Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for

Issuer: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Document type: Indictment
Date: 2024-09-05
Case: Plaintiff v. Meelad Dezfooli,
Case number: 2:22-cr-00142-CDS-DJA

Summary

An order in United States of America v. Meelad Dezfooli, Case No. 2:22-cr-00142-CDS-DJA, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, filed July 14, 2025 as Document 372 and signed by United States District Judge Cristina D. Silva. It denies the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial [ECF No. 331]. The order recounts that a jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts on September 5, 2024, after a six-day trial on a superseding indictment charging bank fraud, money laundering and monetary transactions counts tied to Paycheck Protection Program loans. It sets out the standards under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) and Rule 33 and reviews the trial evidence on three PPP loan applications, which it states totaled $11,231,186.52 in disbursed funds. The court concludes the defendant did not carry his burden for a new trial.

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Case 2:22-cr-00142-CDS-DJA Document 372 Filed 07/14/25 Page 1 of 13

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA
3

4 United States of America, Case No. 2:22-cr-00142-CDS-DJA

5 Plaintiff Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal or, in the Alternative,
6 v. Motion for a New Trial

7 Meelad Dezfooli, [ECF No. 331]

8 Defendant

10 On September 5, 2024, at the conclusion of a six-day trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict
11 on all counts against defendant Meelad Dezfooli. Verdict, ECF No. 242. Dezfooli was charged in

12 a superseding indictment with three counts of bank fraud, three counts of money laundering,

13 and four counts of engaging in monetary transactions involving criminally derived property after

14 an investigation revealed he was involved in Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan fraud

15 during the Covid-19 pandemic. Superseding indictment, ECF No. 97. Dezfooli moves for

16 judgment of acquittal, or in the alternative, for a new trial. Mot., ECF No. 331. The government

17 opposes the motion. Opp’n, ECF No. 337. 1 For the reasons set forth herein, Dezfooli’s motion is

18 denied.

19 I. Legal standard
20 A. Judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)
21 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 provides that “the court may set aside the verdict
22 and enter an acquittal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). When evaluating a motion for judgment of

23 acquittal the court “review[s] the evidence presented against the defendant in the light most

24 favorable to the government to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the

25 essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 273

26
1 Despite granting Dezfooli two extensions to submit a reply, he did not do so prior to the deadline. See

First stip. to extend, ECF No. 340; Second stip. to extend, ECF No. 355.
Case 2:22-cr-00142-CDS-DJA Document 372 Filed 07/14/25 Page 2 of 13

1 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, “it is not the district court’s function to determine

2 witness credibility when ruling on a Rule 29 motion[,]” United States v. Alarcon-Simi, 300 F.3d 1172,

3 1176 (9th Cir. 2002), as those conditions are within the exclusive function of the jury. United

4 States v. Rojas, 554 F.2d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1977). Rather, “after viewing the evidence in the light

5 most favorable to the government,” the relevant question is whether “any rational trier of fact

6 could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.

7 Cordova Barajas, 360 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

8 (1979)). If a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime(s) beyond a

9 reasonable doubt, then motion must be denied. United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.

10 2010) (en banc).

11 B. Motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33
12 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) states that “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the
13 court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” United

14 States v. Xi Andy Lieng, 548 F. App’x 397, 399 (9th Cir. 2013). “A district court’s power to grant a

15 motion for a new trial is much broader than its power to grant a motion for judgment of

16 acquittal,” and the court may thus weigh the evidence itself and judge the credibility of

17 witnesses. United States v. A. Lanoy Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 974 F.2d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1992).

18 II. Discussion
19 It is well-established that when ruling on a Rule 29 motion, “the relevant question is
20 whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

21 trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

22 Alarcon-Simi, 300 F.3d at 1176. Dezfooli fails to demonstrate that any rational trier of fact, when

23 evaluating the evidence presented at trial and viewed in a light most favorable to the

24 government, would not have found that the essential elements of each offense charged were

2
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1 proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, although the government introduced close to 500

2 exhibits, 2 as explained below, the evidence supporting the guilty verdict was rather succinct.

3 A. Dezfooli’s motion for judgment of acquittal is denied.
4 1. The evidence supports that a rational jury could have convicted Dezfooli of bank fraud as
charged in counts one through three of the superseding indictment.
5

6 Dezfooli was charged in counts one through three of the superseding indictment with

7 violations of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344(2). ECF No. 97 at 13. To be found guilty

8 of that charge, the government needed to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable

9 doubt: (1) that Dezfooli knowingly carried out a scheme or plan to obtain money or property

10 from the charged financial institutions by making false statements or promises; (2) that Dezfooli

11 knew that the statements or promises were false; (3) that the statements or promises were

12 material; that is, they had a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, the

13 financial institutions to part with money or property; (4) that Dezfooli acted with the intent to

14 defraud; and (5) that the charged financial institutions were federally chartered or insured. See

15 Ninth Cir. Crim. Jury Instr. 15.39 (2025). 3 The evidence introduced demonstrates that a rational

16 trier of fact could undoubtedly have convicted Dezfooli on all three counts of bank fraud.

17 Indeed, the evidence revealed that starting in April of 2020, Dezfooli knowingly carried

18 out a scheme or plan to obtain money when he submitted three PPP loan 4 applications to FDIC

24 2 See Final Gov’t Ex. list, ECF No. 247.
3 This instruction was last revised in 2021.

25 4 PPP stands for the Paycheck Protection Program, which was created in 2020 by Congress in the early
part of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis as part of the Coronavirus Aid Relief and Economic Security Act
26 (CARES). See Trial tr. 2, 8/27/24, ECF No. 308 at 32. PPP loans were a new forgivable type of loan created
through, and backed by, the Small Business Administration (SBA). Id. at 33–34.

3
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1 financial institutions, 5 for three separate businesses: 6 Best Floors 7, A-Series LLC 8, and Nevada

2 Sales Limited 9. Each application went through a verification process, requiring the applicant to

3 submit proof of identification and bank account information. 10 For each application, Dezfooli

4 did just that: he submitted personal identifying documentation, 11 such as a copy of his driver’s

5 license, 12 and he represented himself as the CEO, manager, owner, or some combination of

6 positions, for each purported business. 13

7 Dezfooli’s argument that because the government did not prove with direct evidence
8 that it was Dezfooli, and not some other unknown actor, 14 that submitted the applications is

9 unavailing for two reasons. First, as it relates to the PPP loan for Best Floors, obtained from First

10 Saving Bank (FSB), Dezfooli was a known customer to that bank. Importantly, while Dezfooli

12 5 Trial tr. 1, 8/27/24, ECF No. 308 at 142 (First Savings Bank FDIC insured in 2020); Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24,
ECF No. 309 at 58 (U.S. Bank was FDIC insured in April of 2020); id. at 197 (Cache Valley Bank was
13 FDIC insured in April of 2020); see also Gov’t Ex. 17 (FDOC records confirming all three financial
institutions were FDIC insured at the time Dezfooli took out the PPP loans).
14 6 Each company’s business registration with the State of Nevada was either revoked, in default, or
expired between 2019 and 2020. See Trial tr. 2, 8/27/24, ECF No. 308 at 112–32 (witness testifying about
15 the process to register a business in the State of Nevada, and that Best Floor’s registration was revoked in
2019, that A-Series LLC was in default in May of 2020, and that Nevada Sales was in default in
16 September 2020).
7 See ECF No. 247, Gov’t Exs. 101–15 (Best Floor Loan Documents).
17 8 Id. at Gov’t Exs. 200–22 (A-Series Loan Documents).
9 Id. at Gov’t Exs. 300–30 (Nevada Sales Ltd. Loan Documents).
18 10
A witness from the SBA testified that the PPP program permitted banks to rely on the information by
19 PPP loan applicants to determine eligibility and underwriting decisions, and that applicants were
permitted to certify information contained in their loan applications. See Trial tr. 2, 8/27/24, ECF No. 308
20 11at 38–41.
Trial tr. 2, 8/27/24 at 154–67 (First Savings Bank (FSB) testifying about Dezfooli’s driver’s license,
21 signature cards for Dezfooli, and the email, dez@bestbuyfloor.com, that were part of the PPP loan
application); Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 78 (U.S. Bank witness testifying that a Meelad Dezfooli
22 submitted a loan application using email address dez@bestbuyfloor.com and phone number 702-502-
8981); id. at 223 (Cache Bank witness testifying that Dezfooli submitted a copy of his driver’s license in
23 his PPP loan application); Trial tr. 4, 8/29/24, ECF No. 310 at 19–20 (Cache Bank witness testifying about
bank’s attempt to contact Dezfooli at phone number 702-502-8981).
24 12 See Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 94–96 (witness identifying and testifying about copy of driver’s
license and “selfie” submitted to U.S. Bank by Meelad Dezfooli as part of loan application).
25 13 See, e.g., Trial tr. 2, 8/27/24, ECF No. 308 at 53 (witness testifying the Best Floors application identified
Dezfooli as the sole owner); Trial tr. 4, 8/29/24, ECF No. 310 at 13 (Dezfooli identified on Nevada Sales
26 Ltd. PPP loan application as manager with 100% ownership interest).
14 See Mot., ECF No. 331 at 6–9.

4
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1 applied for the FSB application online, the trial testimony established that Dezfooli signed, in

2 person, a signature card to replace the Docusign loan documents in July 2020. Trial tr. 2,

3 8/27/2024, ECF No. 308 at 197. Moreover, Dezfooli signed a modification to one loan in person.

4 See Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 49. That is direct evidence that it was, in fact, Dezfooli

5 who obtained the original loan from FSB. Second, while Dezfooli was not a known customer of

6 either U.S. Bank or Cache Bank, circumstantial evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable

7 doubt that Dezfooli was the person who applied for, and received the funds from, the PPP loans

8 from those two financial institutions. 15

9 Dezfooli obtained 16 ever-increasing funds from each fraudulent loan application
10 submitted, from over $1,000,000 for Best Floors, to almost $1.5 million for A-Series, to just shy of

11 $8.7 million for Nevada Sales. 17 In total, banks dispersed $11,231,186.52 in PPP loan funds to

12 Dezfooli. Witnesses from each bank where Dezfooli submitted the PPP loan applications

13 testified they would not have approved the applications if they knew the documentation

14 submitted to support the loan contained fictious information. 18

16
15 That circumstantial evidence includes copies of his driver’s license, the email addresses contained the
17 name “dez,” and his personal cell number that were all included as part of the applications, as well as the
evidence of the funds going into and out of his bank accounts, and the fact the Dezfooli was flush with
18 cash after the fraudulent loans were disbursed. And witnesses testified that the defendant went by the
name “Dez.” Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 11; Trial tr. 4, 8/29/24, ECF No. 310 at 143–44.
19 16
See Gov’t Ex. 469 (Dezfooli’s bank account information).
17 For Best Floors, Ltd, $1,093,606.52 in PPP loans were disbursed to Dezfooli on April 20, 2020. Trial tr.
20
2, 8/27/24, ECF No. 308 at 168–96; Gov’t Ex. 101. For A-Series LLC, $1,464,781 in PPP loan funds were
21 disbursed to Dezfooli on May 6, 2020. See Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 79–80; Gov’t Exs. 200–01.
And for Nevada Sales Limited, $8,672,800 in PPP loan funds were disbursed to Dezfooli on May 8, 2020.
22 See Trial tr. 4, 8/29/24, ECF No. 310 at 12; Gov’t Ex. 300.
18 Trial tr. 2, ECF No. 308 at 152–54 (FSB witness testifying it would have approved the loan without

23 certifications); Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 63–68 (U.S. Bank witness testifying that
misrepresentations and certifications in PPP loan applications matter because it impacted how much an
24 applicant received, applicant eligibility, and whether loan would be approved), id. at 90–91 (same witness
testifying about fictious utility bill emailed to U.S. Bank from email address dez@bestbuyfloor.com
25 that was used as part of the loan approval process); see also Trial tr. 2, 8/27/24, ECF No. 308 at 43 (SBA
witness testifying that if applicants did not certify their applicants, lenders would not issue the loans);
26 Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 204–05 (Cache Bank witness testifying that if bank knew that a PPP
loan application contained misrepresentations it would not have been approved).

5
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1 Dezfooli was required to—and indeed did—certify that he was eligible to receive PPP
2 loan funds, 19 and that those loan funds would only be used for payroll and business-related

3 expenses. 20 But those certifications were false. The evidence also demonstrated that each loan

4 application was submitted using fraudulent or falsified supporting documentation, 21 that they

5 each contained material misrepresentations such as false and inflated numbers of employees

6 working at the purported businesses, 22 to the amount of payroll paid to the alleged employees, 23

8
19
Id. at 59–60 (explaining that the PPP loan application required applicants to certify that “[t]he
applicant is eligible to receive a loan under the rules in effect at the time that this application is
9 submitted and I have been issued by the SBA implementing the Paycheck Protection Program under
Division A, Title 1 of the CARES Act.”). Eligibility included not having received another PPP loan
10 between February 15, 2020, and December 31, 2020. Id. at 66 (Best Floors application including
certification that “[d]uring the period beginning on February 15, 2020, and ending on December 31, 2020,
11 the applicant has not and will not receive another loan under the Paycheck Protection Program”); see also
Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 80–81 (discussing certifications to Dezfooli’s PPP loan for A-Series
12 LLC); id. at 205–07, 218–20 (Cache Bank explaining importance and reliance on certifications).
20 See Trial tr., 8/27/24, ECF No. 308 at 44–49 (SBA witness explaining the PPP loan application purpose

13 and process); id. at 59 (explaining the PPP loan applicants and to certified that “[a]ll SBA loan proceeds
will be used only for business related purposes as specified in the loan application and consistent with
14 the Paycheck Protection Program rules”).
21 See, e.g., Gov’t Ex. 302 (purported Nevada Energy bill submitted as part of loan application); see also Trial
15 tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 129–32 (witness comparing verified NV Energy bill to purported NV
Energy bill that was created “outside” NV Energy’s billing system); compare also Trial Tr. 4, 8/29/2024,
16 ECF No. 310 at 99–100 (IRS witness explaining Best Floors did not submit any federal tax returns after
2018), with id. at 104–09 (IRS witness saying 2019 tax returns submitted for PPP loan for Best Floors were
17 never filed with IRS); Trial tr. 5, 8/30/24, ECF No. 311 at 95–96 (former employee of Dezfooli who
testified they did not know any employee with the names and signatures on purported IRS Form 940s);
18
id. at 156–67 (witness identifying her former address and part of her name and titled as “manager” on
19 Nevada Design LLC paperwork, a business she had never heard of nor did she authorize anyone to file
documents on her behalf, denying being a signatory on a Wells Fargo account for that same company,
20 and denying receiving over eight million dollars in PPP loan funds into that bank account).
22 See, e.g., Trial tr. 5, 8/30/25, ECF No. 311 at 85–100; 143–45; 161; 206 (witnesses testifying about

21 approximate number of employees working for Best Floors, Ltd. during relevant time, which were far less
than listed in PPP loan application); see also Trial tr. 4, 8/29/24, ECF No. 310 at 42–58; 72–73 (witness
22 from Nevada’s Department of Employment, Training, and Rehabilitation (DETR) who collects
unemployment insurance tax and other records for the state, testified that A-Series LLC reported
23 between four and ten employees in 2020, Best Floors Ltd. reported between zero to one employee for
2018 and no reports after 2018, and there were no records for a Nevada Sales Ltd. or Nevada Design Ltd.)
24 23 The Best Floors, Ltd. application claimed seventy-six total employees, resulting in $437,442.61 in
monthly payroll. See Trial tr., 8/27/24, ECF No. 308 at 50–51. The A-Series LLC application claimed
25 ninety-six total employees, resulting in $585,912 in monthly payroll. See Trial tr., 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at
79:2–80:15; Gov’t Exs. 200–01. The Nevada Sales Limited application claimed 477 total employees,
26 resulting in $3,469,142 in monthly payroll. See ECF No. 309, Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 214:18–21;
Gov’t Ex. 300.

6
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1 to false addresses associated with one of the businesses, 24 to an altered utility bill as part of the

2 loan verification process for the A-Series LLC. 25 The certifications and fake or false

3 documentation were material and influenced each victim-bank to approve Dezfooli’s PPP loans.

4 See United States v. Cloud, 872 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1989) (Defendant’s conviction for bank fraud was

5 supported by sufficient evidence showing that defendant signed mutual escrow instructions

6 knowing that they contained materially false representations as to sale price and down payment

7 figures).

8 Thus, contrary to Dezfooli’s argument, 26 the evidence demonstrates that the government
9 provided more than sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could conclude that Dezfooli

10 acted with the intent to defraud. United States v. McNeil, 320 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2003) (evidence

11 was sufficient to establish that defendant acted with specific intent required for bank fraud

12 conviction, in connection with defendant’s use of stolen identity while attempting to

13 fraudulently obtain tax refund from IRS under stolen name; defendant used fake identification

14 to open a bank account in stolen name, and misrepresented himself as person whose name he

15 had stolen, amongst other acts). And Dezfooli’s argument that he was unaware he was not

16 allowed to claim “independent contractors” as “employees” on the loan applications is unavailing

17 when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. That is because his

18 argument that independent contractors were utilized was contradicted by admitted evidence.

19 For example, the evidence showed that, at most, only Best Floors utilized independent

20 contractors. Any suggestion that the other businesses utilized independent contractors was

21 contradicted by filings with the State of Nevada. 27 Moreover, testimony from former Best Floors

22 employees call into question just how many employees were utilized. 28 Thus, even accepting as

23
24 See Gov’t Exs. 200, 201; Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 79–80.

24 25 See Gov’t Exs. 200, 3.02; see also Trial tr. 3, 8/28/24, ECF No. 309 at 129–31.
26 See Mot., ECF No. 331 at 9–13.

25 27 See Trial tr. 4, 8/29/24, ECF No. 310 at 49–50 (A Series LLC answered “no” to a question asking if
independent contractors were used in a 2020 filing with the state).
26 28 See Trial tr. 4, 8/29/24, at ECF No. 310 at 49 (witness testifying there were five to eight employees who
worked at the business located at the 1621 East Sunset location).

7
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1 true his argument that he did not comprehend the differences between employees and

2 independent contractors for purposes of the applications, the evidence showed the PPP loan

3 applications nonetheless contained materially false information about the number of employees,

4 even counting independent contractors, because the numbers were never as high as what he

5 claimed on the applications. See, e.g., Trial tr. 4. 8/29/2024, ECF No. 310 at 49 (former employee of

6 Best Floors testifying there were about five to eight employees back in 2019); see also supra p. 6

7 n.20.

8 Moreover, the evidence at trial also demonstrated that Dezfooli used the proceeds of his
9 fraudulent loan applications for personal—not business—purposes and, in doing so, laundered

10 the funds. Specifically, Dezfooli used part of the funds to makes numerous residential real estate

11 purchases, 29 part of the funds to open a personal Robinhood investment account, 30 part of the

12 funds to purchase a Bentley and a Tesla, 31 and part of the funds to gamble at local casinos. 32 See

13 also Gov’t Exs. 414.02, 415, 433, 434.05 (Dezfooli’s deposit and/or wire information for accounts

14 ending in x4756 and x2777).

15 Dezfooli’s argument that there was no testimony demonstrating that he did not intend to
16 use the PPP loan funds for non-business-related purposes is unconvincing as the evidence

17 speaks for itself: it clearly demonstrated that Dezfooli used the PPP loan funds for his own gain,

18 and not for business purposes as certified in the loan applications. Accordingly, Dezfooli’s

19 motion for judgment of acquittal for counts one through three is denied.

22
29 See, e.g., 6116 Chinook Way (as alleged in Count Four of the Superseding Indictment) and 180 Ruby

23 Ridge Avenue (as alleged in Count Five of the Superseding Indictment); see also ECF No. 312, Trial tr. 6 at
125–28; Gov’t Exs. 402.01; 403.01; 61, 463, 467, 478 (demonstrative aid showing all purchases); Trial tr. 6,
24 ECF No. 312 at 149–54; id. at 164 (testimony that “25 houses were purchased with PPP funds”).
30 See Gov’t Exs. 8.01–18 (records from Dezfooli’s Robinhood account); Gov’t Exs. 465, 471 (Robinhood

25 Transfers).
31 Gov’t Ex. 12 (Bentley purchase records); Gov’t Ex. 13 (Tesla purchase records).
26 32 Gov’t Ex. 466 (Front money deposit at The Cosmopolitan Casino); Gov’t Ex. 470 (Casino Electronic
Transfers); Gov’t Exs. 484–86 (Cosmopolitan Exhibits).

8
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1 2. The evidence supports that a rational jury could have convicted Dezfooli of money laundering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 as charged in counts four through six of the superseding indictment.
2

3 Dezfooli’s argument that the government failed to show Dezfooli had the requisite intent
4 to conceal or disguise the fraudulently obtained funds also fails. See Mot., ECF No. 331 at 14–19.

5 For these counts, the government was required to prove that Dezfooli conducted “a financial

6 transaction involving property represented to be the proceeds of specified unlawful activity,”

7 knowing that the transactions were designed in whole or in part “to conceal or disguise the

8 nature, location, source, ownership, or control of property believed to be the proceeds of

9 specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(B); see also United States v. Singh, 995 F.3d 1069,

10 1076 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The money laundering statute is violated if the transaction in question is

11 ‘designed in whole or in part’ to conceal.”). Here, the evidence shows the jury reasonably arrived

12 at its verdict on the § 1956 violations alleged in counts four through six of the superseding

13 indictment.

14 The intent to deceive, like any mens rea, is usually inferred from circumstantial
15 evidence. See United States v. Plache, 913 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990); Purdue Pharma L.P. v Endo

16 Pharms. Inc., 410 F.3d 690, 700 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Indeed, “[c]ircumstantial evidence ‘can be used to

17 prove any fact,’ although ‘mere suspicion or speculation does not rise to the level of sufficient

18 evidence.’” United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v.

19 Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508, 514 (9th Cir. 1990)). As such, the relevant inquiry is “not whether the

20 evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether the jury could reasonably arrive at

21 its verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991)). The financial

22 transactions that constituted the alleged money laundering in counts four through six of the

23 superseding indictment were not simple. 33 As revealed during the trial, Dezfooli utilized

24
33 Although the transactions conducted were not simple, the funds were nonetheless easily traceable.

25 Thus, Dezfooli’s argument that the government did not properly trace the fraudulent loan funds (see
Mot., ECF No. 331 at 19–20) is unconvincing. The government presented sufficient evidence to
26 demonstrate a reasonable jury could find that the PPP loan funds were linked to the purchases of the
properties alleged in counts four through six of the superseding indictment. A witness from the IRS

9
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1 business names to purchase the residential properties identified in the superseding indictment

2 and registered on a website to make those purchases using an alias. See, e.g., Trial tr. 4, 8/29/2024,

3 ECF No. 310 at 203–04 (witnesses identifying paperwork for purchases involving refunds to

4 “Sanam, Limited,” and the remitter of a check as “James Dez”); id. at 204, 210, 214 (paperwork

5 identifying “James Dez” as the purchaser’s representative but also listing Melaad Dezfooli as

6 primary contact for the transaction). Then, Dezfooli used cashier’s checks to purchase those

7 properties through a website identified as Auction.com. That website permits individuals to

8 utilize cashier’s checks, and if the cashier’s check amount was higher than the purchase amount,

9 the buyer would get a refund for the difference. Id. at 203–07. Stated otherwise, Dezfooli was

10 able to disguise the PPP loan funds by purchasing the property with a cashier’s check, and then

11 through a secondary transaction, conceal the funds by receiving refunds for unused funds.

12 Moreover, trial testimony revealed that issuing such large refunds, 34 though not unlawful or

13 impossible, was not “typical.” Id. at 211; 221–22.

14 A rational juror could undoubtedly find Dezfooli’s actions were designed to conceal or
15 disguise “nature, location, source, ownership, or control” of the fraudulent loan funds. See United

16 States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that defendant’s transfer of a

17 mortgage payment to a congressman in exchange for a government contract was sufficient

19 provided detailed testimony regarding her review of Dezfooli’s bank accounts, the loan disbursements,
and the financial transactions (including real estate, casino, and vehicles) associated with Dezfooli. See
20 Trial tr. 6, 9/3/24, ECF No. 312 at 75–223. As it relates to the transactions charged in counts six through
nine, the witness stated that the Chinook property “was made with one cashier’s check. That cashier’s
21 check was withdrawn from Wells Fargo bank 3281. At the time of the withdrawal, there was
approximately $7.7 million of PPP money in the account and 0 other money from other -- other sources in
22 the account.” Id. at 125. That same witness testified that a cashier’s check from the same account, with all
PPP money, was utilized to purchase the Ruby Ridge property. Id. at 146–47. Last, the same witness
23 testified the purchase for the Nelson Ridge Lane home was “a little more complicated” because there
were five cashier’s checks used for the transaction, and the funds were not drawn from the accounts the
24 PPP loan funds were deposited into but were drawn on an account in the name of “Sanam Ltd.” Id. at 149–
50. Nonetheless, the witness was able to trace the funds in the Sanam Ltd. account as the “refund” funds
25 Dezfooli received from homes that were purchases with PPP loan funds. Id. at 150–53, 165–66 (witness
testifying that the money associated with all three properties originated with PPP money).
26 34 See, e.g., Trial tr. 4, 8/9/24, ECF No. 310 at 206 (Auction.com witness stating the refund for the Chinook
property was “quite high”).

10
Case 2:22-cr-00142-CDS-DJA Document 372 Filed 07/14/25 Page 11 of 13

1 because the funds were not transmitted directly, but rather were “convoluted” as to “mask the

2 link before then funds and their source”). Stated otherwise, the jury could reasonably determine

3 that Dezfooli conducted the transactions alleged in counts four through six in order to conceal

4 or disguise the source of the purchasing funds, so Dezfooli’s motion for judgment of acquittal is

5 denied as to these counts.

6 3. The evidence supports that a rational jury could have convicted Dezfooli of money laundering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 as alleged in counts seven through nine of the superseding
7 indictment.
8 Dezfooli’s arguments that the government failed to meet its burden as to the § 1957

9 violations alleged in counts seven through nine also fail. Section 1957 provides that “(a)

10 [w]hoever . . . knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally

11 derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity,

12 shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).” 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Thus, the government must

13 prove that the defendant knew the transactions at issue involved criminally derived property.

14 See United States v. Lonich, 23 F.4th 881, 899 (9th Cir. 2022), overruled on other grounds by United States

15 v. Lucas, 101 F.4th 1158 (9th Cir. 2024). Although the government must prove that the defendant

16 knew the transactions involved criminally derived property, it need not prove that the defendant

17 knew the act of money laundering itself is unlawful. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a); see also United States v.

18 Stein, 37 F.3d 1407, 1410 (9th Cir. 1994).

19 Dezfooli’s actions of (1) applying for the PPP loans using fake or false representations or
20 documentation, then (2) receiving the funds, and thereafter (3) engaging in monetary

21 transactions that exceeded $10,000 with the fraudulently obtained funds, sufficiently supports

22 Dezfooli’s convictions for counts seven through nine. Based on witness testimony tracing each

23 transaction to the fraudulently obtained PPP loan funds, a rational jury could find that Dezfooli

24 knowingly engaged in each charged financial transaction, each of which exceeded $10,000, and

25 that those funds constituted or were derived from the bank fraud charged in counts one through

26 three. See, e.g., Trial tr. 6, 9/3/24, ECF No. 312 at 114 (witness testifying about a $225,000 check

11
Case 2:22-cr-00142-CDS-DJA Document 372 Filed 07/14/25 Page 12 of 13

1 from FSB account containing solely PPP loan funds, that was transferred into an account

2 associated with A Series); id. at 172–73 (witness testifying about $39,985.29 transfer into

3 Dezfooli’s Robinhood account); id. at 175–76 (witness testifying about $110,602.40 cashier’s

4 check made out to Nevada Property 1—listing Dezfooli in the memo—that was then deposited

5 into Dezfooli’s account at The Cosmopolitan Hotel & Casino). Accordingly, Dezfooli’s motion

6 for judgment of acquittal for these counts is denied.

7 4. A rational jury could have convicted Dezfooli of count ten.
8 Title 18, United States Code, Section § 3147 imposes penalties for individuals who
9 commit an offense while on release pending trial for other federal charges. 18 U.S.C. § 3147. As

10 relevant here, the evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that Dezfooli was placed on pre-

11 trial release 35 on July 11, 2022. Trial tr. 6, 9/3/24, ECF No. 312 at 154–55; see also Gov’t Ex. 11.01

12 (appearance bond). A witness from the IRS further testified that after Dezfooli was released on

13 that appearance bond, he sold the Nelson Ridge Lane residential property in January 2023. Trial

14 tr. 6, 9/3/24, ECF No. 312 at 157–59. Specifically, $589, 715.42 was wired into an account for

15 Sanam Ltd., on January 4, 2023, and the person who signed as the “seller” for that transaction

16 was Dezfooli, who was also listed as the manager for Sanam. Id. Trial evidence also demonstrated

17 that the Nelson Ridge house was originally purchased with PPP loan money. Id. at 161. Thus,

18 based on the evidence presented, a rational jury could determine that Dezfooli engaged in a

19 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 after he was placed on pre-trial release, which constitutes a violation

20 of 18 U.S.C. § 3147(1). As a result, Dezfooli’s motion for judgment of acquittal for count ten is

21 denied.

22 B. Dezfooli’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 is denied.
23 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the
24 court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R.

25 Crim. P. 33(a). Rule 33 motions are generally disfavored and should only be granted in

26
35 See Gov’t Ex. 11.01 (Dezfooli’s personal recognizance bond signed on July 11, 2022).

12
Case 2:22-cr-00142-CDS-DJA Document 372 Filed 07/14/25 Page 13 of 13

1 “exceptional” cases. United States v. Del Toro–Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

2 United States v. Pimentel, 654 F.2d 538, 545 (9th Cir. 1981)). The heavy burden of proving a new

3 trial is warranted rests with the defendant. See United States v. Halali, 2017 WL 3232566, at *2

4 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2017) (quoting United States v. McCourty, 562 F.3d 458, 475 (2d Cir. 2009)).

5 Dezfooli fails to carry his heavy burden here. He presents no new arguments, other than
6 those set forth in support of his Rule 29 motion, that would convince me that it is in the

7 interests of justice to grant a new trial, much less that this is the exceptional case warranting

8 one. Rather, after weighing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, there was no

9 miscarriage of justice. As a result, Dezfooli’s motion for a new trial is denied.

10 III. Conclusion
11 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dezfooli’s motion for judgment of acquittal, or in the
12 alternative, motion for a new trial [ECF No. 331] is DENIED.

13 Dated: July 14, 2025
14
________________________ ________
15 Cristina D. Silva
United States District Judge
16

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