PRAC's Semiannual Report to Congress - September 2022

Summary

The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee Semiannual Report to Congress for April 1, 2022 through September 30, 2022, with a message from Chair Michael E. Horowitz. It states that during the reporting period 26 OIGs issued 114 reports related to pandemic relief oversight with a total of 343 recommendations and $31.2 billion in monetary findings. The message states that, as of September 14, 2022, the Department of Justice had reported criminal charges against more than 1,500 defendants with alleged losses exceeding $1.1 billion, and that PRAC data scientists developed a fraud risk score for 40 million Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster Loans. The report is organized around the PRAC's four goals and includes appendices on pandemic-related reports by Office of Inspector General and on hotline data.

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PANDEMIC RESPONSE ACCOUNTABILITY COMMITTEE
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
PANDEMIC RESPONSE ACCOUNTABILITY COMMITTEE
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

ii
Message from the Chair
During the reporting period,
26 OIGs issued 114 reports
related to pandemic relief
oversight with a total of 343
recommendations and
$31.2 billion in monetary
findings during the past
six months.
I am pleased to present the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee’s (PRAC) fifth Semiannual
Report to Congress, describing our work between
April 1, 2022, and September 30, 2022. The
PRAC has now been operational for two and a half
years, and this report shows the impact of our
innovative approaches to overseeing historical levels
of emergency government spending and fighting
pandemic relief fraud.
But fighting fraud can take time. The recent
extension of the statute of limitations for two
pandemic-related small business loan programs
gives investigators 10 years rather than 5 years to
pursue fraud. And we’re doing so by using advanced
data analytics to drive investigations with our federal
law enforcement partners.
During the reporting period, our Pandemic Analytics
Center of Excellence (PACE) completed several
projects that support the work of our partner
Inspectors Generals (IGs). For example, PACE data
scientists developed a fraud risk score for 40 million
Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and Economic
Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL). This helps the Small
Business Administration (SBA) Office of Inspector
General more effectively target its investigations.
Our Fraud Task Force worked with the Department
of Justice (DOJ), the National Credit Union
Administration and other law enforcement partners
to identify nearly $8.75 million in potentially
fraudulent pandemic relief funds held by credit
unions that could be recovered. The Fraud Task
Force now numbers 50 criminal investigators from
15 federal agencies, helping to surge resources
where they are needed most.
We collaborate and coordinate with our federal
law enforcement partners to support a whole-of-
government response to fighting pandemic fraud.
For example, the PRAC and 30 partner agencies are
part of the Department of Justice’s COVID-19 Fraud
Enforcement Task Force, which has made significant
progress prosecuting fraudsters who stole PPP or
EIDL loans.
In August 2022, the U.S. Secret Service worked with
the SBA OIG to return $286 million in fraudulently
obtained EIDLs to the SBA. These funds were
initially claimed through fraudulently submitted
loan applications that used fake or stolen personal
information. In September 2022, the Inspector
General for the Department of Labor (DOL)
announced that his office has charged more than
1,000 individuals with Unemployment Insurance (UI)

iii
fraud since the beginning of the pandemic. These
charges have resulted in more than 400 criminal
convictions to date.
As of September 14, 2022, the DOJ has reported
criminal charges against more than 1,500
defendants with alleged losses exceeding $1.1
billion; the seizure of over $1.2 billion in relief
funds; and civil investigations into more than 1,800
individuals and entities for alleged misconduct in
connection with pandemic relief loans totaling more
than $6 billion. The PRAC and its partner OIGs are
involved in many of these cases.
We continue to focus on our education and outreach
goals by adding interactive features to our website,
PandemicOversight.gov, to promote transparency
over pandemic relief spending. We launched new
agency funding profiles that enable the public to
see the total amount of pandemic relief money
that nearly 40 federal agencies received and the
specific programs funded. The website also includes
relevant oversight work from federal OIGs, whose
audits and investigations alert the public and
policymakers to fraud, waste, and abuse involving
pandemic funds. During the reporting period, 26
OIGs issued 114 reports related to pandemic relief
oversight with a total of 343 recommendations and
$31.2 billion in monetary findings during the past
six months.
We issued new oversight work, including an update
to our foundational Lessons Learned in Oversight
of Pandemic Relief Funds and the first report by
our Identity Fraud Reduction and Redress Working
Group on how agencies can reduce identity fraud
in pandemic relief programs and help victims
recover. We also issued a joint risk advisory with the
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) OIG and SBA OIG on potential identity fraud
targeting elderly and minors. Together, these
products reflect coordinated, comprehensive
oversight and fraud prevention through leading-edge
data insights and analytic tools.
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
We also added state-level expertise to our team to
further advance our strategic goal of collaborating
across all levels of the oversight community.
We brought on Elaine Howle as Special Advisor
for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Oversight.
A nationally recognized expert and the former
California State Auditor, Ms. Howle brings nearly
40 years of professional auditing and leadership
experience to the PRAC. In a new initiative—the State
Auditor-in-Residence program—we welcomed two
auditors from the Tennessee Comptroller’s Office,
adding more than 30 years’ worth of state and local
oversight experience to our team.
The PRAC and its partners have the tools, the
talent, and the teamwork to effectively oversee
$5 trillion in pandemic relief funds and fight fraud,
waste, and abuse. Our approach to collaborative
oversight has been recognized as a successful
template to follow. For example, in April 2022, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued
a memorandum directing agencies to oversee
infrastructure spending with the same collaborative
approach used for pandemic spending. This
approach has led to stronger controls for small
business loan programs and improved the sharing of
state unemployment insurance data to fight fraud.
I hope you find this Semiannual Report encouraging
and insightful.
The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz
Chair, PRAC
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice

iv
Contents
Message from the Chair
ii
Highlights
1
Background
2
PRAC Accomplishments
4
Goal One–Promote Transparency
5
Goal Two–Promote Coordinated, Comprehensive Oversight
7
Goal Three–Prevent and Detect Fraud, Waste,
Abuse, and Mismanagement
12
Goal Four–Ensure Effective and Efficient PRAC Operations
14
Holding Wrongdoers Accountable Through Investigations
15
Key Insights Through Oversight Reports
25
Key Insight 1: The Pandemic Created Program Monitoring Challenges and
Increased Program Risks
25
Key Insight 2: Risks with Self-Certification Extend Beyond Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance, PPP, and EIDL
27
Key Insight 3: Failure to Implement or Effectively Modify Critical
Internal Controls Created Risks in Pandemic Relief Programs
28
Key Insight 4: Assessing Emergency Planning Procedures Used During
the Pandemic Can Help Inform and Improve Future Emergency Responses 29
Key Insight 5: Data Can Help Inform the Design of More
Equitable Programs
30
Appendix A: Acronyms
31
Appendix B: Pandemic-Related Reports by Office of Inspector General
32
Appendix C: Hotline Data
39

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
1
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Highlights
Highlights

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
2
Highlights
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Background
Background
Established in March 2020 by the CARES Act,
the PRAC is a Committee of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
(CIGIE). CIGIE is an independent entity established
within the executive branch by the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended, whose membership
includes the 75 statutorily created federal IGs.
The CARES Act identifies IGs from nine agencies
as members of the PRAC. The Chair can designate
additional IGs to serve on the Committee from
any agency that receives pandemic funds or is
involved in the federal government’s response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. The IGs serving on the
Committee continue to perform their IG duties.
The PRAC is comprised of 21 IGs (see PRAC
membership below). We are staffed by a full-time
Executive Director and 54 employees distributed
across three lines of business (Oversight &
Accountability, Outreach & Engagement, and
Transparency) and four support functions (Chief
Information Officer, Chief Counsel, Chief Data
Officer, and Chief Management Officer).
The PRAC promotes transparency and provides
Congress and the public with objective, reliable
information about the $5 trillion in pandemic relief
dollars at PandemicOversight.gov. We also work
with IGs to recommend program improvements,
refer matters for criminal investigations, and identify
misspent funds for recovery.
PRAC Membership
Name
Department or Agency OIG
Michael E. Horowitz, Chair
Department of Justice
Paul K. Martin, Vice Chair
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Phyllis K. Fong
Department of Agriculture
Sean W. O’Donnell
Department of Defense
Sandra D. Bruce
Department of Education
Christi A. Grimm
Department of Health and Human Services
Joseph Cuffari
Department of Homeland Security
Rae Oliver Davis
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Mark Lee Greenblatt
Department of the Interior
Larry D. Turner
Department of Labor
Eric J. Soskin
Department of Transportation
Richard Delmar
Department of the Treasury
Michael J. Missal
Department of Veterans Affairs
Jay N. Lerner
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Mark Bialek
Federal Reserve Board / Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Allison C. Lerner
National Science Foundation
Robert P. Storch
National Security Agency
Hannibal “Mike” Ware
Small Business Administration
Brian D. Miller
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
J. Russell George
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
Tammy Whitcomb Hull
U.S. Postal Service
Semiannual Report to Congress
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Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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The PRAC released its Strategic Plan for 2020 through 2025 in July 2020. The plan identifies four goals
to carry out the PRAC’s mission and vision (see Figure 1). These goals are not mutually exclusive—audits,
investigations, reviews, and other activities may meet more than one goal.
MISSION
To serve the American public by promoting transparency and the coordinated oversight
of the Federal Government’s coronavirus response to prevent and detect fraud, waste,
abuse, and mismanagement and mitigate major risks that cross program and agency
boundaries.
VISION
Sound stewardship of taxpayer funds and an effective and efficient coronavirus
response across the Federal Government, the oversight of which will be data-driven,
risk-focused, and technology-enabled.
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Promote Transparency
Promote Coordinated,
Comprehensive
Oversight
Prevent and Detect Fraud, Waste,
Abuse, and Mismanagement
Ensure Effective
and Efficient
PRAC Operations
GOALS
Figure 1. PRAC Mission, Vision, and Goals
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
PRAC Accomplishments
The PRAC was established to serve the American public by promoting transparency and facilitating
coordinated oversight of the federal government’s COVID-19 pandemic response and associated spending.
Our goals are to detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and to identify and mitigate major risks
that cross program and agency boundaries. We aim to serve as the eyes and ears of the American public,
monitoring the government’s pandemic response spending and reporting accessible, timely, accurate, and
comprehensive data that can be translated into actionable insights. The following figure depicts the goals
set out in our Strategic Plan for 2020 through 2025 and key accomplishments we have achieved during this
reporting period, as aligned with the PRAC’s mission and vision.
Figure 2. PRAC Goals
Testimony before
the House Select
Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Crisis
Launched State
Auditor-in-
Residence Program
Coverage in New York
Times, Washington Post,
local news affilitates
and more
President Biden cites
PRAC oversight as model
for infrastructure funds
Joint risk advisory memo with HUD
and SBA OIGs on identity fraud
targeting elderly and minors
Statute of limitations
extended for
PPP and EIDL fraud
Onboarded 18
new employees—
a 22% increase
in new hires
Semiannual Report to Congress
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Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Goal One–Promote Transparency
Provide the Public with Timely Data and Information on
Covered Funds and the Coronavirus Response
Transparency is core to the PRAC mission laid out by
Congress in the CARES Act. We continue to explore
ways to engage the public and empower them to
act as citizen watchdogs. We do this through our
oversight reports, public events, Congressional
testimony, and our website.
During this reporting period, we updated our
Lessons Learned report with five additional lessons.
We originally published a version of this report in
September 2021. This was our first update with
lessons from programs in the American Rescue
Plan Act.
Meanwhile, our Identity Fraud Reduction and
Redress Working Group released its first report,
providing insights agencies can use to reduce
identity fraud in pandemic relief programs and help
victims recover. The working group found that while
the government has issued over 241 indictments
and 110 convictions related to identity fraud in
pandemic relief programs, the onus is on victims to
reclaim their stolen identities.
Identity fraud victims might even have to start two
or more separate processes and navigate multiple
different benefit systems to regain needed benefits.
This legwork adds to what the White House has
called a “time tax,” a phenomenon we further
explored in a virtual panel discussion we co-hosted
with the National Academy of Public Administration
on June 15, 2022.
In his June testimony before the House Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, PRAC
Chair Michael E. Horowitz further emphasized the
need to curtail identity fraud across government
programs, stating that, “because of the siloed
nature of government, each benefits program has
its own redress process, leaving victims lost in a
bureaucratic maze that they have to figure out on
their own.”
On June 8, 2022, we issued an
update to our Lessons Learned in
Oversight of Pandemic Relief Funds,
adding five new insights.
1. Allocate funding based on need
2. New programs need more outreach
to increase public awareness and
participation
3. Watchdogs need access to data to
find fraud
4. Collaboration is critical to oversee
pandemic relief programs
5. Better reporting is needed to track
pandemic relief spending
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Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
“[Our] priority is to help identify gaps in victim redress, figure out how to
address them, and help victims move forward—and regain their rightful
benefits.”
Read more from PRAC Chair Michal Horowitz’s June testimony before the
House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis
In addition to our reports and public-facing events,
we remain committed to making publicly available
data accessible on our website. PandemicOversight.
gov gives the power of insight to the people, allowing
them to search through trillions of dollars’ worth of
relief funding directly from their devices.
During the reporting period, we launched new
agency funding profiles that show the total amount
of pandemic relief money that nearly 40 federal
agencies received, and the specific programs
funded. These profiles also include relevant
oversight work from their respective OIGs. In
addition, we added 13 new data stories, 127 data
visualizations, a simpler way to search PPP data, a
live spending tracker, and new dashboards featuring
spending data from the State and Local Fiscal
Recovery Fund, Shuttered Venue Operators Grants,
and the Restaurant Revitalization Fund. We provided
a public demo of our new dashboards at another
virtual roundtable we hosted on June 29 of this year,
on impactful ways local governments are using data
dashboards and websites to shed light on pandemic
relief spending in their own communities.
During this reporting period, 34 reports from state
and local oversight agencies became available on
our website. We will continue to add more as they
are published so the public and policymakers can
see the full inventory of what federal, state, and
local agencies are finding in their oversight of the
pandemic response.
Finally, this reporting period was another strong one
for media engagement. The PRAC has continued to
build relationships with journalists from small local
publications to large national newspapers, as well
as radio and podcasts.
As the public’s interest in pandemic relief spending
continues to grow—exemplified in front page stories
from the New York Times, in the Washington
Post’s Covid Money Trail series, on National Public
Radio, and Fox Business—this engagement is more
important than ever. It speaks to our credibility as
an authoritative source of government information
and analysis. It also supports the impact of our
strategic goal to promote transparency through
producing and sharing timely updates that answer
questions the public and policymakers are asking.
Semiannual Report to Congress
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Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Goal Two–
Promote
Coordinated,
Comprehensive
Oversight
Facilitate Exceptional
Coordination and
Collaboration to Ensure
High-Impact Results
During this reporting period, President Biden signed
the COVID–19 EIDL Fraud Statute of Limitations Act
of 2022 and the PPP and Bank Fraud Enforcement
Harmonization Act of 2022 into law, extending
the statute of limitations for PPP and EIDL fraud
from 5 years to 10 years. The 10-year statute of
limitations is consistent with that for bank fraud, the
charge in most of these cases.
PRAC Chair Michael Horowitz and SBA IG Hannibal
“Mike” Ware championed these bills. At the time
of signing on August 5, there were more than 650
active investigations into PPP and EIDL fraud.
Further, OIG investigations had already resulted
in more than 700 indictments with total charged
losses of more than $1.2 billion. Signage of these
bills into law represent a monumental achievement
for the PRAC and our partners, giving investigators
more time to pursue those who defrauded programs
intended to assist small business owners and their
employees during a national crisis.
Statue of limitations extended
from 5 to 10 years.
Trends, Insights, and
Observations across the
Oversight Community
Our coordination efforts with federal, state, and local
auditors uniquely position us to identify common trends
in pandemic relief oversight, innovative methodologies,
and work that can be replicated across the oversight
community.
Data visualization tools make critical
information more accessible to both decision
makers and the public. For example, USDA
OIG developed a data tool for USDA’s Farmers
to Families Food Box Program that allows
users to explore the program’s distributors
and recipients across the country.
Many states lacked the infrastructure to
efficiently collect and release data at the
beginning of the pandemic. A multi-state
COVID-19 Data Quality Task Force created a
data quality template to assess the collection,
reporting, and monitoring of COVID-19 cases
across states.
How federal agencies institutionalize
anti-fraud mechanisms, or fail to do so,
can impact future programs. SBA waived
collections on purchased PPP loans with an
outstanding balance of $100,000 or less—a
total of $1.1 billion in loans—because the cost
to collect on these loans would likely be more
than the recovery amount. However, SBA OIG
expressed concern that the decision could
set a dangerous precedent by incentivizing
ineligible borrowers to request loans below
this amount.
Listening to recipients of federal funds can
provide critical information on program
effectiveness and inform future programs.
Of note, HUD OIG surveyed recipients of
Community Development Block Grants and
Emergency Solution Grants to understand
the challenges they faced. In both programs,
grantees lacked the staffing capacity to
administer funds, expressed challenges with
coordinating and managing other pandemic
funding sources, and struggled to spend their
funds before the program’s deadline.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Another key aspect of our mission is identifying major risks that cut across program and agency boundaries.
One of the ways we accomplish this mission is by working closely with the federal IG community and
oversight partners like the U.S. Government Accountability Office, as well as state and local auditors.
During this reporting period, we launched two new initiatives to deepen these relationships.
• First, we brought on Elaine Howle as Special Advisor for State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Oversight.
As a nationally recognized expert and former California State Auditor, Ms. Howle brings nearly 40 years
of professional auditing and leadership experience to the PRAC.
• Second, we rolled out the State Auditor-in-Residence program, welcoming two auditors from the
Tennessee Comptroller’s Office with a combined 30 years’ worth of experience in state and local
oversight.
Foster Sound Stewardship of Covered Funds and Programs
The PRAC has learned that efficient and effective implementation of large-scale spending like the
coronavirus relief programs requires coordinated government oversight. In April 2022, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance to federal agencies recommending they follow the PRAC’s
successful model of pandemic relief oversight for infrastructure funds.
 (AP Photo/Susan Walsh)
President Joe Biden, left, sitting with Office of Management and Budget Director Shalanda Young, right, and Michael
Horowitz, Inspector General for the Department of Justice and chair of the PRAC.
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Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
On April 29, 2022, Chair Michael Horowitz and
other PRAC leadership met with President Biden,
the Director of OMB, federal IGs, and other senior
officials to discuss the importance of ensuring
robust oversight of the Infrastructure Investment
and Jobs Act. The White House meeting coincided
with the issuance of OMB Memorandum M-22-
12 that directs agencies to oversee infrastructure
spending with the same collaborative approach that
has been used for pandemic spending.
Ensure Efficient Sharing of Data, Analytics, and Other
Information
With the funding Congress provided in the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021, we launched the PACE to
deliver analytic, audit, and investigative support to
the oversight community. We’ve acquired dozens of
public and non-public federal datasets and shared
them with IGs to help investigators find fraud across
relief programs. We’ve brought in the best and
brightest data science talent and have assigned 14
data science fellows to member IGs to help analyze
pandemic relief data.
Here are a few case studies to illustrate how the
PACE is delivering data-driven, technology-enabled
tools to support pandemic oversight.
The PACE created a dashboard to provide details on
transactions and entities that received pandemic
assistance from two SBA programs, PPP and EIDL.
To develop this dashboard, the PACE ingested data
from about 12.5 million PPP applications and about
27.8 million EIDL loan applications. Together, these
applications account for more than $1.2 trillion in
pandemic relief money.
Figure 3. The PACE ranked more than 40 million transactions and entities into a Fraud Risk Scale
Semiannual Report to Congress
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Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
What’s the difference
between a transaction
and an entity?
 A transaction refers to a single event or
instance, in this case the submission of a PPP
or EIDL loan application.
An entity, on the other hand, can include multiple
transactions or similarities across transactions—like
nearly identical company names with slightly
different spellings.
Entity analytics allows data analysts to
decipher relationships among people,
transactions, and events, and rate
the likelihood of risk.
The PACE then ran this data through 17 behavioral
risk indicators and six statistical risk indicators.
From this analysis, they were able to assign each
transaction and entity a risk score value between 0
and 100.
The data generated from this dashboard can now
help the IG community:
• target transactions and entities with the highest
fraud risk score;
• provide quantitative insights on how much
fraud existed across both programs; and
• identify gaps in internal controls that could have
been addressed at the program level.
Created indicators of pandemic
spending abuse among federal
contractors.
The PACE partnered with the DOJ’s Procurement
Collusion Strike Force team on a project to surface
suspicious actors that have potential relationships
with suspicious entities. That is, relationships with
entities that have a history of colluding or engaging
in other activities to limit competition.
These indicators can be used to:
• see connections between defendants accused
of pandemic-related fraud with recipients of
recent government contracts;
• identify and connect pandemic-related loan
recipients to government contractors that were
awarded large contracts within 6 months of
pandemic loan actions;
• and identify and connect pandemic-related loan
recipients to contractors that were awarded
more government contracts from 2020-2021,
in comparison to 2018-2019.
Ultimately, the aim of this project is to identify
contractors who received pandemic assistance but
might not have needed it—and to find contractors
who misused the proceeds they received.
Semiannual Report to Congress
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Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Enhanced investigators’ ability
to query pandemic spending
data.
The PACE built an Investigative Support Tool to
fully scan SBA pandemic program data. This
tool empowers investigators to conduct complex
Structured Query Language analysis, or SQL, even if
they don’t have coding skills.
Among the Investigative Support Tool’s features:
• a flexible form to capture as much nuanced
detail as possible from an agent’s request;
• the ability to process a subject’s information
into specially designed SQL queries across all
PPP and EIDL data; and
• pre-formatted output—that is, an easy-to-
read Excel document delivered straight to the
requesting agent.
What is
Structured Query
Language (SQL)
analysis?
SQL is a programming
language that helps data
analysts read, manipulate,
and interact with data
Helping to identify federal
employees’ misuse of PPP
and EIDL funds.
The PACE is engaging in a series of joint projects
with federal OIGs and law enforcement agencies
to identify active employees that applied for PPP
or EIDL, which they are potentially ineligible to
receive. Here are the steps involved:
1. Determine which employees applied for
pandemic related loans and grants.
2. Compare and connect pandemic-related loan
recipients against federal employee information
to identify matches that require further review.
3. Prioritize the quality of the data matches
for investigative review on the likelihood of
matches between PPP and EIDL applicants and
federal employees.
4. So far, this analysis has helped six agency OIGs
match tens of thousands of employees with
SBA loans for which they were potentially not
eligible to receive.*
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
*This content was edited in March 2023 to clarify the project and that some federal employees may be eligible to receive a PPP and/or EIDL loan.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Goal Three–Prevent and Detect Fraud,
Waste, Abuse, and Mismanagement
Hold Wrongdoers Accountable
The PRAC’s Fraud Task Force serves as a resource
for the IG community by surging investigative
resources into areas with the greatest need. We
have 50 agents across 15 OIGs detailed to work
on Task Force cases. These agents are located
around the country and are working cases that
would otherwise go unaddressed due to the scale of
pandemic fraud.
The idea behind our Task Force is to harness the
expertise of the oversight community and attack
this problem with every tool we have—criminal, civil,
forfeitures of money and property, and suspensions
and debarments. Our PRAC Fraud Task Force works
closely with other entities to combat pandemic fraud
such as DOJ’s COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task
Force. The PACE provides investigative support to
the Task Force, flagging anomalies or potential leads
in pandemic relief data.
Working collaboratively with DOJ, the National Credit
Union Administration, and our law enforcement
partners, the PRAC collected information about
pandemic funds being held by credit unions due
to suspected fraud. This data collection effort
identified nearly $8.75 million that may be subject
to recovery. The money comes from a variety of
sources, including the Paycheck Protection Program,
Economic Injury Disaster Loan program, and
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance.
Figure 4. PRAC’s Fraud Task Force Agents are located across the United States
Semiannual Report to Congress
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Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
13
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Mitigate Major Risks That
Cut Across Program and
Agency Boundaries
The PRAC works with our OIG members and state
and local partners to identify emerging fraud
risks created by the pandemic. For instance,
on September 1, 2022, the PRAC entered into
a Memorandum of Understanding with the
Massachusetts Office of the Inspector General to
assist with investigative support. Both agencies
share an interest in pandemic relief investigations
and entered into this agreement to fully promote
interagency collaboration.
In addition, we issued a joint risk advisory with the
HUD OIG and SBA OIG on potential identity fraud
targeting elderly and minors. Through advanced
data analytics, we identified possible identity
or other fraud in SBA programs involving 945
minors and 231 elderly individuals. These minors
and elderly individuals were listed as household
members in HUD’s Low Rent and/or Housing Choice
Voucher Program, which helps low and very low-
income families, the elderly, and the disabled afford
decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private
market.
And we continue to work closely with OMB, the
American Rescue Plan implementation team,
and partner IGs to address issues with pandemic
relief data and opportunities to enhance payment
integrity.
Task Force Indictment
On September 9, 2022, a Louisiana woman was
indicted for preparing more than 110 fraudulent PPP
applications totaling $1.1 million.
Our investigators uncovered her scheme after finding
that more than 100 sole proprietor loan applications
had been submitted in and around Thibodaux,
Louisiana, all with the same invoices and federal tax
forms, listing the same business name and amount.
An agent detailed from the Department of Veterans
Affairs OIG worked the case. Learn more.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Goal Four–Ensure Effective and
Efficient PRAC Operations
Fulfill Statutory
Responsibilities
As previously mentioned, PRAC Chair Michael
Horowitz testified before the House Select
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis this past
June about the PRAC’s ongoing oversight work,
achievements over the past two years, and the
collaborative model we are building to provide
a legacy for effective, coordinated government
oversight during and after the pandemic.
In his testimony, Chair Horowitz also highlighted
results the PRAC achieved though discussions
with the Biden Administration and reiterated
the imperative that executive departments and
agencies do more to incorporate lessons learned
from previous rounds of COVID-19 stimulus—such
as those discussed in our recently updated Lessons
Learned in Oversight of Pandemic Relief Funds.
Further, Chair Horowitz testified that the PRAC’s
efforts could be enhanced by the reforms outlined in
the Administrative False Claims Act of 2021, which
would raise the jurisdictional limit for administrative
recoveries of ‘smaller’ false or fraudulent claims
against the government from $150,000 to $1 million.
This change would extend the PRAC’s and the IG
community’s ability to use this fraud-fighting tool to
recover pandemic-related funds for taxpayers.
Build a Diverse Team of
Innovative Thought Leaders
What started in March 2020 as a Committee within
CIGIE with few employees has grown to a nationally
distributed workforce of 54 staff members spread
across five time zones. Congress gave the PRAC
direct hiring authority in the CARES Act to expedite
our recruiting process, enabling us to continue
recruiting from a deep pool of candidates in the
private sector, academia, and government. With our
partners, tools, staff, and ethos of teamwork, the
PRAC is well positioned to effectively oversee $5
trillion in pandemic relief funds.
Supporting the Independent
Oversight of Inspectors
General
The PRAC is mindful of the complexity of the federal
programs involved in the pandemic response and
the need for deep programmatic expertise in these
programs to ensure efficient and effective auditing
and review. Inspectors General have specialized
expertise and institutional knowledge regarding the
programs of their respective agencies and the most
effective oversight methods for those programs. This
expertise, experience, credibility, and institutional
knowledge is critical to fulfilling the PRAC’s mission.
Accordingly, the PRAC relies on the existing expertise
and experience of individual agency IGs while
respecting their autonomy to conduct their own
audits or investigations.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Reports
Appendices
Accountability
Holding Wrongdoers Accountable
Through Investigations
A key role of OIGs is to support law enforcement in pursuing fraud investigations and criminal enforcement.
A total of 17 OIGs publicly reported 740 indictments and arrests, and 450 convictions from April 1, 2022,
through September 30, 2022, related to the federal government’s COVID-19 pandemic response. The
following section provides the total number of accountability actions organized by agency and highlights
cases categorized by criminal activity.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Percentage of Cases by Program
(April 1, 2022, through September 30, 2022)
Program Area
Percentage of Cases by Program
Paycheck Protection Program
50%
Pandemic Unemployment
32%
Economic Injury Disaster Loans
24%
Health & Safety (Vaccination, Testing, PPE)
3%
Other (Coronavirus Food Assistance Program, Price
Gouging, Economic Impact Payments)
4%
Source: Assembled by the PRAC from DOJ RSS feed.
Note: The percentages above credit all programs included in one case, and therefore, the total percentages exceeds 100
percent.
Table 1. Percentage of Cases by Program
Investigative Results
(April 1, 2022, through September 30, 2022)
Office of Inspector General
Arrests/Indictments
Convictions
Amtrak
2
2
Defense Criminal Investigative Service
26
7
Department of Health and Human Services
48
32
Department of Homeland Security
70
12
Department of Housing and Urban Development
0
1
Department of Justice
2
0
Department of Labor
255
157
Department of the Treasury
2
0
Department of Veterans Affairs
0
3
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
70
33
Federal Housing Finance Agency
10
8
Federal Reserve Board
38
28
Small Business Administration
129
100
Social Security Administration
7
2
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
1
1
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
68
52
U.S. Postal Service
12
12
Source: Assembled by the PRAC from Department of Justice RSS feed
Note: Investigative work often involves several law enforcement agencies working on the same case. OIGs may conduct
cases with other OIGs, other federal law enforcement agencies, and state and local law enforcement entities. The counts
above credit all OIGs involved in the case and do not represent unique cases.
Table 2. Investigative Results
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
17
Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP) and
Economic Injury Disaster
Loan (EIDL) Case Highlights
Amtrak OIG
Former Employee Sentenced for Defrauding
Paycheck Protection Program and
Unemployment Fraud
A former Amtrak train attendant based in New
Orleans was sentenced in the Eastern District
of Louisiana to three years of probation and
12 months of home confinement for stealing
government funds and making false statements.
He was also ordered to pay the SBA and the
Louisiana Workforce Commission nearly $65,000
and $23,000 in restitution, respectively. The
investigation found that the former employee
made false statements to the SBA and fraudulently
obtained almost $90,000 in PPP loans. He also
fraudulently applied for and received unemployment
benefits through the Louisiana Workforce
Commission despite being fully employed by Amtrak.
Florida Man Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud
A Florida man pleaded guilty in U.S. District
Court, Southern District of Florida, to one count
of wire fraud in relation to his application for a
PPP loan and in obtaining an EIDL in the amount
of $149,900. The PPP loan, in the amount of
$150,000, was denied. Investigators found that the
defendant used an invalid social security number
and included other false information on his PPP and
EIDL applications.
Department of Defense OIG
Fort Stewart Soldier Admits Guilt in Prolific
Fraud Scheme Targeting COVID-19 Relief
Programs and Student Loans
An Army soldier stationed at Fort Stewart admitted
that she led a “prolific fraud scheme” in which
she and others illegally raked in millions of dollars
from COVID-19 relief programs and federal student
loan forgiveness. The defendant led a conspiracy
to fraudulently obtain PPP loans and to secure the
fraudulent discharge of federal student loans using
falsified disability claims. The soldier admitted
submitting more than 150 fraudulent PPP loan
applications in all, resulting in more than $3.5
million in fraudulent disbursements.
Department of Labor OIG
Man Pleads Guilty to Role in Stealing More
than $2.2 Million in Pandemic Assistance
Benefits
The defendant plead guilty to conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and mail fraud in connection
with schemes to defraud multiple state workforce
agencies, the SBA, and U.S. Postal Service. The
defendant and his co-conspirators submitted more
than 240 fraudulent unemployment insurance
claims to more than 20 states and territories,
obtaining more than $2.2 million in benefits. He
also successfully obtained a fraudulent PPP loan for
more than $20,000.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
18
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation OIG
California Man Sentenced to Over 11 Years for
$27 Million PPP Fraud Scheme
The defendant submitted 27 PPP loan applications
to four banks on behalf of eight companies. In the
applications, the defendant sought a total of $27
million in forgivable PPP loans. In his fraudulent
applications, the defendant represented that each
of his companies had 100 employees and average
monthly payroll of $400,000, even though he knew
the companies did not have any employees or
payroll expenses.
The evidence further showed that the defendant
submitted fake Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
documents. Although the defendant represented
that the funds would be used for payroll and other
business expenses, evidence showed that he used
the money for personal expenses, including cash
withdrawals, payments on his personal credit cards,
transfers to other personal and business accounts
he controlled, and renting an oceanfront apartment
in Santa Monica.
The defendant was sentenced to more than 11
years in prison.
Federal Housing Finance
Agency OIG
New York and Florida Resident Sentenced to
51 Months in Prison for $6.8 Million Paycheck
Protection Program Fraud Scheme
A business owner was sentenced to 51 months in
prison, two years supervised release, and ordered
to pay over $4.5 million in restitution and forfeiture
for his role in a scheme to fraudulently obtain over
$6.8 million in PPP loans. The defendant previously
pleaded guilty to wire fraud and money laundering.
On the fraudulent PPP applications, the defendant
falsified the number of employees at his company,
and faked federal tax returns and payroll
documentation. He obtained over $4.5 million in
PPP funds and then misused the loan proceeds,
including losing approximately $3 million in
unsuccessful stock trades.
Philadelphia Man Sentenced for Fraudulently
Obtaining Nearly $1 Million in PPP Funds
A business owner was sentenced to 78 months in
prison, five years supervised release, and ordered
to pay $939,350 in restitution and $937,500 in
forfeiture in connection with a scheme to unlawfully
obtain and misuse PPP loans. The defendant
previously pleaded guilty to bank fraud, attempted
bank fraud, and money laundering.
According to court records, the defendant
fraudulently obtained approximately $937,500 in
PPP loans by making multiple false representations
about his business, including the number of
employees, wages paid, and payroll taxes paid on
those wages. The defendant then used the PPP
loan proceeds for personal purchases including a
new residential property in Florida, a motorcycle, an
all-terrain vehicle, a luxury automobile, and diamond
jewelry.
Texas Woman Sentenced to Over Five Years for
COVID Relief Fraud Scheme
A business owner was sentenced to 70 months in
prison, five years supervised release, and ordered
to pay over $2 million in restitution for defrauding
PPP of over $1.9 million in forgivable loans. The
defendant was previously convicted by a federal
jury of bank fraud and making false statements to a
financial institution.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
19
Federal Reserve Board &
Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau OIG
Florida Man to Plead Guilty to $2.5 Million
COVID Relief Fraud
The defendant owned Complete Home Care, LLC
(CHC), a painting company in Massachusetts. In
April 2020, the defendant submitted four different
PPP loan applications on behalf of CHC. The first
three applications, in which the defendant allegedly
listed five employees and an average monthly payroll
of between $10,000 and $18,000, were denied. In
the fourth application for CHC, it is alleged that the
defendant falsely claimed to have 154 employees
and an average monthly payroll of $1 million. On
May 11, 2020, a bank issued the defendant’s
company a $2,500,000 loan based on the allegedly
false representations in the fourth application.
After receiving the funds, it is alleged that the
defendant misused the loan proceeds to buy real
estate and cars and to invest in cryptocurrency.
Owner of Tech Services Company Sentenced to
More than Three Years in Prison for $13 Million
COVID-Relief Fraud Scheme
The defendant was sentenced in federal court in
Boston in connection with filing fraudulent loan
applications seeking more than $13 million in PPP
loans. The defendant devised a scheme to obtain
PPP funds by repeatedly filing false and fraudulent
loan applications in which he systematically used
fake tax documents and payroll processing records
until he was ultimately awarded a loan.
The defendant submitted six fraudulent PPP loan
applications on behalf of his company to four
different SBA-approved lenders. In each loan
application, the defendant misrepresented the
number of employees he had and payroll expenses.
The defendant also submitted fraudulent IRS tax
forms to support his applications. The evidence at
trial showed that his company was a startup with
no U.S.-based payroll and no U.S.-based employees.
As a result of his scheme, the defendant obtained
a $2 million PPP loan. The government recovered
approximately $1.97 million of the loan funds.
The defendant was sentenced to 39 months
incarceration and three years of supervised
release, ordered to pay restitution of $2 million, and
forfeiture of $2 million.
Small Business
Administration OIG
Chinese National Sentenced To 52 Months For
$20 Million Covid-19 Pandemic Loan Fraud
Scheme
The defendant was sentenced to 52 months in
prison in connection with a fraudulent scheme to
obtain over $20 million in government-guaranteed
loans designed to provide relief to small businesses
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Over the course
of two months in 2020, the defendant applied to
the SBA and at least six banks for a business he
claimed had hundreds of employees. However,
the defendant was, in fact, the only employee.
To support the false representations on his
applications, the defendant submitted fake bank,
tax, insurance, and payroll records to six different
banks. He also used the name and identity of
another person in connection with the scheme.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
20
Special Inspector General for
Pandemic Recovery
Naples Felon Pleads Guilty to $2.6 Million
COVID Relief Fraud Scheme
The defendant, a previously convicted felon,
submitted false and fraudulent EIDL, Main Street
Lending Program (MSLP), and PPP applications
to the SBA, as well as PPP and MSLP approved
lenders. The loan applications contained numerous
false representations, including the criminal history,
average monthly payroll, number of employees, and
gross revenues of the applicant.
To support the fraudulent applications, the
defendant submitted fake payroll and tax
documents, as well as a fake commercial lease.
The defendant received more than $2 million
and used the money to buy residences in Naples,
Florida, stocks and investment securities, a 2019
Tiara 34LS boat, a 4.02 carat engagement ring, and
ammunition. (As a convicted felon, the defendant
was prohibited from possessing ammunition.)
The defendant pled guilty to wire fraud, bank fraud,
illegal monetary transaction, and possession of
ammunition by a convicted felon. As part of his
guilty plea, the defendant agreed to forfeit the boat,
real estate, and engagement ring.
Social Security
Administration OIG
Fairhope Man Pleads Guilty to Over $1.2
Million in PPP Fraud
The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of
wire fraud and one count of money laundering for
fraudulently obtaining two PPP loans on behalf of
two companies. The defendant used false tax forms,
altered checks, and falsified loan documents to
obtain the loans. After successfully securing over
$1.2 million in PPP loan funds, the defendant spent
the money on luxury goods and real estate, among
other things.
Florida Man Charged with $1.6 Million CARES
Act Loan Fraud Scheme
The defendant engaged in a scheme to illegally
obtain over $1.6 million in PPP and EIDL loans
through numerous misrepresentations to lenders.
He submitted fraudulent loan applications
that fabricated numbers of employees and
misrepresented company information. The
defendant also submitted falsified tax documents to
support the applications.
The defendant transferred the loan proceeds among
various bank accounts he controlled, withdrawing
significant amounts in cash, and transferring at
least $760,000 out of the country via wire transfers
to banks in Egypt. The defendant was charged with
two counts of wire fraud.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
21
Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration
Riverside County Man Pleads Guilty to Federal
Criminal Charges for Fraudulently Obtaining
$6.6 Million in COVID-Relief Business Loans
The defendant submitted 11 fraudulent PPP loan
applications for seven of his shell companies. The
fraudulent PPP loan applications misrepresented
the number of employees and the average monthly
payroll expenses of the defendant’s companies, and
falsely certified he would use the loan proceeds for
permissible business purposes. The defendant also
submitted false tax and payroll documentation to
support his loan applications. In total, the defendant
received more than $6.6 million in loan proceeds
even though none of his companies were legitimate
recipients of relief funds at that time. The defendant
then laundered loan proceeds to bank accounts in
the United States and Pakistan.
Twenty-two People Charged in Connection with
a Multi-Million Dollar PPP Fraud Scheme
Twenty-two individuals across the United States
were charged with wire fraud conspiracy and other
related charges in connection with a scheme to
obtain nearly $4 million in PPP loans.
The conspirators allegedly submitted, or assisted
in the submission of, PPP loan applications on
behalf of twenty-two businesses. In connection
with the scheme, one defendant allegedly directed
a co-conspirator to fabricate documents on behalf
of individuals that the defendant identified so
they could apply for and receive PPP loans. The
co-conspirator allegedly communicated with the
purported business owners about the loan amount
they wanted to receive, and then fabricated tax
documents and other supporting documents to
submit with the PPP loan application to support that
amount.
To date, two of the co-conspirators have been
sentenced for their involvement in the scheme.
Collectively, the two subjects received 17 months’
imprisonment and were ordered to pay the SBA over
$218,000 in restitution.
Pandemic Unemployment
Case Highlights
Amtrak OIG
Former Amtrak Employee Indicted for
Fraudulently Obtaining Emergency Pandemic
Relief Funding
The indictment alleges that a former Amtrak
employee fraudulently applied for and received
Pandemic Unemployment Assistance while she
was a full-time employee of Amtrak. Further, the
defendant applied for and received a PPP loan for
what she claimed was a small catering business.
She was terminated from employment with Amtrak
after the crimes alleged in the indictment occurred.
Department of Defense OIG
(Defense Criminal Investigative
Services)
Sandown Man Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud
Related to the COVID-19 Pandemic
The defendant executed two schemes to defraud
government programs intended to provide economic
assistance related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
New Hampshire Employment Security administers
the unemployment insurance program in New
Hampshire. The defendant was the Chief Financial
Officer of several companies located in Plaistow,
including Environment and KSC Industrial (a
Department of Defense contractor), that were
controlled by his co-defendant. In late-March 2020,
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Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
22
the defendant and his co-defendant directed
company employees to file for unemployment
benefits with New Hampshire Employment
Security while continuing to work. This resulted in
the unemployment system effectively paying the
employees’ salaries. The defendant also made false
representations to lenders to fraudulently obtain a
PPP and EIDL loan for KSC Industrial. For example,
he certified that KSC Industrial was not engaged
in illegal activity. However, when making that
certification, he knew that he and his co-defendant
were fraudulently using the unemployment benefits
system to pay their employees’ salaries.
Through this scheme, the defendant fraudulently
obtained more than $135,000 in loans.
Department of Homeland
Security OIG
Midlothian Woman Sentenced for $1.8 Million
COVID-19 Fraud Using Information Obtained
from Her State Employment
A Midlothian, VA woman was sentenced to 70
months in prison for defrauding PUA, PPP, and
EIDL, using victims’ personal identifying information
that she obtained from her state government
employment.
In one scheme, the defendant and a co-conspirator
defrauded the Virginia Employment Commission
by filing at least 20 fraudulent unemployment
applications using the personal identifying
information of inmates. The conspirators further
defrauded the Virginia Employment Commission
by filing at least 30 fraudulent applications in
the names of other individuals whose personal
identifying information was obtained, in part, by the
defendant querying a government database she
had access to as an employee of the Virginia Motor
Vehicle Dealer Board. Through this fraud scheme,
the conspirators obtained approximately $1 million
in PUA and Unemployment Insurance benefits.
Couple Charged with Using Fake Employer
Accounts and Stolen Identities to Obtain More
than $1.5 Million in Unemployment Insurance
Benefits
The defendants were indicted for allegedly using
stolen identities to fraudulently claim unemployment
insurance under fictitious employer accounts
registered with the Georgia Department of Labor.
The scheme resulted in the fraudulent payment of
more than $1.5 million in unemployment insurance
benefits, including Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance and Lost Wage Assistance—programs
that were created and expanded to assist
individuals experiencing unemployment due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Starting in June 2020, the defendants allegedly
created several fictitious employer accounts with
the Georgia Department of Labor. Through these
accounts, they submitted false information that
was used to determine whether persons associated
with the employer were entitled to receive benefits.
This information included the names and personally
identifiable information for purported employees,
which were stolen identities of individuals who had
no knowledge of the scheme and did not consent
to the use of their information. The defendants
allegedly used some of the same stolen identities
to submit fraudulent claims for unemployment
insurance benefits in California.
Department of Labor OIG
State Employee Charged in Over $1 million
Unemployment Fraud Scheme
Three women have been charged in a criminal
complaint for their alleged role in a $1.6 million
dollar unemployment insurance fraud scheme
aimed at defrauding the State of Michigan and
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
23
federal government of funds earmarked for
unemployment assistance during the COVID-19
pandemic.
The defendant was employed by the State of
Michigan as an Unemployment Insurance Examiner
in the Benefit Payment Control Unit. Her duties
included reviewing, approving, and adjudicating
various PUA and unemployment insurance claims.
Starting in March 2020, the defendant and her
co-conspirators fraudulently filed and accessed
over 123 PUA claims, resulting in the disbursement
of approximately $1.6 million in federal funds
earmarked for PUA and unemployment insurance
agency benefit payments. The defendant acted
outside the scope of her authority by electronically
accessing, altering, and approving approximately
101 of the fraudulent claims, which were all
associated with the co-conspirators residences.
They are alleged to have received money from third
parties to assist them with the claims and paid
the defendant for her assistance in processing the
fraudulent claims.
U.S. Department of
Agriculture OIG
Former USDA Employee Sentenced to 10
Months in Prison for Fraud in Connection with
Pandemic Assistance Funds
A former Food Safety and Inspection Service
employee was sentenced to 10 months in prison
and 24 months of supervised release and was
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $37,555
and a $100 special assessment.
USDA OIG initiated this investigation to determine
whether the employee applied for and received
Pennsylvania Pandemic Unemployment Assistance
while being gainfully employed as a Consumer
Safety Inspector. The investigation determined the
employee falsely claimed to be unemployed due to
the pandemic and reaffirmed this unemployment
status on a weekly basis, ultimately receiving
$37,555 in benefits. The employee resigned from
the agency and was charged with wire fraud.
This was a joint investigation with the U.S.
Department of Labor OIG.
Health Care/Medicare Fraud
Case Highlights
Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) OIG
MorseLife Nursing Home Health System
Agrees to Pay $1.75 Million to Settle False
Claims Act Allegations for Facilitating
COVID-19 Vaccinations of Ineligible Donors and
Prospective Donors
MorseLife Health System Inc. has agreed to pay
the United States $1.75 million to resolve its
potential liability under the False Claims Act for
facilitating COVID-19 vaccinations for hundreds of
individuals ineligible to participate in the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Pharmacy
Partnership for Long-Term Care Program, a program
specifically designed to vaccinate long-term care
facility residents and staff when doses of COVID-19
vaccine were in limited supply at the beginning of
the CDC’s COVID-19 Vaccination Program. MorseLife
is a not-for-profit corporation located in West Palm
Beach, Florida, that oversees health care facilities
on its campus.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
24
Other Case Highlights
U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development OIG
Wife of Former West Haven City Employee
Admits Role in Scheme to Steal COVID Relief
Funds
According to court documents and statements
made in court, the defendant conspired with her
husband, who at the time was a Connecticut State
Representative and West Haven city employee,
to steal money that was provided to West Haven
to alleviate the economic impact of the COVID-19
pandemic. The defendant’s husband submitted
fraudulent invoices to West Haven for services
related to a Youth Violence Prevention Program.
These invoices listed charges for in-home
counseling, cleaning supplies, special needs hourly
service, wifi assistance for low- and moderate-
income families, counseling services, license fees,
a fall youth clinic, meals, support group supplies,
equipment rental, and youth clinic support group.
The payment vouchers requested that checks be
made out to directly to the defendant.
The City of West Haven made 16 payments totaling
$147,776 to the defendant, who never provided any
services to the City of West Haven. The defendant
and her husband used the proceeds for their own
benefit. The defendant pled guilty to a conspiracy
and wire fraud charges stemming from her role in
the scheme.
U.S. Postal Service OIG
Queens Postal Workers Charged with Bribery
and Theft of Mail Linked to Covid-19 Benefits
Fraud
While employed as letter carriers with the U.S.
Postal Service and working in Queens, New York, the
defendants accepted cash bribes to intercept and
steal mail sent by the New York State Department of
Labor to addresses on their assigned postal routes.
The stolen mail was linked to a scheme to obtain
COVID-19 unemployment benefits through the
fraudulent filing and verification of benefit claims
using the names and social security numbers of
hundreds of other individuals. Law enforcement
agencies were first alerted to the scheme after
a pair of other conspirators fled a hotel, leaving
behind over 700 pieces of New York State
Department of Labor mail, containing, among other
items, benefit debit cards. The stash was tied to over
500 unemployment benefit claims seeking in excess
of $16 million in benefits, approximately $3 million
of which had already been disbursed.
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Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
25
Reports
Key Insights Through Oversight
Reports
From April 1, 2022, through September 30, 2022,
26 Offices of Inspectors General issued 114
oversight reports related to the Federal
Government’s COVID-19 pandemic response, and
these reports identified $31.2 billion in monetary
findings (e.g., questioned costs or funds put to
better use).1 OIGs also made 343 recommendations
to improve the government’s response to the
pandemic, such as improving internal controls and
providing more oversight of recipients . See table 3
for more information about the reports issued by
our OIG partners. For a complete list of all oversight
reports issued, see “Appendix B” on page 32.
As we will discuss in the following pages, these
federal oversight products provide key insights on:
1. Ways the pandemic created program monitoring
challenges and increased program risk.
2. Risks with self-certification that extend beyond
the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, the
Paycheck Protection Program, and Economic
Injury Disaster Loan programs.
3. How failure to implement or effectively modify
critical pandemic-related internal controls
created risks for agency programs.
4. Why assessing emergency planning procedures
used during the pandemic can help inform and
improve future emergency responses.
5. Ways data can help inform the design of more
equitable programs.
Key Insight 1: The Pandemic
Created Program Monitoring
Challenges and Increased
Program Risks
With significant increases in federal funding
provided to recipients, monitoring the money to see
if it helped achieve intended goals and objectives
was critical. Oversight reports issued during this
reporting period identified several challenges
recipients experienced implementing pandemic
response activities. For example, travel restrictions
delayed inspections and large increases in funding
made it difficult to monitor subrecipients. These
difficulties show that federal agencies need to adapt
during the pandemic to effectively monitor funds.
In one example, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) OIG found that travel restrictions
caused inspection delays at Superfund sites (a
contaminated area that has not been cleaned
up). Specifically, 147 sites (31%) had a delayed
inspection of more than one month due to travel
restrictions. The delays caused prolonged human
health and environmental exposure to pollutants
and/or hazardous chemicals at 31 sites.
EPA changed its guidance and protocols to increase
oversight and monitoring of these sites, including an
increase in virtual communication. This increased
participation and clean-up activities. However,
virtual communication increased inspection costs at
some sites and complicated participation and clean-
up at other sites with unreliable internet access.
1
These oversight reports include all reports, memorandums, and advisories issued by the OIGs related to the COVID-19 response funding and
programs.
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Appendices
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Oversight Reports from April 1, 2022, through September 30, 2022
Office of Inspector General
Total
Reports
Total
Recommendations
Total Monetary
Findingsa
Architect of the Capitol
1
0
Department of Agriculture
5
7
$5,928,922
Department of Defense
5
3
$26,630,773
Department of Education
5
21
$652,720
Department of Health and Human Services
17
45
Department of Homeland Security
11
53
$45,000,000
Department of Housing and Urban Development
3
6
Department of the Interior
2
6
$466,044
Department of Justice
1
6
Department of Labor
4
12
$29,607,092,604b
Department of State
1
0
Department of Transportation
1
7
$360,352,764
Department of the Treasury
4
8
$1,105,256
Department of Veterans Affairs
4
4
$2,336,381
Election Assistance Commission
6
25
$914,835
Environmental Protection Agency
1
3
General Services Administration
2
2
Federal Reserve Board & Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau
2
0
National Security Agency
1
4
  $16,400,000
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
2
0
U.S. Postal Service
2
3
  $2,336,381
Railroad Retirement Board
1
1
$28,575,000
Small Business Administration
8
27
  $18,559,541
Social Security Administration
3
18
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
8
2
U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration
14
80
$1,130,882,934
Totals
114
343
$31,247,234,155
a “Monetary findings” include all questioned costs and funds put to better use identified by each
OIG. b One recommendation was $29,600,000,000.
Table 3. Oversight Reports from April 1, 2022, through September 30, 2022
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In another example, a survey by HUD OIG found
it was difficult for prime recipients of Emergency
Solutions Grants to monitor their subrecipients.
This may increase the risk of misuse of the funds
and delay spending. These monitoring challenges
were driven by a large increase in federal funding
and the expectation that funds be used quickly
to address the impact of the pandemic. HUD
OIG recommended that the agency consider
incorporating this challenge into the program’s risk
assessment.
Key Insight 2: Risks
with Self-Certification
Extend Beyond Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance,
PPP, and EIDL
The PRAC and its partner OIGs have issued reports
highlighting the challenges associated with
using self-certification to approve federal funds
or benefits. The use of self-certification in small
business assistance programs and unemployment
insurance programs sought to distribute funds
quickly to meet the needs of the public. However, it
led to an increase in fraud and improper payments.
For example, in a September 2022 report, SBA OIG
found $8.5 billion in EIDL payments were disbursed
before SBA began using tax information to verify
eligibility. SBA OIG found more than $92 million
was disbursed to businesses with suspect taxpayer
identification numbers.
Additional reports issued during this reporting
period identified issues with self-certification in
other programs. For example, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) OIG reported that FEMA’s
Lost Wages Assistance Program—implemented by
state workforce agencies—provided $3.7 billion
in improper payments ($3.3 billion of which was
Insights through Single Audits
Under federal regulations, any recipient
(or subrecipient) that receives more than
$750,000 in federal funding during its fiscal year
is subject to a single audit. This can include state
governments, local governments, and non-profit
organizations. Single audits assess a recipient’s
controls over compliance for federal assistance and
identify possible areas of improvements and questioned
costs. If a finding or concern is identified, the recipient
must prepare a corrective action plan to address those
concerns. As of September 30, 2022, 36 fiscal year
2021 statewide single audits had been issued. These
audits include:
• 114 findings related to the Coronavirus Relief
Fund  (CRF)
• 140 findings related to unemployment insurance
For example, the single audit for Washington state
found the state spent $17.6 billion in federal pandemic
funding between July 1, 2020, and June 30, 2021.
The Washington State Auditor looked at 17 pandemic
relief funds, including $9.3 billion in unemployment
insurance funds and $3.4 billion in Medicaid funds
related to the pandemic. The single audit identified
several issues with reporting requirements and
subrecipient monitoring, including not evaluating
subrecipient risk, resulting in $4.1 million in question
costs, and $6.4 million in likely improper payments for
the Coronavirus Relief Fund. See the report summary
for more information.
The Tennessee single audit showed a dramatic increase
in federal assistance from $14 billion in 2019 to $24
billion in 2021. The report questioned approximately
$1.8 million of UI benefits that were not properly paid.
The audit also questioned nearly $500,000 of duplicate
expenditures charged to the CRF program and reported
that two departments receiving CRF funds did not
monitor subrecipients. See Tennessee’s single audit
report for more information.
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fraudulent) in 21 states reviewed. The DHS OIG
previously identified the use of self-certification by
FEMA as a decades-long problem.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) OIG found
that within two weeks of the CARES Act passage—
which gave the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
$10 billion—FAA had announced awards to more
3,000 airports through their Airport Improvement
Program. DOT OIG found that FAA did not provide
clear guidance on documenting information and
data the grant application needed to provide
prior to award approval. As a result, FAA had to
rely on airport self-certification, which was often
inconsistent, to assess grant compliance and
monitor recipient activity effectively.
State oversight offices have also found risks related
to self-certification within pandemic programs. The
Wisconsin State Auditor found that the controls
of their state’s Emergency Rental Assistance
program, funded by the Department of the Treasury
(Treasury), did not comply with Treasury’s guidance
that required documentation to verify eligibility.
Instead, Wisconsin’s Rental Assistance Program
allowed individuals to provide a rental attestation
form, signed by an individual and a landlord, and
an income attestation form in place of Treasury’s
required documentation to prove eligibility. In a
random sample of 40 individuals who received
benefits, 29 provided signed rental attestation forms
but not housing documentation, and 8 individuals
did not provide a signed rental attestation form or
housing documentation at all, which may indicate
the applications were not compliant with federal or
state guidance.
Key Insight 3: Failure to
Implement or Effectively
Modify Critical Internal
Controls Created Risks in
Pandemic Relief Programs
The pandemic created unique challenges that
required distinct controls to mitigate fraud or
improper payments. It was also critical for agencies
to adapt or modify initial controls as needs shifted
during the pandemic, but this did not always occur.
Examples included failing to institutionalize proper
procedures or effectively train program personnel.
In some cases, these controls were legislatively
required to improve programs and reduce fraud.
For example, Department of Defense (DoD) OIG
found that the North American Aerospace Defense
Command and U.S. Northern Command used
$19.2 million of its CARES Act funds for purposes
that did not contribute to the overall federal and
agency priorities for the pandemic response. This
occurred because those commands did not have
sufficient controls in place to review and approve
expenditures related to the pandemic—instead they
relied on existing controls, which did not require
adequate support that goods and services aligned
with guidance.
HHS also did not update its controls to account
for new roles and responsibilities for public health
services. HHS historically has been the primary
coordinator for emergency support functions
related to the public health and medical services,
but FEMA was assigned as the federal response
lead for COVID-19 instead of HHS. However, given
this difference, HHS did not update its controls to
properly identify the roles and responsibilities for
ventilator contracts. Therefore, HHS does not have
documentation to support decisions made by FEMA
that directly impact its procurement process.
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Alternatively, SBA OIG found that SBA updated
its controls for verifying eligibility once Congress
allowed the agency to use tax information. However,
SBA took four months to implement the new
controls. During that time, nearly $8.5 billion in EIDL
funds were disbursed, including $92 million issued
to businesses with suspect Taxpayer Identification
Numbers.
Issues with modifying pandemic-related controls
also existed at the state level. For example, the
Alaska Legislative Auditor, which assessed their
state’s Small Business Relief Program, found
that the eligibility requirements for the program
changed multiple times over the course of the
program. Program staff received directives to
speed up the approval process, since the program
design and the number of incomplete and/or
inaccurate applications slowed disbursement. To
increase speed, several program requirements were
inconsistently considered or enforced by program
operators. As a result, the Alaska State Auditor
identified at least one error for 39 percent of the
grants it tested (155 grants), such as grant awards
exceeding amounts requested and grants being
provided to unlicensed businesses.
Key Insight 4: Assessing
Emergency Planning
Procedures Used During
the Pandemic Can Help
Inform and Improve Future
Emergency Responses
During this reporting period, OIGs assessed some of
their agencies’ emergency planning and response
processes and identified good practices and areas
for improvement or consideration for agencies’
overall emergency planning processes. These
include:
• Proper coordination among all stakeholders
during evacuations.
• Improved coordination and communication
when changing policies that impact other
federal offices; and
• Proper assessment or re-evaluation of needed
supplies or services.
For example, the Department of State OIG identified
several good practices used by the Department
of State to repatriate more than 800 Americans
back to the United States from Wuhan, China at
the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak. These
practices include coordination with interagency
partners, the development of a Wuhan Evacuation
Task Force, and compliance with existing crisis
response and planning policies and guidance.
However, the Department of State OIG also
identified areas of improvement where coordination
between the Department of State and HHS deviated
from established practices—which resulted in
challenges coordinating with state and local
partners that would be receiving the repatriated
Americans.
A report by HHS OIG also highlighted the need
to improve communication among government
agencies. The CDC did not comply with best
practices for coordinating overlapping programs
and initiatives and did not coordinate with the Office
of Refugee Resettlement to implement a public
health order that significantly affected one of their
programs. When CDC issued a federal order that
required most non-citizen children entering the
United States without a parent be expelled to their
home country, the CDC did not notify the required
stakeholders in advance of the order. As a result,
the Office of Refugee Resettlement was unable to
plan for how much care they may be required to
provide. HHS OIG recommended the agency take
steps to improve its internal communication and
coordination regarding unaccompanied children
and that HHS ensure that CDC coordinates with the
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Office of Refugee Resettlement when making future
decisions that may affect unaccompanied children
placed in the office’s care.
In another example, the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA) Veterans Health Administration
purchased 10,000 iPhones and more than 80,900
iPads to help veterans experiencing homelessness
or enrolled in supportive housing programs connect
to telehealth services. The VA OIG found that while
the program was laudable, VA OIG noted areas for
improvement. Specifically, the agency paid $1.8
million in data plans for iPhones and $2.3 million
in data plans for iPads and iPhones while they were
not in use or in storage. VA OIG recommended that
the program implementation could be improved by
turning on a data plan when there is an immediate
need.
Key Insight 5: Data Can
Help Inform the Design of
More Equitable Programs
Although the pandemic affected everyone, minority
and socioeconomically disadvantaged communities
faced additional and unique challenges related to
public health risks, accessing medical expertise,
and obtaining federal benefits.
During this reporting period, both agencies and
oversight entities have used data to provide more
equitable services and inform program design,
respectively. In January 2021, President Biden
issued an Executive Order focused on advancing
racial equity and support for under-served
communities through government programs. The
insights from the following reports can help program
managers implement more equitable federal
emergency response programs.
A significant public health initiative during the
pandemic was to ensure equitable access to
vaccines. A recent DHS OIG report highlighted the
efforts by the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to work with other federal agencies to use
the CDC Social Vulnerability Index to identify and
address inequalities in under-served communities’
access to vaccination centers. The report also
showed how FEMA is modifying its strategic
plan and plans to collect demographic data on
applicants to help target resources to under-served
communities.
Work by HHS OIG shows another example of
obtaining and using data to assess equity in federal
programs. They completed a quantitative analysis to
identify which communities used telehealth during
the first year of the pandemic. HHS OIG found that
beneficiaries in urban areas were more likely to
use this virtual service. Additionally, beneficiaries
eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid, Hispanic
beneficiaries, younger beneficiaries, and female
beneficiaries were more likely than others to use
telehealth. The findings could inform broader
expansion or design of future Medicare telehealth
services, and inform discussions on issues of health
care access, quality of care, cost, health equity, and
program integrity.
The pandemic also had significant economic
impacts on different professional sectors and
communities. The Oregon Audits Division found
that disparities in processing UI claims could have
occurred because communities of color were
overrepresented in leisure and hospitality jobs
which were significantly affected by the pandemic.
The state received a federal grant of more than
$4.5 million to increase outreach and develop more
robust data analysis to identify disparities and
provide more equitable services to under-served
communities.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Acronyms
CARES Act
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act
CDC
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
CIGIE
Council of the Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency
COVID-19
novel coronavirus disease 2019
DHS
Department of Homeland Security
DoD
Department of Defense
DOJ
Department of Justice
EIDL
Economic Injury Disaster Loan
EPA
Environmental Protection Agency
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration
FEMA
Federal Emergency Management
Agency
HHS
Department of Health and Human
Services
HUD
Department of Housing and Urban
Development
IG
Inspector General
IRS
Internal Revenue Service
MSLP
Main Street Lending Program
OIG
Office of Inspector General
OMB
Office of Management and Budget
PACE
Pandemic Analytics Center of
Excellence
PPP
Paycheck Protection Program
PRAC
Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee
PUA
Pandemic Unemployment
Assistance
SBA
Small Business Administration
SQL
Structured Query Language
Treasury
Department of the Treasury
UI
Unemployment Insurance
VA
Department of Veterans Affairs
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Appendix B: Pandemic-Related
Reports by Office of Inspector General
Offices of Inspectors General (OIGs) issued a total of
114 reports between April 1, 2022, and September
30, 2022, related to the COVID-19 pandemic
response. The following information provides a list
and summary of each of those reports.
U.S. Architect of the Capitol OIG
Architect of the Capitol’s COVID-19 Emergency
Supplemental Spending, OIG-AUD-2022-06,
July 25, 2022
U.S. Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve
System & Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau OIG
The CFPB Implemented Safety Measures in
Accordance with Its Reentry Plan, 2022-MO-C-011,
September 21, 2022
The Board Implemented Safety Measures in a
Manner Consistent with Its Return-to-Office Plan,
2022-MO-B-010, September 7, 2022
U.S. Department of Agriculture OIG
COVID-19—Oversight of the Emergency Food
Assistance Program—Final Report, 27801-0001-21,
August 18, 2022
COVID-19 – Food Safety and Inspection Service
Pandemic Response at Establishment, 24801-
0001-23, July 26, 2022
COVID-19―Food and Nutrition Service’s Pandemic
Electronic Benefits Transfer―Interim Report, 27801-
0001-23(1), June 24, 2022
COVID-19—Farmers to Families Food Box Program
Administration—Interim Report, 01801-0001-22(1),
June 24, 2022
USDA Farmers to Families Food Box Program, 22-
001-01, June 22, 2022
U.S. Department of Defense OIG
Audit of the DoD Certification Process for
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
Act Section 4003 Loans Provided to Businesses
Designated as Critical to Maintaining National
Security, DODIG-2022-131, September 20, 2022
Audit of DoD Cooperative Agreements with
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
Obligations, DODIG-2022-102, June 8, 2022
Audit of North American Aerospace Defense
Command and U.S. Northern Command Use of
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
Funding, DODIG-2022-098, May 17, 2022
Audit of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s Execution of
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
Funding, DODIG-2022-091, May 5, 2022
Evaluation of Department of Defense Military
Medical Treatment Facility Challenges During the
Coronavirus Disease-2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic in
Fiscal Year 2021, DODIG-2022-081, April 5, 2022
U.S. Department of Education OIG
The Department’s Use of Pandemic Assistance
Program Administration Funds, F22DC0059,
September 27, 2022
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Allocation of ESSER I Funds at Selected Local
Educational Agencies, F20IT0049,
September 26, 2022
Michigan’s Administration of the Governor’s
Emergency Education Relief Fund, A20GA0039,
September 14, 2022
Oklahoma’s Administration of the Governor’s
Emergency Education Relief Fund, A20GA0011,
July 18, 2022
The Office of Postsecondary Education’s Oversight
of Higher Education Emergency Relief Grant Funds,
A20CA0029, June 1, 2022
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services OIG
HHS’s and HRSA’s Controls Related to Selected
Provider Relief Fund Program Requirements Could
Be Improved, A-09-21-06001, September 29, 2022
End-Stage Renal Disease Network Organizations’
Reported Actions Taken in Response to the
COVID-19 Pandemic, A-05-20-00051,
September 23, 2022
FDA Repeatedly Adapted Emergency Use
Authorization Policies to Address the Need for
COVID-19 Testing, OEI-01-20-00380,
September 21, 2022
FDA’s Work with the Tri-Agency Task Force for
Emergency Diagnostics Helped Labs Implement
COVID-19 Tests, OEI-01-20-00381,
September 21, 2022
IHS’s National Supply Service Center Was Generally
Effective in Providing Supplies to Facilities During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, but Its Internal Controls Could
Be Improved, A-07-20-04124, September 20, 2022
Certain Life Care Nursing Homes May Not
Have Complied With Federal Requirements for
Infection Prevention and Control and Emergency
Preparedness, A-01-20-00004,
September 19, 2022
The IHS Telehealth System Was Deployed Without
Some Required Cybersecurity Controls, A-18-21-
03100, September 9, 2022
Certain Medicare Beneficiaries, Such as Urban
and Hispanic Beneficiaries, Were More Likely Than
Others to Use Telehealth During the First Year of the
COVID-19 Pandemic, OEI-02-20-00522,
September 7, 2022
Medicare Telehealth Services During the First Year
of the Pandemic: Program Integrity Risks, OEI-02-
20-00720, September 7, 2022
HHS Did Not Fully Comply with Federal
Requirements and HHS Policies and Procedures
When Awarding and Monitoring Contracts for
Ventilators, A-02-20-02002, September 2, 2022
Certain Nursing Homes May Not Have Complied
With Federal Requirements for Infection Prevention
and Control and Emergency Preparedness, A-01-20-
00005, July 26, 2022
CDC Found Ways to Use Data To Understand and
Address COVID-19 Health Disparities, Despite
Challenges With Existing Data, OEI-05-20-00540,
July 15, 2022
An Estimated 91 Percent of Nursing Home Staff
Nationwide Received the Required COVID-19
Vaccine Doses, and an Estimated 56 Percent of
Staff Nationwide Received a Booster Dose, A-09-22-
02003, June 27, 2022
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Office of Refugee Resettlement’s Influx Care Facility
and Emergency Intake Sites Did Not Adequately
Safeguard Unaccompanied Children From
COVID-19, A-06-21-07002, June 23, 2022
Selected Dialysis Companies Implemented
Additional Infection Control Policies and Procedures
to Protect Beneficiaries and Employees During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, A-05-20-00052, May 26 2022
HHS Should Improve Internal Coordination
Regarding Unaccompanied Children, OEI-
BL-20-00670, May 2, 2022
National Snapshot of Trends in the National
Domestic Violence Hotline’s Contact Data Before
and During the COVID-19 Pandemic, A-09-21-
06000, April 27, 2022
U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG
FEMA’s Management of Mission Assignments to
Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement, OIG-
22-76, September 30, 2022
FEMA Made Efforts to Address Inequities in
Disadvantaged Communities Related to COVID-19
Community Vaccination Center Locations and Also
Plans to Address Inequity in Future Operations, OIG-
22-74, September 29, 2022
More than $2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent
LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees’
Identities, OIG-22-79, September 28, 2022
A Review of FEMA Funding for Coronavirus Disease
2019 (COVID-19) Response and Relief, OIG-22-72,
September 16, 2022
FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent
More than $3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from
the Lost Wages Assistance Program, OIG-22-69,
September 16, 2022
FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the
Emergency Food and Shelter Program, OIG-22-56,
August 10, 2022
Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Folkston
ICE Processing Center and Folkston Annex, OIG-22-
47, June 30, 2022
ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or
Recommendations to Ensure Migrants Were
Tested for COVID-19 before Transport on Domestic
Commercial Flights, OIG-22-44, May 18, 2022
Lessons Learned from DHS’ Employee COVID-19
Vaccination Initiative, OIG-22-42, May 10, 2022
Management Alert - FEMA’s COVID-19 Funeral
Assistance Operating Procedures Are Inconsistent
with Previous Interpretation of Long-Standing
Regulations for Eligible Funeral Expenses, OIG-22-
36, April 13, 2022
ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed COVID-19
Protocols and Detention Standards while Housing
Migrant Families in Hotels, OIG-22-37,
April 12, 2022
U.S Department of Housing and Urban
Development OIG
Fraud Risk Inventory for the Tenant- and Project-
Based Rental Assistance, HOME, and Operating
Fund Programs’ CARES and ARP Act Funds, 2022-
FO-0007, September 29
Community Development Block Grant CARES
Act Implementation Challenges, 2022-LA-0003,
September 28, 2022
Emergency Solutions Grants CARES Act
Implementation Challenges, 2022-LA-0002,
August 17, 2022
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U.S. Department of the Interior OIG
The Three Affiliated Tribes Did Not Account for
CARES Act Funds Appropriately, 2021–FIN–032–C,
September 28, 2022
The Lower Brule Sioux Tribe Did Not Account for
CARES Act Funds Appropriately, 2021–FIN–032–A,
September 19, 2022
U.S. Department of Justice OIG
Audit of the Management and Coordination of
Pandemic-Related Fraud Allegations and Referrals
Between the Criminal Division and Executive Office
for U.S. Attorneys, 22-109, September 21, 2022
U.S. Department of Labor OIG
COVID-19: ETA and States Did Not Protect
Pandemic-Related UI Funds from Improper
Payments Including Fraud or from Payment Delays,
19-22-006-03-315, September 30, 2022
Alert Memorandum: Potentially Fraudulent
Unemployment Insurance Payments in High-Risk
Areas Increased to $45.6 Billion, 19-22-005-03-
315, September 21, 2022
Alert Memorandum: Employment and Training
Administration Needs to Ensure State Workforce
Agencies Report Activities Related to CARES Act
Unemployment Insurance Programs, 19-22-004-03-
315, August 2, 2022
The U.S. Department of Labor Did Not Meet the
Requirements for Compliance, 22-22-007-13-001,
July 1, 2022
U.S. Department of State OIG
Review of Department of State Evacuations
from Wuhan, China in Response to COVID-19,
ISP-I-22-19, May 10, 2022
U.S. Department of Transportation OIG
FAA Quickly Awarded CARES Act Funds but Can
Enhance Its Oversight Approach to Promote
Effective Stewardship, AV2022032, July 18, 2022
U.S. Department of the Treasury OIG
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF
PROGRAMS Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support
Certifications - XOJET Aviation, LLC, OIG-22-041,
September 28, 2022
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF
PROGRAMS Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support
Certifications – Alpine Aviation, Inc., OIG-22-043,
September 28, 2022
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 PANDEMIC RELIEF
PROGRAMS: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support
Certifications - Pegasus Elite Aviation, Inc.,
OIG-22-043, September 28, 2022
Inquiry on Use of Pandemic Relief Funds for
Increased Broadband Access to Unserved
Communities, OIG-CA-22-020, August 30, 2022
U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs OIG
Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection Summary
Report: Evaluation of Medication Management in
Veterans Health Administration Facilities, Fiscal
Year 2021, 22-00814-230, September 1, 2022
The Veterans Health Administration Needs to Do
More to Promote Emotional Well-Being Supports
Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, 21-00533-15,
May 10, 2022
Purchases of Smartphones and Tablets for
Veterans’ Use during the COVID-19 Pandemic,
21-02125-132, May 4, 2022
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
36
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
36
Comprehensive Healthcare Inspection of Facilities’
COVID-19 Pandemic Readiness and Response in
Veterans Integrated Service Networks 2, 5, and 6,
21-03917-123, April 7, 2022
U.S. Election Assistance Commission OIG
Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants
Awarded to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
G22PA0014-22-07, September 22, 2022
Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded
to the State of Delaware, G22DE0010-22-06,
September 21, 2022
Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded
to the State of Washington, G22WA0015-22-04,
September 6, 2022
Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded
to the State of Indiana, G22IN0011-22-03,
September 2, 2022
Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded
to the State of Arizona, G22AZ0008-22-01,
August 9, 2022
Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded
to the State of Ohio, G22OH0013-22-02,
August 9, 2022
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency OIG
The Coronavirus Pandemic Caused Schedule
Delays, Human Health Impacts, and Limited
Oversight at Superfund National Priorities List Sites,
22-E-0049, June 23, 2022
U.S. General Services Administration OIG
COVID-19: PBS Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to
Improve Air Filtration in GSA-Controlled Facilities,
A201018P4R22008, September 30, 2022
Alert Memorandum: PBS Did Not Test Water Prior to
Reopening GSA Child Care Centers Closed During
the COVID-19 Pandemic, A201018-8,
September 6, 2022
U.S. National Security Agency OIG
Audit of the Implementation of the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Section
3610, AU-20-0008, May 26, 2022
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Risk Advisory – Potential Identity or Other Fraud in
SBA Pandemic Relief Programs, PRAC-2022-08,
September 20, 2022
Key Insights: Identity Fraud Reduction and Redress
in Pandemic Response Programs, PRAC-2022-07,
June 13, 2022
U.S. Postal Service OIG
COVID-19 Test Kit Distribution, 22-076-R22,
September 28, 2022
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act Funding, 21-234-R22, July 7, 2022
U.S. Railroad Retirement Board OIG
The RRB Did Not Have Detailed Project Plans to
Expend Information Technology Modernization
Funds, 22-10, June 29, 2022
U.S. Small Business Administration OIG
SBA’s Guaranty Purchases for Paycheck Protection
Program Loans, 22-25, September 30, 2022
Follow-up Inspection of SBA’s Internal Controls to
Prevent COVID-19 EIDLs to Ineligible Applicants,
22-22, September 29, 2022
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
37
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
37
COVID-19 and Disaster Assistance Information
Systems Security Controls, 22-19,
September 27, 2022
Paycheck Protection Program Eligibility for Nonprofit
Organizations, 22-21. September 26, 2022
COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan
Applications Submitted from Foreign IP Addresses,
22-17, September 12, 2022
SBA’s Award and Payment Practices in the Shuttered
Venue Operators Grant Program, 22-15, July 5,
2022
SBA’s Handling of Potentially Fraudulent Paycheck
Protection Program Loans, 22-13, May 26, 2022
Evaluation of SBA’s Disaster Assistance Loan
Recommendation Services, 22-10, April 14, 2022
U.S. Social Security Administration OIG
Summary of the Audit of the Social Security
Administration’s Information Security Program and
Practices for Fiscal Year 2022, A-14-22-51179,
September 30, 2022
The Social Security Administration’s Enumeration
Services During the COVID-19 Pandemic, A-15-21-
51015, September 30, 2022
The Social Security Administration’s Mail Processing
During the COVID-19 Pandemic, A-08-21-51115,
May 13, 2022
U.S. Special Inspector General for Pandemic
Recovery
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – Meridian Rapid Defense Group,
LLC, SIGPR-A-22-003-10, August 4, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – Mesa Airlines, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-9 August 2, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan
Recipient’s Validation Memo – Map Large, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-8, July 11, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan
Recipient’s Validation Memo – United Airlines,
SIGPR-A-22-003-7, June 22, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – SkyWest Airlines, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-6, June 2, 2022
Alert Memorandum: Delays in the Quarterly
Monitoring of Borrowers’ Compliance with Loan
Requirements, SIGPR-A-22-002-1, May 24, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-5, May 19, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – JetBlue Airways Corporation,
SIGPR-A-22-003-4, April 28, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan
Recipient’s Validation Memo – SpinLaunch, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-12, September 27, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – Republic Airways, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-11, September 14, 2022
U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration
Mainframe Platform Configuration Compliance
Controls Need Improvement, 2022-20-050,
September 30, 2022
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
38
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
38
Reporting on the Use of Coronavirus Response
Funding Could Be Enhanced, 202110624,
September 22, 2022
American Rescue Plan Act: Accuracy of Advance
Child Tax Credit Periodic Payments, 2022-47-070,
September 21, 2022
Delays in Management Actions Contribute to the
Continued Tax Processing Center Backlogs, 2022-
46-057, September 16, 2022
The IRS’s Inability to Keep Pace with Non-Corporate
Applications for Refund of Net Operating Losses
Under the CARES Act Has Cost Taxpayers Millions
of Dollars in Additional Interest, 2022-36-048,
September 7, 2022
The IRS Effectively Planned to Use and Provide
Oversight of the American Rescue Plan Act Funds;
However, Subsequent Reallocation of Modernization
Funds Resulted in Significant Replanning,
2022-27-045, September 2, 2022
Compliance Efforts Are Needed to Address Refund
Claims Reported on Form 1139 That Are Based
on the CARES Act Net Operating Loss Carryback
Provisions, 2022-35-049, August 31, 2022
Delays Continue to Result in Businesses Not
Receiving Pandemic Relief Benefits, 2022-46-059,
August 31, 2022
American Rescue Plan Act: Assessment of the Child
Tax Credit Update Portal’s Capabilities and Related
Processes, 2022-47-02, July 25, 2022
Fingerprinting and Employment Eligibility
Verification Delays Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic
May Increase Taxpayer Data Exposure Risks,
2022-16-039, July 7, 2022
Final Report – The IRS Leveraged Its Telework
Program to Continue Operations During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 2022-IE-R003, May 23, 2022
Processing of Recovery Rebate Credit Claims During
the 2021 Filing Season, 2022-46-032,
May 19, 2022
The Child Tax Credit Update Portal Was Successfully
Deployed, but Security and Process Improvements
Are Needed, 2022-27-028, May 18, 2022
American Rescue Plan Act: Implementation of
Premium Tax Credit Provisions, 2022-47-034,
May 2, 2022
Semiannual Report to Congress
APRIL 1, 2022 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2022

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
39
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
39
Appedix C: Hotline Data
Since inception, the PRAC received most of its hotline complaints through its electronic complaint form.
The PRAC’s hotline provides an avenue for concerned citizens to report potential fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement related to the pandemic response, including the CARES Act and other related legislation.
During the reporting period, we received 1,705 hotline communications, of which 500 were filed for
information or not actionable. The remaining 1,205 were deemed potentially actionable for fraud, waste,
abuse, or mismanagement. From these, the PRAC forwarded 1,241 allegations to 16 different OIGs for review
and appropriate action. Referrals might be sent to more than one OIG based on the allegation(s) referenced,
resulting in the slightly higher number reported here.

For more information:
Lisa Reijula
Associate Director of Outreach and Engagement, PRAC
Lisa.Reijula@cigie.gov
Visit us at:
PandemicOversight.gov
Follow us at:
@COVID_Oversight
Report Fraud, Waste, Abuse, or Misconduct:
To report allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or
misconduct regarding pandemic relief funds or programs
please go to the PRAC website at
PandemicOversight.gov.
A Committee of the
Council of the Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency

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