Memorandum of Law of Movant Blue Laine-Beveridge in Opposition to Competing Lead Plaintiff Motion — In re January 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litigation (Dkt. 378, S.D. Fla.)

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A Memorandum of Law of Movant Blue Laine-Beveridge in Opposition to Competing Lead Plaintiff Motion in In re: January 2021 Short Squeeze Trading Litigation, Case 1:21-md-02989-CMA (Case No. 21-2989-MDL-ALTONAGA/Torres, Document 378, 21 pages), in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, dated August 10, 2021 and entered that day, filed by The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. over the /s/ signature of Laurence M. Rosen. The memorandum argues that Laine-Beveridge should be appointed lead plaintiff and the selection of counsel approved, and that the competing group's motion should be denied. It describes the group as inadequate and atypical: an improper lawyer-made group of unrelated investors that provided no background information on its members and no joint declaration, gave inaccurate calculations, and chose counsel in a way that demonstrates inadequacy.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 21-2989-MDL-ALTONAGA/Torres

This Document Relates to: All Actions Involving the Federal Securities Laws
MEMORANDUM OF LAW OF MOVANT BLUE LAINE-BEVERIDGE IN
OPPOSITION TO COMPETING LEAD PLAINTIFF MOTION

In re: JANUARY 2021 SHORT SQUEEZE
TRADING LITIGATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 1
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3
I.
   MR. LAINE-BEVERIDGE SHOULD BE APPOINTED LEAD PLAINTIFF ............... 3
II.
MR. LAINE-BEVERIDGE’S SELECTION OF COUNSEL SHOULD BE
APPROVED ................................................................................................................................ 5
III.        THE GROUP’S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED ...................................................... 6
A. THE GROUP IS INADEQUATE AND ATYPICAL...................................................... 7
1.
The Group is an Improper Lawyer-Made Group of Unrelated Investors ..................... 7
2.
The Group Failed to Provide Any Background Information Regarding its Members 10
3.
The Group Failed to Provide a Joint Declaration ....................................................... 11
4.
The Group Provided Inaccurate Calculations ............................................................. 13
5.
The Group’s Selection of Counsel Demonstrates its Inadequacy .............................. 14
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 16

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Abouzied v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc., 2018 WL 539362 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2018) ........ 9, 12
Adcock v. Netbank, Inc., 2008 WL 11322962 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) ....................................... 3
Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 185 F.R.D. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 222 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000) .............................................................................. 14
Belmont Holdings Corp. v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., 2009 WL 3188695 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2009) .. 2
Bhojwani v. Pistiolis, 2007 WL 9228588 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2007) ............................................ 13
Brustein v. Lampert, 2005 WL 8154797 (S.D. Fla. June 16, 2005) ............................................... 7
Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Mednax, Inc., 2018 WL 8804814 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2018), report and
recommendation adopted,  2018 WL 6978626 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2018) ...................... 3, 5, 6, 7
Camp v. Qualcomm Inc., 2019 WL 277360 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2019) ......................................... 10
Carvelli v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 2017 WL 11068524 (S.D. Fla. July 14, 2017), objections
overruled, 2017 WL 3473482 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2017) ....................................................... 7, 8
Eastwood Enterprises v. Farha, 2008 WL 687351 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2008) ............................. 9
Halman Aldubi Provident & Pension Funds Ltd. v. Teva Pharmaceutical Indus. Ltd., 2021 WL
1217395 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2021) ............................................................................................ 16
In re 21st Century Holding Co. Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 9220955 (S.D. Fla. 2007) .......................... 8
In re Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214 (D.D.C. 1999) ........................................................... 12
In re Boeing Co. Aircraft Sec. Litig., 2019 WL 6052399 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15,
2019), reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 476658 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2020) ............................. 10
In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ............................... 15
In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001)...................................................... 2, 4, 12
In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002) ...................................... 7
In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 104 F. Supp. 3d 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ................................................. 7
In re Ply Gem Holdings, Inc., Securities Litigation, 2014 WL 12772081 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14,
2014).......................................................................................................................................... 12
In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ......................................................... 14
In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). ........................................ 7
In re Robinhood Order Flow Litigation, case no. 4:20-cv-09328 (N.D. Cal.) ....................... 14, 15
Jakobsen v. Aphria, Inc., 2019 WL 1522598 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019) ..................................... 12
Karp v. Diebold Nixdorf, Inc., 2019 WL 5587148 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2019), adhered to on
reconsideration, 2019 WL 6619351 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2019) ................................................. 11
Kniffin v. Micron Tech., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) ........................................... 12
Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 581 (W.D. Tex. 2002) .................................................... 15
Luczak v. Nat'l Beverage Corp., 2018 WL 9847842 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2018) ......................... 4, 5
Marcus v. J.C. Penney Co., 2014 WL 11394911 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2014) ................................. 8
McIlvaine v. ArthroCare Corp., 2008 WL 11331999 (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2008) ............................ 2
Micholle v. Ophthotech Corp., 2018 WL 1307285 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2018) ............................ 13
Miller v. Dyadic Int'l, Inc., 2008 WL 2465286 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2008) ............................... 1, 14
Newman v. Eagle Bldg. Techs., 209 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Fla. 2002) .............................................. 3, 9
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Perez v. HEXO Corp., 2020 WL 905753 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020), reconsideration denied sub
nom. In re HEXO Corp. Sec. Litig., 2020 WL 5503634 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2020) ................ 11
Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. LaBranche & Co., 229 F.R.D. 395
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) ........................................................................................................................ 11
Piven v. Sykes Enters. Inc., 137 F.Supp.2d 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2000).......................................... 1, 10
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 51 Pension Fund v. Darden Restaurants, Inc., 2008 WL 2608111
(M.D. Fla. July 1, 2008) .......................................................................................................... 6, 9
Smajlaj v. Brocade Commc’ns Sys. Inc., 2006 WL 7348107 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2006) .............. 10
Springer v. Code Rebel Corp., 2017 WL 838197 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2017)................................... 6
Stires v. Eco Science Solutions, Inc., 2018 WL 5784817 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2018) ........................ 12
Tsirekidze v. Syntax-Brillian Corp., 2008 WL 942273 (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 2008)........................... 10
Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) . 8, 11
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2009) ........................................................ 4
Weinberg v. Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings, Inc., 216 F.R.D. 248 (S.D.N.Y.2003) .................... 14
Welch v. Meaux, 2020 WL 4758269 (W.D. La. Aug. 17, 2020) .................................................... 7
Statutes
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) .............................................................................................................. passim
Rules
Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 23 .......................................................................................................... passim

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Lead Plaintiff Movant Blue Laine-Beveridge (“Movant” or “Mr. Laine-Beveridge”)
respectfully submits this opposition to the competing lead plaintiff motion filed by Abe Kurdi
(“Mr. Kurdi”) and Teodoro Russell Pueyrredon (“Mr. Pueyrredon” and collectively with Mr. Kurdi
the “Group”). Dkt. No. 365.
BACKGROUND
Before the Court are two motions seeking appointment as Lead Plaintiff and approval of
their selection of counsel.  Dkt. Nos. 365 and 366.
Mr. Laine-Beveridge lost $122,383.49.  Dkt. Nos. 366 at 9 and 366-4.  As explained in his
opening papers, Mr. Laine-Beveridge is a sophisticated investor with 10 years of investing
experience, including 5 years of trading on Robinhood’s platform.  Dkt. No. 366 at 11.  Mr. Laine-
Beveridge is a resident of New York, a registered nurse, holds a degree in biology, and has
experience in the hospitality industry.  Id.
The Group lost $16,239.70.  Dkt. No. 365 at 13; see also Dkt. No. 365-2 at 6 and 9.
Because the Group has a smaller financial interest and does not meet Rule 23’s adequacy
requirements, the Group cannot be the presumptive lead plaintiff.
These motions are governed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”),
as amended by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”).  “The PSLRA
was enacted to remedy perceived abuses in the class action procedure in securities fraud
actions.”  Miller v. Dyadic Int'l, Inc., 2008 WL 2465286, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2008) (citing
Piven v. Sykes Enters. Inc., 137 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2000)).
“The PSLRA ‘sets up a rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff with the largest stake in
the controversy will be the lead plaintiff. [] So long as the plaintiff with the largest losses satisfies
the typicality and adequacy requirements, [he, she, or it] is entitled to lead plaintiff status, even if
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the district court is convinced that some other plaintiff would do a better job.’”  Belmont Holdings
Corp. v. Suntrust Banks, Inc., 2009 WL 3188695, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2009) (citing In re
Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d 726,729 n. 2 and 732 (9th Cir.2002); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d
201, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2001); 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(B).
First, Mr. Laine-Beveridge has the largest financial interest in this litigation as he has the
largest losses of all the movants.  See Dkt. Nos. 365 at 13 and 366-4.  Indeed, the Group’s
maximum losses are stated as $16,239.70.  Dkt. No. 365 at 13; see also Dkt. No. 365-2 at 6 and 9.
Second, as set forth in Mr. Laine-Beveridge’s opening papers, including his PSLRA
certification, he has made a prima facie showing of adequacy and typicality under Fed. R. Civ. P.
Rule 23.  Dkt. No. 366 at 9-10, 366-3, and 366-4; McIlvaine v. ArthroCare Corp., 2008 WL
11331999, at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2008) (“Typicality is established where the proposed lead
plaintiff has sustained the same injuries as the proposed class members resulting from the same
course of conduct by the defendants[,]” and “adequa[cy] where ‘1) class counsel is qualified,
experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation; (2) the class members' interests are not
antagonistic to one another; and (3) the class has sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to
ensure vigorous advocacy.’”) (quoting Miller, 2008 WL 2465286 *6)).  Finally, the presumption
that Mr. Laine-Beveridge is the “most adequate plaintiff”—i.e. the presumptive lead plaintiff—
“may be rebutted only upon proof.”  15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II).
Because the Group can offer no proof to rebut the presumption in favor of Mr. Laine-
Beveridge, the Court should grant his motion in its entirety and deny the Group’s motion.

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ARGUMENT
I.
MR. LAINE-BEVERIDGE SHOULD BE APPOINTED LEAD PLAINTIFF
“The PSLRA establishes the procedure for the appointment of a lead plaintiff in a private
class action arising under federal securities law.”  Adcock v. Netbank, Inc., 2008 WL 11322962,
at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 21, 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1)); Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 729 (the
PSLRA provides a “clear path that the district court must follow in selecting the lead plaintiff.”);
see also Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Mednax, Inc., 2018 WL 8804814, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6,
2018), report and recommendation adopted,  2018 WL 6978626 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2018).  After
reviewing the notice and timeliness of a motion, the Court “address[es] which of the
proposed lead plaintiffs has the ‘largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class’ and
whether that proposed lead plaintiff satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, i.e., whether its claims
‘are typical of the claims ... of the class’ and whether it ‘will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.’”  Cambridge Ret. Sys., 2018 WL 8804814, at *2; (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)); Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 730, 732.  Importantly, “a straightforward application of the
statutory scheme … provides no occasion for comparing plaintiffs with each other on any basis
other than their financial stake in the case.”  Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 732.  “So long as the plaintiff
with the largest losses satisfies the typicality and adequacy requirements, [he, she or it] is entitled
to lead plaintiff status, even if the district court is convinced that some other plaintiff would do a
better job.”  Id; Newman v. Eagle Bldg. Techs., 209 F.R.D. 499, 502 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“The most
important factor in determining the lead plaintiff is the amount of financial interest claimed.”).
Utilizing this simple process confirms that Mr. Laine-Beveridge is the presumptive Lead Plaintiff
and the Court should grant his motion.
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Mr. Laine-Beveridge has triggered the PSLRA’s most adequate plaintiff presumption.  15
U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).  Mr. Laine-Beveridge has the largest loss of any movant before the
Court.  Therefore, Mr. Laine-Beveridge has the largest financial interest.
Once the Court “determines which plaintiff has the biggest stake [here Mr. Laine-
Beveridge], the court must appoint that plaintiff as lead, unless it finds that he does not satisfy the
typicality or adequacy requirements.”  Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 730, 732 (“If the plaintiff with the
largest financial stake in the controversy provides information that satisfies these requirements, he
becomes the presumptively most adequate plaintiff.”); Cendant, 264 F.3d at 263 (“The initial
inquiry (i.e., the determination of whether the movant with the largest interest in the case
‘otherwise satisfies’ Rule 23) should be confined to determining whether the movant has made a
prima facie showing of typicality and adequacy.”).
Like all purported class members, Mr. Laine-Beveridge alleges that Defendants violated
the Exchange Act by engaging in market manipulation.  Mr. Laine-Beveridge sold certain of the
Affected Securities1 after Robinhood’s restrictions and was damaged thereby.  See Dkt. Nos. 366
at 9 and 366-4.  These claims are also premised on the same legal and remedial theories and are
based on the same misconduct—the market manipulation.  See generally, Luczak v. Nat'l Beverage
Corp., 2018 WL 9847842, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2018); Kavra v. Health Ins. Innovations, Inc.,
2018 WL 4611215, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2018) (citing Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d
1256, 1275 (11th Cir. 2009)).  Mr. Laine-Beveridge has demonstrated his adequacy by submitting
a sworn certification affirming his willingness to serve as, and carry out the responsibilities of,

1 The Affected Securities include American Airlines Group Inc. (NASDAQ: AAL), AMC
Entertainment Holdings Inc. (NYSE: AMC), BlackBerry Limited (NYSE: BB), Bed Bath &
Beyond Inc. (NASDAQ: BBBY), GameStop Corp. (NYSE: GME), Express (NYSE: EXPR), Koss
Corporation (NASDAQ: KOSS), Naked Brand Group (NASDAQ: NAKD), Nokia Corporation
(NYSE: NOK), Sundial Growers, Inc. (NASDAQ: SNDL), Tootsie Roll Industries (NYSE: TR),
and Trivago NV (NASDAQ: TRVG).
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class representative.  Dkt. No. 366-3.  Based on his financial interest in the litigation and
satisfaction of the Rule 23 requirements at this stage, Mr. Laine-Beveridge has triggered the
PSLRA’s most adequate plaintiff presumption.  15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
A showing that a proposed lead plaintiff is the presumptively most adequate can be rebutted
by proof by a member of the purported class that the proposed lead plaintiff “will not fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class” or is “subject to unique defenses that render such
plaintiff incapable of adequately representing the class.”  Cambridge Ret. Sys., 2018 WL 8804814,
at *2 (citing  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)); Kavra, 2018 WL 4611215, at *2 (same); see also
Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 732 (explaining that courts are not to “engage[] in a freewheeling
comparison of the parties competing for lead plaintiff”).  That “the presumption is rebuttable does
not mean that it may be set aside for any reason that the court may deem sufficient.  Rather, the
statute provides that the presumption ‘may be rebutted only upon proof . . . that the presumptively
most adequate plaintiff’ does not satisfy the adequacy or typicality requirements of Rule 23.’”
Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 729 n.2 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)).
II.
MR. LAINE-BEVERIDGE’S SELECTION OF COUNSEL SHOULD BE
APPROVED
The PSLRA vests authority in the lead plaintiff to select lead counsel, subject to Court
approval.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v); Luczak, 2018 WL 9847842, at *2 (“The Court should
interfere with lead plaintiff’s selection only when necessary ‘to protect the interests of the class.’”)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(II)(aa)).
Here, Mr. Laine-Beveridge has selected The Rosen Law Firm, P.A. as Lead Counsel.  The
Firm is eminently qualified.  See Dkt. No. 366 at 12-13 and 366-5.  The Firm has the resources
and expertise to litigate this action efficiently and aggressively.  The Firm has been ranked in the
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top 4 each year since 2013 by the ISS Institutional Securities Class Action Services and has
recovered hundreds of millions of dollars for investors.  In 2019 alone the firm secured over $438
million for investors.  In 2020, founding partner Laurence Rosen was named by law360 as a Titan
of Plaintiffs’ Bar.  See Dkt. No. 366 at 12-13.
As the Firm’s resume reflects, it is highly experienced in the area of securities class action
litigation and has successfully prosecuted numerous securities fraud class actions on behalf of
investors.  Dkt. No. 366-5; see Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 51 Pension Fund v. Darden
Restaurants, Inc., 2008 WL 2608111, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 1, 2008) (“where a law firm ‘has
successfully prosecuted securities class action litigations in the past,’ courts generally will not
‘interfere with the [l]ead [p]laintiff's choice of counsel ....’”) (quoting Miller, 2007 WL 4754041,
at *2)).
Thus, the Court may be assured that by approving Mr. Laine-Beveridge’s selection of
counsel, the members of the class will receive excellent legal representation.
III.        THE GROUP’S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED
The Group’s motion should be denied as Mr. Laine-Beveridge has the larger financial
interest in the litigation, satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, and should therefore be appointed
Lead Plaintiff without further analyses.  Cambridge Ret. Sys., 2018 WL 8804814 (“The Court
must, therefore, address which of the proposed lead plaintiffs has the ‘largest financial interest in
the relief sought by the class’ and whether that proposed lead plaintiff satisfies the requirements
of Rule 23, i.e., whether [his] claims ‘are typical of the claims ... of the class’ and whether [he]
‘will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.’” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a));
Cavanaugh, 306 F.3d at 732 (“The statutory process is sequential: The court must examine
potential lead plaintiffs one at a time, starting with the one who has the greatest financial interest,
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and continuing in descending order if and only if the presumptive lead plaintiff is found inadequate
or atypical.”).
That said some facts bear noting about the Group.
A. THE GROUP IS INADEQUATE AND ATYPICAL
1.
The Group is an Improper Lawyer-Made Group of Unrelated Investors
While the PSLRA allows groups to serve as lead plaintiffs, “courts routinely reject lead
plaintiff applications filed by groups of investors who are ‘simply an artifice cobbled together by
cooperating counsel for the obvious purpose of creating a large enough grouping of investors to
qualify as ‘lead plaintiff,’ ...”  Carvelli v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 2017 WL 11068524, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
July 14, 2017), objections overruled, 2017 WL 3473482 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 14, 2017) (citing In re
Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
Indeed, “[w]here the motion for appointment seeks to appoint more than one lead plaintiff,
‘that group must be restricted to a few cohesive parties and the movant must bear the burden of
demonstrating that the group not only has the largest interest in the outcome of the litigation,
but also a pre-litigation relationship based on more than the losing investments at issue in the
securities fraud class action.’”  Welch v. Meaux, 2020 WL 4758269, at *6 (W.D. La. Aug. 17,
2020) (citing In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427, 442 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2002))
(emphasis added); Cambridge Ret. Sys., 2018 WL 8804814, at *14 (“Allowing unrelated plaintiffs
to band together in order to manufacture a larger financial interest ... ensures that the lawyers, who
are invariably the matchmakers behind such marriages of convenience, are the true drivers of the
litigation.”) (quoting In re Petrobras Sec. Litig., 104 F. Supp. 3d 618, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2015));
Brustein v. Lampert, 2005 WL 8154797, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 16, 2005) (denying a group of
unrelated investors because “the aggregation of losses under the present circumstances would not
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serve the purpose” of the PSLRA “and because an individual movant with significant losses has
also sought lead plaintiff status, the Court is unwilling to allow such aggregation here”).
Courts require members of a proposed group to make “an evidentiary showing that
unrelated members of a group will be able to function cohesively and to effectively manage the
litigation apart from their lawyers before its members will be designated as presumptive lead
plaintiffs.”  Varghese v. China Shenghuo Pharm. Holdings, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).  Courts evaluate evidence of the following Varghese factors:
(1) the existence of a pre-litigation relationship between group members; (2)
involvement of the group members in the litigation thus far; (3) plans for
cooperation; (4) the sophistication of its members; and (5) whether the members
chose outside counsel, and not vice versa.
Id.; Carvelli, 2017 WL 11068524, at *5 n. 8 (considering Varghese factors in evaluating an
unrelated group); Marcus v. J.C. Penney Co., 2014 WL 11394911, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2014)
(same).
Here, the Group has made no evidentiary showing to justify its grouping.  Nor has the
Group provided any client-driven reason for their grouping; nor has any information about the
Group’s members been provided so that the Court and Mr. Laine-Beveridge can evaluate the
Group and its members.  Rather, the facts indicate that the Group was constructed to create the
largest losses—specifically to show a greater loss than a previous movant, Cody Todd.  See Dkt.
No. 26-4 (loss chart of Cody Todd showing a loss of $8,056.70) and 365 at 9 (the Group claiming
a loss of $8,413.10 under the so-called “Bursor & Fisher’s class definition”).
Indeed, this lack of justification, lack of a joint declaration, and lack of institutional
investors as part of the Group, also renders its cases inapposite.
In In re 21st Century Holding Co. Sec. Litig., the appointed group was comprised of two
Israeli mutual funds, managed and controlled by the same entity.  2007 WL 9220955, at *6 (S.D.
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Fla. 2007).  There was no concern that these mutual funds were cobbled together by counsel as
there is here.
In Plumbers & Pipefitters Loc. 51 Pension Fund, the appointed group members were
related institutional investors, the Carpenters Pension Trust Fund for Northern California and
Carpenters Annuity Trust Fund for Northern California.  2008 WL 2608111, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July
1, 2008).  These funds also clearly certified with their initial motion papers that they were willing
to “serve as a lead plaintiff either individually or as part of a group.”  Plumbers & Pipefitters Loc.
51 Pension Fund, case no. 6:08-cv-00388-MSS-DAB, Dkt. No. 26-2 at 2 and 4 (M.D. Fla.).
In Eastwood Enterprises v. Farha, the appointed group members were again institutional
investors which “filed a joint declaration in which they detail their history together and their desire
to join together to litigate this action” and the “Court was satisfied that the PPF Group is not
lawyer-driven.”  2008 WL 687351, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2008).  Two of the group members,
the New Mexico State Investment Council and the Public Employees Retirement Association of
New Mexico, which together had the next largest loss after their group as a whole, were closely
related with overlapping management and representation.  Id.
In Newman, the appointed group members consisted of two banks and three individuals.
209 F.R.D. 499, 502 (S.D. Fla. 2002).  The inclusion of institutional investors, which the PSLRA
gives preference to, is lacking in the Group but found throughout their citations.

Further, the Group members provide no indication that they even know of each other, much
less chose to move the Court for appointment as co-Lead Plaintiffs.
That the Group specifically requests that “[i]n the alternative, each Movant moves
individually for appointment as Lead Plaintiff and for appointment of counsel Bursor & Fisher,
P.A. as Lead Counsel should the Court decline to appoint them as a group[,]” is further evidence
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that this is merely a group cobbled together by counsel.  Abouzied v. Applied Optoelectronics, Inc.,
2018 WL 539362, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2018) (“Indeed, the movants assert that each stands
ready and willing to abandon the group and serve as sole-lead plaintiff. The Court finds that [the
Group] is not the most adequate plaintiff.”); Tsirekidze v. Syntax-Brillian Corp., 2008 WL 942273,
at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 7, 2008) (“The willingness to abandon the group only suggests how loosely it
was put together.”).  Even if either Group member were to be considered individually, Mr. Laine-
Beveridge still has by far the largest loss.  Compare Dkt. No. 366-4 with Dkt. No. 365-2 at 6 and
9.
2.
The Group Failed to Provide Any Background Information Regarding its
Members

The Group did not provide any background information about itself or its members in its
opening papers, preventing the Court, Mr. Laine-Beveridge, and the class from vetting its
background.  This makes it impossible for the Court, Mr. Laine-Beveridge, or the class to make a
determination on the Group’s adequacy and typicality.  Courts have held that movants who provide
such sparse information are inadequate to represent the class.  See Piven v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 137
F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2000) (finding movant inadequate to serve as lead plaintiff
where it “has not proffered any information regarding its identity, resources, and experience”);
Smajlaj v. Brocade Commc’ns Sys. Inc., 2006 WL 7348107, at *11-*12 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2006)
(rejecting investor’s motion for appointment as lead plaintiff, despite a presumption in its favor
from having the greatest financial interest in the litigation, after concluding that it “will not
adequately represent the interests of the plaintiff class” where questions existed as to, inter alia,
its “authority, transparency, and structure”); see also Camp v. Qualcomm Inc., 2019 WL 277360
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2019); In re Boeing Co. Aircraft Sec. Litig., 2019 WL 6052399, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
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Nov. 15, 2019), reconsideration denied, 2020 WL 476658 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2020).

Perez v. HEXO Corp., 2020 WL 905753 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020), reconsideration denied
sub nom. In re HEXO Corp. Sec. Litig., 2020 WL 5503634 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2020) is instructive.
In that case, a lead plaintiff movant was rejected for failure to include any background information
in the opening papers, even though the movant provided background information in later rounds
of briefing.  The court explained that “[n]otwithstanding this additional [] information . . . [the
Group’s] failure to provide any information regarding his experience in his preliminary motion,
the Court questions whether [the Group] will meaningfully oversee and control the prosecution of
this consolidated class action.”  Perez 2020 WL 905753, at *3.  See also Karp v. Diebold Nixdorf,
Inc., 2019 WL 5587148, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2019), adhered to on reconsideration, 2019
WL 6619351 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2019).
3.
The Group Failed to Provide a Joint Declaration

Universally, group movants for appointment as lead plaintiff in PSLRA cases file joint
declarations.  This is to allow group members to provide background information about themselves
individually, how they found each other, their involvement in the litigation, how they chose
counsel, how they decided to move together and with their chosen counsel, and how they will
decide disagreements between group members—essentially answering the Varghese factors.

Here, the Group failed to provide a joint declaration with its initial motion and, as noted
above, failed to provide any of that important information.  However, even if the Group were to
belatedly file a joint declaration to reveal any of the necessary information noted above, it would
be too late.  See generally 15 U.S.C. §78u-4(a)(3)(A) (60-day deadline); see also Pirelli Armstrong
Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust v. LaBranche & Co., 229 F.R.D. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
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(“[PSLRA] … precludes consideration of … any other pleading … filed after the sixty (60) day
window has closed.”) (emphasis in original).
Further, Courts do not simply credit any joint declaration that is filed.  It must be detailed
and actually show the above information. In other words, mere boilerplate declarations are
insufficient.  Abouzied, 2018 WL 539362, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2018) (“While members of the
group submitted a Joint Declaration asserting their desire to together litigate the case as lead
plaintiffs, the Joint Declaration provides no mechanism for resolving disputes.  Indeed, the
movants assert that each stands ready and willing to abandon the group and serve as sole-lead
plaintiff.  The Court finds that the Applied Investor Group is not the most adequate plaintiff.”);
Lampert, 2005 WL 8154797, at *6 (“Although the Marcus Group attempted to address these same
problems by filing a joint declaration, in which it committed itself to joint control over the
litigation and joint management of counsel [], the Group has pointed to no actual evidence
showing that these six members—living in Portugal, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Kentucky, and
California—have the incentive or practical ability to fulfill these commitments.”) (citing  In re
Baan Co. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 214, 224 (D.D.C. 1999)); Stires v. Eco Science Solutions, Inc.,
2018 WL 5784817, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2018) (denying lead plaintiff status to an investor group
despite their larger losses due, in part, to the group apparently being “precisely the type of lawyer-
created group the Third Circuit cautioned about in In re Cendant Corp.”); Jakobsen v. Aphria,
Inc., 2019 WL 1522598, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019) (vague plans for cooperation and
“boilerplate assurances” are insufficient to show that unrelated investors will be able to manage
the litigation efficiently.); Kniffin v. Micron Tech., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 3d 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(court not persuaded by a declaration that the group would function cohesively); In re Ply Gem
Holdings, Inc., Securities Litigation, 2014 WL 12772081, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2014) (denying
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appointment of joint lead plaintiffs even though the group filed a joint declaration because “joint
lead plaintiffs run counter to the purposes of the PSLRA, which seeks to avoid lawyer-driven
litigation.” (internal quotation marks omitted) and “[a]llowing lawyers to combine otherwise
unrelated entities as joint lead plaintiffs would encourage the lawyers to drive the litigation”).2
4.
The Group Provided Inaccurate Calculations
In the Group’s memorandum of law, it lists its members’ losses under the so-called “Bursor
& Fisher Class Definition” and the so-called “Rosen Class Definition.”  Dkt. No. 365 at 13.  While
the listed losses appear to be correct under the so-called “Bursor & Fisher Class definition,” these
are incorrect under the “Rosen Class Definition.”3
The Group lists Mr. Kurdi’s loss as $9,917.98 from GME losses (Dkt. No. 365 at 12),
however, his loss from GME should state “$9,541.08” with “$376.91” in losses from AMC for a
total loss of $9,917.994.  See Dkt. No. 365-2 at 4-6.
Similarly, the Group lists Mr. Pueyrredon’s loss as $6,321.72 from GME losses (Dkt. No.
365 at 12), however, his loss from GME should state “$4,318.27” with “$2.52”, “$1,864.25”, and
“$136.68” in losses from AMC, KOSS, and NOK, respectively.

These errors also militate against the Group’s appointment regardless of its other issues.
Bhojwani v. Pistiolis, 2007 WL 9228588, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2007) (finding “carelessness
about detail that undermines the adequacy of [the Group] as a lead plaintiff.”); Micholle v.

2 This omission of joint declaration and any background information by the Group in this round of
briefing is troubling.  These same issues were flagged in the first round of lead plaintiff briefing.
3 That the Group would name one definition the “Bursor & Fisher Class Definition” raises the
question of whether the Group only intends to use that definition and therefore does not intend to
prosecute this case on behalf of investors who bought and/or sold their securities after January 28,
2021 when the restrictions were ongoing and changing for at least several days.  Puzzlingly, this
would essentially cut their own damages in half.
4 The one cent difference in overall loss is likely attributable to a rounding difference because the
Group members neglected to provide their full transaction data (neglecting to include price per
share for any transaction).
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Ophthotech Corp., 2018 WL 1307285, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2018) (“The errors in [their]
submissions, however, militate against appointment and render [them] inadequate to serve as lead
plaintiff under Rule 23's adequacy requirement.”).
5.
The Group’s Selection of Counsel Demonstrates its Inadequacy
Courts have held that a proposed lead plaintiff’s selection of counsel can demonstrate
inadequacy if the lead plaintiff selects a firm that is not experienced in the field of law at issue.
The adequacy requirement is satisfied where: “(1) class counsel is qualified, experienced, and
generally able to conduct the litigation; (2) the class members’ interests are not antagonistic to one
another; and (3) the class has sufficient interest in the outcome of the case to ensure vigorous
advocacy.”  Miller, 2008 WL 2465286 at *6 (citing Weinberg v. Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings,
Inc., 216 F.R.D. 248, 253 (S.D.N.Y.2003)); In re Quintus Sec. Litig., 201 F.R.D. 475, 482 (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (“if a representative plaintiff does not select competent counsel, he cannot meet the
adequacy requirement of FRCP 23 and the PSLRA.”) (citing Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
Sec. Corp., 185 F.R.D. 172, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 222 F.3d 52 (2d
Cir. 2000)).
While the Group’s counsel, Bursor & Fisher P.A. (“Bursor”) appears to have experience
in other types of class actions, there is not a single successful securities class action outcome noted
in the Bursor firm’s credentials included with the Group’s motion.  See Dkt. Nos. 365 and 365-1.
Only one securities class action is mentioned in the Bursor firm’s credentials—In re
Robinhood Order Flow Litigation, Case No. 4:20-cv-09328 (N.D. Cal.) (“Robinhood Order Flow
Case”), where on April 12, 2021 (the same day it filed a case here) the firm was appointed co-lead
counsel with two other law firms on an unopposed motion.  No other securities class actions are
listed where the Bursor firm is either sole-lead or co-lead counsel.
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The Bursor firm’s involvement in the Robinhood Order Flow Case actually weighs against
the Group’s motion.  The interests of the Robinhood Order Flow Case class are antagonistic to the
federal securities class here.  Both classes have common Robinhood defendants5 and have
overlapping class periods.6  Therefore, if the Bursor firm is appointed lead counsel in this case, it
would be representing two competing classes that are both vying for a limited pool of resources
from the same defendants.  See Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 581, 590–91 (W.D. Tex.
2002) (finding a disqualifying conflict of interest where counsel represented shareholders in
multiple class actions against the same defendant because “[w]ith multiple lawsuits, more than a
fair chance exist[ed] that the shareholders represented in the various suits, and their interests
[might] not always coincide”); see also In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litig., 225 F.R.D. 552,
557 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (“Counsel cannot represent different classes of plaintiffs with conflicting
claims who are seeking recovery from a common pool of assets.”).

Additionally, the damages theories in the Robinhood Order Flow Case conflict with the
damages in the instant case.  The Robinhood Order Flow Case asserts damages based on
Robinhood’s failure to obtain the best execution on trades in connection with an undisclosed
payment for order flow scheme with vendors, whereas the damages in the instant case are premised
on market price declines based on Robinhood’s actions to prevent transactions in the Affected

5 Defendants Robinhood Financial LLC, Robinhood Securities, LLC, and Robinhood Markets,
Inc. are defendants in the Robinhood Order Flow Case and pertinent actions in this case.  E.g.,
Muncy v. Robinhood Financial, LLC, et al., case no. 1:21-CV-21307-CMA, Dkt. No. 1; Robinhood
Order Flow Case, Dkt. Nos. 62.
6 Robinhood Order Flow Case includes a class definition of “All persons in the United States or
its Territories who were users of Robinhood between September 1, 2016 and June 16, 2020 and
who placed orders in connection with which Defendants received payment for order flow [][,]”
while either the so-called Bursor & Fisher Class Definition and the Rosen Class Definition would
also include many if not all of those purchasers.  Dkt. No. 365 at 12; Robinhood Order Flow Case,
Dkt. Nos. 62 at 16.

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Securities.  See Halman Aldubi Provident & Pension Funds Ltd. v. Teva Pharmaceutical Indus.
Ltd., 2021 WL 1217395 at * 9- *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2021) (denying lead plaintiff motion and
finding disabling conflict of interest of where counsel would be required to make conflicting
damages arguments in a different litigation covering an overlapping time period).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Laine-Beveridge’s motion should be granted in its entirety
and the competing motion should be denied.
Dated: August 10, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
THE ROSEN LAW FIRM, P.A.
/s/Laurence M. Rosen
 Laurence M. Rosen, Esq., Fla. Bar No. 0182877
 Phillip Kim, Esq.
 Michael Cohen, Esq.
 Erica Stone, Esq.
275 Madison Avenue, 40th Floor
New York, New York 10016
Telephone: (212) 686-1060
Fax: (212) 202-3827
Email: lrosen@rosenlegal.com
Email: pkim@rosenlegal.com
Email: mcohen@rosenlegal.com
Email: estone@rosenlegal.com
[Proposed] Lead Counsel for Lead Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 10, 2021, a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
was served by CM/ECF to the parties registered to the Court’s CM/ECF system.

/s/Laurence M. Rosen

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