, seeding the virus throughout the rest of the world.
The World Health Organization said as late as January 23,
quote, ‘‘This is an emergency in China, but it has not yet become
a global health emergency. At this time, there is no evidence of
human-to-human transmission outside China,’’ closed quote.
The WHO exists to stop pandemics. We’re told to trust the ex-
perts. And while China was hoarding PPE and sending infected pa-
tients around the world, the WHO corruptly misled the world, tell-
ing us not to worry. This committee is failing its mission if we don’t
4
hold China and the WHO accountable for these facts that they
withheld from America and the rest of the world that caused tens
of thousands of deaths just in this country alone.
Sadly, we know how quickly the virus spread in America. The
first death was February 29, and in four months, we have lost over
120,000 of our families, friends, and neighbors. The House passed
the first COVID relief package on March 4, five days after the first
reported death. Congress passed another bill on March 14. And on
March 27, the President signed the CARES Act.
Together, these bills represent the largest relief effort in Amer-
ican history. Our great economy was shut down. Overnight, mil-
lions of Americans were at risk of losing their jobs. China had put
us behind on testing. Republicans and Democrats alike demanded
speed and, thank goodness, we did, 4.5 million PPP loans, totaling
over $500 billion in just three months.
Leaders of all shapes and sizes, including large banks, commu-
nity banks, credit unions, and small banks, participated in this pro-
gram. More than 5,400 lenders have participated to date. Mr.
Chairman, we should hear testimony from the millions of small
businesses who were saved by the PPP. PPP has been a smashing
success; but given the speed we demanded and the overwhelming
need in any program this massive, there are always mistakes made
and lessons to be learned.
The GAO report finds that SBA’s reliance on applicant self-cer-
tification left the PPP program, quote, ‘‘vulnerable to exploitation.’’
Mr. Chairman, SBA chose to rely on self-certification because of the
need to expeditiously provide funds to small businesses. Congress
demanded that speed. Would anyone have preferred SBA to take
months to design a mistake-free program, while millions of small
businesses and tens of millions of workers lost everything they had
in their lives?
I appreciate GAO reviewing the program and making rec-
ommendations of how to improve. Each of us should take seriously
those recommendations, but the partisan attacks from Democrats
on this subcommittee that seem to imply that the Trump adminis-
tration should have slowed down the PPP, that goes against every-
thing that we all voted on. Every Democrat and Republican who
voted for the CARES Act chose speed over perfection. We didn’t
have that luxury, our economy didn’t. The millions of families who
have been saved from this program would have died on the vine
waiting for some perfectly run Federal program, which I would love
to see an example of that.
The GAO says HHS has experienced, quote, ‘‘substantial chal-
lenges’’ with its initial COVID–19 response. The worst pandemic in
over 100 years hit our shores suddenly because China lied and cov-
ered up the danger. Yes, I agree HHS was faced with historic chal-
lenges. Past administrations and Congresses, by the way, did not
do an adequate job of keeping the national stockpile supplied, and
then we faced China’s hoarding.
But look at what America has accomplished. More than 28 mil-
lion tests for COVID–19 have been performed in the United States,
so many now that some are complaining about all of the positive
COVID responses that we’re seeing after they demanded more
tests. We have more tests, we have more COVID positives. That
5
was something everybody knew would happen. Most days now,
we’re conducting over 500,000 tests per day, and we’re expanding
that capacity. FEMA has procured and delivered over 25 million
swabs to support the administration’s testing blueprint.
As of June 17, FEMA, HHS, and the private sector combined a
coordinated delivery of over 150 million N95 respirators, 631.8 mil-
lion surgical masks, over 16 billion gloves. FEMA coordinated two
shipments, totaling a 14-day supply of personal protective equip-
ment to over 15,000 Medicaid and Medicare certified nursing
homes, which is something we need to investigate further. The
shipments are meant to supplement existing efforts to provide
equipment to nursing homes.
We have accomplished a great amount in a short period of time.
We have a long way to go. We need the efforts on therapies, vac-
cines, and cures to move forward at warp speed. Thankfully, the
Trump administration has launched Operation Warp Speed to find
vaccines and therapies. Congress needs to be a partner, not an ob-
stacle, to the success of Operation Warp Speed.
House Democrats actually plan to bring a drug price control bill
to the floor next Monday. CBO has said that your plan would actu-
ally reduce the creation of lifesaving drugs. The Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors says that number could be up to 100 or higher life-
saving drugs not brought to market if the bill you are going to
bring next week is to pass.
There is never a good time to stifle innovation and investment
in lifesaving cures, but this seems to be an unthinkable time to
pursue policies that will slow down the development of a vaccine.
I am calling on Speaker Pelosi to pull this bill from further con-
sideration on Monday. We do not need to be slowing down the
search for a cure.
We still need to hold a hearing focused on holding China ac-
countable. And while this committee spends so much time trying
to find things that went wrong, we should also highlight some of
the things we did well, like the PPP, which has saved thousands
of lives and millions of jobs. We should join together and demand
that the five governors who issued deadly nursing home orders,
going against the Federal guidelines, finally comply with the de-
mands that we have sent forward to turn over the data so that we
can actually have transparency and accountability for the tens of
thousands of seniors who died unnecessarily in nursing homes be-
cause those governors violated the Federal guidelines. I hope we
search for those answers.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you, the gentleman, for yielding back.
Our witness today is the Comptroller General of the United
States, Mr. Gene Dodaro.
Will the witness please stand so I can swear him in.
Now, I understand that there are others who may be testifying
today who would like to be sworn in as well.
Mr. DODARO. That’s correct.
Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Orice Williams Brown——
Mr. DODARO. That’s correct.
6
Mr. CLYBURN [continuing]. Director for the Financial Markets
and Community Investment, and A. Nicole Clowers, Managing Di-
rector of the Healthcare Team.
I will ask both of you to stand and step forward. I would like to
see you.
Thank you. I appreciate it.
Please raise your right hands.
Do you swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give
is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Let the record show that all three witnesses answered in the af-
firmative.
You may be seated.
Without objections, all of your written statements will be made
part of the record.
With that, Mr. Dodaro, you are now recognized for your testi-
mony.
STATEMENT OF HON. GENE L. DODARO, COMPTROLLER GEN-
ERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY ORICE WILLIAMS
BROWN, DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND COMMUNITY
INVESTMENT; AND A. NICOLE CLOWERS, MANAGING DIREC-
TOR, THE HEALTHCARE TEAM
Mr. DODARO. Thank you very much, Chairman.
Good morning to you, Ranking Member Scalise, members of the
subcommittee. I am very pleased to be here today to talk about our
first comprehensive assessment of the set of legislation that the
Congress swiftly passed and the administration has been working
hard to implement.
We determined that the first two months after the legislation
was passed, there was $1.2 trillion of assistance provided in the
form of almost $700 billion in direct spending, and over $500 bil-
lion in loan guarantees. Now, this assistance was accompanied by
a lot of dedication and agility by various segments of our society.
We had heroic efforts made by our healthcare workers across the
country. There were significant efforts put forward by the Federal
work force to implement this legislation. State and local govern-
ments and others made valuable contributions and continue to do
so.
Now, with regard to the Federal agencies, they gave a high pri-
ority, given the urgency of healthcare needs and the severe eco-
nomic downturn, to move swiftly to allocate the funds, as we point
out in our report. There were tradeoffs that were made, and our
report is designed to help them make some mid-course corrections
with regard to those tradeoffs. But as a consequence, we’ve made
good progress in distributing the money, but only limited progress
in ensuring and meeting the transparency and accountability goals.
Now, our report provides a very comprehensive assessment
across the entire Federal Government. But this morning, in my
opening comments, I’ll just focus on those areas that I think our
initial recommendations for improvement focus on.
First is the PPP program. I agree that they made swift alloca-
tions, standing up a nationwide program and distributing the
7
money; but there were some issues that I think need to be attended
to very quickly. So, our recommendation—there was a lot of confu-
sion with the program. It was, you know, implemented with a
stream of frequently asked questions and guidance, and, so, there
is some confusion that still remains with the program. But all
being said, they need an oversight plan to ensure that the funds
are safeguarded. There’s already some indications of fraud in the
program, and I’m pleased to report, that Administrator Carranza
called me last night, agreed that they’d just give us the information
that we needed in order to go forward.
So, we’re in the process of finalizing arrangements for that. I also
offered to help them as they design their oversight and monitoring
plans, and she accepted my agreement.
On the unemployment insurance area, states are struggling to
implement the program because of the antiquated systems, need
for additional staffing. However, there’s a potential problem with
overlap between unemployment benefits and employees who may
have received aid under the Paycheck Protection Program that
we’re not paying people twice. We recommend they give guidance.
They agree, they’re going to give guidance.
At IRS, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
identified 1.4 million payments of $1.4 billion of aid that was pro-
vided to deceased. We recommend IRS take more measures to get
that money back. They have done so.
We also recommend that the Congress give Treasury the author-
ity to have the master deaths file from the Social Security Adminis-
tration so they could prevent these payments from being made, not
just here, but across the range of the Federal Government’s activi-
ties.
We also recommend that the Congress require the Department
of Transportation to develop a national aviation security plan for
communicable diseases. We recommended this in 2015. So far,
there’s not a plan because of bureaucratic wrangling about who’s
responsible for developing it. I think Congress needs to give clear
direction in this regard. The vessel in which this virus was spread
around the world very quickly came through our air transportation
system. We will always be behind the curve unless we have a na-
tional aviation security plan that’s coordinated, and with some
international norms to protect safety in that area.
So, Mr. Chairman, as I conclude my statement, I want to assure
this committee that we’re going to continue to focus on this, to
meet our statutory responsibilities, to report every two months. We
also have about 40 audits underway now, dozens of others planned
for specific areas.
So, we’re pleased that you took time to focus on our report, and
we look forward to working with the Congress and the administra-
tion to make sure that these programs are effectively and effi-
ciently implemented for the benefit of the American people and our
economy.
Thank you very much.
Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you very much for your testimony.
We will now go into Q&A. Each member will be granted five
minutes to ask questions.
And let me recognize myself for five minutes.
8
Mr. Dodaro, according to your report, the Federal Government
spent at least $677 billion in response to this pandemic as of May
31, 2020. With that much money at stake, robust and sustained
oversight by GAO is essential, but you can only do your job if the
executive branch cooperates.
Now, my question is, why is it so important for the Trump ad-
ministration to cooperate with the GAO’s oversight?
Mr. DODARO. There’s two fundamental reasons: One, we want to
make sure that we fairly represent their views and all of the things
that they considered in carrying out this legislation. Our goal is to
always provide a balanced, fair, comprehensive picture.
Second, we need the information in order to make our assess-
ments. The data are critical to doing analysis and carrying out our
responsibilities. So, without the data, there’s a totally incomplete
picture of what we have had.
Now, I would note that in April, right after the legislation was
passed, I sent a letter to all of the major departments and agencies
of the Federal Government explaining the fact that we were going
to be doing real-time auditing, add a report and monthly briefings
to the Congress, and bimonthly reports to the Congress, that we
needed their cooperation.
By and large, we got that cooperation across the vast range of
Federal agencies and departments. Some—you know, the IRS Com-
missioner made himself and his deputies available to talk to our
team, and other agencies were very helpful.
We really only encountered the most significant problem in SBA,
and I talked to Administrator Carranza, I talked to Secretary
Mnuchin about it. We’re in the process of working it out. So, I
think we have turned a corner. But it is essential for us to do our
job, to help Congress do its job, we need to have access to all of
the information and all of the agency officials that are responsible
for these programs, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. Well, thank you for that.
I noticed that you mentioned the SBA as being a significant
problem. Now, the SBA is administering $670 billion in the PPP
program. That’s one of the largest relief programs in the history of
the country. But according to your report—and I’m quoting you
here—SBA, to date, has failed to provide information critical to our
review.
I would like for you to take a minute to tell us the kinds of infor-
mation that SBA withheld, and what is its impact on GAO’s efforts
to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in the PPP program?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, sir. Two categories of things:
One, the most significant, was access to their data base as to who
received the loans and how much, what the characteristics are. We
still don’t know what information they collected versus what infor-
mation the banks and other financial agencies have at their offices
and control.
So, you know, we weren’t able to do an analysis, other than what
the data was they provided publicly on their website, as to, you
know, aggregate data about different industries, different sizes of
the loans; but we don’t have the specific data yet, which is what
they promised to provide now, but we didn’t have it to do this re-
port, and that’s why we said what we did.
9
I elicited support from Members of Congress on a bipartisan
basis to talk to SBA to encourage them to release the information
to us, and those efforts, I believe, have paid off. So, we’re going to
get the data, but we didn’t have it to do this report.
Second, we didn’t have access to the key program people. Now,
I recognize that they’re busy, but people were busy across the gov-
ernment that made time to meet with us. So, while they did make
some officials available, they weren’t the ones we really wanted to
talk to. So, now they have agreed to make those officials available
to talk to us.
So, those are the two missed categories, Mr. Chairman. But the
data is essential for us. Otherwise, we can’t tell the Congress, you
know, specifically, you know, what type of companies got this as-
sistance, and we can’t carry out any potential risk analysis of what
the potential may be for inflated applications, or even people, you
know, submitting false information to the government.
There have already been cases reported by the Justice Depart-
ment and the SBA IG of people willfully misrepresenting the infor-
mation. So, they’re pursuing a lot of investigations already.
Mr. CLYBURN. Well, thank you.
I gather from your statement that you feel that the information
you received the last several hours and the names that have been
submitted to you, these people are sufficient for you to get the in-
formation?
Mr. DODARO. If they provide us—we still—the data this morning,
we’re still working out the details to transmit it, so we don’t have
it. We expect it at any time. If they give us what they say they’re
promising to give us, which is everything in the data base, then we
will have the sufficient information. I will let this committee
know——
Mr. CLYBURN. Please.
Mr. DODARO [continuing]. One way or another as soon as we re-
ceive the information and assess it.
Mr. CLYBURN. Well, I hope that you will let us know very soon
if you do not receive it.
Mr. DODARO. I’ll let you know one way or the other.
Mr. CLYBURN. Very good.
Mr. DODARO. Yes, one way or the other, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you very much.
With that, I’ll yield to the ranking member.
Mr. SCALISE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Dodaro, for coming to testify about the report as we’ve seen things
so far.
I am encouraged to hear that you are testifying that you are in
a negotiation to get the data that you are looking for from the ad-
ministration. Is that correct?
Mr. DODARO. That’s correct.
Mr. SCALISE. And those appear to be good faith negotiations?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, indeed. I talked to Administrator Carranza in
May, encouraging her, following up on my April letter, and they
agreed to work to provide the data, but they just didn’t do it. I
think they have been, you know, in part, overwhelmed, to be fair,
you know, but we have our statutory obligations.
10
Now, Congress said they want the information quickly, and so we
had an obligation by law to provide it. I talked to Secretary
Mnuchin as well. I talked to the Small Business Oversight Com-
mittee.
Mr. SCALISE. And do you feel Secretary Mnuchin has been coop-
erative in those conversations?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, yes.
Mr. SCALISE. I know we’re limited on time——
Mr. DODARO. But I just—you know, the conversations have been
good. The one I had last night was the most promising, which was
we would receive the information eminently.
Mr. SCALISE. That’s with the SBA?
Mr. DODARO. Yes.
Mr. SCALISE. Look, I mean, I appreciate that you are sharing
with us how overwhelmed any agency would be to have to deal
with this much relief, which we wanted, by the way. We wanted
to push this out the doors as quickly as possible to save—I mean,
if we were still trying to figure out the rules and get agreements
on how to properly do this, there would be millions of people out
of work on top of what we already have, and there would be mil-
lions of small businesses that wouldn’t even open, they would be
gone. We know that, and so, we do want to make sure we get it
right.
But, in the meantime, for somebody to suggest that the adminis-
tration is refusing to cooperate kind of flies in the face of what you
are testifying before us today about, that there is cooperation,
there’s negotiation, which would happen in any request for data
that, OK, you have gotten a lot of data. There’s some other things
you are trying to get. They are trying to figure out what they
should turn over and what wasn’t in the agreement, but at least
that’s going on, and you feel like that’s going on in a positive direc-
tion?
Mr. DODARO. Yes. It didn’t start out that way.
Mr. SCALISE. Yes, of course. In any——
Mr. DODARO. But it’s evolved in a positive direction.
Mr. SCALISE. And ultimately that’s where you want it to go?
Mr. DODARO. That’s correct.
Mr. SCALISE. You want to see progress. You want to see coopera-
tion, and you are getting that cooperation, and I appreciate that.
That’s important testimony.
I do want to ask about a few things because, for example, last
year, do you know how many loans under the seven-day program
SBA gave out all of last year?
Mr. DODARO. I don’t have that number, but I know——
Mr. SCALISE. I have heard numbers somewhere around the
36,000 level.
Mr. DODARO. I know what they have given out now is far——
Mr. SCALISE. How many have you seen this year just since the
pandemic?
Mr. DODARO. Well, they had 4.2 or 4.6——
Mr. SCALISE. Four-point-six sounds more like what I have heard.
Mr. DODARO [continuing]. Million as of——
Mr. SCALISE. So, if they’ve done 4.6 million this year—and that’s
just in about how many weeks? Maybe eight weeks?
11
Mr. DODARO. That was about eight weeks or so, yes.
Mr. SCALISE. So, in an eight-week period, SBA has given out
about 4.6 million loans. All of last year, all 52 weeks of last year,
they gave out about 36,000 loans. That’s not 10 percent more. It’s
not 50 percent. In fact, it is over 125 percent more loans they’ve
given out——
Mr. DODARO. Right.
Mr. SCALISE [continuing]. In an eight-week period than all of last
year. And, by the way, that’s something we should be applauding
because we wanted them to do it. We asked for them to do it. To
do it, you have to move at rapid speed, and they met our demand.
To criticize them for being so expeditious and saving millions of
small businesses would go against the very things that we as Con-
gressmen and Women voted for and, again, a very bipartisan bill
in the passage of the CARES Act. That’s what we asked them to
do.
Mr. DODARO. Yes.
Mr. SCALISE. I’m glad they’re doing it. I have heard estimates of
over 99 percent of all of the loans are being carried out properly.
If there’s fraud and abuse, absolutely root it out. I am glad you
said—isn’t it correct you testified that IRS is working to go after
that money if there’s any kind of fraud you find?
Mr. DODARO. Yes.
Mr. SCALISE. I would love to see loan programs in any segment
of our economy that have an over 99 percent compliance rate; you
go after the folks that are doing wrong. But in an eight-week pe-
riod, to give out over 4.6 million loans and to see it, by and large,
being carried out the way we would all expect it to do, is, I think,
something we should be applauding. Again, go after folks that are
doing it the wrong the way. I’m glad the administration is cooper-
ating and being aggressive in that front.
I do want to ask you about testing. This comes up a lot. We have
heard people complaining there’s not enough testing. The adminis-
tration has worked at warp speed, working with the FDA, in fact,
getting the FDA to move red tape that they normally would take
two years to approve testing, they’re doing it in weeks now. So,
we’re getting that testing, which everybody knew would show more
positives, and then you have people complaining that there are
more positives after they’ve complained there wasn’t enough test-
ing.
Wouldn’t it be fair to say if you do more tests, you get more posi-
tive cases?
Mr. DODARO. That’s one potential reason. I mean, another rea-
son——
Mr. SCALISE. Finally, final question, we—some of us on this com-
mittee have been demanding answers from five governors who
went against CMS guidelines on nursing homes. Unfortunately,
those deadly orders led to tens of thousands of people dying, who
shouldn’t have, in nursing homes. Forty-five governors got it right,
Republican and Democrat.
Would you help us get the data? Because those governors right
now are refusing to give us the data that anybody should see. Vic-
tims’ families, by the way, have been contacting us by the thou-
12
sands asking for that same data, and the governors are refusing to
get it.
Will you work with us to get the data, as we should all be able
to have access to, that shows what really happened with this dis-
ease in nursing homes, so we can make sure it doesn’t happen
again and save maybe thousands more lives?
Mr. DODARO. Be happy to work with the committee.
We did a report recently that showed that 82 percent of the nurs-
ing homes—this is pre-pandemic—had cited for violations for in-
spections. About half of the nursing homes had cited for violations
every year during, I think it was 2012 to 2017.
Mr. SCALISE. We would love to work with you on getting that in-
formation.
Mr. DODARO. Yes. So, this is a very important issue. We’re happy
to work with you on it.
Mr. SCALISE. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you, gentleman.
The chair recognizes Ms. Maloney for five minutes.
Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, Chairman, for calling this important
hearing.
And I thank the Comptroller for being here, Comptroller Gen-
eral, and for your very excellent report on opportunities to improve
the Federal response. You go through a lot of the challenges and
point them out, and then suggestions. And I just want to point out
how helpful it is, as we are going through the coronavirus, to have
this report. It shows how important GAO and the IGR in finding
the problems and pointing to some solutions.
I want to hear what your solution is for the 1.4 billion that was
sent out to dead people. We may be sending out money again to
help people, depending on how the coronavirus develops or doesn’t
develop. And what are you doing? Just checking with Social Secu-
rity? What is the solution going forward that this does not happen
again?
Mr. DODARO. Yes. What happened was, you know, IRS initially
determined that the deceased people, or anybody who filed a return
in 2018 or 2019, should be paid. So, they knew they were paying
people who were deceased. Then it became known publicly. Treas-
ury then reevaluated that position and stopped it and said, No, we
shouldn’t be doing that because it’s not—you know, obviously,
they’re not benefiting, you know, individuals there.
So, they stopped it going forward. But in order to stop it, Con-
gresswoman Maloney, they had to give the Treasury, Fiscal Service
that actually makes the payments temporary access to this death
master file that includes information from states. It is far more
complete than what they had before. For years, I have been—I
have a recommendation to the Congress to pass legislation to give
the Fiscal Service, the Treasury access to this full death master
file. They will stop those payments because they do a do-not-pay-
check.
My own mother received a payment. She, unfortunately, passed
away in February 2018, and my sister got it on behalf of my moth-
er, and right on the check it said deceased. She sent me a picture
of it. Of course, she returned it. A lot of other people didn’t know.
13
IRS only posted on their website if you got one of these, please re-
turn it. What we’re suggesting is they have a proactive approach.
Actually, since our report was issued yesterday, a couple citizens
have already emailed us to say they have these checks and want
to know how to return them.
So, the IRS agreed, they’re going to do it; but Congress needs to
pass this legislation. I think it is very important because it is not
only just the IRS stimulus payments, it could be payments for agri-
culture, education, or whatever.
So, I would encourage you to do that. There has been legislation
introduced, but it’s not been put over the goal line yet.
Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you, thank you.
And I want to go to—return to the testing. Your report states
that the first tests that were deployed by the CDC—you used some
of the strongest language I’ve seen in any of your reports—quote,
‘‘experienced accuracy and reliability issues that resulted in signifi-
cant delay in testing nationwide during the critical early weeks of
the outbreak.’’ Your report also warns that concerns with the accu-
racy of the antibody tests and the viral tests continued even to
June.
So, how did these, basically, failures, impact our ability at the
outset of this crisis to determine who had the virus and prevent its
spread?
Mr. DODARO. They were setback in terms of quickly moving to
get the testing deployed. CDC relied on its own process to develop
the tests. There was some quality——
Mrs. MALONEY. Can I ask, why did they do that when so
many——
Mr. DODARO. That’s historically——
Mrs. MALONEY. Who had a test? All of these countries had a test,
and we developed our own, and then it didn’t work; is that——
Mr. DODARO. That’s correct.
Mrs. MALONEY. And they just discarded that one?
Mr. DODARO. Well, they had to because of concerns associated
with it. Then they opened up testing to the private sector and oth-
ers, and FDA started doing emergency-use authorizations. So, they
moved quickly after that, but they weren’t able to get out of the
gate very quickly. But they have done better since then because
they’re engaging a broader range of people in helping develop the
tests. And some of the tests are having some problems later. FDA
is monitoring it. They have withdrawn some emergency-use author-
izations if there are problems and so—but it is a significant issue.
Mrs. MALONEY. In your report, you go into the procurement proc-
ess. The test didn’t work, and then we’re trying to get it. We
couldn’t get it from other places, and there really was a lot of criti-
cism about the procurement testing supplies and the way it was co-
ordinated. In your view, did you find out why they weren’t coordi-
nating it and working more together?
I heard the complaint in the news where states would say we’re
competing against other states for supplies, and everyone was
pleading with the government to come in and coordinate it on a na-
tional level and make it available to people, and yet, it didn’t hap-
pen. And actually, my state and other states are still asking for
Federal coordination, that we feel that it would work better.
14
Did you find out why they determined that they would not follow
really the suggestion of FEMA and others to have a coordinated
national strategy for distribution, procurement, and everything, of
the supplies.
Mr. DODARO. Yes. We’re still looking at that issue in more depth,
but what we have seen—and this is true in the past with plans and
exercises, including one of which was done just last fall by the ad-
ministration, that there’s always lack of clarity on roles and re-
sponsibilities in these endeavors among Federal agencies, as well
as Federal, state, and local responsibilities.
So, those things—and when you are trying to short them out in
the midst of an emergency, it’s a problem. So, we recommend in
our report, that’s one of the evolving lessons learned that we’re
going to keep for the Congress. And there needs to be greater clar-
ity in roles and responsibilities here, and particularly, you know,
if the Federal Government wants to rely on the states to do the
testing, then they have to figure out how to help them get these
supplies because they have unique authorities, which they have
begun to do, the Defense Production Act, and other things. So,
they’re making a lot of efforts and headway, but the problem keeps
evolving with new cases, et cetera.
So, there’s a unified command group that’s made up of HHS As-
sistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, FEMA, and CDC,
and so they’re working together now. So, I think that that’s encour-
aging.
Mrs. MALONEY. My time has expired.
Mr. CLYBURN. The gentlelady’s time has expired.
The chair recognizes Mr. Jordan for five minutes.
Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, the GAO has issued a report that a brand new government
program has got some problems, got a few glitches. Ain’t the first
time that’s happened, is it, Mr. Dodaro?
Mr. DODARO. No, sir.
Mr. JORDAN. How many years have you been at GAO?
Mr. DODARO. Actually today, Congressman, is my 47th anniver-
sary at GAO.
Mr. JORDAN. Forty-seven years. And we’ve—how many times
have you testified? How many times have you testified—thank you
for your service.
How many times have you testified in front of Congress, Mr.
Dodaro?
Mr. DODARO. I’m closing in on 200.
Mr. JORDAN. Yes, we’ve done this a time or two in the Oversight
committee, haven’t we?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, we have.
Mr. JORDAN. The gentleman from Pittsburgh has been in front
of the Oversight Committee many times.
How many reports have you issued in—well, can you give me any
number? In that 47 years or, I think, the 12, 13 years you have
been running it, how many reports have you issued?
Mr. DODARO. There’s thousands. Since I have become Comp-
troller General, it was probably—and I was No. 2 beforehand for—
so, for 25 years, I would say in the last 25 years, about 15,000 re-
ports.
15
Mr. JORDAN. Fifteen-thousand reports. And the Federal Govern-
ment has some problems. Shazam, it should be a news flash, right?
Four trillion dollars the Federal Government spends, and one bill,
as you said in your opening statement, you said, swiftly passed. We
had to swiftly pass it. The governors were telling businesses own-
ers, you have got to shut down your business, the economy is going
to collapse. So, we spent $2 trillion. Half of what the government
spends annually, we spent in one bill. And the Democrats say,
wow, we’re shocked, there were a few glitches.
I mean, this is—plus, as the ranking member said, we have the
PPP program, which saved businesses from collapsing, helped fami-
lies across this great country. And somehow the Democrats are, oh,
we have got a major problem here. It’s a good thing we did the
CARES Act, which they all voted for, by the way, as well, we had
to. I mean, you are taking people’s property, taking their liveli-
hoods, telling businesses they couldn’t operate,
So, I mean, this shouldn’t be a big surprise.
So, let’s talk about a few of the things in this report that just
came out. On page 108, you referenced the Governor from Michi-
gan. According to the Governor of Michigan, who testified before
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce in June 2020, just
a few weeks ago, the supplies states received from S&S were insuf-
ficient to meet the state’s needs in early days of the pandemic.
Now, first of all, this is the Governor from Michigan, this same
Governor who said you could go to a Lowe’s, you could buy a dish-
washer, but you couldn’t buy a gallon of paint. This is the same
Governor who said to her residents in her state, you may have a
home on a—a small home, a cabin on a lake in northern Michigan,
your property, but you can’t even go to your own property. This is
what this Governor said, she testified and said this, but why don’t
you look at what China was doing? As the ranking member men-
tioned, China hoarding supplies, why didn’t you look at that?
Mr. DODARO. Well, we don’t have the authority to audit other
countries, nor were we asked by Congress to do this.
Mr. JORDAN. No, but it’s an issue, right?
Mr. DODARO. I don’t dispute the fact that that’s an issue, but we
just don’t have the authority to go——
Mr. JORDAN. So, you could put in here a Governor who wouldn’t
let her own people buy a gallon of paint, wouldn’t let her own peo-
ple travel to their own property, and you could put her statement
in the report; but you can talk about equipment and masks and
things they need, but you can’t put in the real problem was China
was hoarding it and not letting us get access to it?
Mr. DODARO. I can’t audit what I don’t have authority to do.
Mr. JORDAN. OK. Well, let’s talk about another issue that’s real
important that the Ranking Member brought up as well.
Did CMS issue guidance on March 13 on nursing homes?
Mr. DODARO. Yes.
Mr. JORDAN. Yes, they did.
Did it mandate nursing homes accept COVID positive patients?
Mr. DODARO. If I could bring Ms. Clowers up?
Mr. JORDAN. You can do whatever you want, Mr. Dodaro.
Mr. DODARO. Thank you, Congressman Jordan.
16
Ms. CLOWERS. Yes, Representative, they issued guidance about
taking COVID positive patients.
Mr. JORDAN. Didn’t mandate they take COVID positive patients?
It said there was guidance on if you were, here’s what you should
do, right?
Ms. CLOWERS. Correct.
Mr. JORDAN. Now, on March 25 there was a Governor from the
great state of New York who issued guidance and said you have to
take COVID positive patients and you can’t test them before you
put them in a nursing home; is that accurate?
Ms. CLOWERS. I have seen those reports, yes, in terms of those
policies of this handful of governors.
Mr. JORDAN. Yes, handful of governors.
Did you guys look at that issue at all?
Ms. CLOWERS. We have ongoing work looking at nursing home
infections. As the Comptroller General mentioned, we——
Mr. JORDAN. Do you know how many days the Governor of New
York told nursing homes you have to take COVID positive patients,
and you can’t test people and decide if they’re coming in before if
you don’t know what—do you know how many days the Governor
of New York did that?
Ms. CLOWERS. I do not have the number off the top of my head.
Mr. JORDAN. Forty-six days. Now, contrast that with what the
Governor of Florida did, the Governor of Florida said you cannot
take—someone who maybe has symptoms, someone who’s come to
a hospital, you can’t let them into a nursing home unless they have
two negative tests before you let them back in.
But you guys didn’t cover that? You didn’t get into that, but
you’re looking at it?
Ms. CLOWERS. We’re looking at it, both the nursing homes fol-
lowing CMS guidance, the guidance that has been put out, the data
that——
Mr. JORDAN. Now, that’s data this committee could use. I mean,
the idea that a $2 trillion bill, the PPP program had a few glitches,
everyone understands that. We were trying to get money out the
door as fast as possible to save businesses, to save families. We all
get that. But the study that would matter is the study you are
doing. When are you going to have that for us?
Ms. CLOWERS. We hope to have that later this fall, earlier this
winter. We’ve already issued one on nursing home infection——
Mr. JORDAN. We need it sooner than that.
Ms. CLOWERS. We can brief you as soon as——
Mr. JORDAN. Forty-six days, the Governor of New York, where
this was the worst, the Governor of New York was putting COVID
positive patients back in an environment where the most suscep-
tible people were. We need a study much sooner than that. This
study, everyone—this could have been—we knew this before you
gave it to us.
That’s what we need to know, why that all happened, how bad
it really was, the real numbers from New York and these other
states that didn’t follow the CMS guidelines, that had their own
darn guidance, and I think caused tremendous harm and death to
countless number of families and countless number of people.
17
That’s the study we need, and I hope it comes before the winter.
I hope it comes, like, soon.
Ms. CLOWERS. We’ll work to move as fast as we can. Among
other issues, we will also be looking at the PPE that was provided
to the staff because, of course, that’s important as well——
Mr. JORDAN. Sure.
Ms. CLOWERS [continuing]. Because lots of staff were coming in
and out of the community.
Mr. JORDAN. Sure.
Ms. CLOWERS. So, we have a body of work on this issue to try
and look at all of the factors that have led to the number of cases
and deaths.
Mr. JORDAN. We need that study, and we need a hearing on that
study ASAP.
Mr. CLYBURN. The gentleman’s time has expired. I’m sure that
the Governor of New York’s decision caused all of those nursing
home deaths in Texas.
I’ll yield five minutes to the gentlewoman, Ms. Waters.
Ms. WATERS. Thank you so very much, Mr. Clyburn.
I’m really appreciative for the opportunity to have this informa-
tion before us today that basically identifies what has happened
with our attempt to respond to this pandemic with several things,
facilities that are being created, of course, by the Feds, and the
PPP program, which is perhaps the best known of all of the re-
sponses that we are attempting to do.
I am, of course, concerned. The GAO has found that SBA and
Treasury have failed to implement adequate safeguards to ensure
that loans are only going to eligible recipients, and the report that
basically teaches us that because of the number of loans approved,
the speed with which they were processed and the limited safe-
guards, there’s significant risk that some fraudulent or inflated ap-
plications were approved. And, of course, this was all done in such
a short period of time, and we are spending record amounts of
money.
I want to ask you, if you have heard of anything—or legislation,
rather, that is entitled ‘‘The Paycheck Guarantee Act’’?
Mr. DODARO. No. No, I have not heard of that.
Ms. WATERS. You have not heard of that. Ms. Jayapal, one of the
Members of the House, has introduced a bill, and basically I think
that the essence of that legislation is this: Instead of trying to orga-
nize all of these different efforts and create all of these facilities,
et cetera, et cetera, we should basically pay people what they
would be earning on their job if they were—as they were working,
up to about $90,000 and let them pay their rent and let them pay
their bills in the way that they would normally do it.
Now, I don’t know exactly how this would work with the PPP
and the small businesses, but what do you think about that idea?
Mr. DODARO. Well, I can give it some thought and, you know,
provide an answer for the record for the hearing. I mean, offhand,
you know, it has the benefit of, you know, going direct to individ-
uals without through intermediaries. I’m not sure how you would
execute it, though, to ensure that you have accurate information;
but I would be happy to think more about it and give you any
thoughts that I have.
18
Ms. WATERS. Well, let me——
Mr. CLYBURN. Would the gentlelady yield for a moment—?
Ms. WATERS. Yes.
Mr. CLYBURN [continuing]. On that question? Let me refer you
to there’s several European countries that have used this approach,
and so, I don’t know that it may not be good to take a look at the
experiences they have had there, and maybe let us know what you
think about it?
Mr. DODARO. OK. Yes, we will do.
Mr. CLYBURN. OK.
Mr. DODARO. I will do that.
Ms. WATERS. Of course, I think by now, we all know a lot about
what happened with PPP. We know that the banks executed the
program for us essentially, and that they took—many of them or
some of them took care of their concierge clients first. They set up
a portal. I talked with a couple of CEOs, and they admitted what
they had done.
Are you aware of that?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, yes. Yes, but we won’t be able to get that type
of detail until we get the data, you know, from SBA.
Ms. WATERS. But you know that the banks, some of them, I’m
not saying all of them, but some of the banks set up special portals
for their concierge clients, and those turned out to be the ones who
got the largest amounts of loans. And tell me, how did it happen
that these hotels and these restaurants were able to identify each
of their installations under 500 people, that they could get paid, get
a loan for all of them? How did that happen?
Mr. DODARO. My understanding of that is that that was a change
that was made in the legislation at the last minute to allow them
to be able to do that, that that was part of the original legislation.
It’s my understanding, you know. If I’m wrong, I’ll provide a correc-
tion to the answer for the record. But that allowed that industry
to apply if they had 500 people or less employees per location.
Ms. WATERS. Did the SBA sign off on that?
Mr. DODARO. Pardon me?
Ms. WATERS. Did SBA sign off on that?
Mr. DODARO. I don’t know their involvement in the legislation.
I’m sure the administration did if the President signed the bill.
Ms. WATERS. Do you think that basically undermined what PPP
was supposed to be about?
Mr. DODARO. Well, you know, I wouldn’t second-guess the Con-
gress on what it did and, you know, the legislation that it passed.
So, I mean, I was assuming it was part of congressional intent if
it’s in the legislation.
Ms. WATERS. Of course, for small businesses.
Mr. DODARO. Congress—the legislation defined what businesses
were eligible or not. I mean, that decision was in the legislation,
from my understanding.
Ms. WATERS. Do you think that the application for small busi-
nesses was too cumbersome?
Mr. DODARO. We’re looking at that issue now. We’ll talk to some
of the small businesses. There’s been some concerns about that, as
19
well as the application for loan forgiveness, which we’ll be looking
at that issue as well.
But in many respects they relied on self-certification so that it
shouldn’t have been that big of a problem, but it could have been.
But we just haven’t been able to do the detailed work yet necessary
to do this, because we want to go out and talk to small businesses
who received loans, but we don’t have that information yet.
Ms. WATERS. Thank you.
Mr. CLYBURN. The gentlelady’s time has expired.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Luetkemeyer.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Dodaro and your colleagues, for being with
us today. I appreciate your years of service, and congratulations on
your anniversary of service to our country.
I just want to followup a little bit on some of the comments that
were made with regards to the PPP program. I serve on the Finan-
cial Services Committee, and part of this actually comes through
some of my subcommittee that we worked a lot with the adminis-
tration on on these programs. I know that, for instance, the SBA
got more money out the door in 14 days than they normally do in
14 years. I mean, that’s pretty significant, that they were able to
do that.
The error rate that I saw was roughly $280 million out of $350
billion that was authorized, and that’s about an eight ten-thou-
sandth of a percent.
Do you, in your years of experience and analysis, find any other
program that can have an error factor of less eight ten-thousandth
of a percent that’s a government program?
Mr. DODARO. Yes. Well, I haven’t looked at the error factors. If
it’s accurate, OK, if it’s accurate, it is a very good record.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Yes, that’s the number that came out from
the media, and I think the Treasury actually acknowledged that
that’s roughly what they’re having to claw back from businesses
that should not have got the PPP.
Mr. DODARO. Yes.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. But that’s a pretty good record, getting out
in 14 days that much money and then only an error factor of eight
ten-thousandth.
Similarly, with the issue with regards to the stimulus checks
going to people who shouldn’t get them, you made a comment a
while ago about Social Security’s Death Master File, and it’s some-
thing that you recommended, apparently for a number of years,
that we, Congress, have never done. In fact, the Trump administra-
tion has proposed in every single budget to give Treasury access to
this, and we, Congress, have not done that. Is that roughly correct?
Mr. DODARO. That’s correct. And I know Treasury, I’ve talked to
Secretary Mnuchin about this and the head of the Fiscal——
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. So, this problem could have been eliminated
and alleviated if we, Congress, had done our job and allowed this
to happen in previous years.
Mr. DODARO. That’s a reasonable hypothesis, Congressman.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. OK. Thank you very much for that.
Also, your charge here is to figure the pandemic’s effects on pub-
lic health. I want to followup on that just a little bit, since we had
20
a report in one of the local political magazines here that roughly
65,000 people die as a result—per month—as a result of the lack
of focus on their healthcare needs due to suicides, opioid abuse,
lack of cancer treatments, heart conditions that aren’t addressed.
You know, New York City even said they didn’t do 80 percent of
the brain surgeries that are necessary.
Did your report look at this part of the healthcare picture? Be-
cause that’s about 50 percent more people dying because of the lack
of treatment versus attention on the COVID.
Mr. DODARO. Yes, we’re going to take a look at that. We’ve been
also focused in our report—let me ask Nikki to come up and talk
about—our healthcare expert—to talk about that. We’ve been try-
ing to focus on the numbers of the deaths that are over and above
what would normally be expected over a period of time and then
as one of the factors that we’re looking at.
But this issue about the other factors is a very important issue,
and so we’re going to be looking more about it.
Nikki?
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Very quickly. I’ve got one more question.
Ms. CLOWERS. Certainly. Just exact type of indicator that we
want to be developing, Representative, in terms of the impact on
public health, those type of elective procedures. I think people
often, when they hear elective, think it’s nonessential. These are
important procedures for people in terms of preventative care. So,
we’ll be examining how quickly hospitals get back to providing
those.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. You know, they said in here 650,000 cancer
treatments, about half of them missed their treatment. About
150,000 cases typically discovered each month are not being diag-
nosed. That’s just on the cancer side.
One more question before I run out of time here is with regards
to right now there seems to be an increase in the number of cases
that are detected. Obviously, we are testing more, so you would an-
ticipate more tests, positive tests, as a result of that.
Have you looked at the percentage of hospitalizations as a result
of that and the number of deaths as a result of that? Because you
would think, if the virus was at its same potency, you would still
have the same number of hospitalizations, you would still have the
same number of deaths. But, anecdotally, that’s not happening.
Can you verify that, or have you looked at that?
Ms. CLOWERS. We are tracking that information. Both it’s an im-
portant point in terms of watching the number of cases, but hos-
pitalizations, as well as deaths, and the percent positive. Those are
all indications in terms of the spread.
One of the things we’ve pointed out in our report is that we do
need better data at the Federal Government in terms of hos-
pitalizations, for example, the number of ICU beds that are filled,
and that’s something we’ll be continuing to track.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. Well, it would seem to me, you know, we had
about three weeks ago the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center,
which according to what somebody told me yesterday is actually
where they did the research and helped develop the polio vaccine,
these are the experts of the experts, they said that the virus is los-
ing its potency, it’s mutating to a lesser strain, which, if it were
21
having more positives but yet less hospitalizations and less deaths,
would seem to indicate that this could be the case.
So, I think this is a very important point that needs to be made
with regards to the media is only telling you that the cases are in-
creasing, but it doesn’t tell you that the deaths continue to go down
and hospitalizations continue to go down, as well as most hospitals
still have the capacity to take care of that.
Ms. CLOWERS. All those factors are important. All those data
points are important.
I would note hospitalizations and deaths tend to lag. So, it will
be important to track this in the next couple weeks to see how that
data changes.
Mr. LUETKEMEYER. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll yield back.
Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you very much.
The chair now recognizes Ms. Velázquez for five minutes.
Ms. VELÁZQUEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Comptroller Dodaro.
From the beginning, I have been calling for the administration
to provide Congress and the GAO with detailed data regarding the
Paycheck Protection Program. It is our job to be good stewards of
taxpayers’ dollars and ensure our programs are working as we in-
tended.
In my call with SBA Administrator Carranza on Wednesday, she
indicated that both Congress and GAO would be receiving loan
data today. This is a good step, but we must work to guarantee
GAO can interview and collect additional data to conduct its over-
sight responsibility. And this brings me to my first question.
Mr. Dodaro, SBA indicated to me that they contacted GAO on
June 23 about transferring full access to all PPP loan data. Have
you responded to SBA? And does GAO have the necessary systems
to securely receive that data?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, we have responded to them. We’re in discus-
sions with them about the details on how it would be done. And
we definitely have the ability to secure the data. We deal with tax
data, healthcare data, classified information of all stripes.
Ms. VELÁZQUEZ. Thank you.
And in the same vein, has SBA indicated a time and date when
they will provide you with access to officials so that you can con-
duct interviews?
Mr. DODARO. I think there’s been one date offered so far, but I’m
not sure about that.
Ms. VELÁZQUEZ. OK. So, you know, Mr. Chairman, to compare
the loans made by SBA on 2019 to what they have done today is
ridiculous. You know, they have a cap as to the 7(a) loan program
that is the flagship loan lending program of SBA. Beyond that,
they cannot lend any money.
Plus the cuts that the agency has suffered under this administra-
tion. So, budgets have consequences. The E-Tran system, they shut
it down. It’s a result of the money that has been cut.
So, the first SBA IG flash report noted that SBA implementation
of the PPP did not align with the CARES Act objective of
prioritizing underserved and rural markets.
22
Has GAO been able to draw any conclusions as to what imple-
mentation failures led to so many rural and minority-owned busi-
nesses from being shut out of the PPP program during the initial
rollout?
Mr. DODARO. We will be looking at that issue. But until we get
the information, we’re not in a position to determine that.
Now, they also, from my understanding, did not collect demo-
graphic information, and they’re trying to collect it as part of the
loan forgiveness application, but it’s voluntary. So, I don’t know
how many people are going to submit the information. But we’re
going to try to look at that and that’s one of our key objectives.
Ms. VELÁZQUEZ. OK. So, you note SBA experienced IT chal-
lenges, such as crashes to the E-Tran portal, forcing SBA to shut
down the site. Is GAO considering future reports on IT issues that
may have resulted in some businesses not being able to access
loans while other businesses may have received more than one
loan?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, we’ll take a look at that issue.
Ms. VELÁZQUEZ. Sir, do you think that it is important for the
Small Business Committee to have access to the raw data so that
if we need to make changes or if the administration comes back to
us and says we need to approve more money and to provide more
relief, how could we assess if the program is working as it was in-
tended by Congress if we don’t have access to that information?
How many times have we requested the Administrator to come be-
fore the committee, and Secretary Mnuchin?
So, it is not right, and we expect for them to come forward. She
committed to me on Wednesday that she would be coming to the
committee. When she asked me what steps or what intentions you
have—and the committee—going forward regarding the program,
my answer is: I don’t have any data. I have no information to be
able to make any responsible decision at this point.
So, thank you, sir.
I yield back.
Mr. CLYBURN. I thank the gentlelady.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Green for five minutes.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Scalise, and thanks to our witnesses for being here today.
There is understandably a lot of consternation in our country
today about the spike in new coronavirus cases. As with all the
other public health decisions we face this year, we have to make
sure we take a holistic look at the data to ensure we have the truth
and not some preferred narrative. Is the alarming spike in cases
in parts of this country due to greatly increased spread or could
there be another factor?
Let’s be honest. The United States is testing people for the
coronavirus at unprecedented rates, and more people are willing to
go see their doctor as the country reopens, so of course we will see
an increase in cases. Some public health experts have estimated
that we have 10 times the number of cases of coronavirus than
being accounted for in testing.
Others, like Dr. Francis Collins, the Director of the National In-
stitutes of Health, have observed in the past, and I quote, ‘‘The
number of people who haven’t yet turned up in the healthcare sys-
23
tem but who already are infected is probably 100 times the number
of cases you know about,’’ end quote.
Even CNN—yes, I’m referencing CNN—reported just this week
that a new study suggests 80 percent of cases were never reported
in the month of March because we weren’t testing as broadly as we
are now.
We’ve known since the beginning that there were likely far more
cases overall than just the confirmed cases. And as we have
ramped up testing, we see that to be the case.
Dr. Donald Yealy of the University of Pennsylvania reinforced
this point. He urged us, and I quote, ‘‘to change our mindset and
focus not exclusively on the number of cases but on the severity of
the illness,’’ end quote. Yealy continued and pointed out, quote,
‘‘Fewer people are being admitted, and when they are, they tend
to be much less sick than at the beginning or the peak phases of
the pandemic,’’ end quote.
We have to look at the hospitalization rates in context. The CDC
reports, and I quote, ‘‘For people 65 years and older, current cumu-
lative COVID–19 hospitalization rates are within ranges of cumu-
lative influenza hospitalization rates observed at comparable time
points during recent influenza seasons,’’ end quote.
Now, that’s good news. And while we’re clearly not out of the
woods yet, we need to look at the data in context. Asserting that
the President has failed to contain the virus because the cases are
going up is either blindly uninformed or blatantly malicious.
First, the goal was to flatten the curve, not stop every person
from getting the virus. That’s physically impossible. Trust me. I’m
a physician.
Any honest broker will realize that cases are going through the
roof because we’re testing through the roof. So, what is it, we have
to have more tests or, now that we are, ‘‘Oh, my dear, the Presi-
dent’s failed us because we’re testing more and there are more
positives’’? I think most people will see the ridiculous hypocrisy in
that.
The media continues their narrative, marching in lockstep with
my Democrat colleagues, and they ignore the context and the facts.
As I came in today, I saw a gentleman running on the sidewalk.
There was no one within a hundred yards of the guy, yet he was
wearing a mask while running. This speaks to the irrational fears
this dishonest representation of the data by the media has caused.
The media also ignores the fact that reopening society will save
lives in other ways. Cancer screenings deemed nonessential but in
reality, are very essential. Social isolation, which has devastating
healthcare consequences, can come to an end if we open up and
Americans can get back to work, feed their families, pay their
rents, and save for their kids’ college.
Other data is also suspicious. Colorado’s Governor just revised
the state’s deaths due to COVID down by 12 percent because he
found that the state’s health department was counting even auto-
mobile accidents from trauma deaths as COVID if the patient had
the virus. That’s absurd. Twelve percent.
Now, my question to you, sir, is have you looked into how states
are actually counting their COVID deaths? And, if so, are there
24
other states that are going to be revising their numbers down 12
percent?
Mr. DODARO. One of the findings in our report is that the testing
data that CDC’s been reporting is inconsistent and not complete.
Not all the test data has been reported, states are counting dif-
ferent things differently, and it’s been a problem. So, you really
don’t have good, reliable data.
Now, we were getting ready to make a recommendation here, but
on June 4 CDC finally, through the Secretary of HHS, used the au-
thority Congress gave them in the CARES Act to set out testing
requirements to all labs in the country. So, hopefully the testing
data will get better.
Mr. GREEN. Hopefully, it’s not 12 percent all across the country
being revised down—or, well, maybe hopefully it is and then we’ll
get a real accurate contextual picture.
Mr. Chairman, manipulating the data to fit a progressive nar-
rative is damaging this country, and I ask that we stop it, espe-
cially in this committee.
Thank you.
Mr. CLYBURN. I agree. I thank the gentleman. I agree with that.
I also agree that ignoring science is damaging to our country.
Mr. GREEN. I couldn’t agree more. I try to practice evidence-
based medicine, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. I just want to say, you’ve asked, Mr. Ranking
Member, that we have meetings in person. We’ve accommodated
you. I would love for us to abide by the Attending Physician’s rec-
ommendations.
Mr. GREEN. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. Yes.
Mr. GREEN. Point of order. CDC has said six-foot social
distancing, you don’t need a mask. We are 6 feet apart. We don’t
need a mask. When I came in today, I put my mask on because
I walked past people. Now that I’m in a seat, I don’t need a mask.
Mr. CLYBURN. You are a scientist.
Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir.
Mr. CLYBURN. You are a physician.
Mr. GREEN. Clinician, yes, sir.
Mr. CLYBURN. So, anyone walking past you and you don’t have
on a mask, you wear the mask to protect them.
Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir, if someone comes by who doesn’t have a
mask on, I’ll put mine on. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. CLYBURN. Yes, well, I just want to say—I’m going to yield
to you there, Mr. Foster—but I just want to say this.
If you wish to continue having these meetings in person, you’re
going to have to adhere to the Attending Physician or I will not
have the meetings in person. It’s just that simple.
Mr. GREEN. I understand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. Yes. I’ll yield.
Ms. WATERS. Point of order.
Mr. CLYBURN. You’re recognized, yes, ma’am.
Ms. WATERS. I’d like to raise the question of, if we are sitting
here without a mask and we’re speaking, is it possible that we
25
could have emissions that are going on the desk, on the microphone
around us?
And if someone comes behind us who has not worn a mask and
we are basically emitting on the table here on the dais, have we
been told by the scientists that the virus remains on the surface
for a certain length of time, depending on whether it’s wood or
steel, et cetera, and that if you contact that surface and you have
emitted—there have been emissions, that you could become in-
fected?
Mr. CLYBURN. Chairwoman Waters, I’m going to yield now to one
of my favorite scientists.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. And maybe he’ll weave an answer to that ques-
tion.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. The chair recognizes Mr. Foster.
Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. Just a moment.
Voice. Point of order.
Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Jordan.
Mr. JORDAN. It seems to me science and common sense that you
should not put COVID-positive patients back in nursing homes.
That to me seems to be science based and common sense. And
that’s the study we need, as I indicated earlier.
Mr. CLYBURN. I have absolutely no control over the Governor of
New York. I do have some control over this subcommittee, and I
will exert it. Please rest assured I will exert what control I do have.
Mr. Foster, you’re recognized for five minutes.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Comptroller Dodaro.
Our greatest, best hope for finally emerging from this crisis is
through the development of safe and effective vaccines and thera-
peutics. Great scientific progress has been made by scientists
around the world, and many of these products are entering ad-
vanced clinical trials.
But developing, manufacturing, and distributing vaccines and
therapeutics are challenging and complicated tasks, especially in a
compressed timeframe and with an often international supply
chain. This requires not only great scientific efforts, but also good
technical project management, a real strength of GAO.
This is something, unfortunately, that we’ve not always seen in
the Federal response to this crisis. As stated in the GAO’s report,
I quote, ‘‘While multiple Federal agencies are taking actions to de-
velop vaccines and therapeutics to prevent and treat COVID–19,
questions remain about their timing and distribution.’’
Now, this should not be used as some sort of partisan hatchet.
I know from conversations with my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle on this committee that there is a great appetite for Congress
and the American people to get the best possible information on the
status and likely time scales of the results of these efforts.
I also know from conversations with many of the scientists and
executives involved that there is a real desire for them to present
the full complexity of their efforts, not in the form of sound bites
in hearings or answering feisty letters from Congress, but actually
26
detailed briefings on the technical uncertainties of what they’re try-
ing to accomplish and the schedule uncertainties.
This is important, I think, to not only every American, but cer-
tainly every elected official. A city mayor cannot make plans if they
don’t know whether a therapeutic will be available next month or
not for years. And this sort of getting the best scientific information
on when these will actually happen from a neutral third party is,
I think, something that the GAO really is uniquely qualified to pro-
vide for us.
So, Mr. Comptroller General, the GAO has expertise in technical
project management. So, could you just say what capabilities does
the GAO have today to provide oversight of vaccine and therapeutic
development? And what additional capabilities might you be able
to stand up to help this committee address these efforts?
Mr. DODARO. We’ve been building our capacities in the science
and technology areas. In fact, we will have a Ph.D. in microbiology
that has experience with vaccine therapies on staff here within a
week as part of our effort, supported by the Congress, to grow that
team. We have other people who have observed past efforts to build
vaccines and distribute them. So, we have great capabilities.
We also have standing arrangements with the National Academy
of Sciences. We just completed a joint study with the National In-
stitute of Medicine on use of artificial intelligence in drug develop-
ment. And I also have people on my advisory committee that are
making themselves accessible, including Harvey Fineberg, who
used to be the President of the Institute of Medicine.
So, we have in-house capabilities to do this, Congressman, and
we have standing arrangements to get additional expertise.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you.
In my many years in science I’ve been on the receiving end of
GAO reporting on our projects, and I have to say that, although it
was often painful at the time, it made the projects better, that hav-
ing the GAO come in and ask the tough questions that we’ve sort
of been hiding from or don’t have good answers for, asking: Well,
what if this happens? Do you have a contingency plan in this case?
What are your plans if the virus mutates, you deploy a therapeutic
and then the virus immediately mutates around it? What’s your
backup plan?
And simply asking those questions will often make the project
stronger and give Congress and the American people better infor-
mation on probably the most important question that we’re facing
as a world right now.
Mr. DODARO. Well, we’re planning to do that.
Mr. FOSTER. Well, thank you. And I look forward to working with
you.
As I’ve mentioned, I’ve had good conversations on both sides of
the aisle here on really standing up and getting an agreement be-
tween you and HHS, and to really get the kind of information, like
your access to the data bases, so that you can get the answers that
we need, so that if you’ve got access to things like the details of
the contractual arrangements, the true projected capacity to manu-
facture different types of vaccines and therapeutics, and to be able
to report in a timely manner, in almost real time, I think this could
27
be one of the most valuable things that this select subcommittee
could end up doing.
Mr. DODARO. Yes, I agree with you. We will make arrangements
to do that. We’ve done that on, like, major weapon systems, look
at the test data and analyze. Happy to do that. I agree with you,
it’s essential to attacking this issue thoroughly and providing prop-
er safeguards, is vaccines and other therapeutics.
Mr. FOSTER. Thank you. Well, you’re uniquely situated. I appre-
ciate that.
I’ll yield back.
Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you, Mr. Foster.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Raskin for five minutes.
Mr. RASKIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to start with a few facts. Fact: 124,415 deaths in the
United States from COVID–19. Fact: More than 2.4 million cases
of infection among our people. Fact: Hospitalizations in Texas are
up more than 215 percent since Memorial Day. Fact: Florida just
reported 10,000 new coronavirus infections in two days. Fact: Ari-
zona, as of yesterday, had more than 60,000 cases, 1,467 deaths,
and the infection continues to spiral out of control.
Mr. Comptroller General, the GAO report raises questions about
the IRS’ handling of the economic impact statements, the stimulus
checks, to get people through this nightmare.
According to your report, the IRS has issued around 160 million
payments so far, but the agency has faced challenges and delays
in getting checks to some of our most vulnerable people. That in-
cludes hard-to-reach populations like, quote, ‘‘individuals without
bank accounts, the homeless, people with limited or no internet ac-
cess, people with limited English proficiency.’’
Would you agree that these populations are especially vulnerable
during a pandemic and a recession and are likely in need of this
Federal support?
Mr. DODARO. Absolutely.
Mr. RASKIN. So, should this be a top priority for the IRS to reach
these populations?
Mr. DODARO. Yes. And we’ll be looking at their efforts to do so.
I know they’ve started some on the Interagency Council on Home-
lessness and Men of Valor to help individuals coming out of prison.
So, we’ll be looking at it to see if we have any additional sugges-
tions.
Mr. RASKIN. Your report says that IRS faced difficulties identi-
fying and then delivering payments to people who did not file tax
returns in 2018 or 2019, including recipients with low adjusted
gross incomes.
I’ve heard from a number of these people. These nonfilers usually
have incomes below 12,000 a year and, according to one estimate,
there are as many as 12 million nonfilers who may be at risk of
missing out on their economic impact statement that they may
need more desperately than the rest of the population.
What should Treasury and IRS be doing now to ensure payments
reach up to 12 million American nonfilers without any further
delay?
28
Mr. DODARO. Yes. They need to explore different data sources to
try to identify these individuals. That’s one of the things we’re
going to look at and make some recommendations to them.
Mr. RASKIN. Well, when will that happen? It’s just a matter of
some urgency. My office, and I’m sure my colleagues’ offices, are
just besieged with people who desperately need this money.
Mr. DODARO. Yes. We’re working on it. I hope to have those rec-
ommendations by our next bimonthly report.
Mr. RASKIN. OK. I’m working through the weekend during this
pandemic. I hope your people are working through the weekend,
too, to get that report.
Mr. DODARO. We wouldn’t have been able to produce that report
that you have there in 90 days since the law if we weren’t working
24/7.
Mr. RASKIN. I appreciate that.
GAO also reported that Treasury and IRS sent nearly $1.4 billion
in payments to 1.1 million decedents, that is, Americans who had
already died. I had also heard from some honest constituents who
called up and said: We got this check for my wife or my husband
who’s no longer with us.
IRS apparently was aware this was happening back in March
but didn’t begin to correct it until months later. What’s up with
that? That’s just shocking. How did that happen?
Mr. DODARO. Well, IRS’ original determination was that the law
required them to send the check to everybody who filed a return
in 2018 or 2019. So, they figured it would include those people. So,
they did it with foresight that that’s what they were supposed to
do. Then——
Mr. RASKIN. Well, OK, so let me pause you there, because that
seems to contradict common sense. In other words, because we said
that it should go to everyone who filed taxes, they thought it
should go to people who had died.
Mr. DODARO. Right.
Mr. RASKIN. Who had filed taxes.
All right. Well, what is the law? Because some people were say-
ing: Should we cash this check? Why would the government be
sending to it us?
Mr. DODARO. Right. Right. Yes. No, no, I agree.
Mr. RASKIN. Well, what is the correct legal interpretation?
Mr. DODARO. The correct interpretation, we believe, is Treasury’s
interpretation after that was that the intent was to help people
who were affected by the situation, which wouldn’t include people
who were deceased. So, they stopped it at that point in time after
IRS had made the first three payments.
So, we believe the correct interpretation now is they should not
have been sent, and our recommendation is to try to get as much
of the money back as possible.
Mr. RASKIN. OK. And they’ve changed that policy of sending
checks to people who have died?
Mr. DODARO. That’s correct.
Mr. RASKIN. OK.
Mr. DODARO. Yes, they stopped that after the first three rounds.
Mr. RASKIN. All right. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
29
Mr. CLYBURN. Thank you very much, Mr. Raskin.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Kim for five minutes.
Mr. KIM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to begin by just addressing something that came up
earlier in this hearing. It was talked about CDC guidance when it
comes to wearing a mask and social distancing.
I just went onto the CDC website and just want to confirm that
it says cover your mouth and nose with a cloth face cover when
around others and continue to keep about 6 feet between yourself
and others. It is not saying that it is one or the other. It is recom-
mending both social distancing and using a mask.
Moving forward, I have to say I’m very concerned about the
Trump administration’s failures when it comes to providing per-
sonal protective equipment and medical supplies that our commu-
nities need to keep safe. According to the GAO’s report, there was
an HHS exercise in August 2019 that determined, quote, ‘‘that do-
mestic manufacturing capacity would be unable to meet the de-
mands for personal protective equipment and other supplies in the
event of a global influenza pandemic.’’
This was months before the coronavirus pandemic, but the
Trump administration failed to act on these findings. As a result,
according to the GAO, quote, ‘‘The nationwide need for critical sup-
plies to respond to COVID–19 quickly exceeded the quantity con-
tained in the Strategic National Stockpile.’’
Mr. Comptroller General, I wanted to ask you, do you agree that
the Strategic National Stockpile had been short of the critical sup-
plies that were needed during this pandemic?
Mr. DODARO. Yes. And that’s been acknowledged, and they’re try-
ing to fix it now, and they’re going to try to revamp the stockpile
going forward.
The exercise that you talk about, it’s called Crimson Contagion,
and it was pretty much an exercise that mirrored what exactly has
happened with this particular COVID–19 situation, and it identi-
fied things.
Now, what they told us was that they didn’t have enough time
to react to the findings in there, that they did brief some Members
of the Congress, but they’re trying to revamp the national stockpile
now.
But the masks that were in there that were left over from H1N1
weren’t effective anymore, and so they had to be replaced, or they
were provided with a caveat about their potential ineffectiveness.
Mr. KIM. What steps could have been taken and should have
been taken to prepare for this to quickly replenish that stockpile,
in your opinion?
Mr. DODARO. Yes, well, I mean, the issues—we raised this before
in prior administrations as well, that there weren’t enough ventila-
tors in urban hospitals around the country. So, we’ve raised these
issues over time.
Our country has difficulty—and the hardest part of my job is get-
ting people to act before there’s a crisis—has great difficulty in pre-
paring ahead for things. So, it’s not unique to any administration.
This has been a problem that I’ve seen throughout my career in
government.
Mr. KIM. So, earlier in this hearing——
30
Mr. DODARO. So, they could have—they had the information and
everybody preceding had it in order to act on it, but they just—they
didn’t. Either the money wasn’t appropriated, they didn’t allocate
it properly. We’re looking more at the details about it, but clearly
steps could have been taken previously and recently.
Mr. KIM. It was characterized earlier in this hearing that some
of the problems that we’re facing with the government response
were a few glitches. So, would you then categorize the problems in
terms of the supply of PPE as a few glitches?
Mr. DODARO. I wouldn’t categorize it that way.
Mr. KIM. Now, beyond just the supply side of the issue, it’s also
about the coordination side. And this was something that was
raised here. I think you wrote there had been reports of the Fed-
eral acquisition and distribution efforts to supplement the Strategic
National Stockpile supplies lacked coordination and resulted in
challenges obtaining supplies here.
How did that lack of coordination hurt the efforts to obtain the
critical supplies?
Mr. DODARO. Well, I think early on—I’ll ask Ms. Clowers to
elaborate—early on HHS was taking the lead here. Later it was
shifted to FEMA. Then the President’s—the task force, the White
House Task Force came in, set up the unified command, and
brought in people to focus on the supply chain.
Mr. KIM. Would you characterize that as a few glitches?
Mr. DODARO. Pardon me?
Mr. KIM. Would you categorize the problems when it comes to
the coordination as a few glitches that caused the problems with
getting the PPE to the states and the hospitals?
Mr. DODARO. No.
Mr. KIM. When it comes to—one last part here that I just wanted
to address. In your report you said you requested information on
the Strategic National Stockpile inventory prior to the pandemic,
the types and amount of supplies that states requested, as well as
what HHS and FEMA distributed from the Strategic National
Stockpile to the states’ request. You said you did not have that in-
formation as of June 12th.
That seems like very basic information to me about what is nec-
essary to assess whether the stockpile is doing what it’s meant to
do. Have you received that information yet?
Mr. DODARO. Go ahead.
Ms. CLOWERS. We have not.
Mr. KIM. When did you make that request?
Ms. CLOWERS. I don’t have a specific date, but it’s a request that
we made fairly early on. But we’ll continue to work with HHS.
Mr. KIM. Have you been given a reason why you have not been
receiving this information?
Ms. CLOWERS. We have not.
Mr. KIM. Do you know how much is in our stockpile right now?
Ms. CLOWERS. I do not.
Mr. KIM. A question is just, who pays for our stockpile?
Ms. CLOWERS. There’s a—the Federal Government provides ap-
propriations. And as the Comptroller General mentioned, the ap-
propriations have varied each year over a number of years in terms
31
of what’s been provided to maintain adequate supplies in the stock-
pile.
Mr. KIM. Yes, that’s absolutely correct. It comes from our govern-
ment. It comes from the American people. It’s the American peo-
ple’s stockpile, and they deserve to know what has been done to
keep them safe.
The American people are still under threat from this virus. We
face rising cases across this country. We face a threat of a second
wave later this year. And the American people deserve to know if
we’re ready, and your testimony and the report today makes me
concerned that we’re not ready.
Mr. Chairman, back to you.
Mr. CLYBURN. I thank the gentleman.
We have had questions from all of our members. I would like
now to yield to the Ranking Member for any closing statement he
would like to make.
Mr. SCALISE. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing in this committee room.
Again, thank you, Mr. Dodaro, for your report, your testimony.
I appreciate the fact that you’ve been working with the Trump ad-
ministration to get the information you need to compile this report,
as well as to continue providing us proper oversight. And I’m glad
that in your testimony you made clear that you’re getting that co-
operation from the Trump administration.
Clearly, there are other issues you’re going to continue to work
through with the Small Business Administration. As you testified
today, they have been overwhelmed. Last year they issued about
36,000 loans under the 7(a) program and in eight short weeks they
issued over 4–1/2 million loans through that same program, over
125 percent increase in workload in a time where we knew we had
to move expeditiously. Time was of the essence to save millions of
small businesses, to save millions of jobs so that families have the
ability to pay their mortgage, to get back to work, to have their ca-
reers before them as we work through this pandemic.
It’s been unprecedented in terms of the response, the quickness
that we’ve seen in getting testing brought to the market. Tests that
would have taken two years for the FDA to approve have been ap-
proved instead in weeks, following safety guidelines but removing
red tape.
I applaud the Trump administration for implementing Operation
Warp Speed to push more results for families, to get more testing,
to get more cures, therapies. We’re seeing revolutionary changes,
drugs like Remdesivir, that are proving effective for many people
of COVID–19.
That would not have happened without the Trump administra-
tion moving red tape out of the way so we could save lives, con-
tinuing to search for a vaccine at rapid speed that we’re seeing in
the private sector because red tape has been cut. We need to con-
tinue to push for those kinds of reforms and that kind of expedi-
tious response.
Now, clearly when you move expeditiously there can be mistakes
made. It’s good for us to look at finding out what those mistakes
are and correct them. I’m glad you testified that you are seeing
agencies like the IRS correct things along the way that they found.
32
But we also have seen that, based on your findings that you pre-
sented, so far the PPP program has more than a 99 percent success
rate. That is revolutionary for a program that has given out loans
to over 4–1/2 million small businesses, over 500 billion taxpayer
dollars that have been used properly, as we all voted for. Repub-
licans and Democrats joined together to say let’s help these small
businesses quickly. To have over a 99 percent effective rate.
Let’s go find the folks who abused it. Let’s go get that money
back. And I’m glad the administration’s working to do that. But for
somebody to suggest that a program that has over a 99 percent
success rate is a failure or shouldn’t have happened is ludicrous.
Again, millions of families would be out of work. Small busi-
nesses that would be closed. Even with the unemployment numbers
we’re seeing each week, those numbers are dropping because busi-
nesses are starting to open again.
Again, we look back to the science. As Dr. Green talked about,
why did we do this? We didn’t do this to hope that nobody gets
coronavirus. Sure we hope that nobody gets coronavirus. But in a
real world we know it’s still out there. And so the question is, do
we just shut everything down and wreck our economy, wreck the
livelihoods?
And, again, as Dr. Green pointed out, there are thousands of peo-
ple dying because they’re staying at home. They’re not going to
their doctor. They’re not getting their checkups and their cancer
treatments and their colonoscopies and their mammograms and
their immunizations. Children will die because they’re not getting
immunized.
So, there’s a cost to keeping people at home as well. We need to
look at all of that.
We’ve talked in this committee about the nursing home crisis
that happened. Yes, every state experienced nursing home deaths,
but not all states experienced it at the same level. Let’s just look
at the data we’ve gotten so far.
And, again, we’re trying to get more data because some of these
states are hiding the data. But what we know, if you look at the
five states that violated the CMS guidelines, went against the
science, tens of thousands of people died that shouldn’t have died.
We want to know about that.
I’m glad that you’re looking into it. As Mr. Jordan said, we hope
that you do that quickly as well, because we need to stop it from
happening where it is still going on. In states like Michigan, where
we know this is killing people to force nursing homes to take back
COVID-positive patients if they can’t isolate them, it killed tens of
thousands of people and probably a lot more.
I know the chair brought up the state of Texas. The state of
Texas had 700 percent fewer nursing home deaths per capita than
the state of New York. Of course, they had deaths, every state had
nursing home deaths, but not all states experienced the same
thing. The state of Florida had over 500 percent fewer nursing
home deaths per capita than the state of New York.
We ought to be looking at where it’s working well, where it’s
working poorly, stop it from working poorly, and say, why don’t you
follow the guidelines that the folks who are doing it right are?
33
I’d love to have zero nursing home deaths. But 700 percent fewer
in one state than another, you should be looking and going, why
are they doing it right and why are they not?
And finally, Mr. Chairman, and to all of our members, I know
we’re looking at the ICU beds. Again, the economy was closed down
to make sure our hospitals don’t get overwhelmed. And as we
speak today, there’s not a single state in the Nation whose hospital
system is overwhelmed.
We’ve seen spikes, clearly we’re following the spikes, and the
governors are managing that, but not a single state in this Nation
has their hospital system overwhelmed. That was the barometer
for closing the economy down. It’s why we need to reopen safely.
And, again, to address the people that are dying because things are
closed down, that has to be understood as well.
So, I appreciate the report you gave. I look forward to the future
reports.
I hope the governors of those five states comply with the letter
we sent, and I’m going to get you a copy of this. There were very
specific things we’ve asked for that they’re recording. They’re just
not sharing it with the public.
We need to know more about what happened in those states that
didn’t follow the Federal guidelines, and the result was that thou-
sands of people died in nursing homes that shouldn’t have.
Why are they hiding the data? What do they have to hide? We
ought to find it out. I appreciate that you’re going to join with us
to finally get the facts and uncover this scandal.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. CLYBURN. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.
Let me close by thanking Mr. Dodaro, Ms. Brown, and Ms.
Clowers for being here today. We appreciate all the work you do
to hold our government accountable, especially during this terrible
pandemic.
Today’s hearing has made clear that there are tangible steps the
Federal Government can take now to increase transparency, to de-
mand accountability from those receiving Federal funds, and to en-
sure that tax dollars are used to help the American people and are
not diverted due to waste, fraud, and abuse.
I want to thank the ranking member for calling attention to
what happened last month and the month before in New York. I
think we all would like to know what happened last week in South
Carolina, my home state, in Georgia, in Florida, in Texas, in Ar-
kansas, in Oklahoma. All those states are spiking within the last
week.
And I’m interested in last week and what we can expect next
week, as opposed to spend all of our time trying to figure out where
the virus came from. I would hope that we spend a little time try-
ing to figure out where the virus is going next so as to be prepared
for it.
We talked a little bit today, I thank the gentleman from Illinois
for raising the issue of vaccines. I’m old enough to remember the
last time the country wrestled with vaccines. I was around. I was
a school kid when we had the polio vaccines.
There was an ‘‘s’’ on that. Jonas Salk came up with a great vac-
cine. Required a shot. Albert Sabin came up with a great vaccine,
34
a little drop of serum on a lump of sugar, and according to all the
science it was more effective than Salk.
I happen to remember which communities got Salk and which
communities got Sabin. I grew up in the communities that got
Salk, the least preferred and the least effective.
Now, I know there are going to be about 19—there are about 19
countries that supposedly are in search of a vaccine. That’s what
I want to see this committee focus on: What vaccines come forward,
the effectiveness of the vaccines, and where they’re allocated, not
just the efficiency of the work, but how effective it’s going to be and
how equitable it will be distributed.
I grew up a victim of that which is not equitable, and I’m not
going to preside over a process that will revisit that or even con-
tinue it. So, you can wallow in the past. I’m going to be concerned
about the future.
And thinking about the future, let me just read, for our benefit,
this is a document from the Attending Physician, and I want to
read it.
‘‘For U.S. House of Representatives meetings in a limited and
closed space, such as a committee hearing room, for greater than
15 minutes, face covering are required,’’ in all caps.
That’s not me. That’s the Attending Physician. And we are not
going to have another meeting in a confined space for more than
15 minutes if we’re not going to abide by this. I will stay in the
safety of my home. In fact, I would ask all you to do.
I grew up believing that the first sign of a good education is good
manners. I think it’s good manners to look out for your fellow men.
I see all the staff wearing masks. I don’t know what this is that
we are pretending——
Mr. SCALISE. Mr. Chairman, will you yield on that?
Mr. CLYBURN. I’ll be glad to yield.
Mr. SCALISE. I thank the chairman for yielding.
And as Dr. Green pointed out, there are guidelines out there for
how to properly social distance and we’re following those.
I understand doctors might look at things differently and want
to give even extra precautions. But the precautions that have been
out there are clearly being followed, and Dr. Green pointed that
out.
None of us would want to put anybody else in harm’s way. It’s
why the House has been having votes on the House floor safely,
properly, with social distancing, with the necessary supplies to
make sure we can wipe down spaces as we’re all—not here, but in
the House floor, we’re working in a similar area, speaking at podi-
ums, and, as one person moves out, they wipe down the area and
another person follows those guidelines, just like we do here.
I would yield back.
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. Mr. Raskin.
Mr. GREEN. I’d yield to Mr. Raskin.
Go ahead. After you, sir, please.
Mr. RASKIN. OK.
35
I really wish, Mr. Chairman, we could work this out pursuant to
your suggestion, following the exact instructions of the Capitol phy-
sician.
Look, we don’t have a cure right now, we don’t have a treatment,
and we definitely don’t have a vaccine. We’ve got one thing, which
is the public health guidance from Dr. Fauci, the Centers for Dis-
ease Control, and the vast majority of the doctors in the land who
do not think this is a hoax and do not think this is invented and
they don’t think it’s political. And there’s one thing we can do. We
can put our masks on, and we can keep our distance.
And I don’t understand why my friends in the minority, who I
know are sincerely motivated people, would lambaste the majority
for trying to keep the continuity of government going with com-
mittee meetings, online with remote or through proxy voting, and
say, ‘‘Everybody needs to be here, everybody needs to be here,’’ and
then show up and not wear masks, and put terror and fear in your
colleagues and perhaps your staff.
Ms. Waters lost her sister to this disease. We have lots of col-
leagues who have gotten COVID–19. We’ve lost more than 125,000
of our countrymen and—women. There’s no other country in the
world in which wearing a mask has become a political or ideolog-
ical statement. It’s a public health measure.
You know, we’ve got a rule which says you have to wear a jacket
on the floor of the House. And I know people tease our friend, Mr.
Jordan, about never wearing a jacket. You know, I don’t care about
his not wearing a jacket. That’s a fashion statement. But when he
doesn’t wear a mask and interacts with people in the legislative as-
sembly, it’s dangerous. That is a public health menace.
So, could we all agree that we will abide by the chairman’s sug-
gestion and the Capitol physician’s strict recommendation and let’s
go forward and let’s try to meet together as much as possible, as
opposed to driving us away from the Capitol?
Mr. SCALISE. Could I ask my friend, in reference to Mr. Jordan,
I think you used the term ‘‘public menace.’’ I hope you weren’t re-
ferring to him. He walked out of here with a mask on. I hope you
noticed that.
Mr. RASKIN. He walked within one foot of our friend, Mr. Green.
I saw it happen. And they whispered to each other. It happens all
the time. You know, we might think we’re in these six-foot bubbles,
but we’re not.
I see it happening on the floor on both sides of the aisle. You
start to hang around with people. We’re social beings, and people
begin to interact.
Did you see what happened in the Pennsylvania Legislature
where one of the legislators came down with it, told his party, but
didn’t tell the other party? It created absolute panic and more divi-
sion.
Why are we the only country on Earth where this is now a mat-
ter of polemical partisan debate instead of just public health order?
Why don’t we just follow what the public health authorities are
telling us to do?
Mr. CLYBURN. The chair recognizes Mr. Green.
Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, let me say, before I cite this study
that just came out June the 27th, that if you put the gavel down
36
and say we want to wear a mask or we’re going to require it, I’ll
wear my mask.
But I do want to inform the committee, The Lancet published
just on June 27th a meta-analysis. A meta-analysis is where they
look all these other studies and they compile the data and draw
conclusions with hopefully more confidence because they’re looking
at multiple studies.
They looked at 172 studies across 16 countries on 6 continents.
They found that a 1-meter distance increased—it decreased your
risk with moderate certainty.
Now, when they do these meta-analyses, they say high certainty,
the data is convincing enough to say that there’s high certainty
that the conclusion is accurate. There’s moderate certainty, and
then there’s low certainty. On the mask issue, it was low certainty
that it makes a difference.
The New England Journal of Medicine, one of the most respected
journals in the Nation, had an article several weeks ago that said
outside the healthcare segment the masks don’t work.
Now, it was referenced earlier about fomites, but, yet, documents
are being passed around in here all the time. Are we sterilizing
each document before we hand it off to one another? I haven’t seen
that.
This mask that was sitting outside is there for anyone. They
could go to the bathroom and come in and pull a mask out and
touch other masks in the stack and then the next person comes
along and collects the masks. We’re not doing surgical sterilization
here.
I just want us—we have to be consistent. And if you say, ‘‘Green,
I want you to wear a mask,’’ sir, I’ll wear a mask. You’re the chair-
man of my committee. But I want us to make decisions based on
sound data and information.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. CLYBURN. Will you yield for a question?
Mr. GREEN. Yes, sir, I will.
Mr. CLYBURN. Are you arguing that we should not meet in per-
son?
Mr. GREEN. No, sir, not at all. I think with the social
distancing——
Mr. CLYBURN. That sounds like the argument you’re making to
me.
Mr. GREEN. No, I don’t—I don’t——
Mr. CLYBURN. Because of all—because there’s no certainty, the
mask may not work. But we know how the disease is transmitted.
So, if the mask has such a low probability of working, maybe we
ought not be meeting in person.
Mr. GREEN. If you’re asking my clinical opinion, sir——
Mr. CLYBURN. Yes.
Mr. GREEN [continuing]. My opinion is, is that patients who are
in high-risk categories——
Mr. CLYBURN. Oh, patients——
Mr. GREEN. People, individuals. Anyone who’s 65 years or
older——
Mr. CLYBURN. That’s me.
37
Mr. GREEN [continuing]. That has comorbidities should wear a
mask. If you don’t, I’m telling people in Tennessee it’s not required.
Mr. RASKIN. Mr. Chairman, could I ask about that?
As I understand it, the mask is not to protect me. It gives me
a little protection. But it’s to protect other people in the event that
I’m infected. And a majority of the infections, I understand, are of
people who are asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic. So, you don’t
know whether you’ve got it.
We have Members of Congress who didn’t realize they had it and
they were fraternizing with everybody else and any of us would do
that if that were the rule.
So, why is this so complicated? There’s one thing we can do to
try to protect other people when we’re together, which is put on a
mask. It doesn’t cost us anything. Why would we not do that? Why
is it some kind of macho thing, like, if I don’t wear a mask, I’m
tough?
I think if you want to be tough, go spend a day with the nurses
and the doctors in the hospital and all of them come out and say:
Everybody wear your mask. Listen to them. You don’t want to
spend the day with them, at least listen to them. All of the first
responders are saying: Save us from this nightmare, wear your
mask.
Mr. GREEN. I can cite many other professionals who are saying
just the opposite. So, that’s the challenge we’re in right now.
Mr. RASKIN. They’re saying don’t wear a mask?
Mr. GREEN. When I’m around, I’m not wearing a mask, no.
Mr. RASKIN. Will you send us the medical advice that people not
wear a mask? Because I haven’t seen that.
Mr. GREEN. I can share some medical literature with you, Mr.
Raskin.
Mr. RASKIN. It’s against the Centers for Disease Control.
Mr. GREEN. I know what they’re putting out.
Mr. RASKIN. And Harvard University, Johns Hopkins, all the
studies I’ve seen.
Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CLYBURN. OK. Without objection, all members will have five
legislative days within which to submit additional written ques-
tions for the witnesses to the chair, which will be forwarded to the
witnesses for their response. I ask our witnesses to please respond
promptly, as promptly as are you able to.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Æ
File and source
- File
- CHRG-116hhrg41892.pdf
- Size
- 252,379 bytes
- SHA-256
- 9f45c78d14335218f21653d97756e274af02d25f8944750cf2ef9c46db7af0c1
- Our copy
- CHRG-116hhrg41892.pdf
- Original
- www.govinfo.gov