Opinion and Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings — Jeffrey Wonser v. Charles Norman

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An Opinion and Order in Jeffrey Wonser v. Charles Norman and other defendants, Case No. 2:24-cv-2160, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, filed June 11, 2025 (Doc #: 38). The order addresses the defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 9) and the plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 12) in a challenge to Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles guidelines for personalized license plates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Court holds that the § 1983 claims are untimely under a two-year statute of limitations and finds no continuing violation. It dismisses the claim under Ohio Revised Code § 2307.60 without prejudice, denies the preliminary injunction motion and states that the case is terminated.

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“Opinion and Order on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings — Jeffrey Wonser v. Charles Norman.” Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/38-5a90f33dfc/, SHA-256 030bfde4a5ca4a5dcff7f0ea506a39d88376c5bcf8b2613cd59b9296a5b2b37a.

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Case: 2:24-cv-02160-SDM-EPD Doc #: 38 Filed: 06/11/25 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: 2489

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

JEFFREY WONSER,
:
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:24-cv-2160
v. Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A.
Preston Deavers
CHARLES NORMAN, et al.,
:
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (ECF No. 9) and Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF No.

12). Each motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for consideration.

For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff’s

claim alleging a violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2307.60 is DISMISSED without

prejudice. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles allows Ohio drivers to apply for

personalized license plates through its website. BMV reviews any such applications

using a set of guidelines.1 Those guidelines, in part, instruct BMV to reject plates

1 The guidelines arose from a settlement agreement in Anthony Zucco v.

Franklin L. Caltrider, No. 2:01-cv-1270 (S.D. Ohio filed Dec. 20, 2001). In that case,
BMV was sued for revoking the license plate “RDRAGE.”
Case: 2:24-cv-02160-SDM-EPD Doc #: 38 Filed: 06/11/25 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: 2490

that “are profane (that is, swearwords or expletives), [or can be interpreted as]2

obscene, sexually explicit, or scatological (i.e., pertaining to feces or excrement).”

(See Compl. ¶ 31.)

Jeffrey Wonser applied for the license plate “F46 LGB” on March 9, 2022.

(Answer Ex. A, ECF No. 4-1.) His Complaint alleges that these letters have no

objective meaning but many interpret them to mean either “Fuck 46 (Joe Biden, the

46th President of the United States) Let’s Go Brandon”3 or “FAG LGB,” a “gay-pride

message intended to reclaim a homophobic slur.” (Compl. ¶ 82–85.)

On March 11, and again on March 15, BMV rejected Mr. Wonser’s application

as violating its guidelines. (Answer Exs. A, B, ECF No. 4-1.) Mr. Wonser appealed

and BMV affirmed its rejection of his proposed plate on March 24, 2022. (Id. Ex. C.)

It issued Mr. Wonser a refund of his special plate fee on May 20, 2022. (Compl. ¶

107.)

In July 2022, Mr. Wonser contacted BMV to request that he receive his

proposed license plate and that BMV reconsider its guidelines. (Pl.’s Mot. for

Prelim. Inj. Ex. 39, ECF No. 12-39.) BMV declined to do either. (Id. Ex. 41, ECF No.

12-41.) Mr. Wonser again attempted to apply for his plate through BMV’s website in

April 2024, but the website was programmed to automatically reject a request for

2 It is unclear from the pleadings whether this bracketed language is included

in the guidelines. Neither party has provided a copy of the guidelines. The
Complaint cites the guidelines without including this language (Compl. ¶ 31), but
goes on to say that this language is now part of the guidelines. Emails from BMV
personnel include this language. (Answer Exs. A & C.) Because of the analysis
below, resolving this ambiguity is unnecessary.
3 “Let’s Go Brandon” is a euphemism for “Fuck Joe Biden.” See D.A. by &

through B.A. v. Tri Cnty. Area Sch., 746 F. Supp. 3d 447, 459 (W.D. Mich. 2024).

2
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“F46 LGB.” (Compl. ¶ 113.) Mr. Wonser’s counsel then requested reconsideration,

but BMV declined. (Pl.’s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. Ex. 47, ECF No. 12-47.)

Mr. Wonser filed his Complaint on May 3, 2024, naming as defendants

Charles Norman (BMV Registrar), Andy Wilson (Director of the Ohio Department of

Public Safety), and Thomas Stickrath, (former Director of the Ohio Department of

Public Safety).4 He challenges BMV’s guidelines under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing

they violate his First Amendment right to free speech both facially and as applied.

He also alleges a violation of Ohio law.

II. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

A. Standard of Review

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(c) is analyzed in the same manner as a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6). Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008). To

overcome such a motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The complaint need not contain detailed

4 Mr. Wonser does not specify whether Defendants are sued in their

individual or official capacities. Absent a clear indication that defendants are being
sued in their individual capacities, courts must assume that they are being sued in
their official capacities only. Nelson v. City of Flint, 136 F. Supp. 2d 703, 717 (E.D.
Mich. 2001).

3
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factual allegations, but it must include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic

recitations of the elements of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545.

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted when there is no

material issue of fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Tucker, 539 F.3d at 549.

All well-pled factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true for

purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See id. Although a court’s

decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings rests primarily upon the

allegations of the complaint, the Court may also consider “matters of public record,

orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the

complaint” and answer. Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir.2001)).

B. Mr. Wonser’s §1983 claims are untimely.

The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Ohio is two years. Collyer v.

Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). The statute “begins to run when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the act providing the basis of his or her

injury has occurred.” Id. (citing Friedman v. Est. of Presser, 929 F.2d 1151, 1159

(6th Cir.1991)). Mr. Wonser concedes that his initial license plate application was

rejected more than two years before he filed his Complaint, arguing that

4
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Defendants’ enforcement of the guidelines constitutes a continuing violation of his

First Amendment rights, thereby tolling the statute of limitations.5

To prove a continuing violation, a plaintiff must show that he suffered “a new

deprivation of constitutional rights every day . . . rather than merely suffering

additional harm from a prior unconstitutional act.” Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of

Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 1997). Repeated requests for relief from the

previous act do not trigger the doctrine. Pittman v. Spectrum Health Sys., 612 Fed.

App’x. 810, 813 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980,

998 (10th Cir. 2022) (“[W]here a defendant reaches a final decision on a matter and

informs the plaintiff of such outside the statute of limitations period, we have

rejected efforts by a plaintiff to rely on subsequent denials of renewed requests

within the limitations period to overcome the statute of limitations.”).

A continuing violation occurs only when (1) the defendant engaged in

continuing wrongful conduct, (2) the injury to the plaintiff accrued continuously,

and (3) had the defendants at any time ceased their wrongful conduct, further

injury could have been avoided. Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693, 697 (6th

Cir. 2009). “The doctrine applies most frequently in the context of Title VII cases,

and is rarely extended to § 1983 actions.” Goldsmith v. Sharrett, 614 F. App’x 824,

828 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 259, 267 (6th Cir.2003)). In

the § 1983 context, continuing violations “are akin to hostile-work environment

5 In response to BMV’s Motion, Mr. Wonser also argues that his overbreadth

challenge is timely when considered as a violation of his right to receive information
from other drivers. Because Mr. Wonser does not allege this injury in his
Complaint, the Court will not consider it.

5
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claims where the harm ‘cannot be said to occur on any particular day’ and

individual incidents are not actionable on their own.” Id. at 828–29 (quoting Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)).

Mr. Wonser’s initial license plate application was rejected on March 11 and

15, 2022. His appeal of that rejection was denied on March 24, 2022. After March

24, 2022, Mr. Wonser suffered no new constitutional deprivation—he knew or

should have known at that time that his First Amendment rights had been violated.

His subsequent requests for the same license plate in July 2022 and April 2024

were not new deprivations.

Nevertheless, Mr. Wonser invokes Kuhnle Brothers, Inc. v. County of Geauga,

103 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1997) to support his argument that BMV’s guidelines

constitute a continuing violation. In that case, Geauga County had enacted

Resolution 91-87, which prevented the Kuhnle Brothers (a trucking company) from

using a certain road to access a quarry. 103 F.3d at 518. The County stopped

enforcing 91-87 after the Ohio Supreme Court found that a similar resolution was

improper. Id. More than two years after 91-87 was enacted, but less than two years

after the County stopped enforcing it, Kuhnle filed § 1983 claims against the

County. Id. at 518–19. After the district court dismissed all of Kuhnle’s claims on

statute of limitations grounds, the Sixth Circuit reinstated Kuhnle’s Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process claim for the deprivation of its right to interstate travel.

Id. at 522. The court found that Kuhnle had been “actively deprived” of its right to

travel everyday Resolution 91-87 was in effect, stating that “a law that works an

6
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ongoing violation of constitutional rights does not become immunized from legal

challenge for all time merely because no one challenges it within two years of its

enactment.” Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of Kuhnle’s

takings claim and claim for deprivation of property without Due Process as time

barred. Id. at 521.

Mr. Wonser’s alleged injury and the causation thereof are different in nature

and kind than Kuhnle Brothers’ right to interstate travel claim. Here, any harm

stems from BMV’s discrete use of the guidelines to deny a particular application for

a license plate. The denial of a requested license plate is a single harm, measurable

and independently actionable, triggering the statute of limitations. There was no

continuing violation of Mr. Wonser’s First Amendment rights.

This decision aligns with the purpose of the statute of limitations. If the

Court were to find that Mr. Wonser had established a continuing violation by

challenging the existence of BMV’s guidelines, then BMV would be subject to suit

from anyone whose license plate had been rejected since the enactment of the

guidelines in 2003; this would be untenable.

C. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state law claim.

Having found that Mr. Wonser’s § 1983 claims are barred by the applicable

statute of limitations, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

his remaining state law claim. It is DISMISSED without prejudice.

7
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III. MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

When considering a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court examines

four factors: (1) whether the plaintiff has established a strong likelihood of success

on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if

a preliminary injunction did not issue; (3) whether the injunction would cause

substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served if

the court were to grant the requested injunction. Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729,

736 (6th Cir. 2000).

Based on the foregoing analysis, Mr. Wonser has not established a strong

likelihood of success on the merits. His Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF

No. 12) is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

is GRANTED in part. Mr. Wonser’s state law claim is DISMISSED without

prejudice. His Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. This case is

terminated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison
SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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