Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity, Ch. 2 (Aug. 2024)
- Issuer
- Inspector general and oversight reports
- Document type
- Report
- Date
- 2024-08-14
- Case
- Report Prac Blueprint Enhanced Program Integrity Chapter 2 2024 08 14
Summary
Chapter 2 of the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee's Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity, "Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity," dated August 2024. It draws on oversight reports and testimony issued between January 2020 and January 2024, GAO, OMB and CRS publications, and listening sessions with OIGs. Its sections cover data access and collection, administrative remedies and OIG authorities, and amendments to legislation and regulations to reduce fraud and improper payments. Its key recommendations are a central data analytics center, statutory access to data and extended statutes of limitation for emergency programs. It quotes PRAC Chair Michael E. Horowitz urging Congress to sustain the Pandemic Analytics Center of Excellence beyond September 30, 2025.
Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used
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PANDEMIC RESPONSE
ACCOUNTABILITY COMMITTEE
Blueprint for Enhanced
Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities
for Policymakers to Improve
Program Integrity
August 2024
Contents
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity 1
Executive Summary 1
Section 1: Remove Barriers to Data Access and Collection 2
Section 2: Enhance Administrative Remedies and Expand OIG Authorities 10
Section 3: Amend Legislation and Regulations to Fight Fraud and Reduce
Improper Payments 16
Appendix 2-A: Pending Legislation 21
Appendix 2-B: Objective, Scope, and Methodology 24
Contributing Partners 25
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee ii
Chapter 2: Opportunities for
Policymakers to Improve
Program Integrity
Executive Summary:
In this chapter for Policymakers, which includes legislators and regulators, we highlight
recommendations to aid in preventing and detecting fraud and improper payments in government
programs. Policymakers can adopt these strategies when drafting legislation and policy for
emergency and regularly appropriated funding.
We compiled best practices and lessons learned from pandemic oversight reports issued by
the federal oversight community, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and congressional testimony by federal oversight officials. In this
chapter, we identify key recommendations related to the need for a central data analytics center,
statutory access to data, and the extension of statutes of limitation for emergency programs. We
also include information from listening sessions with federal and state stakeholders.
How We Developed Chapter 2
We took the following steps to identify best practices and lessons learned:
• Reviewed oversight reports and testimony issued between January 2020 and January 2024 to
identify key recommendations and considerations for Congress and other policymakers.
• Reviewed published reports, guidance, and memoranda from the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Congressional Research
Service (CRS).
• Requested assistance from Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) member
Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) and other OIGs for feedback, key takeaways, lessons
learned, and best practices from their reports and testimony.
• Conducted listening sessions with OIGs and professional organizations to incorporate their
knowledge and expertise.
For the full Methodology, see Appendix 2-B.
In the following sections, we list key themes with examples and citations from supporting
documents.
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 1
Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
Section 1: Remove
Barriers to Data Access
and Collection
Transparency and the prevention and detection of fraud are compromised when agencies and OIGs
have difficulty accessing data related to federal spending. This section underscores the need for a
central data analytics center to give agencies and the oversight community access to government-
wide data. The section also outlines the fundamental role data plays in preventing and detecting
improper payments, as well as in verifying the recipient eligibility.
Mandate the Creation of a Central Data Analytics Center
A central data analytics center that provides access to data and analytics services to agencies and
the OIG community, including investigators, is critical for tracking federal funds and preventing
and detecting fraud. Services could include identifying recipients receiving duplicate funding from
multiple programs and detecting red flags for improper payments and fraud.
• Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Chair, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee,
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight
Subcommittee, “Examining Federal COVID-era Spending and Preventing Future Fraud,”
November 11, 2023 (p. 9)
“It is critical that Congress consider legislation to sustain the PACE [Pandemic Analytics
Center of Excellence] beyond the PRAC’s scheduled sunset date of September 30, 2025,
so that the Inspector General community has an effective analytics platform to oversee all
federal spending. In my view, it would be a wasted opportunity and a potentially enormous
waste of funds to allow this fraud fighting tool to expire, as happened with the ROC [Recovery
Operations Center], and then have it need to be re-created at further taxpayer expense in
response to the next natural disaster or financial calamity. More critically, with or without
another economic or other crisis, authorizing a permanent data analytics tool for the
Inspector General community will allow us to adapt this tool to fight fraud in all government
spending, not just spending that is linked to the pandemic recovery. To be clear: the
ongoing role of the PACE (or its successor), while critical, will be for the purpose of providing
advanced data analytics services to OIGs to aid their program integrity, fraud prevention,
and recovery efforts. The community does not need—and this proposal would not create—a
‘super IG’ that would duplicate the audit, investigative, and oversight responsibilities and
efforts of OIGs; rather, what OIGs, the government, and taxpayers need is the continued
benefit from the analytical support role provided by the PACE on an ongoing, permanent
basis.”
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Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
• Testimony of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, “Emergency Relief Funds:
Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and Accountability for COVID-19
and Beyond,” March 17, 2022 (p. 42, Matter for Congressional Consideration 4)
“Congress should establish a permanent analytics center of excellence to aid the oversight
community in identifying improper payments and fraud.”
• Testimony of Rebecca Shea, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, GAO, before
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight, Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “COVID-19: Insights and Actions for Fraud
Prevention,” November 14, 2023 (p. 23, Matter for Congressional Consideration 4)
“Congress should establish a permanent analytics center of excellence to aid the oversight
community in identifying improper payments and fraud.”
• CRS IF2334, Preventing Improper Payments: Lessons from Using Data Matching in Pandemic
Relief Program Oversight (p. 2)
“Congress has empowered the PRAC to address improper payments and to access and use
data to carry out its oversight of pandemic relief programs. Congress may consider whether
to extend the PRAC data platform’s capabilities beyond pandemic programs for the IG
[Inspector General] community.”
• Testimony of Sheldon Shoemaker, Deputy Inspector General, Small Business Administration,
before the Subcommittee on Government Operations and the Federal Workforce of the
Committee on Oversight and Accountability, House of Representatives, “Waste, Fraud, and
Abuse Go Viral: Inspectors General on Curing the Disease,” March 9, 2023 (p. 15)
“So, the fact that you would want that resource [the PACE] to be available during the next
disaster for the inspector general community, I think that that is a worthwhile investment.”
• DOJ, COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force 2024 Report (p. 19)
“[T]he PRAC also provides robust investigative support to law enforcement partners
in a variety of ways. The Pandemic Analytics Center of Excellence (PACE) offers data
management, advanced analytic capabilities, and investigative lead generation for the PRAC
Fraud Task Force, DOJ [Department of Justice] COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force, and
other OIG and law enforcement organizations. As of January 2024, the PACE has provided
investigative support to more than 45 federal law enforcement and OIG partners in over
700 pandemic–related investigations—all in less than four years since the PRAC’s inception.
With over 8,000 subjects and an estimated fraud loss of $1.87 billion associated with these
investigations, the PACE has demonstrated a valuable return on investment.
The PACE serves as a force multiplier for the PRAC’s OIG and law enforcement partners due
to its ability to share data, resolve entities (i.e., recipients) across data sources, and detect
potentially suspicious networks across agencies and programs. The PACE has access to
47 government, public, and non-public data sets, and has established Memorandums of
Understanding with 47 OIGs and law enforcement agencies to prevent and detect improper
payments and fraud across federal benefits programs.”
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Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
Additional Key Insights from Listening Sessions
Key stakeholders told us that a lesson learned from the 2008 financial crisis is the need to
maintain a central data analytics platform, such as the PRAC’s Pandemic Analytics Center of
Excellence (PACE). Although the Recovery, Accountability, and Transparency Board created the
Recovery Operations Center in response to the crisis of 2008, it was not maintained after the
organization sunset in 2015, so when the pandemic crisis came in 2020, a new data analytics
center had to be built from scratch. Extending the life of the PACE will enable agencies and the
oversight community to respond to crises more quickly and efficiently.
Provide Statutory Access to Data
With access to key data like the National
Directory of New Hires for wage data, Internal Lessons Learned: Require Third Parties, Such
Revenue Service (IRS) tax transcripts, and as Banks, to Vet Eligibility for Recipients
State Unemployment Claims data, agencies Stakeholders noted that legislation should mandate
and oversight communities can more effectively third-party checks of potential recipients against
analyze, crossmatch, and share data to identify available payment integrity data sources, such as
potential ineligible recipients. Currently, the IRS DNP, so that funding goes to the right entities for the
right reasons. It is important to make sure there is an
has no authorization to disclose tax information
incentive structure to set up the appropriate level of
for general oversight purposes, so Congress controls. This was missing from the legislation (the
would need to amend the Internal Revenue statutory language), and, therefore, when policies
Code to allow for such data sharing. In addition, were being written by the agencies, they were not
permanently extending the availability of the making the leap because banks were responsible
Death Master file in the Department of the for lending approval decisions and disbursing funds.
Treasury’s Do Not Pay Working System (DNP) Congress should also be mindful of the Payment
will give agencies and the oversight community Integrity Information Act as to which internal controls
the ability to better protect federal program related to eligibility are relaxed and which are not.
funds from fraud, waste, and abuse.
• Testimony of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States, before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, “Emergency Relief Funds:
Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and Accountability for COVID-19
and Beyond,” March 17, 2022
(p. 42, Matter for Congressional Consideration 10)
“Congress should amend the Social Security Act to accelerate and make permanent the
requirement for the Social Security Administration to share its full death data with the
Department of the Treasury’s Do Not Pay working system.”
• CRS IF2334, Preventing Improper Payments: Lessons from Using Data Matching in Pandemic
Relief Program Oversight (p. 2)
“To try to minimize improper payments in benefit programs, Congress might examine how
it can best facilitate data matching and examine whether current statutory mechanisms
effectively enable data matching in the way and on the scale it desires.”
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• Testimony of Larry D. Turner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), before the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Accountability, Subcommittee
on Government Operations and the Federal Workforce, “Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Go Viral:
Inspectors General on Curing the Disease,” March 9, 2023 (pp. 21-22)
“Congress should consider legislative proposals included in prior DOL budget requests
and pass legislation to improve UI [Unemployment Insurance] program integrity. The DOL
proposals included the following: require SWAs [state workforce agencies] to crossmatch UI
claims against the National Directory of New Hires; require SWAs to crossmatch UI claims
with the U.S. Social Security Administration’s prisoner database and other repositories of
prisoner information. These legislative proposals are consistent with previous OIG findings
and recommendations to improve the UI program. The OIG has also recommended that
Congress ensure DOL and the OIG have ongoing, timely, and complete access to UI claimant
data and wage records for our respective oversight responsibilities.”
• Testimony of Richard K. Delmar, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury,
before the House Oversight and Accountability Committee, Subcommittee on Government
Operations and the Federal Workforce, “Concerning Fraud and Improper Payments in COVID
Relief Programs,” March 9, 2023 (p. 8)
“Watchdogs need timely access to data to find fraud.”
• DOL OIG, Semiannual Report to Congress
(p. 70) Lessons Learned: Avoid Tax Changes During
Tax Season
“To enhance oversight of and reduce
overpayments in employee benefit TIGTA, Management and Performance Challenges
programs, including UI, DUA [Disaster Facing the Internal Revenue Service for Fiscal Year
2022 (p. 2)
Unemployment Assistance], and the
Federal Employees’ Compensation Act “A number of the provisions contained in pandemic
(FECA) program, the Department and legislation required the IRS to take steps to implement
the OIG need authority to easily and such legislation while in the midst of its 2020 and
expeditiously access state UI and Social 2021 annual tax filing seasons. The extensive actions
Security Administration (SSA) wage the IRS must undertake to implement tax legislation
will continue to be challenging when tax law changes
records. Access to SSA and UI data
are enacted close to, or after, the start of the annual
would allow the Department to measure filing season. Additional legislative developments
the long-term impact of employment related to tax reform and tax policy will continue to
and training services on job retention present challenges for the IRS.”
and earnings. This type of outcome
information for program participants is
otherwise difficult to obtain.”
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• SBA, Protecting the Integrity of the Pandemic Relief Programs: SBA’s Actions to Prevent, Detect
and Tackle Fraud (pp. 24-26, Recommendation 1)
REC 1: “Expand government data-sharing. IRS holds the gold-standard data for business
verification. However, today, IRS tax data is only available to SBA [Small Business
Administration] for limited program use and by request (a process that often takes a week
or longer), relying on an old form of technology and requiring human-conducted reviews by
both the SBA and IRS. In the CARES Act, Congress initially barred SBA from using IRS tax
data in administering COVID-EIDL [COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan], a long-standing
agency practice for mitigating fraud and determining eligibility, to facilitate quick delivery of
pandemic relief funds to needy businesses. SBA was subsequently granted the authority and
used IRS data starting in 2021 to verify identity for its pandemic programs, notably doing so
for COVID-EIDL, RRF [Restaurant Revitalization Fund], and SVOG [Shuttered Venue Operators
Grants]. Once established, the use of IRS tax data was highly successful in denying loans to
ineligible and fraudulent applicants.
Using IRS payroll and tax identification data in future programs comes with an expectation
of faster processing so that relief can be provided timely. A faster, more modern payroll
verification would be necessary to achieve the goals of speedy distribution and reduced
fraud. Fortunately, a model already exists for other federal agencies having direct access
to IRS tax data. Notably, Congress granted the authority to the Department of Education
for its Federal Student Loan program. Extending the same authority to SBA could enable a
real-time application programming interface (API), such that SBA could instantly verify an
applicant’s stated payroll level from the prior year. This feature would allow SBA to verify all
the applicant-provided payroll information necessary to compute the eligible loan amount.
Facilitating the sharing of government-collected information between federal agencies would
reduce the fraud risks inherent in government programs. Several pandemic programs used
objective business financial data (for example, payroll expenses and business income) to
calculate an appropriate loan or grant amount. Because SBA does not have access to this
information, applicants were required to provide it as part of their application or retain it to
support self-certification of eligibility. Instead of requiring a substantial amount of financial
data and burdening agencies with verifying complex transactions such as payroll expenses,
Congress could base eligibility and loan amount on objective, pre-existing tax data, such as
a desired percentage of Social Security- or Medicare-covered wages reported to IRS in the
previous tax year or quarter.”
• SBA OIG 23-09, COVID-19 Pandemic EIDL and PPP Loan Fraud Landscape (Appendix 2, pp.
2-3)
“SBA introduced pre-award application screenings beginning in January 2021, including
automated screenings for PPP, adding tax transcript verification for COVID-EIDL, and running
applications through the Treasury Department’s Do Not Pay system. These controls saved
billions.”
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• PRAC, FRAUD ALERT: PRAC Identifies $5.4 Billion in Potentially Fraudulent Pandemic Loans
Obtained Using Over 69,000 Questionable Social Security Numbers (p. 2)
“The ability to perform the type of SSN check the PRAC conducted was not readily available
to SBA when it faced a deluge of applications in 2020 for COVID-19 EIDL and PPP relief...the
results of this Fraud Alert demonstrate the benefit of a consent-based verification process to
authenticate basic applicant information—such as name, date of birth, and Social Security
Number—to ensure applicant eligibility and to prevent program and identity fraud. Such an
internal control, which we believe is a best practice, can be facilitated by legislative language
requiring federal agencies to use a consent-based verification process when making applicant
eligibility determinations and by authorizing SSA [Social Security Administration] to verify
information for this purpose.”
• PRAC, FRAUD ALERT FOLLOW-UP: Improved Sharing of Death Records and Use of the Do Not
Pay System Would Strengthen Program Integrity and Better Protect the Public (p. 3)
“A Do Not Pay system that contains the full DMF can give agencies a higher degree of
certainty that a payee is legitimate and eligible before making an award or payment.”
• PRAC, Why Unemployment Insurance Surged During the Pandemic (p. 12)
“Ensure the DOL and the DOL OIG have ongoing, timely, and complete access to UI claimant
data and wage records. [. . .] Ensure effective payment integrity controls to reduce improper
payments in all UI programs including temporary ones, such as through broader requirements
for mandatory cross-matching.”
• DOJ, COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force 2024 Report (pp. 1, 18, 32)
“To continue the CFETF’s [COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force] work and ensure
COVID-19 fraudsters don’t get away with it, legislation is required to adequately resource
COVID-19 fraud data sharing, lead development, investigations, prosecutions, and asset
recoveries.”
“The NUIFTF [National Unemployment Insurance Fraud Task Force] provides investigators
with a central location where searches of multiple pandemic relief data sets can be
conducted, rather than having to pursue data that was previously siloed within various state
and federal agencies.”
“The members of the CFETF stand ready to engage with the relevant policy makers to discuss
ways to improve our data sharing and a coordinated response to government benefits fraud
going forward, including creating an ongoing data-sharing and analytics entity.”
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 7
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Increase Quality of Data Collected by Federal Reporting Systems
• PRAC, Transparency in Pandemic-Related Federal Spending: Report of Alignment and Gaps,
Executive Summary (pp. 3, 6)
“The following actions are recommended to mitigate the data gaps found in federal reporting
systems:
• Treasury modifies USAspending.gov to allow for additional data element granularity,
collection, and display.
• Treasury, federal agencies, and OMB collaborate to retroactively correct existing
information.
• GSA [General Services Administration] modifies Federal Subaward Reporting System
[FSRS] and other government-wide systems [...] to capture data.
• OMB, GSA, and federal procurement community determine whether government-wide
changes in FPDS [Federal Procurement Data System] are required for procurement
awards.
• OMB and federal awarding agencies issue guidance and execute outreach/training to
prime recipients.
• Treasury and Congress collaborate to publish historic congressional districts on
USAspending.gov to ensure accuracy of reporting.
• Enforce existing OMB requirements in USAspending.gov for award descriptions.”
• SBA OIG 21-02, Inspection of Small Business Administration’s Initial Disaster Assistance
Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic (p. 28, Recommendation 6)
REC 6: “Strengthen data integrity to make it possible to determine if the inaccurate
information allowed loans to be made to ineligible entities and to strengthen SBA’s ability to
service loans appropriately.”
• Testimony of Rebecca Shea, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, GAO, before
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight, Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, entitled “COVID-19: Insights and Actions for
Fraud Prevention,” November 14, 2024 (p. 24, Matter for Congressional Consideration 9)
“Congress should amend the DATA Act to clarify the responsibilities and authorities of
OMB and the Department of the Treasury for ensuring the quality of data available on
USAspending.gov.”
• GAO 24-106214, Federal Spending Transparency: Opportunities to Improve USAspending.gov
Data (pp. 1-3)
“Congress could help improve the completeness of data on USAspending.gov by assigning
Treasury, in coordination with OMB, the responsibility to periodically assess and determine
which agencies must report spending data, and by requiring agencies to report OTAs [other
transaction agreements]. In addition, we are recommending that OMB, in collaboration
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with Treasury, provide guidance for agencies to ensure that the disaster and emergency
budgetary data they are reporting to USAspending.gov are consistent with other information
they make publicly available.”
Additional Key Insights from Listening Sessions
Key stakeholders told us that requirements for grantee reporting like those in Section 15011
of the CARES Act are critical. However, they pointed out that in subsequent pandemic-related
legislation grantees were not required to provide the type of reporting needed for oversight. When
the legislation didn’t identify the reporting details, everyone reported something different with
the result that Inspectors General did not have the data needed to conduct effective oversight.
Stakeholders also noted the importance of statutes that explicitly define requirements and mandate
that grantees report detailed information.
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Section 2: Enhance
Administrative Remedies
and Expand OIG Authorities
Empowering OIGs with administrative remedies, subpoena authority, and extended statutes of
limitations, as well as more flexibility in budget expenditures and hiring, will enable more agile and
effective approaches to meet increased oversight demands and better protect federal funding.
Extend Statutes of Limitation for Emergency Programs and Consider Additional
Asset Forfeiture Authorities
Identifying and prosecuting fraud continues even after all the funding for a program has been
obligated and spent. Extending criminal statutes of limitation related to emergency programs and
requiring third parties to preserve records that could be relevant to investigations ensures that OIGs
can pursue criminal charges for an extended period.
• DOL OIG 19-23-014-03-315, COVID-19: Pandemic Unemployment Assistance for Non-
traditional Claimants Weakened by Billions in Overpayments, Including Fraud (pp. 23-24,
Recommendation 3)
REC 3: “We recommend the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Employment and
Training work with Congressional stakeholders to inform them of the urgency of the statute
of limitations concerning pandemic-related UI fraud.”
• Testimony of Larry D. Turner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Labor, before the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Accountability, Subcommittee on
Government Operations and the Federal Workforce, “Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Go Viral:
Inspectors General on Curing the Disease,” March 9, 2023 (p. 22)
“In our November 2022 Semiannual Report to Congress, the OIG recommended that
Congress extend the statute of limitations for fraud involving pandemic‑related UI programs
and authorize OIG participation in asset forfeiture funds to combat UI fraud and other
crimes.”
• DOJ, COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force 2024 Report (p. 32)
“The CFETF strongly supports an extension of the statute of limitations for COVID-19
pandemic benefit fraud, an extension of the data sharing and analysis facilitated by the
PRAC, and the necessary resources for CFETF members to continue their impressive work
holding fraudsters accountable and recovering stolen funds.”
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• Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Chair, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee,
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight
Subcommittee, “Examining Federal COVID-era Spending and Preventing Future Fraud,”
November 14, 2023 (pp. 11-12)
“Congress should extend the statute of limitations for pandemic-related Unemployment
Insurance (UI) fraud from 5 to 10 years. The 117th Congress enhanced the PRAC, Inspectors
General community, and law enforcement partners’ efforts to fight fraud in small business
loan programs with its passage of H.R. 7352 and H.R. 7334. These bipartisan bills, signed
into law in August 2022, established a 10-year statutes of limitation for all forms of PPP
loan fraud and all COVID-19 EIDL fraud. The extension of the statutes of limitation for fraud
in these two programs was necessary given the scope of the fraud identified to date to
allow our investigators the time necessary to fully pursue those who defrauded these aid
programs.
In May 2023, the House of Representatives passed legislation that would extend the statute
of limitations for pandemic-related UI fraud from five to 10 years. We strongly support
an extension of the statute of limitations for these crimes in order to help ensure that
investigators and prosecutors have time to effectively pursue and hold accountable those
groups and individuals that targeted and defrauded the UI program, and to ensure that they
do not escape justice. I am hopeful that the Senate will support extending the statute of
limitations.
Additionally, we are grateful for the Senate’s support of S. 659, which passed by unanimous
consent to amend the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act, 31 U.S.C. 3801 et seq.; Pub.
L. 114-74, to raise the jurisdictional limit for administrative recoveries of ‘smaller’ false
or fraudulent claims from $150,000 to $1,000,000. The Congressional Budget Office
determined that passage of this legislation would actually save taxpayers approximately
$149 million over 10 years because of the amount of the financial recoveries that would
result from it. To date, the PRAC is aware of at least one million pandemic awards, totaling
about $362 billion, that ranged from $150,000 to $1,000,000. While the scope of the fraud
for these ‘smaller’ awards has not yet been fully determined, increasing the jurisdictional
amount for administrative recoveries would ensure that we could pursue them more
effectively and efficiently. I am hopeful that the House of Representatives will take up and
pass this legislation.”
• PRAC, Why Unemployment Insurance Surged During the Pandemic (p. 12)
“Extend the statute of limitations for fraud involving pandemic-related UI programs.”
• DOL OIG 19-23-014-03-315, COVID-19: Pandemic Unemployment Assistance for Non-
traditional Claimants Weakened by Billions in Overpayments, Including Fraud (p. 24,
Recommendation 3)
REC 3: “Work with Congressional stakeholders to inform them of the urgency of the statute
of limitations concerning pandemic-related UI fraud.”
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• PRAC, Why Unemployment Insurance Surged During the Pandemic (p. 12)
“Grant the DOL OIG statutory authority to participate in asset forfeiture funds to combat
fraud and other crime.”
• SBA OIG 24-06, Evaluation of SBA’s Eligibility and Forgiveness Reviews of Paycheck Protection
Program Loans Made to Borrowers with Treasury’s Do Not Pay Data Matches (p. 18,
Recommendation 5)
REC 5: “Develop and implement clear guidance requiring responsible officials to maintain
documentary evidence used to support loan decisions in the loan files.”
Additional Key Insights from Listening Sessions
Key stakeholders told us that Congress should amend the Federal Records Act to require that
the programs with extended statutes of limitation request that their grant recipients maintain
documents for this extended period of time.
Enhance the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act
• Statement of Michael E. Horowitz, Chair, Pandemic Response Accountability Committee,
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, “The Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee’s Role in Combating Fraud in Pandemic Relief and Small Business Programs,”
March 25, 2021 (p. 9)
“Too often those who fraudulently divert tax dollars in amounts below what is typically
accepted by prosecutors are not fully held accountable, impacting agency programs
and leaving the taxpayer footing the bill. In light of this challenge, the PRAC’s and the IG
Community’s efforts to fight fraud in pandemic-related spending would be enhanced by
congressional support for a long-standing CIGIE legislative priority to amend the Program
Fraud Civil Remedies Act (PFCRA). As my fellow PRAC member and CIGIE [Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency] Legislation Committee Chair Kathy Buller has
testified before the House Oversight and Reform Committee:
‘PFCRA is often referred to as the “mini False Claims Act” because it provides
administrative remedies for smaller false and fraudulent claims against the
government that the Department of Justice (DOJ) declines to enforce. Unfortunately,
because of problems in the original legislation, passed over three decades ago in
1986, PFCRA remains a relatively underutilized tool.’
CIGIE has suggested raising the jurisdictional limit for administrative recoveries of ‘smaller’
false or fraudulent claims against the government from $150,000 to $500,000 extending
PFCRA’s coverage as a fraud-fighting tool to cover approximately $50 billion in government
expenditures. This estimate was developed in 2018, two years before passage of the CARES
Act, which exponentially increased the total amount of ‘small’ payments to recipients of
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pandemic-related funds, and could further increase PFCRA’s reach, if CIGIE’s proposal were
to pass, by tens of billions of dollars. CIGIE and the PRAC look forward to working with the
subcommittee and the full committee to enact this important legislation.”
• Testimony of Richard K. Delmar, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Treasury,
before the House Oversight and Accountability Committee, Subcommittee on Government
Operations and the Federal Workforce, “Concerning Fraud and Improper Payments in COVID
Relief Programs,” March 9, 2023 (p. 8)
“Program integrity is enhanced by the availability of civil remedies, including the Program
Fraud Civil Remedies Act (PFCRA) and suspension and debarment, as well as a commitment
to civil and criminal enforcement by the Department of Justice and by state, territorial, local,
and tribal authorities.”
Provide OIGs With Testimonial Subpoena Authority
• Statement of Allison C. Lerner, Chairperson, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency, Inspector General, National Science Foundation, before the Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, “Safeguarding Inspector General Independence
and Integrity, October 21, 2021 (p. 5)
“Expansion of Testimonial Subpoena Authority: Inspector General oversight can be
substantially hampered by the inability to compel the testimony of witnesses who have
information that cannot be obtained by other means. Congress could address this concern
by providing IGs with the authority to subpoena the testimony of certain witnesses as
necessary in the performance of OIG oversight. This authority is especially important in
cases where a Federal employee resigns or retires. Without testimonial subpoena authority,
that employee’s resignation or retirement can limit an IG audit, investigation, or other review
into matters pertaining to that individual’s former responsibilities. IGs can also face difficulty
accessing key information during an inquiry into other individuals or entities with whom the
Federal government does business. Examples include contractors, grantees, guarantors,
volunteers, and entities that have no contractual relationship with the Federal Government
but are suspected of defrauding a federally funded program. In these cases, IGs have limited
recourse if these individuals refuse to provide information to the IG. CIGIE recommends
that testimonial subpoena authority for IGs mirror the IGs’ current documentary subpoena
authority, similar to the testimonial subpoena authority recently granted to the Pandemic
Response Accountability Committee of CIGIE.
We want to express our appreciation to Chairman Peters and Ranking member Portman
for including this authority in the substitute amendment. We greatly appreciate the initial
introduction of a Senate bill authorizing IG testimonial subpoena authority, S. 1794, by
Senator Hassan and Senator Grassley. Providing Inspectors General with testimonial
subpoena authority has been a bipartisan effort in this committee since at least 2015, when
the Committee put forward the IG Empowerment Act. Then in 2018 the House passed H.R.
4917. We are committed to continuing to work with you and providing technical assistance,
as appropriate, to help ensure the effectiveness of this oversight tool and the judicious
exercise of the authority.”
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Mandate Exclusions for Select Convicted Felons
• Statement of Allison C Lerner, before Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S.
House of Representatives, “Protecting the American Taxpayer: Highlighting Efforts to Protect
Against Federal Waste, Fraud, and Mismanagement,” April 19, 2023 (pp. 14-15)
“Many felony fraud convictions involving federal program funds do not result in government-
wide suspension or debarment action against the felon. An analysis of 250 felony fraud
convictions involving federal program funds over a four-year period found that more than 70
percent of those convicted were not suspended or debarred from doing business with the
government, thus allowing them to remain eligible for more federal funding.
This initiative would enhance existing law by making exclusion actions automatic for
those convicted of violating certain felony fraud statutes involving any agency contract,
grant, cooperative agreement, loan, or other financial assistance. Under current law, no
mandatory exclusion exists for individuals convicted of, or who plead guilty to, felony fraud
against the government. Instead, both the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the
Non-Procurement Common Rule allow agencies to take discretionary, time-limited actions
to exclude felony fraud convicts from receiving Federal grants and contracts through
government-wide suspensions or debarments.”
Provide Adequate Funding for OIGs to Administer and Oversee Influxes of Money
Multiple OIGs testified that additional funding and hiring authorities will enable OIGs to staff up
quickly to address expanded emergency funding and oversight. Also, when agencies are provided
with substantial supplemental emergency funding, OIGs should be provided additional funding to
ensure that they have the necessary resources for robust oversight of those emergency programs.
• Testimony of Hannibal Ware, Inspector General, U.S. Small Business Administration, before the
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Small Business, July 13, 2023 (pp. 14-15)
“OIG’s proposed FY 2024 budget maintains our staffing level at 185 positions. The budget
proposal also provides for three additional investigative groups (27 positions) to expand
our investigative efforts to match the unprecedented resources expended on pandemic
economic assistance. Vital to the oversight successes of OIG, the budget also provides
for three additional data scientists, which are essential to detecting the fraud, prioritizing
investigations, and enhancing the impact of the investigations.
With sufficient resources, coupled with the 10-year statute of limitations on PPP and EIDL
fraud, our office will be poised to combat fraud for years to come. We are grateful for the
swift action from the 117th Congress to extend the statutes of limitation on PPP and EIDL
fraud and look forward to working with Congress on resource determinations for FY 2024
and beyond. Support of OIG’s budget request sends a strong message of deterrence to
fraudsters taking aim at all U.S. government programs. OIG has proven that, with adequate
resources, we are poised to promote public trust and instill integrity in SBA programs. Budget
scenarios, such as a return to FY 2022 funding levels, would be detrimental to instilling
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 14
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Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
integrity in SBA programs. We will not be able to accomplish the goal of accountability
for wrongdoing. Reducing OIG’s funding to FY 2022, as enacted, would decrease OIG’s
investigative and fraud enforcement capabilities to nearly equivalent to staffing levels of the
office following sequestration in 2013, which is less than 100 total positions. At the same
time, OIG will exhaust supplemental funds being directed to combat fraud in SBA’s pandemic
response programs in FY 2024. Such a funding scenario simply does not allow OIG to
provide effective oversight.”
• Statement of Tammy L. Whitcomb, Inspector General, United States Postal Service, before the
Subcommittee on Financial Services and General Government, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate, July 13, 2021 (p. 4)
“Continuous monitoring and oversight of the announced network changes will allow the
Postal Service to quickly fix issues, protecting postal customers. As a result of these
significant upcoming changes, we plan to request an additional $17 million in our FY 2023
budget to increase the amount and timeliness of our oversight.
With these funds we can expand our capacity to quickly respond to ongoing service
challenges. These funds will partially restore our staffing by 83 employees and allow us to
form an audit group dedicated to continuous monitoring of service across the country and
providing quick, service-focused reports. We will build on the lessons learned last fall when
we sent 500 OIG employees to over 2,000 postal facilities nationwide to monitor election
mail. Using an OIG-created app, we were able to provide the Postal Service and Congress
near real-time data on our daily observations.”
• Testimony of Larry D. Turner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Labor, before the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Accountability, Subcommittee on
Government Operations and the Federal Workforce, “Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Go Viral:
Inspectors General on Curing the Disease,” March 9, 2023 (p. 7)
“Our work is being impacted by resource limitations. The OIG received $38.5 million to
oversee close to $1 trillion in expanded programs. Unfortunately, it will be fully expended
by April 2024. Combined with a lower-than-expected Fiscal Year 2023 appropriation, our
funding is insufficient to maintain the level of oversight we deployed during the pandemic.
However, the President’s recent proposal to provide OIG with $100 million would allow us to
continue fighting pandemic-related fraud beyond 2024.”
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 15
Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
Section 3: Amend
Legislation and Regulations
to Fight Fraud and Reduce
Improper Payments
Critical amendments to current legislation could help fortify the framework governing federal
financial oversight and financial management. (To learn about pending legislation related to fraud
and improper payments, visit Appendix 2-A.)
• Testimony of Rebecca Shea, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Services, GAO, before
the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight, Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, “COVID-19: Insights and Actions for Fraud
Prevention,” November 14, 2023 (pp. 23-24, Matters for Congressional Consideration 2, 3,
7-8)
Consideration 2: “Congress should amend the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019
to designate all new federal programs making more than $100 million in payments in any
one fiscal year as ‘susceptible to significant improper payments’ for their initial years of
operation.”
Consideration 3: “Congress should amend the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019
to reinstate the requirement that agencies report on their antifraud controls and fraud risk
management efforts in their annual financial reports.”
Consideration 7: “Congress should consider legislation to require improper payment
information required to be reported under the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 to
be included in agencies’ annual financial reports.”
Consideration 8: “Congress should amend the DATA Act to extend the previous requirement
for agency inspectors general to review the completeness, timeliness, quality, and accuracy
of their respective agency data submissions on a periodic basis.”
• CRS R47902, Improper Payments in Pandemic Assistance Programs (Summary section)
“Congress may also consider whether to require agencies to develop internal controls
designed specifically for emergency spending programs, as GAO has recommended. These
controls, based on guidance issued by OMB, could be implemented quickly to mitigate the
risk of fraud and improper payments when agencies need to expedite the disbursement
of funds. H.R. 877 would require agencies to deem programs with outlays of at least $100
million to be susceptible to significant levels of improper payments, thereby subjecting them
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 16
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to PIIA estimating and reporting requirements. Congress provided at least $100 million in
pandemic funding to 173 different programs, but many of those programs are not subject to
PIIA because they fall below the current spending threshold.”
• Testimony of Richard K. Delmar, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of the
Treasury, before the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, “Holding the Biden Administration Accountable for Wasteful Spending and
Regulatory Overreach,” March 8, 2023 (p. 3)
”To overcome the challenges of obtaining better death data, Fiscal Service submitted
legislative proposals to Congress seeking access to the full Death Master File. On December
27, 2020, Congress enacted the CAA, 2021, which amended the Social Security Act to allow
the Social Security Administration to share its full death data with the Do Not Pay program
for a three-year period starting no later than December 27, 2023. As this access is only
temporary, Fiscal Service plans to seek a permanent legislative change for access to the full
death data. We concur with the Department’s decision to pursue a permanent legislative
change for this necessary information to prevent improper payments.”
• Testimony of Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, “Emergency Relief Funds:
Significant Improvements Are Needed to Ensure Transparency and Accountability for COVID-19
and Beyond,” March 17, 2022 (p. 42, Matter for Congressional Consideration 10)
“Congress should amend the Social Security Act to accelerate and make permanent the
requirement for the Social Security Administration to share its full death data with the
Department of the Treasury’s Do Not Pay working system.”
• SIGPR, Letter from Brian D. Miller, Special Inspector General, to Senator Hassan, Chair, and
Senator Romney, Ranking Member, Emerging Threats and Spending Oversight Subcommittee,
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, United States Senate, December 29,
2023
“Congress should encourage a review of Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, other
Federal laws and regulations, and relevant GAO and OMB guidance to determine whether
updates to guidance appropriate for direct loans is necessary or desirable. This effort
can help establish a framework for future direct loan programs and identify risks to aid
policymakers in their decision to create direct lending programs or not.”
• CRS IN11433, Supplemental Appropriations: SBA Disaster Loan Account (p. 4)
“The supplemental appropriations in Table 1 have not required SBA to submit reports on
the funding status of the Disaster Loan Account. Congress has required disaster funding
reports from other agencies to delineate funding activities and estimate the date on which
the funds may be exhausted. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, Congress required the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to issue quarterly reports on the Disaster
Relief Fund (DRF). The DRF is ‘an appropriation against which FEMA can direct, coordinate,
manage, and fund eligible response and recovery efforts associated with domestic major
disasters and emergencies that overwhelm state resources pursuant to the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.’ DRF monthly reports help Congress
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 17
Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
track disaster relief funding activities and determine how much funding is available for
current and future incidents. The SBA could be required to issue a similar report on the
Disaster Loan Account. The report could include information such as the account balance,
available lending authority, monthly revenues, and cost and exhausted funding projections.”
• SBA, Protecting the Integrity of the Pandemic Relief Programs: SBA’s Actions to Prevent,
Detect, and Tackle Fraud (pp. 26-27, Recommendation 4)
REC 4: “Make the private sector part of the solution. Two statutory features of PPP combined
to substantially minimize the incentive for lenders to deter and weed out fraudulent
applications: (1) the 100% loan guarantee provided, and (2) the requirement that SBA hold
lenders harmless for false certifications made by borrowers. As reported by the House Select
Committee on the Coronavirus Crisis, the combination of these two features led to some
lenders bypassing fraud controls as they rushed to approve as many loans as possible.
Removing, or at least redesigning, the hold harmless provision to ensure that lenders have
skin in the game would strengthen their resolve to fully participate in fraud prevention.”
Additional Key Insights from Listening Sessions
OIG officials and agency administrators shared that certain statutory provisions in the pandemic
relief legislation did not allow them to implement important internal controls to protect federal
funds from fraud, waste, and abuse. They recommended that future legislation authorize agencies
to validate self-certified eligibility criteria and requirements for program applicants and recipients.
Draft Clear Guidance Related to Outcomes of Funding
Legislation should define the beneficiaries of the funding and the expected program outcomes.
• SBA OIG 21-13, Management Alert Serious Concerns About SBA’s Control Environment and
the Tracking of Performance Results in the Shuttered Venue Operators Grant Program (p. 5)
“On March 26, 2021, SBA announced the funding opportunity for the SVOG program in
the Federal Register, but it did not include performance goals for the program or establish
performance requirements for the recipients. Federal regulations require that federal awards
must include performance goals. OMB stresses that grant programs should be planned and
designed with clear goals and objectives. Where appropriate, these goals should include the
public impact of the awarded funds. Reporting requirements must be clearly documented.
The agency must provide a standard against which non-federal entity performance can be
measured, such as the estimated number of jobs saved or created, tax revenue generated,
or entity operational status. Program officials told us that the authorizing legislation for the
program did not require SBA to establish performance measures. Program officials explained
they tried to meet the federal standards for grants while also creating an aid distribution
program.
While the Economic Aid Act did not specifically mandate that the SBA establish performance
goals, it did not exempt the agency from adhering to the requirements of 2 CFR 200. Without
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 18
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Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
specific grantee performance reporting requirements, the stakeholders will disburse $16.25
billion without knowing whether the program successfully made an impact on the small
businesses in the live arts and entertainment industry that were impacted by the pandemic.
This runs counter to recent revisions to 2 CFR 200, effective November 12, 2020, that
emphasized the need for performance goals to improve stewardship of grant funds.”
• CRS LS10586, Scholl v. Mnuchin and Economic Impact Payments (p. 4)
“The district court’s orders in Scholl, and other CARES Act relief eligibility cases pending in
courts around the country, could have long-lasting effects on how and when Treasury and
the IRS respond to rapidly developing situations following the enactment of tax legislation.
After the enactment of the CARES Act, the IRS issued FAQs to provide the public with timely
guidance on EIP [Economic Impact Payments] eligibility and information on how to obtain
EIPs. The IRS might delay issuing similar tax guidance in the future out of concern that
courts are more likely to find that judicial deference is unwarranted when Treasury and
the IRS’s interpretations of statutes are conveyed in tax guidance other than regulations
and do not provide an explanation of the agencies’ reasoning. Scholl suggests that in
order to ensure that the intended recipients of tax benefits receive them quickly, Congress
could consider whether to define precisely in the statute whom the legislation is and is not
intended to benefit, leaving little room for judicial or agency misinterpretation.”
Additional Key Insights from Listening Sessions
Key stakeholders recommended that:
• Deadlines should not create a “first come, first served” scenario that favors more
sophisticated applicants and neglects the most vulnerable and needy. The Shuttered Venue
Operators Grant program website went live at a specific time and with limited funds. Those
who logged on first received the grants. In such instances, applicants with more resources,
who could navigate the process more efficiently, had an unfair advantage.
• Instead of specifying how funding could be spent, it would be helpful for Congress to clearly
spell out how funding cannot be spent.
Authorize Whistleblower Incentives
• Statement of Director Kathleen L. Kraninger, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, July 29, 2020 (p. 13)
“Earlier this year, the Bureau requested that Congress advance proposed legislation that
would authorize the Bureau to award whistleblowers who report violations of Federal
consumer financial law. The proposal would amend Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act and provide
authority to establish a whistleblower award program. The incentive created for employees to
report wrongdoing to the Bureau will assist in advancing enforcement cases, especially as it
relates to fair lending violations.”
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 19
Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
Additional Key Insights from Listening Sessions:
Key stakeholders told us Congress should consult with Inspectors General when drafting legislation
about programs they oversee in order to understand IG perspectives, particularly around financial,
staffing, and IT impacts resulting from increased workloads.
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 20
APPENDIX 2-A:
Pending Legislation
During the pandemic, legislation was introduced to:
• Combat fraud
• Update technology for collecting and reporting UI data
• Use data to verify eligibility of recipients
• Strengthen efforts to recover stolen funds
• Create a permanent data analytics center
• Enhance the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act
H.R. 1163, Protecting Taxpayers and Victims of Unemployment Fraud Act (Passed in the House of
Representatives)
This bill allows states to:
• Address fraud and overpayments of pandemic unemployment insurance (UI) benefits,
including by providing incentives for states to investigate and recover overpayments of these
benefits.
• Retain 25 percent of any recovered fraudulent overpayments. These retained funds may be
used for modernizing unemployment compensation systems and information technology,
reimbursing administrative costs, hiring fraud investigators and prosecutors, and for other
program integrity activities.
• Retain 5 percent of any overpayments of regular and extended UI benefits. A state must,
in order to retain these overpayments, certify that it has met certain conditions for data
matching.
• Extend from three to 10 years the time during which states can recover overpayments of
pandemic UI benefits.
• Hire temporary staff on a noncompetitive basis to identify, pursue, and recover fraudulent
overpayments under federal pandemic unemployment compensation programs authorized by
the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act).
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 21
Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
• Extend from five to 10 years the statute of limitations for federal criminal charges or civil
enforcement actions related to UI fraud.
• Repeal a section of the CARES Act (as amended by the American Rescue Plan of 2021) that
provided funding for UI program integrity activities. Subject to appropriations, the unobligated
balance of this funding shall be transferred to the Department of the Treasury and periodically
credited to the appropriate state account in the Unemployment Trust Fund, as outlined by the
bill.
H.R. 1458 Unemployment Insurance Technology Modernization Act of 2021 (Introduced in the
House of Representatives) Requires the DOL in consultation with relevant experts, to develop,
operate, and maintain technology capabilities to modernize the federal and state administration
of UI benefits. This proposal would establish a Digital Services Team at DOL to assist state UI
agencies in the development of these technology capabilities and to oversee their maintenance and
improvement.
H.R. 723 The Reducing Fraud in Unemployment Assistance Act (Introduced in the House of
Representatives) Requires that states compare lists of individuals receiving state UI benefits with
a list of incarcerated individuals in federal and state custody for the purposes of investigating and
prosecuting fraud, waste, and abuse. Would also have provided for the federal recovery of state
overpayments of PUA and FPUC (now expired).
H.R. 6224 Fix the Unemployment Backlogs Act (Introduced in the House of Representatives)
Suspends federal payments for the administration of unemployment compensation to states
that have more than 45,000 unprocessed unemployment claims. These payments must
remain suspended until the Department of Labor determines that the number of unprocessed
unemployment claims in the state has been reduced to zero.
H.R. 4190 Pandemic Unemployment Assistance Fraud Protection Act (Introduced in the House of
Representatives) Requires states, as a condition of receiving any of the $2 billion in additional UI
administrative funding authorized under ARPA, to “detect and prevent fraud, promote equitable
access, and ensure the timely payment of benefits,” submit a plan for recovering all fraudulent PUA
payments, establish an anti-fraud task force to investigate and recover fraudulent PUA payments,
and report to DOL on the ratio of recovered fraudulent PUA payments to total PUA payments.
S. 2898 Unemployment Insurance Systems Modernization Act of 2021 (Introduced in the Senate)
Expands the list of requirements a state unemployment compensation system must meet for the
state to receive federal funds for administration of the system. Specifically, the bill requires the
unemployment law of each state to include various provisions to promote adaptability, including
provisions for (1) handling surges in claims, (2) processing disaster unemployment assistance
claims, (3) processing claims under temporary federal benefits programs, and (4) automating
claims for short-time compensation.
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 22
Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
It also requires states to utilize databases and other systems in an effort to prevent fraudulent
and improper unemployment compensation payments. Specifically, states must use (1) a system
selected by the Department of Labor for cross-matching unemployment claimants against
available databases, (2) an automated system developed and approved by Labor for exchanging
unemployment compensation information, and (3) the existing National Directory of New Hires for
identifying individuals who have become employed.
H.R. 3268 and S. 1699 Combatting COVID Unemployment Fraud Act of 2021 (H.R. 3268
Introduced in the House of Representatives and S. 1699 Introduced in the Senate) Amends the
CARES Act to make several program-integrity-related changes. These bills would have required
states to verify the identity and eligibility status of a PUA applicant prior to paying benefits and
change the backdating deadline for PUA claims to April 1, 2021 (rather than December 1, 2020).
H.R. 3268/S. 1699 would have also prevented any claimant from receiving a retroactive FPUC
payment more than 14 days after program expiration. In addition, H.R. 3268/S. 1699 would have
reinstated the federal work search requirement by removing the authority for COVID-19-related
flexibility for states authorized under Families First Coronavirus Response Act (P.L. 116-127).
S.4089 The Fraud Prevention and Recovery Act (Introduced in the Senate) Includes key resources
and programs to strengthen efforts to recover stolen pandemic funds, hold bad actors accountable,
prevent identify theft, and ensure taxpayer dollars are being used effectively. The legislation also
includes critical safeguards that will prevent future fraud and improper use of federal relief funds.
S.4036 Government Spending Oversight Act (Introduced in the Senate) Emphasizes the need
for a permanent analytics platform to oversee federal spending and prevent fraud, mirroring the
capabilities demonstrated by PRAC during the COVID-19 pandemic.
S.659 Administrative False Claims Act of 2023 (Passed in the Senate) Amends the Program Fraud
Civil Remedies Act, which allows the federal government to pursue fraud claims without filing a suit
in federal court. The bill raises the maximum dollar amount of fraud claims from $150,000 to $1
million and allows agencies to recoup costs for investigating and prosecuting these frauds.
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 23
APPENDIX 2-B:
Objective, Scope,
and Methodology
The objective of Chapter 2 was to compile leading practices, recommendations, and lessons
learned from reports and testimony by the oversight community and other government entities that
policymakers can adopt by when drafting legislation and policy related for emergency and regularly
appropriated funding.
Our review period was January 2020 through March 2024. In addition to reports by Inspectors
General (IGs) the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Memoranda, we reviewed Semiannual Reports to Congress by the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee’s (PRAC) and IGs. We also reviewed congressional testimony applicable
to Chapter 2. To ensure we identified an accurate and complete list of reports, we compared our
document review with reports listed on Oversight.gov.
We held listening sessions with key stakeholders, including IGs and OMB to identify key takeaways,
lessons learned, and best practices based on pandemic legislation and policy that could be used in
the future.
Based on this fundamental work, we identified key themes and added links to supporting reports
and testimony. The PRAC IG partners reviewed a draft of the Chapter prior to publication. Our work
was completed between February 2024 and June 2024.
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 24
Blueprint for Enhanced Program Integrity
Chapter 2: Opportunities for Policymakers to Improve Program Integrity
Contributing Partners
With our thanks to the following stakeholders for sharing key recommendations, leading practices,
and lessons learned, which are incorporated throughout Chapter 2 of the Blueprint:
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee Members
Inspector General Mark Bialek, Federal Reserve Board & CFPB
Inspector General Sandra D. Bruce, Department of Education
Inspector General Joseph Cuffari, Department of Homeland Security
Inspector General Fara Damelin, Federal Communications Commission
Inspector General Rae Oliver Davis, Department of Housing and Urban Development
Deputy Acting Inspector General Richard Delmar, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General Jennifer L. Fain, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Inspector General Phyllis K. Fong, Department of Agriculture
Inspector General Mark Lee Greenblatt, Department of the Interior
Inspector General Christi A. Grimm, Department of Health & Human Services
Acting Inspector General Heather M. Hill, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
Inspector General Tammy L. Hull, U.S. Postal Service
Inspector General Allison C. Lerner, National Science Foundation
Inspector General Brian D. Miller, Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
Inspector General Michael J. Missal, Department of Veterans Affairs
Inspector General Eric J. Soskin, Department of Transportation
Inspector General Robert P. Storch, Department of Defense
Inspector General Larry D. Turner, Department of Labor
Inspector General Hannibal “Mike” Ware, Small Business Administration
Additional Federal Partners
Department of the Treasury Office of Inspector General
Office of Management and Budget
Chapter 2 Team
From USPS OIG From the PRAC:
Renee Sheehy, Co-Lead Alice Siempelkamp, Co-Lead
Lynn Houston, Co-lead
From TIGTA Sansara Cannon
Euneke Couts Kirstyn Flood
Jarrett Fussell
From Peace Corps OIG Nisha Kumaraswamy
Elizabeth Sweetland Mey McLean
Julio Rodriquez
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee 25
For more information:
Lisa Reijula
Associate Director of Outreach and Engagement, PRAC
Lisa.Reijula@cigie.gov
Visit us at:
PandemicOversight.gov
Follow us at:
Report Fraud, Waste, Abuse, or Misconduct:
To report allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or misconduct regarding
pandemic relief funds or programs please go to the PRAC website at
PandemicOversight.gov.
A Committee of the
Council of the Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency
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