COVID-19: State Should Strengthen Policies to Better Maintain Overseas Operations in Future Crises (GAO, March 2022)

Summary

GAO-22-104519, a Government Accountability Office report to congressional addressees dated March 2022, titled COVID-19: State Should Strengthen Policies to Better Maintain Overseas Operations in Future Crises. GAO found that the Department of State made key decisions for overseas posts during the pandemic but did not communicate them to other overseas agencies before they went into effect, and that its new global evacuation policy created confusion for staff on timelines, allowances and conditions for returning to post. State used COVID-19 relief funds to provide equipment and better network access for telework but does not track telework at overseas posts. GAO is making six recommendations to State; State agreed with five and partially agreed with one.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Issuer: Government Accountability Office
Document type: Report
Date: 2021-10-01

Cite this document

“COVID-19: State Should Strengthen Policies to Better Maintain Overseas Operations in Future Crises (GAO, March 2022).” Government Accountability Office, dated 2021-10-01. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/source-documents/2021-10-01-gao-22-104519-covid-19-state-should-strengthen-policies-to-better-maintain-over/, SHA-256 24b9c8f2e4c6e5f279814f342053d6776858587d19591f2c1ce893f67f36fdf3.

Full text

United States Government Accountability Office
Report to Congressional Addressees

COVID-19
March 2022

State Should
Strengthen Policies to
Better Maintain
Overseas Operations
in Future Crises

GAO-22-104519
March 2022

COVID-19
State Should Strengthen Policies to Better Maintain
Overseas Operations in Future Crises
Highlights of GAO-22-104519, a report to
congressional addressees

Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found
The U.S. government has over The Department of State made key decisions for overseas posts (e.g., U.S.
22,000 U.S. staff working in more embassies and consulates) during the COVID-19 pandemic, as shown in the
than 290 overseas posts. State figure below, but did not communicate them to other overseas agencies before
made operational adjustments in an they went into effect. State created a new global evacuation policy with
effort to balance overseas staff’s flexibilities that were different from the pre-existing policies for post-specific
health with the pursuit of diplomacy evacuations, which created confusion for staff on timelines, allowances, and
during the COVID-19 pandemic. conditions for returning to post. According to federal internal control standards,
policies should be documented in the appropriate level of detail. However, State
The CARES Act includes a provision
has not yet established an evacuation policy that could be used for future crises
for GAO to report on its ongoing
affecting multiple posts. In addition, State’s decisions for posts affected all U.S.
oversight efforts related to COVID-
government staff overseas but State did not communicate these key decisions,
19. In addition, GAO was asked to
and related policies, to other overseas agencies before announcing them to all
examine State’s overseas
staff. As a result, other overseas agencies had to develop guidance for their staff
operational response to COVID-19.
to follow after State’s public announcements.
This report examines, among other
things, actions State took to respond Timeline of State’s Key Decisions during the COVID-19 Pandemic
to COVID-19 and how it
communicated them to overseas
employees, posts’ operational
adjustments and the effect on
operations, and lessons learned
identified by State.
GAO reviewed relevant State
documents, including agency
guidance and post-level reporting,
and interviewed State and other U.S.
agency officials. GAO also met with
four selected overseas posts based Evacuations of key personnel and public health restrictions reduced some
on various factors, such as operations at posts, but information technology improvements and other
geographic location and proportion of adjustments largely allowed staff to continue to work. Nevertheless, some posts
U.S. overseas staff evacuated. reported they did not have sufficient information to help them determine which
staff should remain overseas and which could be evacuated. Posts implemented
What GAO Recommends a maximum telework policy and State used COVID-19 relief funds to provide
equipment and better network access. Federal internal control standards state
GAO is making six recommendations that agencies should use quality information to make decisions. However, State
to State, including that it review its does not track telework at overseas posts and, as a result, does not have the
evacuation policies, maintain timely information needed to inform future decisions about its use overseas.
communication with other agencies
present overseas, develop a plan to State has identified lessons learned on telework and communication but does not
track overseas telework, and develop have a procedure for ensuring their collection from posts. According to State’s
a procedure to ensure collection of guidance, lessons learned are required to be gathered and preserved after
lessons learned. State agreed with critical operational events. Individual posts reported lessons learned on
five of the recommendations and communication, including the utility of informal communication between staff, but
partially agreed with one. not all posts submitted required lessons learned. State does not have a
procedure to ensure the collection of lessons learned from posts—a significant
View GAO-22-104519. For more information, component of improving its future crisis response.
contact Jason Bair at (202) 512-6881 or
bairj@gao.gov.

United States Government Accountability Office
Contents

Letter 1
Background 3
Opportunities Exist for State to Strengthen Its Evacuation Policies
and Communication with Other Overseas Agencies 8
Despite Loss of Key Personnel and Public Health Restrictions,
Telework and Other Adjustments Helped Overseas Staff
Continue to Work 19
Overseas Staff Experienced Some Challenges Teleworking, but
State Considers Telework an Operational Success 31
Posts Used State’s Decision Framework to Evaluate Local
Conditions and Return Staff to Posts Amidst Challenges 34
State Has Identified Lessons Learned but Lacks a Procedure to
Ensure Their Submission 38
Conclusions 41
Recommendations for Executive Action 42
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 43

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 47

Appendix II Department of State Use of COVID-19 Relief Funds for Operational
Adjustments 50

Appendix III Comments from the Department of State 52

Appendix IV Comments from the U.S. Agency for International Development 56

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 58

Tables
Table 1: Posts from Which 60 Percent or More of Overseas Staff
Evacuated during Calendar Year 2020 20
Table 2: State’s Use of COVID-19 Relief Funds for Operational
Adjustments, as of October 1, 2021 50

Page i GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Figures
Figure 1: Overseas Staff by Region 4
Figure 2: Organization of a “Typical” Overseas Post 5
Figure 3: Number of Evacuated Overseas Staff, by Region,
January 2020–December 2020 11
Figure 4: Countries with Post-Specific Evacuations, January
2020–December 2020 12
Figure 5: Countries by Phase of State’s Diplomacy Strong
Framework, as of December 2020 19
Figure 6: Percentage of Overseas Staff in Each Region Who
Evacuated during Calendar Year 2020 21
Figure 7: Examples of Pandemic Response Measures inside the
Department of State’s Overseas Posts 25
Figure 8: Damage to Post Housing in Kenya from a Water Leak 27
Figure 9: State’s Process for Collecting Required Lessons
Learned from Overseas Posts 41

Page ii GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Abbreviations

CGRCU Coronavirus Global Response Coordination Unit
CIR COVID-19 Interim Review
CMS Office of Crisis Management and Strategy
COM Chief of Mission
EAC Emergency Action Committee
EAP Emergency Action Plan
FAH Foreign Affairs Handbooks
FAM Foreign Affairs Manual
IRM Bureau of Information Resource Management
LE staff Locally Employed staff
MED Bureau of Medical Services
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OPM Office of Personnel Management
OPMED Directorate of Operational Medicine
State Department of State
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the
United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety
without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain
copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be
necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Page iii GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Letter

441 G St. N.W.
Washington, DC 20548

March 16, 2022

Congressional Addressees

The Department of State (State) leads the operation of more than 290
overseas posts, staffed by employees from various government
agencies. 1 In early 2020, as COVID-19 began to spread around the globe
and the World Health Organization declared a pandemic, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) issued guidance to federal agencies on ways in
which they could adjust their operations to minimize risks to employee
health while ensuring continuity of operations. 2 State made various
operational adjustments in an effort to balance the health of more than
22,000 overseas staff with the pursuit of U.S. diplomacy. 3

To support agencies’ response to COVID-19, among other things,
Congress passed six COVID-19 relief laws, including the CARES Act. 4
The CARES Act includes a provision for us to report on our ongoing
monitoring and oversight of federal efforts related to the COVID-19
pandemic. 5 In addition, you asked us to review State’s response to the
pandemic at its overseas posts. This report examines (1) actions State
leadership took in calendar year 2020 to respond to the global pandemic
and how it communicated these actions to overseas employees; (2) how
overseas posts adjusted their operations at the onset of the pandemic
and the extent to which these adjustments affected post operations; (3)

1State’s overseas posts consist of U.S. embassies, consulates, missions to international
organizations, and other diplomatic posts in foreign countries.
2See, for example, Office of Management and Budget, Updated Guidance on Telework
Flexibilities in Response to Coronavirus, M-20-13 (Mar. 12, 2020) and U.S. Office of
Personnel Management, Preliminary Guidance to U.S. Agencies during Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CPM 2020-04 (Mar. 3, 2020).
3In this report, we are using “overseas staff” to refer to U.S. staff working overseas, which
includes U.S. direct hires and employed eligible family members. It also includes U.S. and
third country national Personal Services Contractors working for USAID. These data do
not include locally employed staff.
4CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).

5See Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 19010, 134 Stat. at 579–81. We regularly issue government-
wide reports on the federal response to COVID-19. For the latest report, see GAO,
COVID-19: Significant Improvements are Needed for Overseeing Relief Funds and
Leading Responses to Public Health Emergencies, GAO-22-105291 (Washington, D.C.:
January 27, 2022).

Page 1 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
how posts made operational decisions as the pandemic progressed and
challenges they faced in returning evacuated staff overseas; and (4)
lessons learned that State has identified regarding adjustments to
overseas operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the extent to
which State collected them.

To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant State documents,
such as policy and procedures in its Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and
Foreign Affairs Handbooks (FAH) pertaining to post operations and
emergency preparedness, cables documenting department-wide
operational decisions, and the Diplomacy Strong Framework. We also
reviewed State data on post evacuations from January 2020 through
December 2020. We interviewed State officials about the data and
performed electronic testing to ensure consistency. We found the data to
be sufficiently reliable to describe the proportion of overseas staff who
evacuated during 2020.

To assess operational adjustments and decisions at overseas posts, we
conducted interviews with a variety of officials in Washington, D.C., and at
selected overseas posts. We interviewed officials in State offices and
bureaus in Washington, D.C., that played a role supporting overseas
posts during the pandemic, including officials in each of State’s six
geographic regional bureaus. We also met with officials from the
American Foreign Service Association and members of various State
employee groups, to discuss their experiences with operational
adjustments. Additionally, we interviewed officials at the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) to obtain their perspectives as
another agency with a significant presence at overseas posts. Lastly, we
interviewed officials at four selected overseas posts— Azerbaijan,
Barbados, Mongolia, and Kenya—to obtain their perspectives on their
posts’ operational adjustments. We selected these posts because of the
diversity of their geographic locations and varying proportion of U.S. staff
evacuated from them, among other factors.

To identify challenges and lessons learned from the pandemic and steps
State is taking to address them in the future, we conducted a content
analysis of lessons learned documents that overseas posts submitted to
State regarding their evacuation or COVID-19 experiences. We also
reviewed a subset of completed questionnaires and the final report
resulting from State’s COVID-19 Interim Review (CIR)—the department’s

Page 2 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
internal lessons learned exercise. 6 We interviewed State officials to
understand what steps they planned to take to address the identified
lessons learned. Appendix I provides additional details of our scope and
methodology.

We conducted this performance audit from September 2020 to March
2022 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to
obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background
Composition and Chief of Mission. The presence of U.S. government agencies within
Organization of U.S. overseas posts is collectively referred to as “missions,” and the Chief of
Mission (COM) is the principal officer in charge. The COM—an
Overseas Posts
ambassador or chargé d’affaires who acts as the official spokesperson to
the foreign government—determines the structure of the posts within the
country, and has responsibility for the direction, coordination, and
supervision of all U.S. government executive branch employees in that
country. 7 This responsibility is referred to as COM security responsibility
and authority.

U.S. footprint abroad. The United States has more than 22,000
overseas staff at more than 290 posts in 173 countries. These staff are
spread across State’s six geographic regions, as shown in figure 1. 8 The

6Department of State, Lessons Learned from the Department of State’s Response to the
COVID-19 Pandemic: December 2019-December 2020 (Washington, D.C.: June 2021).
7The COM acts under the direction of the President. The COM does not have authority
over Voice of America correspondents on official assignment, executive branch
employees officially on the staff of an international organization and performing the
functions of that organization, or employees under the command of a U.S. military
Geographic Combatant Commander. See 2 FAH-2 H-112.1 Chief of Mission Authority and
22 U.S.C. § 3927.
8Data are from State and represent filled positions for U.S. direct hires and employed
eligible family members, as of December 2020. In this report, we are using “overseas
staff” to refer to U.S. staff working overseas, which includes U.S. direct hires and
employed eligible family members. It also includes U.S. and third country national
Personal Services Contractors working for USAID. These data do not include locally
employed staff.

Page 3 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
majority of these personnel—about 15,000—work for State,
approximately 3,000 work for the Department of Defense in defense
attaché offices or in other capacities, 1,600 work for USAID, and 1,000
work for the Department of Homeland Security. At least 20 other U.S.
government agencies have smaller numbers of personnel at these posts,
including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and Health
and Human Services.

Figure 1: Overseas Staff by Region

Note: Data are from State and represent filled positions for U.S. direct hires and employed eligible
family members, as of December 2020. In this report, we are using “overseas staff” to refer to U.S.
staff working overseas, which includes U.S. direct hires and employed eligible family members. It also
includes U.S. and third country national Personal Services Contractors working for the U.S. Agency
for International Development. These data do not include locally employed staff. Regions represent
State regional geographic bureaus.

Post staff and organization. The staff at overseas posts include U.S.
direct hires, employed eligible family members, Locally Employed (LE)
staff, and various types of contractors. Embassies are the largest
category of overseas posts. As shown in figure 2, their organization can
generally be divided into two categories—sections that are “internal-
facing,” supporting the operational aspects of the post; and those that are
“external-facing,” supporting the diplomatic, consular, and other external
functions.

Page 4 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Figure 2: Organization of a “Typical” Overseas Post

Emergency Preparation The COM and the Emergency Action Committee (EAC), a group that
and Response at generally includes subject matter experts designated by the COM with
representation from all sections and leadership of other U.S. agencies at
Overseas Posts
post, work together to prepare for and respond to emergencies at
overseas posts. The EAC meets periodically, or as situationally required,
to prepare for and assess risks to the health, safety, and security of the
post. The EAC is responsible for drafting and updating the post’s
Emergency Action Plan (EAP), a document that provides procedures and
responses to a range of foreseeable contingencies, including post-
specific planning considerations meant to help EACs identify potential
risks to health, safety, or security. State’s guidance requires EACs to
prepare the EAP and specifies certain EAP components that are
mandatory for inclusion. According to State guidance, posts must conduct
a comprehensive review of their EAP annually, which is to include
updating any out-of-date information and certifying that all other
information is still current. State’s guidance also contains emergency

Page 5 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
planning information for posts on a variety of scenarios including, among
other things, natural disasters, bombings, hijackings, and political unrest. 9

In response to an emergency, EACs may decide to recommend to the
COM an evacuation of staff, and the COM in turn can request
authorization from the Under Secretary for Management. 10 Prior to the
pandemic, State guidance provided for two types of evacuations of an
overseas post, depending on the circumstances: authorized departure,
which allows eligible employees and family members to apply to depart
post, and ordered departure, in which eligible family members or certain
employees are required to depart. Staff under these types of evacuations
are eligible to receive monetary allowances that cover lodging, meals,
and incidental expenses while they are away from their overseas post.

Headquarters Support for Overseas posts receive ongoing and emergency situational support from
Overseas Posts a variety of bureaus and offices at State headquarters in Washington,
D.C.

Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM). IRM provides
information technology and services to State employees and manages
Information Management Officers at posts.

Bureau of Medical Services (MED). MED provides healthcare to U.S.
government employees and their families assigned to overseas posts.
The bureau’s Directorate of Operational Medicine (OPMED) executes
State’s operational medicine program, which includes planning and
executing medical contingency plans.

Office of Crisis Management and Strategy (CMS). CMS, in the
Executive Secretariat’s Operations Center, coordinates crisis response
across the department and with other federal agencies. CMS is
responsible for coordinating department-wide crisis preparedness and
response activities, including monitoring potential crises, coordinating
some evacuations, convening and supporting task forces, and collecting
lessons learned after crises have concluded.

9When personnel at overseas posts have a health emergency that the local health system
is not equipped to handle, they can be flown out of the country to receive medical attention
(medical evacuation, or “medevac”). The planned route for medevac is one aspect of
overseas posts’ emergency planning and preparation.
10COMs may initiate an evacuation under their own authority if necessary to protect the
lives of U.S. citizens, according to State guidance.

Page 6 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Regional geographic bureaus. State has six regional geographic
bureaus whose personnel guide the policy direction and operation of the
overseas posts within their regional jurisdiction, including providing
support and information during crises. These bureaus include African
Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs,
Near Eastern Affairs, South and Central Asian Affairs, and Western
Hemisphere Affairs.

State Guidance on Just prior to the onset of the pandemic, State announced guidance on
Telework Overseas Prior telework at overseas posts. 11 According to the guidance:
to the Pandemic
• Posts that want to approve telework for State employees overseas
must establish a post telework policy, and the decision to establish the
policy falls to the COM.
• Once a post telework policy is in place, post management has the
authority to approve telework arrangements for State employees in
accordance with post policy and on a case-by-case basis.
• Posts may include LE staff in the telework policy after a review of local
labor law, the Local Compensations Plan, and consultations with
human resources/overseas employment.
• Post telework policies should be implemented in consultation with the
regional bureau executive office.
State’s Foreign Affairs Manual outlines State’s policy on telework,
including special considerations for telework abroad. These
considerations include security, inviolability of employees’ personal
residences (or lack thereof), and location of personal residences. 12

State’s COVID-19 Interim State leadership initiated the COVID-19 Interim Review (CIR) in fall 2020
Review to capture lessons learned over the first year of the crisis, identify problem
areas and best practices, and recommend changes to improve its
response to the current pandemic and future crises. According to State,
the CIR surveyed State employees, analyzed lessons learned cables,
conducted focus groups with selected overseas posts and domestic
bureaus, and sent questionnaires to other selected posts. In June 2021,
State completed a report detailing its findings, focused on State’s
response in four broad areas: crisis planning and response coordination,

11Department of State, Overseas Telework Policy for Department of State Employees, 19
STATE 126438 (Dec. 4, 2019).
12See 3 FAM 2360, and in particular, 3 FAM 2362.3.

Page 7 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
workforce management and safety, supporting U.S. citizens, and
advancing U.S. foreign policy.

State evacuated overseas staff in 2020 using post-specific policies and a
Opportunities Exist newly created global evacuation policy for COVID-19 that allowed staff to
for State to evacuate from any post. Since ending the global evacuation in December
2020, State has not updated its policies to include an evacuation policy
Strengthen Its that applies to more than one post and has not reviewed the preexisting
Evacuation Policies evacuation policies to identify flexibilities that could better prepare State
for future crises. State created a pandemic response group, but this group
and Communication did not communicate key decisions—such as the global evacuation
with Other Overseas policy—to other overseas agencies before they went into effect. State
also created a conditions-based, location-specific decision-making
Agencies framework to minimize the risk of COVID-19 to its workforce and help
posts make operational decisions.

State Evacuated Overseas
Staff Using New and
Existing Policies with
Differing Guidance

State Created a Global During 2020, State evacuated overseas staff using existing post-specific
Evacuation Policy for Overseas evacuation policies as well as a global evacuation policy created to
Staff during COVID-19 but Has respond to COVID-19. Wuhan, China, was the first post State evacuated,
Not Established a Similar and a week later State announced evacuations for all other posts in
Policy for Future Crises China. From January 23, 2020, through March 13, 2020, State approved
Affecting Multiple Posts post-specific evacuations for 14 posts. 13

According to State, as global travel restrictions tightened and hospitals
became overwhelmed, it created a global evacuation policy, effective
March 14, 2020, to alleviate staff’s anxiety and ensure their safety. 14
Under the policy, the Secretary of State approved an evacuation from any
overseas post (global evacuation) for individuals who were at higher risk
of a poor outcome if exposed to COVID-19, or who requested evacuation

13For the purposes of this report, we are using “post-specific evacuation” to refer to an
authorized or ordered departure. The 14 post-specific evacuations were in Wuhan, China;
Beijing, China; Chengdu, China; Guangzhou, China; Shanghai, China; Shenyang, China;
Canberra, Australia; Hong Kong, Hong Kong; Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia; Milan, Italy; Baku,
Azerbaijan; Ashgabat, Turkmenistan; Kolonia, Micronesia; and Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
14Department of State, “Global Authorized Departure for Individuals at Higher Risk from
COVID-19,” MRN 20 State 28418 (Mar. 15, 2020).

Page 8 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
based on a commensurate justification in foreign areas. This policy
applied to all overseas staff of U.S. agencies under COM authority.

Timeline of the Department of State’s According to State officials, State created the global evacuation policy for
COVID-19 Response in 2020 COVID-19 because State did not have an evacuation policy that could be
applied across regions. Since ending the global evacuation, State has not
Jan. 23 State’s first ordered departure was at updated its policies to reflect the potential need to evacuate more than
its post in Wuhan, China one post in response to a future crisis. Standards for internal control in
Feb.13 State activated the Coronavirus the federal government call for management to document policies for an
Global Response Coordination Unit
Mar. 11 The World Health Organization
operational process’s objectives and related risks. 15 The policies should
declared COVID-19 a global be documented in the appropriate level of detail to allow management to
pandemic effectively monitor the control activity. 16
Mar. 14 State implemented the global
evacuation policy
May 1 State launched the Diplomacy Overseas officials explained that, on the basis of the new global
Strong Framework evacuation policy, they directed staff interested in the global evacuation to
Dec. 9 State ended the global evacuation have confidential consultations with their post’s Bureau of Medical
Source: State documents. | GAO-22-104519
Services (MED) representative. They also said that the guidance provided
flexibility for posts to approve evacuations of individuals who had a
commensurate justification. For example, officials in Barbados told us that
individuals participated in global evacuation because they were
concerned that the local medical system would be overwhelmed and that
it would be challenging to receive needed supplies on the island.

The global evacuation lasted a total of 270 days—from March 14, 2020,
through December 9, 2020. The Secretary initially approved the global
evacuation for 60 days but subsequently issued five extensions for
approximately 30 days each until his announcement on September 26,
2020, that the evacuation would end in December. Officials we
interviewed who participated in the global evacuation said that the
uncertainty and short time frame of these various extensions were
disruptive. For example, they said they did not know whether State would
continue to approve the global evacuation until a week before it was
about to expire every month. As a result, some noted that they could not
identify longer-term housing leases because they were not sure how long
the global evacuation was going to last. For example, some officials told
us that they had to move to different housing four to six times while on
global evacuation because of the uncertainty.

15GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, Principle 12.03,
GAO-14-704G (Washington, D.C.: September 2014).
16GAO-14-704G, 12.03: Documentation of Responsibilities through Policies.

Page 9 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
According to State’s CIR, uncertainty and anxiety grew among staff each
time the evacuation period was about to expire. The report stated that the
decisions to approve extensions were made at the last minute, leaving
little time to notify staff, and recommended that State develop a plan to
include timely decisions and notification of key dates and extensions to
better serve staff.

Although the global evacuation lasted 270 days, staff were only eligible to
participate and depart post within the first 54 days. As a result, overseas
staff in regions that experienced an increase in COVID-19 cases after the
54th day of the policy—during early May 2020—could not participate. For
example, officials in State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs said
that posts in the region experienced first and second waves of COVID-19
around May 2020 through September 2020, at which point officials could
not participate in the global evacuation. Other officials said that this
eligibility timeline created disparities among staff in different regions since
COVID-19 affected regions differently over time.

State acknowledged that it had abruptly announced the decision to end
eligibility for the global evacuation and that, as the epicenter of the
pandemic changed, some countries experienced rising case numbers
after May 2020, which limited the available options for staff in these posts.
In the CIR, State indicated that the global evacuation might have been
better implemented by using metrics to guide rolling regional or multi-
regional evacuations as COVID-19 spread. According to the report, these
types of data-informed evacuations could assist in determining when and
for how long a regional evacuation should be used. Establishing an
evacuation policy that applies to more than one post, such as the global
evacuation policy for COVID-19, could enhance State’s ability to identify
and develop policies before a future regional or global crisis.

Guidance for Evacuated Staff From January 2020 through December 2020, 20 percent of overseas staff
Varied Based on the across all U.S. agencies—almost 4,500 individuals—evacuated from their
Evacuation Policy They Used respective overseas posts under either the global evacuation policy or a
post-specific evacuation policy. Figure 3 shows the number of evacuated
staff from State’s six geographic regions during 2020.

Page 10 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Figure 3: Number of Evacuated Overseas Staff, by Region, January 2020–December 2020

Some of the staff evacuated as part of a post-specific evacuation. 17
Figure 4 highlights the countries these posts were in and identifies the
countries that had a post-specific evacuation before State implemented
the global evacuation. In addition to participating in a post-specific
evacuation, officials in these countries also had the opportunity to use the

17In addition to COVID-19, some posts were evacuated for other reasons, such as
security.

Page 11 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
global evacuation. As a result, some posts had to manage overseas staff
who were evacuated under more than one evacuation policy.

Figure 4: Countries with Post-Specific Evacuations, January 2020–December 2020

Standards for internal control in the federal government call for
management to periodically review policies or procedures for continued
relevance in achieving the agency’s objectives or addressing related
risks. 18 State created its global evacuation policy for COVID-19, which
contained efficiencies and flexibilities that do not exist in post-specific
evacuation policies, but has not reviewed the existing post-specific

18GAO-14-704G, Principle 12.05: Periodic Review of Control Activities.

Page 12 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
evacuation policies to determine whether they could be updated. For
example, unlike the post-specific evacuation policies, the global
evacuation policy did not establish an initial limit on the maximum length
of the evacuation and did not include requirements related to post status
at the end of the evacuation period. The global evacuation policy also
provided for an approach to calculating monetary allowances for overseas
staff evacuated through that policy that differed from the approach used
for staff evacuated under post-specific evacuation policies.

During our interviews and in our review of lessons learned cables,
officials emphasized that they had experienced some confusion given the
various evacuation policies. Examples include:

• Two evacuation policies in one post. In a lessons learned cable,
officials from Indonesia reported that they had staff evacuated under
both post-specific and global evacuation policies. They said that
having both of these policies in effect at the same time created
confusion related to timelines, allowances, and conditions for staff’s
return. Further, officials explained that other agencies at post
interpreted the evacuation policies differently, which resulted in
disparities for staff from varying agencies at post.
• Transition between policies. Officials we interviewed expressed
conflicting responses on whether staff could transition to the global
evacuation once their post-specific evacuation ended. While officials
in State’s Office of Management Strategy and Solutions told us that
they were not aware of any guidance that would enable staff to do so,
a State cable included allowance guidance for evacuees that
converted from a post-specific evacuation to the global evacuation. In
addition, some officials we spoke with stated that overseas posts
could not implement this transition, but officials from an overseas post
told us that they were able to transition staff from their post-specific
evacuation to the global evacuation.
• Length of evacuation policies. Some overseas posts that were on a
post-specific evacuation would have liked the option to either extend
their post-specific evacuation or have their evacuated staff transition
to the global evacuation. According to State guidance, post-specific
evacuations could be approved for an initial period, and could be
extended incrementally up to the maximum number of days provided
in the guidance. Under the guidance, if a return to post is not
authorized by the end of the maximum period provided for post-
specific evacuations, the post will convert to unaccompanied status

Page 13 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
unless otherwise determined. 19 The global evacuation policy,
however, did not establish a limit on the maximum length of the
evacuation, and State extended the length of the global evacuation
beyond the maximum period of time provided in guidance for post-
specific evacuations. Additionally, the global evacuation policy, unlike
the post-specific evacuation policies, did not include requirements
related to the status of the post at the end of the evacuation period.
• An Ambassador we met with said that his post was days away
from becoming an unaccompanied post when he made the difficult
decision to end its post-specific evacuation. The Ambassador also
noted that State had told him that staff on post-specific evacuation
could not transition to the global evacuation policy. He explained
that he wanted to avoid his post becoming an unaccompanied
post because that could affect continuity of operations and
significantly affect staff morale since staff would be required to
return without their family members. He added that some staff did
not return to post. The Ambassador said that when the country
experienced a military conflict around 2 months later, he and the
rest of the EAC decided not to request another post-specific
evacuation; instead, they implemented restrictions, such as
stopping travel for all staff.
• Allowance calculations. Another aspect of the global evacuation
policy that was different from post-specific evacuation policies was the
process used to calculate monetary allowances. State implemented a
more streamlined process for calculating allowances for staff on
global evacuation. According to State, it developed a simplified
methodology to calculate allowances because the established
process is a manual, labor-intensive process requiring various
interactions with evacuated staff and recalculations. State
implemented this change to simplify the process for the staff on global
evacuation requesting allowances, as well as for the staff processing
the allowances. However, State officials could only use the simplified
methodology for staff on global evacuation and continued using the
established manual and labor-intensive process for staff on a post-
specific evacuation.
Reviewing its new global evacuation policy for COVID-19 and existing
post-specific evacuation policies could help State identify efficiencies and

19According to 3 FAM 3772.2, the Under Secretary for Management is responsible for
designating unaccompanied posts, which are posts located in areas of imminent danger at
which family members are not authorized to reside. Unaccompanied post designations
may change from time to time to reflect changing circumstances.

Page 14 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
flexibilities that could be incorporated into its evacuation policies. In doing
so, State could be better prepared for future crises.

State Created a Pandemic State’s Executive Secretary established the Coronavirus Global
Response Group but Did Response Coordination Unit (CGRCU) to help manage and lead its
response in February 2020. According to State, officials formed the unit to
Not Communicate Key
bring together bureaus to ensure a coordinated response, and receive
Decisions to Other and disseminate information within State and other U.S. government
Overseas Agencies before agencies regarding those efforts.
They Went into Effect
Although the CGRCU was responsible for coordinating State’s
engagement with other U.S. government agencies, including agencies
with an overseas presence, State’s CIR noted that it provided limited
visibility about its decisions to overseas agencies. Standards for internal
control in the federal government call for management to externally
communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity’s
objective. 20 However, State made decisions that affected all U.S.
government staff overseas under COM authority, such as implementing
the global evacuation, but did not communicate these key decisions
before they went into effect. As a result, the leadership of other overseas
agencies, such as USAID, had to develop guidance for staff to follow after
State’s public announcements. In the CIR, State reported that it was
challenging to identify an appropriate structure and leadership for the
CGRCU, resulting in a disorganized and uncoordinated response. The
CIR recommended that State improve its crisis information distribution,
including to other government agencies, to better coordinate in a crisis.

USAID officials said that it would have been helpful if State had provided
them with an advance notice of the global evacuation policy for a variety
of reasons:

• Preparing travel logistics. USAID officials would have wanted more
time to prepare logistically for the evacuation of USAID staff. For
example, USAID had to prepare travel authorizations for all posts and
pay for the evacuation of its staff. USAID reported spending around
$32 million of its COVID-19 relief funds to pay for evacuations and
daily allowances for 700 staff and their families on evacuation.
• Clarifying guidance for USAID workforce. Because, according to
USAID, its COVID-19 task force was unable to establish ongoing
communications with State about key decisions, USAID could only

20GAO-14-704G, Principle 15: Communicate Externally.

Page 15 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
respond and establish guidance after State announced new policies
and guidance applicable to overseas staff. For example, the cable that
State released announcing the approval of the global evacuation
stated that USAID staff and family members should consult with
USAID for guidance regarding fiscal allowances. 21 The cable also
mentioned that contractors employed by the U.S. government,
including Personal Services Contractors (PSC), were not categorized
as staff for evacuation purposes. 22 USAID staff we interviewed said
that some had interpreted this guidance as meaning that PSCs were
not eligible for the global evacuation. However, USAID’s guidance
issued the next day clarified that USAID’s PSCs were eligible.
• Providing evacuation guidance to USAID workforce. Similarly,
State did not communicate with USAID before announcing the end of
the global evacuation. State announced time frames for the end of the
evacuation on September 26, 2020, stating that other U.S.
government personnel should follow their agency’s guidance following
the conclusion of the evacuation. 23 After reviewing State’s guidance,
USAID developed its guidance and shared it with its staff almost a
week later, on October 2, 2020. Receiving timely evacuation guidance
was critical because a delay of a couple of days could have been the
difference between being able to secure a flight for officials to return
to post and navigate countries’ COVID-19 restrictions.
In their lessons learned cable, U.S. officials in China reported that non-
State agencies had faced challenges communicating with State officials in
headquarters. The cable added that some procedures and policies were
not clearly communicated with the appropriate contact at non-State
agencies. For example, according to the cable, State did not
communicate its regulatory change that allowed for evacuees to select a
safe haven location other than Washington, D.C. State established an
internal process to change safe haven locations and communicated it to

21Department of State, “Global Authorized Departure for Individuals at Higher Risk from
COVID-19,” MRN 20 State 28418 (Mar. 15, 2020).
22USAID’s PSCs are non-direct hire U.S. and third country national citizens on contract for
the specific services of those individuals. PSCs represent a significant proportion of
USAID’s workforce. As we have previously reported, USAID uses personal services
contracts for a broad range of functions, such as program management, security analysis,
and logistics.
23Department of State, “Transition of Global Authorized Departure,” MRN 20 State 95682
(Sept. 26, 2020).

Page 16 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
State staff, but according to the cable, non-State agencies struggled to
establish a process.

U.S. officials in Indonesia also reported in their lessons learned cable that
non-State agencies had difficulty understanding State’s requirements and
regulations. Their cable stated that non-State agencies at post had
interpreted the evacuation policies differently, which resulted in disparities
for staff from varying agencies at post. As a result, their cable
recommended that State should ensure that non-State agencies
understand tracking requirements and State regulations. Maintaining
timely communications with overseas agencies during a crisis, such as by
establishing requirements for response groups to communicate with
overseas agencies, would enhance State’s ability to clarify new guidance
and policies to prevent confusion.

State Created a Decision In April 2020, OMB and OPM issued a memorandum that broadly
Framework to Help Posts described a phased process for federal agency leaders to use when
making decisions about resuming workforce operations. 24 In response, in
Respond to COVID-19
May 2020 State published the Diplomacy Strong Framework and
described it as a conditions-based, location-specific decision-making
framework to minimize the risk of COVID-19 to its workforce. 25 According
to State, the framework incorporated federal guidance from the White
House and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, among others.

The framework started at phase 0, where mandatory telework is enforced,
and proceeded to phase 3, where 80 percent or more staff could be
working on-site. According to the framework, overseas posts were to first
consider medical and health conditions at each location as the primary
criteria to move between each phase (see sidebar for more details of
these conditions).

24Office of Management and Budget and Office of Personnel Management, Aligning
Federal Agency Operations with the National Guidelines for Opening Up America Again,
Memorandum M-20-23 (Apr. 20, 2020).
25In September 2021, State replaced the Diplomacy Strong Framework with the COVID-
19 Mitigation Process (CMP), its new framework for helping posts make workplace
operational decisions. According to State, through the CMP, post leadership will review
four main local risk indicators in order to determine the appropriate on-site workforce
posture (mission-critical functions only; mission-critical and on-site-dependent functions
only; or all functions). The CMP also provides guidance on mitigation practices according
to a location’s given workforce posture.

Page 17 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Diplomacy Strong Framework’s Medical The framework then suggested that overseas posts consider additional
and Health Conditions local conditions to move between phases. Local conditions for overseas
The Department of State developed the posts included a total of 27 indicators for overseas posts that were
Diplomacy Strong Framework to help
overseas posts make operational decisions.
divided into six categories: (1) host country posture, (2) advisories in
The framework included six medical and effect, (3) transportation, (4) security, (5) supply chain services, and (6)
health conditions as the primary criteria for work environment.
posts’ decision-making. These conditions
were
1. a downward trajectory of cases within 14 The last consideration for posts, according to the framework, was policy
days, and operational conditions based on their phase. For example, if a post
2. a downward trajectory of positive tests was in phase 1, passport services were limited to processing life-or-death
within 14 days,
and mission-critical applications. If a post was in phase 2, posts were to
3. permission of public health
practice moderate social distancing and could reopen common areas with
authorities/State’s Bureau of Medical
Services for limited return of non- established social distancing measures.
essential personnel,
4. pre-COVID-19 abilities at local Overseas posts kept track of the six medical indicators and local
healthcare facilities, conditions to make decisions about moving forward or back to a certain
5. ability to perform contact tracing for phase. For example, if essential businesses were open in the country, the
State personnel, and
post could be in phase 1. Once non-essential businesses opened, then,
6. established regional or global medevac
capabilities. depending on the status of the other indicators, the post might have been
Source: State’s Diplomacy Strong Framework. | able to move forward to phase 2. Each overseas post was responsible for
GAO-22-104519
updating its Diplomacy Strong phase in a dashboard that State had
developed to summarize and visualize data. This phase dashboard
displayed all overseas posts and phase status for users to filter through
by region, country, post, and designated phase. 26 According to State, its
use of a data-informed framework helped leaders make critical decisions
about workforce posture, with a focus on health and safety. Figure 5
shows countries’ Diplomacy Strong phase as of December 2020. State
collected these data in its dashboard.

26State developed additional dashboards to present data that it regularly updated to
ensure that decision-makers had the most up-to-date information. For example, one
dashboard reported host nations’ posture toward U.S. government employees, including
quarantine status and testing policies. State also created a dashboard to track the
numbers of employees and family members on a global or post-specific evacuation. When
State replaced the Diplomacy Strong Framework with the CMP, it also replaced these
dashboards with the COVID-19 Priority Risk Indicators dashboard, which tracks four main
risk indicators—community transmission, employee vaccination status, local hospital
capacity, and local conditions.

Page 18 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Figure 5: Countries by Phase of State’s Diplomacy Strong Framework, as of December 2020

Note: The map illustrates the phases of State’s Diplomacy Strong Framework, which ranged from
most restrictive COVID-19 mitigation measures (phase 0) to least restrictive measures (phase 3).

The evacuation of key personnel, in conjunction with public health
Despite Loss of Key restrictions limiting in-person work, reduced operations at overseas posts,
Personnel and Public with some posts losing more than 60 percent of their staff. State’s
emergency planning guidance and the global evacuation policy did not
Health Restrictions, provide sufficient information to posts on how to determine the staff
Telework and Other resources and skills required during the pandemic. Equipping posts with
this information, for varying types of emergencies, would better prepare
Adjustments Helped them for future evacuations. While information technology improvements
Overseas Staff largely allowed overseas staff to telework, State does not collect
information on overseas telework, limiting its ability to make data-driven
Continue to Work decisions about its future use.

Page 19 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Evacuation of Key
Personnel and Public
Health Restrictions
Reduced Operations at
Overseas Posts
Impact on Overseas The evacuation of about 20 percent of overseas staff from 291 posts
Operations Was Uneven, with between January 2020 and December 2020 affected overseas operations
Some Posts Reduced by More unevenly, with a small number of posts losing a large proportion of staff.
Than 60 Percent As shown in the table below, 12 posts of varying size and location lost 60
percent or more of their overseas staff via evacuation. 27 In contrast,
almost half of overseas posts lost less than 10 percent of their staff. More
than half of these posts were in Europe, but there were posts in most
regions of the world that lost a minimal number of staff.

Table 1: Posts from Which 60 Percent or More of Overseas Staff Evacuated during Calendar Year 2020

Post Regional bureau Percentage of overseas staff
evacuated
Wuhan, China East Asia and Pacific 100a
Lusaka, Zambia Africa 100a
U.S. Mission to the Association of South East Asian East Asia and Pacific 100
Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Africa 76
Yaounde, Cameroon Africa 73
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia East Asia and Pacific 73
Surabaya, Indonesia East Asia and Pacific 71
Ashgabat, Turkmenistan South and Central Asia 67
Jakarta, Indonesia East Asia and Pacific 65
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania Africa 62
Nairobi, Kenya Africa 61
Lima, Peru Western Hemisphere 60
Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. | GAO-22-104519

Note: We estimated the percentage of overseas staff evacuated by dividing data on the total number
of overseas staff evacuated during calendar year 2020 by the total number of filled positions as of
December 2020. In this report, we are using “overseas staff” to refer to U.S. staff working overseas,

27We estimated the percent of overseas staff evacuated (in total, and by post) by dividing
data on the total number of individuals evacuated (U.S. direct hires and employed eligible
family members) during calendar year 2020 by the total number of filled positions as of
December 2020. Our post-level analysis excluded the 40 out of 291 posts with five or
fewer overseas staff assigned.

Page 20 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
which includes U.S. direct hires and employed eligible family members. It also includes U.S. and third
country national Personal Services Contractors working for the U.S. Agency for International
Development. These data do not include locally employed staff. Our analysis excluded the 40 out of
291 posts with five or fewer overseas staff assigned.
a
State data indicated that the number of staff evacuated from this post over the course of 2020
exceeded the number of filled positions. State said that this could be explained by inconsistencies in
how posts reported data at different points in time and the different purpose of data trackers for
evacuations and filled positions. In addition, some posts may have evacuated more staff during the
course of the year than they have filled slots, because of rotation or curtailment.

Posts in Africa and South and Central Asia experienced the highest level
of staff evacuations. About 39 percent of overseas staff assigned to posts
in Africa and 35 percent of overseas staff assigned to posts in South and
Central Asia were evacuated, as shown in figure 6. State officials in the
Bureau of African Affairs told us that many staff departed posts in Africa
because they feared experiencing a pandemic in a resource-constrained
environment with limited access to quality healthcare. State officials said
that a lack of access to respirators in host country healthcare systems
was a particular concern for posts in Africa, and some staff were
encouraged to evacuate.

Figure 6: Percentage of Overseas Staff in Each Region Who Evacuated during
Calendar Year 2020

Note: We estimated the percentage of overseas staff evacuated by dividing data on the total number
of overseas staff evacuated from posts in that region during calendar year 2020 by the total number
of filled positions at posts in that region as of December 2020. In this report, we are using “overseas

Page 21 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
staff” to refer to U.S. staff working overseas, which includes U.S. direct hires and employed eligible
family members. It also includes U.S. and third country national Personal Services Contractors
working for the U.S. Agency for International Development. These data do not include locally
employed staff. Regions represent State regional geographic bureaus.
Evacuations resulted in staffing losses that were sometimes unevenly
distributed across post sections. For example, in Kenya, staff told us that
the consular and political sections were heavily affected by evacuations.
In Azerbaijan, EAC members noted that the consular section as well as
USAID had been greatly affected.

Some Posts Lost Key State’s emergency planning guidance for overseas posts, as well as the
Personnel in the Absence of global evacuation policy created during the pandemic, did not provide
Information on Determining sufficient information to posts to help them to determine the appropriate
Staffing Levels and Critical staff resources and skills required during the pandemic. State’s
Skills emergency planning guidance stated that if an evacuation were
necessary, the post must plan to keep a sufficient number of staff at the
post to maintain certain emergency operating functions until a decision is
made to lift the departure or suspend operations completely. According to
the guidance, in preparing for a drawdown of overseas staff, the post
must ensure that the following programs have sufficient resources:
security, facilities and logistics, communications with State headquarters,
U.S. citizen and other consular services, communication of U.S. foreign
policy, public affairs, and human resources. The guidance noted that
staffing needs may vary depending on the type of emergency and that
posts should anticipate the number of staff members with appropriate skill
sets that are needed to ensure continuity of operations. The guidance
instructed posts to conduct a realistic staffing analysis for ordered
departures and provided a worksheet for posts to identify the number of
employees that should remain at post in each organizational unit and
overall. However, the guidance did not provide information on how posts
were to determine what would constitute a sufficient level of staff or how
to determine the types of skills required at post for a particular type of
emergency.

Further, the guidance did not require posts to calculate proposed staffing
levels for authorized departures because, as noted in the guidance, staff
were not required to leave. Most of the staff evacuated during 2020 were
evacuated under State’s global evacuation policy for COVID-19—and that
policy did not contain information for posts on determining staff resources
and skills required during the pandemic, beyond specifying that consular

Page 22 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
officers should generally remain until the last phase of an evacuation. 28
While the global evacuation policy stated that employees occupying
emergency positions who wished to depart post should review
arrangements to fill the positions and consult with the regional bureau’s
Executive Office, it did not address overall staffing levels by section or the
post as a whole.

Interviews with overseas posts and a review of lessons learned indicated
that posts struggled with decisions on staff drawdowns and stated that the
resources available to them for determining an appropriate staff “footprint”
during the pandemic, including their EAP, were inadequate. EAC
members in Kenya told us they did not use their EAP in conjunction with
evacuation decisions, and said the embassy did not think strategically
about its emergency staffing level, including which essential staff needed
to stay at post. In Azerbaijan, EAC officials said they had consulted their
EAP but found it to be of limited use in the pandemic emergency. They
told us they looked beyond the EAP to assess people’s backgrounds and
skill sets to ensure coverage of critical functions. Officials in Turkmenistan
reported that they were not prepared for the number of officers who
decided to leave—especially those in key positions, such as in the
Consular and Management sections. They suggested that each post
evaluate its decision criteria for the evacuation of officers occupying
critical positions, especially those necessary for the continued and secure
operation of the post. In Milan, officials reported that the post’s
emergency personnel lists indicating who might need to remain at post
were not suitable for a pandemic and required changes during the crisis.
Officials in Kenya and Azerbaijan noted that responding to different types
of emergencies requires different skill sets and entails different optimal
staffing patterns. Providing posts with information to assist them in
determining the skills and staff needed in different types of emergencies
would help them be better prepared for future evacuations.

Posts Closed or Heavily In the first half of March 2020, some posts began imposing restrictions on
Restricted Access to Protect travel and telling staff to limit their meetings. By mid-March, as some staff
Staff, and Host Countries were evacuating, posts had implemented measures to minimize the
Imposed Lockdowns, Limiting number of staff working inside post facilities. Post management instructed
In-Person Work most staff to stay home and telework to the maximum extent possible,
and limited access to post facilities. On March 20, 2020, State announced

28Department of State, “Global Authorized Departure for Individuals at Higher Risk from
COVID-19,” MRN 20 State 28418 (Mar. 15, 2020).

Page 23 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
a suspension of routine visa services at overseas posts, which require in-
person interaction. 29 Posts also began implementing team-based
alternating schedules for those mission critical staff who needed to come
into the office, such as maintenance staff and individuals working on
classified information, in order to minimize the health risk. 30

As the pandemic progressed, State’s Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations developed a “COVID-19 Mitigation at Overseas Posts Toolkit”
with guidance to help posts determine how to disinfect and reorient
workspaces and other areas, improve ventilation, promote physical
distancing, and install signage and hand disinfecting stations. Figure 7
shows some of these pandemic response measures at State’s overseas
posts.

29This suspension of services lasted until July 2020, when State announced that posts
could begin offering limited routine visa services according to the phase of Diplomacy
Strong they had attained.
30Team-based alternating schedules consists of creating cohorts or teams within an office
and placing the cohort or team on alternating schedules for in-person work.

Page 24 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Figure 7: Examples of Pandemic Response Measures inside the Department of State’s Overseas Posts

According to State, some host countries imposed strict lockdowns that
impeded staff movements. For example, according to post reporting, the
government’s lockdown restrictions in Mongolia included closing all non-
essential businesses and schools, prohibiting non-essential movement
outside one’s residence except during a few hours per day, and enforcing
mask wearing by financial penalty. 31 According to State, the government
deployed national police who stopped vehicles and pedestrians at all
major intersections in the capital to verify their purpose of travel and

31According to State, Mongolia did not experience community transmission of the virus
until fall 2020, and imposed its first lockdown that November.

Page 25 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
check whether they were associated with one of the excepted critical
infrastructure organizations, which included foreign diplomatic missions.
State officials told us that while diplomatic personnel were sometimes
exempted from government lockdowns, it could be challenging for LE
staff to access the post unless the embassy provided transportation with
diplomatic license plates. In Mongolia, for instance, LE staff told us that
the embassy provided transportation in embassy vehicles for staff who
needed to travel to the office.

Employees Remaining Overseas staff who remained at posts reported that their workload
Overseas Indicated that increased tremendously as their colleagues evacuated and the pandemic
Staffing Shortages and created additional tasks, particularly for those in the Consular and
Movement Restrictions Management sections. As we previously reported, in response to the
Adversely Affected Operations pandemic, State carried out a historic repatriation of more than 100,000
individuals who were in 139 countries between January 2020 and June
2020. 32 This effort—largely led by consular staff at overseas posts—
involved working with host governments, using social media to
communicate with U.S. citizens, coordinating with other overseas posts,
and drawing on staff’s local knowledge to navigate airports and around
the country.

The Management section at overseas posts saw its workload increase
with the addition of responsibilities related to post operations, creation
and implementation of telework policies, and the logistical and physical
aspects of staff evacuations. According to State officials in Kenya, staff
evacuated quickly and did not always properly secure their residences or
prepare them for an extended absence. As a result, the Management
section faced several challenges while trying to manage the properties,
including rodent infestations, property damage from water leaks, and
problems accessing residences. As a result, substantial damage occurred
to some staff housing, as shown in figure 8 below.

32See GAO, COVID-19: State Carried Out Historic Repatriation Effort but Should
Strengthen its Preparedness for Future Crises, GAO-22-104354 (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
2, 2021). The 139 countries include two territories, the West Bank and Gaza.

Page 26 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Figure 8: Damage to Post Housing in Kenya from a Water Leak

State’s CIR surveyed overseas posts regarding the pandemic’s impact on
various aspects of posts’ functions and found that operations were greatly
affected, particularly in the first month of the pandemic (see sidebar).

Page 27 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Selected Findings from the Department of In particular, the CIR survey found that the pandemic had a very negative
State’s COVID-19 Interim Review Survey of effect on the work of the consular section and a slightly negative effect on
Overseas Posts
posts’ security. Eight posts cited the role of the Management section in
State surveyed 23 overseas posts and
provided us with responses from 17. The
overcoming operational challenges, with several posts noting that this
survey asked respondents to characterize the section bore the brunt of the operational adjustments while also
impact of the pandemic in the first month, as experiencing reduced staffing because of evacuations. 33 Moreover,
well as in October 2020 and November 2020.
Selected findings include the following: State’s CIR report found that the staffing shortages caused by
• “Very Negative” impact on operations. evacuations led, at times, to reduced critical services along with
Fifteen of the 17 posts stated that the resentment among staff who stayed at post and were managing a
impact of COVID-19 on internal
operations in the first month of the
significantly higher workload than before the pandemic.
pandemic was very negative, as did five
of the 17 posts with regard to October Our interviews with overseas staff at posts illustrated the impact of
2020 and November 2020. personnel shortages on operations—staff we spoke with were covering
• “Very Negative” impact on the consular multiple positions, sometimes across sections. For example, in
section. Sixteen of the 17 posts stated
that the impact of COVID-19 on the work Azerbaijan, officials told us that a member of the Economics office ran the
of the consular section was very Consular section for a period of time. In Mongolia, the Information
negative in the first month of the Management Officer (IMO) had been acting as Facility Manager during
pandemic, as did 11 of the 17 posts with
regard to October 2020 and November
the pandemic and was due to take over as the Acting Management
2020. Officer.
• “Slightly Negative” impact on security.
Eleven of the 17 posts stated that the In addition to its effects on operations, the pandemic has also affected
impact of COVID-19 on their security
posture in the first month of the
implementation of foreign assistance programs at overseas posts.
pandemic was slightly negative, as did According to State and USAID officials, travel restrictions and other public
eight of the 17 posts with regard to health regulations affected the agencies’ planned programming. We
October 2020 and November 2020. previously reported that the pandemic substantially affected State’s,
Source: Department of State. | GAO-22-104519
USAID’s, and their implementing partners’ ability to conduct project
monitoring. 34 The USAID Office of Inspector General has reported that
the pandemic and associated travel restrictions limited USAID’s ability to
monitor its foreign assistance programs, increasing the potential for fraud
or misuse, and that the effectiveness of the agency’s shift to remote
monitoring is still to be determined. 35 However, agencies said that they
were generally able to repurpose funds to meet changing needs brought
on by COVID-19. In addition, USAID officials told us that one positive
aspect of pivoting to virtual programs during the pandemic was an
33State provided us with survey responses from 17 of the 23 posts that CIR surveyed, and
we determined that was sufficient for our review.
34See GAO, COVID-19: Better USAID Documentation and More-Frequent Reporting
Could Enhance Monitoring of Humanitarian Efforts, GAO-22-104431 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 26, 2022).
35U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General, USAID Adapted
to Continue Program Monitoring during COVID-19, but the Effectiveness of These Efforts
is Still to be Determined, Audit Report 9-000-21-007-P (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2021).

Page 28 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
increased participation rate among program participants. For example, in
Mongolia, more women were able to attend online trainings because they
did not have to travel, find childcare, or overcome other logistical barriers,
according to USAID.

Overseas staff we interviewed—those who remained at post and those
who evacuated—generally mentioned experiencing high levels of stress
during the pandemic. Staff at overseas posts cited stress from an
increased workload and expressed concerns with being overseas while
borders were closed, commercial flights had stopped, mail was delayed,
and local medical systems were potentially overwhelmed. Evacuated staff
mentioned stress from uncertainty regarding their timeline for returning
overseas and workday adjustments to align with the time zone of their
overseas post. Both categories of staff noted that telework tended to blur
the lines between work and home life. Posts cited a variety of measures
instituted to boost staff resiliency, such as virtual events, as well as
promoting access to mental health care through counseling resources.

Information Technology
Improvements Largely
Allowed Overseas Staff to
Telework, but State Does
Not Collect Information on
Telework at Posts
Posts Implemented a State implemented a maximum telework posture on March 16, 2020,
Maximum Telework Policy and directing most staff to work from their personal residences. IRM officials
State Took Steps to Support It told us that State had already begun migrating some functions to the
cloud pre-pandemic, which helped to facilitate telework. However, prior to
the pandemic, overseas posts did not regularly utilize telework, as State
maintained that the responsibilities of overseas positions required in-
person attendance. This meant that posts needed to pivot quickly to an
operational posture they had never envisioned.

Page 29 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Telework Access to the Department of State officials said that State helped overseas posts transition to
State’s Network maximum telework posture by providing department-wide guidance on
the creation of telework policies, and posts’ Management section and
State officials described the following options human resources department determined post-specific policies and
for accessing the department’s network for
telework. drafted telework agreements for State staff. Officials at the four overseas
posts with which we conducted virtual site visits told us that their
State/IRM colleagues worked diligently to assist in getting State staff
connected to State’s network and to provide necessary equipment such
as smartphones, laptops, wifi hotspots, webcams, and headsets.
“GO mobile” on smartphones.
GO mobile allows smartphone users to
Information Management Officers at posts also created user guides and
access State’s Microsoft 365 applications and assisted staff with trainings and troubleshooting.
OneDrive. State officials told us that newer
smartphones are needed to use GO mobile.
In the weeks and months after moving to maximum telework, State
expanded the infrastructure and access for existing products that allowed
teleworking staff to access State’s network, or “Global OpenNet” (GO)
(see sidebar).
“GO browser” on personal computers.
GO browser provides web-based access to
some State systems through an internet State officials noted that the most effective way for staff to telework was
browser on the user’s personal computer. through GO desktop devices—specially configured laptops—which were
State officials said that most staff were using it
at the transition to maximum telework. increasingly provided to U.S. staff in overseas posts as the pandemic
progressed. Nine out of the 10 interviews we conducted with State’s
regional bureaus and EACs identified GO desktops as an example of a
key technology improvement that aided telework. A regional bureau
official commented that GO desktop laptops helped them be more
“GO virtual” on personal computers.
productive by allowing them to access systems that were not on GO
GO virtual is a Citrix environment that allows
users access to more State applications than browser and could only be accessed through State’s OpenNet. Appendix
GO browser. State officials told us there is a II provides details on how State used COVID-19 relief funds to enhance
$360 annual cost per user.
access while teleworking and to purchase equipment.

“GO desktop” devices.
GO desktop devices, which are specifically
configured laptops, create a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) session with headquarters.
According to State officials, it is the most
efficient way to access State’s network.
Source: State Bureau of Information Resource Management.
| GAO-22-104519

Page 30 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
State overseas staff and LE staff experienced challenges in teleworking
Overseas Staff from their residences when State initially moved to a maximum telework
Experienced Some posture. State’s CIR report acknowledged that telework had not been a
traditional part of State’s work culture in overseas posts. The report noted
Challenges that, for State staff in general, a number of issues made telework
Teleworking, but challenging, if not impossible, for many employees. These issues
included lack of equipment, the number of legacy platforms that are
State Considers difficult to access and use while working remotely, the inexperience of
Telework an staff in using real-time collaboration tools, and the high cost of sufficient
home internet connections. The report also noted that the transition to
Operational Success maximum telework highlighted equipment access issues, particularly for
the approximately three-quarters of State staff who had not been issued
U.S. government-furnished mobility equipment, such as laptops.

State’s CIR report identified high cost and limited accessibility of internet
connections as a barrier to teleworking overseas. Officials we spoke with
emphasized internet connectivity as a challenge, as well as other issues
specific to host countries (see sidebar).

Page 31 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Department of State and U.S. Agency for According to State officials, in some parts of the world, LE staff do not
International Development (USAID) have internet at their residences. Officials said the cost of maintaining a
Officials’ Reflections on International
Telework
fast enough connection, if one is available, can be prohibitively
State and USAID officials we interviewed
expensive. According to State’s CIR report, 28 percent of LE staff at posts
described some benefits of telework, including in Africa and 17 percent of LE staff at posts in South and Central Asia
work-life balance. However, teleworking from said that a poor or non-existent home internet connection, stemming from
home required successfully connecting to an
employer’s network. State and USAID officials the host country’s technical infrastructure, hindered their ability to
at selected posts around the world told us effectively do their work. The report also noted that for staff located in
they experienced the following problems in
doing so. countries where internet connections are not a standard feature in
• Power outages. “It’s frustrating to be personal homes, the cost of internet installation and recurring service fees
working and have the power go out, can be a significant financial burden.
since that also means the internet goes
down, and then you can’t access any
websites or do any work.” “Telework is
Despite these challenges, in all 10 interviews we conducted with officials
tough; frequent power outages can make in State’s regional bureaus and members of posts’ EACs, officials
internet access challenging,” and officials characterized telework as an overall success. For example, officials from
often went into the office because
“internet access is more predictable
a regional bureau stated that State went to extraordinary lengths to
there.” –-Officials at a post in Africa enable global telework, characterizing it as “an enormous lift that has
• Uneven internet coverage. “The been hugely successful.” Members of one post’s EAC said that when their
biggest challenge is that the internet personnel were spread across various time zones on global evacuation,
drops a lot and we don’t have enough the post was able to develop a “telework rhythm” and have coverage
bandwidth to use video on our team
calls.” “Internet connection quality most of the day. The post appointed a U.S.-based “telework deputy” who
depends on where you live.” –-Officials would receive assignments from staff at post as they logged out and
at a post in Asia would then distribute these assignments to the U.S.-based staff to work
• Expiring passwords. “Some people’s on while staff at post were offline.
passwords expired after they had left
post on Global Authorized Departure...it
was weeks, maybe even months” before State conducted a Telework Capabilities Survey about 6 weeks after
State HQ found a way to remotely reset maximum telework was instituted to assess employees’ telework
them. They could not telework during this
time. –-Officials at a post in the
experiences and identify barriers to telework productivity and
Caribbean effectiveness. State sent the survey to 108,000 domestic and overseas
• Host government restrictions. The State personnel, including LE staff. In response, 80 percent of almost
government unpredictably placed 20,000 respondents indicated being “very satisfied” or “somewhat
restrictions on the internet, which satisfied” with their overall telework experience. In addition, 44 percent of
complicated telework capabilities. “We
couldn’t use messaging or video respondents said they expected to telework more often than before
conferencing applications.” –-Officials at COVID-19. Finally, State reported that a key takeaway of the survey was
a post in Eurasia “don’t revert to business as usual (because the) workforce sees the value
Source: State and USAID officials at overseas posts. |
GAO-22-104519 of telework.” 36

In October 2021, State issued updated guidance on overseas telework.
State told us that the guidance requested that all overseas posts develop

36Department of State, Telework Capabilities Survey: Results and Findings (June 2020).
The survey was conducted from April 27, 2020 through May 30, 2020.

Page 32 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
post-specific telework policies for U.S. direct hires by December 1, 2021.
According to State, the policies will allow situational telework but will not
permit regularly scheduled telework—in line with the department’s policy
prior to the pandemic.

State Does Not Track Use of State does not maintain any information on telework participation for U.S.
Telework at Overseas Posts direct hires at overseas posts. Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government states that management should use quality
information to achieve the entity’s objectives, and as changes to
objectives and risks occur, management should change information
requirements as needed. 37 Management should process the data into
quality information which should be used to make informed decisions and
evaluate the entity’s performance in achieving key objectives and
addressing risks. In addition, management should periodically review
policies, procedures and related control activities and if there is a
significant change to a relevant process, it should be reviewed. 38

State did not authorize routine telework at overseas posts prior to the
pandemic. State told us that there is currently no requirement to collect
information on telework for its overseas U.S. direct hires. According to
State, telework agreements are completed on electronic forms maintained
at the post, and electronic payroll systems for State staff assigned
overseas do not collect information on telework. As a result, State cannot
track or report on telework overseas for any State employee. State used
telework as an operational response to the pandemic and, according to
State officials, will continue to approve situational telework moving
forward. 39 However, without information on overseas telework, State
cannot assess its use and will not have the ability to make data-driven
decisions about the future of telework abroad. Developing a plan that
specifies how it could collect this information would position the agency to
make informed policy decisions regarding telework.

37GAO-14-704G, Principles 13.01, 13.02, 13.03: Use Quality Information – Identification of
Information Requirements.
38GAO-14-704G, Principle 12.05: Implement Control Activities – Periodic Review of
Control Activities.
39We have previously reported on the use of telework across the federal government
during the pandemic, including at State. See GAO, COVID-19: Federal Telework
Increased during the Pandemic, but More Reliable Data are Needed to Support Oversight,
GAO-22-104282 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2022). State collects and reports information
on telework for domestic staff.

Page 33 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Posts Used State’s
Decision Framework
to Evaluate Local
Conditions and
Return Staff to Posts
Amidst Challenges
Overseas Posts Used EACs at posts met frequently throughout 2020 to use the Diplomacy
State’s Diplomacy Strong Strong Framework to assess medical and other local conditions,
determine whether to recommend the COM change the post’s Diplomacy
Framework to Evaluate
Strong phase, and report their recommendation to State through a cable.
Local Conditions and According to the Diplomacy Strong Framework, the COM, EAC, and other
Make Operational post management, in partnership with the Under Secretary for
Decisions Management, would drive the decision-making. Our analysis of cables
from four selected overseas posts found that posts weighed the following
factors, which included medical and operational benchmarks:

Local medical information, including data on new COVID-19
infections. EACs discussed local medical information, such as trends in
new cases—one of the medical and health conditions included in the
Diplomacy Strong Framework. In Kenya, the EAC cited the increased
capacity and levels of testing by the country’s Ministry of Health and the
Embassy Medical Unit when recommending a phase progression in
summer 2020. In Barbados, the EAC noted pressure on limited medical
resources, among other factors, when recommending a phase
regression. 40

Availability of commercial flights and medevac routes. Another factor
noted by EACs was the ability of personnel to fly out of the country if
necessary, particularly if a medical emergency occurred. Global medevac
capabilities and the status of commercial air were discussed in almost
every cable. In Azerbaijan, the EAC cited the ability for OPMED to

40Some EAC reporting cables from 2021 contain discussions of vaccination rates at post
and in host countries more generally. State began distributing vaccines to overseas posts
in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia beginning in December 2020, but most posts received
vaccines beginning in February 2021. State offered vaccines to U.S. staff, eligible family
members, members of household, and locally employed staff. According to the four posts
we met with, as overseas staff were vaccinated, portions of the workforce returned to the
office.

Page 34 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
provide aircraft to post within 48 hours as one of the factors allowing it to
recommend that the post lift its authorized departure policy.

Host government pandemic response policies. Policies implemented
by the host government to prevent virus spread, such as lockdowns,
testing, contact tracing, quarantines, border controls, and masking, were
cited by EACs in their discussion of phase changes. In Mongolia, the EAC
cited significant changes in the government’s state of emergency in the
capital city of Ulaanbaatar—announcement of a stay at home order,
closure of non-essential businesses and schools, resumption of the 5-
week quarantine, and suspension of inbound flights—in support of its
recommendation that the post regress from phase 2 to phase 1.

The MED units at posts also played a role in providing the EAC with local
medical information, including information on healthcare availability.
According to overseas MED staff we met with, they also helped assess
COVID-19 data reported by host governments; in some cases, these data
were unreliable, but the MED units used different methods to verify
trends. For instance, staff in the MED unit in Azerbaijan told us that they
corroborated data provided by the government by checking with contacts
in the health sector—if the government reported that COVID-19 cases
were decreasing, and local medical officials reported that hospital beds
were becoming more available, they could have more confidence in the
data. One post told us that their MED unit did not typically play a large
role on the post’s EAC, but given that the pandemic was a health
emergency, the MED unit’s input was particularly important, and over
time, their role in the conversation about phase changes grew.

Most of the officials we spoke with in State’s regional bureaus and at
overseas posts characterized the Diplomacy Strong Framework as useful
in making operational decisions during calendar year 2020, despite some
limitations. Some officials told us they struggled to use some of the
framework’s indicators—for example, whether to consider a school “open”
if it was conducting virtual instruction—and said that State should have
provided more instructions regarding the framework’s application. State’s
CIR report found that personnel expressed the need for training in how to
use the framework and a clearer description of the key terms and metrics.
The report concluded that though the framework was useful at the start of
the pandemic to guide missions as to how to structure their workforce, it
waned in utility as the pandemic progressed, and updated metrics, to
include criteria to move back phases, would have bolstered its

Page 35 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
usefulness. State replaced the Diplomacy Strong Framework in
September 2021 with the CMP. 41

Flight Availability,
Quarantine, and Testing
Requirements Affected the
Return to Posts for
Evacuated Staff
With the Slow Return of International commercial air travel ground to a halt at the beginning of the
Commercial Flights, State pandemic, and for some countries, air space closures persisted for
Arranged Charter Flights to months, causing delays in the movement of U.S. government personnel.
Return Staff to Some Posts For example, State reported that Azerbaijan, Mongolia, and Kenya all
stopped international air travel in spring 2020, and commercial flights did
not resume until several months later. Even when international flights
resumed, they were still quite limited in some countries, which made it
hard for U.S. government personnel to secure seats.

As evacuated staff began returning to posts and staff started to rotate to
new overseas assignments in June 2020, State needed to utilize charter
flights in addition to commercial means of transportation. State reported
that it used its OPMED aviation capabilities to move approximately 4,400
U.S. government personnel to and from overseas posts. This number
represented a significant increase in OPMED’s air support—according to
State, OPMED conducted a total of 476 missions in fiscal year 2020
(including movement of U.S. government personnel as well as
repatriations of private American citizens), as compared with 26 to 50
missions per year in previous years. 42

Even with the addition of charter flights, some posts reported delays in
returning personnel because of the difficulty of securing a flight. For
example, in Mongolia, State officials told us that the last group of

41According to State, the CMP is intended to reduce post workloads by eliminating some
previous reporting requirements, as well as to simplify decision-making and allow greater
flexibility domestically and overseas.
42In addition to transporting personnel, the OPMED flights offered an opportunity to send
needed laboratory equipment, PPE, and diplomatic cargo to posts. For example, in
Azerbaijan, OPMED delivered equipment that provided COVID-19 and other medical
testing capabilities to the embassy. According to State’s CIR report, OPMED delivered
close to 3,000 diplomatic pouches and over 150,000 pounds of cargo to posts, in addition
to COVID-19 testing equipment.

Page 36 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
evacuated staff returned via a charter flight in January 2021 because it
was not possible to secure a flight until that time. State officials in
Azerbaijan told us that obtaining permission for a U.S. citizen to arrive in
the country is a large administrative burden that involves seeking
permission from the Cabinet of Ministers via multiple diplomatic notes.

Posts Needed to Negotiate In addition to the logistical challenge of moving personnel between
with Host Governments on different countries during the pandemic, posts also needed to contend
Quarantine and Other with each host country’s pandemic-related entry requirements. The
Requirements Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations sets international standards
for the treatment of diplomats. 43 State told us that the Vienna
Convention’s standards are relevant to testing and quarantine
requirements for U.S. government employees returning to overseas
posts.

State officials at overseas posts said that they worked with State
headquarters to negotiate the terms of testing and quarantine
requirements with individual foreign countries. For example, State officials
in Mongolia said that they had reached an agreement with the host
government to allow MED personnel to monitor U.S. personnel in
quarantine and conduct COVID-19 testing, rather than Mongolian
government officials, and to prevent personnel who tested positive from
being immediately detained and sent to the hospital. State officials noted
that the family of an ambassador from another country was detained for
an extended period in a Mongolian hospital. State officials at other
overseas posts also mentioned negotiations with host governments
regarding testing.

State MED’s Health Alert Response Team (HART) in Washington D.C.
played a large role in ensuring that U.S. staff returning to overseas posts
met any pre-departure COVID-19 testing requirements. MED HART staff,
some of whom were LE staff brought from overseas posts to the United
States, tracked the various testing requirements, such as timelines and
types of tests, for entry into each country. According to State’s CIR report,
between July 2020 and December 2020, MED HART coordinated or
conducted pre-travel testing for 8,761 people, of whom 79 tested positive,
were isolated, and delayed from traveling overseas.

43Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961).

Page 37 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
State is responsible for collecting and preserving lessons learned from
State Has Identified overseas posts after a critical operational event. During COVID-19, some
Lessons Learned but individual posts reported lessons learned, including on communication,
but not all posts submitted required lessons learned. State initiates the
Lacks a Procedure to collection process by sending a request to posts for their lessons learned;
Ensure Their however, it does not have a procedure to ensure that all posts submit
them.
Submission
Posts Reported Lessons During the COVID-19 pandemic, State collected various lessons learned
Learned on from 18 posts about their experiences and operational adjustments. State
initiates lessons learned requests by sending a lessons learned template
Communication and
to a post following a critical operational event. CMS then collects the
Telework completed lessons learned template from the post and analyzes it. Of the
18 posts, six voluntarily submitted lessons learned related to the
pandemic and 12 submitted them as required by their post-specific
evacuation. 44

The 18 posts provided insights on successful operational adjustments
and identified gaps. For example:

• Informal communications were critical for connecting staff.
Thirteen of the 18 overseas posts reported using informal
communication channels. A post reported that informal
communication channels, such as weekly virtual town halls, were
critical for providing clear, correct information, noting changes,
responding to questions, and keeping the lines of communication
open. Some of the 13 posts also created group chats in a messaging
application to maintain communication within the post community.
Through the CIR, State identified that even after in-person
engagements resume, foreign officials will expect to engage with
State employees through a variety of means, including messaging
applications. A recommendation of the CIR is that State should
determine how to facilitate federally compliant use of messaging
platforms by State staff to communicate with foreign officials.

• Crisis management training could strengthen emergency
preparedness. Ten of the 18 overseas posts identified a need for
future crisis management guidance, training, or planning. For

44We previously reported on lessons learned State collected from overseas posts that
assisted in the repatriation of U.S. citizens; see GAO-22-104354. In this report, we
focused our analysis on the 18 cables that were intended to reflect lessons learned related
to operational adjustments.

Page 38 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
example, although U.S. officials in Saudi Arabia reported that the
overall management of authorized departure at the post level was a
success, it recommended that training in crisis communications and
preparedness be a part of an annual training for key positions that
have responsibilities for managing evacuations. U.S. officials in Iraq
reported that when staff evacuated, the post lost capability and
institutional memory. The post lacked specific cross-training or
updated, written, standard operating procedures to handle the loss of
staff and Iraq recommended that crisis management planning could
include more information on how to maintain continuity of operations
and reevaluate an initial approach to a longer crisis.
• Connectivity is key for telework productivity. Six of the 18
overseas posts identified telework connectivity issues as adversely
affecting telework productivity. For example, U.S. officials in
Azerbaijan reported bandwidth issues preventing the use of cameras
in Microsoft Teams during its weekly country team meeting, which
negatively affected communication. U.S. officials in Indonesia
reported that the data connectivity required for video conferencing
applications or telework posed challenges for almost all sections with
LE staff. A lesson learned is to use simpler communication technology
that require less bandwidth for town halls and other large events
connecting hundreds of community members using various devices in
multiple locations.
• Telework requires sufficient equipment. Five of the 18 overseas
posts identified a need for more equipment in order to effectively
telework. For example, some essential LE staff in Indonesia did not
have government-issued smartphones with internet access, which
posed communication challenges. LE staff at other posts were only
able to access their work emails and make calls through their
government-issued smartphones with internet access. In Botswana,
post reported that its cell phone policy was created 5 years ago and
limited smartphones to a certain subset of employees, effectively
excluding others. According to the post, embassy management tried
to ensure that LE staff could attend virtual meetings without
smartphones, but some LE staff never succeeded in attending such
meetings.
• State could take steps to further facilitate telework. Six of the 18
overseas posts had proposals concerning telework and its place in the
future overseas work environment. For example, U.S. officials in
Botswana proposed that every State employee should have a
smartphone, contingent upon training and use of a handful of State
telework applications (such as Microsoft Teams), to ensure that the

Page 39 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
State community can speak a common technological language. U.S.
officials in Thailand recommended that teleworking options should still
be available after the pandemic following a review of the efficacy of
situational telework across its large and diverse interagency, bilateral,
and multilateral engagement.
State Does Not Have a State’s CMS is responsible for collecting lessons learned, but there are
Procedure to Ensure that currently no procedures in place for CMS to ensure their submission by
overseas posts. According to the FAM, CMS has responsibility for
Posts Submit Lessons
convening State and interagency stakeholders to gather and preserve
Learned as Required lessons learned after critical operational events to share across the
organization. 45 At the beginning of the pandemic, State required posts to
submit lessons learned to CMS following a post-specific evacuation. CMS
officials told us that this requirement did not apply to posts that used the
global evacuation policy during COVID-19. However, in March 2021 State
updated its guidance to require posts to submit lessons learned following
any large-scale event, emergency, or crisis, which State officials said
would include a future global pandemic.

During 2020, 26 posts were on post-specific evacuation and were
required to submit lessons learned, but three of the posts did not submit
them. According to State guidance, CMS initiates the lessons learned
process by sending a request to the post after the event, and the lessons
learned review should be conducted within 30 days following the
termination of an authorized departure, ordered departure, or a significant
incident. Figure 9 illustrates this process.

451 FAM 022.2-3 Operations Center (S/ES-O).

Page 40 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Figure 9: State’s Process for Collecting Required Lessons Learned from Overseas Posts

The State guidance that requires lessons learned does not state what to
do if a post does not respond to the initial request for lessons learned or
lay out any other procedure by which CMS can ensure their submission.
State’s CIR report found that CMS’s current process for collecting lessons
learned fails to compel submissions. The CIR report recommended that
State implement a lessons learned review procedure to ensure that best
practices are captured and incorporated into preparations for future
crises.

If posts do not comply with the lessons learned requirement, then CMS
will not be able to fulfill its role to gather, preserve, and share these
lessons. In addition, without developing a procedure to ensure that posts
submit lessons learned, State may miss opportunities to leverage
information to help improve its policies, procedures, or plans for future
crisis response.

The COVID-19 pandemic has surprised the world with its global reach,
Conclusions duration, and impact on public health and the economy. State needed to
make quick operational adjustments for more than 22,000 federal
employees working in 173 countries around the world. In large part, these
adjustments were successful—State was able to continue advancing U.S.
interests abroad while shifting to a maximum telework posture. State’s
global evacuation policy allowed staff to voluntarily depart posts and its
Diplomacy Strong Framework provided guidance for making operational
decisions.

Page 41 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
However, overseas employees’ varying interpretation of the new global
evacuation policy and the brief eligibility timeline caused confusion and
disparities among those employees on post-specific evacuations.
Establishing an evacuation policy that applies to more than one post,
such as the global evacuation policy used during the pandemic, and
reviewing State’s existing post-specific evacuation policies would help
decrease confusion and uncertainty in future implementation. In addition,
State’s pandemic response unit did not have timely communication and
engagement with other U.S. overseas agencies. Establishing guidance
that directs State crisis response groups to maintain regular
communication with other agencies present at overseas posts would help
provide those agencies with the information they need to make decisions.

Further, while evacuations were occurring, some overseas posts did not
have the information they needed to determine the resources and skills
needed to staff the embassy in a pandemic, and in some cases, key staff
departed. Providing guidance to posts on how to assess and document
the critical skills required for different types of emergencies would
enhance posts’ crisis preparedness. During the pandemic, State created
the infrastructure necessary for staff to telework from their overseas
residences—something that had never been envisioned prior to the
pandemic. State has also authorized posts to permit situational telework
moving forward. However, it does not collect information on the use of
overseas telework. While collecting such information could require
adjustments to State’s information systems, developing a plan that
specifies how it could collect this information would position it to make
informed policy decisions regarding telework.

State conducted an agency-wide interim review of its pandemic response
and collected required lessons learned from some posts, but not others.
Without a procedure to ensure that posts submit required lessons
learned, State may miss opportunities to leverage information that could
be used to improve the policies, procedures, or plans for future crisis
response.

We are making the following six recommendations to State:
Recommendations for
Executive Action The Secretary of State should ensure that the Under Secretary for
Management establishes a policy for evacuations that applies to more
than one post to prepare for future global or regional crises.
(Recommendation 1)

Page 42 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
The Secretary of State should ensure that the Under Secretary for
Management conducts a review of existing evacuation policies and
determines whether such policies should be updated to include new
efficiencies and flexibilities used during COVID-19, such as a streamlined
process for calculating monetary allowances and increased flexibility
regarding the length of evacuations. (Recommendation 2)

The Secretary of State should ensure that the Director of Crisis
Management and Strategy establishes guidance that directs agency-wide
groups responding to crises to maintain timely interagency
communication with agencies present at overseas posts that would be
affected by policies State implements during crises. (Recommendation 3)

The Secretary of State should ensure that the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security provides additional information to posts on how to assess and
document in their Emergency Action Plans the staff resources and critical
skills required at post for different types of emergencies.
(Recommendation 4)

The Secretary of State should ensure development of a plan that
specifies how the department should collect information on overseas
telework participation. (Recommendation 5)

The Secretary of State should ensure that the Director of Crisis
Management and Strategy develops a procedure to ensure that overseas
posts submit required lessons learned. (Recommendation 6)

We provided a draft of this report to State and USAID for review and
Agency Comments comment. State’s comments are reprinted in appendix III and USAID’s
and Our Evaluation are reprinted in appendix IV. State and USAID also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

State concurred with five of our six recommendations. State partially
agreed with our recommendation to ensure timely communication with
interagency partners during crises, indicating that it already has a
mechanism to share information with other agencies. Since that
mechanism—the Washington Liaison Group—existed during the
pandemic and we and State’s own CIR report identified problems with
interagency communication, we believe that additional action is
necessary to ensure timely communication.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of State, and the Administrator of USAID. In

Page 43 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at
https://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-6881 or bairj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix V.

Jason Bair
Director, International Affairs and Trade

Page 44 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
List of Committees

The Honorable Patrick Leahy
Chairman
The Honorable Richard Shelby
Vice Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate

The Honorable Ron Wyden
Chairman
The Honorable Michael Crapo
Ranking Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate

The Honorable Robert Menendez
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate

The Honorable Patty Murray
Chair
The Honorable Richard Burr
Ranking Member
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions
United States Senate

The Honorable Gary C. Peters
Chairman
The Honorable Rob Portman
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The Honorable Kyrsten Sinema
Chair
The Honorable James Lankford
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Government Operations and Border Management
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Page 45 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
The Honorable Rosa L. DeLauro
Chair
The Honorable Kay Granger
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers
Republican Leader
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives

The Honorable Gregory W. Meeks
Chairman
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul
Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman
The Honorable John Katko
Ranking Member
Committee on Homeland Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable Carolyn B. Maloney
Chairwoman
The Honorable James Comer
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Reform
House of Representatives

The Honorable Richard E. Neal
Chairman
The Honorable Kevin Brady
Republican Leader
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives

Page 46 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

Methodology

This report examines (1) actions Department of State leadership took to
respond to COVID-19 and how it communicated these actions to
overseas employees; (2) how overseas posts adjusted their operations at
the onset of the pandemic and the extent to which these adjustments
affected post operations; (3) how posts made operational decisions as the
pandemic progressed and challenges they faced in returning evacuated
staff to overseas posts; and (4) lessons learned that State has identified
regarding adjustments to overseas operations during COVID-19, and the
extent to which State collected them.

To obtain information for all of our objectives, we reviewed relevant State
documents, such as policies and procedures in the Foreign Affairs
Manual and Foreign Affairs Handbooks pertaining to post operations and
emergency preparedness, cables documenting department-wide
operational decisions, the Diplomacy Strong Framework, and the COVID-
19 Interim Review (CIR) report. 1 We reviewed State data on post
evacuations and the Diplomacy Strong phases that posts were in from
January 2020 through December 2020. 2 We interviewed State officials
about the data and performed electronic testing to ensure consistency.
We found these data to be sufficiently reliable to describe the Diplomacy
Strong phases of posts and the proportion of overseas staff who
evacuated during 2020. We also reviewed data on State’s use of COVID-
19 relief funds through October 1, 2021. We found these data sufficiently
reliable for our purpose of presenting State’s use of COVID-19 relief
funds for operational adjustments.

To examine the actions State leadership took to respond to the pandemic
and how it communicated them to overseas employees, we reviewed
guidance related to the global evacuation policy that State developed
during COVID-19 and compared it to existing evacuation policies. We
determined that the control activities and information and communication
components of internal control were significant to this objective.
Specifically, the underlying principles that management should document
responsibilities through policies; periodically review policies, procedures,

1Department of State, Lessons Learned from the Department of State’s Response to the
COVID-19 Pandemic: December 2019–December 2020 (Washington, D.C.: June 2021).
The CIR was conducted to identify lessons learned and make recommendations for
improvement in emergency planning and response.
2State told us that posts were responsible for manually updating evacuation records and
Diplomacy Strong phase data. They also told us that it is possible the evacuation data
contain data entry errors and there may be a lag between when an individual departed
post or returned and when the data were updated.

Page 47 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

and related control activities; and communicate externally were relevant.
We interviewed officials in a variety of State offices and bureaus in
Washington, D.C., that played a role supporting overseas posts during
the pandemic. These bureaus included the Office of Crisis Management
and Strategy (CMS), the Bureau of Information Resource Management
(IRM), and the Bureau of Medical Services (MED). We also interviewed
officials in each of State’s six regional geographic bureaus to discuss their
role in communicating with overseas posts. Additionally, we interviewed
officials at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to
obtain the perspective of another agency with a significant presence at
overseas posts.

To examine how overseas posts adjusted their operations at the onset of
the pandemic and the extent to which these adjustments affected post
operations, we obtained information on overseas posts’ operational
adjustments and decision-making during the pandemic, as well as the
return of evacuated staff to posts. We determined that the information and
communication component of internal control was significant to this
objective, along with the underlying principle that management should
use quality information. We selected four of 291 overseas posts with
which to conduct virtual site visits: Azerbaijan, Barbados, Kenya, and
Mongolia. Interviews with the overseas posts are not generalizable. At
each post, we interviewed officials from the Emergency Action
Committee, IRM, MED, and USAID, as well as locally employed staff, to
gain their perspectives on their posts’ operational adjustments, including
information on overseas telework participation. We selected these posts
on the basis of their size and geographic location, the proportion of U.S.
staff who were evacuated, and the presence of a USAID mission, among
other factors. We also interviewed officials in each of State’s six regional
bureaus to determine their role in operational decision-making, as well as
officials with the American Foreign Service Association and members of
various State employee groups to discuss their experiences with
operational adjustments. Lastly, we assessed completed questionnaires
from 17 of the 23 overseas posts involved in State’s CIR that provided
information to the department on posts’ operational experiences during
the pandemic.

To determine the lessons learned that State has identified, we conducted
a content analysis of 18 lessons-learned cables that 18 overseas posts
submitted to State regarding their evacuation or COVID-19 experiences.
An analyst conducted the content analysis, which another analyst then
independently verified. We also reviewed the completed CIR
questionnaires, which contained questions on lessons learned, as well as

Page 48 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and
Methodology

the CIR final report, which catalogued lessons learned and made
recommendations for improving crisis response. We interviewed State
officials to understand what steps they planned to take to address the
identified lessons learned.

Page 49 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix II: Department of State Use of Appendix II: Department of State Use of
COVID-19 Relief Funds for Operational

COVID-19 Relief Funds for Operational
Adjustments

Adjustments
Congress has provided funding to support the Department of State’s
operational adjustments during the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2020, two
COVID-19 relief laws appropriated about $580 million for State’s
Diplomatic Programs account for expenses to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to coronavirus, including for maintaining consular operations,
reimbursement of evacuation expenses, and emergency preparedness. 1
In 2021, a COVID-19 relief law appropriated an additional $204 million to
State for similar purposes. 2 State reported obligating about $700 million of
this funding, as of October 1, 2021. See table 2 below for a description of
how State used this funding.

Table 2: State’s Use of COVID-19 Relief Funds for Operational Adjustments, as of October 1, 2021

Responsible Purpose Allocated (dollars Obligated (dollars Expended (dollars
bureau/office in millions) in millions) in millions)
Bureau of Consular Prevent, prepare for, and respond to 420.4 346.5 284.1
Affairs COVID-19, sustain consular operations,
support direct hire and locally employed
staff, modernize information technology.
Bureau of Medical Contract aviation support services, 181.4 178.2 139.3
Services procurement of machines and testing
supplies, vaccine distribution, knowledge
management.
Bureau of Information Capacity expansion, licenses, network 63.2 62.2 55.7
Resource Management implementation for Global OpenNet, other
costs/fees, acquisitions of mobile devices,
increase in contracted staffing support.
Bureau of Cleaning, hand sanitizers, increased 24.2 23.6 13.7
Administration diplomatic pouch costs, emergency
preparedness supplies.
Post Assignment Travel Increased permanent change of station 46.0 43.2 43.2
expenses because of movement delays
and restrictions related to COVID-19.
Various bureaus and Equipment, bandwidth, and other supplies 16.8 11.1 9.1
offices to facilitate telework, physical distancing,
and sanitized work spaces.

1This funding was provided through two COVID-19 relief laws, the Coronavirus
Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020, and the CARES
Act, and directed to specific accounts. Pub. L. No. 116-123, tit. III and IV, 134 Stat. at 147-
148 and 152-53; Pub. L. No. 116-136, div. B, tit. VIII and XI, 134 Stat. at 554 and 590.
2This funding was provided through the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No.
117-2, tit. X, 135 Stat. at 238.

Page 50 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix II: Department of State Use of
COVID-19 Relief Funds for Operational
Adjustments

Responsible Purpose Allocated (dollars Obligated (dollars Expended (dollars
bureau/office in millions) in millions) in millions)
Foreign Service Institute Procurement of technology licenses for 12.2 12.2 10.2
virtual training and employment of
additional instructors for language training.
Global Engagement Address harmful COVID-19 propaganda 11.3 10.9 10.6
Center and disinformation.
Bureau of Educational Repatriation of U.S. and foreign exchange 5.0 5.0 5.0
and Cultural Affairs program participants and extension of
financial stipends.
Office of the Center for Analytics, Reimagine Task 4.4 4.3 3.5
Undersecretary for Force, and change management.
Management
Bureau of Intelligence Opinion polling and global health analysis 3.0 2.8 1.8
and Research of pandemic response, unclassified mobile
devices, secure mobile equipment for
classified connectivity, and support
contractors.
Bureau of Oceans and Augment the capacity of the Office of 0.7 0.5 0.3
International International Health and Biodefense to
Environmental and respond to outbreaks of infectious
Scientific Affairs diseases internationally.
Bureau of Global Talent Emergency back-up childcare and adult 3.5 3.4 0.2
Management care and development of leave guidance.
Total 792.0 703.9 576.6

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data. | GAO-22-104519

Page 51 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix III: Comments from the
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of State

Department of State

Page 52 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of State

Page 53 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of State

Page 54 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix III: Comments from the Department
of State

Page 55 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S.
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency
for International Development

Agency for International Development

Page 56 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Agency
for International Development

Page 57 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff
Acknowledgments

Acknowledgments

Jason Bair, (202) 512-6881, bairj@gao.gov
GAO Contact

In addition to the contact named above, Valérie L. Nowak (Assistant
Staff Director), Jennifer Young (Analyst-in-Charge), Nicholas Pigeon Rossy,
Acknowledgments Katya E. Rodriguez, Debbie Chung, Neil Doherty, Justin Fisher, and K.
Nicole Willems made key contributions to this report.

(104519)
Page 58 GAO-22-104519 Overseas Operations during COVID-19
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and investigative
GAO’s Mission arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the
federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public
funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses,
recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed
oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government
is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is
Obtaining Copies of through our website. Each weekday afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly
GAO Reports and released reports, testimony, and correspondence. You can also subscribe to
GAO’s email updates to receive notification of newly posted products.
Testimony
Order by Phone The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of production and
distribution and depends on the number of pages in the publication and whether
the publication is printed in color or black and white. Pricing and ordering
information is posted on GAO’s website, https://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm.
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, MasterCard,
Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.
Connect with GAO Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or Email Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.
Visit GAO on the web at https://www.gao.gov.

Contact FraudNet:
To Report Fraud,
Website: https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/fraudnet
Waste, and Abuse in
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7700
Federal Programs
A. Nicole Clowers, Managing Director, ClowersA@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400, U.S.
Congressional Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125, Washington,
Relations DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800
Public Affairs U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149
Washington, DC 20548

Stephen J. Sanford, Managing Director, spel@gao.gov, (202) 512-4707
Strategic Planning and U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7814,
External Liaison Washington, DC 20548

Please Print on Recycled Paper.

File and source

File: 22-104519-covid-19-state-should-strengthen-policies-to.pdf
Size: 4,736,707 bytes
SHA-256: 24b9c8f2e4c6e5f279814f342053d6776858587d19591f2c1ce893f67f36fdf3
Our copy: 22-104519-covid-19-state-should-strengthen-policies-to.pdf
Original: www.gao.gov