Order re Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint — Ryan Keller v. Automattic Inc.

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An order on a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint in Keller, et al. v. Automattic Inc., et al., Case No. 25-cv-01892-AMO, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Document 75, filed July 27, 2026. Plaintiffs Ryan Keller and Sharon Schanzer and their businesses assert claims for intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic relations and violation of California's Unfair Competition Law, based on alleged harm when the defendants blocked WPEngine, Inc. from accessing WordPress.org. The Court finds standing sufficient for the monetary claims but not for injunctive relief. It grants the motion in part and denies it in part, and allows a third amended complaint within 30 days.

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“Order re Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint — Ryan Keller v. Automattic Inc.” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/75-order-granting-in-part-and-denying-in-part-60-motion-to-dism-199ccb2e47/, SHA-256 59dfa6cab351a707b89cf88b7558d3c6a39cc50f36d498904680edeef29ec7e1.

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Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 1 of 11

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7 RYAN KELLER, et al., Case No. 25-cv-01892-AMO
Plaintiffs,
8
ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS
v. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
9

10 AUTOMATTIC INC., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 60
Defendants.
11

12 Plaintiffs Ryan Keller and Sharon Schanzer, and their respective businesses, Keller

United States District Court
13 Holdings LLC (d/b/a SecureSight) and RLDGroup, bring this putative class action against

14 Defendants Automattic Inc. and Charles Matthew Mullenweg. Plaintiffs assert claims for

15 intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective

Northern District of California
16 economic relations, and for violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Profs.

17 Code § 17200, based on alleged harm they suffered when Defendants blocked a third-party,

18 WPEngine, Inc. (“WPE”), from accessing WordPress.org. Plaintiffs are WPE customers who rely

19 on its hosting services to operate their own businesses, and deliver services to their own clients,

20 within the WordPress ecosystem.

21 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) for

22 lack of Article III standing and pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The motion

23 is fully briefed and suitable for disposition without hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b).

24 Accordingly, the hearing currently set for July 30, 2026, is VACATED. Having reviewed the

25 parties’ papers, the arguments therein, and the relevant legal authority, the Court DENIES the

26 motion IN PART and GRANTS the motion IN PART for the reasons set forth below. This

27 Order assumes familiarity with Plaintiffs’ factual allegations and the procedural history of this

28 case.
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 2 of 11

1 DISCUSSION

2 The Court first takes up the threshold issue of Article III standing that Defendants raise

3 under Rule 12(b)(1), before turning to those they raise under Rule 12(b)(6).

4 A. Article III Standing
5 To establish standing under Article III of the Constitution, Plaintiffs “must show (i) that

6 [they] suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the

7 injury was likely caused by the defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by

8 judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of

9 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). “[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs

10 must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek

11 (for example, injunctive relief and damages).” Id. at 431 (citations omitted). “For injunctive

12 relief, which is a prospective remedy, the threat of injury must be actual and imminent, not

United States District Court
13 conjectural or hypothetical.” Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir.

14 2018) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “Where standing is premised entirely on the

15 threat of repeated injury, a plaintiff must show a sufficient likelihood that he will again be

Northern District of California
16 wronged in a similar way.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).

17 Defendants contend Plaintiffs have to establish Article III standing to assert any of their

18 three claims. Dkt. No. 60 (“Mot.”) at 11-12. This argument fails as to Plaintiffs’ claims for

19 monetary remedies. Plaintiffs allege they were denied the benefit of their bargain with WPE.

20 Under the Scale Plan Keller purchased from WPE for the yearly fee of $3,300, he was entitled to

21 “(i) automated WordPress and PHP updates, described as ‘effortless site management’; (ii)

22 security patching and plugin risk scans; and (iii) fully managed WP, PHP, and MySQL updates.”

23 Dkt. No. 57 (“SAC”) ¶ 73. All of these services required continuous access to WordPress.org. Id.

24 When Defendants blocked WPE’s access to the platform, Plaintiff Keller had to perform all of

25 these tasks himself, “which took significant time and expense.” Id. As a result of Defendants’

26 actions, Plaintiff Keller did not receive the benefit of his bargain with WPE. Id. ¶ 76.

27 Plaintiff Schanzer pays $762.12 per month for a Premium 1 Plan with WPE. Id. ¶ 87.

28 That plan offers “(i) automated WordPress & PHP updates and ‘[e]ffortless site management with
2
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 3 of 11

1 daily backups, one-click staging, automatic WordPress & PHP updates, and simple-to-use portal,’

2 (ii) security patching and plugin risk scans, and (iii) fully managed WP, PHP & MySQL updates

3 as well as access to themes[,]” all of which required continuous access to WordPress.org. Id.

4 (modifications in original). When Defendants cut off WPE’s access to WordPress.org, Plaintiff

5 Schanzer had to perform all of these functions herself, “which took significant time and expense.”

6 Id. ¶ 90. She, like Plaintiff Keller, did not receive the benefit of her bargain due to Defendants’

7 conduct. Id.

8 These allegations plausibly plead a concrete economic injury,1 that is fairly traceable to

9 Defendants’ conduct and redressable by this Court. This is sufficient to satisfy Article III standing

10 requirements with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims for monetary remedies. See Williams v. Apple, Inc.,

11 449 F. Supp. 3d 892, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“Generally, where plaintiffs plead that they were

12 economically harmed because they did not receive the ‘benefit of the bargain,’ plaintiffs have

United States District Court
13 adequately alleged Article III standing”) (citations omitted). Defendants’ attack on this ground

14 therefore fails.

15 Defendants challenge to Plaintiffs’ Article III standing to seek injunctive relief, Mot. at 12,

Northern District of California
16 fares better. They argue that because the Court issued an injunction in the related case brought by

17 WPE, “Plaintiffs lack standing for injunctive relief because they do not plausibly allege a ‘real and

18 immediate threat of repeated injury.’ ” Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102

19 (1983)). Plaintiffs assert that, “[i]n the absence of a permanent injunction, Defendants will resume

20 their attempts to harm WPE customers, and Plaintiffs ‘will have no option but to terminate their

21 relationships with WPE because of the danger Defendants’ unlawful and unfair business practices

22 pose.” Opp. at 27 (citing SAC ¶ 147). They contend “[e]quitable relief is particularly

23 appropriate” given the findings in the related action, where the Court issued a preliminary

24 injunction in part because maintaining “continuity and preventing arbitrary disruption stemming

25 from a corporate dispute is in the public interest.” WPEngine, Inc. v. Automattic Inc., No. 24-CV-

26
1
27 Plaintiffs also allege they incurred mitigation costs. SAC ¶¶ 68, 71, 84; Dkt. No. 62 (“Opp.”) at
13. Because the lost benefit of their bargain with WPE is sufficient to confer standing, the Court
28 thus does not reach the parties’ arguments about whether mitigation costs independently establish
standing under Article III or statutory standing under the UCL.
3
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 4 of 11

1 06917-AMO, 2024 WL 5077610, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2024). Here, Plaintiffs claim that

2 without permanent equitable relief, “Defendants remain free to resume the same disruptive

3 conduct that prompted the injunction—conduct that threatens ongoing harm to Plaintiffs, class

4 members, and the broader WordPress ecosystem.” Opp. at 27. Plaintiffs, however, do not address

5 how they face a “real and immediate threat of repeated injury” while the preliminary injunction

6 issued in the related case remains in effect. See generally Opp. They have thus failed to establish

7 standing to pursue injunctive relief in this action.

8 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Rule

9 12(b)(1) is granted, with leave to amend, to the extent Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief. It is denied

10 to the extent Plaintiffs seek monetary remedies. The Court now moves to grounds for dismissal

11 that Defendants raise under Rule 12(b)(6) as to Plaintiffs’ intentional interference and UCL

12 claims.

United States District Court
13 B. Intentional Interference Claims
14 1. Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations
15 The elements of Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional interference with contractual relations are

Northern District of California
16 “(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this

17 contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the

18 contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and

19 (5) resulting damage.” hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 31 F.4th 1180, 1191 (9th Cir. 2022)

20 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

21 Defendants challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ allegations as to the elements of

22 knowledge, intent, and breach or disruption. Mot. at 12-16. The Court analyzes each below.

23 a. Knowledge
24 Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that Defendants knew about their contracts with WPE.

25 As early as November 6, 2024, Defendants published a list of WPE customer websites. SAC

26 ¶ 101. While Defendants claim that nothing on that list “indicates who owns those websites,”

27 Mot. at 13, Plaintiffs allege that “the technical sophistication required to compile th[e] list

28 demonstrates that Defendants had access and utilized data identifying specific WPE customers[,]”
4
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 5 of 11

1 including “specific identifying information about which domains were hosted on WPE’s

2 infrastructure.” SAC ¶ 101. Indeed, “Defendants had to identify WPE traffic to block it.” Id.

3 The list contained 842,514 different WPE-hosted domains. Id. ¶ 101 “Every single

4 website” that Plaintiff Schanzer “owned or operated appeared on the list.” Id. ¶ 103. Eighteen of

5 the nineteen websites Plaintiff Keller operated appeared on the list. Id. Defendants “represented

6 publicly that this list represented every domain hosted by WPE[] and that ‘you can see the decline

7 every day’ for each day since September 21, 2024.” Id. ¶ 105. These were websites Defendants

8 deemed “ready for a new home.” Id. ¶ 107. Defendants used the list to track how many

9 customers WPE was losing each day, determine whether to provide or restrict access to

10 WordPress.org depending on the website’s affiliation with WPE, track the sites that changed web

11 hosts each day (down to the minute), and to poach specific WPE customers. Id. ¶¶ 101, 106, 107,

12 110, 112.

United States District Court
13 While Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants tried to poach them specifically, Plaintiffs

14 have pleaded sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that Defendants knew they had

15 contracts with WPE.2 As Plaintiffs themselves note, “Defendants would not have published

Northern District of California
16 Plaintiffs’ websites on their own WPE customer list if they did not believe that Plaintiffs were

17 WPE customers.” Id. ¶ 108. Defendants may challenge whether the WPE customer list actually

18 conveys the information necessary to prove knowledge at a later stage. Moore v. Apple, Inc., 73 F.

19 Supp. 3d 1191, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding allegation that wireless service providers update

20 wireless accounts when users switch from Apple to non-Apple devices sufficient to establish

21 support an inference of knowledge and noting “Defendant may contest whether the wireless

22 providers’ update or Plaintiff’s contact with Apple personnel actually conveyed the relevant

23 information to Apple”). For now, the existing allegations in the second amended complaint are

24 sufficient to establish knowledge for purposes of the Plaintiffs’ intentional interference with

25 contractual relations claim. See id.

26
2
27 To the extent Defendants contend Plaintiffs have failed to allege that Defendants had knowledge
about the specifics of their contracts with WPE, Mot. at 13-14, that is not grounds for dismissal at
28 the pleading stage. See Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1203 (rejecting the argument that the plaintiff
had to identify a specific contract term or language).
5
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 6 of 11

b. Intent
1
Plaintiffs have also sufficiently pleaded intent. Defendants disabled WPE’s access to
2
WordPress.org, which Defendants knew would degrade WPE’s services, and consequently, those
3
of its customers, including Plaintiffs. SAC ¶ 55. The goal of their “scorched earth nuclear war”
4
against WPE, id. ¶ 100, was to “deliberately target[] and inhibit[] the services and contracts
5
between WPE and Plaintiffs and Class Members.” Id. ¶ 56. “[I]mmediately after the disruptions
6
to WPE began,” Defendants’ “sales representatives began contacting WPE customers.” Id. ¶ 60;
7
see also id. ¶ 59. While Defendants describe this behavior as demonstrating “at most an intent to
8
compete for business,” Mot. at 15, the Court must take Plaintiffs allegations as true and draw all
9
inferences in their favor. See Gregg v. Hawaii Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir.
10
2017). On the current allegations then, Plaintiffs have plausibly established that Defendants acted
11
intentionally with the aim of disruption and inducing breach of their contracts with WPE. See
12

United States District Court
Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1203 (finding intent sufficiently pleaded where plaintiff alleged that
13
“Apple, as designer of the Messages application, knew that use of iMessages would result in
14
undelivered text messages if a user switched to a non-Apple device” but failed to alert consumers
15

Northern District of California
about the issue).
16
c. Breach or Disruption
17
Plaintiffs’ allegations of disruption are also sufficient. The benefits for which Plaintiffs
18
contracted with WPE required continued access to WordPress.org. SAC ¶¶ 73, 90. By cutting off
19
WPE’s access, Plaintiffs “were unable to install or update Plugins or themes[,]” their
20
administrative access to the websites they operated was limited, as “they could not update the
21
Plugins, themes, and in some cases the content of the website,” and they had “limited access to
22
software updates, editing tools, and access control because these features were all tied to the
23
WordPress central repository.” Id. ¶ 48. This “crippled website owners’ ability to control and
24
modify their websites in a managed environment, as they had paid WPE for[.]” Id. It also
25
“created a significant security risk, as security vulnerabilities may not be left unpatched.” Id. As a
26
result, Plaintiffs had to perform the services they had contracted for themselves, leaving them
27
without the benefit of the contracts they had negotiated with WPE. Id. ¶¶ 76, 90. While
28
6
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 7 of 11

1 Defendants urge the Court to require Plaintiffs to identify the relevant terms of their actual

2 contracts with WPE and show how Defendants prevented performance or made performance more

3 expensive or difficult, Mot. at 15-16, Plaintiffs’ allegations adequately establish disruption at the

4 pleading stage. See Moore, 73 F. Supp. 3d at 1204 (finding element of breach or disruption

5 sufficiently pleaded where plaintiff alleged Apple’s Messages application prevented her from

6 receiving text messages, a service for which Plaintiff paid as part of her wireless service contract).

7 2. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations
8 The elements of Plaintiffs’ claim for intentional interference with prospective economic

9 relations are: “(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the

10 probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the

11 relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship;

12 (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused

United States District Court
13 by the acts of the defendant.” CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. Werner Enters., Inc., 479 F.3d 1099,

14 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1153

15 (2003)).

Northern District of California
16 Defendants argue this claim fails for lack of sufficient allegations of the requisite economic

17 relationship, defendant’s knowledge, or independent wrongful acts. Mot. at 18. As before,

18 assuming Plaintiffs adequately plead the remaining elements of this claim, their allegations do not

19 establish “an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the

20 probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff.” See CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 479 F.3d at

21 1108. Plaintiff Keller alleges that one of his “clients was considering adding a new website, but

22 declined to do so after [he] advised the clients about the risk of problems caused by the WPE

23 dispute and service disruption.”3 SAC ¶ 81. This allegation, like those in the original complaint,

24 falls short of suggesting a “reasonabl[e] probab[ility] that the prospective economic advantage

25 would have been realized but for defendant’s interference.” See AlterG, Inc. v. Boost Treadmills

26
27 3
Plaintiff Schanzer makes no comparable allegation, and so dismissal without leave to amend her
28 claim is warranted for this reason alone.

7
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 8 of 11

1 LLC, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see

2 also Song v. Drenberg, No. 18-CV-06283-LHK, 2019 WL 1998944, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 6,

3 2019) (explaining that “even in a situation where companies were actively engaging in business

4 negotiation,” that is not enough to establish the requisite economic relationship).

5 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for intentional interference with

6 prospective economic relations is granted. Because Plaintiffs were previously allowed to remedy

7 the deficiency discussed above, the Court denies further leave to amend. See Allen v. City of

8 Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to

9 amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”).

10 C. UCL
11 Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ UCL claim on the grounds that they lack statutory

12 standing, restitution is unavailable, and an adequate remedy at law exists. Mot. at 18-22. The

United States District Court
13 Court addresses each in turn.

14 1. Statutory Standing
15 Under the UCL’s “the narrower standing requirements[,]” a party must “(1) establish a loss

Northern District of California
16 or deprivation of money or property sufficient to qualify as injury in fact, i.e., economic injury,

17 and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of, i.e., caused by, the unfair business

18 practice or false advertising that is the gravamen of the claim.” Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Ct., 51

19 Cal. 4th 310, 322 (2011).

20 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ alleged harm is non-monetary or self-inflicted costs.

21 Mot. at 19. Plaintiffs counter that because they have “alleged a direct economic injury—the loss

22 of the benefit of the bargain,” that injury “alone satisfies the statute’s standing requirement.” Opp.

23 at 22, 23. The Court agrees this suffices to the extent Plaintiffs seek a monetary remedy. See In re

24 Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2017 WL 3727318, at

25 *21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017) (allegations of lost benefit of the bargain were sufficient to

26 establish UCL standing). However, to the extent Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, they lack

27 standing for the reasons previously discussed in this Order. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the

28 UCL claim for lack of statutory standing is thus granted in part and denied in part with leave to
8
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 9 of 11

1 amend.

2 2. Restitution
3 “A UCL action is equitable in nature; damages cannot be recovered.” Korea Supply Co.,

4 29 Cal. 4th at 1144. “[R]estitution is the only monetary remedy authorized in a private action

5 brought under the unfair competition law.” Clark v. Superior Ct., 50 Cal. 4th 605, 614 (2010).

6 “[A]n order for restitution [i]s one compelling a UCL defendant to return money obtained through

7 an unfair business practice to those persons in interest from whom the property was taken, that is,

8 to persons who had an ownership interest in the property or those claiming through that person.”

9 Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal. 4th at 1144-45 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

10 Defendants contend that restitution is unavailable to Plaintiffs absent a showing that

11 “Defendants are in possession of money or property in which Plaintiffs have an ownership

12 interest.” Mot. at 20-21 (citing Banga v. Experian Info. Sols., No. 4:08-cv-04147-SBA, 2010 WL

United States District Court
13 11531066, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2010). Plaintiffs offer two arguments in opposition. Neither

14 persuades. First, they assert that “[e]ven if restitution ultimately proved unavailable, Plaintiff’s

15 UCL claim would survive because Plaintiffs independently seek injunctive relief[.]” Opp. at 23.

Northern District of California
16 This argument fails because, as discussed above, Plaintiffs have yet to establish standing to seek

17 such relief. Second, Plaintiffs contend “restitution may be available where a plaintiff loses the

18 benefit of the bargain as a result of a defendant’s conduct—even if the plaintiff paid the money to

19 an intermediary.” Id. at 24. Here, however, Plaintiffs did not pay money to an intermediary.

20 They paid money to WPE, their hosting provider. This renders the three cases on which Plaintiffs

21 rely inapposite. In Juarez v. Arcadia Fin., Ltd., 152 Cal. App. 4th 889, 915 (2007), the court

22 recognized an “ownership interest in any profits Arcadia may have gained through interest or

23 earnings on the plaintiffs’ money that Arcadia wrongfully held.” The plaintiffs sought to recover

24 restitution based on funds defendant “wrongfully collected from the plaintiffs.” Id. at 917. In

25 Troyk v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 171 Cal. App. 4th 1305, 1340 (2009), the court of appeal upheld the

26 trial court’s conclusion that the defendant could be liable for restitution under the UCL. There, the

27 defendant had not received services charges directly from class members, but through its wholly-

28 owned subsidiary, and the trial court concluded that both companies had operated as a single
9
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 10 of 11

1 enterprise. Id. at 1340. In Trew v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, No. CIV-S-051379DFLPAN, 2006

2 WL 306904, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2006), the court permitted the plaintiffs to proceed on their

3 UCL claim because “if Volvo profited from class members who replace defective [electronic

4 throttle modules] by purchasing new ones, then plaintiffs could recover that money from Volvo

5 under a theory of restitution.” Id.

6 In light of these authorities, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs’ theory of restitution

7 is cognizable. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the UCL claim for lack of allegations

8 that Defendants have an ownership interest in the funds Plaintiffs are seeking to recover is granted

9 with leave to amend.

10 3. Adequate Remedy at Law
11 Finally, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s UCL claim because they have not shown

12 that legal remedies are inadequate. Mot. at 21-22. Plaintiffs counter that they “expressly plead

United States District Court
13 their UCL claim in the alternative,” and “[t]hat alone is sufficient.” Opp. at 26 (citing SAC

14 ¶ 140). The Court disagrees. Although Plaintiffs are free to pursue alternative remedies at the

15 pleading stage, where, as here, Plaintiffs pursue both legal and equitable remedies, they must plead

Northern District of California
16 facts as to why legal remedies may be inadequate. See, e.g., Valiente v. Simpson Imports, Ltd.,

17 717 F. Supp. 3d 888, 907 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (denying motion to dismiss equitable claims where

18 plaintiff alleged she might lack of adequate remedy at law “if the amount of damages recoverable

19 is less than the price premium she paid” for defendant’s products and that “[r]estitution and/or

20 injunctive relief may also be more certain, prompt, and efficient than other legal remedies . . . .”).4

21 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to allege the unavailability of an adequate

22 legal remedy is granted with leave to amend.

23 CONCLUSION

24 For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART

25 and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs may file a third amended complaint curing the deficiencies

26
4
27 Plaintiffs also argue that even if they lack allegations of an inadequate legal remedy, this
pleading defect does not bar their request for forward-looking injunctive relief. Opp. at 26. In
28 light of Plaintiffs’ failure to establish standing to pursue injunctive relief, the Court does not reach
this argument.
10
Case 4:25-cv-01892-AMO Document 75 Filed 07/27/26 Page 11 of 11

1 discussed above within 30 days of this order. They may not otherwise add new substantive

2 allegations, plead new claims, or name additional parties without Defendants’ consent or leave of

3 Court. Courtesy copies of the third amended complaint and the redline required by the Court’s

4 Standing Order for Civil Cases is due to chambers within 3 days of filing.

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

6 Dated: July 27, 2026

8
ARACELI MARTÍNEZ-OLGUÍN
9 United States District Judge
10

United States District Court
13

Northern District of California
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