Are Loans to Minority Firms Mispriced?
- Issuer
- Congressional materials
- Document type
- 2025 01 29 A32584 D276684 Uw Foster School Of Business Interest Rate And Collateral Di
- Date
- 2025-01-29
- Case
- 2025 01 29 A32584 D276684 Uw Foster School Of Business Interest Rate And Collateral Di
Summary
A research presentation titled Are Loans to Minority Firms Mispriced?, by researchers at the University of Washington, Virginia Tech and the Public Policy Institute of California, dated January 29, 2025. It uses a survey of small business loans, conducted by the Foster School of Business and the Social & Economic Sciences Research Center at Washington State University, to test whether interest rates and collateral differ across racial groups and by gender. The presentation reports statistically significant mispricing resulting in higher interest paid by Asian American-, Black- and Hispanic-owned firms and woman-owned firms. It estimates that minority business borrowers pay over $8 billion in higher interest annually. It also compares results across lender types, summarizes borrower opinions and describes weighted robustness tests on a sample of 2,784 firms.
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Cite this document
“Are Loans to Minority Firms Mispriced?”
Original at app.leg.wa.gov, dated 2025-01-29. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/2025-01-29-2025-01-29-a32584-d276684-uw-foster-school-of-business-interest-rate-and-collateral-di/
, SHA-256 41fcbb85a99ce727e358072056cd7015e24f56f4cb8cd2aaddc3ca2371d694c1.Full text
ARE LOANS TO
MINORITY FIRMS
MISPRICED?
Measuring the Risk Mispricing for Firms Owned by
People of Color and the Lost Economic Opportunity
That It Creates
William D. Bradford University of Washington
Michael Verchot University of Washington
Chunbei Wang Virginia Tech
Magnus Lofstrom Public Policy Institute of California
Credit mispricing occurs when lenders adjust
the terms for borrowers based on factors
unrelated to their financial risk, such as the
race of the business owner, rather than
economic and creditworthiness indicators.
This research explores whether interest rate
and collateral mispricing are evident across
racial groups using survey data on small
business loans.
Overview
Findings
Interest Rates Collateral
• Our data indicates • Co-signatures from third
statistically significant parties are required for
mispricing resulting in higher Asian American-, Black- and
• Nationwide Survey on Small Business interest paid by Asian Hispanic- and Native-owned
Lending American-, Black- and firms more frequently than is
Hispanic- owned firms, and justified by our economic
woman-owned firms. analysis.
• Assessment of loan terms—interest rates
and collateral—for loans granted to small Impact Impact
businesses across the U.S. from Jan 2022
• This mispricing leads to • The opportunity cost due to
to Jun 2023. Similar data has not been
minority business excessive collateral
available since the Federal Reserve’s 2003 requirements remains
borrowers paying over $8
Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). billion in higher interest unclear due to limited data.
annually.
II. Background
Description of Surveys
• Conducted By: • Supplier.IO provided the authors with a nationwide list of over 300,000
⚬ The Foster School of Business, firms, to which we sent an internet survey.
University of Washington
• The firms were potential or actual government or business suppliers,
⚬ Social & Economic Sciences some of which also served personal consumers.
Research Center (SESRC),
Washington State University • The survey collected firm/owner/lender information on non-
government guaranteed borrowing by small firms (< 500 employees)
from January 2022 through May 2023.
• Focus Areas:
⚬ National survey on business loan • Duns credit score information was added for a subset of firms that
and credit accessibility, equity, and completed the survey.
related challenges
• To be eligible for the survey, a business must be operating at the time
of the survey and a for-profit firm with employees.
• Sponsor:
⚬ The Schultz Family Foundation • The firm must have borrowed during the specified period through a line
of credit or loan. Following previous studies, firms in the finance
industry were ineligible.
FINDINGS
Exhibit 1A
Loan
Outcomes Race Gender
Exhibit1A
Measures:
Race and
Gender
*The survey asked the firm its location in six intervals of collateral relative to the amount of credit
granted: 0, 1 – 50%, 51 – 99%, 100%, 101 – 150%, or greater than 150%.
Loan Outcomes
Race Gender
Exhibit 1A
Loan
Outcomes
(Cont.)
Exhibit1B
Measures:
Collateral
SUMMARY White-owned firms
• Paid the lowest interest rates.
• Committed the least collateral relative to
the loan amount, were least often required
to commit more collateral than the amount
of the loan, and least often required by the
lender to have an external party sign for
the loan.
• Were the most satisfied with the credit they
received.
Comparison
Process
Minority-Owned vs. White-Owned Firms
in Loan Pricing
• Separate Comparisons:
Each minority group is compared individually to white-owned firms.
• Indicator Variable:
An indicator variable for each minority group is included, capturing the
loan rate difference between the minority and white-owned firms.
• Sequential Analysis:
The minority-white loan pricing difference is analyzed by sequentially
adding control variables to examine the impact on loan rate disparities.
Control
Variables
Race Gender
Selected Firm
Characteristics
Exhibit
2
Firm Condition White Firms
• Report the highest fraction of firms with the same or higher revenue in
2022 vs. 2021.
• Have the highest fraction of firms with the same or more employees in
2022 vs. 2021.
• Show the highest credit rating scores.
• Report the lowest fraction of firms in good or better condition at year-end
2022.
Black and Hispanic Firms
• Have the lowest credit score profile
Other Traits
• Mixed across groups; no group stands out as significantly better or worse in
other firm measures
Quantifying Impact of Race and Gender on Interest Rates and Collateral
I = interest rate charged to borrowing firms
I is based on a set of controls (attributes) that gauge the lender’s risk:
I = 𝛽₀ + 𝛽₁X₁ + 𝛽₂X₂ + 𝛽₃X₃ + …. + 𝛽NXN + 𝛽RRace + 𝛽GGender (1)
𝛽₀ is the base interest rate charged
𝛽j (j = 1 through N) is the coefficient reflecting the effect of attribute j on the interest
rate. X j is the firm’s quantity of attribute j.
Mispricing indicated if 𝛽R or 𝛽G is statistically different from zero.
Estimate each 𝛽i through ordinary least squares regression.
For Collateral, change I to C in the model above. C and 𝛽j are estimated using model
(1) with a different form of regression.
Exhibit 3
Hispanic
Regressions
Controlling for
Black
Different
Characteristics
Minority v. Asian
White Firms
and Male- Native
Owned vs. American
Female
Owned Firms Women
• Significance levels:
• p < 0.10 (*)
• P < 0.05 (**)
• P < 0.01 (***)
Exhibit 4 A
Split Sample
Regressions:
Minority -
White B
Interest Rate
Differences
Notes:
• Standard Errors in
Parentheses C
• Statistical Significance:
• p < 0.10 (*)
• p < 0.05 (**)
• p < 0.01 (***)
Interest
Rates Minority-White
difference at
Minority-White large banks
Interest Rate
Differences
Across
Lenders
Lender i-large
bank difference
in minority-
white interest
Notes: rate
• Dependent Variable: Loan
Rate
• Significance levels:
• p < 0.10 (*)
• P < 0.05 (**)
• P < 0.01 (***)
SUMMARY: Black-owned firms
Interest Rate • Paid higher rates than their white counterparts at credit unions, fintech
lenders and nonbank finance companies. Black owned category was not
Differences
statistically significant in loans from large banks, small banks and CDFIs.
Across Lenders Hispanic-owned firms
• Paid higher interest rates than their white counterparts at all of the six lender
types except CDFIs.
Asian-owned firms
• Paid higher interest rates than their white counterparts at large banks. There
were too few cases in the sample to make inferences about the other lenders
to Asian firms.
Women-owned firms
• Paid higher interest rates than male counterparts at credit unions, CDFIs, and
fintech lenders. We did not find that gender affected the interest rate at large
banks, small banks and nonbank finance company loans
Collateral (cont.) Race Gender
Minority vs.
White Firms
& Women-
Owned vs.
Man-Owned
Firms
Notes:
• Dependent Variable: Loan
Collateral Requirements
• Standard errors in
parentheses
• Significance levels:
• p < 0.10 (*)
• P < 0.05 (**)
• P < 0.01 (***)
IV. Conclusion
A.A: Discussion
Discussion
Disparities in borrowing experiences extend
beyond economics, fueling broader inequalities and
perpetuating historical discrimination.
Addressing these issues requires joint efforts from
policymakers, regulators, lenders, and other
stakeholders to improve credit access and reduce
discrimination in lending.
Conclusion B Total Annual Difference in Interest $8 Billion
A B C D E F G
Additional A*B*C* D*E*F
Interest Paid 2021 2022 2022 2022 Survey
From Census ABS Fed Res SBCS Fed Res Estimated $ Total Annual
U.S. Total Fraction SBCS Number of $ Estimated Mispriced Difference
Mispricing Employer Applied Fraction Approved Average Interest Rate in Interest
Firms For Credit Approved# Loans Loan Size## Difference % (000)
White 4,409,715 0.40 0.820 1,446,387 414,796
Hispanic 406,086 0.44 0.680 121,501 336,158 3.34 1,363,765
Notes: Asian 637,539 0.48 0.690 211,153 776,816 3.96 6,502,357
• Sources: Census ABS (2021), Black 149,326 0.40 0.500 29,865 276,518 2.82 232,682
Fed Reserve SBCS (2022) Native 28,338 0.46 0.560 7,300 489,811 0.00 0
• Calculation Details:
• Column D, E, F contribute
8,098,804
to final total in G #Partially approved plus fully approved
• # Partially approved plus fully ##Fiscal year 2023 average SBA 7(A) loan for each racial group
approved applications
included.
• ## Fiscal year 2023 average
SBA 7(a) loan size for each
racial group.
IV. Appendix
Opinions of
Borrowing
Firms
Q35: Race Gender
“Overall, how
satisfied were you
with the credit
services offered by
lender that provided
you this credit?”
Opinions
Lender of
Borrowing
Firms (cont.)
Q37: Race Gender
“Compared to the
average business
owner with the same
business risk factors
and other
attributes, how
would you describe
your experiences in
applying for a loan
or line of credit?”
SUMMARY: Minority and women-owned firms
Opinions of • Found going through the credit process
more difficult
Borrowing Firms
• Were less satisfied with their loan terms
• More often felt that their loan terms were
mispriced, than were White and men
owners.
Opinions
Lender of
Borrowing
Firms (cont.)
Q39:
“Mispricing occurs
when the lender’s
terms (interest rate, Race Gender
collateral, etc..) do
not objectively match
the risk and other
attributes of the
business being lent
the money. The terms
are more onerous or
less onerous than
those in a fairly priced
market. Everything
considered (interest
rate, collateral, terms
of loan, etc.), do you
feel you have
experienced
mispricing?”
Robustness Sample Composition
Tests Using
• Our sample of 2,784 firms includes a higher
concentration from more populated states.
• However, it does not fully mirror the U.S. distribution of
Weights minority and white-owned firms by state and industry.
Weighted Analyses
• We conducted two separately weighted analyses to
enhance representativeness.
• In both analyses, weights were applied to reflect the
national distribution of white-owned and minority-
owned firms across different states.
Excerpts Race Gender
from
Weighted
Regressions
Using Race-
State-Industry
of Gender-
State-Industry
Weights
Notes:
• Dependent Variable: Loan
Rate and Requirement for
External Party Signature
• Standard errors in
parentheses
• Significance levels:
• p < 0.10 (*)
• P < 0.05 (**)
• P < 0.01 (***)
THANK YOU
For More Information, Contact:
Michael Verchot
Director, Consulting and Business Development Center
Foster Scholl of Business, University of Washington
Email: mverchot@uw.edu
Phone: 206.572.9521
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