Memorandum Opinion and Order — Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden (January 21, 2022)

Summary

A Memorandum Opinion and Order dated January 21, 2022, by United States District Judge Jeffrey Vincent Brown (Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division) in Feds for Medical Freedom, et al. v. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., et al., No. 3:21-cv-356. The plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of two executive orders, numbered 14042 and 14043. Declining to enjoin the first, which is already subject to a nationwide injunction, the court holds that the Civil Service Reform Act does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. The court grants the motion as to Executive Order 14043, enjoining all defendants except the President from implementing or enforcing that order until the case is resolved on the merits, with nationwide applicability, and the plaintiffs need not post a bond.

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Date: 2022-01-21

Cite this document

“Memorandum Opinion and Order — Feds for Medical Freedom v. Biden (January 21, 2022).” Original at archive.org, dated 2022-01-21. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/2022-01-21-feds-for-medical-freedom-et-al-plaintiffs-v-joseph-r-biden-jr-et-al-defendants/, SHA-256 025ae48032b619c700286b59841b57bcf023b0e949baa1b78e56c009efdfb5b8.

Full text

Case 3:21-cv-00356 Document 36 Filed on 01/21/22 in TXSD Page 1 of 20
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas

ENTERED
January 21, 2022
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTNathan Ochsner, Clerk
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
GALVESTON DIVISION
═════════════
No. 3:21-cv-356
═════════════

FEDS FOR MEDICAL FREEDOM, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS,

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., ET AL., DEFENDANTS.

═══════════════════════════════
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
═══════════════════════════════

JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

The plaintiffs have moved the court to preliminarily enjoin the

enforcement of two executive orders by the President. The first, Executive

Order 14042, is already the subject of a nationwide injunction. Because that

injunction protects the plaintiffs from imminent harm, the court declines to

enjoin the first order. The second, Executive Order 14043, amounts to a

presidential mandate that all federal employees consent to vaccination

against COVID-19 or lose their jobs. Because the President’s authority is not

that broad, the court will enjoin the second order’s enforcement.

The court notes at the outset that this case is not about whether folks

should get vaccinated against COVID-19—the court believes they should. It
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is not even about the federal government’s power, exercised properly, to

mandate vaccination of its employees. It is instead about whether the

President can, with the stroke of a pen and without the input of Congress,

require millions of federal employees to undergo a medical procedure as a

condition of their employment. That, under the current state of the law as

just recently expressed by the Supreme Court, is a bridge too far.

Background

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Biden Administration has

put out four mandates requiring vaccination in various contexts. Earlier this

month, the Supreme Court ruled on challenges to two of those mandates. For

one, a rule issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) concerning businesses with 100 or more employees, the Court

determined the plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits and so granted

preliminary relief. See Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. OSHA, 595 U.S. ___ (2022)

[hereinafter NFIB]. For the second, a rule issued by the Secretary of Health

and Human Services concerning healthcare facilities receiving Medicare and

Medicaid funding, the Court allowed the mandate to go into effect. See Biden

v. Missouri, 595 U.S. ___ (2022).

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In this case, the plaintiffs challenge the other two mandates. One

compels each business contracting with the federal government to require its

employees to be vaccinated or lose its contract. Exec. Order No. 14042,

Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors, 86 Fed.

Reg. 50,985 (Sept. 9, 2021). Because that order has been enjoined

nationwide, Georgia v. Biden, No. 1:21-CV-163, 2021 WL 5779939, at *12

(S.D. Ga. Dec. 7, 2021), this court declines to grant any further preliminary

relief. The other mandate requires that all federal employees be vaccinated—

or obtain a religious or medical exemption—or else face termination. See

Exec. Order No. 14043, Requiring Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination for

Federal Employees, 86 Fed. Reg. 50,989 (Sept. 9, 2021) [hereinafter federal-

worker mandate].

The federal-worker mandate was issued last year on September 9. At

first, federal agencies were to begin disciplining non-compliant employees at

the end of November. But as that date approached, the government

announced that agencies should wait until after the new year. See Rebecca

Shabad, et. al, Biden administration won’t take action against unvaccinated

federal workers until next year, NBC News (Nov. 29, 2021).1 The court

1 Available at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-
administration-delay-enforcement-federal-worker-vaccine-mandate-until-next-
n1284963.
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understands that the disciplining of at least some non-compliant employees

is now imminent.

Before this case, the federal-worker mandate had already been

challenged in several courts across the country, including this one. See

Rodden v. Fauci, No. 3:21-CV-317, 2021 WL 5545234 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 27,

2021). Most of those challenges have fallen short due to procedural missteps

by the plaintiffs or a failure to show imminent harm. See, e.g., McCray v.

Biden, No. CV 21-2882 (RDM), 2021 WL 5823801, at *5–9 (D.D.C. Dec. 7,

2021) (denied because plaintiff tried to directly enjoin the President and did

not have a ripe claim).

This case was filed by Feds for Medical Freedom, Local 918, and

various individual plaintiffs on December 21. Dkt. 1. The next day, the

plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against both mandates. See

Dkt. 3. At a scheduling conference on January 4, the court announced it

would not consider preliminary relief on Executive Order No. 14042 while

the nationwide injunction was in effect. Dkt. 14, Hrg. Tr. 7:8–8:11. The court

then convened a telephonic oral argument on January 13, shortly before the

Supreme Court ruled on the OSHA and healthcare-worker mandates. See

Dkt. 31. At that hearing, both sides agreed that the soonest any plaintiff might

face discipline would be January 21. Dkt. 31, Hrg. Tr. 4:11–5:5.

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Jurisdiction

The government2 mounts two challenges to the court’s jurisdiction:

that the Civil Service Reform Act precludes review and that the plaintiffs’

claims are not ripe.

1. Civil Service Reform Act

“Under the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et

seq., certain federal employees may obtain administrative and judicial review

of specified adverse employment actions.” Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567

U.S. 1, 5 (2012). The government maintains that the CSRA, by providing an

exclusive means of relief, precludes the plaintiffs’ claims in this case. Dkt. 21

at 8–12. Specifically, the government argues that by challenging the vaccine

mandate, the plaintiffs are disputing a “significant change in duties,

responsibilities, or working conditions,” which is an issue exclusively within

the province of the CSRA. Id. at 11 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii)).

Unfortunately, the CSRA does not define “working conditions.” But the

interpretation that courts have given that term would not encompass a

requirement that employees subject themselves to an unwanted vaccination.

Rather, “these courts have determined that the term ‘working conditions’

2Throughout this memorandum opinion, the court will refer to all the
defendants, collectively, as “the government.”
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generally refers to the daily, concrete parameters of a job, for example, hours,

discrete assignments, and the provision of necessary equipment and

resources.” Turner v. U.S. Agency for Glob. Media, 502 F. Supp. 3d 333, 367

(D.D.C. 2020).

The government also argues that the CSRA applies “to hypothetical

removals or suspensions.” Dkt. 21 at 11 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7512). But, contrary

to the government’s suggestion, the statute says nothing about

“hypothetical” adverse employment actions. See 5 U.S.C. § 7512. Rather, it

applies to actual discipline, whether that be firings, suspensions, reductions

in pay, or furloughs. See id. Indeed, neither the Merit Systems Protection

Board (the administrative body charged with implementing the CSRA) nor

the Federal Circuit (which hears CSRA appeals) has jurisdiction until there

is an actual adverse employment action.3 Esparraguera v. Dep't of the Army,

981 F.3d 1328, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

3 The government relies on two Fifth Circuit cases as support for its
contention that the CSRA applies to the plaintiffs’ claims in this case. But in both
of those cases, unlike this one, the plaintiffs had already suffered an adverse
employment action and were not seeking prospective relief. See Rollins v. Marsh,
937 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1991); Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 980–81 (5th
Cir. 1982). Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has held repeatedly that pre-enforcement
challenges to government-wide policies—such as the mandates at issue here—do
not fall within the scheme of the CSRA. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v.
Devine, 733 F.2d 114, 117 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (allowing “preenforcement judicial
review of rules” over CSRA objections); Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Weinberger,
818 F.2d, 935, 940 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing the right of federal employees
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Finally, central to the Supreme Court’s holding in Elgin was the idea

that employees must be afforded, whether under the CSRA or otherwise,

“meaningful review” of the discipline they endure. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 10. But

requiring the plaintiffs to wait to be fired to challenge the mandate would

compel them to “to bet the farm by taking the violative action before testing

the validity of the law.” Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.

477, 490 (2010) (cleaned up). As the Fifth Circuit has held, the choice

between one’s “job(s) and their jab(s)” is an irreparable injury. BST

Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17 F.4th 604, 618 (5th Cir. 2021). To deny the

plaintiffs the ability to challenge the mandate pre-enforcement, in district

court, is to deny them meaningful review. The CSRA does not deprive the

court of jurisdiction over these claims.

2. Ripeness

The government also argues that the court lacks jurisdiction because

none of the plaintiffs’ claims are ripe. See Dkt. 21 at 12–14. Some of the

plaintiffs’ claims—those who have asserted a religious or medical exemption

from the mandate—are indeed at least arguably unripe. See Rodden, 2021

to seek injunctive relief through the courts where agencies cannot act); Nat'l
Treasury Emps. Union v. Horner, 854 F.2d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (allowing
judicial review for employees who did not have access to the Merit Systems
Protection Board).

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WL 5545234, at *2 (the claims of plaintiffs whose exemption claims remain

unresolved are as yet “too speculative”).4 But the government insists that

even plaintiffs who have not claimed exemptions do not have ripe claims

because “federal employees have ample opportunities to contest any

proposed suspension or removal from employment through a multi-step

administrative process.” Dkt. 21 at 13.

The government pushes the ripeness doctrine too far. Absent a valid

exemption request, at least some plaintiffs face an inevitable firing. See, e.g.,

Dkt. 35, Exhibit 39 at 4 (federal employer claiming that employee’s failure to

provide evidence that he is fully vaccinated “will not be tolerated”). The court

does not have to speculate as to what the outcome of the administrative

process will be. Many plaintiffs have not only declined to assert any

exemption but have also submitted affidavits swearing they will not. The

court takes them at their word. Many of these plaintiffs already have received

letters from their employer agencies suggesting that suspension or

termination is imminent, have received letters of reprimand, or have faced

4 There is some dispute as to whether some plaintiffs who have asked for an

exemption are in danger of being disciplined even while their exemption requests
are still pending. Though in Rodden this court ruled that plaintiffs who had
claimed exemptions did not yet face imminent harm, that ruling was based largely
on the specific representations of the agencies for which those plaintiffs worked
that there would be no discipline before the exemption claims were resolved. But
because there are plaintiffs here who have not claimed exemptions, the court need
not sort out that dispute.
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other negative consequences. Dkt. 3, Exhibits 15–18, 20), 26–27. To be ripe,

the threat a plaintiff faces must be “actual and imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.” Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009). And

in the context of preliminary relief, “a plaintiff must show that irreparable

injury is not just possible, but likely.” June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140

S. Ct. 2103, 2176 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Because at least some of

the plaintiffs have met that burden, the government’s ripeness allegations

are unfounded. The court has jurisdiction.

III

Injunctive Relief

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be

awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). “A plaintiff

seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed

on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an

injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20.

1. Threat of irreparable injury

Because injunctive relief is an extraordinary tool to be wielded

sparingly, the court should be convinced the plaintiffs face irreparable harm

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before awarding it. See Booth v. Galveston Cnty, No. 3:18-CV-00104, 2019

WL 3714455, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2019), R&R adopted as modified, 2019

WL 4305457 (Sept. 11, 2019). The court is so convinced.

As noted above, the Fifth Circuit has already determined that the

Hobson’s choice employees face between “their job(s) and their jab(s)”

amounts to irreparable harm. OSHA, 17 F.4th at 618. Regardless of what the

conventional wisdom may be concerning vaccination, no legal remedy

adequately protects the liberty interests of employees who must choose

between violating a mandate of doubtful validity or consenting to an

unwanted medical procedure that cannot be undone.

The Fifth Circuit has also held that the reputational injury and lost

wages employees experience when they lose their jobs “do not necessarily

constitute irreparable harm.” Burgess v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 871 F.3d

297, 304 (5th Cir. 2017). But when an unlawful order bars those employees

from significant employment opportunities in their chosen profession, the

harm becomes irreparable. Id.

The plaintiffs have shown that in the absence of preliminary relief, they

are likely to suffer irreparable harm.

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2. Likelihood of success on the merits

The court does not decide today the ultimate issue of whether the

federal-worker mandate is lawful. But to issue a preliminary injunction, it

must address whether the claim is likely to succeed on the merits. The

plaintiffs’ arguments fall into two categories: (1) that the President’s action

was ultra vires as there is no statute authorizing him to issue the mandate

and the inherent authority he enjoys under Article II is not sufficient, and (2)

that the agencies’ implementation of his order violates the Administrative

Procedures Act (APA).5 Each argument will be addressed in turn.

a. Ultra vires

• Statutory authority

The government points to three statutory sources for the President’s

authority to issue the federal-worker mandate: 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3302, and

5 The government maintains that the plaintiffs cannot challenge the
mandate as ultra vires, leaving the APA as their only vehicle to attack it. An action
is not ultra vires, the government argues, unless the President “acts ‘without any
authority whatever.’” Dkt. 21 at 25 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 n.11 (1984) (cleaned up)). “Because the ‘business’
of the ‘sovereign’ certainly encompasses issuing [this] kind of directive,” the
government contends, there is no room for ultra vires review. Dkt. 21 at 25–26.
But the government’s argument misinterprets the law concerning judicial review
of presidential action: executive orders are reviewable outside of the APA. See
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 828 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“[r]eview of the legality of Presidential action can ordinarily be obtained in a suit
seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President's directive”);
see also Halderman, 465 U.S. at 101 n.11 (“[A]n ultra vires claim rests on the
officer’s lack of delegated power.”) (citation omitted).
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7301. None of them, however, does the trick.

Section 3301, by its own terms, applies only to “applicants” seeking

“admission . . . into the civil service.” 5 U.S.C. § 3301. The statutory text

makes no reference to current federal employees (like the plaintiffs). And

other courts have already held that whatever authority the provision does

provide is not expansive enough to include a vaccine mandate. See, e.g.,

Georgia, 2021 WL 5779939, at *10; Kentucky v. Biden, No. 3:21-CV-55, 2021

WL 5587446, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2021), aff’d, No. 21-6147, 2022 WL

43178 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2022).

Section 3302 provides that the “President may prescribe rules

governing the competitive service.” 5 U.S.C. § 3302. That language sounds

broad until one reads the next sentence: “The rules shall provide, as nearly

as conditions of good administration warrant, for . . . (1) necessary exceptions

of positions from the competitive service; and (2) necessary exceptions from

the provisions of sections 2951, 3304(a), 3321, 7202, and 7203 of this title.”

Id. When the cross-referenced provisions are checked, it becomes evident

that the “rules” the President may prescribe under § 3302 are quite limited.

For example, he may exempt certain employees from civil-service rules and

from certain reports and examinations, and he may prohibit marital and

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disability discrimination within the civil service. But not even a generous

reading of the text provides authority for a vaccine mandate.

The final statutory authority on which the government relies is § 7301,

which provides in its entirety: “The President may prescribe regulations for

the conduct of employees in the executive branch.” 5 U.S.C. § 7301.

According to the government, “the act of becoming vaccinated” is “plainly

‘conduct’” within the meaning of the statute. Dkt. 21 at 27.

But the plaintiffs argue that rather than regulate “conduct,” the federal-

worker mandate compels employees to assume a vaccinated “status,” and

“one that is untethered to job requirements, no less.” Dkt. 3 at 12. Moreover,

the plaintiffs contend, even if becoming vaccinated is “conduct,” it is not

“workplace conduct,” which is all that § 7301 reasonably authorizes the

President to regulate. Dkt. 23 at 12.

Assuming that getting vaccinated is indeed “conduct,” the court agrees

with the plaintiffs that under § 7301, it must be workplace conduct before

the President may regulate it. Any broader reading would allow the President

to prescribe, or proscribe, certain private behaviors by civilian federal

workers outside the context of their employment. Neither the plain language

of § 7301 nor any traditional notion of personal liberty would tolerate such a

sweeping grant of power.

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So, is submitting to a COVID-19 vaccine, particularly when required as

a condition of one’s employment, workplace conduct? The answer to this

question became a lot clearer after the Supreme Court’s ruling in NFIB

earlier this month. There, the Court held that the Occupational Safety and

Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 15 et seq., allows OSHA “to set workplace

safety standards,” but “not broad public health measures.” NFIB, 595 U.S.

___ slip op. at 6. Similarly, as noted above, § 7301 authorizes the President

to regulate the workplace conduct of executive-branch employees, but not

their conduct in general. See 5 U.S.C. § 7301. And in NFIB, the Supreme

Court specifically held that COVID-19 is not a workplace risk, but rather a

“universal risk” that is “no different from the day-to-day dangers that all face

from crime, air pollution, or any number of communicable diseases.” NFIB,

595 U.S. ___ slip op. at 6. Accordingly, the Court held, requiring employees

to get vaccinated against COVID-19 is outside OSHA’s ambit. Id. Applying

that same logic to the President’s authority under § 7301 means he cannot

require civilian federal employees to submit to the vaccine as a condition of

employment.

The President certainly possesses “broad statutory authority to

regulate executive branch employment policies.” Serv. Emps. Int'l Union

Loc. 200 United v. Trump, 419 F. Supp. 3d 612, 621 (W.D.N.Y. 2019), aff'd,

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975 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020). But the Supreme Court has expressly held that

a COVID-19 vaccine mandate is not an employment regulation. And that

means the President was without statutory authority to issue the federal-

worker mandate.

• Constitutional authority

Though the government argues §§ 3301, 3302, and 7301 evince the

authority the President wields to regulate the federal workforce, it also

contends that statutory authorization is wholly unnecessary. Dkt. 21 at 26–

27. Article II, the government maintains, gives the President all the power he

needs. Id. But the government points to no example of a previous chief

executive invoking the power to impose medical procedures on civilian

federal employees. As Chief Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit has noted, no

arm of the federal government has ever asserted such power. See In re MCP

No. 165, OSHA Interim Final Rule: COVID-19 Vaccination & Testing, 20

F.4th 264, 289 (6th Cir. 2021) (Sutton, C.J., dissenting from denial of initial

rehearing en banc) (“A ‘lack of historical precedent’ tends to be the most

‘telling indication’ that no authority exists.”).

The government relies on Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.

Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), but that case concerns

certain “Officers of the United States who exercise significant authority

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pursuant to the laws of the United States,” not federal employees in general.

Id. at 486 (cleaned up). Moreover, the Free Enterprise Fund Court itself

acknowledges that the power Article II gives the President over federal

officials “is not without limit.” Id. at 483.

And what is that limit? As the court has already noted, Congress

appears in § 7301 to have limited the President’s authority in this field to

workplace conduct. But if the court is wrong and the President indeed has

authority over the conduct of civilian federal employees in general—in or out

of the workplace—“what is the logical stopping point of that power?”

Kentucky v. Biden, No. 21-6147, 2022 WL 43178, at *15 (6th Cir. Jan. 5,

2022). Is it a “de facto police power”? Id. The government has offered no

answer—no limiting principle to the reach of the power they insist the

President enjoys. For its part, this court will say only this: however extensive

that power is, the federal-worker mandate exceeds it.

b. APA review

The plaintiffs argue that even if the President had the authority to issue

the federal-worker mandate, the agencies have violated the APA by

arbitrarily and capriciously implementing it. Dkt. 3 at 16–25. While the court

need not reach this question, as it has already determined the federal-worker

mandate exceeds the President’s authority, the government correctly argues

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that, if the President had authority to issue this order, this case seems to

present no reviewable agency action under the APA. The Supreme Court held

in Franklin v. Massachusetts that executive orders are not reviewable under

the APA. 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992). But the plaintiffs seem to argue that

Franklin no longer applies once an agency implements an executive order—

the order itself is then vulnerable to review. That is not the law. To hold

otherwise would contravene the thrust of the Supreme Court’s holding in

Franklin by subjecting almost every executive order to APA review.

The plaintiffs are right to argue that agency denials of religious or

medical exemptions, additional vaccination requirements by agencies apart

from the federal-worker mandate, or other discretionary additions to the

executive order would likely be reviewable under the APA’s arbitrary-and-

capricious standard. But the plaintiffs have not challenged any discretionary

agency action—only the implementation of the federal-worker mandate

itself.6 Accordingly, there is nothing for the court to review under the APA.

6 The court is convinced that the best reading of the APA in light of Franklin

is to allow APA review only when the challenged action is discretionary. See
William Powell, Policing Executive Teamwork: Rescuing the APA from
Presidential Administration, 85 MO. L. REV. 71, 121 (2020).

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3. Balance of equities and the public interest

Finally, the court weighs the plaintiffs’ interest against that of the

government and the public. When the government is the party against whom

an injunction is sought, the consideration of its interest and that of the public

merges. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

The government has an undeniable interest in protecting the public

against COVID-19. Through the federal-worker mandate, the President

hopes to slow the virus’s spread. But an overwhelming majority of the federal

workforce is already vaccinated. According to a White House press release,

even for the federal agency with the lowest vaccination rate, the portion of

employees who have received at least one COVID-19 vaccine dose exceeds 88

percent. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, Update on Implementation of COVID-19

Vaccination Requirement for Federal Employees (Dec. 9, 2021).7 The

government has not shown that an injunction in this case will have any

serious detrimental effect on its fight to stop COVID-19. Moreover, any harm

to the public interest by allowing federal employees to remain unvaccinated

must be balanced against the harm sure to come by terminating

unvaccinated workers who provide vital services to the nation.

7 Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/briefing-room/2021/12/

09/update-on-implementation-of-covid-%e2%81%a019-vaccination-requirement
-for-federal-employees/.
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While vaccines are undoubtedly the best way to avoid serious illness

from COVID-19, there is no reason to believe that the public interest cannot

be served via less restrictive measures than the mandate, such as masking,

social distancing, or part- or full-time remote work. The plaintiffs note,

interestingly, that even full-time remote federal workers are not exempt from

the mandate. Stopping the spread of COVID-19 will not be achieved by

overbroad policies like the federal-worker mandate.

Additionally, as the Fifth Circuit has observed, “[t]he public interest is

also served by maintaining our constitutional structure and maintaining the

liberty of individuals to make intensely personal decisions according to their

own convictions.” OSHA, 17 F.4th at 618. The court added that the

government has no legitimate interest in enforcing “an unlawful” mandate.

Id. All in all, this court has determined that the balance of the equities tips in

the plaintiffs’ favor, and that enjoining the federal-worker mandate is in the

public interest.

Scope

The court is cognizant of the “equitable and constitutional questions

raised by the rise of nationwide injunctions.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New

York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 601 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Trump

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v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2393, 2428–29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). But it

does not seem that tailoring relief is practical in this case. The lead plaintiff,

Feds for Medical Freedom, has more than 6,000 members spread across

every state and in nearly every federal agency, and is actively adding new

members. The court fears that “limiting the relief to only those before [it]

would prove unwieldy and would only cause more confusion.” Georgia, 2021

WL 5779939, at *12. So, “on the unique facts before it,” the court believes the

best course is “to issue an injunction with nationwide applicability.” Id.

* * *
The court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction. Dkt. 3. The motion is DENIED as to

Executive Order 14042, as that order is already subject to a nationwide

injunction. The motion is GRANTED as to Executive Order 14043. All the

defendants, except the President, are thus enjoined from implementing or

enforcing Executive Order 14043 until this case is resolved on the merits.

The plaintiffs need not post a bond.

Signed on Galveston Island this 21st day of January, 2022

___________________________
JEFFREY VINCENT BROWN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

20/20

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