Objections Regarding Order from 12/30/24 (Docket #23) — Brandon Joe Williams v. Small Business Administration
Summary
Objections filed 01/06/25 as Document 24 in Brandon Joe Williams v. United States Small Business Administration, No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK, in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, captioned as objections regarding the order from 12/30/24. The numbered objections state that the plaintiff is BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS®, that the causes of action are State causes of action over which the Federal court cannot gain jurisdiction, and that 28 USC 1442(a)(1) does not fit this case. They also object to the statement that the complaint is "unintelligible". The Request for Relief asks the court either to call a hearing or to remand the case back to State court. The signature line reads /s/ Brandon Joe Williams, agent, and the filing refers to an affidavit (Exhibit A).
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Cite this document
“Objections Regarding Order from 12/30/24 (Docket #23) — Brandon Joe Williams v. Small Business Administration.”
Original at archive.org. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/24-eddcb7b4ec/
, SHA-256 adac9f2f5bdf48d3a2aae9c0965d09cfafe5a215d9ff7d8ff61ff5fe0c433e2c.Full text
Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK Document 24 Filed 01/06/25 Page 1 of 5 Page ID
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Brandon Joe Williams
747-273-0799
brandon@williamsandwilliamslawfirm.com
PO Box 1962
Glendale, CA 91209
Attorney-in-fact for Plaintiff
BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS®
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS®, No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK
Plaintiff, OBJECTIONS REGARDING ORDER
FROM 12/30/24 (DOCKET #23)
v.
UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION,
Honorable R. Gary Klausner
Defendant. United States District Judge
OBJECTIONS REGARDING ORDER FROM 12/30/24 (DOCKET #23)
1. The plaintiff is listed as “Brandon Joe Williams,” when the plaintiff is actually
BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS®.
2. The “introduction and background” section contains information from the defense’s
original motion to dismiss. While I have already thoroughly addressed much of that
motion in other filings, I will be attaching an affidavit (Exhibit A) that will clarify all
confusions involving parties, nationality and current case specifics, in accordance with
the Rules of Evidence #402, 602 and 603.
3. The reason that there was no response in opposition done with the motion to dismiss is
because there are no causes of action of which this Federal court could possibly gain
jurisdiction over. They are all explicitly and specifically State causes of action, of which
this Federal court would not be able to dismiss, nor rule in the plaintiff’s favor for.
4. In the “MOTION TO REMAND” section, 28 USC 1442(a)(1) is mentioned, which
states: “The United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting
under that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, in an official or
individual capacity, for or relating to any act under color of such office or on account of
any right, title or authority claimed under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or
punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.”
Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK Document 24 Filed 01/06/25 Page 2 of 5 Page ID
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The Supreme Court case Caha v. U.S., 152 U.S. 211 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1894),
combined with 4 USC 71, explains how this court could not possible have jurisdiction:
“This statute is one of universal application within the territorial limits of the United
States, and is not limited to those portions which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the national government, such as the District of Columbia. Generally speaking, within
any State of this Union the preservation of the peace and the protection of person and
property are the functions of the state government, and are no part of the primary duty, at
least, of the nation. The laws of Congress in respect to those matters do not extend into
the territorial limits of the States, but have force only in the District of Columbia, and
other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government.”
4 USC 71: “All that part of the territory of the United States included within the present
limits of the District of Columbia shall be the permanent seat of government of the
United States.”
So the idea that State causes of action could have jurisdiction in a Federal court could
only exist if this Federal court explicitly states and proves that “State of California” is
“located in the District of Columbia.” Which is never going to happen.
It is obvious that this case does not fit at all under 28 USC 1442(a)(1) and it is obvious
that gaining jurisdiction over this case in a Federal court is a jurisdictional impossibility.
5. Regarding the “MOTION TO REMAND” section: Brandon Joe Williams finds it
absolutely hilarious that the person called UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION falls within the definition of a US citizen in 42 USC 9102(18)(B)
(“(B) any Federal, State, or local government in the United States, or any entity of any
such government”) - yet the representative of that person is calling for “sovereign
immunity.” Literally a sovereign citizen defense while simultaneously calling the
plaintiff a “sovereign citizen.” The idea that this could actually be a defense is, in fact,
frivolous. This is hypocrisy to an extreme degree.
The only way that this “colorable defense” could become a reality is simply by my
acquiescence. Which appears to be what this court is assuming despite my extensive
filings done so far. This is exactly why I am writing an extensive affidavit (Exhibit A) in
order to end this presumption nightmare right now before it falls even further into
ridiculous oblivion. I do not wish to waste this most honorable court’s time with such
rubbish. There is absolutely no colorable defense for a court that cannot gain
jurisdiction.
6. The following Supreme Court cases and quotes describe how, though my procedure may
be a bit rough, dismissal is improper:
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1972):
We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which
we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears
“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41, 355 U. S. 45-46 (1957). See
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (CA2 1944).
Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK Document 24 Filed 01/06/25 Page 3 of 5 Page ID
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Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1969):
The prevailing opinion's strained construction of the complaint goes well beyond the
principle, with which I have no quarrel, that federal pleadings should be most liberally
construed. It entirely undermines an important function of the federal system of
procedure -- that of disposing of unmeritorious and unjusticiable claims at the outset,
before the parties and courts must undergo the expense and time-consumed by
evidentiary hearings.
7. In the “MOTION TO DISMISS” section, it is said: “To put it bluntly, Plaintiff’s
Complaint is unintelligible.”
The word “unintelligible” means “That which cannot be understood.”
This violates various Canons and is an abuse of discretion as this court has not even
attempted, in the slightest, to to understand what the plaintiff is trying to say.
Canon 3(A)(3) states: “(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, respectful, and courteous
to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. A judge should require similar conduct by those subject to the judge’s
control, including lawyers to the extent consistent with their role in the adversary
process.”
Canon 3 (A)(4) states: “(4) A judge should accord to every person who has a legal
interest in a proceeding, and that person’s lawyer, the full right to be heard according to
law.”
If there is any aspect of the plaintiff’s complaint that is difficult to understand, the
correct action is to call a hearing to have the agent explain everything, in detail, on
behalf of the plaintiff. Not simply deem the pleadings “unintelligible” despite ZERO
attempt to clarify. The plaintiff is, factually, not being heard by this court on purpose.
Which is absolutely disgusting.
8. Brandon Joe Williams has explored the previous case mentioned in the order of Sneed v.
Chase Home Finance LLC (2007) and there is a quote here that sums up the case nicely:
“It has long been established that Federal Reserve Notes are legal tender and that legal
tender need not consist of silver or gold coin.”
The fact that this case, which is not even remotely similar or comparable to any of my
pleadings or filings, is being used and compared to my case is both terribly lazy and also
an abuse of discretion. I did not speak of any aspect of “specie” and my case is, openly
and honestly, only involving negotiable instruments, negotiation, indorsements, etc, not
about money or specie at all.
In fact, due to my knowledge that the Uniform Commercial Code is not Federal law, I
have culled a list of case law to give standing to commercial code claims in Federal
court. Here are the relevant Supreme Court cases for most or all aspects of my
complaint:
Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 US 557 - (U.S. Supreme Court - 1880)
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Bills of exchange and promissory notes are exceptional in their character. They are
representatives of money, circulating in the commercial world as evidence of money, "of
which any person in lawful possession may avail himself to pay debts or make purchases
or make remittances of money from one country to another, or to remote places in the
same country. Hence, as said by Story, J., it has become a general rule of the commercial
world to hold bills of exchange, as in some sort, sacred instrument in favor of bona fide
holders for a valuable consideration without notice." Without such a holding they could
not perform their peculiar functions. It is for this reason it is held that if a bill or note,
endorsed in blank or payable to bearer, be lost or stolen, and be purchased from the
finder or thief, without any knowledge of want of ownership in the vendor, the bona fide
purchaser may hold it against the true owner.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF WASHINGTON v. WHITMAN 94 U.S. 343 (U.S.
Supreme Court - 1876)
(this case is talking about negotiability when an indorsement is forged)
WHITE v. NATIONAL BANK 102 U.S. 658 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1881)
This indorsement is treated by counsel here as an assignment of the paper without
recourse, in which the title to the paper passed, but the right to recourse to the assignor
was cut off.
Swift v. Tyson, 41 US 1 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1842)
The debtor also has the advantage of making his negotiable securities of equivalent
value to cash.
ARMSTRONG v. AMERICAN EXCHANGE NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO 133
U.S. 433 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1890)
(This case speaks extensively about bills of exchange, acceptance, the functionality of
negotiation, etc)
Nathan v. Louisiana 49 U.S. 73 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1850)
A bill of exchange is neither an export nor an import. It is not transmitted through the
ordinary channels of commerce, but through the mail. It is a note merely ordering the
payment of money, which may be negotiated by indorsement, and the liability of the
names that are on it depends upon certain acts to be done by the holder, when it becomes
payable.
The dealer in bills of exchange requires capital and credit. He generally draws the
instrument, or it is drawn at his instance, when he is desirous of purchasing it. The bill is
worth more or less, as the rate of exchange shall be between the place where it is drawn
and where it is made payable. This rate is principally regulated by the expense of
transporting the specie from the one place to the other, influenced somewhat by the
demand and supply of specie.
United States v. Fisher 6 U.S. 358 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1805):
The government is to pay the debt of the union, and must be authorized to use the means
which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has consequently a right to
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make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions which will render
the transaction safe.
Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (U.S. Supreme Court - 1896):
National banks are instrumentalities of the federal government, created for a public
purpose, and as such necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United States.
9. Please do not attempt to squash my complaint using irrelevant generalities and irrelevant
case law. I have real concerns and damages that I need help to have relief from. The
plaintiff and his indorser deserve to be heard on this matter and are willing to handle any
confusions. Please simply request a hearing and the agent will explain everything in
great detail.
10. To achieve full clarity and to end the presumption nightmare that is wasting the time of
this court, I have attached an affidavit (Exhibit A) to this filing to be used in unison with
these objections
Request for Relief:
The proper relief for this situation is to either call a hearing to clarify any aspects of negotiable
instruments, negotiation, indorsements, etc… or to simply remand this case back to State court
where it belongs.
A hearing will not change the outcome of this as no jurisdiction can be gained at the Federal
level. But the agent for the plaintiff is willing to clarify any confusions in order to ensure this
court is comfortable as this case is moved back to State court.
Dated: January 6rd, 2025 Respectfully submitted,
BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS®
By: /s/ Brandon Joe Williams, agent
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